Daniel Orr's Blog, page 44

November 15, 1988 – PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat proclaims the independence of Palestine

On November 15, 1988, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of thePalestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), declared the establishment of thestate of Palestine in front of an assembly ofPalestinian leaders in ceremonies in Algiers, Algeria. Theassembly then proclaimed Arafat as “President of Palestine”, which was laterconfirmed in April 1989 by the PLO Central Council that acknowledged him as Palestine’s firstpresident. The declaration of independence was made in the midst of thePalestinian Uprising of 1987-1993 against Israel.

In the Madrid Conference of October 1991, which was jointlysponsored by the United Statesand the Soviet Union, the community of nations urged Israeland the Palestinians, as well as Jordan,Syria, and Lebanon, to begin a negotiated settlement to theMiddle East conflict.

(Taken from Palestinian Uprising of 1987 – 1993 – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 2)

Background As aconsequence of the 1947-48 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and the 1948Arab-Israeli War, some 700,000 Palestinian Arabs lost their homes and becamerefugees.  Most of them eventuallysettled in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.  The Palestinian Jews emerged victorious, inthe process establishing the state of Israel.  Then with the Israeli Army’s victory in theSix-Day War in 1967 (separate article), the Israelis gained control of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.  Israel imposed militarized authority over the“occupied territories” (as the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem were called collectively) as a means to deteropposition.  Check points and road blockswere raised, searches and arrests conducted, and civilian movement curtailedand monitored.  Perceived enemies wereeliminated, imprisoned, or deported. Furthermore, the Israeli government encouraged its citizens to migrateto the occupied territories, where Israeli housing settlements soon began toemerge.

The Palestinians greatly resented the presence of theIsraelis, whom they regarded as a foreign force occupying Palestinianland.  Furthermore, as the Israeliauthority became established and greater numbers of Israeli settlements werebeing built, the Palestinians believed that their lands eventually would beintegrated into Israel.  The Israeli occupation was also perceived asa serious blow to the Palestinian people’s aspirations for establishing aPalestinian state.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO, a politicaland armed movement, was formed in 1964 and was headed by Chairman Yasser Arafatto lead the Palestinians’ struggle for independence.  However, the PLO experienced many setbacks,not only in the hands of Israelbut also by the Arab countries to which the Palestinians had turned forsupport.  In 1970, the PLO was expelledfrom Jordan and thereaftermoved to Lebanonwhere, in 1982, it also was forced to leave. Subsequently, the PLO moved its headquarters to Tunisia, whose distant locationprevented the Palestinian leadership from exercising direct control and influenceover the affairs of Palestinians in the occupied territories.  The PLO itself was wracked by internaldissent among some factions that opposed Arafat, who had cast aside hishard-line stance against Israeland adopted a more conciliatory approach.

Furthermore, later developments in the Middle East boded ill for the Palestinians.  Egypt,the militarily strongest Arab country and a main supporter of the PLO, hadsigned a peace treaty with Israelin 1979 and ceased its claim to the Gaza Strip. Jordan had not onlyexpelled the PLO but had relinquished its claim to the West Bank and consequently stripped the Palestinian residents there ofJordanian citizenship.  Syria, another major backer of the PLO, had afalling out with Arafat during the 1982 Lebanon War and began to support arival PLO faction that ultimately forced Arafat and his Fatah faction to leave Lebanona second time.  For so long, the Arabcountries’ regional security concerns centered on the Palestinians’ strugglefor statehood.  In the 1980s, however,much of the concentration was on the Iran-Iraq War, relegating the Palestinianissue to a lesser focus.  Palestiniansbelieved that many Arab countries, because of the Arab military defeats to theIsraelis, generally had abandoned active support for the Palestinians’nationalist aspirations.

The Palestinians’ frustrations were compounded by direeconomic circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza. Nearly half of all Palestinians were poor and lived in refugee camps incramped, squalid, and poorly serviced conditions.  Unemployment was high and so was thePalestinians’ birth rate, leading to more people competing for limitedopportunities and resources.

Uprising Eversince the Israelis took over the occupied territories, tensions betweenIsraelis and Palestinians persisted, which often erupted in violence.  Then during the second half of 1987, thesetensions rose dramatically, ultimately leading to a major Palestinian uprisingthat was triggered by the following events.

On December 6, 1987, an Israeli citizen was murdered in Gaza.  Two days later, four Palestinian residents ofthe Jabaliya refugee camp in Gazawere killed in a road accident by a truck belonging to the Israeli Army.  Many residents of the Jabaliya camp took tothe streets in protest, believing that the four Palestinians were killeddeliberately in reprisal for the Gazamurder.  Israeli security forces moved into disperse the crowd, but in the process, opened fire and killed aprotester.  Demonstrations then broke outin other refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank, triggering a full-blown uprising.

The 1987 Palestinian uprising is more commonly known as theFirst Intifada, where the word “intifada” is Arabic that means “to shake off”,and has come to denote an uprising or rebellion.  The 1987 Intifada initially took the form ofspontaneous, disorganized street rallies and demonstrations consisting of tensof thousands of Palestinians who incited anarchy and clashed with Israelisecurity forces.  Youths and minors oftenformed the front lines, leading Israeli authorities to accuse the Palestiniansof using the children as “human shields”. The protesters lobbied stones and Molotov cocktails (home-madeincendiary bombs) at the police, burned tires, and set up road blocks andbarricades.  Militancy increased when theprotesters began using firearms and grenades as weapons.  Other Palestinians supported the intifadathrough non-violent means, such as not paying taxes, boycotting Israeliproducts, and undertaking other forms of civil disobedience.

The depth and speed of the intifada surprised Israeliauthorities, who believed that the actions were being planned and carried outby the PLO.  In fact, each local protestaction was organized by community leaders in response to and in support of otheruprisings that were already taking place, creating a snowball effect.  Eventually, however, the intifada came underthe centralized command of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising(UNLU), an alliance of PLO factions in the occupied territories, which began tocarry out more organized militant actions. Two other Palestinian armed groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, also roseto prominence during the intifada and emerged as the political and militaryrivals to the PLO.

Israeli authorities recorded 3,600 incidents involving theuse of Molotov cocktails, 100 cases with hand grenades, and 600 instances withfirearms and other explosives.  Themilitarized nature of the intifada forced Israel to deploy military units toconfront the protesters.  In the ensuingclashes, however, hundreds of Palestinian civilians were killed.  As a result, the United Nations issuedcondemnations against Israel,while Amnesty International and other human rights groups criticized theIsraeli government.  Israeli authoritiesresponded to the Palestinians’ acts of civil disobedience by imposing heavyfines for non-payment of taxes, and confiscated the violators’ goods,merchandise, and properties.  Thegovernment also closed schools, conducted mass arrests, and imposed curfew.  The school closures had the contrary effect,however, as more youths joined the protest actions.

Israelsoon deployed specially trained anti-riot teams to confront theprotesters.  Furthermore, Shin Bet (Israel’sinternal security service) secretly hired Palestinians to collect informationon the uprising, particularly the leaders of the intifada.  As a result, a spate of violence took place,where Palestinians began targeting other Palestinians who were believed to bespying for Israel.  Palestinians who associated with or workedfor Israelis also were targeted.  Thecrackdown also became used as a way to level false accusations on, take revengeagainst, or settle a personal feud, against one’s enemies.  As intra-violence among Palestinians began toreach alarming rates, the intifada’s leaders called for an end to the uprising,declaring that Palestinians had lost sight of their original goal, which was toforce the Israelis out of the occupied territories.  In the end, the number of deaths caused byintra-violence among Palestinians exceeded the total attributable to theintifada itself.

On November 15, 1988, or eleven months after the start ofthe intifada, Chairman Arafat established the state of Palestinein ceremonies held in Algiers, Algeria.  Then in the Madrid Conference of October1991, which was jointly sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, the community of nationsurged Israel and thePalestinians, as well as Jordan,Syria, and Lebanon, to begin a negotiated settlement to theMiddle East conflict.

November 14, 1965 – Vietnam War: U.S. and North Vietnamese forces engage in the Battle of La Drang

Meanwhile, inNovember 1965 in the Central Highlands, one of the early major battles of thewar occurred when outnumbered U.S.forces engaged the North Vietnamese Army in intense fighting near the Chu Pongmassif.  This encounter, called theBattle of La Drang, saw heavy casualties on both sides, but the arrival of U.S. planes and their overwhelming firepowerforced the North Vietnamese to withdraw to Cambodia,with U.S. forces notpursuing because of Cambodia’sofficial neutrality in the war.  Thebattle was notable because of the U.S. military’s first large-scaleuse of helicopters to transport troops to the battle zone (using the newlydeveloped Airmobile Offensive strategy).

(Taken from Vietnam War – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia: Vol. 5)

Aftermath The Vietnam War had a profound, long-lasting effect on the United States.  Americans were bitterly divided by it, andothers became disillusioned with the government.    War cost, which totaled some $150 billion($1 trillion in 2015 value), placed a severe strain on the U.S. economy,leading to budget deficits, a weak dollar, higher inflation, and by the 1970s,an economic recession.  Also toward theend of the war, American soldiers in Vietnamsuffered from low morale and discipline, compounded by racial and socialtensions resulting from the civil rights movement in the United States during the late 1960sand also because of widespread recreational drug use among the troops.  During 1969-1972 particularly and during theperiod of American de-escalation and phased troop withdrawal from Vietnam, U.S.soldiers became increasingly unwilling to go to battle, which resulted in thephenomenon known as “fragging”, where soldiers, often using a fragmentationgrenade, killed their officers whom they thought were overly zealous and eagerfor combat action.

Furthermore, someU.S. soldiers returning fromVietnam were met withhostility, mainly because the war had become extremely unpopular in the United States,and as a result of news coverage of massacres and atrocities committed byAmerican units on Vietnamese civilians. A period of healing and reconciliation eventually occurred, and in 1982,the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was built, a national monument in Washington, D.C.that lists the names of servicemen who were killed or missing in the war.

Following thewar, in Vietnam and Indochina, turmoil and conflict continued to bewidespread.  After South Vietnam’s collapse, the Viet Cong/NLF’s PRG was installed as the caretakergovernment.  But as Hanoi de facto held full political andmilitary control, on July 2, 1976, North Vietnamannexed South Vietnam,and the unified state was called the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Some 1-2million South Vietnamese, largely consisting of former government officials,military officers, businessmen, religious leaders, and other“counter-revolutionaries”, were sent to re-education camps, which were laborcamps, where inmates did various kinds of work ranging from dangerous land minefield clearing, to less perilous construction and agricultural labor, and livedunder dire conditions of starvation diets and a high incidence of deaths and diseases.

In the yearsafter the war, the Indochina refugee crisis developed, where some three millionpeople, consisting mostly of those targeted by government repression, lefttheir homelands in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, for permanent settlement inother countries.  In Vietnam, some 1-2 million departingrefugees used small, decrepit boats to embark on perilous journeys to otherSoutheast Asian nations.  Some200,000-400,000 of these “boat people” perished atsea, while survivors who eventually reached Malaysia,Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and other destinationswere sometimes met there with hostility. But with United Nations support, refugee camps were established in theseSoutheast Asian countries to house and process the refugees.  Ultimately, some 2,500,000 refugees wereresettled, mostly in North America and Europe.

The communistrevolutions triumphed in Indochina: in April 1975 in Vietnamand Cambodia, and inDecember 1975 in Laos.  Because the United States used massive air firepower in the conflicts, North Vietnam, eastern Laos, and eastern Cambodia were heavily bombed.  U.S.planes dropped nearly 8 million tons of bombs (twice the amount the United States dropped in World War II), and Indochina became the most heavily bombed area inhistory.  Some 30% of the 270 millionso-called cluster bombs dropped did not explode, and since the end of the war,they continue to pose a grave danger to the local population, particularly inthe countryside.  Unexploded ordnance (UXO) has killed some 50,000people in Laos alone, andhundreds more in Indochina are killed ormaimed each year.

The aerialspraying operations of the U.S. military, carried out using several types ofherbicides but most commonly with Agent Orange (whichcontained the highly toxic chemical, dioxin), have had a direct impact onVietnam.  Some 400,000 were directlykilled or maimed, and in the following years, a segment of the population thatwere exposed to the chemicals suffer from a variety of health problems,including cancers, birth defects, genetic and mental diseases, etc.

Some 20 milliongallons of herbicides were sprayed on 20,000 km2 of forests, or 20%of Vietnam’stotal forested area, which destroyed trees, hastened erosion, and upset theecological balance, food chain, and other environmental parameters.

Following theVietnam War, Indochina continued to experiencesevere turmoil.  In December 1978, aftera period of border battles and cross-border raids, Vietnamlaunched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia(then known as Kampuchea)and within two weeks, overwhelmed the country and overthrew the communist PolPot regime.  Then in February 1979, in reprisal for Vietnam’s invasion of its Kampuchean ally, China launched a large-scale offensive into thenorthern regions of Vietnam,but after one month of bitter fighting, the Chinese forces withdrew.  Regional instability would persist into the1990s.

November 13, 1941 – World War II: German U-81 torpedoes the British carrier HMS Ark Royal off Gibraltar

One of the main assets of the German U-boat (submarine;German: U-boot, shortened from Unterseeboot, literally“underseaboat”) was stealth, and the first naval casualty of the war,the British ocean liner, SS Athenia,was attacked and sunk by a U-boat (which it mistook for a British warship) onSeptember 3, 1939, with 128 lives lost. Also in September 1939 and just a few days apart, two British aircraftcarriers, the HMS Ark Royal and HMS Courageous, were both attacked by a U-boat, with the formernarrowly being hit by torpedoes, while the latter was hit and sunk.  Then in October 1939, another U-boatpenetrated undetected near Scapa Flow, themain British naval base, attacking and sinking the battleship, the HMS RoyalOak. On November 13, 1941 off Gibraltar, aU-boat fired one torpedo on the HMS ArkRoyal, which sank the next day.

(Taken from Battle of the Atlantic – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe: Vol. 6)

At the start of the war, the British military washard-pressed on how to deal with the U-boat threat.  During the interwar period, prevailing navalthought and budgetary resources, both Allied and German alike, focused onsurface ships, and the belief that battleships would play the dominant role innaval warfare in a future war.  GermanU-boats had proved highly effective in World War I, causing heavy losses onmerchant shipping that nearly forced Britain out of the war, before theBritish introduced the convoy system that turned fortunes around.

However, the British Navy’s implementing the ASDIC system(acronym for “Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee”; otherwiseknown as SONAR), which could detect the presence of submerged submarines,appeared to have solved the U-boat threat. Naval tests showed that once detected by ASDIC, the submarine could thenbe destroyed by two destroyers launching depth charges overboard continuouslyin a long diamond pattern around the trapped vessel.  The British concept was that the U-boatscould operate only in coastal waters to threaten harbor shipping, as they haddone in World War I, and these tests were conducted under daylight and calmweather conditions.  But by the outbreakof World War II, German submarine technology had rapidly advanced, and werecontinuing so, that U-boats were able to reach farther out into the AtlanticOcean, eventually ranging as far as the American eastern seacoast, and alsowere able to submerge to greater depths beyond the capacity of depthcharges.  These factors would weighheavily in the early stages of the Battle of theAtlantic.

In December 1939, hostilities were suspended by the harshAtlantic weather, and German surface ships and U-boats returned to their basesin Germany.  In May 1940, the eight-month “Phoney War”period of combat inactivity in the West was broken by the German invasion of France and the Low Countries, which had beenpreceded one month earlier, April 1940, with the conquest of the Scandinaviancountries of Denmark and Norway.  By late June 1940, these campaigns werecomplete, Italy had joinedthe war on Germany’s side,and Britain remained thesole defiant nation in Western Europe.

These triumphs in Scandinavia and Western Europe wereimportant for the Kriegsmarine: in the Norwegian campaign, the German Navy,which played a major role by transporting the troops and war supplies to thelanding points, lost a large part of its surface fleet, and for a time, wasrendered virtually incapacitated, while the conquest of France allowed theKriegsmarine to establish new bases in western France, at Brest, Lorient, LaRochelle, and Saint-Nazaire, which greatly reduced (by 450 miles) the distanceto the Atlantic, allowing the U-boats to range further west and spend more timeat sea.  The campaigns also eased thedifficult war-time economy of Germany,as more agricultural and industrial resources became available.  Germany’sposition would later improve further with more conquests, as well as withforming Axis treaties, in Eastern Europe,rendering the British blockade (temporarily) ineffective.

But for Britain, these campaigns were disastrous: in Norway,the Dunkirk evacuation, and clashes in the English Channel and the North Sea,the Royal Navy lost 23 destroyers sunk, and dozens more damaged; there loomedthe possibility that the Germans might seize the French fleet and use it toinvade Britain; and more Royal Navy ships had to return for the defense of thehomeland, thus reducing security for the merchant convoys in the Atlantic.  To preclude the possibility that the Frenchships would fall to the Germans, in July 1940, the British Navy attacked theFrench fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, French Algeria, while the French squadron at Alexandria, Egypt,was forced to be interned by the British fleet there.  These naval actions infuriated the new,nominally sovereign Vichy government in France, which had declared its neutrality in thewar, and also because it had assured Britain that the French Navy wouldnot fall into German hands.

In July 1940, Hitler launched the Luftwaffe over the English Channel and British skies, starting the air warknown as the Battle of Britain.  The airattacks peaked in August 1940, when the Luftwaffe turned its attention fromattacking British military and industrial infrastructures to bombing civiliantargets in Londonand other cities, which would continue with some intensity until early1941.  By then, the threat of a Germancross-channel invasion (Operation Sea Lion) had diminished, and endedcompletely in May 1941 when Hitler was fully engaged in the forthcominginvasion of the Soviet Union, set for June1941.

Meanwhile, in the second half of 1940, hostilities in theAtlantic again escalated following the end of the campaigns in Scandinavia and Western Europe. Launching from their new bases in western France,in June 1940, U-boats in increasing numbers prowled the Atlantic,immediately coming upon and attacking and sinking many merchant ships.  In a radical change from World War I U-boatsthat operated singly as lone ambushers of isolated ships, in September 1940,Admiral Karl Donitz, head of the U-boat arm of the Kriegsmarine, devisedRudeltaktik (“pack tactics”), where a squadron of U-boats would simultaneouslyattack a convoy of ships.  This strategy,soon called “wolf pack” by the British, consisted of several U-boats spaced outin a single long line across the anticipated path of an incoming convoy.  One U-boat, upon sighting the convoy, wouldmaintain contact with it, while the other U-boats were alerted by radio and bebrought forward.  Together, the U-boatswould attack at night, generally with impunity against the lightly escortedconvoys, inflicting heavy losses in men and ships.  Convoy protection was provided by corvettes,which were too slow to chase away a U-boat. ASDIC also proved unreliable in the turbulent conditions that thebattles generated and in inclement weather, and underwater detection wasfurther defeated by U-boats that stayed at the surface at night.

The German effort also was strengthened when in August 1940,the Italian Navy (Regia Marina) sent a fleet of submarines to operate in theAtlantic from a naval base in Bordeaux, France.  Over-all, the Italian contribution was small,with only a few dozen submarines taking part, and accounted for 3% of the totalnumber of merchant ships sunk in the Battle ofthe Atlantic. From June to October 1940, in what German U-boat crews celebrated as“The Happy Time” (German: Die Glückliche Zeit), German U-boats sunk 274 Alliedships (totaling 1.5 million tons) for the loss of only 6 U-boats.  This stunning success brought instant fame tomany U-boat commanders and their crews, who were welcomed as heroes on theirreturn to Germany.

In November 1940, Britainintroduced some counter-measures: convoys were diverted away from the regulartrade routes to further north near Iceland and shipping codes werechanged.  More measures were adopted inearly 1941: the merchant convoys and British reconnaissance aircraft were equippedwith radar to detect surfaced U-boats; the British Western Approaches Command(tasked with safeguarding the Atlantic trade) was moved to Liverpool, allowingbetter strategic control; and the convoys were given naval escort protectionall along the length of the Atlantic.  In the latter, the convoys at their assemblypoint in St. John’s, Newfoundland,Canada were escorted byRoyal Canadian Navy ships to a designated point off Iceland,where the British Royal Navy then would take over escort protection for therest of the way to Britain.  Furthermore, the British Navy introduced anew convoy system: a few large convoys (rather than many smaller convoys) wereorganized, as British experience thus far showed that their less frequencymeant that they were exposed to less time to attack, and they required fewerescorts measured on a prorated basis against smaller convoys.

The end of the U-boat’s “Happy Time” in November 1940coincided with the German Navy’s surface ships rampaging through the Atlantic Ocean.  Inearly November 1940, the German heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer came upon anAllied merchant convoy, sinking five ships and damaging many others.  In January-March 1941, in a series ofactions, two German battleships, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, sunk orcaptured 22 merchant ships.  And inFebruary 1941, the cruiser Admiral Hipper ambushed a 19-ship unescorted convoy,sinking 13 ships.

By then, British battleships were tasked to protect merchantships, and in a number of incidents, they warded off German surface raidersfrom attacking the convoys.  This measurepaid off materially when two German ships, the new battleship Bismarckand the cruiser Prinz Eugen, were sighted off Icelandby a British naval squadron, and in the ensuing clash, the Bismarck was damaged, although it sank theBritish battle cruiser HMS Hood.  Whileattempting to escape to France,the Bismarckwas intercepted and sunk.  The increasingBritish Navy presence in the Atlantic and Hitler’s displeasure with the loss ofthe Bismarck compelled the Fuhrer to suspendsurface fleet operations in the Atlantic.  The German Navy’s surface vessels finallyceased to have any impact in the Atlantic when in February 1942, in the“Channel Dash”, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen boldly crossed theheavily protected English Channel from their base in western France to Norway.  The transfer was prompted by reports of animminent British invasion of Norway,as well as the need for greater German naval presence in the Norwegian Arcticto stop the Allied convoys supplying the beleaguered Soviet Union.

In the second half of 1941, Admiral Donitz focused U-boatoperations along the “mid-Atlantic air gap”, which accounted for 70% of Alliedmerchant ship losses during this period. Improved Allied aircraft technology, which allowed greater air range,was yet unable to provide cover for the full distance of the vast Atlantic Ocean. Allied shipping losses in the Atlantic war was eased somewhat when manyU-boats were withdrawn to other sectors, first in June 1941 to the Arctic tohelp stop the flow of Allied supplies to the Soviet Union, and in October 1941,in the Mediterranean Sea to cut British supply lines in the North Africancampaign.

November 12, 1940 – World War II: German and Soviet ministers discuss the possibility of the Soviet Union joining the Axis

In November 1940, on a Germaninitiative, Soviet and German delegates met to negotiate the Soviet Union’sentry into the Axis, a key discussion involving the partition among the fourpowers (Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union) of the vast Britishoverseas colonies in what the Germans were claiming was the British military’simpending defeat in the ongoing Battle of Britain.  Talks broke down on the issue of EasternEurope, with the Soviets wanting security guarantees (and control) of theBaltic Sea and Black Sea, and the Germans holding firm for exclusive influencein the Balkans and Finland.  On December18, 1940, a furious Hitler signed the order for Operation Barbarossa,disregarded a Soviet counter-proposal, and then refused to respond todiplomatic overtures by the Soviets.  InJanuary 1941, the Soviets indicated their intention to sign the agreement andjoin the Axis. But by then, Hitler was determined to proceed with the invasion.

(Taken from Invasion of the Soviet Union – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe: Vol. 6)

Soviet preparationsDuring much of the 1930s, Soviet defensive doctrine centered on the Stalin Line, a non-continuous series of fortifications along theSoviet western frontier aimed at funneling an invading army into killing zones,as well as protecting the main Soviet forces positioned behind the Line.  With the Soviet Union acquiring newterritories in 1939-1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Sovietforward defenses were constructed farther west, in positions stretching fromthe Baltic States, eastern Poland,and Bessarabia, and the Stalin Line thus wasreduced in importance.  Also in the1930s, the Soviet Union produced largequantities of war equipment, including tanks, planes, and artillery pieces,which resulted from Stalin’s focusing on military preparedness, and which alsocoincided with the country’s massive industrialization programs during thisperiod.

Because of Hitler’saggressive foreign policy, Stalin viewed Germany as the main potentialenemy, and the tenuous German-Soviet non-aggression pact as only a temporaryreprieve before war broke out between them. Stalin believed that war with Germanywould not happen until after Britainwas defeated, and was unaware that by late December 1940, Hitler had alreadyset the invasion date for Operation Barbarossa for the summer 1941.

In June 1940, a study by theSoviet High Command identified Belarusas the likely entry point of a German invasion (correctly anticipating the cruxof Operation Barbarossa).  Stalinrejected this conclusion, as he believed that the Germans would focus on the Ukrainein order to acquire the region’s rich agricultural and mineral resources whichwere vital to the German economy.  As aresult, on Stalin’s orders, the Soviet border commands (“military districts”)of Ukraine (later renamed the Southwestern Front) and Odessa (later SouthernFront) were given more military resources than the two northern bordercommands, the Baltic (renamed Northwestern Front) and western (later WesternFront).

By the late 1930s, Stalin hadfull control of the Soviet military establishment after he completed a majorpurge of the officer corps (which was part of the wider “Great Purge”).  The purge ofthe Red Army affected 3 of the 5 Field Marshals of the Soviet Union, 13 of 15Army commanders, 8 of 9 Admirals, 50 of 57 Army Corps commanders, and 154 of186 divisional commanders; a total of 34,000 officers were sent to labor campsin Siberia or were executed[1].  To ensure military adherence to partyideology, political commissars were appointed to individual units up to thedivisional level; the commissars had veto powers against unit commanders’orders if they violated party lines.  Butas a result of the Red Army’s lackluster performance in the Finnish campaign,Stalin allowed a restructuring of the military and its doctrines, and easedparty control of the Red Army (leading to reduced influence of the politicalcommissars).  These reforms, though stillongoing at the start of the German invasion, were crucial to the survival ofSoviet forces.  A consequence of themilitary purge was that the Red Army’s main operational doctrine, called DeepBattle, which had been devised at the highest levels of the general staff whowere purged and executed, was left to be implemented by inexperienced officerswho were not thoroughly familiar with its concept.

At the start of OperationBarbarossa, although the Red Army was not yet fully mobilized, Soviet forces atthe western frontier had 2.9 million soldiers (of the total 5.5 millionmobilized troops and reserve force of 14 million troops), 11,000 tanks (of thetotal 25,000 tanks), 9,000 planes (of the total 18,700 planes), and 117,000artillery pieces.

German preparationsHitler and the German High Command planned Operation Barbarossa as a quick,thorough invasion of the Soviet Union usingoverwhelming force all along the 1,800-mile frontier.  The whole campaign was expected to last only3-4 months, and end before the start of winter, by which time, German forceswould have captured Soviet territory to the east along a line stretching from Arkhangelsk in the Arctic in the north to Astrakhanin the Caspian Sea in the south (Figure 27).  Thereafter, the remaining Soviet militarydefenses and industrial centers to the east of this line would be destroyed by Luftwaffebombing attacks.  German plannersbelieved that the Soviet Army would not retreat but fight to defend theimportant regions in the west (Ukraine,Caucasus, and Belarus),which would allow the German Army to maneuver into a series of massive encirclementsthat would annihilate the bulk of the Red Army. The German belief in a short campaign resulted from the Red Army’s poorperformance in Finlandand because of Stalin’s late 1930s military purge that decimated the Sovietofficer corps.  Furthermore, because ofGermany’s lack of natural resources needed to sustain a long war, the GermanArmy needed a quick victory, and not be bogged down in a protracted war ofattrition that it could not win against the manpower- and resource-rich SovietUnion.

By February 1941, the Germanshad massed 680,000 troops in Romania,purportedly to guard the Ploiesti oil fieldsfrom British air attacks from Greece.  By this time, two other nations had joinedthe Axis: Hungary onNovember 20, 1940 and Romaniathree days later; Bulgariajoined on March 1, 1941.

To demonstrate that Britain remained its target, Germany launched Operation Harpune and Haifisch, a series of military exercises, ship concentrations, andair reconnaissance missions in the English Coast and Norwegianwaters.  Furthermore, as the massiveGerman buildup in the East was bound to be detected, Hitler announced to theSoviet Union that the troop movement was necessary to escape the Britishbombing attacks inside Germany.

By spring 1941, OperationBarbarossa’s planned launch date of May 15, 1941 increasingly appeareddifficult to achieve: an unusually rainy winter flooded rivers and had turnedRussian roads into impassable quagmires; troop transport vehicles from France,as well as oil supplies, were delayed; and the Luftwaffe forward airfields inPoland were not yet completed.  Then inApril 1940, Hitler was forced to launch the invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia following his allyBenito Mussolini’s disastrous campaign against the Greek Army (Greco-ItalianWar, separate article).

The Wehrmacht placed the A-A Line, which extended from Arkhangelsk in the Arctic in the north to Astrakhan in the Caspian Sea in the south, as the furthest advance of Operation Barbarossa

The German intervention wassuccessful, with Yugoslaviafalling within two weeks and Greecein another fortnight. But by then, the delay in awaiting the resolution ofthese campaigns and then transferring German troops from Greece to theirlaunch-off positions in Romania and Poland forced Hitler to move back theattack on Russia to June 22, 1941, 38 days from its original planned launch.

[1] Of this number, as a result of the Red Army’s poor performance in Finland,11,000 would be reinstated in May 1940; after the start of the German invasionin June 1941, 80% of the officers purged would be returned to various commands.

November 11, 1919 – Latvian War of Independence: Latvian forces repulse an attack by the West Russian Volunteer Army

In October 1919, the WestRussian Volunteer Army instead attacked sections of Latviaincluding Riga,intending to overthrow the Latvian nationalist government.  The Latvians fought back  with armed support provided by the BritishNavy and Estonian armored trains, and foiled the attack, forcing the West RussianVolunteer Army to withdraw into Lithuania where it subsequently also was defeatedthere.

(Taken from Latvian War of Independence – Wars of the 20th Century – Vol. 4)

Independence War The northern front of the Soviet offensive was directed at Latvia and Estonia.  In Latvia, the Red Army, as Soviet forceswere called and which included the Red Latvian Riflemen (formerly the LatvianRiflemen of the Imperial Russian Army who had shifted their allegiance toBolshevik Russia), made rapid progress and easily gained control of most ofLatvian territory, including Valka, Valmiera, Rēzekne, Daugavpils, and thecapital Riga, which was taken in April 1919. The newly formed Latvian Army and pro-Latvia German militias retreatedin disarray.  Under the sponsorship ofSoviet Russia, on December 17, 1918, the Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic led by Latvian communist PēterisStučka, was set up as a regime to rival the UlmanisLatvian nationalist provisional government that had been formed one monthearlier.

The Latvian communistgovernment and its infrastructures were based largely on the Russian Bolshevikmodel but zealously imposed strict communist doctrines.  Ethnic Germans, particularly the BalticGerman nobility, were the target of repressive measures.  Private ownership was placed under governmentcontrol, and under an agrarian reform program, the government nationalizedagricultural lands, including the German nobility’s vast landholdings.  The expropriated farmlands were placed undera collective farming system which was bitterly opposed by the rural populationthat wanted the lands subdivided and distributed to landless peasants.  Ultimately, the Latvian communist regime lostits initially widespread support from the general population, which opposed thegovernment’s authoritarian rule, unpopular decrees, and repressive measures.

The Red Army’s offensivehad forced the Ulmanis nationalist provisional government to evacuate tosouthwest Latvia centered onthe city of Liepāja.  Then in January 1919, the Latvian nationalistleaders built up its nascent armed forces that initially consisted of the 1stLatvian Independent Battalion (later expanded to the Latvian IndependentBrigade).  At the request of the Ulmanisregime, two other paramilitary groups were organized to fight on the side ofthe Latvian government: the BaltischeLandeswehr (Baltic defense forces), organized by and consisting mainly ofBaltic Germans; and the German Iron Brigade (later German Iron Division), a Freikorps (lit. “Freecorps”; German militias formed after World War I) paramilitary consisting ofethnic German volunteers and former soldiers (from Germany) who were enticed tofight in the Baltic region for various reasons, e.g. to stop the spread ofRussian communism into Europe; to acquire free lands in the Baltic region thathad been promised to them as a reward for their participation; etc.  German forces in the Baltic region wereplaced under German General Rüdiger von der Goltz who succeeded in stopping the SovietRed Army’s advance at the Venta River.

The presence of GermanArmy units in the Baltic region after World War I resulted from a directivefrom the Allied Powers that required Germany (which had been forced todemobilize much of its armed forces) to maintain a sufficient enough militarypresence in the Baltic region to stop an anticipated Red Army offensive thatwas aimed at recapturing Russian territories that had been lost in World WarI.  At the outset, tensions existedbetween the Latvian nationalist government and the Baltische Landeswehr/GermanIron Division – Latvian leaders particularly were concerned that the BalticGerman nobility and German Freikorps volunteers had a second motive other thandefeating the Bolsheviks, i.e. maintaining German political and economic powerin Latviaat the expense of Latvian nationalism. In the meantime, the two sides were compelled by the Allied Powers towork and fight together, and both shared the mutual need to defeat a commonenemy.

The Allied Powersprovided diplomatic and material support for the independence struggles of Latvia and Estonia.  The United States delivered food, clothing, and other humanitarianaid to the Baltic region that currently was experiencing a serious foodshortage, while Francefurnished relief as well as naval assistance. Among the Allies, Britainprovided the greatest support, sending to the Baltic region a number ofmilitary and relief missions by the Royal Navy whose ships blockaded the Baltic Sea to prevent Soviet vessels from launchingartillery attacks or amphibious landings on the Latvian and Estoniancoasts.  The British also provided theLatvian and Estonian forces, as well as the White Russian (i.e. anti-Bolshevik)Army in the Baltic region, with large amounts of weapons and militaryequipment.  British authorities, however,distrusted the Germans and Baltische Landeswehr, and did not provide them withweapons; instead, German Baltic forces received their military supplies from Germany.

In February-March 1919,the now strengthened German-Latvian alliance launched a number of majoroffensives that succeeded in recapturing large sections of Courland,including the major centers of Ventspils, Kuldīga, and Saldus.  By late April 1919, Estonian forces from thenorth also had driven the Red Army from southern Estoniainto northern Latvia.  With German-Latvian forces advancing fromwestern Latvia, the combinedforces pushed back the Red Army into a section of Latgale (in eastern Latvia), where the Latvian communist governmentalso transferred its capital after evacuating from Riga, Latvia’scapital.  Riga itself fell to the Germans-Latvians onMay 22, 1919.

Latvian War of Independence

Meanwhile, on April 16,1919, the Latvian-German alliance fell apart when the Baltische Landeswehr, with the tacit support of General von der Gotz, overthrew the Ulmanisnationalist government, and in its place, installed a pro-German regime led by Andrievs Niedra, a Latvian Lutheran pastor.  Prime Minister Ulmanis and members of hisCabinet evaded capture by taking refuge at the British diplomatic mission andthen aboard the steam ship Saratov, whichwas protected by British warships.

To the Latviannationalists, the coup confirmed the Germans’ political ambitions in Latvia,which ostensibly could not be stopped, as the Latvian military was yet largelyundeveloped and had played a subordinate role in the German-Latviancounter-offensive.  Furthermore, even theUlmanis government was not supported by some sectors of the Latvian population.

The defeat of the Soviet RedArmy in northern Latvialed to tensions between the Estonian Army and the Baltische Landeswehr-GermanFreikorps, hitherto nominal allies.  TheBaltische Landeswehr accused the Estonians of occupying Latvian territory,while Estonians distrusted the Baltische Landeswehr, believing that the latterwas planning to invade Estoniaand curb Estonian nationalism in order to maintain the Baltic German nobility’sdomination of Estonian society, a supposition that was merited since theBaltische Landeswehr had overthrown Latvia’s nationalist government.

Both sides demanded theother to back down and withdraw, while Allied officials in the Baltic regiontried to force the two sides to seek a negotiated solution.  On June 6, 1919, fighting broke out when theBaltische Landeswehr attacked and seized the town of Cēsis,which served as a railway junction between Tartu,Estonia and Riga.  Four days later, Allied authorities imposed aceasefire, and strongly urged the two sides to negotiate a peaceagreement.  The talks, however, wentnowhere and fighting continued. Following the German Freikorps’ unsuccessful attack on Estonianpositions in Limbaži and Straupe, on June 23, 1919, Estonian forcescounter-attacked, supported by the North Latvian Brigade, a Latvianparamilitary group organized in Estonia by anti-German Latvians, and wrestedback control of Cēsis, and turned in the direction of Riga to pursue theBaltische Landeswehr and German forces that now were in full retreat.

On July 3, 1919, theAllied Powers again mediated an end to the fighting, compelling thebelligerents to sign the ceasefire of Strazdumuiza, which held.  The pro-Germangovernment in Rigacollapsed and the Ulmanis nationalist government was restored to power.  Allied authorities placed the BaltischeLandeswehr under Latvian authority and ordered the German forces in Latvia to disband and return to Germany.  The German Freikorps did disband but 14,000of its soldiers joined anti-Bolshevik General Pavel Bermondt-
Avalov and his West Russian Volunteer Army, a WhiteRussian militia that was organized, armed, and funded by ethnic Germans who hadeconomic interests in Latvia.  General Bermondt-Avalov also was a staunchmonarchist and opposed secession of the Baltic States from Russia.

November 10, 1945 – Indonesian War of Independence: British forces and Indonesian militias engage in the Battle of Surabaya

On November 10, 1945, British forces and Indonesiannationalist fighters fought the Battle of Surabaya during the Indonesian War ofIndependence. After World War II ended, the first Allied forces arrived in theDutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia)in mid-September 1945. When British forces arrived in Surabayain East Java in late October, they found thatthe city was fortified by Indonesian nationalist fighters – in all, some 20,000Indonesian revolutionary troops and 100,000 militia fighters had takendefensive positions. In a skirmish on October 30, 1945, British BrigadierA.W.S. Mallaby was killed, which served as a trigger for the British toinitiate full-scale fighting on November 10. Within three days, British forceshad largely taken the city, but continued fierce house-to-house fightingcontinued for three weeks, with some 30,000 British troops supported withtanks, aircraft, and artillery bombardment from warships finally forcing outthe last guerrilla resistance.

(Taken from Indonesian War of Independence – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia: Vol. 5)

Independence War Sukarno’sproclamation of Indonesia’s independence de facto produced a state of war withthe Allied powers, which were determined to gain control of the territory andreinstate the pre-war Dutch government. However, one month would pass before the Allied forces wouldarrive.  Meanwhile, the Japanese EastIndies command, awaiting the arrival of the Allies to repatriate Japaneseforces back to Japan,was ordered by the Allied high command to stand down and carry out policingduties to maintain law and order in the islands.  The Japanese stance toward the Indonesian Republic varied: disinterested Japanesecommanders withdrew their units to avoid confrontation with Indonesian forces,while those sympathetic to or supportive of the revolution provided weapons toIndonesians, or allowed areas to be occupied by Indonesians.  However, other Japanese commanders compliedwith the Allied orders and fought the Indonesian revolutionaries, thus becominginvolved in the independence war.

In the chaotic period immediately after Indonesia’sindependence and continuing for several months, widespread violence and anarchyprevailed (this period is known as “Bersiap”, an Indonesian word meaning “beprepared”), with armed bands called “Pemuda” (Indonesian meaning “youth”)carrying out murders, robberies, abductions, and other criminal acts againstgroups associated with the Dutch regime, i.e. local nobilities, civilianleaders, Christians such as Menadonese and Ambones, ethnic Chinese, Europeans,and Indo-Europeans.  Other armed bandswere composed of local communists or Islamists, who carried out attacks for thesame reasons.  Christian and nobility-alignedmilitias also were organized, which led to clashes between pro-Dutch andpro-Indonesian armed groups.  Theseso-called “social revolutions” by anti-Dutch militias, which occurred mainly inJava and Sumatra, were motivated by variousreasons, including political, economic, religious, social, and ethniccauses.  Subsequently when the Indonesiangovernment began to exert greater control, the number of violent incidentsfell, and Bersiap soon came to an end. The number of fatalities during the Bersiap period runs into the tens ofthousands, including some 3,600 identified and 20,000 missing Indo-Europeans.

The first major clashes of the war occurred in late August1945, when Indonesian revolutionary forces clashed with Japanese Army units,when the latter tried to regain previously vacated areas.  The Japanese would be involved in the earlystages of Indonesia’sindependence war, but were repatriated to Japan by the end of 1946.

In mid-September 1945, the first Allied forces consisting ofAustralian units arrived in the eastern regions of Indonesia (where revolutionaryactivity was minimal), peacefully taking over authority from the commander ofthe Japanese naval forces there.  Alliedcontrol also was established in Sulawesi, withthe provincial revolutionary government offering no resistance.  These areas were then returned to Dutchcolonial control.

In late September 1945, British forces also arrived in theislands, the following month taking control of key areas in Sumatra, including Medan, Padang, and Palembang, and inJava.  The British also occupied Jakarta (then still known, until 1949, as Batavia),with Sukarno and his government moving the Republic’s capital to Yogyakarta in Central Java.  InOctober 1945, Japanese forces also regained control of Bandungand Semarangfor the Allies, which they turned over to the British. In Semarang, the intense fighting claimed thelives of some 500 Japanese and 2,000 Indonesian soldiers.

In late October 1945, the shooting death of British GeneralAubertin Mallaby in Surabayaprompted the British command to launch a land, air, and sea attack on thecity.  In this encounter, known as theBattle of Surabaya, the British met fierce resistance from Pemuda militias butgained control of the city after three days of fighting.  Casualties on both sides were high,fatalities numbering 6,000-16,000 revolutionaries and 500-2,000 mostly BritishIndian soldiers.

In late 1945, the revolutionaries intensified their attacksin Bandung.  Then in March 1946, forced by the British towithdraw from Bandung,the revolutionaries set fire to a large section of the city in what is known asthe “Bandung Sea of Fire”.  Also thatmonth, communal violence broke out in East Sumatra,where elements supporting the revolutionaries attacked groups aligned with theold colonial order.

The Netherlandsitself was greatly weakened by World War II, and was unable to quicklyreestablish its presence in the Dutch East Indies.  However, by April 1946, Dutch troops hadbegun to arrive in large numbers, ultimately peaking at 180,000 during the war(aside from another 60,000 predominantly native colonial troops of the RoyalDutch East Indies Army).  The restoredcolonial government, called the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration,reclaimed Jakarta as its capital, while Dutchauthority also was established in the other major cities in Java and Sumatra,and in the rest of the original Dutch East Indies.

By late 1946, the British military had completed its missionin the archipelago, that of repatriating Japanese forces to Japan and freeing the Alliedprisoners of war.  By December 1946,British forces had departed from the islands, but not before setting upmediation talks between the Dutch government and Indonesian revolutionaries, aninitiative that led the two sides to agree to a ceasefire in October 1946.  Earlier in June 1946, the Dutch governmentand representatives of ethnic and religious groups and the aristocracy fromSulawesi, Maluku, West New Guinea, and other eastern states met in South Sulawesiand agreed to form a federal-type government attached to the Netherlands.  In talks held with the Indonesianrevolutionaries, Dutch authorities presented a similar proposal which onNovember 12, 1946, produced the Linggadjati Agreement, where the two sidesagreed to establish a federal system known as the United States of Indonesia(USI) by January 1, 1949.  The Republic of Indonesia(consisting of Java, Madura, and Sumatra) would comprise one state under USI;in turn, USI and the Netherlandswould form the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, with each polity being a fullysovereign state but under the symbolic authority of the Dutch monarchy.

November 9, 1938 – Interwar Period: A German diplomat is assassinated by a Polish Jew; in response, Hitler’s government carry out “Kristallnacht”

On November 9, 1938 in Paris, German diplomat Ernst vom Rathwas assassinated by a Polish Jew. In response, Hitler’s government carried out“Kristallnacht” (Crystal Night), where the Nazi SA and civilian mobs in Germanywent on a rampage, killing hundreds of Jews, jailing tens of thousands ofothers, and looting and destroying Jewish homes, schools, synagogues,hospitals, and other buildings.  Some1,000 synagogues were burned, and 7,000 businesses destroyed. 

(Taken from Events Leading up to World War II in Europe – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe: Vol. 6)

Hitler and Nazis inPower In October 1929, the severe economic crisis known as the GreatDepression began in the United States, and then spread out and affectedmany countries around the world.  Germany, whose economy was dependent on the United Statesfor reparations payments and corporate investments, was badly hit, and millionsof workers lost their jobs, many banks closed down, and industrial productionand foreign trade dropped considerably.

The Weimargovernment weakened politically, as many Germans turned to radical ideologies,particularly Hitler’s ultra-right wing nationalist Nazi Party, as well as theGerman Communist Party.  In the 1930federal elections, the Nazi Party made spectacular gains and became a majorpolitical party with a platform of improving the economy, restoring politicalstability, and raising Germany’sinternational standing by dealing with the “unjust” Versailles treaty.  Then in two elections held in 1932, the Nazisbecame the dominant party in the Reichstag (German parliament), albeit withoutgaining a majority.  Hitler long soughtthe post of German Chancellor, which was the head of government, but he wasrebuffed by the elderly President Paul von Hindenburg , who distrustedHitler.  At this time, Hitler’s ambitionswere not fully known, and following a political compromise by rival parties, inJanuary 1933, President Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor, with fewNazis initially holding seats in the new Cabinet.  The Chancellorship itself had little power,and the real authority was held by the President (the head of state).

On the night of February 27, 1933, fire broke out at theReichstag, which led to the arrest and execution of a Dutch arsonist, acommunist, who was found inside the building. The next day, Hitler announced that the fire was the signal for Germancommunists to launch a nationwide revolution. On February 28, 1933, the German parliament passed the “Reichstag FireDecree” which repealed civil liberties, including the right of assembly andfreedom of the press.  Also rescinded wasthe writ of habeas corpus, allowing authorities to arrest any person withoutthe need to press charges or a court order. In the next few weeks, the police and Nazi SA paramilitary carried out asuppression campaign against communists (and other political enemies) across Germany,executing communist leaders, jailing tens of thousands of their members, andeffectively ending the German Communist Party. Then in March 1933, with the communists suppressed and other partiesintimidated, Hitler forced the Reichstag to pass the Enabling Act, whichallowed the government (i.e. Hitler) to enact laws, even those that violatedthe constitution, without the approval of parliament or the president.  With nearly absolute power, the Nazis gainedcontrol of all aspects of the state.  InJuly 1933, with the banning of political parties and coercion into closure ofthe others, the Nazi Party became the sole legal party, and Germany became de facto a one-partystate.

At this time, Hitler grew increasingly alarmed at themilitary power of the SA, particularly distrusting the political ambitions ofits leader, Ernst Rohm.  On June 30-July2, 1934, on Hitler’s orders, the loyalist Nazi SS (Schutzstaffel; English:Protection Squadron) and Gestapo (Secret Police) purged the SA, killing hundredsof its leaders including Rohm, and jailing thousands of its members, violentlybringing the SA organization (which had some three million members) to itsknees.  The purge benefited Hitler in twoways: First, he became the undisputed leader of the Nazi apparatus, and Secondand equally important, his standing greatly increased with the upper class,business and industrial elite, and German military; the latter, numbering only100,000 troops because of the Versailles treaty restrictions, also felt threatenedby the enormous size of the SA.

In early August 1934, with the death of PresidentHindenburg, Hitler gained absolute power, as his Cabinet passed a law thatabolished the presidency, and its powers were merged with those of thechancellor.  Hitler thus became bothGerman head of state and head of government, with the dual roles of Fuhrer(leader) and Chancellor.  As head ofstate, he also was Supreme Commander of the armed forces, making him absoluteruler and dictator of Germany.

In domestic matters, the Nazi government made great gains,improving the economy and industrial production, reducing unemployment,embarking on ambitious infrastructure projects, and restoring political andsocial order.  As a result, the Nazisbecame extremely popular, and party membership grew enormously.  This success was brought about from soundpolicies as well as through threat and intimidation, e.g. labor unions and jobactions were suppressed.

Hitler also began to impose Nazi racial policies, which sawethnic Germans as the “master race” comprising “super-humans” (Ubermensch),while certain races such as Slavs, Jews, and Roma (gypsies) were considered“sub-humans” (Untermenschen); also lumped with the latter were non-ethnic-basedgroups, i.e. communists, liberals, and other political enemies, homosexuals,Freemasons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, etc. Nazi lebensraum (“living space”) expansionism into Eastern Europe and Russiacalled for eliminating the Slavic and other populations there and replacingthem with German farm settlers to help realize Hitler’s dream of a 1,000-yearGerman Empire.

In Germanyitself, starting in April 1933 until the passing of the Nuremberg Laws inSeptember 1935 and beyond, Nazi racial policy was directed against the localJews, stripping them of civil rights, banning them from employment andeducation, revoking their citizenship, excluding them from political and sociallife, disallowing inter-marriages with Germans, and essentially declaring themundesirables in Germany.  As a result, tens of thousands of Jews left Germany.  Hitler blamed the Jews (and communists) forthe civilian and workers’ unrest and revolution near the end of World War I,ostensibly that had led to Germany’sdefeat, and for the many social and economic problems currently afflicting thenation.  Following anti-Nazi boycotts inthe United States, Britain, and other countries, Hitler retaliatedwith a call to boycott Jewish businesses in Germany, which degenerated intoviolent riots by SA mobs that attacked and killed, and jailed hundreds of Jews,looted and destroyed Jewish properties, and seized Jewish assets.  The most notorious of these attacks occurredin November 1938 in “Kristallnacht” (Crystal Night), where in response to theassassination of a German diplomat by a Polish Jew in Paris, the Nazi SA andcivilian mobs in Germany went on a violent rampage, killing hundreds of Jews,jailing tens of thousands of others, and looting and destroying Jewish homes,schools, synagogues, hospitals, and other buildings.  Some 1,000 synagogues were burned, and 7,000businesses destroyed. 

In foreign affairs, Hitler, like most Germans, denounced theVersaillestreaty, and wanted it rescinded.  In1933, Hitler withdrew Germanyfrom the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva,and in October of that year, from the League of Nations, in both casesdenouncing why Germanywas not allowed to re-arm to the level of the other major powers.

In March 1935, Hitler announced that German militarystrength would be increased to 550,000 troops, military conscription would beintroduced, and an air force built, which essentially meant repudiation of theTreaty of Versailles and the start of full-scale rearmament.  In response, Britain,France, and Italyformed the Stresa Front meant to stop further German violations, but thisalliance quickly broke down because the three parties disagreed on how to dealwith Hitler.

November 8, 1940 – World War II: Greek forces repulse the Italians at the Battle of Elaia-Kalamas

On November 8, 1940, Greek forces repulsed an Italianoffensive at the Battle of Elaia-Kalamas during the Greco-Italian War. TheItalians launched their invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940. At thecoastal flank of the Epirussector, the Greek main defensive line was located at Elaia-Kalamas, some 30 kmsouth of the Greek-Albanian border. On November 2, Italian forces launched airand artillery strikes on Greek positions, and by November 5, were able toestablish a bridgehead over the Kalamas River. However, Greekdefenses held despite repeated attempts to break through with infantry andlight and medium tanks. The Italian offensive stalled as much as by thetenacity of the defenders and minefields as by the harsh hilly, rugged terrainand muddy ground from heavy rains.

(Taken from Greco-Italian War – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe: Vol. 6)

On October 28, 1940, Italian forces in Albania, which weremassed at the Greek-Albanian border, opened their offensive along a 90-mile(150 km) front in two sectors: in Epirus, which comprised the main attackingforce; and in western Macedonia, where the Italian forces were to hold theirground and remain inside Albania.  Athird force was assigned to guard the Albania-Yugoslavia frontier.  The Italian offensive was launched in thefall season, and would be expected to face extremely difficult weatherconditions in high-altitude mountain terrain, and be subject to snow, sleet,icy rain, fog, and heavy cloud cover.  Asit turned out, the Italians were supplied only with summer clothing, and sowere unprepared for these conditions. The Italians also had planned to seize Corfu,which was cancelled due to bad weather.

At the Epirussector, the Italians attacked along three points: at the coast for Konispol andproceeding to the main targets of Igoumenitsa and Preveza; at the center ofKalpaki; and in the Pindus Mountains separating Epirusand western Macedonia,towards Metsovo.  The coastal advancemade some progress, gaining 40 miles (60 km) in the first few days withoutmeeting serious resistance and seizing Igoumenitsa and Margariti.  The Italians soon were stalled at the Kalamas River, which was swollen and raging fromrecent heavy rains.

Background InApril 1939, Italian forces invaded Albania (previousarticle) in what Italian leader Benito Mussolini hoped would be the firststep to founding an Italian Empire (in the style of the ancient Roman Empire)in southern Europe, which would be added to the colonies that he alreadypossessed in Africa (Italian East Africa and Libya). 

In September 1939, World War II broke out in Europe when Germany attacked Poland,prompting Britain and France to declare war on Germany.  After an eight-month period of combatinactivity in Europe (called the “Phoney War”), in April 1940, Germany launched the invasions to the north andwest, which ended in the defeat of France on June 25, 1940.  In July 1940, Hitler set his sights onBritain, with the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) launching attacks (lasting untilMay 1941) aimed at eliminating the last impediment to his full domination ofWestern Europe. 

To Mussolini, France’sdefeat and Britain’sdesperate position seemed the perfect time to advance his ambitions in southernEurope. Just as France was verging on defeat from the German onslaught, on June10, 1940, in a brazen act of opportunism[1],Mussolini entered World War II on Germany’s side by declaring war on France andBritain, and sending Italian forces that attacked France through theItalian-French border.  Then with Britain grimly fighting for its own survivalfrom the German air attacks (Battle of Britain, separate article), Mussolini set his sights on British possessionsin Africa, with Italian forces seizing British Somaliland in August 1940, andadvancing into Egypt from Libyain September 1940.

At the same time, Mussolini was ready to build an Italian Empire, withhis attention focused on the Balkans which he saw as falling inside the Italiansphere of influence.  He also longed togain mastery of the Mediterranean Sea in the Mare Nostrum (“Our Sea”) concept, and turn it into an“Italian lake”.  He chafed at Italy’s geographical location in the middle ofthe Mediterranean Sea, likening it to beingshut in and imprisoned by the British and French, who controlled much of thesurrounding regions and possessed more powerful navies.  Mussolini was determined to expand his ownnavy and gain dominance over southern Europe and northern Africa, andultimately build an empire that would stretch from the Straitof Gibraltar at the western tip of theMediterranean Sea to the Strait of Hormuz near the Persian Gulf.

Meanwhile, Greece hadbecome alarmed by the Italian invasion of Albania.  Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas, whoironically held fascist views and was pro-German, turned to Britain for assistance.  The British Royal Navy, which had bases inmany parts of the Mediterranean, including Gibraltar,Malta, Cyprus, Egypt,and Palestine, then made security stops in Crete and other Greek islands.

Italian-Greek relations, which were strained since the late 1920s byMussolini’s expansionist agenda, deteriorated further.  In 1940, Italyinitiated an anti-Greek propaganda campaign, which included the demand that theGreek region of Epirus mustbe ceded to Albania,since it contained a large ethnic Albanian population.  The Epirusclaim was popular among Albanians, who offered their support for Mussolini’sambitions on Greece.  Mussolini accused Greece of being a British puppet,citing the British naval presence in Greek ports and offshore waters.  In reality, he was alarmed that the BritishNavy lurking nearby posed a direct threat to Italyand hindered his plans to establish full control of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas.

Italy then launchedarmed provocations against Greece,which included several incidents in July-August 1940, where Italian planesattacked Greek vessels at Kissamos, Gulf of Corinth, Nafpaktos, and Aegina.  On August15, 1940, an undetected Italian submarine sank the Greek light cruiser Elli. Greek authorities found evidence that pointed to Italian responsibilityfor the Elli sinking, but PrimeMinister Metaxas did not take any retaliatory action, as he wanted to avoid warwith Italy.

Also in August 1940, Mussolini gave secret orders to his military highcommand to start preparations for an invasion of Greece.  But in a meeting with Hitler, Mussolini wasprevailed upon by the German leader to suspend the invasion in favor of theItalian Army concentrating on defeating the British in North Africa.  Hitler wasconcerned that an Italian incursion in the Balkans would worsen the perennialstate of ethnic tensions in that region and perhaps prompt other major powers,such as the Soviet Union or Britain,to intervene there.  The Romanian oilfields at Ploiesti, which were extremely vitalto Germany,could then be threatened.  In August1940, unbeknown to Mussolini, Hitler had secretly instructed the Germany military high command to draw up plansfor his greatest project of all, the conquest of the Soviet Union.  And for thismonumental undertaking, Hitler wanted no distractions, including one in theBalkans.  In the fall of 1940, Mussolinideferred his attack on Greece,and issued an order to demobilize 600,000 Italian troops.

Then on October 7, 1940, Hitler deployed German troops in Romaniaat the request of the new pro-Nazi government led by Prime Minister IonAntonescu.  Mussolini, upon beinginformed by Germany fourdays later, was livid, as he believed that Romania fell inside his sphere ofinfluence.  More disconcerting forMussolini was that Hitler had again initiated a major action without firstnotifying him.  Hitler had acted alone inhis conquests of Poland, Denmark, Norway,France, and the Low Countries, and had given notice to the Italians onlyafter the fact.  Mussolini was determinedthat Hitler’s latest stunt would be reciprocated with his own move against Greece.  Mussolini stated, “Hitler faces me with afait accompli.  This time I am going topay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I haveoccupied Greece.In this way, the equilibrium will be re-established.”

On October 13, 1940 and succeeding days, Mussolini finalized with his topmilitary commanders the immediate implementation of the invasion plan forGreece, codenamed “Contingency G”, with Italian forces setting out fromAlbania.  A modification was made, wherean initial force of six Italian divisions would attack the Epirus region, to be followed bythe arrival of more Italian troops.  Thecombined forces would advance to Athens andbeyond, and capture the whole of Greece.  The modified plan was opposed by GeneralPietro Badoglio, the Italian Chief of Staff, who insisted that the originalplan be carried out: a full-scale twenty-division invasion of Greece with Athens as the immediate objective.  Other factors cited by military officers whowere opposed to immediate invasion were the need for more preparation time, therecent demobilization of 600,000 troops, and the inadequacy of Albanian portsto meet the expected large volume of men and war supplies that would be broughtin from Italy.

But Mussolini would not be dissuaded. His decision to invade was greatly influenced by three officials:Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano (who was also Mussolini’s son-in-law),who stated that most Greeks detested their government and would not resist anItalian invasion; the Italian Governor-General of Albania Francesco Jacomoni,who told Mussolini that Albanians would support an Italian invasion in returnfor Epirus being annexed to Albania; and the commander of Italian forces inAlbania General Sebastiano Prasca, who assured Mussolini that Italian troops inAlbania were sufficient to capture Epirus within two weeks.  These three men were motivated by thepotential rewards to their careers that an Italian victory would have; forexample, General Prasca, like most Italian officers, coveted being conferredthe rank of “Field Marshall”. Mussolini’s order for the invasion had the following objectives,“Offensive in Epirus,observation and pressure on Salonika, and in a second phase, march on Athens”.

On October 18, 1940, Mussolini asked King Boris II of Bulgaria to participate in a joint attack on Greece, but the monarch declined, since underthe Balkan Pact of 1934, other Balkan countries would intervene for Greecein a Bulgarian-Greek war.  Deciding thatits border with Bulgaria wassecure from attack, the Greek government transferred half of its forcesdefending the Bulgarian border to Albania; as well, all Greekreserves were deployed to the Albanian front.  With these moves, by the start of the war,Greek forces in Albaniaoutnumbered the attacking Italian Army.  Greecealso fortified its Albanian frontier. And because of Mussolini’s increased rhetoric and threats of attack, bythe time of the invasion, the Italians had lost the element of surprise.

[1] Mussolini had stated just five days earlier, on June 5, 1940,“I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conferenceas a man who has fought”.

November 7, 1941 – World War II: Stalin leads the October Revolution Parade as German forces attack Moscow

On November 7, 1941, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin led thecelebrations for the October Revolution in Moscow’sRed Square. In his speech, Stalin exhorted thesoldiers in the parade as they were about to be sent out to battle. Many ofthem would be killed in the fighting for Moscow.The event took place just as German forces were closing in on the Sovietcapital.

In modern-day Russia, November 7th iscelebrated as a Day of Military Honour in remembrance of the 1941 parade.

(Taken from Battle of Moscow – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe: Vol. 6)

On October 2, 1941, shortly after the Kievcampaign ended, on Hitler’s orders, the Wehrmacht launched its offensive on Moscow.  For this campaign, codenamed OperationTyphoon, the Germans assembled an enormous force of 1.9 million troops, 48,000artillery pieces, 1,400 planes, and 1,000 tanks, the latter involving threePanzer Groups (now renamed Panzer Armies), the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th (the lattertaken from Army Group North).  A seriesof spectacular victories followed: German 2nd Panzer Army, moving north fromKiev, took Oryol on October 3 and Bryansk on October 6, trapping 2 Sovietarmies, while German 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies to the north conducted a pincersattack around Vyazma, trapping 4 Soviet armies. The encircled Red Army forces resisted fiercely, requiring 28 divisionsof German Army Group Center and two weeks to eliminate thepockets.  Some 500,000–600,000 Soviettroops were captured, and the first of three lines of defenses on the approachto Moscow hadbeen breached.  Hitler and the GermanHigh Command by now were convinced that Moscowwould soon be captured, while in Berlin,rumors abounded that German troops would be home by Christmas.

Some Red Army elements from the Bryansk-Vyazma sectoravoided encirclement and retreated to the two remaining defense lines nearMozhaisk.  By now, the Soviet militarysituation was critical, with only 90,000 troops and 150 tanks left to defend Moscow.  Stalin embarked on a massive campaign toraise new armies and transfer formations from other sectors, and move largeamounts of weapons and military equipment to Moscow. Martial law was declared in the city, and on Stalin’s orders, thecivilian population was organized into work brigades to construct trenches andanti-tank traps along Moscow’sperimeter.  As well, consumer industriesin the capital were converted to support the war effort, e.g. an automobileplant now produced light weapons, a clock factory made mine detonators, andmachine shops repaired tanks and military vehicles.

On October 15, 1941, on Stalin’s orders, the stategovernment, communist party leadership, and Soviet military high commandevacuated from Moscow, and established (temporary) headquarters at Kuibyshev(present-day Samara).  Stalin and a smallcore of officials remained in Moscow,which somewhat calmed the civilian population that had panicked at thegovernment evacuation, and initially had also hastened to leave the capital.

On October 13, 1941, while mopping up operations continuedat the Bryansk-Vyazma sector, German armored units thrust into the Sovietdefense lines at Mozhaisk, breaking through after four days of fighting, andtaking Kalinin, Kaluga, and then Naro-Fominsk (October 21) and Volokolamsk(October 27), with Soviet forces retreating to new lines behind the NaraRiver.  The way to Moscow now appeared open.

In fact, Operation Typhoon was by now sputtering, withGerman forces severely depleted and counting only 30% of operational motorvehicles and 30-50% available troop strength in most units.  Furthermore, since nearly the start ofOperation Typhoon, the weather had deteriorated, with the seasonal cold rainsand wet snow turning the unpaved roads into a virtually impassable clayeymorass (a phenomenon known in Russia as “Rasputitsa”, literally, “time withoutroads”) that brought German motorized and horse traffic to a standstill.  The stoppage in movement also prevented thedelivery to the frontlines of troop reinforcements, supplies, andmunitions.  On October 31, 1941, withweather and road conditions worsening, the German High Command stopped theadvance, this pause eventually lasting over two weeks, until November 15.  Temperatures also had begun to drop, and theGermans were yet without winter clothing and winterization supplies for theirequipment, which also were caught up in the weather-induced logistical delay.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, Stalin and the Soviet High Commandtook advantage of this crucial delay by hastily organizing 11 new armies andtransferring 30 divisions from Siberia (together with 1,000 tanks and 1,000planes) for Moscow, the latter being made available following Sovietintelligence information indicating that the Japanese did not intend to attackthe Soviet Far East.  By mid-November1941, the Soviets had fortified three defensive lines around Moscow, set up artillery and ambush pointsalong the expected German routes of advance, and reinforced Soviet frontlineand reserve armies.  Ultimately, Sovietforces in Moscowwould total 2 million troops, 3,200 tanks, 7,600 artillery pieces, and 1,400planes.

On November 15, 1941, cold, dry weather returned, whichfroze and hardened the ground, allowing the Wehrmacht to resume itsoffensive.  For the final push to Moscow,three panzer armies were tasked with executing a pincers movement: the 2nd inthe south, and the 3rd and 4th in the north, both pincer arms to link up atNoginsk, 40 miles east of Moscow.  Thenwith Soviet forces diverted to protect the flanks, German 4th Army would attackfrom the west directly into Moscow.

In the southern pincer, German 2nd Panzer Army had reachedthe outskirts of Tulaas early as October 26, but was stopped by strong Soviet resistance as well assupply shortages, bad weather, and destroyed roads and bridges.  On November 18, while still suffering fromlogistical shortages, 2nd Panzer Army attacked toward Tula and made only slow progress, although itcaptured Stalinogorsk on November 22.  Inlate November 1941, a powerful Soviet counter-attack with two armies andSiberian units inflicted a decisive defeat on German 2nd Panzer Army atKashira, which effectively stopped the southern advance.

To the north, German 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies made moreheadway, taking Klin (November 24) and Solnechnogorsk (November 25), and onNovember 28, crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal, to begin encirclement of thecapital from the north.  Wehrmacht troopsalso reached Krasnaya Polyana and possibly also Khimki, 18 miles and 11 milesfrom Moscow,respectively, marking the farthest extent of the German advance and also whereGerman officers using binoculars were able to make out some of the city’s mainbuildings.

With both pincers immobilized, on December 1, 1941, German4th Army attacked from the west, but encountered the strong defensive linesfronting Moscow,and was repulsed.  Furthermore, by earlyDecember 1941, snow blizzards prevailed and temperatures plummeted to –30°C(–22°F) to –40°C (–40°F), and German Army Group Center, which wasfighting without winter clothing, suffered 130,000 casualties fromfrostbite.  German tanks, trucks, andweapons, still not winterized, suffered operational malfunctions in the winteryconditions.  Furthermore, because of poorweather prevailing throughout much of Operation Typhoon, the Luftwaffe, whichhad proved decisive in earlier battles, had so far played virtually no part inthe Moscowcampaign.

The final German push for Moscow was undertaken with greatly depletedresources in manpower and logistical support, but the German High Command hadhoped that one final fierce and determined attack might overcome the last enemyresistance.  Then with the offensivefailing, the Germans turned to hold onto their positions, and correctlyassessed that the Soviet frontline forces were just as battered, but unawarethat large numbers of Red Army reserve armies were now in place and poised togo on the offensive.

On December 6, 1941, Soviet forces comprising the Western,Southwestern, and Kalinin Fronts, with estimates placing total troop strengthat 500,000 to 1.1 million, launched a powerful counter-attack that took theGermans completely by surprise.  TheSoviets initially made slow progress, but soon recaptured Solnechnogorsk onDecember 12 and Klin on December 15, and with the German lines crumbling,nearly trapped the German 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies in separate encirclementmaneuvers.

On December 8, 1941, Hitler ordered German forces to holdtheir lines, but on December 14, General Franz Halder, head of the German ArmyHigh Command, believing that the frontline could not be held, ordered a limitedwithdrawal behind the Oka River.  On December 20, a furious Hitler met withfrontline commanders and rescinded the withdrawal instruction, and ordered thatpresent lines be defended at all costs. A heated argument then ensued, with the generals pointing out thebattered conditions of the troops and that German casualties from the cold werehigher than those from actual combat.  OnDecember 25, Hitler dismissed forty high-ranking officers, including GeneralHeinz Guderian (2nd Panzer Army), General Erich Hoepner (4th Panzer Army), andGeneral Fedor von Bock (Army Group Center),the latter for “medical reasons”.  Oneweek earlier, Hitler had also fired General Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chiefof the German Armed Forces, and took over for himself the control of all Germanforces and all military decisions.

By late December 1941 to January 1942, the Red Armycounter-offensive was pushing back the Germans north, south, and west ofMoscow, with the Soviets retaking Naro-Fominsk (December 26), Kaluga (December28), and Maloyaroslavets (January 10). But on January 7, 1942, the Red Army, soon experiencing manpower lossesand extended supply lines, and increasing German resistance, halted its offensive,by then having driven back the Wehrmacht some 60-150 miles from Moscow.  The Luftwaffe, which thus far had been anon-factor, took advantage of a break in the weather and took to the skies,attacking Soviet positions and evacuating trapped German units, and provedinstrumental in averting the complete collapse of ArmyGroup Center,which had established new defense lines, including a section, called the RzhevSalient, which potentially could threaten Moscow.

November 6, 1956 – Suez Crisis: Britain announces a unilateral ceasefire, which ends fighting

On November 6, 1956, Britain,without consulting its allies France and Israel, announced a unilateralceasefire, ending nine days of fighting in the Suez Crisis. The reasons for theBritish sudden about-face in the midst of the fighting stem from both domesticand international pressures.  In London and other Britishcities, anti-war protests and demonstrations immediately broke out after thewar began.  The immense public supportfor starting war against Egyptafter Nasser seized the Suez Canal hadsubsided by the time of the invasion.

The Suez Crisis was a war between Egyptagainst the alliance of Britain,France, and Israel for control of the politically andeconomically vital Suez Canal, a man-modified shipping channel that connectsthe Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea.

(Taken from Suez Crisis – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 2)

Background TheSuez Canal in Egypt is aman-made shipping waterway that connects the Mediterranean Sea and the IndianOcean via the Red Sea (Map 7).  The Suez Canal was completed by a Frenchengineering firm in 1869 and thereafter became the preferred shipping and traderoute between Europe and Asia, as itconsiderably reduced the travel time and distance from the previous circuitousroute around the African continent. Since 1875, the facility was operated by an Anglo-French privateconglomerate.  By the twentieth century,nearly two-thirds of all oil tanker traffic to Europe passed through the Suez Canal.

In the late 1940s, a wave of nationalism swept across Egypt,leading to the overthrow of the ruling monarchy and the establishment of arepublic.  In 1951, intense publicpressure forced the Egyptian government to abolish the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of1936, although the agreement was yet to expire in three years.

With the rise in power of the Egyptian nationalists led byGamal Abdel Nasser (who later became president in 1956), Britain agreed to withdraw its military forcesfrom Egyptafter both countries signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954.  The last British troops left Egyptin June 1956.  Nevertheless, theagreement allowed the British to use its existing military base located nearthe Suez Canal for seven years and the possibility of its extension if Egyptwas attacked by a foreign power.  TheAnglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 and foreign control of the Suez Canal wereresented by many Egyptians, especially the nationalists, who believed thattheir country was still under semi-colonial rule and not truly sovereign.

Furthermore, President Nasser was hostile to Israel,which had dealt the Egyptian Army a crushing defeat in the 1948 Arab-IsraeliWar.  President Nasser wanted to startanother war with Israel.  Conversely, the Israeli government believedthat Egypt was behind theterrorist activities that were being carried out in Israel.  The Israelis also therefore were ready to goto war against Egyptto put an end to the terrorism.

Egypt andIsrael sought to increasetheir weapons stockpiles through purchases from their main suppliers, the United States, Britain,and France. The three Western powers, however, hadagreed among themselves to make arms sales equally and only in limitedquantities to Egypt and Israel,to prevent an arms race.

Friendly relations between Israeland France,however, were moving toward a military alliance.  By early 1955, Francewas sending large quantities of weapons to Israel.  In Egypt,President Nasser was indignant at the Americans’ conditions to sell him arms:that the weapons were not to be used against Israel,and that U.S. advisers wereto be allowed into Egypt.  President Nasser, therefore, approached theSoviet Union, which agreed to support Egypt militarily.  In September 1955, large amounts of Sovietweapons began to arrive in Egypt.

The United Statesand Britainwere infuriated.  The Americans believedthat Egypt was falling underthe sphere of influence of the Soviet Union,their Cold War enemy.  Adding to thisperception was that Egyptrecognized Red China.  Meanwhile, Britainfelt that its historical dominance in the Arab region was beingundermined.  The United States and Britain withdrew their earlierpromise to President Nasser to fund his ambitious project, the construction ofthe massive Aswan Dam.

Egyptian troops then seized the Suez Canal, which President Nasser immediately nationalized with thepurpose of using the profits from its operations to help build the AswanDam.  President Nasser ordered theAnglo-French firm operating the Suez Canal to leave; he also terminated thefirm’s contract, even though its 99-year lease with Egypt still was due toexpire in 12 years, in 1968.

The British and French governments were angered by Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal.  A few days later, Britain and Francedecided to take armed action: their military leaders met and began to preparefor an invasion of Egypt.  In September 1956, Franceand Israel also jointlyprepared for war against Egypt.