Daniel Orr's Blog, page 41

December 15, 1971 – Bangladesh War of Independence/Indian-Pakistani War of 1971: Indian forces capture Dhaka

On December 15, 1971, Indian forces entered Dhaka, thecapital of East Pakistan, capturing over90,000 Pakistani soldiers.  With the fallof East Pakistan, fighting in the westernsector of the Indian-Pakistani War of 1971 ended.

Following the war, Indiaand Pakistanentered into a number of agreements in the hope of resolving theirdifferences.  Indiareturned to Pakistan the90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war, as well as areas in Pakistan that it had capturedduring the war.  In exchange, Pakistan agreed to recognize Bangladesh’s independence.  Pakistani authorities then released SheikhMujibur Rahman, the jailed Bengali leader, who returned to Bangladesh and subsequently becamehis country’s first president.

(Taken from Bangladesh War of Independence and Indian-Pakistani War of 1971 – Wars of the 20th Century – Vol. 3)

Background In1947, the Indian subcontinent was partitioned (previous article) into two new countries: the Hindu-majority Indiaand the nearly exclusive Muslim Pakistan. Much of India wasformed from the subcontinent’s central and eastern regions, while Pakistan comprised two geographically separateregions that became West Pakistan (located in the northwest) and East Pakistan (located in the southeast).

From its inception, Pakistanexperienced a great disparity between West Pakistan and East Pakistan.  The nationalcapital was located in West Pakistan, fromwhere all major political and governmental decisions were made.  Military and foreign policies emanated fromthere as well.  West Pakistan also held a monopoly on the country’s financial,industrial, and social affairs.  Much ofthe country’s wealth entered, remained in, and was apportioned to theWest.  These factors resulted in WestPakistan being much wealthier than East Pakistan.  And all this despite East Pakistan having ahigher population than West Pakistan.

In the 1960s, East Pakistancalled for social and economic reforms and greater regional autonomy, but wasignored by the national government.  Thenin 1970, the Amawi League, East Pakistan’s main political party, won a stunninglandslide victory in the national elections, but was prevented from taking overthe government by the ruling civilian-military coalition regime, which fearedthat a new civilian government would reduce the military’s influence on thecountry’s political affairs.

Leaders from East Pakistan and West Pakistan tried to negotiate a solution to the political impasse,but failed to reach an agreement.  Havingbeen prevented from forming a new government, Mujibur Rahman, East Pakistan’s leader, called on East Pakistanis to carry out acts ofcivil disobedience.

In Dhaka, the EastPakistani capital, thousands of residents undertook mass demonstrations thatparalyzed commercial, public, and civilian functions.  On March 25, 1971, the Pakistani Armyarrested and jailed Mujibur, who then declared while in prison the secession ofEast Pakistan from Pakistanand the founding of the independent state of Bangladesh.  Mujibur’s supporters aired the declaration ofindependence on broadcast radio throughout East Pakistan.

East Pakistanis then organized the Mukti Bahini, a guerillamilitia whose ranks were filled by ethnic Bengali soldiers who had defectedfrom the Pakistani Army.  As armedclashes began to break out in Dhaka, the national government sent more troopsto East Pakistan.  Much of the fighting took place in April-May1971, where government forces prevailed, forcing the rebels to flee to theIndian states of West Bengal and Tripura.  The Pakistani Army then turned on thecivilian population to weed out nationalists and rebel supporters.  The soldiers targeted all sectors of society– the upper classes of the political, academic, and business elite, as well asthe lower classes consisting of urban and rural workers, farmers, andvillagers.  In the wave of violence andsuppression that took place, tens of thousands of East Pakistanis were killed,while some ten million civilians fled to the Indian states of West Bengal, Tripura, Assam,Bihar, and Meghalaya.

As East Pakistani refugees flooded into India, the Indian government calledon the United Nations (UN) to intervene, but received no satisfactoryresponse.  As nearly 50% of the refugeeswere Hindus, to the Indian government, this meant that the causes of the unrestin East Pakistan were religious as well aspolitical.  (During the partition of theIndian subcontinent in 1947, a massive cross-border migration of Hindus andMuslims had taken place; by the 1970s, however, East Pakistan, still containeda significant 14% Hindu population.)

Since its independence, Indiahad fought two wars against Pakistanand faced the perennial threat of fighting against or being attackedsimultaneously from East Pakistan and West Pakistan.  Indiatherefore saw that the crisis in East Pakistan yielded one benefit – if thethreat from East Pakistan was eliminated, India would not have to face thethreat of a war on two fronts.  Thus,just two days into the uprising in East Pakistan,India began to secretlysupport the independence of Bangladesh.  The Indian Army covertly trained, armed, andfunded the East Pakistani rebels, which within a few months, grew to a force of100,000 fighters.

In May 1975, Indiafinalized preparations for an invasion of East Pakistan,but moved the date of the operation to later in the year when the Himalayanborder passes were inaccessible to a possible attack by the Chinese Army.  Indiahad been defeated by Chinain the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and thus was wary of Chinese intentions, more sosince China and Pakistan maintained friendly relations and bothconsidered Indiatheir common enemy.  As a result, India entered into a defense treaty with theSoviet Union that guaranteed Soviet intervention in case India was attacked by a foreignpower.

In late spring and summer of 1971, East Pakistani rebelsbased in West Bengal entered East Pakistan andcarried out guerilla attacks against the Pakistani Army.  These infiltration attacks includedsabotaging military installations and attacking patrols, outposts, and otherlightly defended army positions. Government forces threw back the attacks and sometimes entered into Indiain pursuit of the rebels.

By October 1971, the Indian Army became involved in thefighting, providing artillery support for rebel infiltrations and even openlyengaging the Pakistani Army in medium-scale ground and air battles along theborder areas near Garibpur and Boyra (Map 14).

December 14, 1971 – Bangladesh War of Independence: The Pakistan Army execute hundreds of East Pakistani intellectuals and elite

On December 14, 1971,Pakistani soldiers in Dhaka went on a rampageand killed hundreds of Hindus, particularly targeting Bengali intellectuals andthose belonging to the upper class.  TheIndian Army entered the capital on December 15, 1971 and took prisoner over90,000 Pakistani soldiers who surrendered. With the fall of East Pakistan,fighting in the western sector ended as well.

(Taken from Bangladesh War of Independence / Indian-Pakistani War of 1971 – Wars of the 20th Century –Vol. 3)

The Bangladesh War of Independence beganas a civilian uprising in East Pakistan that escalated into a civil war betweenEast Pakistan and West Pakistan.  India intervened in the civil war,sparking the Indian-Pakistani War of 1971.  Inthe aftermath of the two wars, East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan and formed the new state of Bangladesh.

Background In 1947, the Indian subcontinent waspartitioned (previous article) intotwo new countries (Map 13): theHindu-majority Indiaand the nearly exclusive Muslim Pakistan. Much of India wasformed from the subcontinent’s central and eastern regions, while Pakistan comprised two geographically separateregions that became West Pakistan (located in the northwest) and East Pakistan (located in the southeast).

From its inception, Pakistanexperienced a great disparity between West Pakistan and East Pakistan.  The national capital was located in West Pakistan, from where all major political andgovernmental decisions were made. Military and foreign policies emanated from there as well.  West Pakistanalso held a monopoly on the country’s financial, industrial, and socialaffairs.  Much of the country’s wealthentered, remained in, and was apportioned to the West.  These factors resulted in West Pakistan beingmuch wealthier than East Pakistan.  And all this despite East Pakistan having ahigher population than West Pakistan.

In the 1960s, East Pakistancalled for social and economic reforms and greater regional autonomy, but wasignored by the national government.  Thenin 1970, the Amawi League, East Pakistan’s mainpolitical party, won a stunning landslide victory in the national elections,but was prevented from taking over the government by the rulingcivilian-military coalition regime, which feared that a new civilian governmentwould reduce the military’s influence on the country’s political affairs.

Leaders from East Pakistan and West Pakistan tried to negotiate a solution to the political impasse,but failed to reach an agreement.  Havingbeen prevented from forming a new government, Mujibur Rahman, East Pakistan’s leader, called on East Pakistanis to carry out acts ofcivil disobedience.

In Dhaka, the EastPakistani capital, thousands of residents undertook mass demonstrations thatparalyzed commercial, public, and civilian functions.  On March 25, 1971, the Pakistani Armyarrested and jailed Mujibur, who then declared while in prison the secession ofEast Pakistan from Pakistanand the founding of the independent state of Bangladesh.  Mujibur’s supporters aired the declaration ofindependence on broadcast radio throughout East Pakistan.

East Pakistanis then organized the Mukti Bahini, a guerilla militiawhose ranks were filled by ethnic Bengali soldiers who had defected from thePakistani Army.  As armed clashes beganto break out in Dhaka, the national government sent more troops to East Pakistan. Much of the fighting took place in April-May 1971, where governmentforces prevailed, forcing the rebels to flee to the Indian states of West Bengal and Tripura. The Pakistani Army then turned on the civilian population to weed outnationalists and rebel supporters.  Thesoldiers targeted all sectors of society – the upper classes of the political,academic, and business elite, as well as the lower classes consisting of urbanand rural workers, farmers, and villagers.  In the wave of violence and suppression thattook place, tens of thousands of East Pakistanis were killed, while some tenmillion civilians fled to the Indian states of West Bengal, Tripura,Assam, Bihar,and Meghalaya.

As East Pakistani refugees flooded into India,the Indian government called on the United Nations (UN) to intervene, butreceived no satisfactory response.  Asnearly 50% of the refugees were Hindus, to the Indian government, this meantthat the causes of the unrest in East Pakistanwere religious as well as political. (During the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, a massivecross-border migration of Hindus and Muslims had taken place; by the 1970s,however, East Pakistan, still contained a significant 14% Hindu population.)

Since its independence, Indiahad fought two wars against Pakistanand faced the perennial threat of fighting against or being attackedsimultaneously from East Pakistan and West Pakistan.  Indiatherefore saw that the crisis in East Pakistan yielded one benefit – if thethreat from East Pakistan was eliminated, India would not have to face thethreat of a war on two fronts.  Thus,just two days into the uprising in East Pakistan,India began to secretlysupport the independence of Bangladesh.  The Indian Army covertly trained, armed, andfunded the East Pakistani rebels, which within a few months, grew to a force of100,000 fighters.

In May 1975, Indiafinalized preparations for an invasion of East Pakistan,but moved the date of the operation to later in the year when the Himalayanborder passes were inaccessible to a possible attack by the Chinese Army.  Indiahad been defeated by Chinain the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and thus was wary of Chinese intentions, more sosince China and Pakistan maintained friendly relations and bothconsidered Indiatheir common enemy.  As a result, India entered into a defense treaty with theSoviet Union that guaranteed Soviet intervention in case India was attacked by a foreignpower.

December 13, 1942 – World War II: The German Army attempts to relieve the trapped forces at Stalingrad

In early December 1942, General Erich von Manstein, commanderof the newly formed German Army Group Don, which was tasked with securing thegap between German Army Groups A and B, was ready to launch a relief operationto Stalingrad. Began on December 12 under Operation Winter Storm, German Army Group Donsucceeded in punching a hold in the Soviet ring and advanced rapidly, pushingaside surprised Red Army units, and came to within 30 miles of Stalingrad onDecember 19.  Through an officer that wassent to Stalingrad, General Manstein askedGeneral Paulus to make a break out towards Army Group Don; he also sentcommunication to Hitler to allow the trapped forces to break out.  Hitler and General Paulus both refused.  General Paulus cited the lack of trucks andfuel and the poor state of his troops to attempt a break out, and that hiscontinued hold on Stalingrad would tie down large numbers of Soviet forceswhich would allow German Army Group A to retreat from the Caucasus.

On December 23, 1942, Manstein canceled the relief operationand withdrew his forces behind German lines, forced to do so by the threat ofbeing encircled by Soviet forces that meanwhile had launched Operation LittleSaturn.  Operation Little Saturn was amodification of the more ambitious Operation Saturn, which aimed to trap GermanArmy Group A in the Caucasus, but was rapidly readjusted to counter GeneralManstein’s surprise offensive to Stalingrad.  But Operation Little Saturn, the Sovietencirclement of Stalingrad, and the trapped Axis forces so unnerved Hitler thaton his orders, German Army Group A hastily withdrew from the Caucasusin late December 1942.  German 17th Armywould continue to hold onto the Taman Peninsula in the Black Sea coast, and planned to usethis as a jump-off point for a possible future second attempt to invade the Caucasus.

(Taken from Battle of Stalingrad – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe: Vol. 6)

Meanwhile to the north, German Army Group B, tasked withcapturing Stalingrad and securing the Volga, began its advance to the Don River on July 23, 1942.  The German advance was stalled by fierceresistance, as the delays of the previous weeks had allowed the Soviets tofortify their defenses.  By then, theGerman intent was clear to Stalin and the Soviet High Command, which thenreorganized Red Army forces in the Stalingradsector and rushed reinforcements to the defense of the Don.  Not only was German Army Group B delayed bythe Soviets that had began to launch counter-attacks in the Axis’ northernflank (which were held by Italian and Hungarian armies), but also byover-extended supply lines and poor road conditions.

On August 10, 1942, German 6th Army had moved to the westbank of the Don, although strong Soviet resistance persisted in the north.  On August 22, German forces establishedbridgeheads across the Don, which was crossed the next day, with panzers andmobile spearheads advancing across the remaining 36 miles of flat plains to Stalingrad.  OnAugust 23, German 14th Panzer Division reached the VolgaRiver north of Stalingradand fought off Soviet counter-attacks, while the Luftwaffe began a bombingblitz of the city that would continue through to the height of the battle, whenmost of the buildings would be destroyed and the city turned to rubble.

On August 29, 1942, two Soviet armies (the 62nd and 64th)barely escaped being encircled by the German 4th Panzer Army and armored unitsof German 6th Army, both escaping to Stalingrad and ensuring that the battlefor the city would be long, bloody, and difficult.

On September 12, 1942, German forces entered Stalingrad, starting what would be a four-month longbattle.  From mid-September to earlyNovember, the Germans, confident of victory, launched three major attacks tooverwhelm all resistance, which gradually pushed back the Soviets east towardthe banks of the Volga.

By contrast, the Soviets suffered from low morale, but werecompelled to fight, since they had no option to retreat beyond the Volga because of Stalin’s “Not one step back!”order.  Stalin also (initially) refusedto allow civilians to be evacuated, stating that “soldiers fight better for analive city than for a dead one”.  Hewould later allow civilian evacuation after being advised by his top generals.

Soviet artillery from across the Volgaand cross-river attempts to bring in Red Army reinforcements were suppressed bythe Luftwaffe, which controlled the sky over the battlefield.  Even then, Soviet troops and suppliescontinued to reach Stalingrad, enough to keepup resistance.  The ruins of the cityturned into a great defensive asset, as Soviet troops cleverly used the rubbleand battered buildings as concealed strong points, traps, and killingzones.  To negate the Germans’ airsuperiority, Red Army units were ordered to keep the fighting lines close tothe Germans, to deter the Luftwaffe from attacking and inadvertently causingfriendly fire casualties to its own forces.

The battle for Stalingradturned into one of history’s fiercest, harshest, and bloodiest struggles forsurvival, the intense close-quarter combat being fought building-to-buildingand floor-to-floor, and in cellars and basements, and even in the sewers.  Surprise encounters in such close distancessometimes turned into hand-to-hand combat using knives and bayonets.

By mid-November 1942, the Germans controlled 90% of thecity, and had pushed back the Soviets to a small pocket with four shallowbridgeheads some 200 yards from the Volga.  By then, most of German 6th Army was lockedin combat in the city, while its outer flanks had become dangerouslyvulnerable, as they were protected only by the weak armies of its Axispartners, the Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians.  Two weeks earlier, Hitler, believingStalingrad’s capture was assured, redeployed a large part of the Luftwaffe tothe fighting in North Africa.

Unbeknown to the Germans, in the previous months, the SovietHigh Command had been sending large numbers of Red Army formations to the northand southeast of Stalingrad.  While only intending to use these units insporadic counter-attacks in support of Stalingrad, by November 1942, Stalin andhis top generals had reorganized these forces for a major counter-offensivecodenamed Operation Uranus involving an enormous force of 1.1 million troops,1,000 tanks, 14,000 artillery pieces, and 1,300 planes, aimed at cutting offand encircling German 6th Army and units of 7th Panzer Army in Stalingrad.  German intelligence had detected the Sovietbuildup, but Hitler ignored the warning of his general staff, as by now he wasfirmly set on taking Stalingrad at all costs.

On November 19, 1942, the Soviet High Command launchedOperation Uranus, a double envelopment maneuver, with the Soviet SouthwesternFront attacking the Axis northern flank held by the Romanian 3rd Army.  The next day, the Soviet Stalingrad Frontthrust from the south of the Axis flank, with the brunt of the attack fallingon Romanian 4th Army. The two Romanian Armies, lacking sufficient anti-tankweapons and supported only with 100 obsolete tanks, were overwhelmed by sheernumbers, and on November 22, the two arms of the Soviet pincers linked up atKalach.  German 6th Army, elements of 4thPanzer Army, and remnants of the Romanian armies, comprising some250,000-300,000 troops, were trapped in a giant pocket in Stalingrad.

The German High Command asked Hitler to allow the trappedforces to make a break out, which was refused. Also on many occasions, General Friedrich Paulus, commander of German6th Army, made similar appeals to Hitler, but was turned down.  Instead, on November 24, 1942, Hitler advisedGeneral Paulus to hold his position at Stalingraduntil reinforcements could be sent or a new German offensive could break theencirclement.  In the meantime, thetrapped forces would be supplied from the air. Hitler had been assured by Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering that the 700tons/day required at Stalingrad could bedelivered with German transport planes. However, the Luftwaffe was unable to deliver the needed amount, despitethe addition of more transports for the operation, and the trapped forces in Stalingrad soon experienced dwindling supplies of food,medical supplies, and ammunition.  Withthe onset of winter and the temperature dropping to –30°C (–22°F), anincreasing number of Axis troops, yet without adequate winter clothing,suffered from frostbite.  At this timealso, the Soviet air force had began to achieve technological and combat paritywith the Luftwaffe, challenging it for control of the skies and shooting downincreasing numbers of German planes.

Meanwhile, the Red Army strengthened the cordon aroundStalingrad, and launched a series of attacks that slowly pushed the trappedforces to an ever-shrinking perimeter in an area just west of Stalingrad.

In early December 1942, General Erich von Manstein,commander of the newly formed German Army Group Don, which was tasked withsecuring the gap between German Army Groups A and B, was ready to launch arelief operation to Stalingrad.  Began on December 12 under Operation WinterStorm, German Army Group Don succeeded in punching a hold in the Soviet ringand advanced rapidly, pushing aside surprised Red Army units, and came towithin 30 miles of Stalingrad on December 19. Through an officer that was sent to Stalingrad,General Manstein asked General Paulus to make a break out towards Army GroupDon; he also sent communication to Hitler to allow the trapped forces to breakout.  Hitler and General Paulus bothrefused.  General Paulus cited the lackof trucks and fuel and the poor state of his troops to attempt a break out, andthat his continued hold on Stalingrad would tie down large numbers of Sovietforces which would allow German Army Group A to retreat from the Caucasus.

On December 23, 1942, Manstein canceled the relief operationand withdrew his forces behind German lines, forced to do so by the threat ofbeing encircled by Soviet forces that meanwhile had launched Operation LittleSaturn.  Operation Little Saturn was amodification of the more ambitious Operation Saturn, which aimed to trap GermanArmy Group A in the Caucasus, but was rapidly readjusted to counter GeneralManstein’s surprise offensive to Stalingrad.  But Operation Little Saturn, the Sovietencirclement of Stalingrad, and the trapped Axis forces so unnerved Hitler thaton his orders, German Army Group A hastily withdrew from the Caucasusin late December 1942.  German 17th Armywould continue to hold onto the Taman Peninsula in the Black Sea coast, and planned to usethis as a jump-off point for a possible future second attempt to invade the Caucasus.

Meanwhile in Stalingrad, byearly January 1943, the situation for the trapped German forces grewdesperate.  On January 10, the Red Armylaunched a major attack to finally eliminate the Stalingradpocket after its demand to surrender was rejected by General Paulus.  On January 25, the Soviets captured the lastGerman airfield at Stalingrad, and despite theLuftwaffe now resorting to air-dropping supplies, the trapped forces ran low onfood and ammunition.

With the battle for Stalingradlost, on January 31, 1943, Hitler promoted General Paulus to the rank of FieldMarshal, hinting that the latter should take his own life rather than becaptured.  Instead, on February 2,General Paulus surrendered to the Red Army, along with his trapped forces,which by now numbered only 110,000 troops. Casualties on both sides in the battle of Stalingrad, one of thebloodiest in history, are staggering, with the Axis losing 850,000 troops, 500tanks, 6,000 artillery pieces, and 900 planes; and the Soviets losing 1.1million troops, 4,300 tanks, 15,000 artillery pieces, and 2,800 planes.  The German debacle at Stalingrad andwithdrawal from the Caucasus effectively endedCase Blue, and like Operation Barbarossa in the previous year, resulted inanother German failure.

December 12, 2000 – Ethiopian-Eritrean War: Ethiopia and Eritrea sign a peace agreement

On December 12, 2000,under the auspices of the Algerian government, Ethiopia and Eritrea officiallyended the war with the Algiers Agreement, whose important stipulations includedan exchange of war prisoners, return of displaced persons to their homes andlands, and formation of a Boundary Commission to study and demarcate a commonborder, and a Claims Commission to assess war damages and decide on liabilitiesand reparations.  Pursuant to the AlgiersAgreement, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) was formed in collaborationwith the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA, based in The Hague,Netherlands), tasked to “delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border basedon pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicableinternational law”.  Both Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to abide by theEEBC/PCA ruling which was to be “final and binding”.

(Taken from Ethiopian-Eritrean War – Wars of the 20th Century – Vol. 4)

In September 1952, the UNmerged Eritrea with Ethiopia as the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation,which granted Eritreabroad political autonomy under Ethiopian sovereignty.  Pro-independence sentiments among Eritreanswere strong, however, and when the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie, graduallytook away Eritrea’s autonomy, a process that led in November 1962 to thedissolution of the federation and Ethiopia’s outright annexation of Eritrea asa province, Eritreans rose up in rebellion and launched what ultimately turnedinto a thirty-year struggle for independence (previous article).

In the midst of Eritrea’sindependence war, in 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed in a militarycoup and a council of army officers called “Derg” came to power.  The Derg regime experienced great politicalupheavals initially arising from internal power struggles, as well as theEritrean insurgency and other ethnic-based armed rebellions; in 1977-78, theDerg also was involved in a war with neighboring Somalia (the Ogaden War, separate article).

By the early 1990s, theEthiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of Ethiopianrebel groups, had formed a military alliance with the EPLF and separatelyaccelerated their insurgencies against the Derg regime.  In May 1991, the EPRDF toppled the Derg regime,while the EPLF seized control of Eritrea by defeating and expellingEthiopian government forces.  Both theEPRDF and EPLF then gained power in Ethiopiaand Eritrea,respectively, with these rebel movements transitioning into politicalparties.  Under a UN-facilitated processand with the Ethiopian government’s approval, Eritreaofficially seceded from Ethiopiaand, following a referendum where nearly 100% of Eritreans voted forindependence, achieved statehood as a fully sovereign state.

Because of their war-timemilitary alliance, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea maintained a closerelationship and signed an Agreement of Friendship of Cooperation thatenvisioned a comprehensive package of mutually beneficial political, economic,and social joint endeavors; subsequent treaties were made in the hope ofintegrating the two countries in a broad range of other fields.

Both states nominallywere democracies but with strong authoritarian leaders, Prime Minister MelesZenawi in Ethiopiaand President Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea. State and politicalstructures differed, however, with Ethiopiaestablishing an ethnic-based multi-party federal parliamentary system and Eritreasetting up a staunchly nationalistic, one-party unitary system.  Eritreaalso maintained a strong militaristic culture, acquired from its longindependence struggle, for which in the years after gaining independence, itcame into conflict with its neighbors, i.e. Yemen,Djibouti, and Sudan.

Ethiopian-Eritreanrelations soon also deteriorated as a result of political differences, as wellas the personal rivalry between the two countries’ leaders.  Furthermore, during their revolutionarystruggles, the Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel groups sometimes came into directconflict over projecting power and controlling territory, which was overcomeonly by their mutual need to defeat a common enemy.  In the post-war period, this acrimonioushistorical past now took on greater significance.  Relations turned for the worse when inNovember 1997, Eritreaintroduced its own currency, the “nakfa” (which replaced the Ethiopian birr),in order to steer its own independent local and foreign economic and tradepolicies.  During the post-war period,trade between Ethiopia and Eritrea was significant, and Eritrea gave special privileges to the nowlandlocked Ethiopia to usethe port of Assab for Ethiopian maritime trade.  But with Eritreaintroducing its own currency, Ethiopiabanned the use of the nakfa in all but the smallest transactions, causing tradebetween the two states to plummet. Trucks carrying goods soon were backed up at the border crossings andthe two sides now saw the need to delineate the as yet unmarked border tocontrol cross-border trade.

Meanwhile, disputes inthe frontier region in and around the town of Badme had experienced a steady increase.  As early as 1992, Eritrean regional officialscomplained that Ethiopian armed bands descended on Eritrean villages, andexpelled Eritrean residents and destroyed their homes.  In July 1994, regional Ethiopian and Eritreanrepresentatives met to discuss the matter, but harassments, expulsions, andarrests of Eritreans continued to be reported in 1994-1996.  Then in April 1994, the Eritrean governmentbecame aware that Ethiopiahad carried out a number of demarcations along the Badme area, prompting anexchange of letters by Prime Minister Zenawi and President Afwerki.  In November 1994, a joint panel was set up bythe two sides to try and resolve the matter; however, this effort made nosubstantial progress.  In the midst ofthe Badme affair, another crisis broke out inJuly-August 1997 where Ethiopian troops entered another undemarcated frontierarea in pursuit of the insurgent group ARDUF (AfarRevolutionary Democratic Unity Front or AfarRevolutionary Democratic Union Front);then when Ethiopia set up a local administration in the area, Eritreaprotested, leading to firefights between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

Another source offriction between the two countries was generated when, starting in 1993, theregional administration in Tigray Province (in northern Ethiopia) published“administrative and fiscal” maps of Tigray that included the Badme area and anumber of Eritrean villages that lay beyond the 1902 colonial-era and de facto “border” line.  Since the 1950s, Tigray had administered thisarea and had established settlements there. In turn, Eritreadeclared that the area had been encroached as it formed part of the EritreanGash-Barka region.

Badme, a 160-square milearea that became the trigger for the coming war, was located in the wider Badmeplains, the latter forming a section of the vast semi-desert lowlands adjoiningthe Ethiopian mountains and stretching west to the Sudan.  During the early 20th century whenthe Ethiopian-Italian border treaties were made, Badme was virtuallyuninhabited, save for the local endemic Kunama tribal people.  The 1902 treaty, which became the de facto border between the EthiopianEmpire and Italian Eritrea in the western and central regions, stipulated thatthe border, heading from west to east, ran starting from Khor Um Hagger in theSudanese border, followed the Tekezze (Setit) River to its confluence with theMaieteb River, at which point it ran a straight line north to where the MarebRiver converges with the Ambessa River (Figure 32).  Thereafter, the border followed a generaleastward direction along the Mareb, through the smaller MelessaRiver, and finally along the Muna River.  In turn, the 1908 treaty specified that theborder along the eastern regions would follow the outlines of the Red Sea coastline from a distance of 60 kilometersinland.  These treaties have since beenupheld by successive Ethiopian governments, whose maps have followed thetreaties’ delineations to form a border that is otherwise unmarked on theground.

December 11, 1981 – Salvadoran Civil War: Government forces perpetrate the El Mozote Massacre

A Salvadoran military unit, the Atlacatl Battalion, whosecommanders were trained in the U.S. Army-run School of the Americas, was particularly fearedby the rural population during the Salvadoran Civil War (1979-1992).  In December 1981, in a major ground sweep inrebel-held areas in Morazan Province, the AtlacatlBattalion became involved in the so-called El Mozote Massacre, which took placein December 11, 1981, where some 700 to 900 residents were killed.  These soldiers are also believed to havecarried out the El Calabozo Massacre, which took place on August 21-22, 1982,where, on the bank of the Amatitán River, located in SanVicente Province, some 200 fleeing civilians were shot and killed.  The killings were prompted by the perceptionthat these civilians were members of or actively supported the insurgency.

(Taken from Salvadoran Civil War – Wars of the 20th Century – 26 Wars in the Americas and the Caribbean: Vol. 7)

Background Duringthe 1970s, El Salvadorexperienced great social unrest as a result of a number of factors: an unstablepolitical climate, economic problems, an entrenched system of economic andsocial inequalities, and a growing population competing for an increasinglylimited amount of resources.  Thelong-repressed lower social classes, which form the vast majority of thepopulation, had become radicalized, and advocated both militant and violentmethods of expression.  In turn, thegovernment imposed harsh measures against threats to its authority.

At the heart of the conflict was the country’s economicallypolarized social classes, the unequal distribution of wealth, resources, andpower between the small Spanish-descended elite and the vast majority ofAmerindian and mestizo (mixed American-European descendants) populations. Sincethe colonial era when the Spanish Crown gave out vast tracts of lands topersonal favorites through royal patents, just 2% of the population (theso-called “Fourteen Families”) owned 60% of all arable land, which subsequentlywas converted to latifundia, i.e. vast plantations that produced coffee beans,and later, sugarcane and cotton, for the lucrative export market.  Some 60% of the rural population did not ownland, and of those who did, 95% of them owned farmlands too small to subsiston.

Apart from controlling the economy, the biggest landownersheld a monopoly on the governmental, political and military infrastructures ofthe country.  Government policies favoredthe oligarchy and thus widened the economic gap, limiting available resourcesand opportunities to the lower classes, and relegating the vast majority to become(exploited) plantation farm hands in the primarily agricultural economy thatexisted for much of the 19th and 20th centuries.

In 1932, peasants in the western provinces, supported by thenascent Salvadoran Communist Party, rose up in rebellion because of economichardships caused by the ongoing Great Depression.  Government forces put down the rebellion andthen carried out a campaign of extermination against the Pipil indigenouspopulation, whom they believed were communists who had supported the uprisingthat was aimed at overthrowing the government. Some 30,000 Pipil civilians were killed in the military repression.

For nearly five decades thereafter (1932-1979), the countrywas ruled by a long line of military leaders (under a façade of democracy),including one military-controlled civilian government.  The military’s hard-line rule suppresseddissent and promoted the interests of the upper class.  But in 1959, Fidel Castro’s communist victoryin the Cuban Revolution profoundly altered the political and security paradigmin the Western Hemisphere, and challenged for the first time United States hegemony and theregion’s democratic, economic, and social institutions.  Consequently, revolutionary groups sprung upall across Latin America to initiate armedstruggles aimed at toppling democratic and military governments, and thensetting up communist regimes.

In El Salvador, the local Communist Party was revitalizedafter a long hiatus; in 1970, dissenting elements that advocated armedrevolution broke away from the party and reorganized as the Popular LiberationForces “Farabundo Marti” (FPL; Spanish: Fuerzas Populares de Liberación“Farabundo Martí”), an armed group that carried out a rural-basedguerilla war against the government. Other communist insurgent groups soon formed as well, including thePeople’s Revolutionary Army (ERP; Spanish: Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo),formed in 1972, and the National Resistance (RN; Spanish: La ResistenciaNacional), formed in 1975.

Revolutionary activity at this time did not seriouslythreaten the government; the focus of leftist radicalism was on “mobilizing themasses”, where clandestine Marxist-leftist groups organized or formed allianceswith Salvadoran Communist Party-affiliated peasant groups, labor unions, andstudent movements that carried out labor strikes, street protests, and mediacampaigns in San Salvador, the country’s capital, that called for reforms andbetter working and living conditions, as well as create a climate that wouldencourage a general uprising.  Theseclandestine groups often had an armed wing that conducted terror activitiesagainst conservative groups (landowners, businessmen, military officers,right-wing politicians, etc.), targeting them with assassinations, kidnappings,and extortions.  Worth noting is thatwhile these clandestine groups derived much of their support from the “masses”,they also received substantial financial backing from secret sympathizers fromthe upper classes, even some among the wealthiest.

In the 1960s, a middle-ground political force emerged, theChristian Democratic Party, which was led by middle-class professionals whorejected left-wing and right-wing politics and advocated a moderate, centristline that they believed led to political stability and greater economic parity,conditions that were favorable to the growth of the country’s middleclass.  These political centrists, led byJosé Napoleón Duarte, initially had little support but soon expanded to becomea major political force by the early 1970s. In presidential elections held in February 1972, Duarte won the popular vote, but thegovernment used fraud that allowed the candidate who was a military officer towin.  In the highly charged, unstableclimate of the Cold War, the right-wing government viewed politics ofmoderation as threatening and even communist-leaning.

The Salvadoran insurgency received a great boost when inJuly 1979, Sandinista communist rebels in nearby Nicaragua deposed pro-U.S. dictatorAnastacio Somoza.  In El Salvador, now ruled by General CarlosHumberto Romero, an increase in urban violence and rural insurgent action tookplace in the period leading up to the Marxist victory in Nicaragua.  In response, the Salvadoran governmentintensified repressive measures in urban areas and military operations in thecountryside.  In towns and cities, thegovernment’s internal  security forces(National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police) organized “death squads”to kill leaders of peasant, labor, and student organizations, leftistpoliticians, academics, journalists, and many others whom they regarded ascommunists.  Hundreds were arrested andjailed, tortured, and executed or “disappeared”.

In October 1979, a group of army officers, alarmed that theincreasing violence was creating conditions favorable to a communist take-oversimilar to that which occurred in Nicaragua, carried out a coup thatdeposed General Romero.  A five-membercivilian and military junta, called the Revolutionary Junta Government (JRG;Spanish: Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno) was formed to rule the country untilsuch that time that elections could be held. In March 1980, after some restructuring, Duarte joined the junta and eventually tookover its leadership to become the country’s de facto head of state.  The junta was openly supported by the United States, which viewed Duarte’scentrist politics as the best chance to preserve democracy in El Salvador.

However, neither the coup nor the junta altered the powerstructures, and the military continued to wield full (albeit covert) authorityover state matters.  The juntaimplemented agrarian reform and nationalized some key industries, but theseprograms were strongly opposed by the oligarchy.  Militias and “death squads” that the juntaordered the military to disband simply were replaced with other armedgroups.  The years 1980 and 1981 saw agreat increase in the military’s suppression of dissent.

December 10, 1950 – Korean War: UN troops are evacuated at Hungnam, North Korea

By December 8, 1950, General DouglasMacArthur had ordered theU.S. X Corps to withdraw from the eastern sector and set up a defensive linearound the port of Hungnam for a full evacuation from North Korea.  On December 10-24, 1950, the U.S. militarycarried out the largest naval evacuation in American history, with 193 ships atHungnam evacuating some 100,000 soldiers, 100,000 North Korean civilians (whochose to defect to South Korea), 17,000 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies.

(Taken from Korean War – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia: Vol. 5)

AftermathUnder the armistice agreement, the frontline at the time of the ceasefirebecame the armistice line, which extended from coast to coast some 40 milesnorth of the 38th parallel in the east, to 20miles south of the 38th parallel in the west, or anet territorial loss of 1,500 square miles to North Korea.  Three days after the agreement was signed,both sides withdrew to a distance of two kilometers from the ceasefire line,thus creating a four-kilometer demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the opposingforces.

The armistice agreement alsostipulated the repatriation of POWs, a major point of contention during thetalks, where both parties compromised and agreed to the formation of anindependent body, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), toimplement the exchange of prisoners.  TheNNRC, chaired by General K.S. Thimayya from India, subsequently launchedOperation Big Switch, where in August-December 1953, some 70,000 North Koreanand 5,500 Chinese POWs, and 12,700 UN POWs (including 7,800 South Koreans,3,600 Americans, and 900 British), were repatriated.  Some 22,000 Chinese/North Korean POWs refusedto be repatriated – the 14,000 Chinese prisoners who refused repatriationeventually moved to the Republic of China (Taiwan), where they were givencivilian status.  Much to the astonishmentof U.S. and British authorities, 21 American and 1 British (together with 325South Korean) POWs also refused to be repatriated, and chose to move toChina.  All POWs on both sides whorefused to be repatriated were given 90 days to change their minds, as requiredunder the armistice agreement.

The armistice line wasconceived only as a separation of forces, and not as an international borderbetween the two Korean states.  TheKorean Armistice Agreement called on the two rival Korean governments to negotiatea peaceful resolution to reunify the Korean Peninsula.  In the international Geneva Conference heldin April-July 1954, which aimed to achieve a political settlement to the recentwar in Korea (as well as in Indochina, seeFirst Indochina War, separate article),North Korea and South Korea, backed by their major power sponsors, eachproposed a political settlement, but which was unacceptable to the otherside.  As a result, by the end of theGeneva Conference on June 15, 1953, no resolution was adopted, leaving theKorean issue unresolved.

Since then, the Korean Peninsulahas remained divided along the 1953 armistice line, with the 248-kilometer long DMZ, which was originallymeant to be a military buffer zone, becoming the de facto border between North Koreaand South Korea.  No peace treaty was signed, with thearmistice agreement being a ceasefire only. Thus, a state of war officially continues to exist between the two Koreas.  Also as stipulated by the Korean ArmisticeAgreement, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was established,comprising contingents from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland,tasked with ensuring that no new foreign military personnel and weapons arebrought into Korea.

Because of the constant stateof high tension between the two Korean states, the DMZ has since remainedheavily defended and is the most militarily fortified place on Earth.  Situated at the armistice line in Panmunjomis the Joint Security Area, a conference center where representatives from thetwo Koreashold negotiations periodically.  Sincethe end of the Korean War, there exists the constant threat of a new war, whichis exacerbated by the many incidents initiated by North Korea against South Korea.  Some of these incidents include: thehijacking by a North Korean agent of a South Korean commercial airliner inDecember 1969; the North Korean abductions of South Korean civilians; thefailed assassination attempt by North Korean commandos of South KoreanPresident Park Chung-hee in January 1968; the sinking of a South Korean navalvessel, the ROKS Cheonon, in March2010, which the South Korean government blamed was caused by a torpedo fired bya North Korean submarine (North Korea denied any involvement), and the discoveryof a number of underground tunnels along the DMZ which South Korea has saidwere built by North Korea to be used as an invasion route to the south.

Furthermore, in October 2006,North Koreaannounced that it had detonated its first nuclear bomb, and has since statedthat it possesses nuclear weapons.  With North Koreaaggressively pursuing its nuclear weapons capability, as evidenced by a numberof nuclear tests being carried out over the years, the peninsular crisis hasthreatened to expand to regional and even global dimensions.  Western observers also believe that North Koreahas since been developing chemical and biological weapons.

Since the end of the war, thetwo Koreashave pursued totally divergent paths.  North Korea,a Marxist state, implemented a centrally planned policy, nationalizedindustries, lands, and properties, and collectivized agriculture.  During the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula,industrialization (and thus also wealth and power) was concentrated in thenorth.  Following the Korean War, North Korea focused on heavy industrialization,particularly power-generating, mineral, and chemical industries, which washelped greatly by large technical and financial assistance from the SovietUnion, China,and other Eastern Bloc countries.  It wasalso determined to achieve juche(self-reliance).  Simultaneously, North Koreafunneled a large share of its national budget to building a large Army.  To fund both its large industrial andmilitary programs, the government borrowed heavily from foreign sources.  But after the 1973 global oil crisis, theprice of minerals fell in the world market, negatively affecting North Koreawhich was unable to pay its large foreign debt. By the mid-1980s, it failed to meet most of its debt repaymentobligations, and defaulted.

By the late 1980s, socialismwas waning across eastern and central Europe,with Eastern Bloc countries shedding off Marxism-Leninism and centrally plannedeconomies, and adopting Western-style democracy and a free market system.  In December 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated.  North Korea, suddenly withoutSoviet financial support, went into an economic freefall.  Also in the 1990s, widespread famine in North Koreacaused by various factors, including failed government policies, massiveflooding in 1995-1996, a drought in 1997, and the loss of Soviet support, ledto mass starvation.  The number of deathsfrom the famine is estimated at between 500,000 and 2 million people, even upto 3 million.  The internationalcommunity responded to the calamity, and North Korea received food and other humanitarian aid from theUN, China, South Korea, the United States, and othercountries.  At present, North Korea, when measured in termsof its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), ranks among the poorest and leastdeveloped countries in the world.

By contrast, South Korea,which pursued Western-style democracy and a free market economy, initiallysuffered from severe political, social, and economic difficulties in the yearsfollowing the Korean War.  The country,which traditionally had an impoverished agricultural economy, was nearlyexclusively dependent on U.S.financial aid (up to 90%).  In October1953, South Korea and the United Statessigned a Mutual Defense Treaty.

In May 1961, General ParkChung-hee came to power in South Korea through a military coup.  Soon becoming president, Park began thedramatic economic transformation of South Korea.  Within a few decades, the country had becomea regional and global economic powerhouse, its rapid growth being called the“Miracle on the Han River” (referring to the Han River, which flows through Seoul).

Because of the prevailingunstable security climate, President Park imposedauthoritarian rule and a one-party state system.  His regime suppressed political opposition,censored the press, and committed grave human rights violations.  But at the same time, his governmentinitiated large-scale modernization and export-centered industrialization.  Succeeding national administrations (after President Park was assassinated in 1979) havecontinued the country’s economic growth. By the 1990s, South Koreahad become one of Asia’s business andcommercial centers, boasting a highly developed economy.  South Korea has since become theworld’s 12th large economy, with a GDP that is nearly forty timesgreater than that of North Korea.

December 9, 1987 – Israeli–Palestinian conflict: The start of the First Intifada in the Gaza Strip and West Bank

On December 6, 1987, an Israeli citizen was murdered in Gaza.  Two days later, four Palestinian residents ofthe Jabaliya refugee camp in Gazawere killed in a road accident by a truck belonging to the Israeli Army.  Many residents of the Jabaliya camp took tothe streets in protest, believing that the four Palestinians were killeddeliberately in reprisal for the Gazamurder.  Israeli security forces moved into disperse the crowd, but in the process, opened fire and killed aprotester.  Demonstrations then broke outin other refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank, triggering a full-blown uprising.

The 1987 Palestinian uprising is more commonly known as theFirst Intifada, where the word “intifada” is Arabic that means “to shake off”,and has come to denote an uprising or rebellion.  The 1987 Intifada initially took the form ofspontaneous, disorganized street rallies and demonstrations consisting of tensof thousands of Palestinians who incited anarchy and clashed with Israelisecurity forces.  Youths and minors oftenformed the front lines, leading Israeli authorities to accuse the Palestiniansof using the children as “human shields”. The protesters lobbied stones and Molotov cocktails (home-madeincendiary bombs) at the police, burned tires, and set up road blocks andbarricades.  Militancy increased when theprotesters began using firearms and grenades as weapons.  Other Palestinians supported the intifadathrough non-violent means, such as not paying taxes, boycotting Israeliproducts, and undertaking other forms of civil disobedience.

The depth and speed of the intifada surprised Israeliauthorities, who believed that the actions were being planned and carried outby the PLO.  In fact, each local protestaction was organized by community leaders in response to and in support ofother uprisings that were already taking place, creating a snowballeffect.  Eventually, however, theintifada came under the centralized command of the Unified National Leadershipof the Uprising (UNLU), an alliance of PLO factions in the occupiedterritories, which began to carry out more organized militant actions.  Two other Palestinian armed groups, Hamas andIslamic Jihad, also rose to prominence during the intifada and emerged as thepolitical and military rivals to the PLO.

(Taken from Palestinian Uprising of 1987 – 1993 – Wars of the 20th Century – Vol. 2)

Background As aconsequence of the 1947-48 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and the 1948Arab-Israeli War, some 700,000 Palestinian Arabs lost their homes and becamerefugees.  Most of them eventuallysettled in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.  The Palestinian Jews emerged victorious, inthe process establishing the state of Israel.  Then with the Israeli Army’s victory in theSix-Day War in 1967 (separate article), the Israelis gained control of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.  Israel imposed militarized authority over the“occupied territories” (as the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem were called collectively) as a means to deteropposition.  Check points and road blockswere raised, searches and arrests conducted, and civilian movement curtailedand monitored.  Perceived enemies wereeliminated, imprisoned, or deported. Furthermore, the Israeli government encouraged its citizens to migrateto the occupied territories, where Israeli housing settlements soon began toemerge.

The Palestinians greatly resented the presence of theIsraelis, whom they regarded as a foreign force occupying Palestinianland.  Furthermore, as the Israeliauthority became established and greater numbers of Israeli settlements werebeing built, the Palestinians believed that their lands eventually would beintegrated into Israel.  The Israeli occupation was also perceived asa serious blow to the Palestinian people’s aspirations for establishing aPalestinian state.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO, a politicaland armed movement, was formed in 1964 and was headed by Chairman Yasser Arafatto lead the Palestinians’ struggle for independence.  However, the PLO experienced many setbacks,not only in the hands of Israelbut also by the Arab countries to which the Palestinians had turned forsupport.  In 1970, the PLO was expelledfrom Jordan and thereaftermoved to Lebanonwhere, in 1982, it also was forced to leave. Subsequently, the PLO moved its headquarters to Tunisia, whose distant locationprevented the Palestinian leadership from exercising direct control andinfluence over the affairs of Palestinians in the occupied territories.  The PLO itself was wracked by internaldissent among some factions that opposed Arafat, who had cast aside hishard-line stance against Israeland adopted a more conciliatory approach.

Furthermore, later developments in the Middle East boded ill for the Palestinians.  Egypt,the militarily strongest Arab country and a main supporter of the PLO, hadsigned a peace treaty with Israelin 1979 and ceased its claim to the Gaza Strip. Jordan had not onlyexpelled the PLO but had relinquished its claim to the West Bank and consequently stripped the Palestinian residents there ofJordanian citizenship.  Syria, another major backer of the PLO, had afalling out with Arafat during the 1982 Lebanon War and began to support arival PLO faction that ultimately forced Arafat and his Fatah faction to leave Lebanona second time.  For so long, the Arabcountries’ regional security concerns centered on the Palestinians’ strugglefor statehood.  In the 1980s, however,much of the concentration was on the Iran-Iraq War, relegating the Palestinianissue to a lesser focus.  Palestiniansbelieved that many Arab countries, because of the Arab military defeats to theIsraelis, generally had abandoned active support for the Palestinians’nationalist aspirations.

The Palestinians’ frustrations were compounded by direeconomic circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza. Nearly half of all Palestinians were poor and lived in refugee camps incramped, squalid, and poorly serviced conditions.  Unemployment was high and so was thePalestinians’ birth rate, leading to more people competing for limitedopportunities and resources.

Ever since the Israelis took over the occupied territories,tensions between Israelis and Palestinians persisted, which often erupted inviolence.  Then during the second half of1987, these tensions rose dramatically, ultimately leading to a majorPalestinian uprising that was triggered by the following events.

December 8, 1936 – Anastacio Somoza is elected president of Nicaragua, starting a dictatorship and dynastic reign lasting over four decades

On December 8, 1936, Anastacio Somoza was elected presidentof Nicaragua,winning an astounding 99.83% of the votes. Somoza then ruled the country asvirtual dictator or through figureheads under his control, and gained allaspects of government. Over time, he accumulated great wealth and owned thebiggest landholdings in the country.  Hismany personal and family businesses extended into the shipping and airlinesindustries, agricultural plantations and cattle ranches, sugar mills, and winemanufacturing.  President Somoza tookbribes from foreign corporations that he had granted mining concessions in thecountry, and also benefited from local illicit operations such as unregisteredgambling, organized prostitution, and illegal wine production.

President Somoza suppressed all forms of opposition with theuse of the National Guard, Nicaragua’spolice force, which had turned the country into a militarized state.  President Somoza was staunchly anti-communistand received strong military and financial support from the United States, which was willing to take Nicaragua’srepressive government as an ally in the ongoing Cold War.

Somoza’s rise to power began in 1933 as Director of theNational Guard. He had ordered the assassination of left-wing nationalistAugusto Sandino who had waged a long guerrilla war against the Nicaraguan government,and United States Marines which had occupied the country since 1912.Thereafter, Somoza’s power and influence grew, leading to his deposingPresident Juan Batista Sacasa in June 1936 and installing a puppet head ofstate leading up to his election as president in December 1936.

(Taken from United States Occupation of Nicaragua, 1912- 1933 – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 1)

Background Inmany instances, Nicaragua’s political troubles prompted American intervention,such as those that occurred in 1847, 1894, 1896, 1898, and 1899, when U.S.forces were landed in that Central American country.  These occupations were brief, with Americantroops withdrawing once order had been restored, although U.S. Navy ships kepta permanent watch throughout the Central American coastline.  The officially stated reasons given by the United States for intervening in Nicaragua was to protect American lives andAmerican commercial interests in Central America.  In some cases, however, the Americans wantedto give a decided advantage to one side of Nicaragua’s political conflict.

In 1912, the United Statesagain intervened in Nicaragua,starting an occupation of the country that would last for over two decades andwould leave a deep impact on the local population.  The origin of the 1912 American occupationtraces back to the early 1900s when Nicaragua,then led by the Liberals, offered the construction of the NicaraguaCanal to Germanyand Japan.  The NicaraguaCanal was planned to be a shippingwaterway that connects the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean through the Caribbean Sea.

The Liberals wanted less American involvement in Nicaragua’sinternal affairs and therefore offered the waterway’s construction to othercountries.  Furthermore, the United States had decided to forgo its originalplan to build the Nicaragua Canal in favor of completing the partly-finished Panama Canal (which had been abandoned by a Frenchconstruction firm).

For the United States,however, the idea of another foreign power in the Western Hemisphere wasanathema, as the U.S.government believed it had the exclusive rights to the region.  The American policy of exclusivity in theWestern Hemisphere was known as the Monroe Doctrine, set forth in 1823 byformer U.S.president James Monroe.  Furthermore, theUnited States believed that Nicaragua had ambitions in Central America and therefore viewed that country as a potential source ofa wider conflict.  U.S.-Nicaraguanrelations deteriorated when two American saboteurs were executed by the Nicaraguangovernment.  Consequently, the United States broke off diplomatic relationswith Nicaragua.

In October 1909, Nicaraguan Conservatives, backed by someLiberals, carried out a rebellion against the government.  The United States threw its supportbehind the rebels.  Then when therebellion spread, the United Statessent warships to Nicaraguaand subsequently, in December 1909, landed troops in Corinto and Bluefields(Map 23).  More American forces arrivedin May 1910.

In August 1910, Nicaragua’s ruling governmentcollapsed, replaced by a U.S.-friendly administration consisting ofConservatives and Liberals.  The United States bought out Nicaragua’s large foreign debt thathad accumulated during the long period of instability.  Consequently, Nicaraguaowed the United Statesthe amount of that debt, while the Americans’ stake was raised in that troubledcountry.

Then in 1912, Nicaragua’s ruling coalition brokedown, sparking a civil war between the government and another alliance ofLiberals and Conservatives.  As therebels gained ground and began to threaten Managua,Nicaragua’s capital, the United Stateslanded troops in Corinto, Bluefields, and San Juan del Sur.  At its peak, the U.S.troop deployment in Nicaraguatotaled over 2,300 soldiers.  Within a monthof the deployment, in October 1912, the American troops, supported byNicaraguan government forces, had defeated the rebels.

The United Statestightened its control of Nicaraguain August 1914 when both countries signed an agreement whereby the Americansgained exclusive rights to construct the Nicaragua Canal,as well as to establish military bases to protect it.  The U.S.-Nicaragua treaty mostly served as adeterrent against other foreign involvement in Nicaragua,since by this time, the Americans already were operating the Panama Canal nearby.

The U.S. Army’s presence in Nicaragua from 1912 to 1925 broughtpeace in that Central American country. At the Nicaraguan government’s request, the U.S. Army helped to organizeNicaragua’s armed forces and police forces (collectively called the NationalGuard) to eliminate the many private militias and other armed groups that localpoliticians were using to advance their personal interests.  After the National Guard was formed, the United States withdrew its forces from Nicaragua.  Nine months later, however, in-fighting amongConservatives led to the overthrow of the incumbent president, again promptingthe United States toredeploy its military forces in Nicaraguato stop the disturbance from spreading.

Peace and order was restored once more, and a newConservative government came to power. The Conservatives’ authority was challenged by the Liberals, however,who formed their own government. Fighting soon broke out between the rival political parties, which rapidlyescalated into a civil war.  Once more,the United Statesintervened and restored peace after threatening to use military force againstthe Liberals.  In the peace treaty thatfollowed, the Conservatives and Liberals agreed to two stipulations: that theConservative government would complete its term of office before new electionswere held; and that all remaining private militias and armed groups would bedisbanded and subsequently incorporated into the government forces to form anexpanded, non-partisan National Guard.

December 7, 1939 – World War II: Finnish forces ambush a bivouacked Soviet battalion during the Winter War

Under the night darkness on December 7, 1939, Finnish skitroops ambushed a bivouacked Soviet battalion, killing all the soldiers.  The next day, the Finns again swept down onand annihilated another camped Russian unit. More attacks continued in the next several days, and Sovietreconnaissance planes were unable to spot the Finnish units concealed in thesnow-covered forests.  In these battles,Soviet casualties totaled 4,000 killed and 5,000 wounded against some 2,000Finnish soldiers killed.

In similar circumstances, in the Battle of the Mottis,Finnish ski units succeeded in cutting communication and supply lines amongindividual units of the Soviet 168th Division that were spread out along thenorthern shore of Lake Ladoga.  The Finns attacked individual Russian pockets(called “mottis” by the Finns) in a mobile siege strategy.  Faced with disaster by a severed supply line,in mid-January 1940, the Russians tried to break out by attacking in force,only to be cut down by heavy Finnish machinegun fire.  Some 3,000 Russians were killed, while 8 ofthe 11 mottis were overwhelmed.

(Taken from Winter War – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe: Vol. 6)

Background In1932, Finland also signed anon-aggression pact with the Soviet Union,which was extended to ten years in 1934. Even so, relations between Finlandand the Soviet Union remained detached, even guarded, not least because ofideological differences and the lingering suspicion generated by the FinnishCivil War where the Soviets had supported the Red Guards, and Germany the White Guards.  Finlanddistrusted the Soviets, particularly since the latter harbored and supportedthe exiled Finnish communist movement, while the Soviet Union regarded the ruling right-wing conservative Finnishgovernment as fascist and reactionary.

While officially neutral, Finland appeared to be pro-German,because of German assistance during the Finnish Civil War, which raised Sovietsuspicions.  Soviet mistrust wasfurthered by a number of events: in 1937, when a German naval flotilla arrivedin Helsinki, in 1938, when Finland held celebrations honoring German supportduring the civil war, and in 1939, when Franz Halder, the German Army chief ofstaff, arrived in Helsinki.

Soviet pressure on Finland for territorial concessionshad begun in April 1938, the secret negotiations continuing intermittentlyuntil the summer of 1939, with no agreement being reached because of strongFinnish opposition.  In June 1939, followingthe visit of high-level German military officials to Finland, Stalin wasconvinced that not only was a Soviet-German war imminent, but that Germanforces would use Finland as a springboard to attack the Soviet Union.

But the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact quelled Stalin’s concernsand seemingly gave assurance that the Germans would not interfere in Finland.  Thus, the Soviets increased their pressure onthe Finnish government, in October 1939 releasing the following demands: thatthe Finnish-Soviet border along the Karelian Isthmus be moved west to a point20 miles east of Viipuri; that Finnish fortifications in the Karelian Isthmusbe dismantled; that Finland cede to the Soviet Union the islands in the Gulf ofFinland, the Kalastajansaarento (Rybachi) Peninsula in the Barents Sea, and theSalla area; and that Hanko be leased for 30 years to the Soviet Union, where aRussian military base would be built.  Inreturn, the Soviets would cede to Finland Repola and Porajarvi from Eastern Karelia,a territory whose size of 3,400 square kilometers was twice as large as thosedemanded from Finland.

For Stalin, the Soviet-Finnish negotiations must address thesecurity guarantees for Leningrad,since the city was located just 20 miles from the Finnish border and withinfiring range of Finnish heavy artillery. Stalin wanted to adjust the border here further to the west into Finland,with the ceded territory serving as a buffer zone between the two nations.  However, the Finnish government saw theseterritorial demands as the first step to an eventual Soviet take-over of Finland.  On October 6 and 10, the Finnish governmentissued a call-up of reserves and effectively conducted a general mobilization,fearing that the Soviet demands would be tantamount to Finland meeting the samefate as the Balkan States.  Thenegotiations, though conducted openly, were characterized by great mutualdistrust: the Finns believing that the Soviet offer was merely a first step togobble up Finland, and theSoviets who believed that Finlandwould side with Germanyin a future war.

The Finns presented a counter-offer, agreeing to cedeterritory in the Karelian Isthmus that would double the distance of the Finnishborder to Leningrad.  But by then, Stalin was in no mood for moretalks and was determined to use armed force, deciding that the Finns werenegotiating in bad faith.

December 6, 1971 – Indian-Pakistani War of 1971: Pakistan cuts diplomatic relations with India

India’sinvolvement in East Pakistan was condemned in West Pakistan, where war sentiment was running high by November1971.  On November 23, Pakistan declared a state of emergency anddeployed large numbers of troops to the East Pakistani and West Pakistaniborders with India.  Then on December 3, 1971, Pakistani planeslaunched air strikes on air bases in India,particularly those in Jammu and Kashmir, Indian Punjab, and Haryana.

The next day, India declared war on Pakistan.  India held a decisive militaryadvantage, which would allow its armed forces to win the war in only 13days.  Indiahad a 4:1 and 10:1 advantage over West Pakistan and East Pakistan, respectively, in terms of numbers of aircraft, allowingthe Indians to gain mastery of the sky by the second day of the war.

India’sobjective in the war was to achieve a rapid victory in East Pakistan before theUN imposed a ceasefire, and to hold off a possible Pakistani offensive from West Pakistan.  Inturn, Pakistan hoped to holdout in East Pakistan as long as possible, and to attack and make territorialgains in western India,which would allow the Pakistani government to negotiate in a superior positionif the war went to mediation.

(Taken from Bangladesh War of Independence / Indian-Pakistani War of 1971 – Wars of the 20th Century – Vol. 3)

Background In 1947, the Indian subcontinent waspartitioned (previous article) intotwo new countries (Map 13): theHindu-majority Indiaand the nearly exclusive Muslim Pakistan. Much of India wasformed from the subcontinent’s central and eastern regions, while Pakistan comprised two geographically separateregions that became West Pakistan (located in the northwest) and East Pakistan (located in the southeast).

From its inception, Pakistanexperienced a great disparity between West Pakistan and East Pakistan.  The national capital was located in West Pakistan, from where all major political andgovernmental decisions were made. Military and foreign policies emanated from there as well.  West Pakistanalso held a monopoly on the country’s financial, industrial, and socialaffairs.  Much of the country’s wealthentered, remained in, and was apportioned to the West.  These factors resulted in West Pakistan beingmuch wealthier than East Pakistan.  And all this despite East Pakistan having ahigher population than West Pakistan.

In the 1960s, East Pakistancalled for social and economic reforms and greater regional autonomy, but wasignored by the national government.  Thenin 1970, the Amawi League, East Pakistan’s mainpolitical party, won a stunning landslide victory in the national elections,but was prevented from taking over the government by the rulingcivilian-military coalition regime, which feared that a new civilian governmentwould reduce the military’s influence on the country’s political affairs.

Leaders from East Pakistan and West Pakistan tried to negotiate a solution to the political impasse,but failed to reach an agreement.  Havingbeen prevented from forming a new government, Mujibur Rahman, East Pakistan’s leader, called on East Pakistanis to carry out acts ofcivil disobedience.

In Dhaka, the EastPakistani capital, thousands of residents undertook mass demonstrations thatparalyzed commercial, public, and civilian functions.  On March 25, 1971, the Pakistani Armyarrested and jailed Mujibur, who then declared while in prison the secession ofEast Pakistan from Pakistanand the founding of the independent state of Bangladesh.  Mujibur’s supporters aired the declaration ofindependence on broadcast radio throughout East Pakistan.

East Pakistanis then organized the Mukti Bahini, a guerilla militiawhose ranks were filled by ethnic Bengali soldiers who had defected from thePakistani Army.  As armed clashes beganto break out in Dhaka, the national government sent more troops to East Pakistan. Much of the fighting took place in April-May 1971, where governmentforces prevailed, forcing the rebels to flee to the Indian states of West Bengal and Tripura. The Pakistani Army then turned on the civilian population to weed outnationalists and rebel supporters.  Thesoldiers targeted all sectors of society – the upper classes of the political,academic, and business elite, as well as the lower classes consisting of urbanand rural workers, farmers, and villagers.  In the wave of violence and suppression thattook place, tens of thousands of East Pakistanis were killed, while some tenmillion civilians fled to the Indian states of West Bengal, Tripura,Assam, Bihar,and Meghalaya.

As East Pakistani refugees flooded into India,the Indian government called on the United Nations (UN) to intervene, butreceived no satisfactory response.  Asnearly 50% of the refugees were Hindus, to the Indian government, this meantthat the causes of the unrest in East Pakistanwere religious as well as political. (During the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, a massivecross-border migration of Hindus and Muslims had taken place; by the 1970s,however, East Pakistan, still contained a significant 14% Hindu population.)

Since its independence, Indiahad fought two wars against Pakistanand faced the perennial threat of fighting against or being attackedsimultaneously from East Pakistan and West Pakistan.  Indiatherefore saw that the crisis in East Pakistan yielded one benefit – if the threatfrom East Pakistan was eliminated, India would not have to face thethreat of a war on two fronts.  Thus,just two days into the uprising in East Pakistan,India began to secretlysupport the independence of Bangladesh.  The Indian Army covertly trained, armed, andfunded the East Pakistani rebels, which within a few months, grew to a force of100,000 fighters.

In May 1975, Indiafinalized preparations for an invasion of East Pakistan,but moved the date of the operation to later in the year when the Himalayanborder passes were inaccessible to a possible attack by the Chinese Army.  Indiahad been defeated by Chinain the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and thus was wary of Chinese intentions, more sosince China and Pakistan maintained friendly relations and bothconsidered Indiatheir common enemy.  As a result, India entered into a defense treaty with theSoviet Union that guaranteed Soviet intervention in case India was attacked by a foreignpower.