Yanis Varoufakis's Blog, page 125

ΤΟ ΔΙΣΤΟΜΟ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΚΑΘΗΚΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑΣ: Γιατί το DiEM25 αντιτίθεται στον αντι-γερμανισμό

 

Η Χάνα Αρέντ, πολύ σωστά, είχε πει ότι ακόμα και ένας μόνο γερμανός να είχε δολοφονηθεί στο Άουσβιτς λόγω της αντίστασής του στους ναζί (και είχαν δολοφονηθεί πολλοί), οι γερμανοί δεν φέρουν, ως λαός, συλλογική ευθύνη για τον ναζισμό.

Από τότε που ξέσπαγε η παγκόσμια οικονομική κρίση, το 2008, κάποιοι ανησυχούσαμε μεγαλοφώνως ότι, δεδομένης της σαθρής δόμησης της ευρωζώνης, πολύ σύντομα η κρίση θα έστρεφε τον έναν περήφανο λαό εναντίον άλλων περήφανων λαών στην ήπειρό μας – μέγιστη νίκη της μισαλλοδοξίας, του ρατσισμού και, βέβαια, της ιδεολογίας του εθνικοσοσιαλισμού.

Όταν, τον Γενάρη του 2015, ο ελληνικός λαός εξέλεξε μια κυβέρνηση στην οποία έδωσε την εντολή να αποτινάξει τον ζυγό της χρεοδουλοπαροικίας, η εντολή εκείνη δεν ήταν αντι-γερμανική. Ήταν εντολή εναντίον των δυνάμεων εκείνων, ιδίως του τραπεζικού τομέα (της Πτωχοτραπεζοκρατίας, όπως ονομάζω το μετά το 2008 καπιταλιστικό καθεστώς), που αρχικά μεγιστοποίησαν την εκμετάλλευση των γερμανών εργαζόμενων πτωχών και έτσι δημιουργούσαν τις συνθήκες για την καταστροφή των ονείρων, της αξιοπρέπειας και της ελπίδας της πλειοψηφίας των ελλήνων, των ισπανών, των ιταλών. Αλίμονο αν οι ίδιες δυνάμεις κατάφερναν να στρέψουν τους έλληνες εργαζόμενους, τους έλληνες προοδευτικούς εναντίον των γερμανών συντρόφων τους.

Ένα χρόνο αργότερα, μετά τον στραγγαλισμό της Ελληνικής Άνοιξης από το Βαθύ Κατεστημένο της Ευρώπης και την ελληνική ολιγαρχία, ιδρύσαμε το DiEM25 στο Βερολίνο. Δεκάδες χιλιάδες τα μέλη μας στην Γερμανία, με τους οποίους από τότε βαδίζουμε μαζί, χέρι-χέρι, δίπλα-δίπλα, καθημερινά αγωνιζόμενοι εναντίον τόσο του Βαθέως Κατεστημένου όσο και εναντίον του εθνικισμού, δεξιού και «αριστερού».

Με αυτές τις σκέψεις κατά νου, δεν μπορούμε παρά να χαιρόμαστε βαθειά κι εμείς, παρά τις διαφωνίες μας με την κυβέρνηση που εκπροσωπεί στην χώρα μας, που ο γερμανός πρέσβυς πήγε στο Δίστομο να καταθέσει στεφάνι στο μνημείο των δολοφονημένων από τους ναζί. Δεν μπορούμε παρά να χαιρετίσουμε την στάση του Μανώλη Γλέζου στο Δίστομο και να στηλιτεύσουμε την προσπάθεια αναγωγής του νέου απελευθερωτικού αγώνα των ελλήνων, των πορτογάλλων, των ιταλών αλλά, ναι, και των γερμανών συντρόφων μας σε μέτωπο εναντίον της Γερμανίας και του γερμανικού λαού.

Όπως συνηθίζουμε να λέμε στο DiEM25, ο «αριστερός» εθνικισμός είναι η χειρότερη αντίδραση τόσο στον εθνικοσοσιαλισμό όσο και στην τρόικα.

What lies behind the euro crisis, Brexit & Trump: Keynote at the FundForum International, Berlin & a discussion with Megan Greene

Keynote at the FundForum International conference in Berlin, 12th June 2017. Followed by a discussion with Megan Greene.

On Documenta 14, Athens – in conversation with iLiana Fokianaki, Art Agenda

“We Come Bearing Gifts”—iLiana Fokianaki and Yanis Varoufakis on Documenta 14 Athens
 Created in 1955 by artist and curator Arnold Bode, Documenta sought to advance the cultural reconstruction of Germany within the postwar European order. Reoccurring every five years, it has since unfolded into a periodic forum for contemporary art. When Adam Szymczyk was appointed artistic director of Documenta 14 in November 2013, he proposed calling the exhibition “Learning From Athens,” opening it first in the Greek capital and then in its traditional home in Kassel. Four years later, with the Greek exhibition now underway and the German edition about to open, iLiana Fokianaki and Yanis Varoufakis share their views on the show, its development, and its implications.

iLiana Fokianaki: In the beginning, when it was first announced that Documenta 14 would be held in Athens, I believed there was a purpose to the experiment. How would a rigid institution be transformed by its curatorial team living and operating in a city of crisis? I thought that the moment one performs such a “move” there must be a particular reasoning behind the relocation, as well as the selection of the location. Two years later, and with the exhibition now open, I am still unable to answer the question of “why Athens?” At the same time, I am starting to feel numb towards what has been presented as a mutually beneficial idea for both guests and hosts, maybe even more beneficial for the Athenian hosts.

Yanis Varoufakis: To begin with there is a sinister parallel with privatization. In 2015, fourteen regional airports, extremely lucrative ones as Santorini, Mykonos, and so on, were sold to one German majority state-owned company as part of the Troika’s privatization drive. Recall that privatization became all the rage in Europe with Margaret Thatcher. Yet Thatcher would have never approved this kind of privatization. Why? Because her argument for privatization was that it enhances competition. Well, you do not enhance competition when you give all the airports to one company; this is enhancing monopoly!

So from a neoliberal point of view this was not a neoliberal privatization. And let’s not forget that we’re talking about Fraport, a state-owned company. Effectively, the Greek regional airports were nationalized, but by a different nation! And let’s take a look at who paid for this privatization/nationalization: the announced price was 1.2 billion euros, which was presented as an influx of capital into cash-starved Greece. But Fraport purchased these airports with loans from Greek banks, which were either recapitalized by the Greek citizens or guaranteed by the Greek state. So it’s like me coming to buy your house, but having you pay for it. Or, rather, making you guarantee the loans I get from the banks, in order that I can pay you for your house. If I fail to repay them, you’ll act as my guarantor. You would laugh if I proposed this to you. It is nothing short of preposterous! But in Greece and in the EU this is presented as substantial privatization, as a gain for the country and proof that Greece is being normalized. Yes it is normalized, but as something worse than a colony.

I gave the example of Fraport because we have a similar phenomenon with Documenta. Documenta supposedly came to Greece to spend, but instead they sucked up every single resource available for the local art scene. The few resources that Greece’s private and public sectors make available to Greek artists, like the Aegean Airways sponsorship, went to Documenta. The Athens municipality gave Documenta a building for free. Many hotels donated rooms for free. Buildings at the Athens School of Fine Arts were made available for free, and now the graduating students have nowhere to host their degree show. The National Museum of Contemporary Art, Athens (EMST) did charge Documenta, but the amount was ludicrously small—a token. And, as Greece’s private and public sectors were handing out all the resources normally available to Greek artists and art institutions to Documenta, its artistic director had the audacity to say out loud that he is not interested in the local art scene but is only interested in Athens. This mindset and practice transposes the Fraport mindset and practice from the world of airports to the art world.

Documenta did bring some resources from Germany but, overall, it has been an extractive process. Documenta took a great deal more from Athens—from both its private and public sector—than it gave. Adding the veneer of a left-wing narrative against neoliberalism to a purely extractive neocolonial project that’s framed as a gift to Greece is adding insult to injury.

iF: This is why the analysis of the institution, the power relations it embodies, and the theoretical proposition it offers interest me more than the exhibition itself. Primarily, a well-branded German cultural institution like Documenta represents the imperium, but also capital, since inclusion in such a show adds commodity value to the artwork. This creates a dynamic that is, a priori, not neutral. So to look at it through the current political spectrum of the EU: a politically, financially, and socially charged binary is created by deciding to bring this German institution to, not just any financial periphery, but to the very periphery that embodies the other half of this binary: Greece. Not to mention the Second World War, which makes it a historically charged binary as well.

So the institution carries an exhibition with a mandate. And the exhibition denies (or chooses to ignore) this binary. Through this exhibition, the institution claims that we are amidst a political and economic war, manifested in Greece’s referendum and the bodies that filled the streets, events that deeply influenced this edition of Documenta. It claims to offer a public service to its audiences. To quote Paul Preciado:

One of the difficulties (and beauties) of making this exhibition was the decision of its artistic director, Adam Szymczyk, to collaborate only with public institutions in Athens. In conditions of war, the institutional interlocutor of the exhibition can be neither the establishment, nor galleries, nor the art market. On the contrary, the exhibition is understood as a public service, as an antidote against economic, political, and moral austerity.(1)

However, anyone who lives in Greece today is aware that the notion of a public service is a joke—and by extension, the establishment itself. As is the notion that the state-funded institution, as a physical space or even as a metaphor, can be an antidote to economic, political, and moral austerity. Any mildly progressive Greek will tell you that the public services represent and promote these austerities, under the umbrella and the absolute fetish of a national identity. A national identity that has been built by fetishizing ancient Greece. I found references to this glorified past—“the origin of civilization”—in many of the opening speeches and curatorial texts, but also in some of the works. It reminded me vividly of the eighteenth-century Grand Tour, with all the Anglo-Saxons coming to Italy and Greece to find the roots of Western civilization, doe-eyed and in awe of the ancient ruins.

On the other hand, if you examine the idea of “a public service” as a gift, then we are talking about a blind spot—coming from, hopefully, good intentions. But, as we know, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Because in fact claiming that you are offering a service (as a gift), when operating from within a mega-institution, positions you immediately as a benefactor. Even more so when this institution represents all that we have described above. Adding into the mix the veneer of a left-wing narrative against neoliberalism makes it even more problematic. What valid political claims can we actually make as cultural practitioners when operating within, and being fed by, a capitalist structure with very well-defined power structures and power centers, in terms of enabling discourses and artworks? A performative element of a left-wing narrative was also quite apparent in the decision to situate the Documenta team in Exarcheia, which is known as an anarchist neighborhood.

YV: There is nothing new to that, and we know this well. Near the coast of Attica there is an awful island called Makronisos, an island of exile on which thousands were tortured and many died during the 1940s civil war. There are tourist trips now to Makronisos, which even offer an inmate’s menu. I have no doubt that there is a lot of demand for this type of tourism, where you get embedded into the context of others’ suffering. In Brazil they also have “favela tours,” as I think they call them, in which tourists experience “life in the favela.” This is not too different from how most Greeks see Documenta 14. They see how art tourists, including the Documenta curators, come to live in their disaster zone for a while, smell the Exarcheia smells and hear its sounds, before catching their free Aegean Airways flights to Kassel to do their proper business.

iF: Greece differs from all the countries of the European south, since it is the only one with no heavy industry, and this has also contributed to the crisis. It is also a country with a political history of constant upheaval, with the shortest history of modern democracy in the European Union (from 1974)—elements that very much explain its failure to achieve the financial stability and prosperity of other countries that entered the EU in the 1980s.

Since the reinstatement of the Greek state in 1821, Greece has been under the wing of the Franco-German axis, with a German king appointed, with the tragedy of Asia Minor in the 1920s where the French, the English, and the Russians meddled in the conflict with Turkey, then a dictatorship that ended during the Second World War, and then the civil war that lasted until 1949, induced by the British, who had a stronghold in the country and basically did not want the Communist wave to spread down to the south. After the Communists were expelled from the country, murdered, or sent to concentration camps, the conservatives—amongst them former collaborators of the Nazis—ruled with some help from far-right-wing paramilitary groups that murdered politicians such as Nikos Beloyiannis, who was immortalized in a Picasso sketch of the time, and Grigoris Lambrakis, whose story is portrayed in Costa-Gavras’s 1969 film Z. And then after such a turbulent political ride, we ended up with a second dictatorship in 1967, which gave birth to what today is the neofascist party Golden Dawn. Since the reinstatement of democracy in 1974, we have tried to generate a healthy economy through a corrupt political system, through a supposedly socialist government that undertook a failed project and built a maze of bureaucracy. Instead, we ended up with the 2004 Olympic Games, which brought to the surface a somewhat “hidden” financial crisis, which accelerated in 2009 and is still deepening. This is the backdrop against which the announcement of Documenta 14 in Athens was received with intense criticism but also praise. During the press conference, Documenta’s CEO Annette Kulenkampff called the exhibition a gift to Greece.

YV: No gift to Greece from Germany is possible. Full stop. Ever! Why? Any sentences that begin with “Germany does X” or “Germany gives X” or “Germany takes X” are wrong and the thin edge of the racist wedge. Because there is no such thing as an anthropomorphic Germany (or Greece for that matter, or France) that can act, give, or take away. There are many, many Germanies. There is Wolfgang Schäuble’s Germany, the Germany of German DiEM25 members,(2) the Germany of working-poor Germans, of German bankers, etc. So that statement by the CEO of Documenta should be further interrogated with questions such as: “Which Germany? The German state? German capital? Particular donors?” There are many interests that feed Documenta financially.(3) So I would need a clarification as to what type of gift. Otherwise, I find the statement offensive and inaccurate. If the gift came from Schäuble, for example, let’s remind Kulenkampff that Schäuble got a huge gift from Greece, because over the last five to six years Germany—the federal state of Germany—has been borrowing from the markets at zero percent interest, whereas it should be 3 percent. This amounts to hundreds of billions of euros, and this is due to the Greek crisis, which forced the European Central Bank to push the interest to negative or zero rates, and the savings to the German federal government from the Greek crisis are stupendous. So if we want to do a proper accounting as to who is gifting whom, let’s do it, but let’s not come up with insupportable generalized inaccuracies.

iF: There are of course the complaints by the locals, accusing Documenta’s artistic director of not involving the Greek art scene, not representing it, not consulting it.

YV: I disagree. I don’t believe they had any obligation to consult anyone. I am an internationalist. I don’t believe in borders. I don’t believe Athens belongs to the Athenians exclusively and that anyone from Kassel or Venice or New York needs to get permission from the Greek authorities or local art scene to be here. I do not even believe this is necessary even as a gesture of courtesy. I do not believe in these mechanisms by which one secures legitimacy to do things in any European country. If this were so, DiEM25 would not have come into existence. We inaugurated DiEM25 in Berlin without the permission of anyone in Germany, except of course our German comrades. I don’t think we had any obligation at all to get permission from the local authorities to be there and present our ideas.

My problem is not that Documenta did not contact Greek society through official or unofficial channels. I am quite happy when people, of their own volition, decide they want to come over to Athens and do things. My criticism is of how they did it. And the mind-set which they brought to this place. I fear that their mind-set here is inimical to internationalism.

iF: The binary between north and south Europe is a profitable one for a “classical” institution such as Documenta to exploit. Athens is just the place to experiment, after its seven very public years of financial chaos. Now there is the fetish of the crisis. This might even unintentionally reinforce the narratives of austerity. Referencing the Greek financial crisis so intensely appeals to all the precariats of the art world and to the middle- and upper-class museum directors and art lovers who are all very curious to see what a country that does not play ball with the EU can become. It is a voyeuristic desire to consume the crisis and the suffering of others, which is nothing new.

Of course, within the strict confines of the five still relatively prosperous neighborhoods where most of the venues and artworks are situated, this has not really been achieved. In fact, most visitors have asked me the same thing I have been hearing for the past seven years: Where is this supposed crisis? The precariat of the ecology of the art world seems to be part of the problem, as Sven Lütticken argues in his new book Cultural Revolution: Aesthetic Practice after Autonomy: the structural revolution of capitalism occurred through an economic but also cultural transformation. So to declare the Greek referendum and the events that followed it as the raison d’être for the exhibition in Athens,(4) when Documenta collaborated closely with those who supported the “Yes” campaign (including our current mayor, Giorgos Kaminis), is problematic.

YV: The point is not that they came but rather how they came to Athens, whom they went to bed with (metaphorically), and how they used a seemingly progressive left-wing critique of what is happening in Greece to willingly or unwillingly propagate the very process that is causing the country’s crisis. In the name of seeking solutions they became part of the problem.

iF: According to Documenta’s artistic director, Adam Szymczyk, Athens operates as a paradigm or a metaphor. Athens stands for the Global South, which I find intriguing but also problematic. I fear that the Global South—as it is recognized by cultural practices, political discourse, and social theory—can become a grouping of the Other, thus generating a continuation of “othering.” The curatorial statements use an anti-neoliberal rhetoric, which is very pro-internationalism, to underline unity and the expression of multiple voices. They question notions of origin and nationality; they talk about the global white patriarchal forces that wish to crush minorities, indigeneity, etc. So this institution presents an exhibition that claims to unite the precariats, the disenfranchised, the dispossessed, and the indigenous of the world: “We (all) are the people” read the words on the poster Hans Haacke produced for Documenta 14—against all these nationalistic neoliberal powers. So Athens is the metaphor for all that, and is in this case compared to Lagos or Guatemala City.

YV: This is why I like Schäuble! He put it very succinctly when in some press conference he suggested that Greece is to Europe what Puerto Rico is to the United States. When Jack Lew, the American treasury secretary under Obama, criticized Germany for its insistence on austerity in Greece, Schäuble suggested that the US (or “the dollar zone,” as he put it) and the EU trade Puerto Rico for Greece! Your depiction of this mind-set, according to which Greece represents the Global South, is accurate and is shared by Germany’s federal finance minister.

iF: The problematic aspect is that this discourse—“all the others are the same”—smells like First World didactics. This approach of “let’s unite or group the precariats” under an anti-neoliberal, or liberal, narrative—doesn’t matter which—becomes a priori dangerous. And this is a real problem, because we should be united in recognizing difference. Of course, on the other side of this you have the nationalists and the neofascists, and I wonder where to stand between these two positions—one position that hastily groups all the precariats, indigenous, and minorities together, and the other that claims “we are undeniably unique and incomparable.” However, I wonder if I’d like it if I were a citizen of Lagos or Guatemala City and someone compared my condition to that of an Athenian.

YV: On the one hand, Athens actually looks like Paris if you compare it to Lagos, though it is degenerating quickly. On the other, the trajectory of countries like Nigeria isn’t necessarily pushing them toward desertification. The great difference is the static versus the dynamic. Countries like Nigeria have a dynamic which may lead them either to disaster or to development, whereas the Greek dynamic is one that I call “Kosovization,” of turning Greece into a protectorate, just like Kosovo, where young people all leave and the place is a real estate opportunity, with pensioners starving and northern European pensioners enjoying cheap old folks’ homes by the seaside. So maybe Nigeria and Lagos have advantages compared to Greece and Athens. At the dynamic level, not at the static.

I also find it remarkable that Documenta’s narrative in Athens is anti-neoliberal. Speaking from my 2015 experience, I had the terrible task of negotiating with creditors whose objective was not to recoup their money. What I was proposing to them was consistent with neoliberal policies, because the crisis was at such an advanced, deep stage that it took a finance minister from the radical left to propose Reaganite and Thatcherite policies: cut your losses, reduce tax rates when both employers and employees are bankrupt, etc. Indeed, when you have low tax revenues and companies and households that are bankrupt, banks that are bankrupt, and actually a state that is bankrupt, and you have very high tax rates, it is not a left-wing economic policy to increase tax rates. It is just madness, from both a left-wing and a neoliberal perspective. So I was proposing to supposedly neoliberal creditors—the International Monetary Fund, Mario Draghi’s European Central Bank—substantial reductions in tax rates, which is what neoliberals supposedly advocate. Remarkably, they would not only turn these policies down, but try to portray me as recalcitrant. Why? Because they were not even interested in neoliberal policies, they were solely concerned with a nineteenth-century-style power play—a postmodern version of gunboat diplomacy. In this context, the critique of neoliberalism that Documenta is trying out in Athens is totally out of place. In 2017 Greece, neoliberalism’s failure is evident in the rejection by neoliberal institutions of neoliberal policies! A delicious paradox that Documenta is utterly blind to, because if they were to talk about the real tragedy unfolding in Greece today, an off-the-shelf critique of neoliberalism would not suffice. They would have to dig deeper, and thus run the risk of discovering the role of the German-led policies combining authoritarianism, large loans to bankrupt banks and governments, and savage burdens for the weakest of citizens in places like Greece but also Germany. Such a “discovery” would risk upsetting Documenta’s sponsors, who remain untouched by the (irrelevant) off-the-shelf critique of neoliberalism.

In short, coming to Athens to talk about “neoliberal powers that wish to destroy Europe” is to miss the point spectacularly. It is like the Greek Communist Party which, stuck in the 1960s and ’70s, blames all of Greece’s ills on American imperialism, while having nothing to say about the Troika, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, or Frankfurt. Like the Greek Communist Party, Documenta ignores the fact that Greece is the most brittle part of a European monetary union set up by the Franco-German axis. A union so terribly designed that it led to a massive, inevitable crisis and, moreover, to the denial of that crisis once it erupted—a denial that took the form of toxic new bailout loans for the bankers and austerity for the majority of the people. When Documenta comes here and talks about neoliberalism with no mention of Deutsche Bank, Société Générale, the awful Troika process, the Eurogroup, etc., it is choosing to be irrelevant. It is choosing to fight the last war against Europe’s Deep Establishment in order to avoid exposing the latter’s current war against decency and rationality. If I were the Troika, I would be very happy with the Athens Documenta. It would add legitimacy to my endeavors by sending art tourists to a disaster area of the Troika’s making. I would not be in the slightest upset by its critique of neoliberalism as long as there is no critique of … the Troika! As I intimated above, neoliberalism is not even being practiced by the Troika. What the Troika is practicing in Greece is punitive illiberalism.

iF: But this is presented as financial “aid,” as doing Greeks a favor by first tolerating us and then saving us. This is also the case with Documenta. I recently had a visit from a group of master’s art students from The Hague to the gallery where I work, and they were troubled by Rasheed Araeen’s work in Kotzia Square, Shamiyaana—Food for Thought: Thought for Change, 2016–17, which is basically a communal cooking and eating ritual that happens twice a day. While the artwork was taking place, an invigilator was trying to explain to a hungry Greek pensioner that he had to stand up and give his seat to the students, because this was not a food bank but an artwork. I am sure the artist had the best of intentions, but sadly it fed into this narrative of solidarity, and “helping the crisis situation” in a locality that cannot understand this artistic discourse, or the simulation of a communal kitchen and free food being distributed under the auspices of an artwork. This is a recurring problem of socially and politically engaged participatory art practices. This narrative of aid, of solidarity can become quite dangerous, when in fact there shouldn’t be aid but a mutually understood exchange. Of course there was a lot of money spent on this exhibition, but in Athens the expenses were mostly for its production, for the salaries of the staff who moved here, their transport, stipends, etc. The institution did give jobs and know-how to locals they hired as employees—and we can debate whether they were paid handsomely or not, or whether they received German-level salaries, etc., and indeed there was an incident with invigilators that, through the intervention of the artistic director, was solved. While I know of people who were not paid well, I also know of some people who received good salaries. And the decision to come here generated revenue, the staff did rent apartments, did spend money in this country: no doubt about that. I am assuming they spent more than anticipated, to be fair.

Nonetheless, to go back to the beginning, in 2015 at the Moscow Biennale you commented that Documenta 14’s arrival in Athens was “crisis tourism.” I must admit that I thought this was hasty. I wondered why you made that statement so early on, without “proof of presence” yet. I wonder whether we can call it crisis tourism, or even cultural imperialism, because I really do not think that we can call it cultural colonialism.

YV: I called it disaster tourism I think, but crisis tourism is the same thing. The distinction between the two is vague. When you have, in a peripheral country, the kind of disaster that we have, this is part and parcel of the neocolonial policy, which brought about the crisis.

iF: So, in fact you do consider it a neocolonial practice.

YV: Absolutely. There is no doubt about it. It is nineteenth-century power politics, or gunboat diplomacy, utilizing the financial sector. The people of Greece elected a government to challenge the terms of a loan agreement whose policy framework had already failed and the creditors arrived by private jet before unceremoniously telling the new finance minister that “if you insist on renegotiating our loan agreement we are going to close down your banks within weeks.” Think about it: in the nineteenth century, if a government had insisted on resisting their will, they would have sent gunboats or troops to Piraeus and started bombarding. Is today’s version significantly different? Our situation is not even neocolonialism. It is pure colonialism.

iF: However, in the case of British colonialism, it was done with much more violent means.

YV: I’m not sure if the means were more violent, just more inefficient. Violence is unnecessary, inefficient today. As Bertolt Brecht once said, “Why send out murderers when we can employ bailiffs?” Similarly we can ask: Why use Panzer tanks when you can use a button to close down all the ATM’s of a stricken nation? This is the undercurrent: the subjugation of a people and a government to the imperatives of creditors who wanted effectively to use the state’s unsustainable debt as a means by which to get their hands on particular assets. Like the airports, the ports, everything with value. Which is currently happening. When cultural organizations from the core come to the periphery, where the disaster is taking place, under the circumstances we are discussing, this is disaster tourism. And neocolonialism. It is exactly the same story.

iF: I generally question the sovereignty of the Greek state throughout the last fifty years. The way you have publicly portrayed the events from March 2015 onwards suggests that this sovereignty barely exists now, with the referendum offering more proof. The theme of Documenta 14 is “Learning from Athens,” and there was a decision to include historically charged spaces, such as the Museum of Anti-dictatorial and Democratic Resistance, as well as the Polytechnic School of Athens, where the uprising of November 17, 1973 took place.(5) But when it comes to why Greece is in this financial and political state today —this was blatantly omitted from Documenta. I think that the elephant in the room when we talk about the Greek financial crisis is the why and the who, and these were missing from the exhibition.

YV: You are spot on. There has been no attempt to understand the political and economic history of Greece. But I find it unproductive to try to push this line forward. My conclusion is that the best way to deal with it is this: any attempt to nuance the narrative on Greece feeds the trolls—those who want to say “ha, the Greeks want constantly to excuse themselves for their failures, they want to shun their own responsibilities and refuse to modernize; they demand their right to be premodern and to be fed by European money.” That is what you get the moment you bring forward the argument of how we fell into the net of the crisis: you lose the argument. The only thing you can say is, “Folks, imagine if we had not entered the Euro in 2000. Would Documenta be taking place in Greece today? No. Why? Because there would be no crisis.” The moment you say this they cannot continue to play the game of blaming the victim.

iF: It is the classic narrative that emerges, both in the cultural field and the political field, when one raises the kinds of issues we have discussed: the marginalization of opinion, the dismissive attitude towards the “complaints” or “rantings” of the Greeks. Funnily enough, it was Preciado who called this phenomenon the “pathologization of all forms of dissidence.”(5)

YV: Oh, the story of my life. I also felt that when discussing this crisis. How do you stop yourself from becoming the raving loony, the sole voice of dissent? We are in a situation that resembles the late Soviet era. In 1983, the USSR still had the capacity to enforce a unitary narrative through its media, a narrative of a “single party line everywhere.” But, at the same time, there was a major disconnect between that unitary dominant party line and what people actually thought. It is similar in Greece today: the state is happy with Documenta, they think it will bring tourism in, but when I talk to people on the streets about it, they reject it with venom. The only way of avoiding becoming the lone enraged dissident is to connect with public opinion.

iF: Public opinion has been vividly demonstrated by the myriad graffiti. Yet, I am not sure that the majority of the public rejects it with venom, the reason being another form of disconnect: the general public does not even know it’s here. The realization of the exhibition was such that unfortunately it will fail in what most of the small local art institutions were hoping for: to breed a new, larger audience for contemporary art. Documenta’s undelivered message will be ours to realize, in politics and in art.

(1) Paul B. Preciado, “The Apatride Exhibition,” e-flux conversations, April 10, 2017, https://conversations.e-flux.com/t/pa....

(2) DiEM25 describes itself as a “pan-European, cross-border movement of democrats” dedicated to the “repair” of the EU. See  https://diem25.org/what-is-diem25/.

(3) Documenta has never published detailed financial accounts of expenses and incomes, just a general figure for total expenditures. But it surely receives more than just state funding. In fact, an official announcement from the office of Documenta states that “the business plan for documenta 14 covers a five-year period. During this timeframe, documenta and Museum Fridericianum gGmbH receive 14 million euros from the City of Kassel and the State of Hessen, both of which are shareholders, and 4.5 million euros from the German Federal Cultural Foundation (Kulturstiftung des Bundes). The remaining 18.5 million euros needed to finance documenta 14 must be raised by documenta and Museum Fridericianum gGmbH in the form of proceeds from the sale of admission tickets, catalogues, and merchandise and through sponsors, additional funding, and grants.” As Artforum reported on March 22, 2017, Ms. Kulenkampff has requested more state funding. See https://www.artforum.com/news/id=67355. It is unclear whether this funding will be put toward the current edition of Documenta.

(4) Preciado, “The Apatride Exhibition.”

(5) Ibid.

iLiana Fokianaki is a Greek curator, lecturer, and writer based in Athens and Rotterdam. She is the founder and director of State of Concept, Athens, co-founder, with Antonia Alampi, of the research platform Future Climates, and curator of Kunsthal Extra City, Antwerp.

Yanis Varoufakis is a Greek economist, academic, and politician who served as the Greek Minister of Finance from January to July 2015, when he resigned. Varoufakis was also a Syriza member of the Hellenic Parliament for Athens B from January to September 2015. In 2015 he co-founded, with Srećko Horvat, the pan-european political movement DiEM25.

1Logo of Documenta 14.

2Poster in Athens, Spring 2017.

3Graffiti in Athens close to the site of the presentation of Ross Birrell’s The Athens–Kassel Ride: The Transit of Hermes, 2017.

4Rasheed Araeen, Shamiyaana—Food for Thought: Thought for Change, 2016–17.

5Posters in Athens, Spring 2017.

6The Lgbtqi+ Refugees in Greece group with the replica of the oath stone of Roger Bernat’s The Place of the Thing,2017.

7Graffiti in Athens, Spring 2017.

8The Lgbtqi+ Refugees in Greece group with the replica of the oath stone of Roger Bernat’s The Place of the Thing, 2017.

9Graffiti in Athens, Spring 2017.

10Graffiti in Athens, Spring 2017.

11Graffiti in Athens, Spring 2017.

1Logo of Documenta 14. Design by Studio Laurenz Brunner, Berlin.
2Poster in Athens, Spring 2017.
3Graffiti in Athens close to the site of the presentation of Ross Birrell’s The Athens–Kassel Ride: The Transit of Hermes, 2017.
4Rasheed Araeen, Shamiyaana—Food for Thought: Thought for Change, 2016–17. Canopies with geometric patchwork, cooking, and eating, Kotzia Square, Athens, Documenta 14. Photo: Yiannis Hadjiaslanis.
5Posters in Athens, Spring 2017.
6The Lgbtqi+ Refugees in Greece group with the replica of the oath stone of Roger Bernat’s The Place of the Thing,2017. Photo courtesy Lgbtqi+ Refugees in Greece.
7Graffiti in Athens, Spring 2017.
8The Lgbtqi+ Refugees in Greece group with the replica of the oath stone of Roger Bernat’s The Place of the Thing, 2017. Photo courtesy Lgbtqi+ Refugees in Greece.
9Graffiti in Athens, Spring 2017.
10Graffiti in Athens, Spring 2017.
11Graffiti in Athens, Spring 2017.




Mel Bochner’s “Voices”

PETER FREEMAN INC., New York

Dara Birnbaum’s “Psalm 29(30)”

MARIAN GOODMAN GALLERY, New York

“Quiet”

BARBARA SEILER GALERIE, Zürich

Jeremy Corbyn’s night was one for the true believers. Onwards now!

In September 2015, soon after Jeremy Corbyn’s election, I was asked to offer advice to the freshly elected Labour leader. My response was, following our experiences in Greece of defeating a resurgent, oligarchic media twice during that year:

Do not get scared by the character assassination attempts of the systemic media. The systemic media will try to tear you apart. What is important is that you shower them with rational arguments, with compassion, with a degree of humour and self deprecation, and concentrate on cultivating very strong relations with the public out there who have had a gutful of spin and of the attempts of all parties to congregate in the middle ground where they hope to serve the prejudices of the median voter.

 

Faced down by an ironclad establishment hell bent on retrieving its control over the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn stood his ground on behalf of basic human decency and, moreover, of Progressive Principled Politics.

Last night the British people rewarded him, and his comrades, for this with an astounding vote of confidence. Against the grain of a British press that had never been so unified before, in ridiculing and distorting his sensible policies and his civilised demeanour (even The Guardian was pitted against him, until the last few days of the campaign), he did that which progressives must always do: He stayed glued to his message and ignored the distortions, provocations, attempts at character assassination of the media, succeeding in the end to bypass them and speak directly to the hopes and concerns of the electorate.

In such a political and media environment, stopping Theresa May’s bandwagon, scoring amongst the largest Labour shares of the vote since WW2, and forcing a hung Parliament upon a Tory leader that was considered a dead-cert victor, was a magnificent victory.

Of course, like all victories that progressives score against the establishment, it is a small stepping stone along a difficult path. Like all progressive victories its significance is not in what it achieved but in the potential that it now unleashes on behalf of the people of Britain and of progressives everywhere.

Onwards comrades!

 

DiEM25 supports Jeremy Corbyn & John McDonnell – except in our own special way!

After DiEM25 published its collective decision to back fifteen Parliamentary candidates in tomorrow’s UK General Election, we received some interesting missives – mostly critical that included non-Labour candidates, including (lo and behold) Nick Clegg. This is a welcome ‘backlash’, in the sense that it gives us an opportunity to put things straight.

DiEM25 was not created just to support existing political parties. Our task is tougher and more important than this: it is to forge the Progressive International that Europe needs, and to promote its values and principles politics in every country. Of course, when a political party is close to our principles and agenda we will do our utmost to support it.

Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell are two politicians who have steered Labour in a direction very close to DiEM25’s principles and aspirations. Naturally, we back them wholeheartedly. However, the Labour Party still leaves much to be desired – as Jeremy and John would readily admit. A certain sectarian attitude (e.g. fielding candidates against progressives, and DiEM25ers,  like Caroline Lucas), a strong tribal tendency, support for first-past-the-post, powerful forces within that are keen to return to a Blairite deep establishment posture – these are examples of why we believe that DiEM25 had to do more than simply support Labour.

In endorsing candidates from different political parties, with a solid rationale for each one of them (see here), DiEM25 is demonstrating in practice the kind of new, progressive politics that would end the neoliberals’ near monopoly of power in the UK and usher in a progressive government. Notice that in constituencies where we supported non-Labour candidates we selected candidates that have a strong chance of toppling a sitting Tory. Notice further that, if our endorsements had also been adopted by the Labour Party, the probability of a Jeremy Corbyn 10 Downing Street would have been enhanced. In short, DiEM25 is genuinely behind Jeremy and John – except in our own special way!

Lastly, on the ‘small’ matter of endorsing Nick Clegg I must say that this was not a choice that I voted for. Nick may have had a change of heart recently, and has called for a progressive alliance government in the UK – all good, proper and in concert with DiEM25’s agenda. BUT, he stands condemned for his connivance in the class war against the weak; i.e. the austerity policies of George Osborne and David Cameron. He also stands condemned for having acceded to various anti-social, uncivilised Tory policies, e.g. trebling university tuition fees. NEVERTHELESS, DiEM25 is a boisterous, democratic movement that combines horizontal decision making with all-member votes. That very process, which we cherish at DiEM25, yielded this particular recommendation – one that I must, and I do, accept.

 

The 15 parliamentary candidates DiEM25 endorses for Thursday’s UK General Election

DiEM25 was formed to build a Progressive International across Europe. The UK, especially since Brexit prevailed in last year’s referendum, is a major battleground for European democracy. The way Brexit is handled will be crucial for the future of Britain but also for European peoples far and wide. DiEM25 could not be absent from this election campaign.

DiEM25’s own position on what should happen once Brexit won the June 2016 referendum is already on record. Following an internal two-stage vote that took place November 2016, DiEM25 members from across Europe opted for the following position:

We support negotiations between the UK and the EU leading to an interim EEA-EFTA UK-EU arrangement (i.e. Norway/Swiss-like) to come into force two years after Article 50’s activation and, subsequently, to a long-term agreement viz. the UK-EU relationship to be approved by the next Parliament (to be elected after Article 50’s activation).

More recently, once Prime Minister Theresa May called an election in search of a mandate for what we consider an ill-fated Brexit negotiation with the EU, DiEM25 UK members decided to demonstrate in practice DiEM25’s progressive, inclusive, transnational politics by identifying candidates across the UK that come close to DiEM25’s progressive agenda for Britain and Europe. Our members have been active in selecting candidates that DiEM25 ought to support in different constituencies with a view not only to improve their chances of being elected but also to give an example of what DiEM25’s commitment to PRINCIPLED VOTING means.

Once DiEM25 UK members put together their recommended list of candidates, the complete list was put to an internal vote. Every DiEM25 member, from across Europe, had a vote in this. This is DiEM25’s weapon against the logic of Brexit, of the UK’s isolation from the rest of Europe: Every DiEM25 member, English, Welsh, Scottish, Irish, French, Greek etc., gets to vote on our favourite UK parliamentary candidates. It is our way of illustrating the formation of a European demos that rejects both a one-size fits-all attitude for Europe and isolationism. 

The results are now in! Below you will find the list of candidates that DiEM25 endorses for the 8th June 2017 UK general election. It includes candidates from the Labour Party (6); the Liberal Democrats (2); the Scottish National Party (2); Plaid Cymru (1); the Greens (1); the Scottish Greens (1); the National Health Action Party (1) and the Women’s Equality Party (1).

The fact that DiEM25 endorses even Liberal Democrats (like former Prime Minister Nick Clegg, whose connivance with David Cameron’s and George Osborne’s class war against poorer Brits was inexcusable and remains unforgiven) reflects Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system. A proportional system would have, naturally, yielded a different set of recommendations. But, when progressive politicians, even if flawed in a variety of ways; e.g. Nick Clegg), are pitted against hard, xenophobic Brexiteers, it is within the realm of our PRINCIPLED VOTING philosophy to support them. Of course, we need to draw the line somewhere. For example, the failure of a substantial body of dissent against toxic, nationalist Brexiteering to rise within the Conservative party makes it impossible for DiEM25 members to endorse Tory candidates. Our members have, nevertheless, singled out three Tories for their resistance to the Brexit juggernaut: Anna Soubry for her dissent to hard Brexit; Kenneth Clarke who, despite his uncritical support for the EU establishment, has been a courageous adversary to the isolationism of Brexiteers; and Baroness Warsi for upholding basic values of decency in the  House of Lords debates.

The fifteen DiEM25  parliamentary endorsees 

Mhairi Black (SNP, Paisley and Renfrewshire South)
Kelly-Marie Blundell (Liberal Democrat, Lewes)
Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat, Sheffield Hallam)
Patrick Harvie (co-convenor of the Scottish Green Party)
Kelvin Hopkins (Labour, Luton North)
Louise Irvine (National Health Action Party, South West Surrey)
Clive Lewis (Labour, Norwich South)
Rebecca Long Bailey (Labour, Salford and Eccles)
Caroline Lucas (Green, Brighton Pavilion and an Advisory Panel member of DiEM25)
John McDonnell (Labour, Hayes and Harlington and an Advisory Panel member of DiEM25)
Lisa Nandy (Labour, Wigan)
Sophie Walker (Womens’ Equality Party, Shipley)
Hywel Williams (Plaid Cymru, Arfon)
Toni Giugliano (SNP, Edinburgh West)
Matt Kerr (Labour & Co-operative, Glasgow South West)

Our fifteen candidates in brief

Mhairi Black became SNP MP for Paisley and Renfrewshire South in the 2015 general election while still a final year undergraduate student at the University of Glasgow. One of the youngest MP’s ever, she is, however, a longstanding critic of the Westminster government, for its unreality, arrogance and sexism. She considered not standing for a second term due to the fact that “so little gets done”. She is on the Work and Pensions Committee, has campaigned tirelessly for Women Against State Pension Inequality (WASPI), and has highlighted the increasing dependence of people on food banks, On the EU, she said on one occasion “If I’m honest there was an element of holding my nose when I voted Remain”.

Kelly-Marie Blundell is the Liberal Democrat candidate for Lewes and became active in the party in order to engage more people in politics. Unashamedly pro-EU, Kelly-Marie organised marches following the referendum. She is well known for speaking up on the NHS and Sheltered Housing as well as leading debates on welfare and social security. Kelly-Marie has worked in the charity sector for the last 8 years as a fundraising and marketing professional, having previously worked as a Citizen’s Advice Bureau advisor and as a Union representative. Kelly-Marie is passionate about rural and town life, making sure communities have access to the services they need and that local business can thrive. She says: “Nationally the country is in crisis. Both the Conservatives and Labour are focused entirely on in-fighting while the economy worsens, threatening jobs, public services and our efforts to build the houses Britain so badly needs”.

Nick Clegg was Deputy Prime Minister in Britain’s coalition government from 2010 to 2015, Leader of the Liberal Democrats from 2007 to 2015, and has been Liberal Democrat MP for Sheffield Hallam since 2005. Previously an MEP, he is currently LD Shadow Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and LD Shadow Secretary of State for International Trade. In an indirect admission that he was profoundly wrong to go into a coalition government with the Tories, and for helping administer an economic and social policy that disadvantaged and disenfranchised poorer and rural Britons, he now says that Britain is run by an unaccountable cabal coordinating Brexit on behalf of the financial sector. In his view, the only solution to a “rotten” British democracy is non-Conservative and anti-Brexit forces coming together after the election to create a viable opposition against a one-party state, for cleaner politics and for progress. Brexit, he suggests, brazenly ignores the interest of the younger generation and they must keep pointing out that the decision was not taken in their name.

Patrick Harvie, co-convenor of the Scottish Green Party, Member of Scottish Parliament for the Glasgow Region and candidate in the UK 2017 General Election for Glasgow North. Patrick is the first openly bisexual Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom and has actively campaigned for civil partnership legislation and more recently for the TIE (Time for Inclusive Education) campaign which focuses on LGBT visibility within the Scottish education system. Patrick, post-Brexit argued that European citizens must focus on changing Europe to serve the interest of the people, as opposed to the corporate interests at present, and for an independent Scotland to re-join a reformed European Union.

Kelvin Hopkins, Labour MP for Luton North, was first elected to the Commons in 1997. His professional career was spent as an economist and policy researcher for trade unions, especially UNISON, and he is deeply sceptical of Labour’s conversion to free market economics. In one debate he described the private finance initiative as “irrational nonsense”, and described it as ‘less popular than the poll tax’. He emerged well from the 2009 MPs expenses scandal, being deemed a “saint” by The Daily Telegraph for his minimal second home claims. He was one of 16 signatories of an open letter to the then Labour leader Ed Miliband in January 2015, which called on the party to commit to oppose further austerity, take rail franchises back into public ownership and strengthen collective bargaining arrangements. Hopkins was one of 36 Labour MPs to nominate Jeremy Corbyn as a candidate in the Labour leadership election of 2015. Before the 2016 referendum on British membership of the EU, Hopkins signed the People’s Pledge, a cross-party campaign for such a referendum, and became a member of its Advisory Council. In 2016 he was one of the leading Labour figures to support the Leave campaign in the UK Referendum on EU membership.

Louise Irvine, is the National Health Action Party candidate standing against Jeremy Hunt in South West Surrey. She is ‘more than ready’ to challenge Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt as many Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green Party members have agreed to back her. Irvine, who led a successful campaign against government plans to downgrade hospital services in Lewisham, where she works, teaches many junior doctors who feel abused and misrepresented by their contracts of employment. She sees widening inequality and opposes the privatisation of the health service, calling for the integration of health and social care, as opposed to the current move towards unaccountable care systems. She says: “the market has wasted billions and we want to make it a public service again. The staff need to be properly valued and properly paid. We have to increase funding by at least £5 billion a year.”

Clive Lewis, Labour MP for Norwich South was appointed Shadow Secretary of State for Defence in June 2016 and Shadow Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in October 2016. He is calling for a second referendum on the terms of the Brexit deal to heal a divided country, and voted against the Brexit bill in order to be “Norwich’s voice in Westminster, not Westminster’s voice in Norwich.” He has said: “The Tories’ plan for Brexit is a plan for a race to the bottom which we will all lose, with weakened human rights, rampant deregulation, and a diminished Britain. It’s an extreme agenda which will not only isolate our country but fatally undermine its democracy, weakening parliament and giving the government unprecedented power to pursue its agenda. We have to wake up before it’s too late, and vote to stop Tory Brexit.”

Rebecca Long Bailey is Labour MP for Salford and Eccles. Previously Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury, she is currently Shadow Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Rebecca Long Bailey has been an outspoken politician criticising the abysmal record of austerity policies by the conservative government. She stands for one of the most deprived inner city areas, Salford and Eccles, an area of historic significance, made famous by L.S.Lowry. She is highly qualified to speak on economic, energy and financial matters and policy and has therefore would have great authority in future talks with European partners in Brexit negotiations.

Caroline Lucas, is the Green MP for Brighton Pavilion and argues that Britain could lead the way on climate change, She will continue to “put her constituents first by campaigning for Britain to remain as close to the European Union as possible and immediately guaranteeing rights of EU nationals here”, campaigning on housing, the NHS and for school funding. She will be an independent Green voice, not constrained by the party whip but “looking to work across party lines on the issues that matter”. She has said: “There’s absolutely no doubt that Brexit is central to this election. The Tories’ extreme agenda would see the UK leaving the single market, ending free movement and endangering our social and environmental protections. This damaging plan must be resisted and we urge people across to use their vote to reject an extreme Brexit.”

John McDonnell, Labour MP for Hayes and Harlington in 1997, became Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer in September 2015. Major architect of Labour’s alternative economic strategy and the current manifesto, committed to scrapping Theresa May’s Brexit plan; committed to introducing a bill to ensure workers’ rights are protected, to guaranteeing that EU nationals can remain in the UK, to negotiating tariff-free access to the European market and to allowing MPs to vote on the final deal. Recently, he challenged a media not doing their job, to help the general public have a democratic election debate, by holding the Tories to account on their “completely uncosted Manifesto of Misery.”

Lisa Nandy, elected Labour MP for Wigan in 2010. A strong advocate for a more humane and sensible refugee policy, she has repeatedly challenged the Home Office for outsourcing refugee housing contracts to private companies such as G4S and Serco, with disastrous effects on both the prospects of integration of refugees into the UK, and the resilience of local communities in these areas. Nandy has focused on the growing divide between British towns and cities, rejecting the rhetoric of “leftbehind communities” by stressing the importance of community bonds in these areas, and people’s right to a dignified life from wherever they come. She understands and has campaigned on one of the central issues that DiEM25 is trying to address: the toxic combination of involuntary underemployment and involuntary migration.

Sophie Walker is the leader of the Women’s Equality Party and is standing in Shipley. Walker, a Remain supporter, wants an “equality impact assessment” of any final Brexit deal, and the chance for MPs to vote it down if necessary. She is standing against a Tory MP who tried to derail a bill to protect women against violence, and told a conference hosted by an anti-feminism party that “feminist zealots really do want women to have their cake and eat it”. As other opposition parties consider giving her a free run in her attempt to unseat the Shipley Conservative MP, the journalist who became the WEP’s inaugural leader in 2015 has been at the forefront of its campaigns for equal representation and pay in working life. She says her opponent‘s anti-equality agenda in Westminster and anti-democratic practices such as filibustering legistlation threatens the rights and freedoms not just of women but also people with disabilities, BAME (black, Asian, and minority ethnic) and LGBT+ communities.

Hywel Williams MP, Plaid Cymru, was elected in 2015 to the Arfon seat. Appointed Head of the Centre for Social Work Practice at the University of Wales, in 1993, having worked as a mental health social worker in Dwyfor, Williams then became a freelance lecturer, consultant and writer in the fields of social policy, social work, and social care, working primarily through the medium of Welsh. He has been a member of numerous professional bodies in relation to social work and training, and was also spokesman for the Child Poverty Action Group in Wales. His parliamentary responsibilities within Plaid Cymru are work and pensions, defence, international development and culture. Campaigning to remain in the European Union, in PM Question Time, he claimed Theresa May was planning to cut a special deal for Britain’s financial sector: “A soft Brexit for her friends in the city, a hard Brexit for everyone else. Will she cut a similar deal for Wales?”

Toni Giugliano, SNP Candidate for Edinburgh West. Born in Italy, he was President of the Young European Movement in the United Kingdom. He has worked for a number EU organisations in Brussels, including the European University Association, where he represented the interests of 850 universities across Europe and successfully led a campaign that halted cuts to research funding. He now works for one of Scotland’s leading mental health charities. He worked for Yes Scotland campaign during the Scottish Independence referendum and he is now fighting to keep Scotland in the single market and protect Edinburgh’s jobs which rely on single market membership.

Matt Kerr, is the Labour and Co-op candidate for Glasgow South West. A critic of the current benefits system, he is seeking cross-party support for a universal basic income as a way of providing security when people change jobs much more frequently than in the past. He lobbied for changes to UK Border Authority and government policies that denied support to asylum seekers.

Background to the internal DiEM25 vote

The list was discussed and then ratified by our movement based on policies advocated by each candidate measured against DiEM25’s political values and beliefs. Our goal is a politics that is fair, democratic and non-polarising; not limited by party tribes, political sect or faction, or the hopelessly constrained binary opposition of the referendum. As a cross-party movement the DiEM25 UK list supports candidates from a variety of parties which share a progressive agenda. (Regrettably, although Conservative candidates were considered, the current regressive programme of the Conservative Party and the lack of vocal dissent did not allow us to include any.)

DiEM25 wants a harmonious and strong relationship established between the UK and EU notwithstanding the result of the 2016 referendum. ‘Brexit’ and the latter are not mutually exclusive: exiting the EU must not wilfully destroy the irreversible social, political and economic ties we have with the union. This is an unprecedentedly complex and risky period for the UK.

In their recent presidential elections, DiEM25 France compiled an endorsed list of candidates, employing DiEM25’s European New Deal as their guiding philosophy. While drawing inspiration from this text, DiEM25 seeks to address the UK’s specific democratic and transparency deficits and their prospects outside the Eurozone, a wealthy country with a poorly representative electoral system and an overly influential, weakly regulated and opaque financial sector. See the full document entitled ‘Principled Not Tactical’.

When the list went out for voting to all DiEM25 members, our UK Provisional National Committee received several complaints about the potential endorsement of candidate Nick Clegg. DiEM25’s goals are to set in motion a progressive and collaborative politics. In this context of isolation and polarisation, we are convinced that collaboration is the key term. To trigger change on the international level we should be inclusive of all political factions from across the country. Our decision to include Nick Clegg in our selection of candidates was based on our belief that to pave the way for the European New Deal also requires collaboration between progressive political traditions; social and liberal democratic, Leavers and Remainers alike. Nick Clegg’s singular experience of European politics among other things, qualify him to make a contribution to the broad coalition of democrats and progressives that DiEM25 seeks. As a movement, we are here to pick and choose the policies and beliefs that unite us rather than divide us.

We welcome everyone to join our movement whose objective is to put the demos back into our democracy – something that we can only achieve at home if Europe is democratised as a whole.

Carpe DiEM!

Do you want to be informed of DiEM25’s actions? Sign up here.

 

 

Jane Goodall’s review of Adults in the Room – Insider Story

Dragged behind a chariot, watched by the crowd

If you studied economics at Sydney University in the 1990s, you might have had the good fortune to be taught in first year by a charismatic young lecturer who earned the nickname of the Greek God. Yanis Varoufakis, who in his youth bore some resemblance to John Travolta in Saturday Night Fever, liked teaching first year because it gave him the opportunity to divest students of the cut-and-dried assumptions they had acquired from the HSC course in economics.

Varoufakis had research interests in game theory, which he later tested in a venture with an innovative technology company named Valve. There, he and his partners experimented with management on the principle of “spontaneous order,” prioritising flexibility and self-determination in order to optimise freedom of initiative for employees. His sceptical view of game theory made him critical of any system based on manipulation and control.

Two decades on from his time at Sydney University, after a brief and turbulent period in 2015 as finance minister of the newly formed Syriza government in Greece, Varoufakis has resumed his career as an economics professor and public speaker. In a recent dialogue with Noam Chomsky at the New York Public Library, he characterised economics in the academy as a “mathematised religion,” an orthodoxy whose belief systems are insulated from the realities of market activity and financial transaction. As co-founder of DIEM 25, a reformist movement committed to a “surge of democracy” in Europe, he remains an indefatigable crusader for pragmatic human intelligence against systemic determination.

Television cameras and tabloid headlines can strip a public figure of all dignity and credibility, as Varoufakis learned from experience.

Adults in the Room is Varoufakis’s third major book on contemporary political economy. The first, The Global Minotaur (2011), concerns the changing role of America in the international economy following the global financial crisis of 2008. And the Weak Suffer What They Must? (2016) provides a historical context for the austerity in which Greece has become engulfed, tracing the macroeconomics of national debt back to the postwar era and the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944.

The three books constitute a kind of trilogy. The first leads up to an account of the first Greek bailout by the European Union. The second two revolve around the catastrophic debacle in which he became engulfed during his attempts as finance minister to negotiate with the European Union over the management of the Greek debt. It is as if he is compelled to revisit this traumatic epicentre – a zone of intellectual quicksand – and find the paths that led into it and may indicate a way out.

On one level, Adults in the Room, subtitled “My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment,” can be read as an autobiographical drama in which Varoufakis plays a contemporary Achilles, gladiator supreme and agile strategist, entering the fortress of the European Union as a champion of his people. Judging by the portrait photograph on the back of the book, Achilles is a role Varoufakis was born for. He’d be a potent physical and vocal presence on stage, as he is on the platform in so many international forums. Any theatre director seeking to cast a production of the Aeschylus trilogy Achilleis need look no further.

When he was chosen by the leader of the left wing Syriza party, Alexis Tsipras, to play a key role in a prospective Syriza government, the charisma was a bonus. It was Varoufakis’s credentials as an economic analyst that were paramount, supplemented by his sophisticated interest in game theory. By his own account, Varoufakis played a tough hand in negotiating his own involvement. At their first meeting in 2011, as he recalls it, he was concerned to “shake Tsipras out of his lazy thinking.” He advised him to get an English tutor and provided a firm lecture on the underlying principles they should adhere to.

It all sounds a little high-handed, reflecting as it does the assurance of someone who was already doing the rounds of international forums pronouncing on the state of the European Union in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Tsipras, though, proved to be a more agile thinker than Varoufakis initially gave him credit for. In the strategy tent, he and his key adviser Nikos Pappas agreed with Varoufakis on a five-point plan.

First, they must fend off any move by the European Central Bank to close the Greek banks. Second, the debts of the Greek state must be uncoupled from those of the banks, so that the government couldn’t be held accountable for bailout for money routed directly back to the banks in any bailout agreement. Third, they must “shout from the rooftops” that the new Syriza government was prepared to enforce strict fiscal discipline so that the country could begin to live within its means. But the fourth point was that humanitarian crisis must be avoided by imposing limits on austerity and introducing measures to assist those “below the absolute poverty line.”

Lastly, there was what might be termed the “Varoufakis special,” a “modest proposal” on which he had been working for some years in collaboration with American economist Jamie Galbraith and former British Labour MP Stuart Holland. This proposed a series of measures for rendering the eurozone viable in the continuing fallout from the global financial crisis. By putting this plan forward, the Syriza government would emphasise that their determination to release the Greeks from “debtor’s prison” was part of a more broadly conceived agenda to strengthen the European Union.

Varoufakis wanted no rash threats of Grexit, but he and Tsipras were agreed on the need to retain it as an option of last resort. As such, it was a key element in the bargaining strategy, the failsafe measure to ensure that the Greek people would not be subjected to another phase of “Bailoutistan,” the regime of debt management that had left three out of four households without employment and some 90 per cent of the unemployed without any form of financial assistance.

As the chosen emissary, Varoufakis was primed to compromise, adapt and collaborate on any reasonable terms. At the bottom line, though, he was the representative of a left-wing government voted into office by an electorate desperate to shake off the misery of ever-harsher austerity measures. In the early chapters of the book, he describes walking through the crowds of protesters who took up almost permanent residence in Syntagma Square outside the Greek parliament in the later, crisis-ridden years of the Papandreou government. Now, duly elected as a member of the government and invested with the critical responsibilities of the finance ministry, he is seen as champion of their cause.

At this stage, with Syriza taking office on the back of a rapid ascent in the polls, there is every reason for those crowds to have confidence in their finance minister. Varoufakis has the natural authority of someone who knows what he is talking about and whose principles have been forged in the sternest metal. As a speaker he’s charming, quick-witted, and fiercely cogent. As an economist, he’s rational and pragmatic.

But whatever his own capacities, they were sorely mismatched against those of the European establishment. Confidence was Varoufakis’s Achilles heel. It inspired a quixotic attempt to pitch clarity against obfuscation, reasonable argument against arbitrary determination, logic against absurdism. This was not, to use one of his own favourite phrases, going to end well.

His account of what transpires as he penetrates to the inner circles of power play in Brussels is based largely on recordings he made of the meetings. Chunks of verbatim dialogue fill out the pages of the book, and as he proceeds from one exchange to another, relentlessly insisting on the contrariness and illogicality he is encountering, it is as if the dramaturgy of Aeschylus is giving way to the absurdist scenarios of Alice Through the Looking Glass.

Anyone with a sceptical view of game theory would surely find a kindred spirit in Lewis Carroll. Carroll’s Alice stories feature playing cards, chessboards, a game of croquet and the famous language game with the domineering Humpty Dumpty, who declares he can make words mean what he chooses them to mean. “The question is,” he says, “which is to be master – that’s all.” Varoufakis finds himself dealing with people who have mastered the principles of economy in similar terms.

The three institutional players who have direct control over the Greek economy – “the troika” – are the European Commission, or EC, the European Central Bank, or ECB, and the International Monetary Fund, or IMF. As in Lewis Carroll’s world, it is not that there is no logic among them, more that they have adapted logic to work quite independently of any kind of common sense. Their bailouts involve a range of imperatives that Carroll’s Red Queen might have devised.

The ECB grants insolvent Greek banks the right to issue IOUs to the value of €5 billion. As no one wants to deal in these, they take them to the bankrupt state, which serves as their guarantor, and then use them as collateral for new loans from the Central Bank of Greece, which is controlled by the ECB. Lost already? But there’s more.

With permission from the Eurogroup (composed mainly of the finance ministers from EU member countries), the ECB issues real cash loans to the Greek banks for €3.5 billion, or 70 per cent of the value of the IOUs, while the Greek Treasury, also with approval from the Eurogroup, issues IOU bills for roughly the same amount. The bankers can now use their new cashflow to buy the state IOUs, so providing the Greek government with the cash to pay off debt to the ECB.

Bailout loans were thus made to serve the interests not of the Greek nation, and certainly not of the Greek people, but of the troika and the most powerful players in the bailout game, France and Germany. In 2011, French and German banks drove the terms of the loan by taking a high stake in it themselves – 20 per cent and 27 per cent respectively, with the remaining 53 per cent underwritten by smaller countries. Over the next two years, France and Germany managed to offload most of their own liability, leaving the debt burden to the taxpayers in smaller economies.

“Socialists sooner or later run out of other people’s money,” according to Margaret Thatcher’s dictum, but when it comes to spending other people’s money, governments pursuing neoliberal goals, and their billionaire backers, take the practice to a whole new level. At the same time, they get to control other people’s governments.

The troika’s bailout strategy is essentially a plan to force Greece to take loans it cannot hope to repay, in order to shackle the Greek government to a set of policies that will ensure a continuous flow of funds to the banks. By the terms of agreement, half the bailout goes to the banks, but the government takes liability for all of it. Fierce and unrealistic repayment schedules to the IMF are enforced through constant oversight of the Greek economy by troika officials. Forced and indiscriminate sale of national assets is the solution when there is no money to make the repayments.

All this leaves the Greek people in a state of near desperation, with radical cuts to even the lowest and most essential pensions, catastrophic levels of unemployment and the loss of national resources that might help to rebuild the economy. The challenge is to stave off the imposition of another loan under terms that will continue to crush the economy, which is showing signs of at least the capacity to recover. But an outright refusal to accept bailout would mean the immediate closure of the Greek banks by Mario Draghi, president of the ECB.

Any attempt to unravel the higher-order nonsense of eurozone finance involves dealing with key office-holders who at times present themselves as entirely reasonable and intelligent human beings. But in looking-glass world, “nohow”and “contrariwise,” stock responses in the dialogue of Tweedledum and Tweedledee, always seem to win out over any moves towards solution and agreement.

It is Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, who gives Varoufakis his title when she insists that a way forward can only be found with “adults in the room.” But Varoufakis also tells of how, in a late-night conversation, Lagarde told him that he was entirely correct in his assessment of the logical impossibility of the bailout terms. Yet he would have to agree to them; the EU had invested so much political capital in the “extend and pretend” strategy that any backdown was impossible.

Varoufakis has told that late-night story many times, in public talks and in his previous books, where it is presented as a watershed moment. This is a world in which logic, reason and mathematics are weapons of no value. Forget economic rationalism. That is not their game at all.

This is vividly illustrated towards the end of the book, in a scene in which Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister who has been presented through most of the narrative as the man in charge of the thumbscrews, comes across with some off-the-record advice: the Greek government should indeed withdraw from the eurozone, and if it does so, he will undertake to ensure that it is funded for the period of transition back to the drachma.

That proposition comes to nothing. The dialogue goes up to the next political level and Tsipras, in discussion with Angela Merkel, finds himself manoeuvred into an endgame in which he seems to lose track of whose side he’s playing for. Though he remains in apparent solidarity, he now seems to be undermining every move Varoufakis tries to make, and Varoufakis is made to appear the cause of the debacle. Key members of the Tsipras government become hostile; assistants who have been his staunch allies in the negotiating process are replaced with adversaries.

One of the climactic scenes in the Achilles story comes when the Greek hero drags the body of his slain enemy Hector behind a chariot, watched by the crowd. It’s the final humiliation, transforming the athletic physique of a warrior into a gory mess. In the media age, we have other ways of achieving an equivalent effect. Television cameras and tabloid headlines can strip a public figure of all dignity and credibility, as Varoufakis learned from experience.

His constant round of public talks, and the publication of this “tell all” book, might be seen as his bid for vindication, or even revenge. If his reputation was temporarily and spectacularly trashed in the media, he can do a slower, fuller and more sophisticated hatchet job on the EU officials and organisations responsible for his defeat.

If you read it this way – as the story of Achilles in a looking-glass world – the book can get rather wearing. It’s over 500 pages long, with scene after scene in which Varoufakis seems to go in holding the lamp of justice and reason and come out covered in confusion. Was it really like that? Surely he must himself have gone about things the wrong way in many of these situations? No doubt. No doubt the story – or the many stories that make up this sorry history – could be told in other ways by other people who were involved.

By the time I came to the end of his account, though, this was not at all the way I was looking at it. Whoever was in the right or the wrong at any stage of the process, wherever one might draw the line between reason and a monstrous culture of sophisticated nonsense, one thing is clear: the effect on the Greek people, and on the new young government in which their hopes were invested, was devastating.

Equally clear is that the culpability for this lies not with Varoufakis, or the Syriza government, but with the EU and its peak bodies. Tsipras is still embroiled in futile “negotiations” over the bailout. His government was forced to pass another suite of austerity measures only a few weeks ago. Opposition leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis, one of Varoufakis’s most strident critics, declared that “our country is being turned into an austerity colony.”

Approval ratings for Tsipras and Syriza have plummeted, and they are badly trailing the conservative opposition in the polls, but Mitsotakis is in no position to do any better. The Greek people have been trying to vote their way out of austerity since 2010, but to no avail. In Syriza, they backed a government committed to tax reform and a raft of responsible economic measures, with a plan for growth. But Tsipras has been able to deliver on virtually none of the policies that got him elected.

Fundamentally, Adults in the Room is a book about political economy. The wider historical context in which Varoufakis is able to place his own experiences makes it more than a narrative of self-vindication. As his previous books have demonstrated, he is a superb historian of political economy and brings enormous background knowledge to his critique of neoliberalism.

The global free-market credo, with all the high-end wheelings and dealings it has led to, produces a way of thinking that makes austerity for the people an inevitable consequence. “There is no alternative,” as Thatcher was fond of saying, but that very expression is a way of locking in thought processes.

Austerity is the cul-de-sac of neoliberalism. The Greeks can’t vote their way out, but the British may be about to vote their way into it. If we really believe there is no alternative, we all wind up there, sooner or later, with an inevitability that is the cynical modern equivalent of the fatalism expressed in Hellenic tragedy. Whatever his shortcomings may have been during his adventures in the looking-glass world of eurozone politics, Yanis Varoufakis is an implacable warrior against inevitability.

[Click here for the original website]

ADULTS IN THE ROOM

What happens when you take on the establishment? In this blistering, personal account, Yanis Varoufakis blows the lid on Europe’s hidden agenda and exposes what actually goes on in its corridors of power.

‘One of the greatest political memoirs of all time’ (Guardian)
The Sunday Times Number 1 Bestseller

Varoufakis sparked one of the most spectacular and controversial battles in recent political history when, as finance minister of Greece, he attempted to re-negotiate his country’s relationship with the EU. Despite the mass support of the Greek people and the simple logic of his arguments, he succeeded only in provoking the fury of Europe’s political, financial and media elite. But the true story of what happened is almost entirely unknown – not least because so much of the EU’s real business takes place behind closed doors.

In this fearless account, Varoufakis reveals all: an extraordinary tale of brinkmanship, hypocrisy, collusion and betrayal that will shake the deep establishment to its foundations.

As is now clear, the same policies that required the tragic and brutal suppression of Greece’s democratic uprising have led directly to authoritarianism, populist revolt and instability throughout the Western world.

Adults In The Room is an urgent wake-up call to renew European democracy before it is too late.

For the publishers’ site click here
For pre-publication pieces click here.
For reviews click here.

 

How to build a democratic Europe in a post-Brexit landscape – interviewed for Jacobin by Doug Henwood

Yanis Varoufakis negotiated with the EU elite over the Greek bailout, witnessed firsthand the callous mathematics used to keep the union together. Today — after OXI, after Brexit, and after Trump — he and his comrades in DiEM25 are calling for a New Deal for Europe: a plan that can stabilize the European Union and return democracy to the people.

He sat down with Doug Henwood on Behind the News to discuss this new venture, the international far right, and Europe’s recovery. This transcript has been edited. You can listen to the original interview here, and subscribe to Jacobin Radio to hear Behind the News and other Jacobin-hosted podcasts at iTunes, Stitcher, or Blubrry.

INTERVIEW BY DOUG HENWOOD

Doug Henwood

The last time we talked was in November 2014. The European growth rates were, I don’t know, 1 to 1.5 percent. The Greek economy was happy if it had a 0 percent quarter. We seem to be pretty much in the same place we were over two years ago, aren’t we?

Yanis Varoufakis

How can we possibly expect something different when we’re doing exactly the same thing in Europe?

Doug Henwood

They did promise us things would work out, but they’re not working out.

Yanis Varoufakis

Yes, but those promises were underpinned by a commitment to continue doing exactly the same thing. Whatever it is that they have done, it was always behind the bend, always in response to the continuation of the crisis for which they were responsible, never an attempt to stem it, to get ahead of the curve, and to do something about the causes rather than the symptoms.

Doug Henwood

Are there any signs of recovery?

Yanis Varoufakis

There is a cyclical recovery of sorts. It’s a very tepid one, a very weak one. The business cycle at this very moment should be registering significant recovery, but it is the architectural design codes and the procrastination and the commitment to failed policies which is holding it back. If you look at countries like Spain, for instance, there is modest growth. There is even a little bit of inflation.

Even in Germany, we shifted away from the deflationary mode of last year, but nevertheless, it is all very tentative. It is based in Spain, for instance, on credit expansion in the country that suffered the credit bubble, and therefore is still laboring under the legacy of that bubble’s bursting.

Investment in things that society needs remains ridiculously low. We are wasting the upturn of the business cycle due to the political failure of the eurozone.

Doug Henwood

Is there any bifurcation between the core of the European Union and the periphery, or are they both stuck in the mud?

Yanis Varoufakis

They’re both stuck in the mud in different ways. The manifestation of the crisis in Italy is evident for all to see. We have a completely broken-down banking system, a public debt which is unsustainable, even though the European Central Bank is buying tens of billions of it all the time.

In places like Germany, you have pension funds that have been crushed by the deflationary forces unleashed by the same process. The fact of the matter is that while the monetary authorities, particularly the European Central Bank, have managed to inject sufficient cortisone into the European patient to make it look stable, under the skin, within the foundations of the real economy, Europe is becoming increasingly imbalanced. The centrifugal forces are doing their catastrophic deed.

Doug Henwood

What about the European version of quantitative easing? Has it had any positive effect at all?

Yanis Varoufakis

This is the cortisone I was talking about. There would have been no eurozone to speak of now if it was not for quantitative easing (QE), but it is quite interesting to compare and contrast QE in Europe to that in the United States or in Japan, or even in Britain. In Europe, quantitative easing is inconsistent with the charter of the European Central Bank. The central bank is not allowed to be the lender of last resort. It’s not allowed to do the things that the Fed is allowed to do.

Mario Draghi, the president of the ECB, had to go through the ringer in order to be permitted to implement quantitative easing. He had to promise to buy a lot more German debt than Italian debt or Spanish debt. He had to buy debt, in other words, in proportion to the size of each member state’s economy, which is absurd.

For every one euro of Italian debt that he buys, he has to buy two euros of German debt, which of course he shouldn’t, because Germany is not in the deflationary state Italy is. In order to stabilize Italy, he has to crush the pension funds and the smaller banks in Germany.

That of course creates a great deal of a backlash in Germany for the ECB actions, which are essentially designed to keep Italy in the eurozone.

Doug Henwood

What about the German banks? Are they still holding up?

Yanis Varoufakis

They’re only holding up because of the implicit guarantee of the German state. As you well know, Deutsche Bank is deeply insolvent. The asset books of Deutsche Bank are replete with non-performing, zero-marke-price assets. The recent decision of the United States regarding fines on Deutsche Bank reduced its equity to the level of a small company, even though it is the largest bank in Europe.

It has many times the size of the German economy buried in its asset books, in the form of liabilities, not assets, and therefore the only thing that keeps it going is the confidence of the marketplace that the German taxpayer is behind Deutsche Bank.

Doug Henwood

Does the German taxpayer have the means to support Deutsche Bank?

Yanis Varoufakis

The German taxpayer is not capable of backstopping Deutsche Bank if Deutsche Bank were to be called to task by the regulators. What the German taxpayer can do is guarantee the short-term refinancing of these bad assets. As long as the regulators do not impose upon Deutsche Bank a proper audit, the German taxpayer is capable of extending and pretending Deutsche Bank’s insolvency into the future by allowing it to carry on trading.

Regulators effectively control the game, and they can allow Deutsche Bank to continue trading as it does for a very, very long time.

Of course, this is a political bombshell buried in the foundations of Europe. While this is happening with Deutsche Bank in Germany, similarly insolvent banks in Italy are being exposed, and the pressure is being placed on Rome to transfer their losses onto the shoulders of the weakest taxpayers.

Therefore, you have a populist backlash against the European Union and the eurozone. We have a situation in Italy where only one party supports Italy’s membership of the eurozone, and that party has just split.

Doug Henwood

This approach to the banking problem sounds very much like the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, though on a much, much larger scale. Is anybody looking at precedents, or are they just trying to get through one day to the next?

Yanis Varoufakis

This is the savings and loan scandal at a larger scale and with a great difference between the United States and Europe. The first difference is that the United States had a federal government by which to affect a federal bailout.

You have a Federal Reserve Bank which has the capacity to effectively transfer all the bad losses onto its balance sheet. The European Central Bank is not allowed to this. To allow the Deutsche mark to be extended to the rest of Europe — to effectively become the euro — the German Central Bank imposed this condition: the new central bank, the Bundesbank writ large, would not be used as a dumping ground for the bad debts and the bad assets of the riffraff — the Italian banks, Greek banks, Italian government, Greek government, and so on.

It turns out that this was a problem for them, because now the central bank that they created cannot come to the rescue of Deutsche Bank. At the same time, we don’t have a federal government to do what happened in the United States after the savings and loan scandal.

Doug Henwood

Is there anyone at this point gaining materially from this arrangement? What’s keeping it going? Ideology? Just inertia?

Yanis Varoufakis

Ideology plays a part, but it’s mainly vested interests. The moment the bubble burst in 2008, 2009, 2010, it was a case of ensuring, from the establishment’s point of view, that the cost of the crisis would be pushed onto the shoulders of the weakest of Europeans. That’s what the Greek bailout was. That’s what the Irish bailout was, the Portuguese bailout, the Spanish bailout, and of course the austerity policies that came along. This was pure, naked self-interest on the behalf of the powers that be.

Now, of course, because they hadn’t thought this through — or because they were so panicked when they resorted to that massive, cynical redistribution — they didn’t realize what would happen, which is that this austerity drive and the toxic bailouts yielded a deflationary environment, which had other unintended effects. Then they tried to deal with those effects. Just like firefighters not aiming their water cannons at the heart of the fire but instead aiming it at the flames, the crisis simply transformed into something different.

They were never attacking the systemic part. There is a combination of vested interest, panic, the lack of a systematic and coordinated approach to the problem, and in the end, incredible callousness in the way they wanted to blame the victims of the crisis.

Doug Henwood

In your brief tenure as finance minister of Greece, you got to sit in on meetings and talk with people of the sorts that economics professors don’t normally rub shoulders with. What did that experience teach you about thinking at the highest levels of the financial establishment?

Yanis Varoufakis

Many, many, many things. For the benefits of brevity, let me point out two lessons. The first one has something to do with what Hannah Arendt once told us about the banality of evil. How banal these people can be, especially the technocrats, especially the second-rate cheerleaders of the great and powerful — figures like Wolfgang Schauble.

The second thing is that the more powerful people know what’s going on. For them, the game resembles a nineteenth-century gunboat diplomacy game. There’s very little room for having any sensible economic arguments in there.

I often referred to what I defined as the Swedish national anthem experience. I’d try to put to them a reasonable economic argument about what should happen. Then I’d look at their faces and think, “My goodness, whether I said what I just said or sang the Swedish national anthem would produce exactly the same thing, the same bland expression.”

A discussion I had with Christine Lagarde was particularly insightful. It was at our first meeting, after a long discussion on the Greek crisis. After I had explained to her what I thought should be done — what the problem was, what the mistakes had been — she was very open to my line of reasoning.

At the very end, when it was just the two of us, she said, “Look, Yanis, of course you are right. This program cannot work.” She was referring to the fiscal consolidation and reform program that the IMF and the rest of the credit group were pushing on us. She didn’t say it’s difficult for it to work; she said it can’t work.

Then she hastened to add, “But look, you’ve got to understand we’ve put so much political capital into this program that we cannot go back, and your credibility depends on you accepting it.”

I think that tells the story, doesn’t it?

Doug Henwood

Some say the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been somewhat more sensible and more humane than, say, Frankfurt or Brussels, and the others who say not. What’s your evaluation of the Fund’s role?

Yanis Varoufakis

The IMF knows its arithmetic better than the Europeans do, there’s no doubt about that. At least the staff at the IMF are reasonably good. They’ve made huge mistakes in the past in prognosticating the impact of their austerity, but at least now they’ve learned their lesson. They decided that Greece needs debt relief and fiscal targets that are manageable, unlike the ones that Berlin and Frankfurt and Brussels are demanding.

At the same time, the IMF is callous in its determination to target cuts on the poor.

They have a Tacitus kind of approach. They believe that we should liquidate millions of small businesses and people who can’t pay their mortgages. Just discard them. Of course, this means that Greece is going to be turned into desert. Then of course you’ve got to cut down the debt, because you cannot pay the debt. In that sense, the IMF gets its math right on the basis of an antisocial, hyper-austerity reform package.

In contrast, Germany, for instance, is happy to go a little softer on the poor as long as debt relief is off the table, because Merkel simply does not want to go to the federal parliament and admit that when she was promising them that the Greek debt will be repaid in full and with interest, she was fibbing.

Greek society now is the collateral damage in a war of attrition between a reasonably numerate villain — that’s the IMF — and a chronic procrastinator that simply does not want to discuss debt, and that’s Germany.

Doug Henwood

The spirit of Andrew Mellon to liquidate, liquidate, liquidate lives on.

Yanis Varoufakis

It’s quite fascinating to see that spirit in practice.

They were very keen on what they call guaranteed minimum income, a basic benefit for the poor, while at the same time they were keen to remove all the protections for labor and for small business that keeps them employed. That’s exactly the liquidate, liquidate, liquidate mindset, and then give them three hundred euros so that they can buy some bread from the shops.

Doug Henwood

The neoliberal era, for all its faults, had a certain internal coherence to it. Now, since 2008, we’ve been living in this world with no internal coherence at all. We have nothing that resembles a regime of accumulation or anything like that. It was all revealed as an unstable fraud, and yet nothing coherent has taken its place. How do you read the politics of this moment?

Yanis Varoufakis

The astonishing thing is these people are not even neoliberal anymore. There I was, the finance minister of a government, of a party whose name was the Coalition of the Radical Left, and what was I asking for? I was asking for debt swaps of the kind that Wall Street does every day.

Doug Henwood

It’s pretty much like what the United States did with the Brady plan and Latin American debt, right?

Yanis Varoufakis

It was even less radical than that, what I was proposing. Instead of having a huge surplus — in other words huge austerity — have a smaller one. That was the radicality of what I was proposing. A bad bank, to deal with non-performing loans. That’s standard practice in neoliberal circles. A development bank, to use public assets as collateral for borrowing in order to have some investment. Some reforms in order to reduce monopoly power in the supermarket sector, that kind of thing. And reductions in taxes. I wanted to reduce corporate tax rates. I wanted to reduce VAT. I wanted to reduce income tax rates.

Why? Because we had a broken economy with high tax rates, and people were either incapable of or unwilling to pay them.

In a sense, I was putting forward a Reaganite argument. It took a hard-left finance minister to propose Reaganite policies. This is the extent of the crisis. There were the creditors on the other side, the IMF and the European Central Bank, saying, “No, you’ve got to increase tax rates.”

We don’t live in a neoliberal era anymore. What we have is punitive neoliberalism, which is not even economic neoliberalism. It places the maintenance of institutional power against anyone who has different ideas.

It was clear to me that their worst nightmare was any agreement with me that would be mutually advantageous. I had often this crushing feeling that I was negotiating with creditors that didn’t want their money back.

Doug Henwood

They wanted to make the political point of grinding Greece’s nose in the dirt.

Yanis Varoufakis

Absolutely. What mattered was to signal to the people of Spain or Portugal that if they dare elect riffraff like us, they would be crushed. Any agreement with us, with me in particular, would have sent the wrong signal to the people of Spain or Portugal, in the sense that there was any agreement at all with a party that had run a campaign and received a democratic mandate to oppose the creditors and to put forward a different set of objections.

It’s exactly like the 1920s and ’30s. There was an irrational exuberance based on a faulty monetary design, then that created financialization. Financialization broke down on Wall Street in 1929 and 2008. After that, you had a clueless establishment trying to impose its authority, first by pushing all the legacy costs of the crisis onto the weak, and then doing anything in its power to retain power, however idiotic politically and economically.

Doug Henwood

We’re seeing something in the form of a political rebellion against this stuff, but it’s taking a right-wing, nationalist form. What are your thoughts on Brexit?

Yanis Varoufakis

We’ve seen this all before in the 1930s. Isn’t it exactly what happened after the inane handling of that crisis? The Nazis rose to government as a result of the austerity that Herr Bruning imposed in very, very similar circumstances. Brexit, the Five Star movement in Italy, Le Pen in France, the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Trump in the United States — these are all manifestations of the wrong kind of passion returning to politics during a period of deflation and lost hope.

Doug Henwood

Looking at Brexit, it’s hard to point out just what the European Union did to Britain that did it any harm. Most of Britain’s economic policies were homegrown — they imposed Thatcher and Cameron on themselves. Why does it take this form against the European Union?

Yanis Varoufakis

It’s got nothing to do with the European Union. It was a rebellion against the establishment. They saw people like David Cameron, the Bank of England, the Treasury, the whole of the City of London, all the bankers, the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, President Obama, Wolfgang Schäuble, Angela Merkel, President François Allande, descending upon them and pointing the finger at them and saying, “If you dare vote in favor of Brexit, Armageddon is going to hit you.”

They thought, “Right, these are all these people together, the establishment, who have been treating us like discarded souls and discarded communities. What can we do to piss them off?” The answer is, vote for Brexit.

Doug Henwood

What do you think the results of the exit will be?

Yanis Varoufakis

What concerns me is not the primary effects but the secondary effects.

I was saying to my audiences before Brexit, “Look, if you vote for Brexit, nothing is going to change much in the next six or twelve months. There will be maybe a little bit more inflation, which is not necessarily a bad thing if you are in a deflationary trap. You are not going to suffer from the primary effects of Brexit, but you will suffer from the secondary effects of Brexit, because Brexit is going to speed up the disintegration of the European Union and the eurozone.”

Just look at Italy. This disintegration is going to unleash huge deflationary forces from within the continent that are going to sweep across the British Channel. They’re going to hit you, and they’re going to bite you when you don’t expect it. By simply voting to get out of the European Union, you are not going to be shielded from those forces.

Doug Henwood

People thought that Brexit would open up possibilities for the Left. What do you think of the Lexit position?

Yanis Varoufakis

I disagree profoundly with it. Before the referendum, I had a public debatewith Tariq Ali, a leading Lexiteer. The most potent argument was that Brexit would split the Tories. My counterargument was: “The Tories never split, because the Tories know about class conflict, and their dedication to the class war in favor of the bourgeoisie is beyond doubt.” It’s the Left that will be split up. It’s the Labour Party that’s going to be split up by Brexit, which happened.

More generally speaking, my comrades ask me, “How can you possibly be against the dissolution of the European Union? It’s a neoliberal construct. It’s got nothing to do with genuine solidarity. It’s all about solidarity between heavy industry and capital,” which is of course all absolutely true. But why I’m against Lexit has to do with the neoliberal faction of the European Union.

If it now disintegrates, if we all pick up our stumps and leave, developments at the economic level will only benefit the extreme right. The deflationary forces will be unleashed from the collapse of the euro, and they will only benefit forces like Marine Le Pen. It will not benefit the Left, just like Brexit did not benefit the Left. From a consequentialist point of view, I believe Lexit is profoundly wrong.

As leftists, we have always protested our government when our government was wrong, which is most of the time. That does not mean, with the exception of a few anarchists in our midst, that we were against having a government. Similarly, as a Europeanist, it is my duty to protest and to disobey the edicts of Brussels and Frankfurt and so on, but at the same time I do not see why I should be proposing the disintegration of the European Union, even though I am extremely critical of its spirit and architecture.

Doug Henwood

There’s been some hatred coming towards Brexit voters, towards Trump voters, mostly from left neoliberals but even from people further to the left of them, who see the thrust behind Brexit, Trump, and all the continental movements as racist, backwards, xenophobic. Is this the right way to think about it?

Yanis Varoufakis

We are politically and morally bankrupt if we set our sights against those people who decided to try to punish the establishment by voting for Trump and voting for Brexit and voting for Le Pen.

Our obligation is to talk to them, to find out what keeps them up at night, and to have a discussion with them, which results in a reconfiguration of their own thinking.

Let me give you an example. I was in Doncaster, a northern English city, during the Brexit campaign, and there was this lovely old lady who approached me and said, “Look, I like you very much, and I like what you’ve done in the eurozone and so forth, but I can’t take your recommendation that I should vote against Brexit. Let me tell you why,” she said. “I’m not racist. Next door to me there are these four Romanian boys. They’re lovely boys. They share a flat. They pay the rent. They do all sorts of jobs. They struggle. They’re lovely, and they save as much money as they can to send back to their home to keep their parents alive in Romania.

“But do you realize,” she said, “that by working together like this and living together, they can afford to outbid Doncaster local families that cannot afford the same amount of rent as they can, since they are poor boys working?”

I said to her, “Let me ask you this. This building of yours, is it publicly owned or is this privately owned?” She said, “Well, it used to be a council estate, a publicly owned housing estate, and then it was privatized, and now we have a private landlord.”

I said, “So you see where the problem is? The problem is not the Romanian boys. The problem is that your public housing was privatized, and then the privateer decided to utilize this new property right in order to maximize his rents. The problem is not the Romanian boys; the problem is the destruction of the council housing program by the Tories. Do you really want to vote for Brexit, and therefore enable the Tory government to destroy whatever labor right protection there is from the European Union?”

That is the way to do it. Not treat her as a racist bigot, but engage in what really keeps these people up at night. If we can’t do it, we are huge failures.

Doug Henwood

You’re devoting a lot of your time a progressive reinvention of the European Union. Nation states were formed on the basis of a common language, a common state, psychologically through fantasies of solidarity and the nation’s singularity in the world. The European Union is a long way from that.

I’ve always been struck by the euro notes, the generic nature of the monuments that are on the bills. There’s no real common history. Back when the euro was being created, Timothy Garton Ash said the continent was embarking on political union through money. That really hasn’t worked out, but what could? Is there some European identity that such a thing could build on?

Yanis Varoufakis

The answer comes in one word: movement. I am dedicating all my life, all my energies and all my activities, on what we call DiEM25, the Democracy Europe movement.

After my resignation from government, I couldn’t bring myself to create a political party just in Greece because the problem is pan-European. Some of us got together in Berlin and created the Democracy Europe Movement about a year ago. Now we have tens of thousands of members everywhere, especially in Germany, Greece, Portugal, Belfast, in all sorts of different, disparate places.

The answer to your question comes from the energy and solidarity and common purpose that I see everywhere I go, whether it’s Poland, Portugal, or anywhere else. The movement approaches the basic problems we have at a pan-European level, in exactly the same way that the green movement approaches climate change.

Climate change cannot be sorted out by Luxembourg, by Greece, by even the United States on their own. It’s something that either we do together or we are defeated by it together. The same thing applies to the big problems we have in Europe, like public debt, like very low investment, like poverty, like the refugee crisis. Either we’re going to deal with these at the pan-European level or we’re going to be defeated by them.

We need to Europeanize the solutions to these in order to maximize the sovereignty at the level of municipality, of regional governments, and of course national governments. This is what we’re working for with DiEM, and we hope to make this movement capable of confronting both the establishment of Europe and the insurgency from the nationalist international, because they are accomplices.

The establishment and the nationalists feed off each other. We need a movement to oppose them throughout Europe. That is what is going to create the glue, and that goes hand in hand with a generational European identity.

Doug Henwood

What would the governance structures look like?

Yanis Varoufakis

Let’s separate the principle from the structure. The principle should be to end involuntary underemployment and involuntary migration.

At the moment, these two phenomena are destroying Europe. Involuntary underemployment, due to very, very low investment, and to the concentration of investment in very, very small areas around London, around certain parts of Germany and Holland. Involuntary migration, because millions of Europeans simply cannot survive within their communities. They have to move. They don’t go to London or to Berlin because of the weather or because of the food. They go because they have no alternative.

How do we deal with this? This is DiEM25. We are putting together what we call the European New Deal document and presenting it on March 25.

These are policies can be applied tomorrow, without federation, without any fundamental change in institutions, just redeploying existing institutions in a sensible and progressive way, so that once we stabilize Europe, we can then have the discussion about the question that you asked.

What will the architecture of Europe look like in the future? This should be an open-ended debate. I don’t believe in borders. I would like to see a federal structure, which is democratic — fundamentally democratic in a way that the United States is not, in a way that Europe is not.

But if a different view prevails, that we need to go back to loosely associated nation states, as long as our common problems are Europeanized, we’re open to that discussion, too. What is of the utmost importance is to arrest this inexorable slide into a postmodern 1930s.

Doug Henwood

How much of this can be accomplished without fundamentally altering the structures of capitalism?

Yanis Varoufakis

It can’t, but there is much that we can do. This is something that the United States is perfectly familiar with. When you are in a Great Depression, a New Deal can stabilize it. A New Deal channels idle wealth into productive investments with caps on the power of the financiers and with a reinforcement of the weakest.

A New Deal can stabilize capital sufficiently so that we can have a conversation about post-capitalism. If we don’t stabilize capitalism, it is a gross error.

This is something that I disagree with many left-wing comrades of mine about. I don’t believe that the free fall of capitalism is conducive to progressive change.

Doug Henwood

I think the history of the last several years has been pretty conclusive on that one.

Yanis Varoufakis

I think so, too.

Doug Henwood

I saw an interview with you where you said we had the means for all of us to live rich, civilized lives without destroying the Earth. You’re not a techno-pessimist who thinks we’ll have to shrink the population, go back to being hunter-gatherers.

Yanis Varoufakis

Of course not. We didn’t come this far in order to return to the idiocy of rural life, as Marx said. We have the technology, and very soon we will be able to take it a bit further, to stop us from either being in need of things that we can have or from interminable chores.

Of course, this technology, how we use it, is a political question. We’re at a juncture. There are two possible directions we can take. One is something like Star Trek, which is absolute communism. You have a whole world that produces everything, and nobody needs to work. There’s no money. People can sit around the table and discuss the meaning of life and explore the universe. Alternatively, The Matrix, where we’re all slaves of the machines that we created.

The choice is ours, and we’d better make it democratically.

[Click here for the Jacobin site]

Ομιλία Γιάνη Βαρουφάκη στην εκδήλωση στο ΣΠΟΡΤΙΓΚ, 19 Μαΐου 2017

ΠΡΩΤΗ ΕΚΔΗΛΩΣΗ DiEM25 ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΘΗΝΑ, ΓΗΠΕΔΟ ΣΠΟΡΤΙΓΚ, 19 Μαΐου 2017

Όπως βλέπετε, φίλες, φίλοι, σύντροφοι, ΕΜΕΙΣ ΔΕΝ ΜΕΝΟΥΜΕ… ΕΜΕΙΣ ΕΙΜΑΣΤΕ Η ΜΑΧΟΜΕΝΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΞΙΟΠΡΕΠΕΙΑ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ!

Ο απομονωτισμός δεν βοηθά κανέναν να πάρει πίσω την πατρίδα του. Όπως η κλιματική αλλαγή έτσι και η αντιμετώπιση του χρέους, των τραπεζικών κρίσεων, των χαμηλών επενδύσεων, της φτώχειας – απαιτούν μεν δράσεις σε τοπικό και εθνικό επίπεδο, αλλά αυτές οι δράσεις δεν αρκούν.

Να γιατί το DiEM25 πασχίζει να είναι το πρώτο ενιαίο, δι-εθνικό κίνημα που δρα σε κάθε γωνιά της Ευρώπης: Επειδή γνωρίζουμε ότι για να επανακτήσουμε την ανεξαρτησία και την κυριαρχία μας ως έλληνες, ως ιταλοί, ως γερμανοί, πρέπει να επανακτήσουμε τον δημοκρατικό έλεγχο της Ευρώπης ως ευρωπαίοι.

Η Ελλάδα ασφυκτιά σε μια Ευρώπη που αποδομείται. Κι η Ευρώπη αποδομείται επειδή χώρες όπως η Ελλάδα ασφυκτιούν – όπως ασφυκτιούν οι εργαζόμενοι πτωχοί σε όλες τις πόλεις και τα χωριά της Γερμανίας – της χώρας που το DiEM25, το κίνημα που διέσωσε την φλόγα της Ελληνικής Άνοιξης του 2015, αριθμεί τα περισσότερα μέλη του – ενός κινήματος που σήμερα επιστρέφει, εδώ στην Αθήνα, στην γενέτειρά του.

Πολλοί ρωτούν: Τι είναι αυτό το DiEM; Είναι η νέα Φιλική Εταιρεία των ευρωπαίων δημοκρατών που ετοιμάζει την ρήξη με την Ανίερη Συμμαχία του Eurogroup, του EuroWorkingGroup, του Βαθέως Κατεστημένου που διαλύει την Ευρώπη.

Αλήθεια, ποιοί έφεραν το Brexit; Ποιοι ευθύνονται για την στροφή των λαών εναντίον της Ευρωπαϊκής ιδέας; Εμείς; Ο Βαρουφάκης; Ή ο Ντάιζελμπλουμ, ο Σόιμπλε, ο Ολάντ, η Μέρκελ και ο Γιούνκερ; Ρητορικό το ερώτημα. Ακόμα και οι βαμένοι ευρωλάγνοι της τρόικας εσωτερικού σκύβουν το κεφάλι στο άκουσμά του.

Όταν μέλη του DiEM25 όπως η Judith βρίσκονται στην Ελλάδα, δεν είναι απλά φιλέλληνες – γίνονται έλληνες. Κι όταν εμείς πηγαίνουμε στο Βερολίνο, που είναι ο επόμενος προορισμός του DiEM25, την επόμενη εβδομάδα, την 25η Μαΐου, γινόμαστε γερμανοί. Αυτό είναι το DiEM25: Το Κίνημα της Συμφιλίωσης των Ευρωπαίων Δημοκρατών.

Το Κίνημα που στην Ευρώπη συμφιλιώνει τα μερμύγγια του Βορρά με τα μερμύγγια του Νότου. Τους δημιουργικούς ανθρώπους του Βορρά με τους δημιουργικούς ανθρώπους του Νότου.
Το Κίνημα που βάζει τέλος στην διχόνοια μεταξύ μας και μας στρέφει εναντίον της Ανίερης Συμμαχίας που δημιούργησε την κρίση και που τώρα πασχίζει να μεταφέρει το κόστος της στους ασθενέστερους του Νότου και του Βορρά.
Το Κίνημα που στην Ελλάδα έρχεται για να συμφιλιώσει, να σταματήσει την διχόνοια μεταξύ των εργαζόμενων πτωχών και των ανέργων, των πτωχευμένων επιχειρηματιών και των πτωχευμένων εργαζόμενων, των δημόσιων και των ιδιωτικών υπαλλήλων. Το κίνημα που εκφράζει την βουβή απόγνωση του έλληνα, την σιωπηλή ανασφάλεια του γερμανού, τον κρυφό καϋμό του μετανάστη.

H Συμφιλίωση των Ελλήνων μεταξύ μας είναι θα αδύνατη όσο το βαθύ ευρωπαϊκό κατεστημένο και η ελληνική ολιγαρχία επιμηκύνουν την επτάχρονη γενικευμένη, τετραπλή πτώχευση: πτωχευμένο κράτος, πτωχευμένες τράπεζες, πτωχευμένες επιχειρήσεις, πτωχευμένες οικογένειες. Την ανυπόφορη κατάσταση του να χρωστούν όλοι σε όλους και κανείς να μην μπορεί να πληρώσει. Όσο αυτό συνεχίζεται ελέω των ελληνικών κυβερνήσεων η διχόνοια θα πλανάται σαν φάντασμα πάνω από μια χώρα που ερημοποιείται ασταμάτητα, δωρίζοντας τους νέους της σε όλα τα μήκη και πλάτη του πλανήτη.

Παράλληλα, θα αναβάλεται η Ευρωπαϊκή Συμφιλίωση ενώ η Ευρωπαϊκή Αποδόμηση θα θριαμβεύει. Γιατί; Επειδή η άρνηση του Βαθέως Ευρωπαϊκού Κατεστημένου να παραδεχθεί πως η τετραπλή μας πτώχευση δεν ξεπερνιέται με ακόμα μεγαλύτερα δάνεια και περισσότερη λιτότητα αντανακλά την άρνησή τους να ξανασχεδιάσουν ένα νομισματικό σύστημα που καταστρέφει την Ευρώπη. Κάτι που πολύ σύντομα θα καταλάβει ο φίλος Εμμανουέλ Μακρόν. Αφού τους δώσει την λιτότητα και την κατάργηση των εργασιακών δικαιωμάτων που απαιτούν, αφού ουσιαστικά καλωσορίσει την Τρόικα στο Παρίσι, θα εισπράξει το μεγάλο ΝΑΪΝ για την αναδιάρθρωση της ευρωζώνης. Όπως γίνεται χρόνια τώρα με την αναδιάρθρωση του δικού μας χρέους μας η άρνηση της οποίας έχει αναδειχθεί στο προάγγελο την Ευρωπαϊκής διάλυσης: Όσο αρνούνται την αναδιάρθρωσή του τόσο δηλώνουν ανίκανοι να σώσουν την ΕΕ.

Φίλες και φίλοι, είναι αλήθεια ότι, όπως με κατηγόρησαν κάποιοι σύντροφοι τότε που αποφάσιζαν να συνθηκολογήσουν, έχω πράγματι κόλλημα με το χρέος. Ναι, έχω κόλλημα με το χρέος όπως ένας αιχμάλωτος πολέμου δεν σκέφτεται τίποτα άλλο από την απόδραση. Η αναδιάρθρωση του χρέους είναι το Νο. 1 ζητούμενο γιατί το δημόσιο χρέος κρύβεται πίσω από την γενικευμένη, τετραπλή πτώχευση.

Σε μια κανονική χώρα, ο καταμερισμός οφελών και ζημιών προκύπτει από την πάλη των τάξεων, την διελκυστίνδα μεταξύ μισθών-κερδών, κεφαλαίου-εργασίας. Όμως η Ελλάδα δεν είναι πια κανονική χώρα. Εδώ και χρόνια, λόγω του μη βιώσιμου χρέους, πτωχεύουν ταυτόχρονα εργοδότες και εργαζόμενοι, ιδιοκτήτες και ενοικιαστές, εισαγωγείς και εξαγωγείς. Εδώ που φτάσαμε οι μόνοι που ωφελούνται είναι η παρασιτική ολιγαρχία που ταυτίζεται με τους δανειστές, εκμεταλλεύεται στο έπακρο την Μνημονιακή διαδικασία και, έτσι, διατηρεί την εξουσία της επί ενός λαού τον οποίο λοιδωρεί στην βάση των νέων δανείων που τον χρεώνει.

Για να γίνει η Ελλάδα κανονική χώρα απαιτείται η κατάλυση της νέας «εθνοσωτηρίου επταετίας», η κατάργηση της χρεο-δουλοπαροικίας. Φτάνουν πια οι διασώσεις μας! Αρκετά μας έσωσαν δανειζόμενοι εκ μέρους μας.

Σήμερα, προέχει η αναδιάρθρωση των ιδιωτικών και δημόσιων χρεών που προαπαιτεί την αποκατάσταση της δημοκρατίας. Αναδιάρθρωση και Δημοκρατία πάνε μαζί!

Το μόνο καλό είναι ότι όταν η κρίση είναι τόσο βαθειά δημιουργούνται προϋποθέσεις συμφωνίας μεταξύ πολιτικών δυνάμεων, παραδοσιακά ανταγωνιστικών. Έντιμοι φιλελεύθεροι και συντηρητικοί, Κεϋνσιανοί και Μαρξιστές, λιμπεραλιστές και μονεταριστές – μπορούμε να συμφωνήσουμε στο τι πρέπει να γίνει αύριο το πρωί: Για να ξεφύγει η Ελλάδα από την ερημοποίηση πρέπει να συμφιλιωθούμε συμφωνόντας σε τρεις στόχους:

Α. Αναδιάρθρωση όλων των χρεών, ιδιωτικών και δημόσιων
Β. Δραστική μείωση όλων των φορολογικών συντελεστών και του σταθερού κόστους της οικονομικής δραστηριότητας.
Γ. Τερματισμός των αυτο-τροφοδοτούμενων περικοπών συντάξεων, επενδύσεων, μισθών

Η επίτευξη αυτών των στόχων μπορεί και απαιτείται να αποτελέσει την βάση για την ΛΥΣΗ.

Κανένας όμως από τους τρεις στόχους δεν συνάδει με το «κλείσιμο της αξιολόγησης», και την λογική του 3ου Μνημονίου, που θεμελιώνεται ακριβώς στα αντίθετα: (α) Αύξηση των απαράδεκτα υψηλών φορολογικών συντελεστών, (β) αναβολή της αναδιάρθρωσης ιδιωτικών και δημοσίων χρεών σε ένα μέλλον όπου ο κοινωνικός ιστός και το ανθρώπινο κεφάλαιο θα έχουν πληγεί ανεπανόρθωτα και η χώρα θα έχει ερημοποιηθεί, και (γ) νέες περικοπές που μειώνουν κι άλλο την παραπαίουσα εγχώρια δραστηριότητα.

Η επίτευξη των τριών απαραίτητων στόχων προϋποθέτει επτά ΤΟΜΕΣ:

Μεγάλες και άμεσες μειώσεις όλων των φορολογικών συντελεστών – 18% ο μέγιστος ΦΠΑ, 20% ο μέγιστος φόρος των επιχειρήσεων, κατάργηση της προπληρωμής φόρων, κατάργηση του φόρου αλληλλεγγύης για εισοδήματα κάτω των 30000.
Αναδιάρθρωση δημόσιου χρέους μέσω ανταλλαγών νέων ομολόγων των οποίων οι αποδόσεις εξαρτώνται από την ανάκαμψη
Στόχο πρωτογενούς πλεονάσματος το πολύ 1,5% του ΑΕΠ
Άμεση ίδρυση Δημόσιου Εξωτραπεζικού Συστήματος Πληρωμών – που επιτρέπει την πολύπλευρη ακύρωση ληξιπρόθεσμων οφειλών, τις εξωτραπεζικές πληρωμές, και δημοσιονομικό χώρο για το κράτος καθώς και δυνατότητες χρηματοδότησης νέου προγράμματος καταπολέμισης της φτώχειας
Ίδρυση Δημόσιας Εταιρείας Διαχείρισης Μη Βιώσιμων Ιδιωτικών Χρεών με μορατόριουμ στους πλειστηριασμούς και στις εξώσεις
Μετατροπή Υπερταμείου-ΤΑΙΠΕΔ σε δημόσια αναπτυξιακή τράπεζα που δανείζεται με εχέγγυα την δημόσια περιουσία (την οποία διαχειρίζεται με στόχο τις επενδυντικές ροές που αναβαθμίζουν την ίδια την δημόσια περιουσία) και με τις μετοχές αυτής της νέας αναπτυξιακής τράπεζας να εκχωρούνται στα ασφαλιστικά ταμεία τα οποία έτσι στηρίζονται με νέα κεφάλαια.
Σεβασμός στην μισθωτή εργασία και στην επιχειρηματικότητα: Τέλος στο «μπλοκάκι» και το ΤΕΒΕ-ΕΦΚΑ για μισθωτούς οι οποίοι εντάσσονται στο ΙΚΑ. Για νέες επιχειρήσεις, start-ups, απαλλαγή για 5 χρόνια από ασφαλιστικές εισφορές. Για όλες τις επιχειρήσεις εισαγωγή «ταβανιού» στο συνολικό ποσοστό φόρων και εισφορών στο 50% των εσόδων τους.

Η κρίση είναι τόσο βαθιά που δεν θα ήταν καθόλου δύσκολο να υπάρξει εθνική συναίνεση πάνω σε μια τέτοια ΛΥΣΗ. Το πρόβλημα, ο σπόρος της διχόνοιας, είναι αλλού: Όποια κυβέρνηση κι αν προσέλθει στο Eurogroup με λογικές προτάσεις θα έρθει αντιμέτωπη με το γνωστό Τείχος της Άρνησης των δανειστών.

Καμία λελογισμένη πρόταση οικονομικής πολιτικής δεν θα έχει την οποιαδήποτε τύχη εφόσον θέτει ως προϋπόθεση εφαρμογής της την πρότερη σύμφωνη γνώμη του Eurogroup.

Οι δανειστές, πρέπει να το καταλάβουμε, συμφωνούν σιωπηλά ότι αυτές οι τομές είναι απαραίτητες αλλά δεν τις δέχονται γιατί η ανάκαμψη της Ελλάδας δεν τους αφορά. Το μόνο που τους νοιάζει είναι να μην φανεί πως μια κυβέρνηση μικρής χώρας τους φέρνει αντίσταση και πετυχαίνει αμοιβαία επωφελή συμφωνία μαζί τους. Έτσι, καταλήγουμε παράπλευρη απώλεια στην τιτάνια μάχη συμφερόντων Παρισίων, Βερολίνου και Ουάσινγκτον.

Εμείς όμως; Θα κάτσουμε στην γωνιά μας, στην φυλακή χρέους μας, βουβοί, αποχαιρετώντας τα παιδιά μας που μεταναστεύουν, για να μην στενοχωρήσουμε δανειστές που δεν νοιάζονται καν για το αν θα πάρουν τα χρήματά τους πίσω; Ή θα συνασπιστούμε να κάνουμε αυτό που είναι σωστό για την Ελλάδα και σωστό για την Ευρώπη; Τι είναι αυτό;

Άμεση νομοθέτηση των 7 τομών άνευ διαπραγμάτευσης και μονομερώς
Όσο τα EuroWorkingGroup και Eurogroup αρνούνται να αποδεχθούν τις 7 τομές ως το αδιαπραγμάτευτο σημείο εκκίνησης της ελληνικής ανάκαμψης, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση θα ακολουθεί την τακτική της «κενής καρέκλας» του Στατηγού Ντε Γκωλ
Αν η τρόικα αρχίσει πάλι τις απειλές για Grexit, και η ΕΚΤ αρνηθεί, όπως τον Ιούνιο του 2015, να αυξήσει τον ELA, η χώρα θα διατηρηθεί εντός της Ευρωζώνης με τα ισχύοντα capital controls και με αυξανόμενη χρήση του Δημόσιου Εξωτραπεζικού Συστήματος Πληρωμών
Στο μεταξύ αναβάλλονται μονομερώς οι αποπληρωμές στην τρόικα και δρομολογείται πολιτική παραμονής εντός της Ευρωζώνης υπό συνθήκες έκτακτης ανάγκης που περιλαμβάνουν την διάθεση της υπάρχουσας/διαθέσιμης ρευστότητας για τις επιλεκτικές εισαγωγές που έχει ανάγκη η χώρα και προς την ενίσχυση των εξαγωγικών τομέων και επιχειρήσεων.

Για να το πω απλά φίλες και φίλοι: Το 2015 δεν θα επαναληφθεί! Αυτή την φορά, οι τομές-προαπαιτούμενα για απόδραση από την κρίση θα εφαρμοστούν χωρίς καμία διαπραγμάτευση. Όσο το Eurogroup αρνείται τον κοινό νου, το δικαίωμά μας να μειώνουμε τους φορολογικούς συντελεστές και να διαθέτουμε το πλεόνασμα και την περιουσία μας όπως εμείς κρίνουμε, τόσο η καρέκλα του ΥπΟικ μας στο Eurogroup θα παραμένει κενή – όπως έκανε ο Στρατηγός Ντε Γκολ την δεκαετία του 1960.

Φίλες και φίλοι, η Ευρωζώνη είτε θα εκπολιτιστεί είτε θα καταρρεύσει. Σε κάθε περίπτωση η εφαρμογή των 7 τομών θα έχει εξοπλίσει την Ελλάδα με αυτά που χρειάζεται για να πάψει να ασφυκτιά, είτε η Ευρωζώνη επιβιώσει είτε όχι.

Καλοπροαίρετα κάποιοι θα ρωτήσουν: Καλά, μπορεί να αντέξει η χώρα εντός της ευρωζώνης υπό καθεστώς σύγκρουσης με την τρόικα; Δεν το προσπαθήσατε αυτό το 2015 και αποτύχατε; Τους απαντώ: Το πρόγραμμα για επιβίωση εντός της ευρωζώνης υπό συνθήκες ρήξης με την τρόικα δεν απέτυχε το 2015. Απλά δεν εφαρμόστηκε! Ο πρωθυπουργός παρέβη την υπόσχεσή του και, απλά, δεν με άφησε να το εφαρμόσω. Λογικό ήταν να επέλθει η ήττα. Σφάλαμε. Όχι επειδή πιστέψαμε ότι η απελευθέρωση ήταν εφικτή. Σφάλαμε που πιστέψαμε τους λάθος ανθρώπους οι οποίοι κάποια στιγμή για να συνθηκολογήσουν αποκάλεσαν αυταπάτη τον εφικτό στόχο.

Εμείς δεν είχαμε αυταπάτες: Μπορούσαμε – τότε – το καλοκαίρι του 2015 – να έχουμε κρατηθεί στην ευρωζώνη με κλειστές τις τράπεζες για καιρό. Σήμερα μπορούμε ακόμα πιο εύκολα. Τι θα μας κάνουν; Θα μας επιβάλουν capital controls; Σήμερα όλοι έχουμε χρεωστικές κάρτες, τα περισσότερα μαγαζιά έχουν POS. Μαζί με το δημόσιο εξωτραπεζικό σύστημα πληρωμών που θα ιδρύσουμε, τον περιορισμό των εισαγωγών ειδών πολυτελείας και την δραστική μείωση των φορολογικών συντελεστών που θα δώσουν ανάσες στον ιδιωτικό τομέα, θα μπορέσουμε να κρατηθούμε εντός της ευρωζώνης για όσο χρειάζεται ώστε να δείξει η επίσημη Ευρώπη τι θέλει. Την διάλυση ή την διάσωση της ΕΕ; Εμείς θα είμαστε έτοιμοι και για τα δύο.

Θα πουν ότι η ρήξη με την τρόικα θα βάλει πάλι την χώρα σε περιπέτειες. «Νάτους πάλι», τους ακούω ήδη να ουρλιάζουν, «θέλουν να μας φέρουν πίσω στο 2015. Πάλι Κούγκι και Ζάλογγο. Πάλι περήφανη διαπραγμάτευση που διακινδυνεύει την θέση της Ελλάδας στην Ευρώπη.» Θα μας πουν εθνοπροδότες και αφελείς. Ποιοί; Εκείνοι που τον Γενάρη του 2015 φώναζαν ΓΕΡΟΥΝ ΓΕΡΑ. Αλλά φίλες και φίλοι:

Περιπέτεια δεν ήταν το Κούγκι και το Μεσολλόγγι. Περιπέτεια ήταν η τουρκοκρατία.
Περιπέτεια δεν ήταν ο Γοργοπόταμος και το Πολυτεχνείο. Περιπέτεια ήταν η κατοχή και η χούντα.
Περιπέτεια δεν είναι η σύγκρουση με την τρόικα & την ολιγαρχία. Περιπέτεια δεν είναι το μη κλείσιμο της αξιολόγησης. Περιπέτεια είναι οι φαιδροί φορολογικοί συντελεστές, οι ακόμα φαιδρότεροι δημοσιονομικοί στόχοι, τα θλιβερά αντίμετρα που θα εφαρμοστούν μόνο εάν και εφόσον πιαστούν οι φαιδροί στόχοι. Περιπέτεια είναι το κλείσιμο της αξιολόγησης υπό όρους συνεχιζόμενης συρρίκνωσης και ερημοποίησης. Περιπέτεια είναι τα συνεχή ανεφάρμοστα Μνημόνια.

Έχετε προσέξει το μένος απέναντι σε όσους δεν υποταχθήκαμε; Οι υποταγμένοι μισούν λυσσασμένα όσους δεν υποτάσσονται. Τα νέα δάνεια | τους είναι απαραίτητα καθώς αντλούν την εξουσία τους από αυτά! Δαιμονοποιούν την ιδέα της ρήξης για να διασωθούν οι ίδιοι βουλιάζοντας την χώρα – σαν ανόητοι ιοί που σκοτώνουν τον οργανισμό στον οποίο ζουν.

Επιτρέψτε μου μια προσωπική αναφορά: Το βράδυ του δημοψηφίσματος, στην επιστολή παραίτησής μου, είχα πει ότι θα φέρω στο πέτο μου το μίσος της τρόικας ως μετάλλειο τιμής. Αυτό κάνω δύο χρόνια τώρα. Χωρίς θυμό! Αλλά με περηφάνεια! Γελάω βλέποντάς τους ΒΑΣΤΑ ΓΕΡΟΥΝ να φορτώνουν κι άλλο χρέος στο πτωχευμένο κράτος και παράλληλα να πασχίζουν να το φορτώσουν πάνω μου. Το μη βιώσιμο χρέος τους το ονόμασαν Κόστος Βαρουφάκη! Αν δεν υπέφερε τόσος κόσμος, θα ήταν αστείο. Πραγματικά είναι σαν να ισχυρίζονται ότι για την Κατοχή του 1941-44 έφταιγαν όσοι πολέμησαν στο Αλβανικό μέτωπο για εκείνο το ΟΧΙ.

Ξεχνούν όμως κάτι: Η Ελλάδα δεν κακίζει όσους δεν κιότεψαν. Δεν κακίζει όσους τίμησαν το ΟΧΙ. Δεν κακίζει τους προστάτες της δημοκρατίας. Δεν υποκλίνεται σε κατακτητές που έτσι κι αλλιώς αντιμετωπίζουν με περιφρόνηση όσους μετατρέπονται σε ικέτες εν μία νυκτί.

Ξεχνούν ότι δεν ξεχνάμε: Η μέγιστη αφέλεια σήμερα είναι το να τους πιστέψεις. Ποιους; Την ΝΔ, που σήμερα, το 2017, τάζει, όπως ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ του 2014, πράγματα που απαιτούν ρήξη την οποία δεν θα κάνουν. Και τους άλλους που σήμερα παπαγαλίζουν όσα έλεγαν οι Σαμαράς-Βενιζέλος το 2014 για να δικαιολογήσουν ότι δεν την έκαναν. Κι όλους εκείνους που υπόσχονται ότι η κρίση θα φύγει ως δια μαγείας αν συνεχίσουμε να κάνουμε ό,τι κάνουμε από το 2010. Και τα μέσα αποβλάκωσης που κοροϊδεύουν τα IOUs που προτείναμε. Αλήθεια γνωρίζετε πως επιβιώνουν οι τραπεζίτες; Με 55 δις ευρώ IOUs που εγγυάστε εσείς, το ΥπΟικ, για πάρτη τους. Τα IOUs βλέπετε είναι καλά όταν τα δίνουμε στους τραπεζίτες. Αλίμονο όμως και τα δώσουμε σε συνταξιούχους, σε μικρές επιχειρήσεις ή σε άπορους…

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Φίλες και φίλοι, δεν ξέρω για εσάς αλλά έχω να νιώσω τόσο καλά στην πόλη μας από εκείνο το βράδυ της 3ης Ιουλίου του 2015. Μαζευτήκαμε εδώ γιατί μας ενώνουν δύο πεποιθήσεις: Πρώτον, ότι δεν ξέρουν καλύτερα το συμφέρον του λαού μας οι δεσμοφύλακες της χρεοδουλοπαροικίας μας και οι υπάλληλοί τους που χειροκροτούν το κλείσιμο της αξιολόγησης και χαίρονται για την επέκταση και το βάθεμα της κρίσης.

Δεύτερον, το ότι δεν μας φοβίζει η αποτυχία. Μας φοβίζει η υποταγή και η έλλειψη προοπτικής, ελπίδας, σχεδίου για την απόδραση από τις νέες διασώσεις τους, από τα μέτρα και αντίμετρα τους, από τις συμφωνίες και την αλληλλεγγύη τους. Δεν μας φοβίζει να βάλουμε ψηλά τον πήχυ και να αποτύχουμε. Μας φοβίζει να κοιτάμε χαμηλά και να καταλήξουμε στα γόνατα, άλλη μια φορά ικέτες. Βλέπω τα πρόσωπα των συντρόφων που παρέμειναν στην κυβέρνηση και θυμάμαι αυτό που κάποτε ήξερα κι εκείνοι:

Όταν κάνεις αυτό που δεν πιστεύεις τότε είσαι φοβισμένος και ανίσχυρος.
Όταν κάνεις αυτό που πιστεύεις δεν έχεις να φοβηθείς τίποτα!

Ξέρουμε λοιπόν τι πρέπει να γίνει. Το ερώτημα τίθεται: Ποιος θα το κάνει; Πως θα γίνει; Ποιό το επόμενο βήμα;

Στη Ρώμη πριν δύο μήνες το DiEM25 προέβη σε μια σημαντική ανακοίνωση στο πλαίσιο της παρουσίασης του ΝΙΟΥ ΝΤΗΛ, ΤΗΣ ΝΕΑΣ ΣΥΝΘΗΚΗΣ, ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΗ – την ατζέντα οικονομικής πολιτικής που προτείνουμε για την Ευρώπη ολόκληρη και για κάθε χώρα ξεχωριστά, ανεξάρτητα αν είναι στο ευρώ ή ακόμα και στην ΕΕ. Καλέσαμε όλες τις προοδευτικές πολιτικές δυνάμεις της Ευρώπης που θέλουν να υιοθετήσουν την ατζέντα μας σε εκλογική συνεργασία έως το 2019. Μια πρώτη συνάντηση θα γίνει στο Βερολίνο την επόμενη εβδομάδα.

Είπαμε ότι εκεί που υπάρχοντα κόμματα θα υιοθετήσουν την ατζέντα μας εμείς θα τους στηρίξουμε. Κι εκεί που δεν υπάρχει τέτοιο κόμμα τα μέλη μας θα πρέπει να αποφασίσουν αν θα κατέβουμε εμείς ως κόμμα. Εδώ στην πατρίδα μας, στην Ελλάδα, στην χώρα όπου η κρίση χτύπησε πιο βάναυσα, δεν υπάρχουν τέτοιες δυνάμεις ριζοσπαστικού ευρωπαϊσμού – δυνάμεις που να υποστηρίζουν το ΕΝΤΟΣ της ΕΕ και την ρήξη με ΑΥΤΗ την ΕΕ.

Θα κατέβουμε λοιπόν εμείς ως DiEM25 στις ευρωεκλογές; Στις εθνικές εκλογές;

Αυτό θα εξαρτηθεί από εσάς και από πάρα πολλούς που δεν είναι απόψε εδώ. Κατ’ αρχάς σας καλούμε να έρθετε μαζί μας. Να γραφτείτε! Να σας θυμίσω μια στιγμή πως μπορείτε να γραφτείτε. Ο πιο εύκολος τρόπος είναι να επισκεφτείτε την ιστοσελίδα diem25.org/el, να πατήστε πάνω δεξιά στο ΓΙΝΕ ΜΕΛΟΣ, να συμπληρώσετε τα στοιχεία σας και κατόπιν, αφού σας αποστελεί κωδικός επιβεβαίωσης στο κινητό σας, τον συμπληρώνετε και… αυτό ήταν. Για τους πιο παλαιομοδίτες, στο κάθισμά σας βρήκατε μια φόρμα – την συμπληρώνετε και είτε την αφήνετε στην σχετική κάλπη κατά την έξοδο είτε την ταχυδρομείτε στην διεύθυνση που αναφέρεται στην φόρμα: Γαμβέτα 6, 7ος όροφος – που είναι, παρεμπιπτόντως τα γραφεία μας στην Αθήνα. Να έρχεστε να μας βλέπετε καθημερινά τουλάχιστον 10 με 5 είμαστε εκεί.

Αν γραφτείτε ηλεκτρονικά τότε μπορείτε, μέσα από την ιστοσελίδα, να συμμετέχετε σε συζητήσεις και σε αποφάσεις. Μια πρώτη απόφαση που θα πάρουμε αφορά το ελληνικό όνομα του DiEM25. Τα μέλη μας, νέα και παλαιά, θα προτείνουν ένα ελληνικό όνομα το οποίο θα συνδυαστεί με την λέξη DiEM25 ώστε να εκφράσει καλύτερα τις δικές μας, καθαρά ελληνικές ανησυχίες και ελπίδες. Κατόπιν θα ψηφίσουμε. Όπως θα ψηφίζουμε για όλες τις αποφάσεις του DiEM25 – από την στάση που θα ακολουθήσουμε στις επόμενες εκλογές στην Πολωνία, στην Ιταλία, στην Βρετανία έως το αν θα κατέβουμε στις ελληνικές εκλογές. Να το πω απλά:

Αν τουλάχιστον είκοσι χιλιάδες νέα μέλη γραφτούν στο DiEM25 Ελλάδα, και η πλειoψηφία των μελών του DiEM25 από όλη την Ευρώπη ψηφίσουν υπέρ της καθόδου μας στις ελληνικές εκλογές, τότε προχωράμε. Η απόφαση δική σας.

Βέβαια το να γραφτείτε απλά δεν αρκεί. Σας θέλουμε ενεργούς. Το καταστατικό του DiEM25 επιτρέπει, και προτρέπει, την δημιουργία πολλών ομάδων 10 με 15 άτομα που οργανώνονται στο πλαίσιο της αυτο-οργάνωσης. Γραφτείτε λοιπόν όχι μόνο για να ψηφίζετε αλλά για να δράσετε, να ηγηθείτε.

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Επιτρέψτε μου να κλείσω με μια ιστορία. Το βράδυ που ιδρύθηκε το DiEM25 στο θέατρο Volksbuhne του Βερολίνου, 9η Φεβρουαρίου του 2016, όταν πλέον όλα είχαν πάει καλά, βρεθήκαμε με πολύ κόσμο στα παρασκήνια για να χαλαρώσουμε. Με τον Srecko Horvat πίναμε μια μπύρα συγκινημένοι. Τότε διέκρινα έναν παλιό ακτιβιστή, γερμανό, μεγάλη μορφή στα κινήματα της Γερμανίας. Παλιά καραβάνα με φυλακές και άλλες διακρίσεις στο βιογραφικό του. Ήταν, όπως συνήθως, κατσούφης. «Πως είδες την ιδρυτική μας εκδήλωση;» τον ρώτησα όλο περηφάνεια. «Δεν σας δίνω ελπίδες. Θα αποτύχετε. Αυτή η Ευρώπη δεν σώζεται», μου απαντά. Τότε ο Srecko θυμωμένος του λέει: «Γιατί είσαι εδώ τότε;» «Επειδή θέλω να είμαι δίπλα στους συντρόφους που θα κληθούν να τα βάλουν με τα τέρατα που θα φέρει η κατάρρευση της Ευρώπης», ήταν η απάντησή του.

Δεν συμφωνώ μαζί του. Δεν είναι δεδομένη η ήττα. Όμως, η ρήση του μου έδωσε κουράγιο. Αυτό κάνουμε απόψε εδώ κι εμείς. Μαζευόμαστε, ενώνουμε τις δυνάμεις μας τόσο για να αποτρέψουμε την οριστική κατάρρευση όσο και για να μαζέψουμε τα σπασμένα τους αν έρθει.»

Τα καλά νέα, όπως είδατε από τα video, όπως ακούσατε από τον Jonas και την Judith που είναι μαζί μας, είναι ότι: Δεν είμαστε μόνοι! Δεν ζητάμε την αλληλλεγγύη των γερμανών, ιταλών, γάλλων, σλοβάκων, πολωνών, κροατών συντρόφων μας. Είμαστε ένα, ενιαίο κίνημα. Είμαστε μαζί. Αποφασισμένοι.

Την 25η Μαρτίου είμασταν σ’ ένα πανέμορφο θέατρο στην Ρώμη. Στις 29 Απριλίου ήμασταν στην Θεσσαλονίκη, σ΄ένα κατάμεστο Βελλίδειο. Κατόπιν στο Λονδίνο το DiEM25 είχε την πρώτη συνάντηση του Βρετανικού Προσωρινού Συμβουλίου μας, Σήμερα στην Αθήνα. Επόμενος σταθμός πάλι το Βερολίνο, στο γνώριμο θέατρο Volksbuhne. Δύο μέρες μετά, στις 27 Μαΐου, στο Δουβλίνο ιδρύεται επίσημα το DiEM25 Ιρλανδίας με την ενοποίηση του DiEM25 Δουβλίνου και Μπέλφαστ. Αμέσως μετά στο Ηράκλειο της Κρήτης. Δεν σταματάμε. Όσο εκείνοι καταστρέφουν εμείς οργανωνόμαστε. Όσο εκείνοι μετατρέπουν τα κοινοβούλια σε φάρσα εμείς καταλαμβάνουμε θέατρα και γήπεδα για να κρατήσουμε την δημοκρατία ζωντανή και να εμψυχώσουμε την κοινή βούληση.

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Και τώρα, ώρα για μουσική και πηγαδάκια – την παραδοσιακή μορφή ελληνικής συμμετοχικής δημοκρατίας. Κατεβείτε όλοι κάτω σε αυτό το σπουδαίο σκηνικό που οφείλουμε στον Jonas Staal. Μαζί μας ο DJ Νίκος Σβώλης που μου επέτρεψε να διαλέξω το πρώτο τραγούδι – με πολιτική σημασία για την Ευρώπη όλη:

«Κανείς δεν είναι λέφτερος αν ακόμα κι ένας βρίσκεται αλυσσοδεμένος.»

Μέγα δίδαγμα του γερμανού φιλόσοφου Χέγκελ. Δοσμένο όμως πολύ πιο όμορφα από τον μεγάλο Solomon Burke.

“No one is free if one is chained!”

Carpe DiEM25! Ας αδράξουμε την κάθε ημέρα. Την κάθε νύχτα!