Governance Quotes
Quotes tagged as "governance"
Showing 1-30 of 184

“Let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as we approve of monarcy, that in America the law is King. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other.”
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“In questions of power, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the constitution.”
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“The key to holding a logical argument or debate is to allow oneself to understand the other person’s argument no matter how divergent their views may seem.”
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“The human race divides politically into those who want people to be controlled and those who have no such desire.”
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“The legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution. The citizen should be molded to suit the form of government under which he lives. For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to preserve it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy.”
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“No matter how an individual views Satan, whether they believe that he is a real character or that he is just the product of literary scholars and imaginations, no one can deny that each one of us has an aspect of the devil within us. By studying the character and nature of Satan, we learn about ourselves; and the more we know about ourselves, the better we can fight our own personal demons—metaphorical or otherwise—in order to create a better tomorrow”
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“العلاقة بين الحاكم والمحكوم تتقرر بطريقة خفية كما في الحب، ويمكن أن يقول إن أظفر الحكام بقلوب المحكومين هو أعظمهم احتراما لإنسانيتهم، وليس بالخبز وحده يحيا الإنسان!”
― السمان والخريف
― السمان والخريف

“A president who is burdened with a failed and unpopular war, and who has lost the trust of the country, simply can no longer govern. He is destined to become as much a failure as his war.”
― A Tragic Legacy: How a Good vs. Evil Mentality Destroyed the Bush Presidency
― A Tragic Legacy: How a Good vs. Evil Mentality Destroyed the Bush Presidency

“Leaders say "no" to corruption. Anyone playing a role in governance, and is not ready to do this is not a leader.”
― Leaders' Ladder
― Leaders' Ladder

“The whole art of government consists in the art of being honest. Only aim to do your duty, and mankind will give you credit where you fail.”
― A Summary View of the Rights of British America
― A Summary View of the Rights of British America

“We were all ready to die for the country but what we did not discover was we have to live for the country.”
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“Bill C-9 was supposed to be a budget bill, but it came with innumerable measures that had little or nothing to do with the nation's finances. It was, as critics put it, the advance of the Harper agenda by stealth, yet another abuse of the democratic process. The bill was a behemoth. It was 904 pages, with 23 separate sections and 2,208 individual clauses....
As a Reform MP, [Stephen Harper] .... said of one piece of legislation that 'the subject matter of the bill is so diverse that a single vote on the content would put members in conflict with their own principles.' The bill he referred to was 21 page long -- or 883 pages shorter than the one he was now putting before Parliament.”
― Harperland: The Politics Of Control
As a Reform MP, [Stephen Harper] .... said of one piece of legislation that 'the subject matter of the bill is so diverse that a single vote on the content would put members in conflict with their own principles.' The bill he referred to was 21 page long -- or 883 pages shorter than the one he was now putting before Parliament.”
― Harperland: The Politics Of Control

“Laws continue to be enacted, and the regulatory environment has become more complex due to unacceptable conduct remediation. Consequently, entities continue to be compelled to demonstrate compliance with legal mandates through documented assurance assessments.”
― Assuring IT Legal Compliance
― Assuring IT Legal Compliance

“If there is alignment among stakeholders, values, and actions, we have the agency to make things happen.”
― The Definitive Guide to Thriving on Disruption: Volume IV - Disruption as a Springboard to Value Creation
― The Definitive Guide to Thriving on Disruption: Volume IV - Disruption as a Springboard to Value Creation

“Effective anticipatory governance is not possible without leadership teams and boards appreciating the range of potential responses to the respective levels of uncertainty.”
― The Definitive Guide to Thriving on Disruption: Volume IV - Disruption as a Springboard to Value Creation
― The Definitive Guide to Thriving on Disruption: Volume IV - Disruption as a Springboard to Value Creation

“The cost of being prepared pales in comparison with the reputational, financial, and human costs of lacking anticipation.”
― The Definitive Guide to Thriving on Disruption: Volume IV - Disruption as a Springboard to Value Creation
― The Definitive Guide to Thriving on Disruption: Volume IV - Disruption as a Springboard to Value Creation

“Potential stakeholders usually rely upon governance elements prior to investing their time, talent, and/or money.”
― IT Auditing: Assuring Information Assets Protection
― IT Auditing: Assuring Information Assets Protection

“Since knowledge and ideas are an important part of cultural heritage, social interaction and business transactions, they retain a special value for many societies. Logically, if the associated electronically formatted information is valued, preventive and detective measures are necessary to ensure minimum organizational impact from an IPR security breach.”
― IT Auditing: Assuring Information Assets Protection
― IT Auditing: Assuring Information Assets Protection

“All governments, even these precious “democracies,” derive all their power by force. Do something the government doesn’t want, like, say, cross the street against the light, refuse to submit to its authority, and it won’t be long before they’ll use some form of force, usually a weapon and the threat of death or injury, to compel you to comply.”
― Hammer of Thor
― Hammer of Thor

“County, two-county (meso-regional), and broader regional elites and identities:
…the greater gentry were in a better position to form an identity that was regional in nature than the lesser gentry because of the broader nature of their landed, marital, and personal interests; in addition, they were also the individuals who would be recruited by magnates for the influence that they could wield over their clients. It appears possible to speak of ‘county elites’: the shires seem to have been the primary foci for identification … The ‘regional elite’–comprising those involved in all counties–was small in number, being composed mostly of peers and greater gentry. While there was a significant supra-shire dimension to elites’ landholding, office-holding, and marriages, this seems to have been focused on meso-scale regions–the coupled-county units of Somerset/Dorset, and Devon/Cornwall. (p. 147)
…With the principal foci appearing to be at shire and meso-regional levels, the concept of a broader south-west regional identity seems somewhat problematic. However, that said, the trans-county and trans-regional nature of the Hungerford affinity–with many of the same clients utilised in transactions concerning different shires–shows how a magnate and his circle could provide a focus for patronage that was extra-county, perhaps even regional, in scope (p.148).
The principal themes of this study have been the interplay of the contemporaneous politics of the south-western elites, and long-term shire and regional identities (p. 347). …The ‘regional elite’, as seen, appears to have consisted mostly of only a small number of peers and the greatest gentry who cannot be regarded as a purely ‘regional’ elite because of their possession of wide-ranging estates on a trans-regional or national scale. The surveys of landowning and office-holding showed that, amongst the political elites, there tended to be some emphasis on the county unit; yet, while there were distinct shire elites, there were also extra-county elements to their identities. A significant emphasis seems to have been on the meso-regional communities of Somerset/Dorset and Devon/Cornwall, corroborating the earlier exploration of the region’s broader geography, economy, and culture (pp. 347–8) ... Both sets of political elites seem to have become more entwined over the period, and there was a growing region-wide dimension… (p. 348).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
…the greater gentry were in a better position to form an identity that was regional in nature than the lesser gentry because of the broader nature of their landed, marital, and personal interests; in addition, they were also the individuals who would be recruited by magnates for the influence that they could wield over their clients. It appears possible to speak of ‘county elites’: the shires seem to have been the primary foci for identification … The ‘regional elite’–comprising those involved in all counties–was small in number, being composed mostly of peers and greater gentry. While there was a significant supra-shire dimension to elites’ landholding, office-holding, and marriages, this seems to have been focused on meso-scale regions–the coupled-county units of Somerset/Dorset, and Devon/Cornwall. (p. 147)
…With the principal foci appearing to be at shire and meso-regional levels, the concept of a broader south-west regional identity seems somewhat problematic. However, that said, the trans-county and trans-regional nature of the Hungerford affinity–with many of the same clients utilised in transactions concerning different shires–shows how a magnate and his circle could provide a focus for patronage that was extra-county, perhaps even regional, in scope (p.148).
The principal themes of this study have been the interplay of the contemporaneous politics of the south-western elites, and long-term shire and regional identities (p. 347). …The ‘regional elite’, as seen, appears to have consisted mostly of only a small number of peers and the greatest gentry who cannot be regarded as a purely ‘regional’ elite because of their possession of wide-ranging estates on a trans-regional or national scale. The surveys of landowning and office-holding showed that, amongst the political elites, there tended to be some emphasis on the county unit; yet, while there were distinct shire elites, there were also extra-county elements to their identities. A significant emphasis seems to have been on the meso-regional communities of Somerset/Dorset and Devon/Cornwall, corroborating the earlier exploration of the region’s broader geography, economy, and culture (pp. 347–8) ... Both sets of political elites seem to have become more entwined over the period, and there was a growing region-wide dimension… (p. 348).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses

“Henry VI’s regime (1450–61):
Henry VI’s inadequacy is widely held to have been the primary cause of the political upheavals of the mid-fifteenth century. To assess how this affected the south-west it is necessary, first, to give a brief regional review introducing the major figures; then, to consider the realities of governance, patronage, and landholding in Somerset, Dorset, Devon, and Cornwall. It is only after surveys of the county elites that a regional overview can be undertaken, which summarises the notable aspects, and evaluates those features that were truly ‘regional’ in nature by relating shire and provincial perspectives to national politics and governance (p. 149).
In summary, it seems that the dukes of Somerset could not only depend on the cooperation of those directly associated with them (such as the Caraunts), but could also rely on the support of others indirectly through secondary patrons such as Stourton and Hungerford. So, including Stourton-Hungerford clients as indirect connections, analysis of shire positions indicates the extent to which the Beauforts’ influence probably pervaded Somerset political society. Beaufort associates had regularly fulfilled local offices since the 1420s, and of the sheriffs’ terms between 1437 and 1450, almost half were undertaken by Beaufort clients. In comparison, between 1450 and 1461, over a third of sheriffs’ terms were served by Beaufort clients (p. 155).
As discussed regarding Devon, during the earl of Devon’s long minority, leading Devon gentry–Sir William Bonville and his clientele–involved themselves in Courtenay dependants’ affairs; hence, on his majority, the young earl lacked local support. The relationship between the earl and Bonville became poisoned after Sir William was designated steward of duchy estates in the county in 1437. This challenge to his authority enraged the earl to resort to violence (p. 174).
In the south-west, if the Beauforts provided a Lancastrian focus in the eastern counties, then the duchy of Cornwall provided another further west, where [Lord] Bonville also provided a specifically Yorkist focus (pp. 186–7).
Therefore, by a combination of estates, royal offices, and prince’s council membership, [James Butler, Earl of] Wiltshire might have become a provincial magnate–and a national power-broker–if he had had a longer period of time in which to establish himself (p. 188).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
Henry VI’s inadequacy is widely held to have been the primary cause of the political upheavals of the mid-fifteenth century. To assess how this affected the south-west it is necessary, first, to give a brief regional review introducing the major figures; then, to consider the realities of governance, patronage, and landholding in Somerset, Dorset, Devon, and Cornwall. It is only after surveys of the county elites that a regional overview can be undertaken, which summarises the notable aspects, and evaluates those features that were truly ‘regional’ in nature by relating shire and provincial perspectives to national politics and governance (p. 149).
In summary, it seems that the dukes of Somerset could not only depend on the cooperation of those directly associated with them (such as the Caraunts), but could also rely on the support of others indirectly through secondary patrons such as Stourton and Hungerford. So, including Stourton-Hungerford clients as indirect connections, analysis of shire positions indicates the extent to which the Beauforts’ influence probably pervaded Somerset political society. Beaufort associates had regularly fulfilled local offices since the 1420s, and of the sheriffs’ terms between 1437 and 1450, almost half were undertaken by Beaufort clients. In comparison, between 1450 and 1461, over a third of sheriffs’ terms were served by Beaufort clients (p. 155).
As discussed regarding Devon, during the earl of Devon’s long minority, leading Devon gentry–Sir William Bonville and his clientele–involved themselves in Courtenay dependants’ affairs; hence, on his majority, the young earl lacked local support. The relationship between the earl and Bonville became poisoned after Sir William was designated steward of duchy estates in the county in 1437. This challenge to his authority enraged the earl to resort to violence (p. 174).
In the south-west, if the Beauforts provided a Lancastrian focus in the eastern counties, then the duchy of Cornwall provided another further west, where [Lord] Bonville also provided a specifically Yorkist focus (pp. 186–7).
Therefore, by a combination of estates, royal offices, and prince’s council membership, [James Butler, Earl of] Wiltshire might have become a provincial magnate–and a national power-broker–if he had had a longer period of time in which to establish himself (p. 188).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses

“Edward IV’s policy of ‘Regional Governance’ (1461–71):
During Edward IV’s first reign, Somerset politics was still influenced by the Stourton and Hungerford affinities which may have sought the patronage of Edward’s courtier, Humphrey Stafford. He was the only son of the Beaufort-Stourton client William Stafford by Katherine Chideock, and it was because of his Chideock inheritance (principally focussed in Somerset, Dorset, and Wiltshire) that he was destined to be a leading member of the Somerset gentry. In the later 1450s, Stafford may have been associated with the earl of Wiltshire whose first wife was his cousin (pp. 192–3).
The Bonville-FitzWaryn alliance had dominated Devon politics throughout the 1440s and 1450s (see Chapter 5) but on Bonville’s death in 1461, his sole heir was his infant great-granddaughter, Cecily. Naturally, a child could not provide adequate leadership to the Bonville-FitzWaryn connection. Moreover, Bonville’s allies, Lord FitzWaryn and Sir Philip Courtenay, were also both entering their sixties (both were deceased before 1470), and similarly could not provide the dynamic direction that was required. Into this leadership void, stepped Lord Stafford (p. 207).
…[Humphrey, Lord] Stafford [of Southwick] became a crucial national–regional power-broker–one of the pillars upon which rested the pediment of Yorkist government (p. 210).
It seems clear that Lord Stafford’s land-holding, office-holding, and clientele suggest that he acted as a political core for the south-west region. Stafford’s inheritances already made him a significant figure in Somerset and Dorset but, favoured by Edward IV, he was granted extensive lands forfeited by Lancastrians throughout the south-west, such as the estates of the earldom of Devon. In addition to his own properties, Stafford was showered with many offices in Somerset and Dorset, as well as other positions of immense significance in the region–in particular, his endowment with the most important duchy of Cornwall offices ensured that he dominated Cornwall (p. 221). It seems quite understandable to find that, as a figure of local, regional, and national importance, Lord Stafford’s associations were regional in nature: he was connected to major figures from each county… (pp. 221–2).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
During Edward IV’s first reign, Somerset politics was still influenced by the Stourton and Hungerford affinities which may have sought the patronage of Edward’s courtier, Humphrey Stafford. He was the only son of the Beaufort-Stourton client William Stafford by Katherine Chideock, and it was because of his Chideock inheritance (principally focussed in Somerset, Dorset, and Wiltshire) that he was destined to be a leading member of the Somerset gentry. In the later 1450s, Stafford may have been associated with the earl of Wiltshire whose first wife was his cousin (pp. 192–3).
The Bonville-FitzWaryn alliance had dominated Devon politics throughout the 1440s and 1450s (see Chapter 5) but on Bonville’s death in 1461, his sole heir was his infant great-granddaughter, Cecily. Naturally, a child could not provide adequate leadership to the Bonville-FitzWaryn connection. Moreover, Bonville’s allies, Lord FitzWaryn and Sir Philip Courtenay, were also both entering their sixties (both were deceased before 1470), and similarly could not provide the dynamic direction that was required. Into this leadership void, stepped Lord Stafford (p. 207).
…[Humphrey, Lord] Stafford [of Southwick] became a crucial national–regional power-broker–one of the pillars upon which rested the pediment of Yorkist government (p. 210).
It seems clear that Lord Stafford’s land-holding, office-holding, and clientele suggest that he acted as a political core for the south-west region. Stafford’s inheritances already made him a significant figure in Somerset and Dorset but, favoured by Edward IV, he was granted extensive lands forfeited by Lancastrians throughout the south-west, such as the estates of the earldom of Devon. In addition to his own properties, Stafford was showered with many offices in Somerset and Dorset, as well as other positions of immense significance in the region–in particular, his endowment with the most important duchy of Cornwall offices ensured that he dominated Cornwall (p. 221). It seems quite understandable to find that, as a figure of local, regional, and national importance, Lord Stafford’s associations were regional in nature: he was connected to major figures from each county… (pp. 221–2).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses

“Edward IV’s second reign (1471–83):
The involvement of household retainers in local government was one aspect that was common to all counties. There were a number of household sheriffs, as shown, and there seems to have been little difference in this policy from Edward’s first reign or, indeed, from that of Henry VI (p. 264).
During his second reign, Edward persisted in pursuing his ideal of regional governance: his favourites were established as provincial ‘governors’ just as during the 1460s (p. 264)… However, just as in his first reign, the serious faults of this vicegerential system inevitably re-surfaced: focusing royal patronage on a limited number of courtiers encouraged the view that the regime was exclusive; but, more importantly–given the motivation–any regional magnate would have had the resources and capacity, potentially, to depose the king (pp. 264–5).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
The involvement of household retainers in local government was one aspect that was common to all counties. There were a number of household sheriffs, as shown, and there seems to have been little difference in this policy from Edward’s first reign or, indeed, from that of Henry VI (p. 264).
During his second reign, Edward persisted in pursuing his ideal of regional governance: his favourites were established as provincial ‘governors’ just as during the 1460s (p. 264)… However, just as in his first reign, the serious faults of this vicegerential system inevitably re-surfaced: focusing royal patronage on a limited number of courtiers encouraged the view that the regime was exclusive; but, more importantly–given the motivation–any regional magnate would have had the resources and capacity, potentially, to depose the king (pp. 264–5).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses

“Richard III’s government (1483–5):
The scale of the insurgency in the south-west–and the consequent reality of Richard’s post-sedition lack of support–forced him into inserting short-term leaders into localities. Richard’s solution was to depend upon those of his courtiers he did trust–his own ducal northern retainers. Hence, in order to remedy his lack of support, he inserted his trusted northerners into the southern counties, including the south-west; naturally, those shires with more intrigants required a greater number of Richard’s imposed supporters (pp. 298–9).
Richard’s intensely difficult circumstances meant that, ideally, he would have to over-endow magnates–in the short-term–to be certain to secure their support. So, Richard’s distribution of patronage may have been too restrained for his precarious situation. Perhaps it was the reserved character of patronage that provoked [the Duke of] Buckingham to rebel. Similarly, it may have been the limited nature of their endowments that weakened the authority of Richard’s [Northern] plantations (p. 302).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
The scale of the insurgency in the south-west–and the consequent reality of Richard’s post-sedition lack of support–forced him into inserting short-term leaders into localities. Richard’s solution was to depend upon those of his courtiers he did trust–his own ducal northern retainers. Hence, in order to remedy his lack of support, he inserted his trusted northerners into the southern counties, including the south-west; naturally, those shires with more intrigants required a greater number of Richard’s imposed supporters (pp. 298–9).
Richard’s intensely difficult circumstances meant that, ideally, he would have to over-endow magnates–in the short-term–to be certain to secure their support. So, Richard’s distribution of patronage may have been too restrained for his precarious situation. Perhaps it was the reserved character of patronage that provoked [the Duke of] Buckingham to rebel. Similarly, it may have been the limited nature of their endowments that weakened the authority of Richard’s [Northern] plantations (p. 302).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses

“Henry VII’s regime (1485–1500):
From these south-western shire surveys it appears that there was not one magnate who provided a ‘political centre’ for the region during Henry’s reign: no leading peer seems to have had the requisite combination of landholding, office-holding, and associations spread throughout all the counties. Rather, it seems that two south-western meso-regional magnates might be discerned: Lords Daubeney and Willoughby (p. 341).
The alliances of the two most influential Cornish families during this period, the Edgcumbes and the Arundells, with Lord Willoughby [de Broke] emphasises the peer’s importance in the governance of Devon and Cornwall… In summary, it seems that, as in Devon, the chief magnate in Cornwall was Lord Willoughby. He could not rely on the support only of those associated directly with him, but on the aid of other local figures through his secondary patrons, [John, Lord] Dinham, [Edward Courtenay, Earl of] Devon, [John] Arundell, and the Edgcumbes (p. 336).
The intermediate focus of royal authority between county and centre in Henry VI’s later years and under Edward IV had been the regional governor. The conciliar governance of Richard III’s Council of the North was continued by the Tudors who reinstituted this council, and the prince’s council in Wales and the Marches, while also creating a regional council in the Midlands focussed on Henry’s mother. However, in the south-west no single magnate or council was given such regional power, which may have been because Henry’s chief magnates were his loyal household officers, his steward and chamberlain… Henry VII’s governance–as chiefly restorative rather than innovatory–might therefore be described as a renewed monarchy, which, it could be said, by revitalising political structures, finally managed to hoist the ensign of settlement above the battlefields of the Wars of the Roses (p. 344).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
From these south-western shire surveys it appears that there was not one magnate who provided a ‘political centre’ for the region during Henry’s reign: no leading peer seems to have had the requisite combination of landholding, office-holding, and associations spread throughout all the counties. Rather, it seems that two south-western meso-regional magnates might be discerned: Lords Daubeney and Willoughby (p. 341).
The alliances of the two most influential Cornish families during this period, the Edgcumbes and the Arundells, with Lord Willoughby [de Broke] emphasises the peer’s importance in the governance of Devon and Cornwall… In summary, it seems that, as in Devon, the chief magnate in Cornwall was Lord Willoughby. He could not rely on the support only of those associated directly with him, but on the aid of other local figures through his secondary patrons, [John, Lord] Dinham, [Edward Courtenay, Earl of] Devon, [John] Arundell, and the Edgcumbes (p. 336).
The intermediate focus of royal authority between county and centre in Henry VI’s later years and under Edward IV had been the regional governor. The conciliar governance of Richard III’s Council of the North was continued by the Tudors who reinstituted this council, and the prince’s council in Wales and the Marches, while also creating a regional council in the Midlands focussed on Henry’s mother. However, in the south-west no single magnate or council was given such regional power, which may have been because Henry’s chief magnates were his loyal household officers, his steward and chamberlain… Henry VII’s governance–as chiefly restorative rather than innovatory–might therefore be described as a renewed monarchy, which, it could be said, by revitalising political structures, finally managed to hoist the ensign of settlement above the battlefields of the Wars of the Roses (p. 344).”
― Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses

“[The Democracy of the Naïve ]
There are still the naïve folks who talk about democracy
They even claim that the future of democracy in this country or that is in danger…
As if democracy had a past or a present,
And therefore, its future is now in danger…
There was never democracy or justice, my friends…
There world has and will remain ruled
By the whims of the elite and the invisible hands
That get the naïve publics to consider
The problems, desires, whims, and agendas of the chosen few
As noble human endeavors
That require the struggle and revolution
Of the naïve and kindhearted people…
There is no democracy nor revolutions, my Friends,
Except those that must happen silently to remove all elites
That plan in secret to push the naïve publics
To appoint or remove this government or that
Based on their interests…
What do you think, my Friends?
Do you still believe that the future of democracy is in danger?
[Original poem published in Arabic on December 21, 2022 at ahewar.org]”
―
There are still the naïve folks who talk about democracy
They even claim that the future of democracy in this country or that is in danger…
As if democracy had a past or a present,
And therefore, its future is now in danger…
There was never democracy or justice, my friends…
There world has and will remain ruled
By the whims of the elite and the invisible hands
That get the naïve publics to consider
The problems, desires, whims, and agendas of the chosen few
As noble human endeavors
That require the struggle and revolution
Of the naïve and kindhearted people…
There is no democracy nor revolutions, my Friends,
Except those that must happen silently to remove all elites
That plan in secret to push the naïve publics
To appoint or remove this government or that
Based on their interests…
What do you think, my Friends?
Do you still believe that the future of democracy is in danger?
[Original poem published in Arabic on December 21, 2022 at ahewar.org]”
―
“The unfortunate thing is that as you strive to free the corrupt because of politics, you don't free them of their insatiable greed for public coffers. A kleptomaniac will always be a kleptomaniac . Even if you dress a cobra and place it in the pulpit, the poison is still in its belly. When the opportunity to bite will present itself, pray that your children will not be the victims.”
―
―
“We can change the destiny of our nation through the Power of making right choices at this very right time.”
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―

“Leaders start with basics, find the key cause of the majority of issues, work at the grass root level, build a plan and implement it with great governance.”
― MODI-fied LEADER-ship
― MODI-fied LEADER-ship
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