Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 117

Press criticism, Iraqi style

Fifty Shiite gunmen invaded
the offices of four newspapers in Baghdad. They
smashed equipment, stabbed some people, and threw one reporter off the roof.

Let freedom reign?

Hey, JOs: Want an interesting career plus a life? Come to the Guard and Reserves

By Brig. Gen. James D.
Campbell

Best Defense Guard
columnist

One of things I find most interesting, and even objectionable,
in the entire discourse between these two senior officers is the fact that, clearly, neither of
them recognizes or even considers the reserve components as part of "the
Army."

Many of the talented young officers and NCOs who
are choosing to leave the active force are, in fact, transferring to the
National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. So in that sense, "the Army"
isn't losing these experienced young leaders. That is, we're not losing them if our active counterparts view the
Guard and Reserve as part of the wider team. Even more of these junior leaders
would choose the Guard and Reserve if active duty senior leaders actually tried
to present service in the Reserve Components as a viable option for those who
want to keep serving but also want stability for their families along with
different career and educational opportunities. Unfortunately, as judged by
these essays in FP, most senior Army
leaders don't ever even think of the reserve components as really part of
"the Army." Personally, along with many of my peers I left the regular
Army in the early '90s after almost 10 years of service and have been in the
Guard ever since. I've managed to have a full, reasonably successful career,
and have gotten to do a lot of things on the civilian side I never would have
done had I stayed on active duty.

This paradigm of leaving the reserve components
out of the equation has all sorts of corollaries: The refusal, for example, of
senior Army leaders to consider that, based on the recent Reserve Forces Policy Board report showing that the reserve components (RC)
cost only one-third the amount of the active components (AC), shouldn't we seek
to grow the RC as we must shrink the AC in order to retain the military
capability and force structure at less cost, and therefore have a flexible
"surge" capacity for emergencies? Aside from the fact that this is
effectively what we have done post-conflict throughout the entire history of
our nation, the cost pressures alone would dictate that it is a very
intelligent option. In addition to saving force structure and capability, we
would also be saving enormous numbers of proven, combat-experienced officers,
NCOs and soldiers by keeping them in the uniform and having them around for the
long term. Unfortunately, what we are hearing from senior Army leaders is that
they want to keep the AC as large as possible, even if that means cutting the
RC -- an idea that flies in the face of fiscal reality, the past 12 years of
actual operational experience, U.S. military history and tradition, and serves
as yet one more glaring reminder that our current generation of senior leaders
has never accepted the RC as equal, capable elements of the overall force. Cutting
off the nose to spite the face...

I invite all high-caliber junior and mid-grade
leaders in our Army (and Air Force) who are seeking a change and want more
stability for their families, more interesting assignment and career
opportunities, and challenging educational opportunities to look into joining
the National Guard in their home states or the states where they'd like to
live. We have been the key component of our nation's military since 1636, we
are in many ways the sole remaining repository of many of the best traditions
of the service, we listen to our people (we have to in order to keep our
high-performing, traditional part-time leaders in uniform), and we are still on
the front lines around the world. We are also still the only part of the force
which can legally and rapidly respond to assist our local communities when they
are in need.

BG James D. Campbell, Ph.D. is the adjutant
general of the Maine National Guard.

If military leaders were serious about retaining talent, they'd collect some numbers on who is leaving and why

By Maj. Peter Munson, USMC

Best Defense commission on junior officer
management

The recent battery
and counter-battery
of general
officer articles on talent
management in the face of a military drawdown is doing little to advance
the debate toward any solution -- or even agreement on the problem. The
debaters are undermined by their hyperbole. Surely, not all of the military's best officers are leaving. On the other hand,
from the volume of complaint, it seems sure that there is something awry with
talent management in the armed forces. A more qualified assertion would be that
more top talent is leaving the
military than should be the case. Yet, as deeply as I believe this statement to
be true, I cannot prove it. Therein lies the greatest problem: a personnel
system that seems not to have a measure of its success or failure in retaining talent vice retaining numbers.

The sad fact of the matter is that we lack the data to fully define the
talent management problem, so there is no way to come up with meaningful
proposals for solutions. This is a debate characterized by hyperbole and
personally charged anecdotal evidence because real data on the phenomenon are
almost completely lacking. The fact that the armed forces do not apparently
collect data on departing servicemembers for talent management purposes is
telling. There is a healthy stable of data available on each servicemember:
performance evaluations, standardized testing, civilian and military school
standings, physical fitness tests, and so on. Correlating these data to
retention and separation propensities should be a relatively easy thing, but as
far as I can tell, this work has not been done and it seems not to have been
released into the public domain.

Yet, even with the existing
data, we have a problem. While we have top-down performance evaluations,
physical fitness, and IQ-like intelligence test data, these data leave out what
may be the most important dimensions of leadership. There is no widespread data
on emotional intelligence, personality type, or 360-degree perspectives on military
officers, even though these tests are readily available and could easily be
done for those screening for key billets, or for a sample population of
separating officers. These would also be an extremely useful statistic when
considering who is getting out and who is staying in.

Absent these data, we have to
rely on works like that of Tim Kane, former Air Force officer, Ph.D. economist,
and author of the book Bleeding Talent: How the US Military
Mismanages Leaders and Why It's Time for a Revolution. Sadly, the lack of data left Kane to
rely on opinion polling -- what people perceived about the talent of those
leaving the military and their reasons for doing so -- rather than first-order
data. This method left Kane's conclusions open to dismissal by the powers that
be, but the indictment is really on a system that has no knowledge of its own
talent challenges.

As long as there are no
publically available data on these issues, each side in the debate about talent
retention in the military is informed only by their personal choices and the
anecdotes that validate that choice. There cannot be a truly informed debate
without some facts to start from and, inexplicably, these facts are completely
lacking. If senior military leaders were serious about talent retention, these
data would already be at their fingertips.

Peter J. Munson is a major in the U.S. Marine Corps. Though selected
for lieutenant colonel, he is leaving the Marine Corps with sixteen years of
service this summer. He is the author of War,
Welfare & Democracy: Rethinking America's Quest for the End of History (Potomac, 2013).

Quote of the day: What one JO wants

From a blog comment posted
on Sunday evening:

I crave autonomy, a sense of meaning in my work, and to have
some semblance of self-determination in my career. My first two desires were
met more often than not while I was deployed to Afghanistan for the last nine
months. However, I'm not entirely sure that will continue now that my unit is
back in garrison and no longer on a patch chart. We have returned to an
environment of repetitive briefings and seemingly endless bureaucratic forms,
and all the while there are whispers of funding problems canceling
opportunities for military schools and substantive training events. Time will
tell if we head the way of incessant drill and ceremony practice augmented by
pay day activities and area beautification. Truth be told, I do not know
because I have never been in a unit that is not preparing to go to war, but
this is the fear. The fear is we will spend hours laying out and cleaning
equipment that we can't train with. That our training will be on making perfect
Powerpoint slides instead of rolling up our sleeves to enable sergeant's time.

What President Obama should say about North Korea’s provocative statements

By Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Best Defense guest columnist

This is what the president should say:

Organs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have recently made announcements of that nation's readiness to attack
with long range weapons targets of the United States.

It is time for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to
cease such behavior and to join the community of nations.

The United States has no intention to attack the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.

If under any pretext the Democratic People's Republic of Korea attacks
the United States, we will respond with devastating might. Their nation will be
a wasteland.

Leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have built military
weaponry that can serve no useful purpose.

I repeat, it is time for them
to cease such behavior and to join the community of nations.

End of conference

General
Cushman commanded the 101st A irborne Division, the Army Combined Arms Center, and the
ROK/US field army defending Korea's Western Sector. He served three tours in
Vietnam. He also is author of C ommand and Control of Theater Forces: The Korea Command and
Other Cases   (1986).

The Hodges-Barno smackdown: A view from the cheap seats of a junior officer

By "Si Syphus"

Best Defense junior officer panel

"Let's get ready to RUMBLE!" I can just picture
Michael Buffer
announcing the upcoming "prize fight."
In the blue corner stands Lt. Gen. (R) David Barno and in the red corner stands
Lt. Gen Fredrick ‘Ben' Hodges. The main event: Are we losing talent in today's Army?

Reading the differences between senior leaders
is quite hilarious. I would equate it to watching two dudes argue about (insert
sports teams here), in an alcohol-induced stupor, less the possibility of
violence. Both bring up valid points, yet one uses "how they see the facts" to
support their argument. However, no matter who is right and who wrong, what is
lost in translation is the actual premise of the argument -- in this case
junior leaders -- and nothing is done to rectify the situation. The end result
is an epic 12-round bout with a split decision resulting in a draw, and a
re-match likely on the horizon in a couple of years.

Lt. Gen. (R) Barno's "Military
Brain Drain" echoes the position of Tim Kane's Bleeding Talent,
stating that "if you ignore the expectations of today's young,
combat-experienced leaders as you shrink the force, your most talented officers
and sergeants will exit, stage left." Both Barno and Kane lament protecting the
"crown jewel" of talented junior leaders is required for future success.

On the other hand, Lt.
Gen. Hodges disagrees with Barno's supposition that there is
a "brain drain" in the Army based on four main points: 1) junior officers are doing
good things deployed, 2) there are "broadening" opportunities, 3) what his
peers have to say, and 4) senior leader examples.

My response, for what it's worth:

Round One: Yes,
junior leaders are doing exceptional things while deployed. That is because
there is "freedom of maneuver." Problems are complex and our junior leaders are
excelling with the opportunity to demonstrate their innovativeness,
adaptability, and unique ability to solve the complex issues. However, when
these junior leaders come home, this ability is stymied due to the fact of not
being at war. The "garrison" Army was, is, and will continue to be a polar
opposite to war-time. Junior leaders, ones that currently have less than 12
years of service, know absolutely NOTHING about "garrison." We are
operationally minded, doing one of three things: prepare to deploy, deploy,
recover. This has been the cycle, but that is about to change. Bottom line: There
is not enough money or incentives in the world that will be able to keep 100
percent of the targeted group to stay in the Army, unless there is a change.

Round Two: Lt. Gen.
Hodges mentions various things that the Army is offering to junior leaders --
"the best and most expensive" universities, fellowships, and training with
industry. Let's be honest, all of these things are pretty cool and the fact
that it is an option, also pretty cool. However, let's be realistic. The Army
has the Olmstead Scholarship -- one per year. Congressional fellowships -- 25
per year. Advanced civil schooling -- a generous figure would be 400 per year.
A realistic amount of junior leaders receiving this "broadening" any given year
would be about 600. However, when applying for these opportunities, a junior
leader is grouped with a total of about three year groups' worth, or about
6,000 other people. So this "broadening" is available to about 10 percent of
junior leaders. If the target is to retain the "top 20 percent" and this is all
the incentive, then we are falling short. Don't get me wrong, this is a good
start. But let's not use this as the be-all end-all answer to saying quality
junior leaders are not leaving. This is more of a "look what we are going to
keep some of the talent."

If you have sipped the green Kool-Aid and are
immersed in current Army rhetoric, now might be a good time to stop reading.
Otherwise, you might berate me as a junior leader who doesn't know shit.

The following two examples are used by Lt. Gen.
Hodges to support his argument that I take issue with the most:

Round Three: Lt. Gen.
Hodges starts his argument saying he is "disappointed" in Barno's position
because it is not something he sees or hears in his "dealings with senior Army
leaders" or his peers. (Ok, I am going to believe it now because a bunch of
crusty old men are saying it's not true. Sure.) I'm pretty sure this is the
whole "group think" mentality we are trying to go away from. What about
"outside the box" thinking? Apparently this only applies to junior leaders.
What do other senior leaders and other generals know about why junior leaders
are staying in? I got an idea: How about asking them and not your peers.

Lt. Gen. Hodges also claims that Barno's
comments about the best leaving are "an insult to the thousands staying." Not
the case. I stayed, and I'm not insulted. Lt. Gen. (R) Barno or Tim Kane never
referred to me as "not talented" because I chose to stay. I understand where
they are coming from when they point out the facts that quality junior leaders
have left up to this point (true) and quality junior leaders will continue to
leave until this situation is rectified (also true). I'm not drinking the
Kool-Aid and buying into a senior leader telling me I should be insulted for
something that is the truth. I'm also not buying it just because a bunch of
them are saying it.

Round Four: The
justification I most take exception to is the "this worked for me" approach.

"Senior Army leaders
have emphasized this repeatedly and are setting an example by doing it
themselves. My own experience validates this. In 33-plus years of service and
about 25 different duty positions, there were only two times when I ended up in
a duty position I had specifically requested or pursued. Every other assignment
was the result of personal intervention of commanders, mentors, or some senior
leader in the span of my career who wanted to invest in me and prepare me for
greater challenges. That has been my experience- indeed, that is the norm I
have witnessed for over three decades- and it's the legacy I have tried to pass
to others."

This statement is
what is wrong with our current Army and exactly the premise that Barno and Kane
are using to explain the exodus of talented junior leaders. Just because this
worked for Lt. Gen. Hodges does not mean that it will work for all current
junior leaders or for that fact even the majority. While this style might have
worked for Lt. Gen. Hodges's three decades of service (20 of which were
predominantly during times of peace), this should not be the direction of the
future.

The Army currently is
structured in such a way that in order to be successful, you have to meet
certain "gates" at certain times. If you don't meet them, no matter how much
talent you possess, you are considered "at-risk" for advancement, as well as
ineligible for any of the extra incentives Lt. Gen. Hodges invoked. Likewise,
it doesn't matter who you are, if you checked the right block at the right
time, then you are good to go. Hypothetically speaking here, what is wrong with
a captain who doesn't want to be a commander but makes a great intelligence
officer, signal officer, or whatever staff position? If he or she had the
opportunity to continue as a staff officer, he or she could be an integral
component of the team. Why must that individual be a commander, where he or she
might not excel, just to be eligible for promotion?

Let's take an example
of two Army captains. In this example, all things are equal. They are in the
same year group and have the exact same jobs. Captain #1 has been stationed at
Ft. Hood (heavy) for 3 years, and wouldn't mind staying for another 3 years.
Captain #2 has been stationed at Ft. Drum (light) for 3 years and really wants
to go to Ft. Bragg (also light). Captain #1 receives orders for Ft. Bragg
because he doesn't have light experience. Captain #2 receives orders for Ft.
Hood because he doesn't have heavy experience. Why is it not possible for the
two to switch and be happy? Well, it has been determined that in order for both
to be successful, they need to be diverse. The outcome of this scenario: two
disgruntled junior leaders who might end up deciding to get out. On the other
hand, had the opportunity presented itself to get what they both wanted, both might
stay in.

Nowadays people want
stability over anything else, especially as we begin to emerge from a decade at
war. I would venture to say that this is the driving factor over anything else
on one's decision to "stay or go." Being obligated to pick up and move
(children are deep-rooted at a school and/or a spouse is well-established in a
career) just to check the block for promotion presents an officer with an
undesirable choice. Nobody should fault that individual for choosing to get out
-- that is, putting family first.

Rather than argue and maintain a stubborn
mindset that there is nothing wrong, or that the Army is better off without the
junior officers who choose to leave, my first recommendation is that current
Army senior leaders LISTEN to what Barno and Kane are saying on the subject.
Barno said it perfectly in his 13 February "Military Brain Drain" article:

There is no reason
not to listen and respond to the concerns of younger officers -- while also
fully meeting the needs of service. But you can't do it with a World War II
mindset, an insular outlook, or an industrial aged personnel system- all of
which are markedly in evidence today. And in the coming years, throwing money
at the problem is not likely to be as easy as in the past.

The decision: Talk to junior leaders and find
out what THEY want. Continuing down the current path won't "break" the Army;
however, it certainly will hinder it for future generations.

"Si
Syphus" is the company-grade officer sitting just a few desks away from you. Go
ask him what he thinks.

Hey, Tom: The next time you write a book, try looking up from the ground

By Lt. Col. Tom
Cooper, USAF

Best Defense aerial
book critic

In order to support our Best Defense host's
desire to learn
more about Air Force history, I thought I'd
provide an airman's perspective on The Generals.
Many reviews of Tom's most recent book ping-pong back and forth against
the Army and in
favor of the Army but make no mention of the teamwork
required to execute military operations since World War II. I don't have much
experience working under direct Army leadership but I do know that the
contributions of the joint team were not fully accounted for in the book.

The subtitle of Tom's book, "American Military
Command from World War II to Today," is not a complete statement because it
neglects all naval and air leaders who have made significant contributions to
military operations in the same period. Fortunately for the nation, more than
just the Army and Marine Corps conduct military operations. The narrow vision
of "the military" presented in the book does not fully capture the lessons of
leadership for the way joint warfighting is conducted today. It is joint
teamwork that makes American military operations succeed. And it is
perspectives born from different service experiences that help broaden the
thinking of leaders and produce the high-level of trust needed for joint
success.

Unfortunately, many assume the strategic leader
ought to wear the same "boots" as the guys sent to fight -- probably tactically
appropriate, but unproven strategically. A single-service strategic perspective
does not take advantage of the joint force the nation has prepared to fight its
wars. The Joint Task Force Commander should be surrounded by a diversity of
thought, not same-service minions that benefit from agreeing and reinforcing
the same-service leader's way of thinking. The military successes (and military
failures) of the leaders highlighted by Ricks require deeper examination
through a joint warfighting lens. Each success in The Generals embraced diverse viewpoints of how to fight over
single-service concepts.

Many people assumed that the wars of the past
decade needed leaders with a ground perspective, but leaders who can approach
problems from other viewpoints might have led to different outcomes. A
different perspective might have created innovative ways to operate in Iraq and
Afghanistan that may have cost less and risked less. In My Share of the Task,
General Stanley McChrystal's descriptions of increasing the pace of operations
of Task Force 712 to hunt Zarqawi is similar to the military challenge General
Carl Spaatz faced when put in charge of achieving air superiority before D-Day.
I don't know if General McChrystal ever studied air operations over Europe, but
the challenge of generating an operational pace that can exhaust your enemy
while not exhausting your own was a significant lesson Carl Spaatz learned in
the skies over Europe in early 1944. Similarly, "it
takes a network" rings very closely to how airmen across
generations thought about generating an effects chain to disrupt enemy actions
before "effects-based operations" became a "concept
that should not be spoken of" by a respected
senior leader.

To understand the diversity of thought brought
by different military experiences, consider the following academic example. As
an airman, I chose a path that did not train me to understand the tactics of an
infantry squad, and I have no expectation that I should lead in the infantry. However,
in choosing the Air Force, I chose a
service that develops an innovative mindset not hindered by geography and more
conscious of range.  

This became particularly evident to me while
participating in a recent Army-led Antietam staff ride. The experience included the entire
South Mountain campaign and siege of Harpers Ferry,
giving a more strategic viewpoint than what happened in the individual, but
instructive, skirmishes. We began on a hillside looking north towards
Frederick, Maryland, where our leader, a well-respected, retired infantry colonel,
asked us what Lee was trying to do by moving towards Pennsylvania. My Army
counterpart, a SAMS graduate who has thought about these things at length,
responded, "The terrain in the valley was a natural funnel for Lee to take the
ground ahead of him and move into the North." I looked at the terrain, thought
of the geography, remembered my very slight skimming of Landscape Turned Red
and said, "Didn't Lee really want to get across Maryland into Pennsylvania to
gain access to the industrial capacity of the North and possibly show the
European allies that the Confederacy was for real?" Right or wrong, what struck
me was that I saw "terrain" across a broader distance like you'd see from the
air and my Army counterpart's view was shaped by infantry experience of being
on foot. It was the sharing of two diverse viewpoints that created a broader
view of what Lee was trying to accomplish.

Similarly, Ricks's most successful examples in The Generals used contributions of
diverse thinking airmen to strengthen the fight. General George Marshall's
embrace of the yet-unproven Army Air Corps and faith in its leader, General
Henry "Hap" Arnold, to strengthen the independent Army Air Forces early in
World War II is proof alone of the need for a broader viewpoint towards
warfighting. Marshall's
trust in Hap Arnold to grow the AAF to a robust,
independent fighting organization, sometimes at the expense of ground force
priorities, was critical to military success. Just as highlighted by Ricks, it
is Marshall's superior leadership that many look to for a superior example of
how a strategic leader should lead. Marshall's leadership skill is solidified
by the fact that all his ground Army subordinates in both theaters embraced the
contributions of airpower.

In Europe, Eisenhower clearly understood the
use of airpower to change the situation on the ground. Eisenhower had
significant trust in RAF Air Marshall Arthur Tedder and AAF commander in Europe
General Carl Spaatz. Tedder
was Eisenhower's second in command for the invasion of Normandy.
Spaatz
was "Eisenhower's Airman" as he commanded United States Strategic Air Forces in
Europe. Eisenhower understood the integration of
ground and air forces so well that when it came to establishing his
headquarters in England, he co-located his with Spaatz. Eisenhower rated Spaatz
and General Omar Bradley as the two leaders who did the most to defeat the Germans,
specifically describing Spaatz as an "Experienced and able air leader: loyal
and cooperative; modest and selfless; always reliable." A final testimony of
this trust is in what Eisenhower wrote to Spaatz in 1948: "No man can justly
claim a greater share than you in the attainment of victory in Europe." General
Omar Bradley, when asked by Eisenhower to rank top generals in prioritized
order based on their contribution to the defeat of Germany, listed Spaatz as
number two and General Elwood R. "Pete" Quesada as number four. Two in the top
five were airmen. (Bedell-Smith was one, Courtney Hodges was another, and
Patton didn't make the top five.)

In the Pacific, General Douglas McArthur's
relationship with General
George Kenney is one of the more interesting stories of how
an innovative air leader changed the way we fought on the ground during World
War II. Kenney's
ability to integrate both air and ground fighting to hop through the southwest
Pacific is what MacArthur's success was built on.
From innovative new bombing techniques to airdrop methods using bombers and
cargo aircraft to cutting trucks in half to move them into the fight, at every
turn Kenney used his unique experience and perspective to strengthen the fight
on the ground. MacArthur's own words about Kenney are the most descriptive of
what he contributed: "Of all the commanders in the war, none surpassed him in
those three great essentials of successful combat leadership: aggressive
vision, mastery over air tactics and strategy, and the ability to exact the
maximum in fighting qualities from both men and equipment." It is clear that
Kenney had MacArthur's trust to use his unique viewpoint on how to fight to
achieve military victory.

Numerous examples exist and all become clear in
a recently released volume of biographies titled Air Commanders.
This book's detailed descriptions of air commanders in conflicts ranging from
World War II to Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom highlight the role played
by airmen and the contributions of airpower to these conflicts. The unique perspective
provided by these air leaders to achieve military effects differently than what
would have been achieved by fighting through a single-service lens is a
critical lesson for future commanders. Each example is stronger or weaker based
on the teamwork between the ground commander and the air commander. Our most
successful military operations tend to have leaders that understood fighting in
the air as strengthening the fight and not as threatening to the Army as they
increasingly have since the early 1950s. A couple of the less lauded Army
leaders in The Generals begin to
exhibit fear of airpower during the Korean War. Maj. Gen. Ned Almond was
opposed to the Air Force's concept for conducting air operations and Gen. Mark
Clark advocated that tactical air forces should operate purely under the
command of the ground commander. In both cases, airpower's flexibility was not
embraced and may have limited airminded solutions for fighting in Korea. Just
look to one of the heroes of The Generals
for what a dose of airmindedness can achieve -- General O.P. Smith's first
action during fighting at the Chosin Reservoir was to build a runway.

Services don't fight wars, the nation does. The
nation fights wars by the application of the full capabilities of joint force to
achieve a military outcome. Ground combat should not be the goal of military
leaders when they develop plans, in fact it might be argued that we should
fight in a way that makes forces on the ground engaging the enemy a last
resort. By discussing generalship and its effectiveness purely in terms of the
Army, it discounts the strength of the joint team and what our nation expects
and deserves. Our nation invests heavily in building a trained joint force that
integrates diverse warfighting perspectives across the spectrum of military
operations. Using examples from one service viewpoint, without recognizing
joint teamwork, is half the story and does not strengthen future leaders with
examples of leadership that truly strengthens how we fight today. As we
continue toward a smaller, more capable, more adaptable military for the United
States, leadership examples with unique perspectives, teamwork, and, most
importantly, trust are increasingly important and should be emphasized.

Lt.
Col. Tom Cooper is deployed from Headquarters Air Force to the Office of
Security Cooperation -- Iraq, where he works to build more than just one strong
Air Force.

An insurgent’s memoirs -- and his observations about his British captors

I've long wanted to
know more about what the Iraq war looked like from the side of the insurgents.
I actually had hoped one day to write a book about this in collaboration with Anthony Shadid,
but he was killed about 13 months ago while trying to cover the fighting in
Syria.

But I got a bit of
insight, unexpectedly, when reading Ernie O' Malley's
On Another Man's Wound: A Personal
History of Ireland's War of Independence, which was
recommended recently by one of this blog's guest
columnists. (I didn't know when I learned that the book and
his other memoir were the basis for the great film The Wind That Shakes the Barley.)

Here is O'Malley's
net assessment of the war. It sounds kind of familiar, no?

The enemy could have
regular meals, a standard of comfort, the advantage of numbers and training,
more than ample supplies of ammunition, and well-cared-for and efficient
weapons, but they were...operating in a hostile countryside when they left the
shelter of their barracks....The British could defeat some of our columns and
round-up our men, but they could not maintain civil administration when they
had lost the support of the people.

Tom again: O'Malley
found that the British army, though full of veterans of World War I, was slow
to adjust to the situation in the Irish fighting, where the rebels could move
among the people. "Few [British] might be elastic enough for guerrilla
fighting," he concluded. He detected in the British soldiers "a glum, swarthy
melancholy."

As a captive, he
concluded that, "Soldiers make bad gaolers," or jailers. He eventually escaped.
The British never even figured out his true identity, even though they beat him
and threatened to torture him with a red-hot poker, holding it close enough to
his face to burn his eyebrows and singe his eyeballs. Calling Abu Ghraib!

What did victory look
like? One day early in 1921, the fact that the fence-sitters were coming over
to the side of the rebels made O'Malley realize he was winning: "We were
becoming almost popular. Respectable people were beginning to crawl into us;
neutrals and those who thought they had best come over were changing from
indifference or hostility to a painful acceptance."

One important
difference, though I don't know quite what to make of it: The British soldiers
and their Irish foes were much closer culturally than were the Americans and
Iraqi insurgents. They could even speak to each other, which meant that
O'Malley could sort of apologize to some British officers
held prisoner before executing them. O'Malley's brother had even been in the
British army.

Gen. Hodges vs. Gen. Barno: Is the Army losing too many talented officers?

What General Hodges lacks in facts in his
column he makes up in indignation. Dare General David Barno worry that the Army is
losing talented Army officers? "What an insult to the thousands who are in fact
staying," Hodges fumes.

Is the Army
"somehow non-adaptive, too inflexible and unimaginative"? Well, I would say too
many Army generals are. But, without
any facts to back up his case, and conveniently ignoring years of
inadaptiveness in Iraq (2003-06), General Hodges assures us that, "This is
nonsense and I reject it." He offers no facts, but hey, we have to take it on
faith, he seems to say -- after all, how could a system that produces me be faulty? It reminds me of the old
Ring Lardner line: "‘Shut up,' he explained."

But you all
know what Tom thinks -- I wrote a whole book on the subject. I
would like to know what you all think, especially junior officers, both those
leaving and those staying in. Let's ask those involved. Who is right: Hodges or
Barno?

Necessary
disclosure: Barno is a colleague of mine at CNAS.

Rebecca’s War Dog of the Week: 20 years later, the world has not forgotten India’s bomb-sniffing dog, Zanjeer

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

When a series of 12 bombings rocked Mumbai in March 1993 -- blasts
that killed over 250 people and left more than 700 others injured -- one member
of India's Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (BDDS) was heralded as savior, a golden
lab called Zanjeer. And now, two decades later, Zanjeer's photo and his story
are making the Internet rounds once again, this time in memorandum.

Zanjeer's first find during those fateful days came on March
15, when he gave his signature three-bark alert on a bomb-laden scooter parked
on Dhanji Street, a mere "stone's throw away" from BDDS
headquarters. In the days that followed he reportedly saved thousands more
lives by finding explosives in "unclaimed suitcases" discovered at the Siddhivinayak
temple and then again a few days later at the Zaveri Bazaar.
All in all, Zanjeer helped members of the BDDS find, as reported by Reuters, "more
than 3,329 kgs of the explosive RDX, 600 detonators, 249 hand grenades and 6406
rounds of live ammunition."

Zanjeer, named after a 1973 Hindi action film about a lone honest cop
who perseveres in a world overrun by corruption, was trained in Pune and joined
the officers of India's BDDS in 1992 at just one years old. The much beloved
and lauded dog went on to have an illustrious and astoundingly productive
eight-year career, during which he was credited with uncovering: "11 military
bombs, 57 country-made bombs, 175 petrol bombs, and 600 detonators." These
finds coming after the March bombings
in 1993.

When Zanjeer died
of bone cancer (other reports
say lung failure) in November of 2000, his fellow officers gave him full honors
during a ceremony and memorial service -- as seen in this
photo as a senior official places flowers over Zanjeer's body. And while
the world is remembering this dog 20 years later, citizens of Mumbai are said
to have commemorated the anniversary of Zanjeer's death yearly.

According to Zanjeer's obituary,
"The cops grew so dependent on Zanjeer that there were occasions when they
would bring only Zanjeer and no equipment." The chief of BDDS
during Zanjeer's tenure, Nandkumar Choughule, said
that the dog was "god sent" and that when men were not able to track down the
explosives, it was Zanjeer who found them.