Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 114

A surprising Afghan top 10 books list

I bet you haven't
heard of most of them!

(Thanks to John Mill.)

Junior officer retention: Pentagon leaders need to start thinking differently about how to deal with military spouses

By Jesse
Sloman

Best
Defense office of Junior Officer Issues

Millions of electrons have been spilled in the last few
months on the subject of junior officer retention.
As a company grade officer in the Marine Corps, I've been following the
widening debate with great interest. Although assertions of a crisis in the JO
community have yet to be proven empirically, the volume of interest this topic
has generated speaks to its importance as a national security issue. It's also
clear that questions about retention resonate among my generation of officers,
many of whom are currently mulling their own decisions about whether to remain
on active duty.

Despite this outpouring, one critical factor in manpower
retention has remained unexplored: quality of life for spouses, over 90
percent of whom are women. Relationship status
and spousal satisfaction are crucial influences on a servicemember's decision
to stay or leave the armed forces, yet these issues have so far been largely
overlooked. As women take on ever greater roles in American professional life
-- they now make up a larger share of the national work force than men -- their
attitudes and expectations will be increasingly at odds with the traditional
role of the military spouse. This is especially true for the spouses of junior
officers, most of whom possess bachelor's degrees, strong employment prospects,
and belong to a generation of women who have been raised with the assumption that
they have as much right to long and fulfilling careers as their husbands. I
have seen this dynamic firsthand among my peers. Two of the most promising
lieutenants I know, including one who graduated at the top of his TBS class,
are planning to curtail their military careers primarily out of consideration
for their wives.

Consider
the difficulties a young educated woman faces when her husband commissions into
the armed forces. As she watches her friends enter the workforce and embark on
their new careers, she will almost certainly be forced to move to an entirely
new community with little in the way of local employment options. If she is
lucky enough to find a good job, her excitement will undoubtedly be tempered by
the knowledge that within a year or two she'll be forced to move and start
over. Every time she begins a new job search she'll be competing against not
just all the other recently arrived spouses, but also against non-military
locals who employers know will not be leaving in the near future.

The
numbers attest to the difficulties spouses face in finding employment. A 2004 Rand Corporation study found that military spouses are less likely to be employed
than their civilian peers and earn less money when they are employed. This
holds true even when they are compared against civilian spouses with similar
employability characteristics. Given these obstacles, it's little wonder that 85 percent of military spouses say they either want or need work. Of those who are
employed, it's not uncommon to find spouses working in positions for which they
are manifestly overqualified. I know a former government lawyer currently
employed at a nearby unit as a Family Readiness Officer, a job that does not even
require a bachelor's degree.

None of
these issues is new for military spouses, but it is surely not lost on them
that today they are being largely excluded from one of the most important
demographic shifts in American history. As Hanna Rosin, journalist and author
of The End of Men, explains: "For the first
time in American history, the balance of the workforce [has] tipped toward
women, who now hold a majority of the nation's jobs.... Women dominate today's colleges
and professional schools -- for every two men who will receive a B.A. this
year, three women will do the same. Of the 15 job categories projected to grow
the most in the next decade in the U.S., all but two are occupied primarily by
women."

To its
credit, the Department of Defense has taken recent action to try and improve
spousal employment with the creation of the Spouse Education and Career
Opportunities (SECO) initiative in 2009. SECO is made up of three programs: the
Military Spouse Career Advancement Accounts (MyCAA) tuition assistance program,
the Military Spouse Employment Partnership (MSEP), and the Military Spouse
Career Center. Unfortunately, a 2012
Government Accountability Office report
noted that, "DOD is not yet able to measure the overall effectiveness of its
spouse employment programs," so it is impossible to know if they are proving
beneficial.

I
suspect that, given the obstacles arrayed against it, SECO will prove
inadequate to the task of providing JO wives with fulfilling long-term
employment. Instead, the military may need to come up with more radical
measures, such as reinstituting homesteading and increasing the number of
unaccompanied tours to locations suffering from limited employment
opportunities. Another option is to ensure that spouses' careers are given
weight when assigning servicemembers to new duty stations. There are
significant practical obstacles to both of these ideas, but over time they may
grow to be considered preferable to the problems brought on by spousal discontent.

Ultimately,
effective solutions will only be possible when there is widespread recognition
that the military's current social model is a legacy of a different time.
Today's young women will be increasingly unwilling to sacrifice their professional
ambitions for their husband's military career. The choice for young officers
will become stark: Stay in the military and make their wives unhappy, or get
out and give them a chance to pursue their dreams as well. Unless positive
measures are taken to increase spousal satisfaction, I fear more and more JOs
will choose the latter.

Jesse Sloman is a
lieutenant in the Marine Corps currently based in Okinawa, Japan.

When the newspapers get it right: Orwell records two reports from August 1939

In our cynical age it
is easy to forget that sometimes the newspapers get it right. I was struck
while reading George Orwell's diaries by the reports he cites in August 1939,
just weeks before World War II began in Europe.

The Manchester Guardian
comes off particularly well. It reports that month that "German
mobilization will be at full strength halfway through August & that some
attempt to terrorise Poland will be made."

A few days later, Orwell
notes, the same paper's diplomatic correspondent predicted that "Spain
will almost certainly remain neutral in case of war."

Quote of the day: General Mattis on the meaning of the Infantry Officer Course

He may be retiring, but he remains quotable: "It's not an easy
course. It's not designed to be. We're not here to get you in touch with your
inner child."

Bridging the gap: A modest manpower management proposal from a Marine

By Lt. Col. Robert "Butch" Bracknell, USMC

Best Defense department of personnel reform

The Department of Defense needs to advocate for and implement
certain reforms to ensure the Department is getting maximum return on manpower
investments. Most notably, the 20-year retirement permits officers, including
senior noncommissioned officers, to request placement on the retired list in
the prime of their careers, denying the Department of Defense an opportunity to
reap the benefits of 20 years of development and experience.

Smarter manpower management would find a way to extract additional value
from a retirement-eligible servicemember by incentivizing his retention,
perhaps in a reserve status, until service limitations.

In 2010, the Defense Business Board issued its report "Modernizing the Military
Retirement System," recommending comprehensive restructuring of the military
retirement system. The report concluded that comprehensive reform is warranted,
and that a new retirement system based on an annual contribution model like the
Thrift Savings Plan could contribute to military retirement sustainability. Citing
unsustainable rises in costs, fairness to servicemembers who separate prior to
retirement vesting, and the relative generosity of the military retirement
system compared to civilian retirement systems, the board's Task Group that
executed the study recognized that the "binary nature" of the system "creates a
strong incentive for personnel to leave shortly after 20 years." The authors
observed "in some areas of specialization, military servicemembers are only
then reaching their peak performance."

After their initial service obligation, typically four to five
years, and occasionally up to 10-12 years or more, active duty members take one
of three options: (1) they remain on active duty, (2) they move to the reserve
component of their service, or (3) they resign or allow their enlistment
contracts to expire and separate from the armed services permanently. Active
servicemembers can retire from active service after 20 years, which entitles
them to 50 percent of their base pay as pension, where "base pay" varies in
terms of calculation depending on the statutory retirement calculation system
that applies to a servicemember's pay entry base date ("Final Pay",
"High 3", "Redux", etc.).  Each year served above 20 years raises the
pension by 2.5 percent. Thirty years is the normal maximum career limitation,
entitling the servicemember to 75 percent of his base pay in retirement (at 30
years, the usual "service limitation"). In unusual circumstances, certain
colonels (with specific and unique qualifications) and general officers can
continue to accrue 2.5 percent "bumps" in retirement pay up to a 100 percent
base pay retirement benefit.

Reserve servicemembers who elect to continue participating until
they have satisfied reserve retirement eligibility criteria obtain the same
retirement benefit based on years of accrued service, participation "points,"
mobilization time, etc., but the benefit generally is deferred until the retired servicemember
reaches age 60. A typical career path for one of these servicemembers is to
serve four to eight years on active duty, then move over to the reserves to
complete a reserve military career while pursuing a "primary" civilian career.

As I contemplated my own retirement from active duty at year 21, I
realized I could be ready for new professional challenges. Simultaneously, I
realized not only that I had not completely whetted my appetite for military
service, but also that I had developed expertise and skills that could still
benefit my nation in uniform. I explored my options; my manpower managers
informed me that I could move to the reserves, just as if I had only completed
four, six, or eight years of military service (an initial service obligation,
or an initial obligation plus one or two assignments thereafter). The problem
with this plan is that I would be sacrificing completely a $45,972 pension (based on 2013 retirement at O-5 with
21 years) for the privilege of continuing to serve. I love service as much as
any Marine who ever wore the uniform, but my family cannot afford to forfeit a
vested $46,000 annuity so that I can continue to serve as a reserve Marine.

The stark choice between an active duty career beyond 20 years and
a reserve career that only makes financial sense if the servicemember moves to
the reserve component earlier in his career, rather than later, counsels that
there ought to be an accommodation for servicemembers caught in the middle. A
the retirement-eligible officer with specialized skill, experience, and
training, who is willing to continue serving as a reserve officer should be
permitted to do so, without incurring a substantial financial penalty for the
privilege.

Assuming my post-military career prospects are such that I am not
going to remain on active duty to year 28 or 30, if I retire and walk away, taking
my O-5/21 year/52.5 percent benefit with me, I am also depriving the Marine
Corps of 21 years of accrued active duty expertise, nearly four years of
cumulative post-9/11 overseas and deployed experience, and a substantial
investment in my graduate education and fellowships. If I move to the reserve
component, I forfeit a vested $46,000 pension. No rational economic actor would
take this deal. As a result, if I retire this year, some other agency or
company will reap the benefit of the Marine Corps's investment in developing me
as a senior leader and technical expert for the past 21 years. There is no
middle ground that would allow the military to reap that benefit, instead of
some third party entity.

Moreover, the current system encourages the services to fill their
reserve ranks with relatively
inexperienced personnel -- an average
officer who serves as an active infantryman for four years and as a reserve
officer for 12 years is almost always less experienced and less competent at
his military trade than an average
officer (with similar intellect, talent, etc.) who spends all 16 of those years
on active duty. Similarly, the officer who spends 25 years on active duty is
deprived of the rich experience of life in the private sector or in another
government agency. The absence of post-military experience may yield a less
mature business sense for finance, logistics, and process management when
compared to a reserve component peer officer who spends four years on active
duty and 21 years as a chief financial officer or production manager at General
Motors or Boeing. These two communities might be bridged by allowing career
active officers to retire and continue service in the reserve component, as a
career active duty/career reserve "hybrid." Such officers might represent the
best of both worlds: abundant active duty experience, augmented by
post-retirement private or other government sector experience that would
benefit the third "tier" (the last 10 years) of the officer's combined active
and reserve military career. Perhaps there ought to be a third "hybrid"
personnel category that allows this to happen.

When an officer vests at 20 years and becomes retirement eligible
under this notional system, he might have 3 options, instead of only 2 (stay on
active duty or walk away). Those three options would be (1) stay on active
duty, (2) walk away, (3) a hybrid option in which the board-selected officer
could continue post-retirement as a reserve component servicemember while being
paid the active duty pension already earned. In a case like mine, for example,
once selected by a combined, proportional board of active and reserve officers,
the officer would retire at year 20 and begin immediately to collect his
"normal" (50 percent) pension. He would continue to serve for another 10 years
as a reserve component officer while starting his second, post-active duty
career. At the end of that 10 year reserve portion of his career, the
retirement benefit would be adjusted incrementally and proportionately to
account for the additional service beyond the 20 year mark. In fairness to
those who stay on active duty, any increase to the hybrid officer's ultimate
retirement pension would be fractionally adjusted; a smaller accrued benefit
would vest in comparison to the hybrid's active duty counterpart who stays on
active duty until year 30. At year 30, he would be eligible to collect 75
percent of his base pay, and the hybrid who retired from active duty at year 20
might collect some smaller amount -- perhaps only 57.5-60 percent at year 30
(0.75-1 percent premium per year served, rather than 2.5 percent per year). This
would account for the 50 percent the hybrid would have already earned, plus
some marginal additional compensation for the willingness to commit another 10
years in the reserve component. The formula might be adjusted to compensate for
periods of mobilization; for example, if within that 10 year period of reserve
service, an officer is mobilized for a major theater conflict for 2 years, then
his active retirement would plus up to 55 percent, and the other 8 years of his
reserve career might be compensated in retirement at the "normal" 0.75-1
percent rate. This notional officer eventually would retire with 22 years of
active service (55 percent) of base pay, and his benefit would increase at age
60 to account for the other 8 years of reserve service (0.75-1 percent over
eight years, for a 6-8 percent plus-up -- equaling 61-63 percent of base pay
retirement annuity).

Purists may intone: "Bah, humbug. Pick one or the other. This is
waffling. This is indecisive. This isn't the way we do things." Duly noted. But
if the goal is to maximize return on
investment, and to extract more value and service out of high-value,
well-trained experts -- COIN experts, counterterrorism practitioners,
logisticians, engineers, foreign area officers and regional experts, resource
managers, aviators, strategists, cyberwarriors, physicians, etc. -- who have
earned the right to walk away through 20 years of service, then we need a new
paradigm for doing so. Modifying force management statutes and regulations to
permit a new category of "hybrid" officer would improve the experience quantum
in the most senior reserve ranks and would temper the loss of institutional
knowledge and expertise when exceptional officers retire at year 20. There
likely are multiple ways to realize additional return on our institutional
manpower investment that fit each service's unique needs for manpower
capabilities. This is but one of them.

Providing a third "hybrid" option in the future that makes
financial sense to the servicemember while retaining talent for the total force
is a win-win proposition. As we look forward to figuring out how to lean out
the services and get the most return on our defense investment, it is clear the
Department of Defense wastes an inordinate amount of human capital by allowing
it to walk out the door at year 20 without providing any option for continued
return on that 20-year investment. Proposing authority to Congress to modify
the military retirement scheme to allow a 20-year retirement plus reserve
continuation permits the Department to honor the "20 year deal" while
extracting additional service value out of officers during the last third of an
officer's potential 30-year career.

This option is far superior to letting
talented, capable officers simply walk away at the 20-year mark with an annuity
and a gold watch, taking 100 percent of their abilities and experience with
them to a new employer.

"Butch" Bracknell is a Marine lieutenant colonel on active duty,
but perhaps not much longer.

Things I didn't know: More British civilians died in WWII than in Royal Navy

In a footnote in the Orwell
diaries, I learned that more British civilians were killed by enemy action
during World War II than were members of the Royal Navy (60,595 vs.
50,758). 

Meanwhile, in other news related
to World War II, for the first time in nearly 70 years, there is not
a single American tank on German soil.

How to work in a TOC: Charlie Sherpa's 26 rules of hard-won wisdom

For the genre of "hard-won but
sometimes humorous military wisdom," "Charlie Sherpa" mentioned these
in a comment on the lessons
of helicopter pilots, but they are too good not to run as a separate post.

1. Continually ask: "Who
else needs to know what I know?"

2. Continually ask: "Who
else knows what I need to know?"

3. Never speak with complete
authority regarding that which you lack direct knowledge, observation, and/or
suppressive fires.

4. Never pull rank over a radio
net.

5. Let the boss decide how he/she
wants to learn.

6. Let the boss decide how he/she wants to communicate.

7. "I am responsible for everything my commander's organization knows and
fails to know, learns and fails to learn."

8. Know when to wake up the Old Man. Also, know how to wake him up
without getting punched, shot, or fired.

9. The three most important things in the TOC are: Track the battle. Track the battle. Track the
battle.

10. Digital trumps analog, until you run out of batteries.

11. Always have ready at least two methods of communication to any point or
person on the map.

12. Rank has its privileges. It also has its limitations.

13. Let Joe surprise you.

14. Don't let Joe surprise you.

15. The first report is always wrong. Except when it isn't.

16. The problem is always at the distant end. Except when it isn't.

17. Exercise digital/tactical patience. Communications works at the speed of
light. People do not.

18. Your trigger finger is your safety. Keep it away from the CAPS LOCK, reply-all, and flash-override buttons.

19. The warfighter is your customer, and the customer is always right.

20. Bullets don't kill people. Logistics kills people.

21. Knowing how it works is more powerful than knowing how it's supposed to
work.

22. Cite sources on demand. State opinions when asked.

23. Work by, with, and through others. It's all about
empowerment.

24. Do not seek the spotlight, Ranger. Let the spotlight find you.
Then, make sure to share it with others.

25. Both the Bible and The Art of War make this point: It's never a
mistake to put oneself in someone else's boots.

26. Humor is a combat multiplier. Except when it isn't.

A military genre: A list of the hard-won wisdom of combat helicopter pilots

I like this list below. First, it is a good
summary of the wisdom and humor in one military field.

Second, it is typical of a military genre -- the
grim but humorous compilation of hard-won knowledge. I've seen multiple copies
of a similar one on infantry ("Friendly fire, isn't"), but would like to see other
examples you might have.

EVERYTHING I NEEDED
TO KNOW IN LIFE I 
LEARNED AS A HELICOPTER PILOT IN VIETNAM. 

1. Once you are in the fight, it is way too late to wonder if this is a
good idea.

2. It is a fact that helicopter tail rotors are instinctively drawn
toward trees, stumps, rocks, etc. While it may be possible to ward off this
natural event some of the time, it cannot, despite the best efforts of the
crew, always be prevented. It's just what they do.

3. NEVER get into a fight without more ammunition than the other guy.

4. The engine RPM and the rotor RPM must BOTH be kept in the GREEN.
Failure to heed this commandment can affect the morale of the crew.

5. Cover your Buddy, so he can be around to cover for you.

6. Decisions made by someone above you in the chain-of-command will
seldom be in your best interest.

7. The terms Protective Armor and Helicopter are mutually exclusive.

8. Sometimes, being good and lucky is still is not enough.

9. "Chicken Plates" are not something you order in a
restaurant

10. If everything is as clear as a bell, and everything is going exactly
as planned, you're about to be surprised.

11. Loud, sudden noises in a helicopter WILL get your undivided
attention.

12. The BSR (Bang Stare Red) Theory states that the louder the sudden
bang in the helicopter, the quicker your eyes will be drawn to the gauges. The
longer you stare at the gauges the less time it takes them to move from green
to red.

13. No matter what you do, the bullet with your name on it will get you.
So, too, can the ones addressed "To Whom It May Concern."

14. If the rear echelon troops are really happy, the front line troops
probably do not have what they need.

15. If you are wearing body armor, they will probably miss that part of
you.

16. Happiness is a belt-fed weapon.

17. Having all your body parts intact and functioning at the end of the
day beats the alternative.

18. If you are allergic to lead, it is best to avoid a war zone.

19. It is a bad thing to run out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas all at
the same time.

20. Hot garrison chow is better than hot C-rations which, in turn, is
better than cold C-rations which, in turn, is better than no food at all. All
of these, however, are preferable to cold rice balls, even if they do have the
little pieces of fish in them.

21. Everybody's a hero...On the ground...In the club...After the fourth
drink.

22. A free fire zone has nothing to do with economics.

23. The further you fly into the mountains, the louder those strange
engine noises become.

24. Medals are OK, but having your body and all your friends in one
piece at the end of the day is better.

25. Being shot hurts and it can ruin your whole day.

26. "Pucker Factor" is the formal name of the equation that
states the more hairy the situation is, the more of the seat cushion will be
sucked up your ass. It can be expressed in its mathematical formula of S
(suction) + H (height above ground ) + I (interest in staying alive) + T ( # of
tracers coming your way)

27.The term 'SHIT!' can also be used to denote a situation where high Pucker Factor is being encountered.

28. Thousands of Vietnam Veterans earned medals for bravery every day. A
few were even awarded.

29. Running out of pedal, fore or aft cyclic, or collective are all bad
ideas. Any combination of these can be deadly.

30. There is only one rule in war: When you win, you get to make up the
rules.

31. C-4 can make a dull day fun.

32. There is no such thing as a fair fight -- only ones where you win or
lose.

33. If you win the battle you are entitled to the spoils. If you lose,
you don't care.

34. Nobody cares what you did yesterday or what you are going to do
tomorrow. What is important is what you are doing -- NOW -- to solve our
problem.

35. Always make sure someone has a P-38. Uh, that's a can opener for
those of you who aren't military.

36. Prayer may not help...but it can't hurt.

37. Flying is better than walking. Walking is better than running.
Running is better than crawling. All of these, however, are better than
extraction by Medevac, even if it is technically, a form of flying.

38. If everyone does not come home, none of the rest of us can ever
fully come home either.

39. Do not fear the enemy, for your enemy can only take your life. It is
far better that you fear the media, for they will steal your HONOR.

40. A grunt is the true reason for the existence of the helicopter.
Every helicopter flying in Vietnam had one real purpose: To help the grunt. It
is unfortunate that many helicopters never had the opportunity to fulfill their
one true mission in life, simply because someone forgot this fact.

If you have not been there and done that you probably will not
understand most of these.

What's up with Gen. Huntoon: Nailed on a penny ante charge of personal favors

I am told this about
the misconducted
West Point superintendent, Lt. Gen. David Huntoon. Apparently there was an
investigation of his relationship with a woman he brought in as director of
strategic communications, whose influence was resented by some faculty members.
But the Army keeps on stonewalling and saying only that he was cleared on that
-- but won't drop the other shoe and provide information on the misconduct
charge that the DOD IG did
substantiate.

So what was he nailed
on? I asked someone in the know. He told me this:

In the end, all they
got him for was, he offered to take care of her cats....[But] the chief of
staff wound up doing it. He had to buy cat food. So, after all the investigating,
all they got him on was coercing a subordinate to do personal favors.... It's
ironic because Huntoon has been all about the ‘image' of West Point.

Tom again: A bigger
concern to me -- and to some civilians at West Point -- is the effect that the
image campaign has had on the academic freedom of faculty members. I asked
about that, and the person I was talking to said, "I think it's fair to say,
there is concern that we cannot speak freely. We get messages all the time:
‘Don't talk about this.' There's a lot of concern about image."

A little transparency
here would go a long way. But apparently the Army cares more about the feelings
of its generals than about informing the people who pay
its bills.

Rebecca’s War Dog of the Week: NoKo unleashes its military dogs

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

Amidst the more comical propaganda intended
to intimidate coming out of North Korea this week was this video of the country's
military dogs.

Unless these dogs are high on methamphetamines, the footage
has clearly been manipulated, sped up as they launch over walls and through
half-lit rings of fire moving at herculean speeds. As the handlers shout and
make angry gestures, the dogs pounce on paper likenesses of South Korea's defense
minister, Kim Kwan-jin (NoKo's
"Enemy No. 1"). Tactically speaking, these dogs -- of which there appear to be
only five or six -- have all the precision and training of a rabid mob. I
suppose that might be frightening in its own right, but it would be a mistake
to assume a military dog is a super threat just because he/she is savage. The
really "dangerous" dogs are the ones who are impeccably controlled by their
handlers.

So, who should be afraid of North Korea's war dogs? Probably
no one.

I sent the clip over to a career dog handler over at the
USAF Academy, Kennel Master Chris Jakubin, who after viewing the footage of NoKo's
dogs attacking stuffed mannequins said it had the intimidating power of a Benny
Hill skit. All it needs, he said, is the music.