Yanis Varoufakis's Blog, page 101

Για την ενότητα των αλέκιαστων, των ανυπάκουων, των αξιοπρεπών – EφΣυν 16 ΙΟΥΝΙΟΥ 2018

Κάθε περίπου 80 χρόνια η Ευρώπη περνά έναν υπαρξιακό «σπασμό», μια κρίση τόσο βαθιά που καταδικάζει μία ή περισσότερες γενιές στην απόγνωση, αλλά παράλληλα επιταχύνει τον ιστορικό ρου γεννώντας νέες δυνατότητες μαζί με τις νέες απειλές: 1848, 1929 και 2008 – στιγμές ιστορικές που οδήγησαν στη μαζική δυστυχία, αλλά και σε κοινωνικούς αγώνες χωρίς τους οποίους η Ευρώπη θα ήταν πιο πρωτόγονη, λιγότερο πολιτισμένη.

Η τελευταία από αυτές τις ιστορικές στιγμές, ο «σπασμός» του 2008, βούλιαξε τη χώρα μας στη Χρεοδουλοπαροικία, την ενέταξε στη διαδικασία της ερημοποίησης και λειτούργησε ως πυροδότης της ευρωπαϊκής αποδόμησης – με πιο πρόσφατο αποτέλεσμά του τη σημερινή Εθνικιστική-Φασιστική Διεθνή που έχει αναδυθεί στην εξουσία με ηγέτες τον Σαλβίνι (υπουργό Εσωτερικών της Ιταλίας), τον Κουρτς (καγκελάριο της Αυστρίας), τον Ζέχοφερ (υπουργό Εσωτερικών της Γερμανίας), τον Ορμπάν (πρωθυπουργό της Ουγγαρίας) κ.λπ.

Μπροστά σε αυτό το τσουνάμι μισανθρωπισμού, μπροστά σε αυτή τη νέα κήρυξη πολέμου εναντίον βασικών αξιών πολιτισμού, είμαστε άλλη μια φορά υποχρεωμένοι να συστρατευτούμε όπως έκαναν οι γονείς, οι γιαγιάδες κι οι παππούδες μας.

«Θα τους πολεμήσουμε στις θάλασσες, στα λιμάνια, στις πόλεις μας, στα δημοτικά συμβούλια, στα κοινοβούλια, στους δρόμους –οπουδήποτε διεισδύουν τα πλοκάμια του ρατσισμού και της μισαλλοδοξίας τους. Παράλληλα, θα πολεμήσουμε με το ίδιο σθένος το βαθύ κατεστημένο το οποίο, με τις ανόητες και βαθιά ταξικές πολιτικές οικτρής λιτότητας για τους πολλούς και άπειρης γενναιοδωρίας για τους ολιγάρχες, δημιουργεί τη θαλπωρή όπου εκκολάπτεται το αυγό του φιδιού και κερδίζει έδαφος ο ρατσισμός».

Αυτά λέγαμε την περασμένη Τετάρτη στο Μιλάνο της Ιταλίας μπροστά σε μεγάλο κοινό, ηλεκτρισμένο από πάθος και ενθουσιασμό, όπου το DiEM25 παρουσίαζε το οικονομικό, κοινωνικό και πολιτικό πρόγραμμα της «Ευρωπαϊκής Ανοιξης» – της πανευρωπαϊκής εκλογικής λίστας με την οποία θα κατέβουμε στις ευρωεκλογές και στην οποία το ΜέΡΑ25, το ελληνικό μας κόμμα, είναι ενταγμένο. Είπαμε όμως και κάποια άλλα πράγματα, λιγότερο πανηγυρικά.

Παραδεχτήκαμε, για παράδειγμα, ότι αντίθετα με τη νέα Εθνικιστική-Φασιστική Διεθνή και τους κατεστημενικούς ολιγάρχες (οι οποίοι επιτυγχάνουν εντυπωσιακή πανευρωπαϊκή συσπείρωση), εμείς –οι αυτοαποκαλούμενοι προοδευτικοί– καταφέρνουμε να είμαστε διασπασμένοι. Βρίσκουμε πολλές αιτίες να εχθρευόμαστε αλλήλους, παραμένοντας διαιρεμένοι και αγνοώντας τον έναν, ισχυρότατο, λόγο να είμαστε μαζί: Να εξαλείψουμε από το πρόσωπο των συνανθρώπων μας την αγωνία.

Να τους βοηθήσουμε να μετατρέψουν τον θυμό σε δημιουργική ανυπακοή. Να εκφράσουμε τη βουβή απόγνωση του Ελληνα άνεργου, του Ιταλού μικρομεσαίου, του Γερμανού που δεν τα βγάζει πέρα. Να αφουγκραστούμε τον βουβό καημό του μετανάστη, είτε είναι Νιγηριανός στο Γκάζι είτε Ελληνας στο Λονδίνο.

Αυτός ο σεκταρισμός μας εγγυάται την απο-πολιτικοποίηση των μεγάλων μαζών των παρατημένων πολιτών, των ανθρώπων που δεν ξέρουν αν θα έχουν δουλειά τον επόμενο μήνα, ή εκείνων των οποίων ο μισθός είναι τόσο πενιχρός που ξέρουν ότι δεν θα τα βγάλουν πέρα τον μήνα που τρέχει. Αυτοί οι άνθρωποι έχουν χορτάσει από τα ψεύτικα τα λόγια τα μεγάλα. Εχουν χάσει την πίστη στην κοινοβουλευτική διαδικασία.

Μας θεωρούν όλους φαφλατάδες που πασχίζουμε για μια βουλευτική έδρα, ένα υφυπουργείο, άντε μια θέση συμβούλου σε κάποιον κρατικοδίαιτο οργανισμό. Το έχουν ξαναδεί το έργο και έτσι συναινούν υποσυνείδητα στην αναπαραγωγή της εξουσίας του κατεστημένου ενώ, κάπου κάπου, εκφράζουν τον θυμό τους ψηφίζοντας την Εθνικιστική-Φασιστική Διεθνή.

Από την άλλη μεριά, ακόμα και να γίνει το θαύμα να υπερβούμε τον σεκταρισμό μας και να βρεθούμε όλοι ενωμένοι, δεν αρκεί (αν και θα ήταν ευχής έργον). Ο κόσμος «εκεί έξω» ζητά συγκεκριμένες, πειστικές απαντήσεις σε ερωτήματα τύπου: «Αν εκλεγείτε, τι θα κάνετε στο πρώτο Eurogroup;» «Το “κόκκινο” δάνειό μου τι θα απογίνει;» «Κι αν μας κλείσουν ξανά τις τράπεζες, πώς θα πληρωθούν οι συντάξεις μας;» «Θα πάρω αγροτική επιδότηση από την Ε.Ε., εάν εσείς τα σπάσετε με τις Βρυξέλλες;».

Αν τους απαντάμε με ευχολόγια και μπανάλ γενικότητες, στερούμενοι κοινών αλλά και απολύτως πειστικών απαντήσεων, θα μας στρέψουν την πλάτη (με το δίκιο τους). Οπερ μεθερμηνευόμενον, έχουμε ιερή υποχρέωση όχι μόνο να πετύχουμε την ενότητα όσων δεν κιότεψαν πάνω στη μάχη (όσων δεν λέκιασαν τα χέρια τους με τα μνημόνια, όπως γράφει ο Αλέκος Αλαβάνος), αλλά και να συμφωνήσουμε σ’ ένα συνολικό, ολοκληρωμένο, καινοτόμο πρόγραμμα πολιτικής.

Είναι δυνατόν κάτι τέτοιο, όταν έχουμε ουσιαστικές διαφωνίες περί σημαντικών ζητημάτων; Ναι, είναι. Το αποδείξαμε αυτό πρόσφατα όταν το DiEM25 ξεκίνησε μια τέτοια πρωτοβουλία στην οποία έως τώρα συμμετέχουν, πέραν του ΜέΡΑ25, δύο γαλλικά κόμματα, δύο γερμανικά, ένα πολωνικό, ένα δανέζικο και δύο νέες ιταλικές πολιτικές κινήσεις.

Πώς; Ξεκινήσαμε με βάση συζήτησης την πρόταση οικονομικής και κοινωνικής πολιτικής του DiEM25, τη Νέα Συμφωνία για την Ευρώπη. Αρχής γενομένης στη Νάπολη της Ιταλίας, δημιουργήσαμε μόνιμο συμβούλιο στο οποίο εκπροσωπούνται όλα τα συμμετέχοντα κόμματα, ρόλος του οποίου είναι να συντονίζει και να αναπτύσσει τον διάλογο για κάθε επί μέρους θέμα: πρόγραμμα καταπολέμησης φτώχειας, διαχείρισης του δημόσιου χρέους της ευρωζώνης, μεταναστευτική πολιτική κ.λπ.

Μέσα από εξοντωτική, καθημερινή δουλειά, με πλήρως αμοιβαίο σεβασμό και καλή τη πίστει, την περασμένη βδομάδα στο Παρίσι καταλήξαμε στην «πρώτη έκδοση» του κοινού μας, συνεκτικού, ολοκληρωμένου προγράμματος εντός μόλις τεσσάρων μηνών – με σκοπό να το θέσουμε σε διαβούλευση και εν τέλει στην κρίση των Ευρωπαίων πολιτών στις ευρωεκλογές του Μαΐου του 2019.

Κι όταν πλέον συμφωνήσουμε στις απαντήσεις που θα δώσουμε στους Ευρωπαίους οι οποίοι νιώθουν παρατημένοι από την καθεστηκυία τάξη, θα προχωρήσουμε γρήγορα τις δημοκρατικές διαδικασίες με τις οποίες θα ψηφιστεί αυτό το πρόγραμμά μας μέσα στο φθινόπωρο από όλα τα μέλη όλων των κομμάτων και κινημάτων που συμμετέχουν καθώς και στην ψήφιση του κοινού μας υποψηφίου για την προεδρία της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής. Τέλος, συμφωνήσαμε στο όνομα του κοινού μας, διεθνικού, πανευρωπαϊκού εκλογικού φορέα: «Ευρωπαϊκή Ανοιξη».

Ο κριτικά ιστάμενος αναγνώστης θα πει: «Ναι, καλή και άγια τόσο η Ευρωπαϊκή Ανοιξη όσο κι η προγραμματική σας διαδικασία σύγκλισης, αλλά από αυτή λείπει το Ευρωπαϊκό Κόμμα της Αριστεράς, οι Ποδέμος, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κόμμα των Πρασίνων, ο Ζαν-Λικ Μελανσόν». Είναι αλήθεια.

Για αυτόν τον λόγο έχουμε στείλει θερμές επιστολές προς όλους να βρεθούμε όπου και όποτε θέλουν, να κάτσουμε γύρω από ένα τραπέζι, να μιλήσουμε μέχρι τελικής πτώσεως για το κοινό πρόγραμμα που έχουμε υποχρέωση όλοι μαζί να σφυρηλατήσουμε, ανοιχτοί στις ιδέες αλλήλων και με τη ρητή δήλωση ότι στο τέλος θα ξαναθέσουμε το πρόγραμμα αυτό (πιθανώς και τις διαφωνίες μας) σε ψηφοφορία όλων των μελών όλων των κομμάτων και κινήσεων που συμμετέχουν. Το ότι κάποιοι δεν έχουν ακόμα ανταποκριθεί δεν μας πτοεί: Θα συνεχίσουμε να τους βομβαρδίζουμε με προσκλήσεις, αλληλεγγύη και συντροφικότητα – ό,τι κι αν έχουν πει και γράψει εναντίον μας.

Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα, δεν θα ήταν δυνατόν το ΜέΡΑ25 να μην επικροτήσει την πρωτοβουλία του Αλέκου Αλαβάνου για μια αντίστοιχη διαδικασία στην Ελλάδα. Είναι πολιτικά και ιστορικά αναγκαία αλλά παράλληλα, για να είναι αποτελεσματική, θα πρέπει να αντανακλά –και να διασυνδεθεί με– την πανευρωπαϊκή διαδικασία προγραμματικής σύγκλισης που έχει ήδη ξεκινήσει με εντυπωσιακά αποτελέσματα.

Γιατί πανευρωπαϊκή; Επειδή σε αυτό το πεδίο, το πανευρωπαϊκό, θριαμβεύουν τόσο η Εθνικιστική-Φασιστική Διεθνής όσο και το βαθύ κατεστημένο. Εκεί πρέπει να τους αντιμετωπίσουμε.

*γραμματέας του ΜέΡΑ25

On the EU’s battle with Italy – in conversation with Phillip Adams, on Late Night Live, ABC Radio National

 

 

 

Τα Αίτια της Ιταλικής Κρίσης – και ο λόγος που το DiEM25 ιδρύει το δικό του κόμμα στην Ιταλία – 13 Ιουνίου στο Μιλάνο

Η πολιτική κρίση στην Ιταλία ήταν αναπόφευκτη συνέπεια της αρχιτεκτονικής της ευρωζώνης και της αποτελμάτωσης που αυτή προκάλεσε. Ο μέσος Ιταλός είναι σήμερα φτωχότερος απ’ ό,τι είκοσι χρόνια πριν, ενώ την τελευταία δεκαετία η διαφορά στο κατά κεφαλήν εισόδημα για τον μέσο Ιταλό από τον μέσο Γερμανό εκτοξεύτηκε από 12% σε 32%. Παράλληλα, για πρώτη φορά από τον 19ο αιώνα, τον μέσο Ιταλό ξεπέρασε σε κατά κεφαλήν εισόδημα ακόμα και ο μέσος Ισπανός, παρά το γεγονός ότι και η Ισπανία βρίσκεται εγκλωβισμένη στην ίδια οικονομική κρίση. Με άλλα λόγια, οι μεγάλες μάζες του ιταλικού λαού νιώθουν να βουλιάζουν αέναα σ’ ένα τέλμα.

Αυτή η ζοφερή αίσθηση ίσως να μην αρκούσε για να γεννήσει τον θυμό εναντίον του ιταλικού και του ευρωπαϊκού κατεστημένου που έφερε την κατάρρευση του λεγόμενου πολιτικού Κέντρου (Ρέντσι, Μπερλουσκόνι) και την απόλυτη πλειοψηφία στη Βουλή των ευρωσκεπτικιστών και ασυγκράτητα ξενοφοβικών κομμάτων 5S και Λέγκας (με ηγέτες τους Ντι Μάιο και Σαλβίνι αντίστοιχα).

Εκείνο που εξοργίζει τον μέσο Ιταλό ψηφοφόρο τόσο ώστε να στρέψει την πλάτη του στα συστημικά κόμματα της Κεντρο-αριστερο-δεξιάς είναι η αίσθηση ότι αυτή η τύχη δεν αξίζει στην Ιταλία. Αν σκύψουμε πάνω από τα δεδομένα της ιταλικής οικονομίας, θα δούμε ότι αυτή η αίσθηση είναι δικαιολογημένη.

Αντίθετα με τη Γαλλία ή τη Βρετανία, η Ιταλία είναι μια πετυχημένη εξαγωγική χώρα με μόνιμο, σταθερό, σημαντικό εμπορικό πλεόνασμα.

Παράλληλα, και παρά τις σπατάλες και τη διαφθορά του ιταλικού κράτους, η κυβέρνηση παρουσιάζει εδώ και χρόνια πρωτογενές πλεόνασμα στον προϋπολογισμό της.

Τέλος, το συνολικό χρέος της Ιταλίας (δημόσιο συν ιδιωτικό) είναι μικρότερο εκείνου της Βρετανίας, της Γαλλίας, της Ισπανίας, της Ιρλανδίας κ.λπ. Δεν είναι λοιπόν φυσιολογικό, με αυτά τα δεδομένα, οι Ιταλοί πολίτες να εξανίστανται βλέποντας το βιοτικό τους επίπεδο να βουλιάζει και ακούγοντας τον Γερμανό επίτροπο Ετινγκερ να τους λέει, κουνώντας το δάκτυλο, ότι «οι αγορές θα μάθουν στους Ιταλούς πώς να ψηφίζουν»;

Το ερώτημα βέβαια τίθεται: Πώς εξηγείται η αποτελμάτωση της Ιταλίας παρά τα πιο πάνω δεδομένα τα οποία θα έπρεπε να κάνουν τη χώρα, αν όχι να «πετάει», τουλάχιστον να μη βρίσκεται στο σημερινό τέλμα;

Η απάντηση είναι απλή και μία: Ο λόγος είναι η συγκεκριμένη, σαθρή δόμηση της ευρωζώνης. Γιατί; Λόγω των ιδιαιτεροτήτων της ιταλικής οικονομίας που την καθιστούν μη βιώσιμη υπό τους κανόνες που ισχύουν σήμερα, οι οποίοι είναι κομμένοι και ραμμένοι για άλλου είδους οικονομίες – και τους οποίους κανόνες το Βερολίνο αρνείται πεισματικά να συζητήσει.

Από μια άποψη η ιταλική οικονομία δεν μοιάζει με καμία άλλη χώρα της ευρωζώνης. Για την ακρίβεια, η πιο κοντινή στην Ιταλία αναπτυγμένη χώρα είναι η Ιαπωνία: χώρα εξαγωγική, βιομηχανική, με μικρό ιδιωτικό χρέος και με τράπεζες που λόγω αλόγιστων ανοιγμάτων στο παρελθόν είναι πλέον νεκροζώντανες, ζόμπι, με αποτέλεσμα να μη δύνανται να δανείσουν τον ιδιωτικό τομέα.

Στην Ιαπωνία η κρίση δεν έγινε καταστροφική, δεν έδωσε έναυσμα στην πολιτική και ηθική κατάρρευση που παρατηρούμε σήμερα στην Ιταλία, επειδή το κράτος ανέλαβε να κάνει αυτό που δεν μπορούν να κάνουν οι τράπεζες-ζόμπι: να δανείζει!

Τόσο η ιαπωνική κυβέρνηση, μέσω μεγάλων δημοσιονομικών ελλειμμάτων, όσο και η κεντρική τράπεζα, μέσα από τη λεγόμενη «ποσοτική χαλάρωση» (την οποία, παρεμπιπτόντως, πρώτη εφηύρε η Κεντρική Τράπεζα της Ιαπωνίας), παρέχουν εδώ και είκοσι χρόνια στον ιδιωτικό τομέα τα χρήματα που απαιτούνται για επενδύσεις και μετακύληση ιδιωτικού, επιχειρηματικού χρέους.

Κάνουν, δηλαδή, ακριβώς αυτό που δεν επιτρέπουν οι κανόνες της ευρωζώνης να κάνουν οι ιταλικές αρχές. Εξ ου και η αποτελμάτωση.

Υπό αυτές τις συνθήκες, βρίσκεται σε εξέλιξη ο φαύλος κύκλος που περιγράψαμε με λεπτομέρειες τότε που, τον Φλεβάρη του 2016, ιδρύαμε το DiEM25 μας στο Βερολίνο. Στο Μανιφέστο μας γράφαμε:

*Η καταστολή που εφαρμόστηκε δοκιμαστικά στην Ελλάδα το 2015 ενισχύει τον φαύλο κύκλο αυταρχισμού-κρίσης: Οσο πιο πολύ πνίγουν τη δημοκρατία στα κράτη-μέλη, τόσο η Ευρώπη χάνει τη νομιμοποίησή της στα μάτια των Ευρωπαίων, τόσο ενισχύεται η οικονομική αποτελμάτωση, τόσο μεγαλύτερη δόση αυταρχισμού χρειάζεται το βαθύ κατεστημένο για να συνεχίζει να επιβάλλει τις αποτυχημένες πολιτικές λιτότητας, τόσο περισσότερο ενισχύεται η οικονομική αποτελμάτωση… και ούτω καθ’ εξής…

Απελπισμένοι και παρακινημένοι πότε από την κατάθλιψη και πότε από την οργή, οι λαοί της Ευρώπης καταφεύγουν όλο και περισσότερο στη «λύση» της διάλυσης.

Το Brexit του Ιουνίου του 2016 δεν ήταν παρά η αρχή. Η άνοδος μιας νέας Εθνικιστικής Διεθνούς, που ενισχύεται από τον αναποτελεσματικό αυταρχισμό του βαθέος ευρωπαϊκού κατεστημένου, αποτελεί τον μεγαλύτερο κίνδυνο.

Κατεστημένο και ξενοφοβική Δεξιά ωθούν την Ευρώπη στον εγκλωβισμό στο τοξικό δίλημμα μεταξύ της υποταγής στην αυταρχική ανοησία των Βρυξελλών και της «λύσης» των κλειστών συνόρων που διαχωρίζουν κράτη-φρούρια-φυλακές.

Το DiEM25 δημιουργήθηκε από Ευρωπαίους δημοκράτες που απορρίπτουν αυτό το «δίλημμα».

Επειδή, δυστυχώς, οι προβλέψεις αυτές επιβεβαιώθηκαν και επειδή οι υπάρχουσες πολιτικές δυνάμεις στην Ιταλία, όπως και στην Ελλάδα, δεν αντιδρούν με τη δημιουργία του ριζοσπαστικού, ευρωπαϊκού μετώπου ανυπακοής στο τοξικό αυτό δίλημμα (κατεστημένου-εθνικισμού), εμείς κάνουμε στις 13 Ιουνίου –στο Μιλάνο– αυτό που κάναμε και στην Αθήνα πρόσφατα: όπως ιδρύσαμε το νέο μας ελληνικό κόμμα την 26η Μαρτίου, το ΜέΡΑ25, στις 13 Ιουνίου ιδρύουμε το νέο κόμμα του DiEM25 στο Μιλάνο.

Στόχος μας; Να σπάσει το δόγμα ότι δεν υπάρχει προοδευτική, ευρωπαϊστική εναλλακτική στις προσταγές του κατεστημένου στην Ιταλία – στη χώρα που μετατρέπεται στο βασικό μέτωπο για τη δημοκρατία και τον ανθρωπισμό στην Ευρώπη.

*γραμματέας ΜέΡΑ25

Interviewed by Vanity Fair Italia on the new 5S-Lega government – Read the original Q&A in English

Vanity Fair’s interviewed me on the new Italian government (see here). The complete, original Q&A follows below:

So, Italy has finally a government. New Premier is Giuseppe Conte, a technician who was never elected. Do you think this is acceptable? 

The new government has the consent of the majority of parliament. So, it is legitimate. My regret is that the Left has failed to garner enough electoral support to put in place a progressive alternative to xenophobic populism.

Would you call it the “government of change” (like Di Maio name it)? Or it’s just the same politics but with other slogans? 

It would be a mistake to assume that this government will mimic the previous ones by changing nothing. Donald Trump has proven that rightwing xenophobic governments can change much. What is not clear, to say the least, is whether this is change for good or for bad.

Paolo Savona has been “transferred” to another ministry (European policies). Do you approve the choice? 

The question is not who gets what office but what gets done. Will the Tria-Savona duo manage to put forward constructive proposals to the Eurogroup and back them up with a credible disobedience strategy when Berlin says no? This is the real question.

Would he been “dangerous” for the Italy at the ministry of finance? 

Not more dangerous for Italy than the policies that are being pursued since 2009…

Many observers defined the new government (the program and the ministers) just a confused mix of left and right wing. Like a minestrone. Do you agree? 

I would liken it to something Dr Frankenstein might have created, putting into one body the parts of several dead agendas: The Presidential ministers, that will continue business as usual, the Xenophobes, like Salvini, who promote racism as the solution, the ‘flat’ tax nonsense of American neoliberals, and a standard guaranteed minimum income which is being sold, fraudulently, as a ‘universal basic income’.

This morning, Repubblica first page was: “Populists at the government”. Do you agree? Does Italy has populists at the government now? 

It does. But it also has populists like Renzi and D’ Alema in the opposition – figures of a pseudo-left who have for years practised what I refer to as Establishment-Populism: promises to everyone that, as long as the Establishment’s playbook is adhered to, everyone will be better off

From 0 to 10, according to you how probable is the Italexit? 

If the current policies and stasis remain, 10. If the eurozone is reformed 0.

Today, would you invest in Italian bonds? Or would you prefer german Bund? 

I would invest in neither. Europe is not the place for patient, non-speculative investment because it is being run by speculative short-termists.

Could you give me a definition (a phrase, an image, an anecdote or an adjective) for these men?

– Luigi Di Maio (New Deputy Prime Minister)

Heterologous

– Giuseppe Conte (New Prime Minister)

Figurehead

– Sergio Mattarella (President of Italian Republic)

Salvini’s unconscious helper

– Matteo Salvini  (New Deputy Prime Minister)

Xenophobe-in-Chief and Italy’s next Prime Minister

– Paolo Savona (New Minister EU Policies)

The Fall Guy

–  Giovanni Tria (New Minister of Finance) 

The Great Unknown

Interviewed by Il Fatto Quotidiano on developments in Italy, Europe and Greece. Here is the original Q&A in English

Italian daily Il Fatto Quotidiano interviewed me (see here) regarding the latest developments in Italy, Europe and Greece. The original Q&A (in English) follows:

Greece is about to exit from the notorious memorandum, the austerity plan signed with the troika. Public finance has improved at a high price for the population as we all know.

I fear you have been misinformed. The only thing that runs out this year is the loans from the troika. The austerity will get harsher and Greece will to deeper and deeper into its debt bondage until… 2060.

Do you believe that your country would be better off if it had left the Eurozone? 

What I know is that we should not have accepted the 3rd bailout and the new austerity conditions it came with in 2015. And if the troika wanted to throw us out of the euro for doing the right thing, it would be regrettable and painful but, by now, Greece would indeed be much better off.

You told that you were attacked by the EU institutions when you asked for a debt restructuring and a reform of EU rules. Could you tell us how did the institution reacted to your requests and how they managed to break Tsipras initial beliefs?

They pretended they did not hear, use the European Central Bank to asphyxiate the banking system and the state and, in parallel, made promises to Tsipras that they would treat him well if he surrendered – promises that they never meant to keep and which they did not keep.

In the summer of 2015, before the referendum, you had in fact a plan for the Grexit, prepared – you said – in agreement with  Prime minister Tsipras. But you state that even ECB, German finance ministry and Italian current minister, Pier Carlo Padoan, have one. What do you know about this last one?  

I have seen no details. But I do know the European Central Bank, the Bank of Italy and various Italian governments do have a plan of how to respond to a crisis that, overnight, freezes Italy out of the euro. Let me put it differently: It would be criminally negligent not to have such as plan. It would be akin to the Ministry of Defence not having a plan for what to do if Italy were to be attacked by an enemy.

How does the Greek debt crisis of 2015 compare, in your opinion, with the current Italian situation?

There are important similarities and important differences. Both are countries are caught up in a conundrum: we are far worse off due to the euro but at the same time a euro exit would be very, very painful. It is as if we are in a burning house without exits. Another similarity is that both our countries are constantly under threat from Berlin and Frankfurt that, if we do not do as we are told, our ATMs will stop functioning and people will lose their deposits – while, at the same time, if we do as we are told, our societies will stagnate. Turning to the main difference, in 2015 our government did not want Grexit whereas any 5S-Lega government would welcome a financial crisis that forces Italy out of the euro. And given Italy’s size, that would mean the end of the euro.

Do you see a parallel between Tsipras’ decision to sign the memorandum and go to new elections and president Mattarella choice to prevent the formation of a Five Star-League government because of his disapproval of the finance minister designate? 

Tsipras called the referendum in order to lose it and, thus, justify his surrender to the troika. Mattarella operated on behalf of the troika.

You wrote that President Mattarella made “a major tactical blunder”, “fell right into Salvini’s trap” and made a “fantastic gift to Salvini’s party”. Which consequences do you predict with regard to the Italian’s attitude towards the EU and the euro? 

The continuation, and possible acceleration, of the steady loss of trust in European institutions amongst the Italian public.

With the second debt/gdp ratio after Greece, Italy is actually very dependent on the market in order to refinance that debt. Isn’t it inevitable for the markets to react badly to the leak about a plan for “Italexit”? 

Italy is heavily dependent on the markets but, at the same time, the markets are heavily dependent on Italy! If Italy defaults countless very rich people will lose a great deal of money. In this sense, it is time both for the Italian government and the markets to grow up and to face up to the simple reality that everyone must have contingency plans while, at the same time, designing and implementing the reforms to the eurozone that would allow a country like Italy to stay in the euro without suffocating –  the very reforms that Berlin is vetoing.

Italy has also a huge imbalance in the Target 2 system, 442 billion euros. Would an exit mean that we should repay that amount?

Of course not. These are accounting figures that make sense only within the eurozone. If they eurozone dies these figures evaporate into thin air.

Do you believe that Italy should anyway leave the Eurozone?

No, I don’t. But nor do I think that Italy can/should stay in the eurozone under rules that condemn the median Italian citizen to permanent stagnation.

What about the consequences, indeed: devaluation of the new currency, fall of households income (to make the devaluation work, the wages shouldn’t rise), redenomination of mortgages and bank loans. Do you believe that some countries should prefer these outcomes to a “memorandum” imposed by EU institutions? 

Yes, Italexit would be painful and have dire consequences. It would be a terrible short, sharp, shock. But, at the same time, staying in the euro as things are, and with Berlin’s point-blanc refusal to reform the euro, Italians are facing a slow death by a million small, individually insignificant, cuts. This is why we shall be announcing on 13th June in Milano that DiEM25 Italia will be contesting the next elections in Italy, national and European: To propose an alternative to stagnation within the euro and Italexit.

Your movement, DiEM25, has put forward an European New Deal which provides, among the other proposals, to “save the Eurozone by ending self-defeating austerity and minimising the cost of its disintegration in case of its occurence”. What does it mean in practice? 

It means the redeployment of the European Investment Bank, the European Central Bank, and the European Stability Mechanism, within the letter of their existing rules and charters, in order to deal simultaneously with the public debt crisis, the banking crisis, the crisis caused by under-investment and, finally, the rise of poverty all over Europe.

Live at ‘Politics and Prose’, Washington DC

Yanis Varoufakis discusses his books, Adults in the Room and Talking to my Daughter About the Economy, at Politics and Prose on 10th May 2018

In his eye-opening memoir, Adults in the Room, Varoufakis, Greece’s former Finance Minister, recounts his frustrating struggle to resolve Greece’s debt crisis without resorting to austerity measures. His book give us a valuable inside look at discussions with officials of the European Union and International Monetary Fund as well as with policy makers in Washington and other capitals. Founder of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025, an international grassroots organization dedicated to restoring democracy to Europe, Varoufakis as a father is all too aware of the legacy today’s fraught economic policies will leave to the next generation. Couched as a series of fatherly letters, Talking to My Daughter about the Economy is an accessible primer on the history, elements, ideals, and problems of economics, including issues of inequality, climate change, and the chronic risk of global instability.

More more, click here and here

‘Politics and Prose Bookstore’ is Washington, D.C.’s leading independent bookshop, founded by Carla Cohen and Barbara Meade in 1984

The terrible prophesies of Brexit – op-ed in literary magazine FIVE DIALS

Brexit rode to victory on the coat-tails of a type of discontent whose power sprang from its insuperable reluctance to specify its nature. Seemingly focused on a foreign power centre that British voters saw (with some justification) as the usurper of their democratic rights, its real focal point was nebulous and imprecise enough to encompass a potent mix of grievances.
The unifying force behind the variety of real grievances motivating the Leavers was the shared feeling, particularly in England, of a people who had been treated for too long like livestock that had lost its market value.
With every Treasury or Bank of England prognosis of Brexit’s disastrous impact on GDP, the pound, share prices, etc., many who felt (perhaps wrongly) that they had little left to lose could not wait for these terrible prophecies to materialize – assuming, as they did, that the predicted horrors would afflict an establishment who had it coming. ‘Let’s see their GDP go south like mine,’ was how one such soul expressed it to me during the pre-referendum campaign.
Precisely because the discontent that motivated Brexit was so ill-defined, its victory at the polls has failed to bring lasting joy to the winning side. News reports on the negotiations with Brussels infuriate a majority of Leavers who can’t care less about the legalities and economic minutiae, since these were never the issue.
The nearest a majority of Leavers get to feeling good these days is when they hear establishment figures lament the gigantic costs of Brexit upon the communities that voted heavily to leave the EU: it makes them secretly crave precisely such a painful, costly, disastrous hard Brexit. Why? Because they see in it a splendid opportunity to revive the spirit of the Blitz in communities in desperate need for something like it.
Against this psychological backdrop, the worst possible outcome is not a run on the pound, further stagnation in productivity, a loss of GDP growth, or the emigration of Nissan from Newcastle or some bankers from the City of London.
No, my great fear is that the new, almost impenetrable division that the Brexit debate brought to (mainly) England will become permanent.That it will be perpetually underpinned by the nebulous, self-reinforcing discontent we first saw in 2016. That, in 2020, the most regressive parts of the British establishment will be stronger and more in control than ever. And that their triumph will, in a never-ending loop of mutual buttressing, prevent a genuine revolt by the good people who had good cause to feel like livestock whose market value had crashed.

For the FIVE DIALS’ site, click here.

Η Ιταλική κρίση ως αντανάκλαση του οικονομικού & πολιτικού αδιέξοδου της ευρωζώνης. Κι οι επιπτώσεις επί της Χρεοδουλοπαροικίας μας – Συνέντευξη στον Real fm με τον Ν. Χατζηνικολάου

With his choice of prime minister, Italy’s president has gifted the far right – THE GUARDIAN

Italy should be doing well. Unlike Britain, it exports considerably more to the rest of the world than it imports, while its government spends less(excluding interest payments) than the taxes it receives. And yet Italy is stagnating, its population in a state of revolt following two lost decades.

While it is true that Italy is in serious need of reforms, those who blame the stagnation on domestic inefficiencies and corruption must explain why Italy grew so fast throughout the postwar period until it entered the eurozone. Was its government and polity more efficient and virtuous in the 1970s and 1980s? Hardly.

The singular reason for Italy’s woes is its membership of a terribly designed monetary union, the eurozone, in which the Italian economy cannot breathe and which consecutive German governments refuse to reform.

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Italian president names interim prime minister until fresh elections

 In 2015 the Greek people elected a progressive, Europeanist government with a mandate to demand a new deal within the eurozone. In the space of six months, under the guidance of the German government, the European Union and its central bank crushed us. A few months later, I was asked by the Italian daily newspaper Corriere della Sera if I thought European democracy was at risk. I answered: “Greece surrendered but it was Europe’s democracy that was mortally wounded. Unless Europeans realise that their economy is run by unelected and unaccountable pseudo-technocrats, committing one gross error after another, our democracy will remain a figment of our collective imagination.”

Since then, the pro-establishment government of Italy’s Democratic party implemented, one after the other, the policies that the unelected bureaucrats of the EU demanded. The result was more stagnation. And so, in March, a national election delivered an absolute parliamentary majority to two anti-establishment parties which, despite their differences, shared doubts about Italy’s eurozone membership and a hostility to migrants. It was the bitter harvest of absent prospects and withering hope.

After a few weeks of the kind of  common in countries like Italy and Germany, the Five Star Movement and League leaders Luigi Di Maio and Matteo Salvini struck a deal to form a government. Alas, President Sergio Mattarella used the powers bestowed upon him by the Italian constitution to prevent the formation of that government and, instead, , a former IMF employee who stands no chance of a vote of confidence in parliament.

Had Mattarella refused Salvini the post of interior minister, outraged by his promise to expel 500,000 migrants from Italy, I would be compelled to support him. But, no, the president had no such qualms. Not even for a moment did he consider vetoing the idea of a European country deploying its security forces to round up hundreds of thousands of people, cage them, and force them into trains, buses and ferries before sending them goodness knows where.

No, Mattarella chose to clash with an absolute majority of lawmakers for another reason: his disapproval of the finance minister designate. Why? Because the said gentleman, while fully qualified for the job, and despite his declaration that he would abide by the EU’s rules, had in the past expressed doubts about the eurozone’s architecture and has favoured a plan of EU exit just in case it was needed. It was as if Mattarella declared that reasonableness from a prospective finance minister constitutes grounds for his or her exclusion from the post.

Beyond his moral failure, the president has made a major tactical blunder

What is so striking is that there is no thinking economist anywhere in the world who does not share concern about the eurozone’s faulty architecture. No prudent finance minister would neglect to develop a plan for euro exit. Indeed, I have it on good authority that the German finance ministry, the European Central Bank and every major bank and corporation have plans in place for the possible exit from the eurozone of Italy, even of Germany. Is Mattarella telling us that the Italian finance minister is banned from thinking of such a plan?

Beyond his moral failure to oppose the League’s industrial-scale misanthropy, the president has made a major tactical blunder: he fell right into Salvini’s trap. The formation of another “technical” government, under a former IMF apparatchik, is a fantastic gift to Salvini’s party.

Salvini is secretly salivating at the thought of another election – one that he will fight not as the misanthropic, divisive populist that he is, but as the defender of democracy against the Deep Establishment. He has already scaled the moral high ground with the stirring words: “Italy is not a colony, we are not slaves of the Germans, the French, the spread or finance.”

If Mattarella takes solace from the fact that previous Italian presidents managed to put in place technical governments that did the establishment’s job (so “successfully” that the country’s political centre imploded), he is very badly mistaken. This time around he, unlike his predecessors, has no parliamentary majority to pass a budget or indeed to lend his chosen government a vote of confidence. Thus, the president is forced to call fresh elections that, courtesy of his moral drift and tactical blunder, will return an even stronger majority for Italy’s xenophobic political forces, possibly in alliance with the enfeebled Forza Italia of Silvio Berlusconi.

And then what, President Mattarella?

Yanis Varoufakis is the co-founder of DiEM25 (Democracy in EuropeMovement). He is also the former finance minister of Greece

Click here for the Guardian’s site

Complete text of my interview with Corriere Della Sera’s Aldo Cazzullo (in English)

Corriere Della Sera, the Italian daily, published today an interview that I gave to Aldo Cazzullo. For the published version (in Italian of course), you can visit the paper’s site here. However, the published text is a heavily reduced version of the exchange between Mr Cazzullo and myself. For those interested in the full exchange, see below. (Nb. the exchange took place in English)

Dear Professor let us start from the beginning? Why did you decide to resign after OXI’s victory in the Greek referendum?

Because that very night, when I spoke to Prime Minister Tsipras, he declared his readiness to turn the NO, our people’s majestic 62% OXI vote, into a YES. Staying would have meant endorsing the overthrowing of a people by its… government.

Did you know or did you expect that Tsipras would accept an even harder austerity plan than the one rejected by the Greek people?

Of course. The troika were not interested in policies that worked for Greece or for Europe. Indeed, they were not even very interested in getting their money back – for if they did care about their money, they would have accepted the moderate proposals I put to them which would have generated more income, more taxes and, ultimately, more repayments to our creditors. No, they were only interested in one thing: Crushing the Greek Spring and humiliating Tsipras so as to signal to the peoples of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and, ultimately, France that they will suffer if they dare vote for governments that do not obey Berlin and Frankfurt. Tsipras’ humiliation via brutal new austerity was the priority. Our priority ought to have been to honour that NO.

What are your relations with Tsipras today? What are you predictions about the next Greek elections?

My relation with Tsipras is non-existent for a simple reason: We have nothing to talk about! In order for him to continue to do what he does he needs to tell himelf a story that he knows I know that he knows to be… untrue!

As for the election results, it is too early to tell. Syriza and New Democracy are struggling to convince the people that each of them will be better at implementing measures that everyone knows will fail. This causes widespread despondency and apathy, boosting abstention and the de-legitimation of politics. Our new party, MeRA25, will do well, I hope, as long as the voters learn about us; as long as we manage to break down the complete media silence about us and the total exclusion of our representatives from TV and radio stations. As we say, our only opponent is the… couch which keeps disappointed but politicised, progressive people from going to the polling stations on election day.

What’s your political project today?

Across Europe, it is to turn the May 2019 European Parliament elections into a transnational campaign against both the Deep Establishment’s business-as-usual and the nationalists’ false promises. To this effect, our Democracy in Europe Movement, DiEM25, has inaugurated, together with other political forces across Europe, including of course in Italy, a transnational progressive list, #EuropeanSpring, with which to succeed in putting forward a progressive, hopeful, ambitious, credible alternative.

As for Greece, my project is to help turn MeRA25, DiEM25’s new political party, into an instrument by which to end Greece’s Great Depression.

The Other Europe with Tsipras list gathered 4%of votes during last elections. How much would a Varoufakis list score?

There will be no Varoufakis list! The time for ‘saviours’ and persona-led parties is well and truly over. I am happy to be one of the many co-founders of DiEM25 and of our #EuropeanSpring. And I am proud of being part of Europe’s first transnational political party aiming to save all our countries from the false dilemma between the troika or exit, between pro-Europe and anti-Europe, between an authoritarian establishment and an authoritarian anti-European nationalism.

Which ones are your interlocutors and allies in Italy? What do you think about Liberi e Uguali the party of  Mr D’Alema and Vendola?

The reason we formed DiEM25 in the first place was the diagnosis that old wine in new bottles will not help revive the spirits of progressives in Italy or in the rest of Europe. The performance of parties like Liberi e Uguali in Italy, the social democrats and the Left in Germany, and other such parties elsewhere confirmed this.

So, our main interlocutors are our members, the activists of DiEM25 Italia who, recently, held twenty regional constituency meetings to construct a national political structure involving 10,000 citizens and, with this structure, to join in our transnational #EuropeanSpring movement. Rather than indulging the old school of politics, we refuse to enter into negotiations with politicians with a view to divide positions and share offices. Instead, we are concentrating on cultivating a new school of politics which concentrates on talking only about policy proposals and ideas of what must be done. In this context, we place a great deal of emphasis of local government, municipalist movements & solutions. It is in this context that we are working, for example, with Napoli Mayor Luigi de Magistris in constructing our transnational #EuropeanSpring

Having established that Italy, and the rest of Europe, needs a new political movement along the lines of DiEM25, we have made the courageous decision to contest the national and, of course, the European Parliament elections in Italy. Our members are currently debating the final details and the manner in which we shall construct as broad a coalition as possible against both the incompetent establishment and the xenophobic nationalists. On 13th June we shall be announcing our decisions in Milano.

Many things happened in Italy in the last hours. Do you regret that a Lega-5S government was not born?

I regret that President Mattarella had no problem with Salvini being Interior Minister given his promise to throw half a million migrants out of the country
I regret that not even for a moment did he consider vetoing the idea of a European country deploying its security forces to round up hundreds of thousands of people, cage them, and force them into trains, buses and ferries before sending them goodness knows where
I regret that Matteo Renzi missed his opportunity to insist that Berlin accepts a policy re-think that would make our countries sustainable within the eurozone – thus putting Salvini and de Maio in the driving seat
Finally, I regret that President Mattarella’s only concern was to block the appointment of a finance minister that voiced reasonable concerns about the euro’s architecture (concerns that all decent economists have, even ones supporting the euro vehemently) and who believed that Italy should have a plan for exiting the euro just in case it is needed (a plan that everyone has, including the ECB, the German government, every major bank etc.)

Could the two populism get together against the Brussels and Berlin elite?

You are asking someone who sees populism as a clear and present threat to democracy and to the prosperity for the many. There is a profound difference between being popular and being populist. Populists exploit fear and anger to garner power in order to use it against the majority. If Brussels and Berlin lose to populism, we all lose. This is why DiEM25 is so keen to create a democratic, Europeanist alternative to both (A) the authoritarian incompetence of Berlin-Brussels, and (B) to the xenophobic populists.

Do you know Mr Salvini and if yes what do you think about him?

No, I have never met him.

You said that the 5 stars movement is not a left party. What are they then? Could they still be considered an anti-system movement?

They began as an anti-system movement combining some ideas that would benefit the common people with increasingly xenophobic views. They are appealing to Italians who are being held back by corruption and by austerity – and who, wrongly, turn against the foreigners, the ‘others’. Having said that, I am convinced that 5S has risen high only because the Left has failed so spectacularly.

Does still make sense to distinguish between a political left and right? Or if the new division is among the people and the elite, those on top or those at the bottom, between globalist and nationalist? (sovereign-ist)

As long as we live under capitalism, the Left-Right divide will be pertinent and inescapable. As long as there is a distinction between those work but do not own the company and those who own the company (or parts of it) without working in it, the tug of war between capital and labour, profit and wages will be central in determining social outcomes. And so will the Left-Right distinction. But, having said that, there are moments in history, like the 1930s and the post-2008 period, when the crisis of capitalism is so deep, and democracy so much under treat, that room is created for a minimum common program between anti-systemic liberals, Marxists, ecologists, even progressive conservatives. This is why we say that, while I and many of my DiEM25 colleagues are unapologetic left-wingers, DiEM25 is more than a left-wing movement. It is rather the meeting place of democrats eager to find an alternative both to the inane establishment and to the nationalists.

President Mattarella has rejected Professor Savona as minister of finance because he is supposedly anti-German. Does a sort of German arrogance exist? Do the German pretend to dictate rules to other UE countries?

The problem with the German elites is that they are refusing to be hegemonic and, thus, end up being authoritarian. The German political class continues to behave as if Germany is a small open economy whose net exports are only due to the skill and hard work of their engineers and whose surpluses are well earned. They deny the macroeconomic effects of their policies upon their partners and insist, puzzlingly, on celebrating their surpluses while admonishing others for having… deficits. In the end, German savers are forced by the laws of economics to entrust their savings to foreigners whom they end up despising for being indebted to them. Free riding comes in two varieties: (1) Wanting to live off other people’s money. And, (2) Wanting to benefit from the low exchange rate that other people’s moneylessness causes. It is clear that no Union can survive in this manner. Unfortunately, there seems to be no likelihood of a change in Berlin now that the new social democratic finance minister has proven more austere and less imaginative than even Dr Wolfgang Schauble was.

While presenting Professor Savona, the Bild wrote he is the new Varoufakis. Are they wrong?

Of course. The profound difference is that I was desperate to keep Greece in the euro sustainably, which required that I clash with the troika whose policies (and refusal of the necessary debt restructure within the euro) were making this impossible. In contrast, existing the euro is the not-so-secret dream of the Lega (the party behind the choice of Mr Savona).

You know the US very well. What do you think about Trump and his ideologist Bannon who was in Italy last March 4 and who is supporting a national ( sovraninist) government?

Mr Bannon is, undoubtedly, an ultra-dangerous belligerent who wants catastrophic regime change (Libya and Iraq style) in countries where, if he succeeds, developments will turn the world into an even more treacherous place than it already is, with many more millions of refugees flooding our shores. Mr Trump, on the other hand, is trying to control the diminution of American power through a process of economic shock-and-awe that stuns Germany and China into submission. The combination of his scandalous corporate tax cuts, the new tariffs, and his pulling out of the Iran deal are part of this overarching program. However, I have little doubt that, if he succeeds, the result will be a new global recession that, ultimately, undermines American interests as well.

Has Angela Merkel come to a political end? Who’s coming next?

Yes. Mrs Merkel is now an enfeebled Chancellor, totally at the mercy of those in her party that are already plotting her replacement. Of course, she is totally to blame, having squandered enormous political power since 2010 that she could have used to unite Europe, rather than divide it via the awful policy mix of universal austerity for the many and socialism for the bankers. Sadly, her successor, whomever it is, will make us feel nostalgic for Mrs Merkel – just like Mr Scholz managed to make me miss Dr Schauble!

What about Renzi?

He wasted his many opportunities to make a positive difference. I shall mention two: First, the opportunity to go to Brussels to demand, as the Prime Minister of the 3rd largest eurozone country, that the EU considers changes to the eurozone rules that would make our countries sustainable within the euro area. He chose, instead, to demand Italy’s right to bend the existing rules – thus looking in German eyes like a spoilt child. Secondly, in June/July 2015 he had an opportunity to defend the then Greek government’s arguments in favour of an immediate debt restructure and a humane fiscal policy. Instead of helping Europe demonstrate that it could be a decent place for deficit countries like ours, he aided Merkel to throttle Tsipras and push him into capitulating. On the day of that capitulation, he celebrated that “they” had gotten “rid of Varoufakis”. The road toward his own downfall was thus paved.

What do you think about the Italian left? the PD is devided amoung the followers of Renzi willing to a position the party on the political centre, and the post-communist pushing more on the left

Very little, sadly. Unfortunately, my friends on the Italian Left still believe that they can stitch together a coalition without a clear, European-wide agenda, forgetting that the whole they are constructing is even less than the sum of the parts. I wish this were not so, so that we could support them. But it is so and this is why DiEM25 has made the momentous decision to contest elections in Italy: because we need a progressive movement that ushers in a new school of principled politics.

Is Corbyn a good model for revamping the European left?

Jeremy Corbyn has already made a gigantic contribution to the quality of politics in Europe, and not just left-wing politics. He has shown that it is possible to activate politically millions of disenfranchised young people that the establishment traditionally dismisses as apolitical, Generation Y etc. And he has proven that a principled position can cut through the walls erected in our way by systemic media doing the job of an authoritarian oligarchy. Having said that, we must not forget that the UK is quite different to our continental countries – which means that, while we must learn from Jeremy, we can’t just copy his techniques. We need our own strategy which, in the case of Europe, must be transnational – like the one DiEM25 has been putting together since February 2016.

What do you think about Macron?

I have spoken a great deal about the French President, praising his solidarity to me personally in 2015 and explaining that he understands that the present architecture of the eurozone is unsustainable. On the other hand, I also said that, ever since he rose to the Presidency, he has adopted legislation that is socially regressive (e.g. cutting taxes on the rich while diminishing the incomes of weaker citizens), awfully authoritarian (e.g. he made permanent security legislation that clashes with civil liberties) and self-defeating. He also put forward proposals about eurozone reform which, while in the right direction, were too lukewarm. Worse still, he did not back them up with any credible threat to Berlin – which led Mrs Merkel and the German establishment to bury them. The result is that, given France’s inability to flourish in the present architecture of the eurozone, Mr Macron is a spent force. He looks and sounds good but his capacity to make a difference has been wasted and will, from now on, lose his authority little by little.

What about Podemos in Spain, discussing about Pablo Iglesias new villa in these days?

Podemos blew fresh wind into the progressive side of politics when it managed to give voice to the Indignados. My concern is not the new villa that Pablo and his partner have purchased. Even though I understand the reactions against this purchase, the notion that those speaking for the dispossessed must be themselves dispossessed is not one that I can adopt. No, my concern is Podemos’ reluctance to articulate a coherent economic and social policy framework that answers to specific questions such as: “If elected, what will you do in the Eurogroup? What is your policy on non-performing bank loans and how will you implement it against resistance from the ECB?” Without such a policy framework, progressive movements like Podemos can never win elections. This is why at DiEM25 we are putting so much emphasis in presenting a rational, comprehensive policy agenda that answers all these burning questions.

What do you think about a potential Cottarelli government?

First, let me say that this is not a personal matter. I know Carlo Cottarelli from his days at the IMF, I worked with him in 2015, and I hold him in some personal esteem. His problem is that, unlike Mario Monti, he cannot count on anything like a parliamentary majority. His will be a stopgap, caretaker government that will hold the ‘fort’ until a new election strengthens the ultra-right further, to the detriment of migrants, progressive Italians and our common goal to turn Europe into as realm of shared prosperity.