Bryan Caplan's Blog, page 83

The World's Worst Argument Against Homeschooling, by Bryan Caplan

I've heard many arguments against homeschooling.  Here's the worst:

"Bryan, you've got to send your kids back to public high school."

"Why?"

"Well, you've got to understand that high school is miserable."

"I remember it well.  How is that an argument for high school?"

"Because it prepares you for the misery of life.  Having a job is just like being in high school.  Without that preparation, you'll never make it in the real world."

The obvious objection: Suppose your kid is incredibly happy in high school.  Everyone's nice and encouraging.  He's learning piles of material.  Day after day, he comes home and says, "High school is a dream come true."  What kind of a parent would react not with elation, but alarm?  As in: "Eek!  My kid's may be excelling academically, but he's totally not being prepared for the harshness of adult life.  I'd got to immediately move him to a school where he's unhappy... for his own good!"  None I've ever encountered. 

Sure, parents occasionally sentence their kids to military school, but they do so because the kid is behaving badly now, not because they fear their studious, well-mannered kids will grow up to be snowflakes.

So what's the best argument against homeschooling?  Conformity signaling, of course.

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What Is Self-Righteousness?, by Bryan Caplan

What exactly does it mean to be "self-righteous"? 

1. "Self-righteous" is definitely not the same as "hypocritical."  A hypocrite talks the talk but doesn't walk the walk.  A self-righteous person can definitely do both; in fact, you're probably more likely to be called "self-righteous" if you're strictly observant of your own principles.

2. "Self-righteous" also seems distinct from simply being morally mistaken, or even extremely morally mistaken.  Indeed, we occasionally accuse people on "our own side" of self-righteousness.

3. You are likely to be accused of self-righteousness if you loudly brag about your moral virtue - even if (especially?) your claims are literally true.  But is that all that's going on?

4. When I call people "self-righteous," the subtext is normally that they're loudly observant but morally unreflective.  (As Nietzsche said in Human, All Too Human, "The most dangerous party member.-- In every
party there is one who through his all too credulous avowal of the
party's principles incites the others to apostasy.")  But perhaps that's just my pet peeve.

Further thoughts?

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Earth 2.0?, by Bryan Caplan

The latest Freakonomics Radio is on "Earth 2.0: Is Income Inequality Inevitable?"  I'm pleased to be prominently featured alongside Jeff Sachs and Alice Rivlin.  A few highlights:

And we'll remember to keep our eye on the economic ball:

CAPLAN: Any time you're trying to analyze a complex
problem, just forget all the other stuff at first, and just say, "Well,
what does this do to the productivity of mankind?"

And:

But not everyone shares Kanter's views on inequality.

CAPLAN: It's definitely the kind of problem that we should worry a lot less about.

Bryan Caplan is an economist at George Mason University.

CAPLAN: The main predictor of living standards of not just most people but the poorest people in the country is productivity in that country.
Countries that produce a lot of stuff aren't just good places to be
rich or middle class; they're good places to be poor. So when people
complain about people being left behind ... China's got 1.3 billion people. Sure, someone's going to be left behind in there. But is it better to be poor now in China
than it was 20 or 30 or 50 years ago, when people were starving to
death? There is no question. It is only by going and forgetting history,
forgetting comparisons, and then searching through a vast number of
people to find a sad story that we can forget the big picture. What is
the big picture? Not that we can find something that happened
that is bad in the world so vast we can't even imagine it, but seeing
what is happening overall. What is the general trend, and how can we
keep the general trend good?

I even get to make the case for not just open borders, but desert itself:

CAPLAN: I am old-fashioned enough to like the distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor. Right now, we have a lot of very expensive government programs that give money to everybody eventually. Old-age programs. Social Security writes checks to Bill Gates
like anybody else. Again, to me, this is insane! Why tax everybody to
pay for them in a situation that everybody knows they'll eventually
reach, as long as they don't die young? Thinking about kids and the
elderly in the same breath is crazy. You're born an orphan and there's
nothing you could have done about that. That's totally not your fault.
But if you are starving when you're elderly, then there's a question:
why didn't you plan for this, which was totally foreseeable in every
way?

Hear the whole show.

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IQ With Conscience: Three Followups, by Bryan Caplan

Three followups on my last post:

1. Most of the brutal policy advocacy I've heard comes from consumers, not producers, of intelligence research.

2. Why didn't I name names or link links?  Because the brutal policy advocacy is almost entirely off-the-record. 

3. In response to this post, many IQ realists have told me they've never heard anything horrifying first-hand.  I totally believe you.  But many other IQ realists have told me they have heard such things.  I totally believe them, too.  Since these horrifying views are (a) rare, and (b) normally concealed, a 50% detection rate strongly suggests that such views are indeed greatly over-represented in the IQ-realist community.

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IQ With Conscience, by Bryan Caplan

I'm an IQ realist, all the way.  IQ tests aren't perfect, but they're an excellent proxy for what ordinary language calls "intelligence."  A massive body of research confirms that IQ predicts not just educational success, but career success.  Contrary to critics, IQ tests are not culturally biased; they fairly measure genuine group differences in intelligence. 

Yet I've got to admit: My fellow IQ realists are, on average, a scary bunch.  People who vocally defend the power of IQ are vastly more likely than normal people to advocate extreme human rights violations.  I've heard IQ realists advocate a One-Child Policy for people with low IQs.  I've heard IQ realists advocate a No-Child Policy for people with low IQs.  I've heard IQ realists advocate forced sterilization for people with low IQs.  I've heard IQ realists advocate forcible exile of people with low IQs - fellow citizens, not just immigrants.  I've heard IQ realists advocate murdering people with low IQs. 

When I say, "I've heard..." I'm not just talking about stuff I've read on the Internet.  I'm talking about what IQ realists have told me to my face.  In my experience, if a stranger brings up low IQ in Africa, there's about a 50/50 chance he casually transitions to forced sterilization or mass murder of hundreds of millions of human beings as an intriguing response.  You can protest that they're just trolling, but these folks seemed frighteningly sincere to me.

Don't such policies flow logically from IQ realism?  No way.  If someone says, "I'm more intelligent than other people, so it's acceptable for me to murder them," the sensible response isn't, "Intelligence is a myth."  The sensible response is, "Are you mad?  That doesn't justify murder."  Advocating brutality in the name of your superior intellect is the mark of a super-villain, not a logician.

But don't low-IQ people produce negative externalities - negative externalities that well-intentioned consequentialists will want to address?  I'm no consequentialist, but the consistent consequentialist position is: Not if the "solution" is worse than the problem!  And if your "solution" involves gross human rights violations, there's every reason to think it is worse than the problem.  We should be especially wary of self-styled consequentialists who rush toward maximal brutality instead of patiently searching for cheap, humane ways to cope with the social costs of low IQ.

Why do IQ realists go so wrong?  Stigma is part of the story: If IQ realists face grave social disapproval, sensible IQ realists will tend to keep their views quiet.  Remaining spokesmen for IQ realism therefore lean crazy.  But stigma aside, IQ realists tend to be smart - and self-consciously smart people are often attracted to what I call high-IQ misanthropy.  If you marinate in your own misanthropy long enough, common decency fades away.

To repeat, I'm an IQ realist myself.  As a result, I'm tempted to deny ugly generalizations about my tribe.  But I won't.  As I've said before:

If you really want to improve your group's image, telling other groups
to stop stereotyping won't work. The stereotype is based on the
underlying distribution of fact. It is far more realistic to turn your
complaining inward, and pressure the bad apples in your group to stop
pulling down the average.

So here's what I say to every IQ realist who forgets common decency: You embarrass me.  You embarrass yourself.  You embarrass intelligence itself.  Teaching IQ with conscience probably won't end the stigma against the science of intelligence.  But if we teach IQ without conscience, we deserve that stigma.



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Economic Systems: The Fundamental Questions, by Bryan Caplan

Next month, my homeschoolers are taking the Advanced Placement Microeconomics test.  Here's a thought-provoking question from a practice exam:

Which of the following constitute the fundamental questions every economic system must answer?

I. What goods and services will be produced?
II. How will they be produced?
III. When will they be produced?
IV. For whom will they be produced?
V. Where will they be produced?

(A) I, III, and V only
(B) I, II, and IV only
(C) I, II, and V only
(D) II, IV, and V only
(E) II, III, and IV only

The textbook answer is of course B: "What will be produced, how, and for whom?"  But does the textbook answer make sense?  Anyone with a good knowledge of comparative economic systems will see some compelling doubts.  Starting with:

1. At least officially, one of the main divisions between Western and Communist regimes was on "When will they be produced?"  The Western answer was basically, "Whenever interest rates make it profitable," while the Communist answer was, "Heavy industry for you, consumer goods for your grandkids."

2. Another less-publicized Western/Communist gap appears on "Where will they be produced?"  The Western answer was basically, "Wherever the wage/rent/locational desirability package is enough to attract a workforce," while the Communist answer was, "Wherever the government orders."  This was clearest in the Soviet Union, where internal passports trapped many farmers in wretched rurality and many resource extractors in hellish locations like Siberia.  But the same held in Maoist China, and other Communist regimes to a lesser extent.

3. As readers of this blog are well-aware, immigration restrictions probably reshape the global economy more than all other regulations combined.  On reflection, this is another huge "where" question that economic systems answer.  The current answer is basically, "In whatever country the workers are born."

4. The same goes for building regulations, which make major cities much smaller (in area and population) than they'd be under laissez-faire in countries as diverse as the U.S. and India.

Bottom line: Questions of "where" and "when" are very important features of any economic system.  Important enough to call "fundamental"?  It's hard to see why not.

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The Undermotivated Apostate: Two Post-Libertarian Case Studies, by Bryan Caplan

Political irrationality is ubiquitous.  Most people irrationally cling to their political views; most of the rest irrationally revise their political views.  This includes, of course, my fellow libertarians.  I know plenty of unreasonable libertarians, but I also know plenty of "post-libertarians" who changed their minds for reasons no reasonable libertarian would accept. 

Let's consider two case studies of libertarian apostasy I've seen first-hand.

1. Anti-immigration. 



While there are plenty of
thoughtful criticisms of fully open borders, libertarian apostates usually just
latch onto a mainstream complaint: It's bad for low-skilled Americans, or
"You can't have open borders and a welfare state," or
"Immigrants will vote to turn the U.S. into a banana republic." 
You'd expect them to go through several layers of argument: "I know the
standard libertarian reply, but that's incorrect because..."  And you'd expect them to endorse the mildest restrictions required to address their concerns.  But
they almost never do.  When libertarians turn against immigration, most become anti-immigration by normal standards, which is very anti-immigration indeed.



Some libertarians have even left me speechless with, "I believed in open borders until
I realized that culture matters."  I could say, "So until
recently, you believed that culture didn't matter?"  But what's the point?  Culture obviously
matters.  Every libertarian I've met admits it.  In fact, libertarians routinely discuss the need to change our culture in a libertarian direction.  So how could the banal "insight" that "Culture matters" possibly lead a reasonable libertarian to rethink anything?


2. Pro-welfare-state.



Libertarians have a standard
list of objections to the welfare state.  Some - like opposition to
universal programs and concern about disincentives - are very strong.  But
the radical objections are much more debatable.  I can easily see someone
with libertarian sympathies reluctantly and cautiously advocating
a small welfare state.

But when libertarians change their minds, they usually go much further.  Indeed, most apostates seem to love the welfare state.  Before long, they're praising the wonders of
Scandinavia, home of massive universal programs - and the massive taxes required to fund such programs.  Isn't it great how Sweden provides a comprehensive safety net, so everyone feels secure?  It's almost like the apostates have forgotten - or never knew - the standard libertarian arguments about the
disincentives of the welfare state and the wastefulness of universal redistribution.

Of course, these generalizations don't apply to all post-libertarians; I disagree with Will Wilkinson's defense of the welfare state, but at least he's trying to meet his burden of proof.  But the typical libertarian apostate is as intellectually disappointing as a former socialist who self-congratulates, "But then I learned that incentives matter."  In both cases, I have to say: Your "realization" is well-known to every reasonable proponent of the view you've abandoned.  Though I've often criticized people for their inability to fairly explain their opponents' views, it's far worse if you can't fairly explain views that were once your own.

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The Undermotivated Apostate, by Bryan Caplan

People rarely revise their beliefs on issues they care about.  Even when confronted with strong counter-evidence, they usually manage to weasel out somehow.  When you encounter someone who has revised his beliefs, therefore, it's tempting to conclude that he's highly reasonable.  Apostates - people who abandoned a whole belief structure - smugly feed this temptation: "When the facts change, I change my mind.  What do you do, sir?"  As a serial apostate, I've often smugly fed this temptation myself.

When I listen to apostates, however, I'm usually struck by the flimsiness of their deconversion stories.  Why exactly did they change their minds?  A reasonable apostate would go through a process like:

1. I used to believe X, where X is something that at least sounds vaguely plausible.

2. But then I noticed a non-obvious but telling intellectual flaw in X.

3. I approached the best minds who believe X with my doubts, but none of them had a good response.

4. So I stopped believing X.

In practice, many apostasy stories discuss people rather than ideas: I had a falling-out with my fellow believers, so I stopped agreeing with them.  But even the idea-centric stories sound more like:

1. I used to believe X, where X is something that sounds silly.

2. But then I noticed an obvious and telling intellectual flaw in X.

3. I ignored the flaw for a while.

4. Then I finally woke up and stopped believing X.

My point here is not that people shouldn't change their minds.  They totally should.  My point, rather, is that human irrationality is even more prevalent than it seems.  Most people are too irrational to change their minds on anything important.  But most people who change their minds on important issues nevertheless do so irrationally.

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A Keynesian Conundrum, by Bryan Caplan

This year, I'm prepping my 8th-grade homeschoolers for the Advanced Placement tests in European History, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics.  The Macro test is less Keynesian than it used to be, but its Keynesian origin remains blatant.  And after years away from the simple Keynesian model, I noticed two things I never noticed before.

But first, let's back up.  In the simple Keynesian model, recessions can be overcome by raising government spending or cutting taxes.  In general, however, Keynesians prefer the former approach.  Why?  I'm sorely tempted to accuse them of leftist bias, but they've got an elegant response.  Namely:

Define people's Marginal Propensity to Consume out of a new dollar of income as MPC. 

Then if you increase government spending by $1000, nominal GDP rises by $1000 + MPC*$1000 + MPC^2*$1000 + ... = $1000/(1-MPC),

If you cut taxes by $1000, however, nominal GDP only rises by MPC*$1000 + MPC^2*$1000 + ... = $1000*MPC/(1-MPC).

If they have to cut taxes, similarly, Keynesians prefer to cut taxes on the poor.  I'm sorely tempted to accuse them of leftist bias, but once again, they've got an elegant response.  Namely: Poor people have a higher MPC than the rich, so tax cuts for the poor give you more bang for your buck.

But what if your problem is not recession, but inflation?  Then both of the preceding arguments reverse.  In terms of the simple Keynesian model:

1. Cutting government spending is a better way to reduce inflation than raising taxes.

2. Raising taxes on the poor is a better way to reduce inflation than raising taxes on the rich.

I'm pretty sure I've never heard any Keynesian policy analyst say either of these things.  But they flow out of the simple Keynesian model just as naturally as their stock anti-recessionary recommendations.  If leftist bias isn't the explanation, what is?

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Scott Alexander's Self-Evaluations, by Bryan Caplan

I just learned that blogger Scott Alexander starts ends the year by scoring the accuracy of his numerous annual predictions: here are the results for 2014, 2015, and 2016.  Since he assigns probabilities to each prediction, Scott can graph his ex ante subjective probabilities against the ex post objective probabilities.  Here's his graph for 2016.  The red line shows perfect calibration; the blue line shows Scott's actual calibration.
Contrary to Tyler, this is not "just another kind of religion," but this intensity of scrupulous rationality does approach the divine.  Or as a wise man once said, "People who say it cannot be done shouldn't interrupt those who are doing it."

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