Eugene Volokh's Blog, page 4

[Ilya Somin] Upcoming Speaking Engagements in Mexico and Israel

[I will be giving multiple talks in these two countries, in December.]

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This December, I will be doing multiple speaking engagements in Mexico and Israel. In the latter country, I will be serving as a visiting professor at the law faculty at Uriel Reichman University (the former IDC Herzliya). Unless otherwise noted, these events are open to the public.

I am potentially open to doing additional speaking engagements in Israel during my time there (Dec. 14-26).

Dec. 3, 12-1:30 PM, Guadalajara International Book Fair (FIL), Barcelo Hotel, Guadalajara, Mexico: "Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom" (tentative title), Panel on Migration in the 21st Century. Other panel participants will be Eileen Truax (journalist covering immigration issues), and Christopher Dominguez. More information about the FIL book fair available here.

Dec. 4, 3:15-4:30 PM, Law Faculty, University of Monterrey, Rm. A6-206, Monterrey, Mexico, : "Political Ignorance and Constitutional Design." This event is likely limited to University of Monterrey students and faculty. But I may be able to get a few other people admitted upon request.

Dec. 5, 3:15-4:30 PM, School of Social Sciences and Government, University of Monterrey, A6-106, Monterrey, Mexico: "Democracy and Political Ignorance." This event is likely limited to University of Monterrey students and faculty. But I may be able to get a few other people admitted upon request.

Dec. 15, 6:30-8:00 PM, Honors Workshop, Law Faculty, Uriel Reichman University, Herzliya, Israel: "The Presumptive Case for Organ Markets." This event is likely to be limited to participants in the Honors Workshop and Uriel Reichman University faculty. But I may be able to get a few other people admitted upon request.

Dec. 16, 4-5:30 PM, Safra Center for Ethics, Buchman Faculty of Law,  Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel: "Judicial Review of Emergency Powers."

The post Upcoming Speaking Engagements in Mexico and Israel appeared first on Reason.com.

[Eugene Volokh] Court Orders Reinstatement of Law Student Expelled for Writing "[W]hatever Harvard Professor Noel Ignatiev Meant by … '[A]bolish the White Race by Any Means Necessary' … Must Be Done with Jews"

An excerpt from today's long opinion by Chief Judge Allen Winsor (N.D. Fla.) in Damsky v. Summerlin, which I think is likely correct:

Damsky has been a controversial figure at the law school since he enrolled. He seems to enjoy pushing boundaries and provoking others. He achieved that and more with two seminar papers and one social media exchange that ultimately became the basis for his expulsion.

In the fall semester of his second year, Damsky wrote two seminar papers that generally argue the United States was founded as a race-based nation and should be preserved as such. He concluded each paper with what some perceived as extralegal calls to violence. In American Restoration, Damsky offered this view:

[W]e should feel no shame about feeling attached to those with whom we share a common racial origin. The founding generations of Americans were also no strangers to fighting, killing, and dying on behalf of their rights and sovereignty. The hour is late, but we are not yet so outnumbered and so neutered that we cannot seize back what is rightfully ours. This land, America, our due inheritance, is worth the struggle.

In National Constitutionalism, Damsky went perhaps further:

The Supreme Court and inferior federal courts have the power to arrest the dispossession of White America…. If the People are not granted relief from the government—which includes the judiciary—then, if they are to survive as masters in the land of their ancestors, they must exercise "their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow" the government. And that will be a process which no deskbound jurist can gleefully look forward to; for it will be a controversy decided not by the careful balance of Justitia's scales, but by the gruesome slashing of her sword.

Neither of Damsky's seminar professors found his language particularly alarming, and both gave him high marks. Still, the papers garnered attention. Many students found them upsetting, and some insisted the law school take action. The law school refused any discipline, though, concluding the writings did not constitute true threats, were not significantly disruptive, and enjoyed First Amendment protections….

[T]he semester continued without incident—at least until Damsky's March 21 X post:

My position on Jews is simple: whatever Harvard professor Noel Ignatiev meant by his call to "abolish the White race by any means necessary" is what I think must be done with Jews. Jews must be abolished by any means necessary.

This post was immediately available to Damsky's few X followers (Damsky said he has "almost no following"), as well as anyone else who happened across his public account. Law student S.J. saw the post and found it upsetting but not, by itself, alarming. A week later, S.J. reported the post to the Interim Dean. A few days after that, on April 1, one of the University's Jewish law professors engaged with Damsky on X. Replying to his post, she asked, "Are you saying you would murder me and my family? Is that your position?" Damsky offered this in reply:

Did Ignatiev want Whites murdered? If so, were his words as objectionable as mine? If Ignatiev sought genocide, then surely a genocide of all Whites would be an even greater outrage than a genocide of all Jews, given the far greater number of Whites.

The next day, the professor continued to engage:

I notice you didn't say no, but instead resorted to whataboutism. Yes, his words are despicable, but you implicitly admit yours are, too.

(The professor's post included a link to a Brittanica Encyclopedia article about "whataboutism.")

At the time, the professor considered the exchange provocative but not alarming or threatening. Other professors and many students, however, found Damsky's posts quite alarming and threatening. Some students were visibly upset, and many came to the Assistant Dean's office crying and describing their fears. Students feared physical harm, and expressed concern that Damsky might come to school armed. {The record suggests students' concerns of physical harm flowed from Damsky's rhetoric alone and not from any separate indication that he might be armed or violent.}

The professor who had engaged with Damsky on X, and who initially did not feel threatened, later grew afraid of what Damsky might do after she heard from students more familiar with him. She and her husband slept with a baseball bat by the bed. Springing into action, the law school increased campus security, began locking doors previously kept unlocked, and provided a police presence at a Jewish Law Students Association event. Then, on April 2—twelve days after Damsky's first post and one day after his follow-up exchange with the professor—the University suspended Damsky.

Damsky was eventually expelled:

In his letter, [University of Florida Dean of Students] Summerlin described Damsky's X posts as threatening and disruptive. And Summerlin described the seminar papers—the ones the Interim Dean earlier concluded were protected speech—as containing "violent rhetoric" that injected fear into the law school community. Summerlin also admonished Damsky for declining to "walk back" what he wrote….

But the court concluded that the expulsion likely violated the First Amendment. First, it concluded that Damsky's posts weren't "true threats" of violence (a category of speech that the Supreme Court has held is excluded from First Amendment protection):

Read in context, Damsky's statements "do not convey a real possibility that violence will follow." Even if ostensibly referring to violence, a hyperbolic and coarse expression of political opinion does not necessarily constitute a true threat. Thus, a draft opponent's public announcement that "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.," was protected speech. Watts v. United States (1969). His statement did not, in context, constitute a true threat. See also id. (noting that "[t]he language of the political arena … is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact").

Here, even taking the statement as the University does—"My position on Jews is simple: … Jews must be abolished by any means necessary"—Damsky offers no indication that he will act on his "position" or do anything at all. {The ellipses are the University's. As Damsky notes, and as discussed more fully below, what the ellipses skip over is important context.} He is stating a view—even if a hateful and offensive one. His statement is thus quite unlike those in the true-threat cases the University cites.

The threat in United States v. Ramos (M.D. Ga. 2024) was an individual message sent "to the home address of a Rabbi who had been speaking publicly against antisemitism following a neo-Nazi demonstration at her synagogue." The private letter—a "typical means for delivery of threats"—said, among other things, "Use code 'GASTHEJEWS' for 10% off!." The threat in United States v. Baker was unequivocal in target, location, and time: "[A]rmed racists mobs" at the state capitol on Inauguration Day would be met with "every caliber available," and those who were "afraid to die fighting the enemy" were advised to "stay in bed and live." Damsky's posts lacked those characteristic features of personal, targeted imminence.

Moreover, Damsky's post was not simply that "Jews must be abolished by any means necessary." His full statement was this:

My position on Jews is simple: whatever Harvard professor Noel Ignatiev meant by his call to "abolish the White race by any means necessary" is what I think must be done with Jews. Jews must be abolished by any means necessary.

Read in context, the post was equating Damsky's view that "Jews must be abolished" to the view of a Harvard professor. This context further undermines any suggestion that the post was a "serious expression" that Damsky would harm others.

The University says the reference to Ignatiev means little because most people are unfamiliar with Ignatiev and because Damsky did not explain that "Ignatiev was not calling for violence." Regardless, Damsky's post expressly conditioned "abolish" and "any means necessary" on "whatever Harvard professor Noel Ignatiev meant." That makes the University's reference to Black's Law Dictionary (quoting definition of "Abolish") inapposite. {Tellingly, the witnesses who considered Damsky's reference to Ignatiev (whether or not they agreed with Damsky's interpretation of the author) did not find the March 21 post clearly threatening. Cf. Watts (considering the audience's reaction as relevant context).}

Similarly, Damsky's other post—his April 1 response to the professor—was no serious expression of a real intent to harm. The post referenced Noel Ignatiev again and asked rhetorically what he wanted when he wrote about abolishing the white race. Notably, the professor to whom he directed his post did not interpret it as a threat to harm her or her family. In fact, she responded with a witty reference to "whataboutism" and a link to an encyclopedia article.

The University makes much of the fact that when asked if he was saying he would murder the professor and her family, Damsky did not say no. True, but neither did he say yes. He answered the question with a question. The overall context of Damsky's exchange with the professor reveals a perhaps course and crude debate on tolerable academic thought, but it does not express a serious intent to commit violence.

That his posts "came on the heels of his two seminar papers" does not undermine that conclusion either. Even if the papers provide pertinent context to the X posts, further context is the law school's recognition months earlier that those papers were protected under the First Amendment. And those papers—pure speech—are different than the kind of violent context that sometimes renders an expression a true threat. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists (9th Cir. 2002) (wanted-style posters "acquired currency as a death threat" after three murders); United States v. Hart (8th Cir. 2000) (use of Ryder truck to protest abortion clinic could be viewed as "true threat" because it was the same style truck used in the then-recent and widely reported Oklahoma City bombing).

To be sure, those reading Damsky's words may be justifiably fearful. Some may assume that anyone uttering such commentary is more likely to act violently than someone who does not. But that is not the test. The test is whether Damsky's posts constituted a "serious expression" that he meant "to commit an act of unlawful violence." Many would not love the idea of attending school with someone who burns crosses, cf. Virginia v. Black (2003), marches in Nazi parades, cf. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie (1977), or engages in countless other forms of offensive expression. But "the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Snyder v. Phelps (2010) (quoting Texas v. Johnson (1989)).

The court also rejected the argument that Dansky could be disciplined on the grounds that his speech was "materially disruptive." It noted that it was unclear whether the "more deferential First Amendment standard" from Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist. (1969) that allows restricting student speech to prevent disruption was applicable to university student speech (as opposed to the K-12 speech in Tinker). But, even if that standard was applicable, the court concluded that Dansky's speech wasn't reasonably perceived as threatening, and thus wasn't sufficiently "disruptive" on that score. It then reasoned:

Without a showing that Damsky's speech constituted a school-directed threat, the University is left without much of a Tinker argument. In fact, it has not articulated any other basis under Tinker to discipline Damsky for his speech. The entirety of its disruption argument is tied to the purported threat.

The University does not argue, for example, that the offensive nature of Damsky's speech or students' strong disagreement with it—even when manifested as an outpouring of students' concern, including crying or anxiety—constitutes the type of "disruption" that would justify restricting the speech. {The Second Circuit's reasoning in Leroy v. Livingston Manor Central School District (4th Cir. 2025) is persuasive here. There, a high school student's social media post generated community outcry and demonstrations. The court noted, however, Tinker's relevant question is "disorder or disturbance on the part of the" speaker. And tying a speaker's free speech rights "to the reaction that speech garners from upset or angry listeners" cannot be squared with Tinker or First Amendment principles. I agree. See also, e.g., Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. (Alito, J., concurring) (noting speech on sensitive subjects like politics and social relations may "disrupt instruction and good order on school premises," but "it is a 'bedrock principle' that speech may not be suppressed simply because it expresses ideas that are 'offensive or disagreeable'").}

Nor does [the University] argue any interest in restricting Damsky's speech to "inculcate the habits and manners of civility." Cf. Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting district court and upholding high school principal's policy prohibiting display of Confederate flag on school property). Instead, its Tinker argument turns exclusively on its insistence that Damsky's X posts were school-directed threats.

At bottom, schools "have a heavy burden to justify intervention" as "to political … speech that occurs outside school or a school program or activity." The University has not met that heavy burden here.

The post Court Orders Reinstatement of Law Student Expelled for Writing "[W]hatever Harvard Professor Noel Ignatiev Meant by … '[A]bolish the White Race by Any Means Necessary' … Must Be Done with Jews" appeared first on Reason.com.

[Eugene Volokh] University's Apparent Concealment of Real Reasons for Non-Renewal of Adjunct Professor's Contract Suspended Statute of Limitations

["The [eventually released personnel] records contain no negative performance reviews, but they do contain three anonymous complaints. Those complaints accused Grossenbach of 'creat[ing] a hostile environment for transgender and LGBTQ students' in connection with his SaveCFSD activities [allegedly referring solely to Grossenbach's outside-class political activity -EV], among other things."]

From Friday's Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Michael Ambri (D. Ariz.) in Grossenbach v. Arizona Bd. of Regents:

The plaintiff in this action, Daniel Grossenbach, founded an organization named SaveCFSD, through which he advocates "for truth, trust, and transparency within Catalina Foothills School District 16 ['CFSD']." He founded this organization because he believes the CFSD is acting contrary to his "sincerely held religious beliefs" by "secretly surveying children about their gender and sexuality, pushing radical gender ideologies upon those students, and unconscionably and intentionally keeping that information from parents."

Grossenbach was employed as an adjunct professor at the University of Arizona. On November 30, 2023, he was informed that his teaching contract would not be renewed. Grossenbach believes that his employment was discontinued because the University received complaints about his advocacy with SaveCFSD.

Grossenbach sued on Aug. 22, 2025, and defendants argued (among other things) that his Title VII religious discrimination claim was brought too late. No, the Magistrate Judge concluded:

[I]n Arizona a prospective plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory employment action.

In this case, Grossenbach was informed on November 30, 2023, that his employment contract would not be renewed. According to the defendants, his 300 days started on that date and expired on September 25, 2024. They assert that he filed his ACRD (Arizona Civil Rights Division) charge on January 9, 2025, and his EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) charge on January 22, 2025. Accordingly, the defendants argue that the claim must be dismissed for failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies.

The court does not agree. Assuming without deciding that Grossenbach's Title VII charge accrued on November 30, 2023, when he was told his contract would not be renewed, the start of the limitation period was postponed under the doctrines of estoppel and equitable tolling.

"Equitable tolling focuses on whether there was excusable delay by the plaintiff: If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs." "Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, focuses primarily on actions taken by the defendant to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit, sometimes referred to as 'fraudulent concealment.'"

In his Complaint, Grossenbach describes when and how he was informed that his teaching contract would not be renewed:

In November of 2023, … Grossenbach was told that "the University had decided to hire a full-time faculty member to teach [his] ethics course instead of an adjunct professor." Grossenbach initially believed the proffered explanation, but he later became skeptical. Consequently, he "submitted a public records request for documents and emails associated with the University's decision to not renew [his] teaching contract."

Grossenbach later saw that "the University had posted an advertisement soliciting resumes for two adjunct professor positions at the School of Government & Public Policy to teach ethics, which [he] was well qualified to teach and had been teaching prior to his unlawful termination." It appeared that the University was not hiring a full-time faculty member to teach these courses as he had been told.

Over the next seven months, Grossenbach sent a number of messages to the University seeking a substantive response to his public records request. Eventually he retained legal counsel, who sent the University a demand letter requesting the records. Grossenbach finally received the records on July 26, 2024, after what he calls "a 239-day campaign of delay and deception." The records contain no negative performance reviews, but they do contain three anonymous complaints. Those complaints accused Grossenbach of "creat[ing] a hostile environment for transgender and LGBTQ students" in connection with his SaveCFSD activities, among other things. Grossenbach asserts that "[t]he furnished public records revealed emails which contain evidence of Defendants' religious discrimination, retaliation, and [his] unlawful termination from the University."

Taking the allegations in the plaintiff's Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the court concludes that a reasonably prudent person would not have known of the existence of his claims until July 26, 2024, when he received the documents pursuant to his public records request. Prior to that date, Grossenbach would have known what happened but not why it happened. And without knowing why it happened, he would not have known that an "unlawful employment practice [had] occurred" and could not have raised a meaningful administrative charge. The limitation period was tolled until Grossenbach received his employment documents. See, e.g., Sterrett v. Mabus (S.D. Cal. 2013) ("Because the [First Amended Complaint's] factual allegations suggest that Sterrett did not realize the employment decision was the result of gender discrimination until her discovery of the similarly situated male in July 2009, the Court finds tolling is sufficiently pled.").

Furthermore, Grossenbach presents allegations from which one may conclude that the defendants took actions to prevent Grossenbach from discovering his claims by slow-walking his public records request and by falsely telling him that his contract would not be renewed because the University was going to hire a full-time faculty member to teach those classes. Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the court finds that the defendants knew the true circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action and falsely represented them to Grossenbach intending that he rely on those false representations.  The court further finds that Grossenbach was ignorant of the true facts and reasonably relied on the defendants' representations to his detriment….

The court also concluded that Grossenbach's federal constitutional claims could proceed notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment (which provides considerable state sovereign immunity against money damages), because he seeks a declaratory judgment against state officers and reinstatement to his position, which isn't precluded by the Eleventh Amendment.

Mathew D. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, Daniel J. Schmid, and Avery B. Hill (Liberty Counsel) represent Grossenbach.

The post University's Apparent Concealment of Real Reasons for Non-Renewal of Adjunct Professor's Contract Suspended Statute of Limitations appeared first on Reason.com.

[Eugene Volokh] No Emergency Order Allowing Worship Service in Possibly Unsafe Barn

From Vaughn v. Harrison County, decided Friday by Judge Taylor McNeel (S.D. Miss.):

Yesterday, Rev. John Vaughn filed this lawsuit seeking to have fifty people attend a worship service in a barn on his private property. Vaughn is proceeding pro se. He has scheduled the worship service for some time tomorrow, but he acknowledges that Harrison County has told him he cannot have the fifty people in the barn because Harrison County believes that a gathering at the property "would constitute a very serious life safety situation."

Vaughn has filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order asking this Court to order Harrison County to allow the fifty people into the barn. But he does not want Harrison County to have notice of this motion or to have the opportunity to respond. Instead, he wants this Court to enter an ex parte Order without giving Harrison County the chance to explain their position. But this is a litigation strategy created by Vaughn's own making. Instead, Harrison County needs to be served with process, given time to respond, and then an evidentiary hearing can be set.

Vaughn's motion is denied for a number of reasons. First, the primary purpose of a temporary restraining order is to maintain the status quo. But Vaughn is seeking to change it—not maintain it. Harrison County told him about seven months ago to not have fifty people in this barn. Vaughn could have challenged that action then.

Second, Vaughn does not establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Vaughn does not really present evidence or on-point case law to support his assertions.

Third, Vaughn does not show a substantial threat of irreparable injury. Vaughn recognizes that the congregation's primary church building is available for the worship service.

Fourth, the harm that will result if the temporary restraining order is granted potentially outweighs Vaughn's injury. If the Court were to grant the temporary restraining order, these people could be injured while congregating at Vaughn's barn.

And fifth, granting the temporary restraining order could disserve the public interest because it may expose fifty people to potentially dangerous and unsafe conditions.

It is true that some of his allegations—even if conclusory—are concerning. But even still, Harrison County has stated that it believes allowing fifty people inside of this barn will present a "very serious life safety situation." Vaughn has really only presented conclusory statements in response. And he provides no concrete evidence in support. No sworn affidavit. No photographs. A court turns activist if it were to force a county to allow a gathering that the county believes is dangerous—without allowing the county the opportunity to first respond and explain. Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and takes the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction under advisement.

For more details, read the whole opinion; here's an excerpt discussing the factual allegations:

[O]n April 30, 2025, Harrison County issued a cease-and-desist order "regarding remodeling work on Plaintiff's barn." {Vaughn does not provide the Court with any information, through photo evidence or otherwise, of the state of his barn and the remodeling work which led to the cease-and-desist order.} The order was allegedly related to zoning and construction requirements. But the directive at issue, which Vaughn refers to as "Item #8," requires Vaughn to "[c]ease operating a church and accessory structures or apply for conditional use to do so." {Vaughn does not provide any information or context as to why the cease-and-desist order was issued, nor does he provide the entirety of the order. The only portion of the cease-and-desist order that Vaughn submitted to the Court was a seemingly partial list of required actions.}

Vaughn assures the Court of his "complete cooperation" with "Item #8's prohibition." Vaughn says that, since April 30, 2025, he has refrained from hosting Bible studies or worship services, conducting monthly prayer meetings, and "exercis[ing] religious practice on his own land." And he claims that he did not "violate, or resist any legitimate zoning requirement related to construction or building safety," despite his argument that "Item #8 is not about construction[,] … fire safety[,] … [or] building permits."

But this changed on November 15, 2025 when he "announced during a worship service at his church that he intended to hold a Thanksgiving prayer gathering and fellowship meal on Saturday, November 22, 2025, at the property." [Fifty people are expected to attend. Vaughn claims that "[s]omeone recorded [his] announcement and provided it to Harrison County officials." …

Vaughn claims violations of RLUIPA, Mississippi Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and several First Amendment theories. But he provides only conclusory statements that he "has an extraordinarily strong likelihood of success" on his claims. Vaughn provides no real evidence or specific case law to support his claims. Rather, he provides only general case law and legal theories.

But even if he provided more evidence to support his claims, a person does not have a constitutional or statutory right to host fifty people in a structure that "constitute[s] a very serious life safety situation," even if the reason for hosting is for a worship service. On the other hand, a local government cannot claim a structure "constitute[s] a very serious life safety situation"—when it does not—just to prevent people from worshiping. And obviously the First Amendment and RLUIPA trump any local ordinance, so Harrison County must be mindful that their actions do not violate federal law. But this is why Harrison County needs to respond. An evidentiary hearing is required to resolve this dispute.

And the "static deficiency in the quantum of evidence" is far from the only problem with Vaughn's request. Samuel L. Bray, The Purpose of a Preliminary Injunction, 78 Vand. L. Rev. 809, 822 (2025). The Court is also faced with the issue of time, for "the district judge cannot be said to have the advantage of living with the case and getting to know its factual nuances." Id. (quotations omitted). So the Court is being asked to appraise the merits when the information needed to do that is unavailable. Id. at n.87 (citing John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 33, 41 (2007). And the "problem for the judge asked to grant a preliminary injunction7 is that he is being asked to rule in a hurry, on the basis of incomplete information. The risk of error is high." Id. (quoting Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.4, at 522 (3d ed. 1986)). Since this motion was filed, the Court has handled four sentencings and two guilty pleas. This is in addition to the time spent out of the courtroom itself that still requires special attention given to other cases in the management of the hundreds of cases on the civil and criminal dockets….

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[Eugene Volokh] Republican Congressman's Staffer Prosecuted for Alleging Faking Attack on Herself, Including "Trump Whore" Written on Her Stomach

From the Justice Department's press release Wednesday:

Natalie Greene, 26, of Ocean City was charged with one count of conspiracy to convey false statements and hoaxes and one count of making false statements to federal law enforcement. On November 19, 2025, Greene made her initial appearance in federal court before U.S. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Pascal. Greene was released on a $200,000 unsecured bond and additional conditions, as set by the Court.

According to statements made in court and documents filed in the case:

Late at night on July 23, 2025, Greene's co-conspirator called 911 and reported that she and Greene had been attacked by three men when they were out walking on a trail at a nature preserve in Egg Harbor Township. According to the co-conspirator, during the attack, the men had called Greene by name and had specifically referenced her employment with Federal Official 1, an official whose identity is known to the Government.

When law enforcement officers located Greene, she was lying in a wooded area just off the trail, with her hands and feet bound together with black zip ties. Greene's shirt was pulled over her head and was also tied with a black zip tie. Greene had numerous lacerations on her face, neck, upper chest, and shoulder. The words "TRUMP WHORE" were written on her stomach and the words "[Federal Official 1] IS RACIST" were written on her back. [Press accounts state that the words written were that Van Drew is racist. -EV] Greene was crying and yelling that one of her alleged attackers had a gun.

Greene told police officers that one or more of the men who allegedly attacked her said he had a gun and threatened to shoot her. Greene also said that one or more of the attackers had held her down and restrained her movement, cutting her and writing on her body. A couple days later, after receiving medical treatment for her lacerations, Greene again described her alleged attack to law enforcement officers, including an agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The investigation revealed that Greene had not, in fact, been attacked by three men at gunpoint on July 23. Instead, Greene had paid a body modification/scarification artist to deliberately cut the lacerations on her face, neck, upper chest, and shoulder, based on a pattern that she had provided beforehand. Law enforcement officers recovered black zip ties in Greene's car on the night of the alleged attack, similar to the zip ties that had been used to bind Greene's arms and feet. Also, the investigation revealed that, two days prior to the alleged attack, the cellphone of Greene's co-conspirator had been used to search "zip ties near me."

You can find more details in the Criminal Complaint, as well as in many news accounts (including this one from Fox News [Greg Norman]). An excerpt:

Individual 1 [the body modification artist] provided the investigators with photos of Greene that he took after the scarification had been completed on the afternoon of July 23, 2025, in his studio in Pennsylvania. The photos from Individual 1 reflect that the cuts made to Greene's skin by Individual 1, at Greene's request, follow the exact same pattern as the lacerations that were observed on Greene when she was found lying on the ground in the Egg Harbor Township Nature Reserve, as well as the lacerations that were observed on Greene and photographed at Hospital-1 later the same evening. The photo comparison is as follows:

UPDATE: I had neglected to mention that Greene "began Rutgers law school last year but is no longer enrolled there, a spokesperson for the college told The [N.Y.] Post."

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[Jonathan H. Adler] Is the Fourth Circuit the New Ninth?

[Could today's summary reversal be a sign of things to come?]

There was a time when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was notorious for issuing decisions at odds with existing Supreme Court precedent, and getting repeatedly overturned as a result. The Ninth Circuit was considered the most liberal circuit in the country at the time, and had a few judges who consciously sought to evade restrictive precedent.

Early in the Roberts Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit developed something of a reputation as the "new Ninth," particularly with regard to habeas cases. In a string of cases, the Sixth Circuit was reversed, often summarily, for granting habeas petitions too readily.

Both the Ninth and Sixth Circuits are more conservative than they used to be, and are more aligned with the Supreme Court. Today the court that may be most at odds with the Supreme Court might be the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit--coincidentally, my new home circuit.  (The other contender would be the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which has only one judge appointed by a Republican president, who was just recently confirmed.)

Today the Supreme Court summarily reversed the Fourth Circuit in Clark v. Sweeney, a habeas case. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court concluded that the Fourth Circuit erred in granting a habeas petition, and that its error was so egregious that it justified summary reversal. As the Court summarized the case:

A Maryland jury found Jeremiah Sweeney guilty of second-degree murder and several other crimes. Sweeney's convictions were affirmed on appeal, and his bid for postconviction relief in state court was unsuccessful. Sweeney sought habeas relief in Federal District Court, and that court, too, denied relief. But the Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, relying on a claim that Sweeney never asserted. Because the Court of Appeals departed dramatically from the principle of party presentation, we reverse.

Is this decision a sign of things to come? While I do not expect there to be a tremendous number of habeas cases going from the Fourth Circuit to One First Street, I would not be surprised if the Fourth Circuit amasses a high reversal rate over the next several terms. Last term, the Fourth went 0 for 8, and it's starting off in the hole for OT 2025.

Also today, the Court summarily reversed a decision from the Mississippi Supreme Court. As with Clark, there was no recorded dissent.

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[Eugene Volokh] One of the 100 Biggest American Law Firms Pays >$50K Because of AI Hallucinations in Filings

[The firm, has "more than 1,600 attorneys in over 80 offices nationwide."]

From In re Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc., issued by Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Hawkins Thursday, following the court's earlier observation of "pervasive inaccurate, misleading, and fabricated citations, quotations, and representations of legal authority in the Motion to Reconsider":

Pursuant to the [court's] Order, … the Firm filed its Status Report on Pending Motions for Sanctions. In the Status Report, the Firm stated that it agreed to pay—and had paid—the DIP Lender the full amount of attorneys' fees sought in the DIP Lender's Motion for Sanctions. In connection with that payment, the DIP Lender agreed not to seek further fees related to the prior filings that were withdrawn or with respect to attendance at the hearing on the Show Cause Order or the Motions for Sanctions, provided that the agreement did not apply to future filings or the renewal of withdrawn motions. The Firm also stated that it had sent to the Debtors the full amount of the fees and expenses sought in the Debtors' Motion for Sanctions, which counsel for the Debtors was holding pending the hearing….

To the Firm's credit, it squarely and unequivocally conceded [in a follow-up document] that under Bankruptcy Rule 9011, it was responsible for the conduct of its attorneys. The Firm further acknowledged its lawyers' duties under the Local Bankruptcy Rules and the Alabama Ethics Rules, and it admitted that one of its lawyers violated those duties. It expressed its willingness to accept "whatever sanction the Court finds appropriate under these circumstances."

The Firm described several steps it had taken regarding its employees' use of artificial intelligence, both before and after the Show Cause Order. On June 28, 2023, the Firm adopted and distributed its official policy regarding the use of artificial intelligence…. On July 30, 2025, without knowledge of the issues beginning to surface in this case, the Firm updated its policy on artificial intelligence (the "Updated AI Policy")…. After learning of the Show Cause Order, the Firm undertook additional remedial and preventive measures. On the remediation side, the Firm paid the fees sought in the Motions for Sanctions—totaling $55,721.20—without haggling with the DIP Lender and the Debtors or otherwise forcing a contested hearing. The Firm also conducted an internal investigation to determine whether any of Ms. Preston's other filings contained "suspected artificial intelligence hallucinations." …

In terms of additional preventive measures, on September 19, 2025, the Firm adopted a policy to supplement the Updated AI Policy, this one focused on cite-checking (the "Cite Checking Policy"). The Cite Checking Policy makes it mandatory for all attorneys in the Firm to check pleadings "in their entirety for (i) whether the cases are still good law; and (ii) whether the citations are accurate, in the correct form, and reflect what the cases actually say." The Cite Checking Policy clarifies that the duty to cite-check—or confirm that another lawyer on the file has performed a cite-check—is non-delegable.

In addition to implementing the Cite Checking Policy, the Firm conducted training on the Updated AI Policy and the Cite Checking Policy at its partner retreat in mid-October, bringing in an outside speaker to discuss the risks of using artificial intelligence and using this case as a cautionary tale. Additional efforts were made through the Firm's regional oversight partners and office managing partners to ensure all lawyers were made aware of the Updated AI Policy, the Cite Checking Policy, and the events of this case….

As to the lawyer in whose filings the hallucinated appeared,

Ms. Preston accepted responsibility for her actions, explaining that she took on the representation of Progressive in this case at the request of a close personal and family friend. She explained that she "allowed her loyalty and desire to help her friend override the fact that she does not have a great deal of experience in the types of matters which were at issue before this Court." She admitted that she "did not have the time necessary to spend on the case to compensate for the obvious learning curve."

Ms. Preston admitted that she misled the Court on August 26, 2025, when she represented that generative artificial intelligence was not used in preparing the Motion to Reconsider. She stated that she did not personally use generative artificial intelligence to prepare the Motion to Reconsider, but she was aware it was used by someone other than an associate at the Firm, contrary to her previous representations….

Like the lawyer in ByoPlanet, Ms. Preston was put on notice that the Motion to Reconsider contained fabricated quotes, mis-citations, and misstatements of existing case law. Despite this notice, Ms. Preston filed the Supplemental Brief and Progressive Response, which contained more mis-citations, misstatements of existing case law, and the re-use of a fabricated quote now attributed to a new case. The Court rejects Ms. Preston's assertion in the Progressive Response that the Motion to Reconsider contained "at most, citation or paraphrasing errors." Even if the Court accepted that assertion, the subsequent misrepresentations of law in the Supplemental Brief and Progressive Response are so egregious that it could only be construed as to have been committed in bad faith. Therefore, sanctions are appropriate against Ms. Preston under the Court's inherent authority.

The court issued a public reprimand of Ms. Preston, ordered her to provide the opinion "to her clients, opposing counsel, and the presiding judge in every pending state or federal case in which she is currently counsel of record," revoked her admission to practice in the court in this case, and ordered that the opinion be served on all the state bars in which she is admitted. As to the firm,

[T]he Court finds that it took reasonable steps both before and after the issuance of the Show Cause Order to address the inherent risk associated with the use of generative artificial intelligence for legal research and writing. It implemented the Original AI Policy in June 2023 and the Updated AI Policy in July 2025. Once it learned of the Show Cause Order, it expended significant financial and human resources to remediate the harm caused in this case and to prevent future violations.

Without limitation, the Firm: paid over $55,000.00 in attorneys' fees to the DIP Lender and the Debtors; used Firm lawyers to investigate other filings by Ms. Preston and to provide supervision in her cases; implemented the Cite Checking Policy; and conducted additional training of its attorneys regarding the responsible use of generative artificial intelligence. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Firm has not acted in bad faith with respect to the events that unfolded in this case, such that sanctions under the Court's inherent authority are not necessary or appropriate with respect to the Firm….

The Firm is not sanctioned or reprimanded, but the Firm is DIRECTED to provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order—as well as the Updated AI Policy and the Cite Checking Policy—to every attorney in the Firm, obtaining acknowledgment of receipt by each attorney. The Firm must comply with this requirement within thirty days from the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and must certify to the Court within twenty-four hours of that compliance that the requirement has been met.

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[Eugene Volokh] Exorcist Files vs. Jesus 911 Libel Suit

["The Defendants intentionally or recklessly invited public critique and scrutiny over Plaintiff's title as an exorcist by repeatedly asserting that the Plaintiff is not an exorcist."]

From the Complaint in Martins v. Romero (E.D. Mich.), filed Monday:

This is a defamation and false light action stemming from false and misleading statements published on the Jesus 911 podcast on the November 20th, November 27th, and December 4th, 2024 episodes. The Defendants intentionally or recklessly invited public critique and scrutiny over Plaintiff's title as an exorcist by repeatedly asserting that the Plaintiff is not an exorcist. The Defendants' statements have perpetuated a narrative that undermines the Plaintiff's credibility….

The Exorcist Files is a podcast co-created and co-hosted by Ryan Bethea and Fr. Martins…. Due to the popularity of the podcast, Fr. Martins published a book, also titled The Exorcist Files, where he provides a comprehensive view of the 2,000-year-old Catholic ministry of exorcism, examining spiritual dangers lurking in modern society, to help readers understand how to remain free from their influence and control….

Jesus 911 published an episode of the podcast titled "What Is the American Model of Exorcism?" …. In this episode, Romero and Clement continue their discussion from the November 20th Episode on exorcisms…. Romero praised Clement's position in Liber Christo and Clement's teachings at the Pope Leo XIII Institute, a private non-profit organization recognized for the "total education and training of priests in the holy ministry of exorcism and deliverance." Romero, on behalf of Clement, asserted that the field of exorcism is small and Clement knows, and has access to, every exorcist in every diocese worldwide. There are more than 3,000 dioceses worldwide. This characterization bolsters Clement's credibility as a set up for him to then criticize and undermine Fr. Martins' credibility and experience as an exorcist….

Romero later explained that part of the reason he reached out to Fr. Martins' religious Order was due to a conversation he and Clement had a few years prior to 2024 regarding Fr. Martins. In recounting that conversation on the November 27th Episode, Romero articulated that Clement previously told him "[Fr. Martins is] not an exorcist" due to the fact that Fr. Martins does not appear in the Liber Christo database. Both knew that a priest does not need to appear on this "database" to perform exorcisms.

Romero received a response from Dede Ayotte, Secretary to the General Superior of Companions of the Cross, which confirmed that Fr. Martins performs exorcisms. The response reads as follows:

"In answer to your inquiry Fr. Carlos has not been appointed as an exorcist by a particular diocese. His full-time ministry is Treasures of the Church, however, due to his travels, he has been involved in exorcisms with the appropriate permission and or by request of the corresponding bishop."

… In this email, Companions of the Cross accurately described Fr. Martins' status as an exorcist. However, at or around the 14:42 minute mark of the November 27th Episode, Romero does not read the full response he received from Companions of the Cross. Instead, knowing he was lying, he only read aloud the following portion: "Hello Jesse, in answer to your inquiry, Fr. Carlos has not been appointed as an exorcist by a particular diocese. His full-time ministry is Treasures of the Church."

At or around the 17:14 minute mark, Romero continued to intentionally and recklessly publish false statements on the November 27th Episode about Fr. Martins: "I just don't understand why he's purporting to be an exorcist when his Order says he's not." Romero knows Fr. Martins is an exorcist but intentionally or recklessly chose not to read the rest of the email response from Companions of the Cross to perpetuate a false narrative on his podcast that Fr. Martins is a fraud.

My quick reaction: Many allegations about a person's qualities as an exorcist wouldn't be actionable, for instance because they are opinions or because resolving them would require resolving claims about theology or the supernatural, e.g., "X is an incompetent exorcist," "X's techniques don't actually exorcise demons," "X is a damned heretic," and so on.

But a false allegation that a particular organization says he's not an exorcist may be actionable, even if less concrete statements would be just statements of opinion. An analogy: Saying a rabbi "isn't really Orthodox" or "doesn't really know the Talmud" wouldn't be actionable, but saying the rabbi didn't actually graduate from a particular rabbinical seminary would generally be a factual assertion that could be defamatory if false.

In any case, so far we're just at the Complaint stage; we'll see what develops.

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[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: November 24, 2001

11/24/2001: Salim Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan. The Supreme Court would decide his case in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006).

The Roberts Court (2006)

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[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread

[What’s on your mind?]

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