Daniel Orr's Blog, page 73

January 25, 1971 – Idi Amin seizes power in a coup in Uganda

On January 25, 1971, Ugandan President Milton Obote wasoverthrown in a military coup while he was on a foreign mission.  Fearing for his safety, he did not return to Uganda but flew to Tanzania,Uganda’ssouthern neighbor, where Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere gave him politicalsanctuary.  President Nyerere’s action,however, was not well received by General Idi Amin, the leader of the Ugandancoup, and relations between the two countries deteriorated.

In Uganda,General Amin took over power and established a military dictatorship, and namedhimself the country’s president and head of the armed forces.  He carried out a purge of military elementsthat were perceived as loyal to the former regime.  As a result, thousands of officers andsoldiers were executed.  General Aminthen formed a clique of staunchly loyal military officers whom he promotedbased on devotion and subservience to his government rather than on merit andcompetence.  In lieu of local civiliangovernments, General Amin set up regional military commands led by an armyofficer who held considerable power. Corruption and inefficiency soon plagued all levels of government.

Africa showing location of Uganda and Tanzania and nearby countries.

(Taken from Uganda-Tanzania War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 3)

Military officers who had been bypassed or demoted fromtheir positions became disgruntled.  Manyof these officers, including thousands of soldiers, crossed the border to Tanzania and metup with ex-President Obote and other exiled Ugandan leaders.  Together, they formed an armed rebel groupwhose aim was to overthrow General Amin. The rebels were well received by the Tanzanian government, whichprovided them with military and financial support.

In 1972, the rebels launched an attack in southern Uganda and came to within the town of Masaka where they triedto incite the local population to revolt against the Ugandan government.  No revolt took place, however.  General Amin sent his forces to Masaka, andin the fighting that followed, the rebels were thrown back across the border.

Ugandan planes pursued the rebels in northern Tanzania, butattacked the Tanzanian towns of Bukoba and Mwanza, causing somedestruction.  The Tanzanian governmentfiled a diplomatic protest and increased its forces in northern Tanzania.  Tensions rose between the two countries.Through mediation efforts of Somalia,however, war was averted and the two countries agreed to deescalate thetension, and withdrew their forces a distance of ten kilometers from theircommon border.

The insurgency provoked General Amin into intensifying hissuppressive policies, especially against the ethnic groups of his politicalenemies.  All social classes from theserival ethnicities were targeted, from businessmen, doctors, lawyers, and theclergy, to workers, peasants, and villagers. Even members of General Amin’s Cabinet and top military officers werenot spared.  General Amin’s secretpolice, called the State Research Bureau, carried out numerous summaryexecutions and forced disappearances, as well as tortures and arbitraryarrests.  During General Amin’seight-year reign in power, an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 Ugandans werekilled.

General Amin also expelled the ethnic South Asian communityfrom Uganda.  These South Asian Ugandans were thedescendants of contract workers from the Indian subcontinent who had beenbrought to Ugandaduring the British colonial period. South Asians comprised only 1% of the total population but werepredominantly merchants, traders, landowners, and industrialists who held adisproportionately large share of Uganda’s economy; other SouthAsians were wealthy professionals, held clerical jobs, or were tradesmen.

After the expulsion, the South Asians’ businesses andproperties were seized by the government and distributed to the generalpopulation in line with General Amin’s program of promoting the social andeconomic advancement of black Ugandans. However, many of the assets ended up being owned by General Amin’smilitary and political associates, most of whom had no knowledge of running abusiness.  Soon, most of these operationsfailed and closed down.

As a result, Uganda’seconomy deteriorated.  Poverty andunemployment soared, and basic commodities became non-existent or in very lowsupply.  Coffee beans, the country’s mainexport product, were required by law to be sold to the government.  But as the government failed to pay orunderpaid the farmers, the smuggling of coffee beans to nearby Kenya (whereprices were much higher) became widespread and carried out by farmers andtraders at the risk of a government-issued shoot-to-kill order againstviolators.  Eventually, however, coffeebean smuggling operations came under the control of the army commandersthemselves.

Initially, the Western media was fascinated by GeneralAmin’s idiosyncratic behavior and outrageous statements, making the Ugandanleader extremely popular in foreign news reports.  But as his brutal regime and human rightsrecord became known, Britainand the United States, both Uganda’straditional allies, distanced themselves and ended diplomatic relations withGeneral Amin’s government.  Uganda then turned to the Soviet Union, which soon became the Ugandan government’s main supplier ofweapons.  Ugandaalso strengthened military ties with Libyaand diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.

By 1978, Ugandahad become isolated diplomatically from much of the internationalcommunity.  Despite outward appearances,the government was experiencing growing dissent from within.  A year earlier, General Amin was nearlyousted in a coup carried out by high-ranking government officials, underscoringthe growing political opposition to his rule.

Then in November 1978, Uganda’s Vice-President, Mustafa Adrisi,was wounded in a car accident, which might have been an assassination attempton his life.  Adrisi’s militarysupporters, which included some elite units, broke out in mutiny.

January 24, 1986 – Ugandan Bush War – Rebel forces capture Kampala

On January 22, 1986, rebel forces of the National ResistanceArmy (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni, laid siege to Kampala, capturing the Ugandancapital three days later.  The governmentcollapsed, with its leaders fleeing into exile abroad.  Thousands of Kampala residents took to the streets andwarmly received Museveni and the NRA fighters. On January 23, 1986, Museveni took over power and declared himselfpresident of Uganda. The Ugandan Bush War was over; between300,000 and 500,000 persons had lost their lives.

Africa showing location of Uganda and nearby countries.

(Taken from Ugandan Bush War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 3)

Background OnApril 11, 1979, General Idi Amin was removed from power when the TanzanianArmy, supported by Ugandan rebels, invaded and took over Uganda (previous article).  Uganda then entered a transitionalperiod aimed at a return to democracy, a process that generated great politicalinstability.  A succession of leadersheld power only briefly because of tensions between the civilian government andthe newly reorganized Ugandan military leadership.  Furthermore, ethnic-based political partieswrangled with each other, hoping to gain and play a bigger role in the futuregovernment.

In general elections held in December 1980, former PresidentMilton Obote, who had been the country’s head of state before being deposed ina coup by General Amin in 1971, returned to power by winning the presidentialrace.  It was hoped that the electionswould advance the country’s transition to democracy.  Instead, they served as the trigger for thecivil war that followed.  Defeatedpolitical groups accused President Obote of cheating to win the elections.  Tensions rose within the already chargedpolitical atmosphere.  Many armed groupsthat already existed during the war now rose up in rebellion against thegovernment.

War The UgandanCivil War is historically cited as having started on February 6, 1981, when oneof the armed groups attacked a Ugandan military facility. The various rebelmilitias were tribe-based, operated independently of each other, and generallycarried out their activities only within their local and regionalstrongholds.  One such rebel militiaconsisted of former Ugandan Army soldiers still loyal to General Amin, andfought out of the West Nile District, which was General Amin’s homeland.  The various rebel militias had limitedcapability to confront government forces and therefore employed hit-and-runtactics, such as ambushing army patrols, raiding armories and seizing weapons,and carrying out sabotage operations against government installations.

The rebel group that ultimately prevailed in the war was theNational Resistance Army (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’sformer Defense Minister.  As a universitystudent, Museveni had received training in guerilla warfare, which he wouldlater put to use in the war.

In response, the Ugandan Army launched an extensivecounter-insurgency campaign in the countryside. The soldiers particularly targeted the rural population, which theybelieved was supporting the rebels.  Themany atrocities committed by soldiers included summary executions, tortures,rapes, lootings, and destruction of homes and properties.  The West Nile District was hard hit becauseof its fierce opposition to President Obote. Furthermore, soldiers from other ethnic groups were repressed during thereign of General Amin.  Thus, after thedictator’s overthrow, these ethnic groups, particularly the Acholi and Langowhich formed the majority in the Ugandan Army, carried out revenge by targetingcivilians in the West Nile District.

The insurgency spread throughout most of Uganda, but the greatest concentration of rebelactivity took place in the Luwero Triangle (Map 23), a rural region located justnorth of Kampala,the country’s capital.  Consequently, thegovernment’s counter-insurgency measures were most intense in the LuweroTriangle, which also received widespread international media attention.  To cut off the insurgency’s source ofsupport, government forces depopulated villages and settlements in the LuweroTriangle and relocated the residents into guarded resettlement camps.

The military campaigns had a great impact on thecountryside, particularly in terms of human casualties.  In the Luwero Triangle, tens of thousands ofcivilians were killed, while hundreds of thousands fled from the region.  In the West Nile District, 30,000 personslost their lives, while 500,000 fled to neighboring Sudanand Zaire.  As a result of the increasing violence, Britain and the United States ended their economic support to Uganda, whichonly worsened the already dire conditions in that African country.

In December 1983, General David Oyite-Ojok, the UgandanArmed Forces chief of staff, died in a helicopter crash.  General Oyite-Ojok was an Acholi.  President Obote appointed a fellow Lango asthe new chief of staff.  General BazilioOlara-Okello, an Acholi, was infuriated as he was the next in line to succeedGeneral Oyite-Ojok.  Tensions rosebetween Acholis and Langos in the military, which led to skirmishes.  In July 1985, General Olara-Okello and otherofficers, declaring their dissatisfaction with the government’s conduct of thewar, overthrew President Obote in a coup.

The coup leaders took over power and formed a “MilitaryCouncil” to run the country.  Peace talkswere held with the various rebel groups, which soon led to an agreement thatestablished a power-sharing government that included rebel leaders who haddisarmed and disbanded their militias. However, Ugandacontinued to experience unrest and widespread violence, and the enmity betweenAcholi and Lango soldiers undermined the military’s ability to operateeffectively.  Most crucially, thegovernment’s peace agreement with Museveni and the NRA, although signed by thetwo sides, was not implemented, and hostility and mistrust remained.

January 23, 1991 – Rwandan Civil War: Rebels attack the town of Ruhengeri

On January 23, 1991, forces of the insurgent RwandanPatriotic Front (RPF), led by Paul Kagame, attacked the northern town of Ruhengeri, where theyseized weapons from the local army barracks. They withdrew the next day when government forces arrived.  Then for the next 18 months, Kagame usedguerilla tactics to elude the Rwandan Army, while staging pin-prick attacks onisolated military outposts, patrols, and convoys.  Despite its superiority in personnel andweapons, the Rwandan Army was unable to inflict a decisive defeat on therebels.

Africa showing location of Rwanda and nearby countries.

Then in June 1992, with mediation by the Organization ofAfrican Unity, or OAU, the government and Kagame signed a ceasefire agreementin Arusha, Tanzania.  OAU officials arrived in Rwanda tomonitor the ceasefire.  Later in 1992,the government and the rebels held peace talks which, however, failed toproduce a clear settlement.  PowerfulHutu radicals in the Rwandan government rejected the peace process, as theywere opposed to making any deals with Tutsis. These radical Hutus formed civilian armed groups, the most notoriousbeing the “death squads” known as the Interahamwe, whose only motive was tokill Tutsis.  Soon, the Interahamwe beganattacking Tutsi civilians.

(Taken from Rwandan Civil War and Genocide – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 2)

Rwandan Genocide OnApril 6, 1994, President Habyarimina and Burundi’shead of state, Cyprien Ntaryamira, were killed by undetermined assassins whentheir plane was shot down by a rocket-propelled grenade as it was about to landin Kigali.  A staunchly anti-Tutsi military governmenttook over power in Rwanda.Within a few hours and in reprisal for the double assassinations, the newgovernment unleashed the Interahamwe “death squads” to murder Tutsis andmoderate Hutus on sight.  Over the nextseveral weeks, in the event known as the “Rwandan Genocide”, large numbers ofcivilians were murdered in Kigaliand throughout the country.  No place wassafe; in some instances, even Catholic churches were the scenes of themassacres of thousands of Tutsis where they had taken refuge.

The attackers used clubs, spears, firearms, and grenades,but their main weapon was the machete, with which they had trained extensivelyand which they used to hack away at their victims.  At the urging of local officials, Hutucivilians joined in the killing frenzy, and turned against their Tutsineighbors, acquaintances, and even relatives. In many cases, the threat of being killed for appearing sympathetic toTutsis forced many otherwise disinterested Hutus to participate.

The Rwandan Army provided the Interahamwe with a list ofTutsis to be killed, and raised road blocks to prevent any escape.  The death toll in the Rwandan Genocide rangesfrom between 800,000 to one million; some 10% of the fatalities were moderateHutus.  The genocide lasted for about 100days, from between April 6 to July 15, producing a killing rate of 10,000persons a day.  The speed by which it wascarried out makes the Rwandan Genocide the fastest in history.  (By comparison, the Holocaust in Europe during World War II, although producing a muchhigher death toll, was carried out over a number of years.)

During the course of the genocide, the UN force in Rwanda wasordered not to intervene by the UN Secretary General.  In any case, the UN force was seriouslyundermanned and only lightly armed to stop the widespread violence.

The UN peacekeepers, however, managed to protect thecivilians inside their zone of authority. Shortly after the violence began, foreign diplomats and their staff fromthe various embassies in Kigalifled the country.  Other civilianexpatriates were evacuated as well.  Theinternational community, including the Western powers, chose not to intervenein the genocide or misread the upsurge in violence as just another combat phasein the civil war.

January 22, 1981 – Start of the Paquisha War, when a Peruvian transport helicopter is attacked in the Comaina Valley

On January 22, 1981, the Paquisha War between Peru and Ecuadorbroke out when a Peruvian transport helicopter was fired upon in the Comaina Valley, in a Peruvian-controlled areathat had been seized by Ecuadorian troops. Subsequently, Peruvian authorities discovered that the Ecuadorians hadconstructed three outposts in the Comaina Valley along the easternslope of the Condor.  The Ecuadoriansnamed their outposts Mayaicu, Machinaza, and Paquisha, with the latter for whichthe coming war was named.  In anOrganization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers meeting held onFebruary 2, 1981, the Peruvian representative denounced the Ecuadorian action.  Then in the next few days, Peruvian forcesattacked the outposts, forcing the Ecuadorians to withdraw to their side of theCondor Mountain Range.  By February 5, Peru had regained control of the whole Comaina Valley and also seized Ecuadorianmilitary supplies and equipment that had been abandoned.

Ecuador and Peru (and other nearby South American countries) as they appear in current maps. For much of the twentieth century, the Ecuador–Peru border was incompletely demarcated, producing tensions and wars between the two countries.

(Taken from Paquisha War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 2)

Background InJuly 1941, Ecuador and Peru(Map 38) fought a war for possession of disputed territory located in theAmazon rainforest.  After the war, bothcountries signed, in January 29, 1942, the Rio Protocol (officially called theProtocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries), which called for establishingthe international border between Ecuadorand Peru.  Four guarantor countries of the Rio Protocol,namely, the United States, Brazil, Argentina,and Chile,were tasked to under the border delineation process.  Since much of the territory where the borderwould pass was thick Amazonian jungle, U.S. planes were brought in toundertake aerial surveys and thereby upgrade the existing Spanish colonial-eramaps of the region.  Consequently, theMixed Border Commission, which was composed of technical teams from Ecuador, Peru, and the four guarantorcountries, succeeded in plotting much of the 1,600 kilometers of theEcuador-Peru border.

The U.S. aerial maps, released in February 1947, showed anerror in the technical descriptions used as the basis of the Rio Protocol inthe watered areas adjoining the Condor Mountain Range (Spanish: Cordillera del Condor).  In particular, the CenepaRiver, situated between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers, was discovered tobe much more extensive than previously thought. As a result of the flaw, Ecuadorwanted to renegotiate the border along the 78-kilometer length of the CondorMountain Range, a proposal that was rejected by Peru.  Furthermore, the U.S.maps showed two divortium aquariums, and not just one, between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers, as indicated inArticle VIII of the Rio Protocol, a discrepancy that eventually led theEcuadorian government to declare that the Protocol, being flawed, wasimpossible to implement.

Two years earlier, in July 1945, when the length of the Cenepa Riverwas yet undetermined and only one divortium aquarium was thought to exist inthe Condor, the question of the placement of the border in the Condor MountainRange was brought before Brazilian Naval Captain Braz Dias de Aguiar.  The multinational guarantors of the RioProtocol had tasked Captain Dias de Aguiar, a technical expert, to mediate onthe disputes that should arise.  In hisdecision, Captain Dias de Aguiar, declared that the Condor Mountain Range wasthe border; this decision was accepted by Ecuadorand Peru.

As a result of the discrepancies in the Rio Protocolrevealed by the U.S.aerial maps, the Ecuadorian government pulled out its representatives from theMixed Border Commission in September 1948, and withdrew altogether from theDemarcation Committee in 1953.  Thedemarcation of the border then stopped, with all but 78 kilometers of the wholelength left unsettled.  In September1960, Ecuadordeclared the Rio Protocol as null and void, stating that the Ecuadoriangovernment during the 1941 war, had been forced under duress to accede to theProtocol, as Peruvian forces were occupying Ecuadorian territory at that time.

Consequently, no major diplomatic initiatives were made toresolve the disputed border area.  Forthe next several years, the heavily forested region was unexplored andunsettled, although a few indigenous tribes resided there.  The area soon became militarized as Ecuador and Perusent troops to stake claims, setting up bunkers and outposts, with theEcuadorians positioned at the top and on the western slopes of the CondorMountain Range and Peruvians along the eastern slopes and adjacent Comaina Valley areas.  Supplies to these army positions were sent byhelicopters, as the region practically did not have any roads.

January 21, 1995 – Cenepa War- Peru lands troops behind Ecuadorian outposts in the disputed Condor-Cenepa border region, triggering war

By early January 1995, the strong Peruvian presence wasbeing felt with an increase in military activities near the Ecuadorian forwardoutposts.  Ecuadorian and Peruvianpatrols encountered each other on January 9 and January 11, with the latterencounter leading to an exchange of gunfire. Then on January 21, 1995, Peruvian troops were landed by helicopterbehind the Ecuadorian outposts in preparation for a Peruvian fulloffensive.  The infiltration wasdiscovered when an Ecuadorian patrol spotted some 20 Peruvian soldiers settingup a heliport.  Ecuadorian Special Forceswere called in; after a two days’ trek through the jungle, the Ecuadorianslocated the Peruvian camp.  In theensuing firefight, the Ecuadorians dispersed the Peruvians.  A number of Peruvians were killed, while theabandoned weapons and supplies in the camp were seized. The Cenepa War was on.

Ecuador and Peru (and other nearby South American countries) as they appear in current maps. For much of the twentieth century, the Ecuador–Peru border was incompletely demarcated, producing tensions and wars between the two countries.

(Taken from Cenepa War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 2)

Background The1981 Paquisha War (previous article) between Ecuadorand Peru left unsettled theborder dispute regarding sovereignty over the CondorMountain range and the Cenepa Riversystem located inside the Amazon rainforest. Peruvian forces achieved a tactical victory by destroying threeEcuadorian forward outposts and re-established control over the whole easternside of the Condor range, although the Ecuadorian government continued to claimownership over the whole Condor-Cenepa region. In the years following the Paquisha War, the two sides strengthenedtheir areas of control in the region, with the Ecuadorians occupying the peaksand western slope of the Condor range, and the Peruvians at the Condor’seastern slope and Cenepa Valley.  Because of the thick forest cover, Ecuadorianand Peruvian patrols often accidentally encountered each other, which at thevery worst, led to exchanges of gunfire, but generally ended without incident,as the two sides had agreed to abide by the Cartillas de Seguridad yConfianza (Guidelines for Security and Trust), which lay down the rules toprevent unnecessary bloodshed.

In November 1994, a Peruvian army patrol came upon an enemyoutpost and was told by the Ecuadorian commander there that the location wassituated inside the Ecuadorian Army’s area of control.  The Peruvian Army soon learned that theoutpost, which the Ecuadorians named “Base Sur”, was located on the easternslope of the Condor, and therefore in the area traditionally under Peruviancontrol.  Thereafter, the Ecuadorian andPeruvian local commanders met a number of times to try and work out aresolution, but nothing came out of the meetings.

With tensions rising by December 1994, Ecuador and Perubegan sending reinforcements and large quantities of weapons and militaryequipment to the disputed zone, a difficult and hazardous operation(particularly for Peru’s Armed Forces because of the greater distance) whichrequired air transports because of the absence of roads leading to the Condorregion.

Apart from “Base Sur”, the Ecuadorians had set up a numberof other outposts, including “Tiwintza” and “Cueva de los Tayos”, and thelarger “Coangos”, near the top of the Condor Mountain.  The camps’ defenses were strengthened by newminefields laid out at the approaches, and the installation of anti-aircraftbatteries and multiple-rocket launchers; a further boost was provided by thearrival of Ecuadorian Special Forces and specialized teams equipped withhand-held surface-to-air missile launchers to be used against Peruvian planes.

By early January 1995, the strong Peruvian presence wasbeing felt with an increase in military activities near the Ecuadorian forwardoutposts.  Ecuadorian and Peruvianpatrols encountered each other on January 9 and January 11, with the latterencounter leading to an exchange of gunfire. Then on January 21, Peruvian troops were landed by helicopter behind theEcuadorian outposts in preparation for a Peruvian full offensive.  The infiltration was discovered when anEcuadorian patrol spotted some 20 Peruvian soldiers setting up a heliport.  Ecuadorian Special Forces were called in;after a two days’ trek through the jungle, the Ecuadorians located the Peruviancamp.  In the ensuing firefight, theEcuadorians dispersed the Peruvians.  Anumber of Peruvians were killed, while the abandoned weapons and supplies inthe camp were seized.

January 20, 1948 – Indian-Pakistani War of 1947: The UNSC passes Resolution 39

On January 20, 1948, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 39 where it offered to set up a UN Commission to assist in resolving the conflict in Kashmir. The proposed UN Commission was only realized with UNSC Resolution 47 passed on April 21, 1948. Resolution 47 recommended a three-step process to establish peace: that Pakistan withdraw its citizens from Kashmir, that India progressively reduce its forces there, and that a plebiscite be held in Kashmir to determine its political future. Through mediation efforts by the UN Commission, India and Pakistan agreed to the commission’s two resolutions, and a ceasefire was achieved in early 1949. But as hostility and distrust remained, in the end, the UN Commission declared that its mission in Kashmir had failed.

India and Pakistan. Diagram shows India and the two “wings” of Pakistan (West Pakistan and East Pakistan) on either side. Kashmir, the battleground during the Indian-Pakistani War of 1947, is located in the northern central section of the Indian subcontinent.

(Taken from Indian-Pakistani War of 1947 – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 2)

On August 15, 1947, the new state of Kashmir (Map 1) founditself geographically located next to Indiaand Pakistan,two rival countries that recently had gained their independences after thecataclysmic partition of the Indian subcontinent.  Fearing the widespread violence that hadaccompanied the birth of Indiaand Pakistan, the Kashmirimonarch, who was a Hindu, chose to remain neutral and allow Kashmirto be nominally independent in order to avoid the same tragedy from befallinghis mixed constituency of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs.

Pakistanexerted diplomatic pressure on Kashmir, however, as the Pakistani governmenthad significant strategic and economic interests in the former Princely State. Most Pakistanis also shared a common religion with the overwhelminglyMuslim Kashmiri population.  India also nurtured ambitions on Kashmir andwanted to bring the former Princely State into its sphere ofinfluence.  After Kashmir gained back itssovereignty, the British colonial troops departed; consequently, Kashmir was left only with a small native army to enforcepeace and order.

On October 22, 1947, when rumors surfaced that Kashmir wouldmerge with India,Muslim Kashmiris in the state’s western regions broke out in rebellion.  The rebels soon were joined by Pakistanifighters who entered the Kashmiri border from Pakistan.  The rebels and Pakistanis seized the towns ofMuzzafarabad and Dommel (Map 1) where they disarmed the Kashmiri troops, whothereafter also joined the rebels.

Within a few days, the rebellion had spread to Baramula andthreatened Srinagar, Kashmir’scapital.  The Kashmiri ruler fled to India,where he pleaded for military assistance with the Indian government.  The Indians agreed on the condition thatKashmir be merged with India,to which the Kashmiri ruler gave his consent. Soon thereafter, Kashmir’s status as asovereign state ended.  On October 27,1947, Indian forces arrived in Srinagarand expelled the rebels, who by this time, had entered the capital.

Earlier, Indiaand Pakistan had jointlyagreed to a policy of non-intervention in Kashmir’sinternal affairs.  But with theterritorial merger of Indiaand Kashmir, Indian forces gained the legal authority to occupy the former Princely State. The Pakistani government now ordered its forces to invade Kashmir.  ThePakistan Armed Forces chief of staff, however, who was also a British Armyofficer, refused to comply, since doing so would pit him against LordMountbatten, the British Governor General of India, who had ordered the Indiantroops to Kashmir.  With the Pakistanimilitary leadership in a crisis and its army placed on hold, the Indian Armyvirtually deployed unopposed in Kashmir andsecured much of the state.

In early November 1947, the Gilgit Scouts, a civilianparamilitary based in the Gilgit region in northern Kashmir,broke out in rebellion over some disagreement with the Kashmirigovernment.  The Gilgit Scouts soon werejoined by tribal militias from Chitral in northern Pakistan.  Together, they wrested control of the wholenorthern Kashmir.

By mid-November 1947, the Indian Army’s counter-attacks inthe west had recaptured Uri and Baramula and had pushed back the coalition of Kashmir rebels and Pakistani fighters toward thePakistani border.  Further Indianadvances were stalled by the onset of winter, however, as the Indian troopswere not prepared for fighting in the cold, high altitudes and wereencountering logistical problems.

With the Indian forces settling down to a defensiveposition, the rebel coalition forces went on the attack and captured the townsof Kotli and Mirpur in the south, thereby extending the battle lines on thewest to a nearly north to south axis.  Insouthwest Kashmir, the Indians took Chamb, and fortified the key city of Jammu, which remained intheir possession throughout the war.

With the arrival of spring weather in May 1948, the Indianslaunched a number of offensive operations in the west and retook the towns ofTithwail, Keran, and Gurais.  In thenorth, a daring Indian attack using battle tanks at high altitudes captured Ziji-La Pass and Dras.  But later that year, the arrival of PakistanArmy units in rebel-held Kashmir in the weststopped further significant Indian advances.

Pakistan Army units also were deployed in Kashmir’sHigh Himalayas to augment the Gilgit-Chitral rebel coalition forces.  Together, they advanced south and capturedSkardu and Kargil, and threatened Leh.  Acounter-attack by the Indian Army in May 1948, however, stopped the PakistanArmy-led forces, which were pushed back north of Kargil.

In early 1948, the battle lines settled in northern andwestern Kashmir – these lines held for therest of the war.  As the two sidesprepared to settle down for the winter, the Indian government asked the UnitedNations (UN) to mediate in the war. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army launched a surprise offensive in the westwhich, however, did not significantly alter the front lines.

The UN released two previously approved resolutions for aceasefire and the future of Kashmir, which were accepted by India and Pakistan.  The war officially ended on December 31, 1948.

January 19, 1960 – Algerian War of Independence: French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle fires General Massu

French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle weakened the FrenchAlgerian Army’s radicalism when on January 19, 1960, he dismissed General JacquesMassu, victor of the Battle of Algiers, who had threatened insubordination bydeclaring that he and other officers may choose to not follow de Gaulle’sorders. Three months later, in April 1960, de Gaulle reassigned General Challe,commander-in-chief of the French Algerian Army, away from Algeria, just as thelatter was on the verge of inflicting a decisive defeat on the FLN “internal”forces.

(Taken from Algerian War of Independence – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 4)

General Massu’s dismissal sparked the “Week of Barricades”(French: La semaine des barricades)starting on January 24, 1960, where some 30,000 pieds-noirs took to thestreets, seized government buildings, and set up barricades in an act ofdefiance against de Gaulle’s government. Viewing these acts as a threat to his regime, de Gaulle, donning hisWorld War II brigadier general’s uniform in a televised broadcast on January29, 1960, appealed to the French people and armed forces to remain loyal to France.  The French 10th Parachute Division, which hadwon the Battle of Algiers for France,did not launch suppressive action against the barricades, but the refusal ofthe French Army to join the protesters doomed the uprising.  The French 25th Parachute Division finallybroke up the barricades; casualties for the protesters were 22 dead and 147wounded, and for the Algerian gendarmes (police), 14 dead and 123 wounded.

A further sign of de Gaulle’s shift in policy toward Algeria took place in June 1960 when he took upa truce offer by a regional leader of the National Liberation Front (FLN;French: Front de Libération Nationale)and negotiate a “warrior’s peace” (French: lapaix des braves); however, peace talks held in Melun (in France) failed.  Then by November 1960, de Gaulle had decidedon Algeria’sfate.  On November 4, he declared that “therewill be an Algerian republic one day, which will not be France”.  He further stated a “new course”, i.e. an“emancipated Algeria…which,if the Algerians so desire…will have its own government, its institutions, andits laws”.  De Gaulle then prepared areferendum for France and Algeria to determine whether Algeria shouldbe given self-determination.

France’s possessions in Africa included the vast French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa (shaded on the left).

By the early 1960s, de Gaulle was shifting his foreign andeconomic priorities to Europe primarily by boosting France’srapidly improving relations with Germany,which ultimately led to the signing, together with Italy,Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, of the Treaty of Romein March 1957 that established the European Economic Council (EEC, precursor ofthe European Union).  Furthermore, in thecontext of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union, de Gaulle wanted to make France, despiteits alignment with the West through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), a political and military “third force” separate from the two superpowers.

De Gaulle’s plan to disengage from Algeria was merely one episode in thedecolonization process that Francehad undertaken in Africa in 1960: by the end of that year, the once vast French West Africa had given way to 13 independentcountries.  Similarly, the British Empire(which together with France held the greatest colonial territorial share ofAfrica) also had begun the process of decolonization in 1960 (apart from Ghana,which gained independence in 1957), having been triggered in February of thatyear when British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan issued his “Wind of Change”speech, declaring that in Africa, “the wind of change is blowing” and “whetherwe like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact”.  Also in 1960, Belgiumturned over political authority to a newly independent Democratic Republic of the Congo and would dothe same to Rwanda and Burundi in1962.  Portugaland Spaintried to hold onto their African possessions, but in the ensuing years, becamemired in long and bitter independence wars against indigenous nationalistmovements.

Furthermore, on December 14, 1960, the United NationsGeneral Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 1514 (XV) titled “Declaration of theGranting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, which establisheddecolonization as a fundamental principle of the UN.  Five days later, on December 19, the UNreleased UNGA Resolution 1573 that recognized the right of self-determinationof the Algerian people.

On January 8, 1961, in a referendum held in France and Algeria,75% of the voters agreed that Algeriamust be allowed self-determination.  TheFrench government then began to hold secret peace negotiations with theFLN.  In April 1961, four retired FrenchArmy officers (Generals Salan, Challe, André Zeller, and Edmond Jouhaud, andassisted by radical elements of the pied-noir community) led the French commandin Algiers in a military uprising that deposed the civilian government of thecity and set up a four-man “Directorate”. The rebellion, variously known as the 1961 Algiers Putsch (French: Putsch d’Alger) or Generals’ Putsch(French: Putsch des Généraux), was acoup to be carried out in two phases: taking over authority in Algeria with thedefeat of the FLN and establishment of a civilian government; and overthrowingde Gaulle in Paris by rebelling paratroopers based near the French capital.

De Gaulle invoked the constitution’s provision that gave himemergency powers, declared a state of emergency in Algeria, and in a nationwidebroadcast on April 23, appealed to the French Army and civilian population toremain loyal to his government.  TheFrench Air Force flew the empty air transports from Algeriato southern France toprevent them from being used by rebel forces to invade France, while the French commands in Oran and Constantineheeded de Gaulle’s appeal and did not join the rebellion.  Devoid of external support, the Algiersuprising collapsed, with Generals Challe and Zeller being arrested and laterimprisoned by military authorities, together with hundreds of other mutineeringofficers, while Generals Salan and Jouhaud went into hiding to continue thestruggle with the pieds-noirs against Algerian independence.

On April 28, 1961, in the midst of the uprising, Frenchmilitary authorities test-fired France’s first atomic bomb in the SaharaDesert, moving forward the date of the detonation ostensibly to prevent thenuclear weapon from falling into the hands of the rebel troops.  The attempted coup dealt a serious blow toFrench Algeria, as de Gaulle increased efforts to end the war with the Algeriannationalists.

In May 1961, the French government and the GPRA (the FLN’sgovernment-in-exile) held peace talks at Évian, France, whichproved contentious and difficult.  But onMarch 18, 1962, the two sides signed an agreement called the Évian Accords,which included a ceasefire (that came into effect the following day) and arelease of war prisoners; the agreement’s major stipulations were: Frenchrecognition of a sovereign Algeria; independent Algeria’s guaranteeing theprotection of the pied-noir community; and Algeria allowing French militarybases to continue in its territory, as well as establishing privilegedAlgerian-French economic and trade relations, particularly in the developmentof Algeria’s nascent oil industry.

In a referendum held in France on April 8, 1962, over 90% ofthe French people approved of the Évian Accords; the same referendum held inAlgeria on July 1, 1962 resulted in nearly six million voting in favor of theagreement while only 16,000 opposed it (by this time, most of the one millionpieds-noirs had or were in the process of leaving Algeria or simply recognizedthe futility of their lost cause, thus the extraordinarily low number of “no”votes).

However, pied-noir hardliners and pro-French Algeriamilitary officers still were determined to derail the political process,forming one year earlier (in January 1961) the “Organization of the SecretArmy” (OAS; French: Organisation del’armée secrète) led by General Salan, in a (futile) attempt to stop the1961 referendum to determine Algerian self-determination.  Organized specifically as a terror militia,the OAS had begun to carry out violent militant acts in 1961, which dramaticallyescalated in the four months between the signing of the Évian Accords and thereferendum on Algerian independence.  Thegroup hoped that its terror campaign would provoke the FLN to retaliate, whichwould jeopardize the ceasefire between the government and the FLN, and possiblylead to a resumption of the war.  Attheir peak in March 1962, OAS operatives set off 120 bombs a day in Algiers, targeting Frenchmilitary and police, FLN, and Muslim civilians – thus, the war had an ironictwist, as France and the FLN now were on the same side of the conflict againstthe pieds-noirs.

The French Army and OAS even directly engaged each other –in the Battle of Bab el-Oued, where French security forces succeeded in seizingthe OAS stronghold of Bab el-Oued, a neighborhood in Algiers, with combined casualties totaling 54dead and 140 injured.  The OAS alsotargeted prominent Algerian Muslims with assassinations but its main target wasde Gaulle, who escaped many attempts on his life.  The most dramatic of the assassinationattacks on de Gaulle took place in a Parissuburb where a group of gunmen led by Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry, a Frenchmilitary officer, opened fire on the presidential car with bullets from theassailants’ semi-automatic rifles barely missing the president.  Bastien-Thiry, who was not an OAS member, wasarrested, put on trial, and later executed by firing squad.

In the end, the OAS plan to provoke the FLN into launchingretaliation did not succeed, as the Algerian revolutionaries adhered to theceasefire.  On June 17, 1962, the OAS theFLN agreed to a ceasefire.  Theeight-year war was over.  Some 350,000 toas high as one million people died in the war; about two million AlgerianMuslims were displaced from their homes, being forced by the French Army torelocate to guarded camps.

Aftermath of theAlgerian War of Independence On July 3,1962, two days after the second referendum for independence, de Gaullerecognized the sovereignty of Algeria.  Then on July 5, 1962, exactly 132 years afterthe French invasion in 1830, Algeriadeclared independence and in September 1962, was given its official name, the“People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria” by the country’s National Assembly.

In the months leading up to and after Algeria’s independence, a mass exodus of thepied-noir community took place, with some 900,000 (90% of the Europeanpopulation) fleeing hastily to France.  The European Algerians feared for their livesdespite a stipulation in the Évian Accords that independent Algeria must respect the rights and propertiesof the pied-noir community in Algeria.  Some 100,000 would remain, but in the 1960sthrough 1970s, most were forced to leave as well, as the war had scarredpermanently relations between the indigenous Algerians and pieds-noirs, forcingthe latter to abandon homes and properties under the threat of “the suitcase orthe coffin” (French: “la valise ou lecercueil”).  In France, the pieds-noirs experienced a difficultperiod of transition and adjustment, as many families had lived for manygenerations in Algeria,which they regarded as their homeland. Moreover, they were criticized and held responsible by Frenchmainlanders for the political, economic, and social troubles that the war hadcaused to France.  Algerian Jews, who feared persecution becauseof their opposition to Algerian independence, also fled Algeria en masse, with 130,000 Jews leaving for France where they held French citizenship; some7,000 Jews also immigrated to Israel.

The harkis, or indigenous Algerians who had served in theFrench Army as regulars or auxiliaries, met a harsher fate.  Disarmed after the war by their Frenchmilitary commanders and vilified by Algerians as traitors and Frenchcollaborators, the harkis and their families faced harsh retaliation by the FLNand civilian mobs – some 50,000 to 100,000 harkis and their kin were killed,most in grisly circumstances.  Some91,000 harkis and their families did succeed in escaping to France underthe aegis of their French commanders in violation of the orders of the Frenchgovernment.

The bitter effects of the war were felt in both countriesfor many years.  Throughout the conflict,France described its actionsin Algeriaas a “law and order maintenance operation”, and not war.  Then in June 1999, thirty-seven years afterthe war ended, the French government admitted that “war” had indeed taken placein Algeria.

January 18, 1974 – Yom Kippur War – Egypt and Israel sign a Disengagement of Forces Agreement

On January 18, 1974, Egypt and Israel signed a Disengagement of Forces Agreement (also known as the Sinai I Agreement) following the Yom Kippur War. The agreement established a buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces that was to be monitored by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Only a limited amount of armament and forces were allowed inside the buffer zone.

On September 4, 1975, the two sides signed the Sinai Interim Agreement (also known as Sinai II Agreement), where they pledged that conflicts between them “shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.” A further withdrawal was agreed and a bigger UN buffer zone was created.

These agreements paved the way for the Camp David Accords (in Camp David, Maryland), which led to the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979. This landmark peace treaty ended their state of war and normalized relations, and Egypt became the first Arab state to officially recognize Israel. Diplomatic relations between them came into effect in January 1980, with an exchange of ambassadors the following month. Israel withdrew from the Sinai, which Egypt promised to leave demilitarized. Israeli ships were allowed free passage through the Suez Canal, and Egypt recognized the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba as international waterways.

(Taken from Wars of 20th Century – Volume 2)

Background of the Yom Kippur War With its decisive victory in the Six-Day War in June 1967, Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from Jordan.  The Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights were integral territories of Egypt and Syria, respectively, and both countries were determined to take them back.  In September 1967, Egypt and Syria, together with other Arab countries, issued the Khartoum Declaration of the “Three No’s”, that is, no peace, recognition, and negotiations with Israel, which meant that only armed force would be used to win back the lost lands.

Shortly after the Six-Day War ended, Israel offered to return the Sinai Peninsula andGolan Heights in exchange for a peace agreement, but the plan apparently wasnot received by Egypt and Syria.  In October 1967, Israel withdrew the offer.

In the ensuing years after the Six-Day War, Egyptcarried out numerous small attacks against Israeli military and governmenttargets in the Sinai.  In what is nowknown as the “War of Attrition”, Egyptwas determined to exact a heavy economic and human toll and force Israelto withdraw from the Sinai.  By way ofretaliation, Israeli forces also launched attacks into Egypt.  Armed incidents also took place across Israel’s borders with Syria,Jordan, and Lebanon.  Then, as the United States, which backed Israel,and the Soviet Union, which supported the Arab countries, increasingly becameinvolved, the two superpowers prevailed upon Israeland Egyptto agree to a ceasefire in August 1970.

In September 1970, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s hard-line president, passedaway.  Succeeding as Egypt’s head of state was Vice-President AnwarSadat, who began a dramatic shift in foreign policy toward Israel.  Whereas the former regime was staunchlyhostile to Israel,President Sadat wanted a diplomatic solution to the Egyptian-Israeliconflict.  In secret meetings with U.S. government officials and a United Nations(UN) representative, President Sadat offered a proposal that in exchange for Israel’s return of the Sinai to Egypt, the Egyptian government would sign apeace treaty with Israeland recognize the Jewish state.

However, the Israeli government of Prime Minister Golda Meirrefused to negotiate.  President Sadat,therefore, decided to use military force. He knew, however, that his armed forces were incapable of dislodging theIsraelis from the Sinai.  He decided thatan Egyptian military victory on the battlefield, however limited, would compel Israelto see the need for negotiations.  Egyptbegan preparations for war.  Largeamounts of modern weapons were purchased from the Soviet Union.  Egypt restructured its large, butineffective, armed forces into a competent fighting force.

In order to conceal its war plans, Egypt carried out a number ofruses.  The Egyptian Army constantlyconducted military exercises along the western bank of the Suez Canal, which soon were taken lightly by the Israelis.  Egypt’s persistent war rhetoriceventually was regarded by the Israelis as mere bluff.  Through press releases, Egypt underreported the truestrength of its armed forces.  Thegovernment also announced maintenance and spare parts problems with its warequipment and the lack of trained personnel to operate sophisticated militaryhardware.  Furthermore, when PresidentSadat expelled 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egyptin July 1972, Israelbelieved that the Egyptian Army’s military capability was weakenedseriously.  In fact, thousands of Sovietpersonnel remained in Egyptand Soviet arms shipments continued to arrive. Egyptian military planners worked closely and secretly with their Syriancounterparts to devise a simultaneous two-front attack on Israel.  Consequently, Syria also secretly mobilized forwar.

Israel’sintelligence agencies learned many details of the invasion plan, even the dateof the attack itself, October 6.  Israel detected the movements of large numbersof Egyptian and Syrian troops, armor, and – in the Suez Canal– bridging equipment. On October 6, a few hours before Egyptand Syriaattacked, the Israeli government called for a mobilization of 120,000 soldiersand the entire Israeli Air Force. However, many top Israeli officials continued to believe that Egypt and Syria were incapable of starting awar and that the military movements were just another army exercise.  Israeli officials decided against carryingout a pre-emptive air strike (as Israel had done in the Six-Day War)to avoid being seen as the aggressor.  Egypt and Syria chose to attack on Yom Kippur(which fell on October 6 in 1973), the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, whenmost Israeli soldiers were on leave.

January 17, 1948 – Indonesian War of Independence: The Renville Agreement is signed between the Netherlands and Indonesia

On January 17, 1948, representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesianrevolutionaries signed the Renville Agreement (named after the USS Renville, a U.S. Navy ship where thenegotiations were held), which confirmed their respective territories in theVan Mook Line, and in the Dutch-held areas, a referendum would be held todecide whether the residents there wanted to be under Indonesian or Dutchcontrol.  Furthermore, in exchange forIndonesian forces withdrawing from Dutch-held areas as stipulated in the VanMook Line, the Dutch Navy would end its blockade of the ports.

Indonesia in Southeast Asia. During the colonial period, Indonesia was governed by the Netherlands and known as the Dutch East Indies.

The Indonesian Republic, already weakened politically andmilitarily, was undermined further when its Islamic supporters in nowDutch-controlled West Java objected to the Renville Agreement and broke away toform Darul Islam (“Islamic State”), with the ultimate aim of turning Indonesia intoan Islamic country.  It opposed both theIndonesian government and Dutch colonial authorities.  Darul Islam subsequently would be defeatedonly in 1962, some 13 years after the war had ended.

The Indonesian Republic also faced opposition from its othererstwhile allies, the communists (of the Indonesian Communist Party) and thesocialists (of the Indonesian Socialist Party), who in September 1948, secededand formed the “Indonesian Soviet Republic”in Madiun, East Java.  Fighting in September-October and continuinguntil December 1948 eventually led to the Indonesian Republicquelling the Madiun uprising, with tens of thousands of communists killed orimprisoned and their leaders executed or forced into exile.  Furthermore, the Indonesian Army itself wasplagued with internal problems, because the government, suffering from acute financialdifficulties and unable to pay the soldiers’ salaries, had disbanded a numberof military units.

Major islands of Indonesia.

(Taken from Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia)

Indonesian War ofIndependence Sukarno’s proclamation of Indonesia’s independence de factoproduced a state of war with the Allied powers, which were determined to gaincontrol of the territory and reinstate the pre-war Dutch government.  However, one month would pass before theAllied forces would arrive.  Meanwhile,the Japanese East Indies command, awaiting the arrival of the Allies torepatriate Japanese forces back to Japan, was ordered by the Alliedhigh command to stand down and carry out policing duties to maintain law andorder in the islands.  The Japanesestance toward the Indonesian Republic varied:disinterested Japanese commanders withdrew their units to avoid confrontationwith Indonesian forces, while those sympathetic to or supportive of therevolution provided weapons to Indonesians, or allowed areas to be occupied byIndonesians.  However, other Japanesecommanders complied with the Allied orders and fought the Indonesianrevolutionaries, thus becoming involved in the independence war.

In the chaotic period immediately after Indonesia’sindependence and continuing for several months, widespread violence and anarchyprevailed (this period is known as “Bersiap”, an Indonesian word meaning “beprepared”), with armed bands called “Pemuda” (Indonesian meaning “youth”)carrying out murders, robberies, abductions, and other criminal acts against groupsassociated with the Dutch regime, i.e. local nobilities, civilian leaders,Christians such as Menadonese and Ambones, ethnic Chinese, Europeans, andIndo-Europeans.  Other armed bands werecomposed of local communists or Islamists, who carried out attacks for the samereasons.  Christian and nobility-alignedmilitias also were organized, which led to clashes between pro-Dutch andpro-Indonesian armed groups.  Theseso-called “social revolutions” by anti-Dutch militias, which occurred mainly inJava and Sumatra, were motivated by variousreasons, including political, economic, religious, social, and ethniccauses.  Subsequently when the Indonesiangovernment began to exert greater control, the number of violent incidents fell,and Bersiap soon came to an end.  Thenumber of fatalities during the Bersiap period runs into the tens of thousands,including some 3,600 identified and 20,000 missing Indo-Europeans.

The first major clashes of the war occurred in late August1945, when Indonesian revolutionary forces clashed with Japanese Army units,when the latter tried to regain previously vacated areas.  The Japanese would be involved in the earlystages of Indonesia’sindependence war, but were repatriated to Japan by the end of 1946.

In mid-September 1945, the first Allied forces consisting ofAustralian units arrived in the eastern regions of Indonesia (where revolutionaryactivity was minimal), peacefully taking over authority from the commander ofthe Japanese naval forces there.  Alliedcontrol also was established in Sulawesi, withthe provincial revolutionary government offering no resistance.  These areas were then returned to Dutchcolonial control.

In late September 1945, British forces also arrived in theislands, the following month taking control of key areas in Sumatra, including Medan, Padang, and Palembang, and inJava.  The British also occupied Jakarta (then still known, until 1949, as Batavia),with Sukarno and his government moving the Republic’s capital to Yogyakarta in Central Java.  InOctober 1945, Japanese forces also regained control of Bandungand Semarangfor the Allies, which they turned over to the British. In Semarang, the intense fighting claimed thelives of some 500 Japanese and 2,000 Indonesian soldiers.

January 15, 1975 – Angolan War of Independence: The Alvor Agreement is signed, where Angola gains independence from Portugal

In January 1975, the Portuguese government met with theleaders of the three Angolan nationalist movements in a series of negotiationsin Alvor, Portugal.  These negotiations resulted in the signing ofthe Alvor Agreement on January 15, 1975, which contained severalprovisions.  First, Angola’sindependence was set for November 11, 1975. Second, during the ten-month interim period before independence, thethree nationalist movements would form a power-sharing government to lead thecountry, with the local Portuguese High Commissioner acting as the mediator fordisputes.  Third, a national constitutionwould be drafted, and parliamentary elections would be held in October1975.  Fourth, the nationalist groups’armed wings would be integrated into the Portuguese colonial army; after thePortuguese had withdrawn from Angola,the core of Angola’sArmed Forces would have been formed.

Africa showing location of present-day Angola and other African countries that were involved in the Angolan War of Independence. South-West Africa (present-day Namibia) was then under South African rule.

Consequently, the Angolan nationalists formed a coalitiongovernment which, however, proved ineffective and barely functioned.  Furthermore, none of the other provisions ofthe Alvor Agreement was truly implemented. And just as the Alvor Agreement ended Portugal’swar in Angola, it alsosparked the so-called “decolonization war” (the hostilities during the interimperiod before Angola’sindependence) among the three Angolan nationalist movements, particularlybetween FNLA and MPLA.  Shortly after Portugal had set the date for Angola’sindependence, the Angolan nationalist movements began aggressive recruitmentcampaigns and sought more weapons deliveries from their foreign backers.

(Taken from Angolan War of Independence – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 1)

Background By the1830s, Portugal had lost Braziland had abolished its transatlantic slave trade.  To replace these two valuable sources ofincome, Portugalturned to develop its African possessions, including their interior lands.  In Angola, agriculture was developed,with the valuable export crops of coffee and cotton being grown in vastplantations.  The mining industry wasexpanded.

Portugal’s development of the local economy, including theconstruction of public infrastructures such as roads and bridges, was carriedout using forced labor of black Africans, a system that was so harsh, ruthless,and akin to slavery.  Consequently,thousands of natives fled from the colony. Indigenous lands were seized by the colonial government.  And while Angola’s economy grew, only thecolonizers benefited, while the overwhelming majority of natives were neglectedand deprived of education, health care, and other services.

After World War II, thousands of Portuguese immigrantssettled in Angola.  The world’s prices of coffee beans were high,prompting the Portuguese government to seek new white settlers in its Africancolonies to lead the growth of agriculture. However, many of the new arrivals settled in the towns and cities,instead of braving the harsh rural frontiers. In urban areas, they competed forjobs with black Angolans who likewise were migrating there in large numbers insearch of work.  The Portuguese, beingwhite, were given employment preference over the natives, producing racialtension.

The late 1940s saw the rapid growth of nationalism in Africa.  In Angola, threenationalist movements developed, which were led by “assimilados”, i.e. the fewnatives who had acquired the Portuguese language, culture, education, andreligion.  The Portuguese officiallydesignated “assimilados” as “civilized”, in contrast to the vast majority ofnatives who retained their indigenous lifestyles.

The first of these Angolan nationalist movements was thePeople’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola or MPLA (Portuguese: MovimentoPopular de Libertação de Angola)led by local communists, and formed in 1956 from the merger of the AngolanCommunist Party and another nationalist movement called PLUA (English: Party ofthe United Struggle for Africans in Angola).  Active in Luanda and other major urban areas, the MPLAdrew its support from the local elite and in regions populated by the Ambunduethnic group.  In its formative years, itreceived foreign support from other left-wing African nationalist groups thatwere also seeking the independences of their colonies from European rule.  Eventually, the MPLA fell under the influenceof the Soviet Union and other communistcountries.

The second Angolan nationalist movement was the NationalFront for the Liberation of Angola or FNLA (Portuguese: Frente Nacional deLibertação de Angola).  The FNLA was formed in 1962 from the mergerof two Bakongo regional movements that had as their secondary aim theresurgence of the once powerful but currently moribund Kingdom of Congo.  Primarily, the FNLA wanted to end forcedlabor, which had caused hundreds of thousands of Bakongo natives to leave theirhomes.  The FNLA operated out ofLeopoldville (present-day Kinshasa) in the Congo fromwhere it received military and financial support from the Congolesegovernment.  The FNLA was led by HoldenRoberto, whose authoritarian rule and one-track policies caused the movement toexperience changing fortunes during the coming war, and also bring about theformation of the third of Angola’snationalist movements, UNITA.

UNITA or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola(Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) was foundedby Jonas Savimbi, a former high-ranking official of the FNLA, overdisagreements with Roberto.  Unlike theFNLA and MPLA, which were based in northern Angola, UNITA operated in thecolony’s central and southern regions and gained its main support from theOvibundu people and other smaller ethnic groups.  Initially, UNITA embraced Maoist socialismbut later moved toward West-allied democratic Africanism.