Kenneth M. Pollack's Blog, page 11

The Deteriorating Situation in Syria: A Discussion Among Five Brookings Middle East Experts

Editor's Note: Following the bombing that killed Syria’s Defense Minister and Deputy Defense Minister, British Foreign Secretary William Hague described the situation in Syria as "deteriorating rapidly," while Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel called on the United Nations to take “urgent” action and pass a new resolution on Syria.  Brookings Middle East experts Michael Doran , Kenneth Pollack , Daniel Byman , and Salman Shaikh , discuss the current developments in Syria and the implications for the United States. 

Michael Doran: Today’s events in Syria are game changing. Bashar Assad might have to dump Damascus, because it lies outside the Alawite enclave. Take a look at this Washington Post article:  http://t.co/lKqtR45p. Reacting to it, Michael Young (@BeirutCalling), tweeted the following question: “Will Assad's reserve elite units defend Damascus if all is near lost, or will they redeploy to defend Alawi heartland?” That is a great question. My theory is that, in fact, they will redeploy, and the elite security services will eventually become an Alawite militia, a Syrian form of Hezbollah, with or without Assad. At any rate, the battle for Damascus may give us some insight into future trends. All of this, of course, raises the question: what is Iran's Plan B? (The U.S. does not yet have a Plan A, so it is not worth asking what the Plan B is.)

Kenneth Pollack: I share Michael's perspective. Holding Damascus might prove too much for the rump Syrian Armed Forces--increasingly just an Alawite militia, like the Lebanese Armed Forces became during the 1970s-1980s. The obvious move for them is to hunker down in the mountains around Latakiya and defend the Alawi heartland. But, as we are seeing, they won't give up Damascus without a fight and their residual heavy weapons could make that a very long one. As I’ve said in the past, they might eventually end up as a Syrian version of the Northern Alliance, holed up in the Panjshir valley.

Daniel Byman: A question to me is whether the violence will spike dramatically -- far more than it has already. We have both desperation (defense of Damascus) and revenge (death of a very prominent figure) that could lead to the units being moved from the Golan to use their firepower and simply level rebellious neighborhoods rather than cordon them off.

My understanding is that Damascus is a very diverse city. Clearly, many regime supporters are in the capital. But there are also poorer neighborhoods, outskirts of the capital, etc. that house many Sunnis that are very hostile to the regime. And as the violence rises in the city, we will see “cleansing” of neighborhoods by partisans of each side. So there are, and may be more, areas in Damascus where the regime can (if it chooses) employ heavy force in a demonstrative way.

Salman Shaikh: I don't think the Alawi minority will stand with the regime to the end. At this stage, they cannot guarantee that there will be a "safe haven" in the mountains for the family. The environment around Latakia is increasingly hot with rebel penetration. There are also some indications of Alawis getting more and more nervous about this family's ability to save them.

Today's event means that we are on the road to the end of this regime. The one person whose name I have not seen is Mohamed Nasif - the "godfather" of the security apparatus. If he had gone, then really we would be talking about "game over". Makhlouf was probably the number two of the security apparatus.

Together, they are the "two legs" of Bashar Assad (the closest to him). I have been in Cairo with quite a few of the folks involved in the operations in Damascus, Aleppo etc. They are working feverishly (one predicted “a big event” would happen today last night over dinner). We may still be headed for a big, drawn out bloody battle (especially since the rebels are still poorly equipped; though there has been a relatively large infusion of arms courtesy of Q/KSA via Turkey over the past week), but other scenarios of a quick regime collapse cannot now be ruled out.

It is therefore imperative that the opposition accelerate its readiness of to lead the transitional phase. They would need to form an as yet elusive coordination committee, involving the main opposition blocs (including Kurds and some folks from the inside) and get that committee to deepen their understandings on arrangements for the transition.

Daniel Byman: I think Salman has the key issue exactly right. The opposition’s ability to lead is what will determine whether this is a “win” for the U.S. (and Syria and its neighbors) in the long-term. And the opposition’s coherence will make it better able to topple Assad.

Kenneth Pollack: Salman, I hope that you are correct, but fear it will prove otherwise. I am afraid I have seen exactly the kinds of cross-signals too many times in the past. On occasion, and eventually they may prove correct (Yemen), but most of the time they are ultimately trumped by the fear of retribution for a failed coup and the sense that internal dissension would ultimately lead to collapse (Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, etc.)

Michael Doran: Another question for you: Whither Aleppo? It's a mystery to me. I have never understood why the regime had such a good grip on it, and why Damascus would explode before it did. If by the end of the week, we have major violence in both cities, then the Alawis will certainly be heading for the hills. But I would like somebody with real knowledge to explain the stability of Aleppo. 

Salman Shaikh: Aleppo: Huge number of detentions (thousands); regime economic investments; MB has not wanted Aleppo to explode (their strategy is to be ready for the day after); Turks don't necessarily want Aleppo to explode either (refugees).  Also protests have become large recently but are not well covered by Arab media. Regarding Tlass - this is seen as a failed Russian/Iranian play for a "constructive" scenario. They are too late.

Michael Doran: Fascinating re: Aleppo. I'm sticking by my Alawite enclave theory, however. I'm sure the average Alawites dislike Bashar and feel caught between the regime and the Sunnis, but will they really be able to resist when Bashar's loyal divisions settle down in the north with Russian and Iranian backing? It's speculation on top of speculation, I do admit. But I don't know anybody who truly has a clue about intra-Alawite politics, so my speculation is as good as any!

Authors

Michael DoranKenneth M. PollackDaniel L. BymanSalman Shaikh


Image Source: Reuters

Security Dynamics in the Middle East

Editor's Note: Kenneth Pollack answers questions from Bilal Saab of Arms Control and Regional Security for the Middle East, discussing the prospect of a regional missile defense system for the Arab Gulf, how the Arab Spring changed traditional security dynamics, and arms control in the Middle East.

Bilal Saab: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently proposed improved collaboration with GCC states on maritime security and missile defense to counter potential threats from Iran. One of the fruits that could come out of enhanced U.S.-GCC relations is a regional missile defense system for the Arab Gulf. How realistic is such a system knowing the classic challenges and limitations of missile defenses?

Kenneth Pollack: As you point out, we should not expect a whole lot in tangible terms from a regional missile defense system for the Gulf. Even with advances in recent years, such a system is likely to miss more than it hits. It might also be extremely expensive—and might not be the best use of such funds for countries (including the United States and Saudi Arabia) that probably would be better off using that money to address deep structural problems in their economies and societies. That said, if the costs are bearable, there are definitely some important plusses to going ahead with such a program. First, it provides another tangible sign that the GCC has no intention to bow down before a nuclear-armed Iran, but will instead balance against Tehran however they can. Second, it is another symbol of American commitment to the defense of the Gulf—something that many people worry about if Iran acquires a nuclear capability. Third, it would help further integrate the defense and security strategies of the Gulf Arab states and the United States in the Gulf. It would further smooth cooperation and be one more physical incentive for all of the states of the region to work and act in unison, and in lock-step with the United States, all of which would be helpful in deterring Iranian aggression, reassuring the Gulf Arabs, and ensuring cooperative moves both among the GCC states and between the GCC and U.S.

Saab: Calls for and discussions about a new regional security architecture are old. From the 1991 Gulf War to the Arab Spring, has anything changed in the Middle East to make that vision possible and what role should the United States play to make it happen?

Pollack: You are right that these ideas date back twenty years, and the original rationale for them remains germane: the GCC architecture is helpful, but it only takes you so far. In particularly, it isn’t of much help if your goal is to create a framework for arms control in the region and/or developing a more cooperative approach to security problems with Iran and Iraq. However, there are three things that have changed since the Persian Gulf War. First, Iran has made much greater progress toward acquiring a nuclear capability of some kind, and that is an important new threat that all of the Gulf States and the U.S. now must confront.  Second, Saddam Husayn is gone, and Iraq is in the hands of a new leadership that everyone hopes will be more peaceful than he was. While the jury is still out on Iraqi stability, let alone aggressiveness, the nature of that threat has changed considerably and if Iraq somehow manages to stumble toward stability, it would be helpful for Iraqis, Gulf Arabs and Americans to find a way to deal with its security needs in a collaborative framework. Finally, the GCC states and the United States have made considerable progress in knitting together their communications, intelligence, air defense, and naval networks, which provides a strong foundation for further cooperation. So there is both a greater need and a greater potential for an expanded and transformed security architecture.

Read the full interview at middleeast-armscontrol.com »

Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Publication: Arms Control and Regional Security for the Middle East

Image Source: Reuters

Sanctions on Iran: Implications for Energy Security

Event Information

June 29, 2012
9:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

The Brookings Institution
Falk Auditorium
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

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Next month, international economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran will intensify dramatically. Although Iran has been the target of various U.S. and multilateral sanctions throughout most of the past three decades, the latest measures are the most severe in history. These actions have been credited with reviving Iran’s interest in negotiations with the world, but they have yet to persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and are creating new challenges for the international coalition that has sought to constrain Iran. They also pose new uncertainties for energy markets and the international economy at a precarious period in the global recovery and the U.S. presidential campaign.

On June 29, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a discussion assessing the wide-ranging implications of the Iran sanctions regime and consider the prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

After each panel, participants will take audience questions.

Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-first Century

[image error]In the wake of the U.S. military departure from Iraq and in the midst of Iran’s continued defiance of the international community over its nuclear program, is a new security arrangement for the Gulf in order? If so, is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capable of such a task, or should other institutions be considered?

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-First Century, Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack examines the possibility of developing a new security architecture for the region.

Pollack analyzes security arrangements in other parts of the world and focuses on two options:  expanding the GCC and turning it into a formal military alliance and creating an arrangement modeled on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In weighing each option, Pollack finds that the latter can better furnish a path toward peace and security.

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Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-First Century


Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Image Source: © Fars News / Reuters

Campaign 2012 : Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy

Brookings Institution Press 2012 250pp.


Ready or not, the quadrennial run for the White House is upon us. American voters face a very different landscape than they did four years ago, when the presidential race was relatively wide open and neither the sitting president nor vice president was seeking the nation's highest office. Osama bin Laden and Muammar Qaddafi are gone, but so are millions of American jobs. It is springtime in much of the Arab world, but for many voters this is the winter of their discontent. Governing the United States will be supremely difficult for whoever emerges in November 2012—reading this book would be a good first step.



Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012. It features a dozen accessible yet authoritative analyses, each one focusing on a specific policy issue currently vexing the nation. All of the authors are Brookings scholars. In addition to contributing a chapter himself, editor Benjamin Wittes draws from each of the Brookings Institution's research programs in this wide-ranging survey of national policy in America. Wittes's previous books include Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor after Guantánamo (Brookings, 2010) and Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (Penguin, 2008). He and Jeffrey Rosen are coeditors of the 2011 Brookings book, Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change .



The capstone of a major institution-wide initiative, Campaign 2012 truly is Brookings at its best—explaining tough problems in accessible terms, and proposing viable solutions. It is one-stop shopping for citizens in need of a primer on the issues that will drive the 2012 presidential campaign.


ABOUT THE EDITOR

Benjamin Wittes



Ordering Information:
{BEE4D1CC-5E07-4799-AEF4-76EAC977FCEC}, 978-0-8157-2198-7, $26.95 Order{B98DCBB0-3580-4D55-ABD4-AB91E00585E6}, 978-0-8157-2199-4, $26.95 Order

Bloomberg Businessweek

Publication: Bloomberg Businessweek

Maliki's Dangerous Tightrope Act at the Arab League Summit in Iraq

Next week, the Arab League will hold its annual summit in Baghdad. It is a day a great many Iraqis have long awaited. For years, Iraqis hoped to host the Arab League in their liberated capital as a sign to the world that Iraq was back—that it had reemerged from Saddam Hussein’s tyranny and a brutal civil war as a new Iraq, stronger, freer, and better than it had been. And for years, the other Arab states denied it. They cited the violence, ethno-sectarian divisions, unsettled politics and the American occupation. Now, finally, Baghdad will get its due.

For Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki it is a great triumph, a tremendous opportunity and a grave threat all rolled into one.



Although many Iraqis long for this sign of reacceptance into the Arab world, it is especially important for Maliki that he be able to say that he fulfilled the dream. Maliki, of course, is a Shia—and not just a Shia but also a member of a Shiite Islamist party who has been personally disdained and excoriated by the Sunni Arab world for most of his time in office. Indeed, for many years, most of the other Arab states refused to resume normal relations with Iraq explicitly because he was its prime minister. Thus, for Maliki, the Arab League’s willingness to come to Iraq under his premiership is an immense personal victory, a signal to the Iraqi people that he, personally, has been accepted by the other (Sunni) Arab heads of state as the rightful and respected leader of Iraq.



As a result, it is all the more imperative for him that the summit go well, both for Iraq and for him personally. If it goes well, not only will he buttress his sagging popularity with the Iraqi street, he also will likely be able to parlay it into improved trade relations with the rest of the region, more direct foreign investment from the wealthy Gulf states and greater Arab diplomatic support for Iraq’s international causes—particularly the lifting of the last UN sanctions under which Iraq has labored since the days of Saddam. If Maliki is truly accepted by the other members of the Arab League, it could mean significant material benefits for Iraq that would further reinforce his popularity and power.



Read the full article »

Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Options for U.S. Strategy Toward Syria

Event Information

March 19, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

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Although the United States wants to see the Assad regime in Syria removed, there is no clear way to achieve this goal. Calls are growing for the U.S. to arm the Syrian opposition and even conduct air strikes against the regime, but skeptics believe these measures will fail or embroil the United States in a costly war. However, the clock is ticking as the regime continues to brutally repress its own citizens with military support from Iran and diplomatic cover from Russia and China.

On March 19, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on U.S. policy options in Syria. Panelists included: Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, director of research for the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; Senior Fellow Michael Doran; Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack; and Fellow Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, who appeared live from Doha via video feed. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center, moderated the discussion.



After the program, panelists took audience questions.

Audio

Options for U.S. Strategy Toward Syria

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20120319_syria_strategy

Participants
Panelists

Saving Syria: Assessing Options for Regime Change

Syria is trapped on a crumbling precipice,
and however it might fall will entail significant risks
for the United States and for the Syrian people.

The brutal regime of Bashar al-Asad is employing its
loyal military forces and sectarian thugs to crush the
opposition and reassert its tyranny. Even if Bashar
fails, Syria may not be out of the woods: an increasingly
likely alternative to the current regime is a
bloody civil war similar to what we saw in Lebanon,
Bosnia, Congo, and most recently in Iraq. The horrors
of such a war might even exceed the brutal reassertion
of Asad’s control, and would cause spillover
into Syria’s neighbors—Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
and Israel—that could be disastrous for them
and for American interests in the Middle East.



But the unrest in Syria, which is now entering its second
year, also offers some important opportunities,
ones that would come from the fall of the regime of
Bashar al-Asad, whose family has ruled the country
with an iron grip for over forty years. Syria is Iran’s
oldest and most important ally in the Arab world, and
the Iranian regime has doubled down on Asad, providing
him with financial aid and military support to
shore up his regime. Asad’s departure would deal a significant
blow to Tehran, further isolating it at a time
when it has few friends in the region or the world. In
addition, Damascus is steadfast in its hostility toward
Israel, and Asad’s regime is also a longtime supporter
of terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas, and has
at times aided al-Qa’ida terrorists and former regime
elements in Iraq. The regime’s collapse, therefore,
could have significant benefits for the United States
and its allies in the region.




Actually ousting Asad, however, will not be easy. Although
the Obama administration has for months
called for Asad to go, every policy option to remove
him is flawed, and some could even make the situation
worse—seemingly a recipe for inaction. Doing
nothing, however, means standing by while Asad
murders his own people, and Syria plunges into civil
war and risks becoming a failed state. Already the violence
is staggering: as of March 2012, at least 8,000
Syrians have died and thousands more have been arrested
and tortured in trying to topple the regime. At
the same time, Syria is fragmenting. The Syrian opposition
remains divided, and the Free Syrian Army
is more a brand than a meaningful, unified force. Al-
Qa’ida is urging fighters to join the fray in Syria, and
sectarian killings and atrocities are growing. Should
the violence continue to intensify, Syria’s neighbors
may increase their meddling, and instability could
spread, further weakening already-fragile neighbors
like Iraq and Lebanon.




So to protect U.S. interests, Asad cannot triumph.
But a failed Syria, one wracked by civil war, would be
just as bad. Thus, U.S. policy must walk this tightrope,
trying to remove Asad, but doing so in a way
that keeps Syria an intact state capable of policing its
borders and ensuring order at home. At the end of
the day, however, removing Asad may not be doable
at a price the United States is willing to pay. If so, the
U.S. government may be forced to choose between
living with a brutal but weakened Asad or getting rid
of Asad regardless of the consequences.




This memo lays out six options for the United States
to consider to achieve Asad’s overthrow, should it
choose to do so:





Removing the regime via diplomacy;
Coercing the regime via sanctions and diplomatic
isolation;
Arming the Syrian opposition to overthrow
the regime;
Engaging in a Libya-like air campaign to
help an opposition army gain victory;
Invading Syria with U.S.-led forces and toppling
the regime directly; and
Participating in a multilateral, NATO-led effort
to oust Asad and rebuild Syria.



The options are complex, and policymakers will probably
try to combine several in an attempt to accentuate
the positives and minimize the negatives, which
will inevitably be difficult and bring out new complications.
But by focusing on discrete approaches, this
memo helps expose their relative strengths and weaknesses.
For each course of action, this memo describes
the strategy inherent to the option and what it would
entail in practice. It also assesses the option’s advantages
and disadvantages.




This memo does not endorse any particular policy option.
Rather, it seeks to explain the risks and benefits of
possible courses of action at this moment in time. As
conditions change, some options may become more
practical or desirable and others less so. The authors
mostly agree on the advantages and disadvantages
of each approach but weigh the relative rewards and
costs differently.

Downloads

Read the full paper


Authors

Daniel L. BymanMichael DoranKenneth M. PollackSalman Shaikh


Image Source: © Luke MacGregor / Reuters

Iran and Israel: The Politics of War

Event Information

February 29, 2012
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

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Israel and Iran have already been trading covert punches and the overheated rhetoric on both sides raises the potential for further escalation. While much has been said about Israeli military options, cautions from the Obama administration, and the Iranian response, the role of internal politics in both countries is typically left out of the discussion. How do domestic political concerns inside Israel and Iran shape their relationship and the chance of war? Does Israel’s perception of the Iranian threat put it at odds with Washington?



On February 29, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore the role of internal politics in Iran and Israel and to discuss the results of a recently conducted poll gauging Israeli public opinion on a number of issues.

Video

Iran Will Meet Threat with ThreatTensions are High in IsraelMore than Just a Pre-emptive StrikeIran is Israel’s Top Concern

Audio

Iran and Israel: The Politics of War

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20120229_iran_israel

Participants
Moderator

Panelists