Kenneth M. Pollack's Blog, page 7

January 23, 2014

Iraq: Once More Unto the Breach? A Conversation with Speaker of Iraq’s Council of Representatives Usama al-Nujayfi

Supporters of Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr chant anti-Iraqi government slogans as they march under a giant Iraqi flag during a demonstration calling for the release of detainees held by the Iraqi authorities, in Baghdad's Sadr City (REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani).

Event Information

January 23, 2014
9:00 AM - 10:00 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036


Register for the Event
A Conversation with Speaker of Iraq's Council of Representatives, Usama al-Nujayfi

Watch the full video of this event on CSPAN.org »


Once again violence has broken out among Iraq’s competing sects, and once again the country appears poised on the brink of civil war. The key Sunni towns of Fallujah and Ramadi have fallen to Salafi terrorists led by al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Iraq’s Sunni community itself seems torn between its fear of the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad and its memory of al Qaeda’s brutal excesses. The United States has urged restraint on both sides, but by providing weapons and other support to the central government, has provoked cries of backing the Shi’a against the Sunnis. Meanwhile, Iraq’s neighbors look on in consternation, anxious to avoid another front in the internecine conflict creeping across the region.


On January 23, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Usama al-Nujayfi, the speaker of Iraq’s Council of Representatives for a discussion to help Americans understand the travails of Iraq and the perspective of Iraq’s Sunni community in particular. Mr. al-Nujayfi discussed the current crisis of Iraq and the role that the United States might play in helping to avoid a further descent into all-out civil war. Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack moderated a question and answer session with Speaker al-Nujayfi following his formal remarks.


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Iraq: "Once More Unto the Breach"? A Conversation with Speaker of Iraq’s Council of Representatives Usama al-Nujayfi

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Published on January 23, 2014 06:00

Iraq: "Once More Unto the Breach"? A Conversation with Speaker of Iraq’s Council of Representatives Usama al-Nujayfi

Supporters of Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr chant anti-Iraqi government slogans as they march under a giant Iraqi flag during a demonstration calling for the release of detainees held by the Iraqi authorities, in Baghdad's Sadr City (REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani).

Event Information

January 23, 2014
9:00 AM - 10:00 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036


Register for the Event
A Conversation with Speaker of Iraq's Council of Representatives, Usama al-Nujayfi

Once again violence has broken out among Iraq’s competing sects, and once again the country appears poised on the brink of civil war. The key Sunni towns of Fallujah and Ramadi have fallen to Salafi terrorists led by al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Iraq’s Sunni community itself seems torn between its fear of the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad and its memory of al Qaeda’s brutal excesses. The United States has urged restraint on both sides, but by providing weapons and other support to the central government, has provoked cries of backing the Shi’a against the Sunnis. Meanwhile, Iraq’s neighbors look on in consternation, anxious to avoid another front in the internecine conflict creeping across the region.


On January 23, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Usama al-Nujayfi, the speaker of Iraq’s Council of Representatives for a discussion to help Americans understand the travails of Iraq and the perspective of Iraq’s Sunni community in particular. Mr. al-Nujayfi will discuss the current crisis of Iraq and the role that the United States might play in helping to avoid a further descent into all-out civil war. Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack will moderate a question and answer session with Speaker al-Nujayfi following his formal remarks.


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Published on January 23, 2014 06:00

January 22, 2014

Iran Nuclear Talks Fail

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaking at an event in New York City

While pressing for a sound comprehensive agreement with Iran, the U.S. we should prepare for a possible failure of those nuclear negotiations, in which case Iran would seek to erode sanctions in the absence of agreement and resume nuclear activities frozen under the interim accord. In that event, Robert Einhorn and Kenneth Pollack recommend President Obama reinforce international support for strengthening sanctions, and for credibly threatening much greater penalties for any Iranian movement toward or across the nuclear threshold.







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MEMORANDUM


TO: President Obama

FROM: Robert Einhorn and Kenneth Pollack

DATE: January 23, 2014

SUBJECT: Iran Nuclear Talks Fail






Summary and Recommendations


While our negotiators are working hard to get a final nuclear agreement with Iran that meets our requirements, we must be prepared for the possibility that negotiations will fail and the Iranians will then direct their efforts toward eroding sanctions and advancing their nuclear program. The opening created by President Hassan Rouhani’s overtures would close.


In this scenario, Iran would reject any extension of the current interim agreement, portray itself publicly as having been the reasonable side in the talks, reach out aggressively to governments and companies around the world to entice them to circumvent or ignore sanctions, and ramp up nuclear activities that have been frozen under the interim deal.


We should seek to head off this scenario by keeping the pressure on Iran to accept a final agreement along the lines of our proposal. That will involve three priorities: (1) continuing to urge governments and companies to enforce existing sanctions, (2) showing additional flexibility within the delegation’s existing instructions to avoid an Iranian narrative that we are the intransigent party, and (3) maintaining a strong consensus among the P5+1 governments and the broader international sanctions coalition that the rigorous measures necessary to make a deal acceptable to us are reasonable, fair and essential to a sound agreement.


At the same time, we need to prepare for the possibility that no agreement will be reached and Iran will attempt to turn that eventuality to their advantage. To thwart that attempt, we would have to ensure that Iran bears the onus for any breakdown of the talks. We would also want to work with Congress to adopt additional sanctions, urge key states (including Russia and China) to press Iran not to further advance its nuclear program, and convey a clear message to Iran that movement toward or across the nuclear threshold would be met by a firm international response that could involve much stronger sanctions and perhaps more coercive measures.


Background


Thanks largely to the crippling sanctions we worked hard to put in place, we were able to achieve the six-month “interim” deal that halted further progress in Iran’s nuclear program at a minimal price in terms of measures to ease sanctions. But negotiations on a final agreement may prove difficult, or even impossible, to bring to a successful conclusion.


To detect and deter any Iranian decision to break out and move to build nuclear weapons, we have proposed going well beyond a freeze of Iran’s nuclear activities to a major reduction of its nuclear infrastructure, and we have sought verification measures that exceed the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. These tough proposals can help restrain Israeli public attacks, although the Israelis can be expected to strongly oppose any watering down of our positions. On the other hand, the Russians and Chinese can be expected to favor significant compromises in order to gain agreement.


The Iranian negotiators have demonstrated the same seriousness of purpose as they did during negotiations of the interim deal. But they oppose deep reductions in their enrichment capacity, insist on operating the Arak reactor and Fordow enrichment plant, and have resisted monitoring arrangements that go beyond the Additional Protocol.


The domestic Iranian backlash against the interim agreement and our negotiating position for a final agreement has been intense. The newspaper Kayhan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and hardliners in the Majlis have been outspoken critics of the Iranian negotiators and their efforts. In a mirror image of the positions taken by American critics, they argue that the interim deal concedes too much and receives too little in return. They inaccurately claim that we have already accepted a legal “right to enrich” and assert that we are reneging on the interim deal by denying such acceptance.


IRGC Commander Jafari has publicly attacked Foreign Minister and chief negotiator Zarif, who has pushed back firmly and asserted that his negotiating team has the support of the Supreme Leader. Critics in the Majlis have strongly condemned the introduction of a new sanctions bill in our Congress and retaliated by introducing their own legislation that would mandate increasing Iranian enrichment levels to 60 percent, ostensibly for submarine propulsion. To justify a retention and even expansion of Iran’s enrichment capacity, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Salehi has spoken of the need to provide fuel for several new nuclear power reactors.


While continuing to press for a final deal, we need to recognize that, given the wide gap between U.S. and Iranian positions as well as domestic opposition in Tehran, such a final deal may be very difficult to achieve. If prospects for a negotiated outcome begin to look remote, we may soon find ourselves confronted by an aggressive Iranian effort to erode the sanctions in the absence of agreement and to move its nuclear program closer to the weapons threshold.


We must seek to head this off by continuing to press for a final deal consistent with our requirements. We should aggressively enforce existing sanctions, both to maintain powerful incentives for Iran to reach agreement and to signal to the Iranians the futility of trying to undermine support for sanctions without an agreement. At the same time, we need to publicize for Iranian audiences the benefits they have realized from the initial sanctions easing measures and the much greater benefits they would realize under a final agreement. We should be willing to accept some modifications to our initial position (e.g., acceptance of somewhat greater centrifuge numbers), both because such modifications would still leave the terms well within our necessary requirements, and because doing so would demonstrate our willingness to compromise to reach a final deal. Meanwhile, we should seek to convince the other members of the P-5+1 of the necessity and appropriateness of our (modified) position, thereby solidifying support for a tough overall agreement that substantially reduces Iran’s breakout capability.


While pressing for an acceptable agreement, we must also prepare for the eventuality that the interim deal will lapse and that Iran will seek to undermine sanctions and resume its nuclear activities. In that circumstance, we would need to demonstrate that Iran, and not the P5+1, was responsible for the breakdown, explaining publicly that our position was supportive of meeting the practical needs of Iran’s civil nuclear energy program. We would discourage Iran from moving closer to a rapid breakout capability—in particular, by urging countries with influence in Tehran, including Russia and China, to press Iran’s leaders to forgo such steps and by encouraging the international community at large to convey a clear message to Iran that such action would be met by a sharp ratcheting up of sanctions or even more coercive actions.


To thwart Iranian efforts to erode the sanctions regime without an agreement, we would consult actively with members of the international sanctions coalition to explain that prospects for resolving the issue diplomatically and avoiding a military confrontation depend on maintaining a united front on sanctions. We would also work with Congress to adopt additional sanctions and make the case internationally on the need for ramping them up. To encourage Iran’s crude oil purchasers to make further reductions, we could continue urging major producers in the Middle East, Africa and North America to increase production in order to provide alternate sources of supply.


Our goal in pursuing these policies would be to make the Iranians amenable to accepting a deal along the lines we propose or, failing a negotiated solution, to deter significant Iranian movement toward or across the nuclear threshold.


Conclusion


We can still achieve a sound final agreement before the expiration of the interim deal, but that will require demonstrating convincingly to the Iranians that the only way to get the sanctions relief they seek is by coming to terms with the P5+1. But if the Iranians are not prepared to come to terms and instead seek to undermine sanctions without an agreement, we need to make sure they bear the onus for the impasse, reinforce international resolve to maintain and increase sanctions, and build support for credibly threatening to impose additional costs for moving toward and across the nuclear threshold.



Read last year's related Big Bets and Black Swans memo, "Turning Tehran" by Suzanne Maloney »



Authors

Robert EinhornKenneth M. Pollack


Image Source: © Keith Bedford / Reuters

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Published on January 22, 2014 21:00

January 13, 2014

Hard Road to Damascus: A Crisis Simulation of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation Over Syria

Free Syrian Army fighters look on as their fellow fighters fire an anti-aircraft weapon towards forces loyal to the Syrian regime in Aleppo's al-Ansari al-Sharqi neighbourhood (REUTERS/Ammar Abdullah).

[image error]Last September, as part of its annual conference with the United States Central Command, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution conducted a day-long simulation of a confrontation between the United States and Iran arising from a hypothetical scenario in which the Syrian opposition had made significant gains in its civil war and was on the verge of crushing the Assad regime.  


The simulation suggested that, even in the wake of President Rouhani’s ascension to power and the changed atmosphere between Tehran and Washington, there is still a risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation between the two sides.


This new Middle East Memo examines the possible U.S. foreign policy lessons that emerged from this crisis simulation, and stresses the importance of communication, understanding the Saudi-Iran conflict and the difficulty in limited interventions. 


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Hard Road to Damascus: A Crisis Simulation of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation over Syria


Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

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Published on January 13, 2014 11:59

December 12, 2013

Iraq: Reemergence of al Qaeda

Remains of a cafe after bomb attacks in Baghdad, Iraq

Editor's note: On December 12, Kenneth Pollack delivered testimony on the resurgence of al Qaeda in Iraq before the joint hearing of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee and the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Read an excerpt below, download the testimony and watch the testimony online.


Mr. Chairman and distinguished Representatives, I am honored to be able to appear before you to discuss the situation in Iraq and the resurrection of al Qaeda since the departure of U.S. forces in December 2011. It is a great credit to this committee that at a time when the nation appears determined to forget our interests in Iraq, you refuse to do so. It is absolutely vital. Since 2003, the United States has invested an enormous amount in Iraq, and the future of Iraq remains of great importance to the interests of the United States and our allies. Iraq has replaced Iran as the second leading oil exporter in OPEC, and projections of future low oil prices are highly contingent upon the continued growth of Iraqi oil exports. Remembering that virtually every postwar American recession was preceded by an increase in oil prices, Iraq and its oil production remain critical to the prosperity of the United States.


Unfortunately, over the past two years, Iraq has taken a noticeable turn for the worse, although how bad things will get still remains uncertain. Our topic today, the reemergence of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), is among the most visible and frightening manifestations of Iraq’s downward turn. AQI has been one of the principal culprits in the worsening violence across Iraq. In 2012, Iraq experienced a 10 percent increase in violent civilian deaths. That was the first annual increase since 2006, prior to the so-called “Surge.” In 2013, Iraq may very well experience a 100 percent increase in violent civilian deaths over 2012. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that violence is multiplying in Iraq by orders of magnitude.


However, we need to recognize that the increasing violence in Iraq, and the reemergence of groups like AQI do not constitute Iraq’s problems per se. They are instead the symptoms of those problems. They are the outward manifestations of deep-seated structural conflicts and unresolved differences among Iraq’s various constituencies. Although it is not impossible to mitigate or even resolve those underlying problems, they will not be overcome easily, and few of Iraq’s political leaders are making the kind of effort that would be needed to do so. Instead, most of Iraq’s leaders concentrate on achieving short-term tactical gains against their rivals, often in ways that exacerbate those problems rather than ameliorating them.


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The Resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq - Kenneth Pollack


Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Publication: Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee and the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Image Source: © Thaier Al-Sudani / Reuters

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Published on December 12, 2013 10:00

December 5, 2013

The United States and the Middle East: Avoiding Miscalculation and Preparing for Conflict


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On September 11-12, 2013, the Saban Center at Brookings and the United States Central Command brought together analysts, officers and policymakers to discuss both new and enduring challenges facing the United States in the Middle East. 


The conference, The United States and the Middle East: Avoiding Miscalculation and Preparing for Conflict, explored the upheaval in key countries of the region resulting from the Arab uprisings, as well as longstanding conflicts and challenges.


Vice Admiral Mark Fox, CENTCOM’s deputy commander, delivered opening remarks, and former Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, delivered a keynote address. 


The proceedings from this conference include summaries of the sessions and an overarching essay by Kenneth Pollack.


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The United States and the Middle East: Avoiding Miscalculation and Preparing for Conflict


Authors

Kenneth M. PollackTamara Cofman WittesDaniel L. BymanSuzanne MaloneySalman Shaikh


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Published on December 05, 2013 12:45

November 24, 2013

A Good Step In The Right Direction, But A Long Way To Our Destination

EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif

I see the interim deal as a good, modest step forward, but one that also increases the plausibility that we will be able to reach a final, comprehensive deal to eliminate the threat of a nuclear Iran.


The deal met or exceeded all expectations on its technical merits. Iran will not be able to make any progress toward achieving a nuclear breakout capability during the six months it is in effect — assuming the Iranians abide by its terms. Moreover, the fact that they will convert or dilute their current stockpile of uranium enriched to 19.75 percent purity is a major, unexpected concession that ensures that they will be farther from such a capability at then end of the six months than they are today or than they would be if they were able to keep enriching during that six months, as would be the case if there were no deal.


But the truth is that I think the calculations regarding how close or far Iran is from being able to produce the fissile material for a weapon are just nonsense. There are too many variables and too many assumptions to have any confidence in the numbers being put out by either the Administration or its critics (including the Israelis). 


For that reason, I think the deal is better understood as a useful, even important confidence-building measure. Neither side trusts the other, but both sides needed to see some tangible manifestation ahead of time, that the other would be willing to do what would be required in a final deal. We needed a demonstration of Iran’s willingness to halt its nuclear progress, give up much of what it has already accomplished, and submit to more comprehensive inspections. And Iran needed to see that the international community (read: the U.S.) would be willing to provide sanctions relief and allow Iran to retain some limited enrichment capacity, albeit with guarantees and safeguards that it would be solely for civilian purposes.


That is what the interim deal did. And for my money, that’s all it really did. But that is still important. And it also suggests that it is plausible to believe that the international community and Iran will also be able to work out the terms for a comprehensive follow-on deal that would hopefully end the threat of Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons altogether.


However, we should recognize that that step may prove far, far more difficult than the agreement just negotiated. The complexities are far greater. The concessions that both sides will be required to make will be far more painful. In particular, it remains to be seen whether Iran is prepared to accept a final deal that would give them what they want in practice, but not in theory. If Tehran insists on standing on principle — especially on its "right" to enrich and the lifting of "all" sanctions — such a resolution may well prove impossible. So it’s a good step in the right direction, but we are still very far from our destination.



Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

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Published on November 24, 2013 17:26

November 16, 2013

Kennedy Showed How to Contain Iran

It may seem like a stretch, but the Cold War crises that President John F. Kennedy faced hold important lessons for the nuclear impasse with Iran. Newly released historical files on the confrontations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s can help us better understand what to expect if the current negotiations with Tehran fail and we are soon confronted with a nuclear-armed Iran.


Kennedy faced an unpredictable, risk-taking and at times aggressive opponent in Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Yet he frustrated Khrushchev’s ambitions and helped the U.S. avoid war through a combination of American nuclear superiority, firmness in defending national interests and a willingness to resist alarmist thinking.


The first observation from Kennedy’s Cold War experience is that if you assume the worst, you may get the worst. If any one lesson emerges from the documents, memoirs and research published in recent years, it is that the U.S. and the Soviet Union wasted billions of dollars and rubles guarding against a surprise nuclear attack that neither country ever seriously contemplated launching. The obsession with this worst-case scenario made many crises far more dangerous than they needed to be -- and even caused some of them.


During both the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, however, Kennedy chose not to assume the worst regarding Soviet motives and likely behavior. Instead, he saw the Russian leadership as driven by a range of different goals and emotions, including fear and uncertainty.


Read more at Bloomberg View.



Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Publication: Bloomberg View

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Published on November 16, 2013 21:00

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