Kenneth M. Pollack's Blog, page 5

Regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran

Prepared testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Representatives, I am honored to be able to appear before you to discuss the implications of a possible nuclear agreement with Iran.

Obviously, at this moment in time, we do not have a nuclear deal and while it seems more likely than not that we will have one at some point this summer, it is certainly not a sure thing. Moreover, with any such agreement, the devil will be in the proverbial details and we simply do not know how such an agreement will treat key details such as the access rights of inspectors, the lifting of sanctions, and the process of reapplying sanctions (or other punitive action) if Iran is caught cheating on the terms of an accord. All of this makes me very wary of commenting on the advantages or disadvantages of a deal where so many key uncertainties remain.

More than that, I believe that the terms of such a deal are of less importance to America’s national interests than how the nations of the Middle East respond to it. Since the election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran, I have believed that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, concluded that he did not need an actual nuclear arsenal because he calculated that there was little likelihood of either an American or Israeli attack and perhaps that Iran was far enough along toward being able to build a nuclear weapon as it needed to be given that threat environment. I also believe that Rouhani’s election convinced him that relieving the pressure of the sanctions on Iran’s economy was a higher priority than making further progress toward fielding a nuclear arsenal—so long as Iran did not have to give up its nuclear capability entirely and forever in return for the lifting of sanctions. Based on this analysis, I suspect that the Iranian government does not intend to cheat on any nuclear agreement or to use it as a cover to covertly acquire nuclear weapons as North Korea did, at least not for now or for the foreseeable future.

Consequently, I plan to focus my remarks primarily on the regional impact of an Iranian nuclear agreement, both because I see that as the issue where such a deal could have the greatest impact on American interests, and where it developments could ultimately shape the implementation of the deal—including Iran’s willingness to abide by its terms.

Even here, the real questions are not those about regional proliferation which has dominated discussion of this matter to date, but about the civil and proxy wars currently roiling the Middle East, and the likely role of the United States in the region after a nuclear accord with Iran. It is those issues that are likely to determine whether a nuclear deal with Iran leads to greater stability or greater instability in the Middle East, and thus whether it ultimately benefits or undermines American national security.

Iran

It is important to begin any assessment of regional dynamics in the wake of an Iranian nuclear agreement by asking how Iran itself is likely to behave. As always, we need to be very humble about our ability to predict Iran’s future behavior. Iran has an opaque and convoluted political system, riven by factions and presided over by a Supreme Leader who has often made decisions by not making decisions or by splitting the Solomonic baby. Indeed, it seems most likely that following any nuclear deal there will be a debate in Tehran over Iranian foreign policy (as there always is) with moderates and reformists arguing for Iran to use the deal as the start of a larger process of re-opening to the world and even rapprochement with the United States, while various hardliners and conservatives argue that a deal makes such moves unnecessary and that instead Iran can and must redouble its efforts to export Khomeini’s revolution and drive the U.S. and its allies out of the Middle East altogether.

Based on his various statements over the years, it seems most likely that Khamene’i’s perspective on a nuclear deal is purely transactional. If he ultimately agrees to one, it seems likely that it will be solely to get the sanctions removed. Nothing more and nothing less. It seems unlikely he will countenance a wider rapprochement with the United States—whatever Foreign Minister Zarif and possibly President Rouhani may want.

Iran has always seemed to fashion discrete policies toward different states of the region. In each case, it has a certain set of interests in a country and engages in a policy debate over how to act toward that country—in which Iran’s complicated domestic politics interact with various strategic perspectives to produce a policy toward that country. Right now, Iran probably has a Syria policy based on its interests and its politics as they relate to Syria. It appears to have an Iraq policy based on its interests and its politics as they relate to Iraq. And the same for Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, etc. Neither those interests nor those politics appear likely to change much, if at all, as a result of the nuclear deal. Instead, Iranian actions toward all of those places seem precisely calibrated to what Iran is trying to achieve there, and that is unlikely to be affected by the nuclear deal one way or the other.

It is also worth noting that, across the region, the Iranians seem pretty comfortable with the status quo. Their Shi’a allies are dominant in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. In Syria, the Asad regime is embattled and has suffered some setbacks, but it remains in power and Iran continues to commit its own resources and the troops of its Iraqi and Hizballah allies shore up the Alawi position there. Most reports indicate that the Iranians exert far greater control over Asad’s rump Syrian state than they ever have in the past, Iran may feel its position has improved in Damascus, even if Damascus’s control over Syria has taken a beating. Tehran may also feel it could be doing better in Bahrain, but of the countries in play in the region, that’s the only one Iran cares about where Tehran may not believe it is “winning.” So there is no particular reason to believe that Iran is looking to increase its aggressive involvement in any of these states but has been somehow constrained from doing so by the nuclear negotiations.

Moreover, while it is impossible to prove, there is strong circumstantial evidence that Khamene’i and the Iranian establishment believe they have has far more at stake in Iraq and possibly Lebanon than they do in a nuclear deal. They have poured resources into Iraq over the years, which is deeply bound up with Iranian society economically, socially and politically—as well as having constituted a dire security threat in the past. Likewise, Iran’s alliance with Hizballah is part of the bedrock of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, and brings Iran a coveted role in the events of the Levant. Because of Syria’s relationship to both Iraq and Lebanon, it too might be more important to Tehran than a nuclear deal if the Iranian leadership were ever forced to choose between the two. The point I am making here is simply that I cannot see Iran changing its policy in any of these countries because of a nuclear deal because I don’t think that Iran values a nuclear deal as much as it does its positions in these various countries.

In short, all other things being equal, it seems unlikely that Iranian policy toward the region will change merely as a result of a nuclear agreement with the P-5+1.

But all other things may not prove equal. It may be that Khamene’i will feel that a nuclear deal is a major concession to Rouhani and the Iranian Left, and so he may feel the need to demonstrate to the hardliners of the Iranian Right that a nuclear deal does not mean that Tehran has abandoned Khomeini’s ideology by giving up its enmity with the United States. If that is the case, Iran may ratchet up some of its anti-status quo activities in certain selected venues.

Israel is the obvious case in point: Iran may try to convince Hizballah, Hamas, PIJ and others to mount attacks on Israel. That’s almost a “freebie” for Iran. Israel is unlikely to retaliate directly against Iran, everyone will know that Tehran is behind the attacks, and since the Netanyahu government has managed to isolate Israel in ways that the Palestinians never could, Tehran will be playing to a popular cause. The problem here is that Iran may not be able to pull the trigger on such a campaign. Hizballah and Hamas are both extremely wary of picking a fight with Israel, as demonstrated by the fact that neither has done so in the face of multiple Israeli provocations. The events of the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war has estranged Hamas from Iran, and tied Hizballah down in intense combat such that neither may be willing to heed a hypothetical Iranian call for new attacks on Israel. For their part, PIJ and other Palestinian proxy groups are weaker than in the past, and may have a hard time penetrating Israel’s ever more sophisticated defenses.


Bahrain is another possibility. Because Bahrain is a majority Shi’a state, whose people have been disenfranchised and oppressed by the regime—and their Saudi allies—it is another arena where Iran may be able to burnish its revolutionary credentials in a relatively popular international cause. But here too, there are limits. Some Bahraini Shi’a clearly accept aid from Iran, but the majority appear to prefer not to. They recognize that the more that they can be dismissed as Iranian agents the harder it is for them to get international pressure on the regime to reform. In addition, Bahrain is a very sensitive issue for the Saudis, and the Iranians have to worry that if they press on Bahrain, the Saudis might push back somewhere else where they are more vulnerable.  


A last possibility is Yemen. Iran has few direct stakes in Yemen and their nominal allies, the Houthis, are dominant at the moment. So Iran has little to lose there and a powerful (relatively) ally. But once again, Iran’s ties to the Houthis have been exaggerated, and it is another very sensitive spot for the Saudis.

Consequently, it may prove difficult for Iran to make much mischief in any of these arenas— more difficult than it may be worth for them.

As this analysis suggests, I believe that Iran’s most likely course after a nuclear agreement will be to continue to pursue the same regional strategy it has pursued over the past three years. That strategy is inimical to the interests of the United States and its allies in many ways. However, there is a much greater danger: the danger that Iran will interpret American behavior after a nuclear agreement as a sign of further disengagement from the Middle East. If that is the case, it is highly likely that Iranian goals will become more expansive and its policy more aggressive as it believes that the U.S. will not be as willing (or able) to block Iranian moves. Thus, the most important variable in Iranian regional behavior after a deal may well prove to be the U.S. reaction, rather than anything derived from Iranian strategy or politics itself.

Israel

Let me now turn to the question of likely Israeli responses to a nuclear deal. I think it important to address the elephant in the living room first: it is highly unlikely that Israel will mount a military attack against Iran after a nuclear deal has been struck between Iran and the P-5+1. (Or in the run up to one). As I have laid out in greater detail elsewhere, Israel does not have a good military option against Iran for both military-technical and political reasons. That’s why Israel has uncharacteristically abstained from a strike, despite repeated threats to do so since the late 1990s.

In this case, the political circumstances would be even worse. Consider the context: Iran will have just signed a deal with the United States and the other great powers agreeing to limits on its nuclear program, accepting more intrusive inspections than in the past, and reaffirming that it will not try to build a nuclear weapon. If the Israelis were to attack at that point, an already anti-Israeli international climate would almost certainly turn wholeheartedly against them.

That question is of more than academic interest to the Israelis. If Israel attacks Iran, there is a very real risk that Iran would respond by withdrawing from the deal, withdrawing from the NPT, evicting the inspectors and announcing that it will acquire nuclear weapons since its own conventional forces and the word of the international community were clearly inadequate to deter an unprovoked Israeli attack. The Iranians will doubtless also demand an end to the sanctions (and/or the imposition of sanctions on Israel), and if that is not forthcoming will set about busting the sanctions. And the problem for the Israelis is that in those circumstances, with the entire world furious at them for committing aggression and destroying a deal that most will see as having been the best way to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, there is likely to be very little will to preserve the sanctions on Iran. It’s hard to imagine a scenario in which Iran has a better chance to break out of the sanctions cage than this one.  

Thus, an Israeli military strike in these circumstances would be unlikely to help prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and regaining its freedom of maneuver. It is more likely to ensure an Iranian nuclear weapon and jeopardize the international containment of Iran.

While this set of problems makes an Israeli military response unlikely, that doesn’t mean that Jerusalem will just roll over and accept the deal. First, I suspect that the Israelis will ramp up their covert campaign against Iran and its nuclear program. More Iranian scientists may get mysteriously assassinated in Tehran. More sensitive Iranian facilities might blow up. More computer viruses might plague Iranian networks. More money might find its way to Iranian democracy activists and ethnic minorities. Of course, even then, the Israelis may show some restraint: the Iranians are believed to have greatly improved their own cyberwar capabilities, and even a right-wing Israeli government might not want to provoke a harsh Iranian response that affected Israel’s civilian economy.

Second, I think it pretty much a foregone conclusion that the Israelis will also seek greatly expanded U.S. aid in response to a nuclear deal with Iran. In particular, it will look to improve its capability to strike Iranian targets, to defeat retaliatory missile and rocket attacks by Iran or its allies, and to ensure that Israel has a secure second-strike capability. More F-35s, greater funding for Israel’s Arrow anti-ballistic missile and Iron Dome anti-rocket systems, more capable bunker-busting munitions—these all seem like certain Israeli requests. But Jerusalem may well ask for other weapons and capabilities previously denied it, both because it may feel a strategic need for such enhanced capabilities and because it may believe that the U.S. will be more willing to provide them to secure Jerusalem’s (grudging) acquiescence to the deal.

Finally, a nuclear deal with Iran could push Israel to become more aggressive in its own neighborhood—or to take advantage of the situation to do so. The Israelis will doubtless argue that the deal has made them feel less safe, and therefore less willing to take risks on other security matters, particularly developments with the Palestinians, but potentially in Syria and Lebanon as well. (The Israelis are very comfortable with the Egyptian and Jordanian governments and are unlikely to take actions that would undermine them or diminish their cooperation with Israel.) For instance, in the wake of a nuclear deal, Israel may look to smash Hizballah and/or Hamas in Gaza again to convince them not to mount new attacks against Israel once their old Iranian allies (a strained relationship in the case of Hamas) begin coming out from under the sanctions and possibly flexing their muscles across the region.

It is worth noting that some Israelis may favor such actions out of a genuine belief that this is what is necessary to guarantee their security after what they will likely consider an imperfect Iran deal. Others may do so cynically, using their well-known unhappiness with a deal to justify doing a bunch of things that they believe that the U.S. and international communities would be loath to condone otherwise.

Saudi Arabia

Especially in light of these assessments of likely Iranian and Israeli behavior after a nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia is the real wild card we must consider. The Saudis aren’t exactly fans of a nuclear deal with Iran. And certainly, Saudi Arabia is the most likely candidate to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran were to do so. In private, Saudi officials have repeatedly warned American officials (including this author) that if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, Saudi Arabia will follow suit—and nothing will stop them—because they will not live in a world where Iran has a nuclear weapon and they do not. Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi Intelligence Chief, has gone so far as to repeat that warning in public. For instance, in 2011, Turki commented that, “It is in our interest that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, for its doing so would compel Saudi Arabia, whose foreign relations are now so fully measured and well assessed, to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences.”

Yet the Saudis are often far more subtle and creative than others give them credit for. Even if Iran were to acquire an actual weapon or a near-term breakout capability, the Saudis might not simply take the obvious path forward and buy a nuclear weapon itself. There are many ways that the Saudis could take actions that would create ambiguity and make Iran (and others) wonder whether the Saudis had acquired a nuclear capability without declaring that the Kingdom had joined the nuclear club. Riyadh could build a nuclear plant of its own and begin to enrich uranium, perhaps even hiring large numbers of Pakistanis and other foreigners to do so very quickly, in almost exactly the same manner that the Iranians have proceeded. A favorite Israeli scenario is that one day, satellite imagery of Saudi Arabia suddenly reveals the presence of a half-dozen nuclear-capable Pakistani F-16s at a Saudi air base. Pakistan has long contributed military support, equipment and even whole formations to Saudi defense, so this would not be anything extraordinary. Everyone would wonder whether the F-16s had brought nuclear weapons with them and the Saudis could studiously avoid answering the question. The Iranians, and the whole world, would not know. There would be no proof that the Kingdom had acquired a nuclear weapon and therefore no particular basis to impose sanctions on Riyadh. Yet overnight, the Iranians would have to calculate that the Kingdom had acquired a nuclear weapon, but it would be very difficult for anyone to punish the Saudis because there would be no evidence that they had.

But all of that lies in the realm of hypotheticals inappropriate to the current context. If Iran signs a nuclear agreement, it will be publicly pledging not to acquire a nuclear weapon—and it will have the entire international community (except Israel) giving them the benefit of the doubt. In that context, we should not expect the Saudis to acquire a nuclear weapon of their own in response.

The Saudis have had good reasons for not acquiring one all of these years (and the Paks good reasons for not giving it to them). More than that, the optics would be all wrong for the Saudis. Iran will have just signed a deal with the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Russia and China agreeing never to build a nuclear weapon and accepting limits on its enrichment program to reassure the world that it won’t/can’t get a nuclear weapon. In that context, if Saudi Arabia goes out and buys a bomb from the Pakistanis, suddenly both Riyadh and Islamabad will become the international pariahs. All of the sympathy will swing to Iran, which will be seen as having behaved well, whereas there will be worldwide demands to sanction the Saudis (and Paks) for doing exactly what Iran had agreed not to. None of this makes sense for the Saudis and probably explains at least part of why Islamabad is already distancing itself from Riyadh on military matters.

That said, the Saudis may react in other ways. First, we should expect that soon after a nuclear deal with Iran, the Saudis will announce that they are going to build-up a nuclear program of their own to whatever levels Iran is allowed. So if, for instance, Iran is allowed to keep 6,500 first-generation centrifuges and 150 kg of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent purity, then the Saudis are likely to announce that they will acquire 6,500 first-generation centrifuges and 150 kg of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent purity. Doing so would be an important warning both to the Iranians (that the Saudis will match their nuclear capabilities at every step) and to the West (that they will have further proliferation in the Middle East if they do not force Iran to live up to its new commitments).

Second, the Saudis may choose to ramp up their support to various Sunni groups fighting Iran’s allies and proxies around the region. The Saudis seem to agree with the Iranians that Tehran is “winning” in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Syria is a more uncertain affair, but Iran’s allies are hardly defeated there and Iran is amping up its support for them. And the Saudis also seem to believe that Iran is making important inroads in Oman and with various Shi’a communities elsewhere in the Gulf. So while the Iranians may want to hold to a steady course, the Saudis may choose to double down, and they may choose to do so after a nuclear deal both to signal to the Iranians that they should not take advantage of it to inflict more damage on the “Sunni” side.

Unfortunately, there is a greater danger still. The Saudis and their Sunni Arab allies may fear that the U.S. intends to use a nuclear deal with Iran as a “Get Out of the Middle East Free” card. The Gulf states are convinced that is the Obama Administration’s intent. Across the board in private, Gulf officials damn the Administration for its weak response to Iran, brought to a head at the May 2015 summit at Camp David, where the claim that the United States offered nothing new as reassurance that Washington would push back on Iran. The danger here is that, far from accommodating Tehran as some have feared, the Gulf states are far more likely to get in Tehran’s face to try to deter the Iranians. The GCC air campaign in Yemen is a perfect example of this. It represents a stunning departure from past GCC practice—they never intervened directly with their own armed forces against another state, except behind a massive American force as in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91.

The ultimate problem is that the Gulf states are not strong enough to take on Iran alone, and if they act provocatively toward Iran, even if intended to deter Iranian aggression, they could easily provoke just such aggression and/or overstretch their own limited capabilities with potentially dire consequences for their own political stability. If the U.S. is not there to reassure the Gulf states and deter Iran, things could get very ugly.

The American Role

Inevitably with any question related to the geo-politics of the Middle East, the question eventually turns to the United States. The preceding analysis all points to the centrality of the American response to a nuclear agreement with Iran as potentially determining whether such a deal is beneficial or detrimental to regional stability, and thus to American interests themselves. As always, the United States is master of its own fate to a much greater extent than any country on earth, even in the turbulent and unpredictable Middle East.

Two points seem to stand out to me from the preceding analysis and the modern history of the region. The first is that while Iranian strategy is anti-American, anti-status quo, anti-Semitic, aggressive and expansionist, it is not reckless and typically quite wary of American power. When the U.S. exerts itself, the Iranians typically retreat. The exception that proves the rule was in Iraq in 2007, when initially the Iranians did not back down from their support to various anti-American Iraqi militias, only to have those militias crushed and driven from Iraq particularly during Operation Charge of the Knights and subsequent Iraqi-American campaigns along the lower Tigris. As we see in Iraq today, the Iranians apparently recognize that they misjudged both America’s will and its capacity to act then, and are once again content to battle Washington for political influence in Baghdad, but unwilling to challenge U.S. power militarily, even by proxy.

The second is the other side of the coin from the first. In the absence of American engagement, leadership and military involvement, the GCC states (led, as always, by the Saudis) become frightened and their tendency is to lash out and overextend themselves. Again, the unprecedented GCC air campaign in Yemen is a striking example of this. As the Gulf Arabs see it, they have never seen the United States so disengaged from the region—at least not in 35 years—and so they feel that they have had to take equally exceptional action to make up for it. I continue to see the GCC intervention in Yemen as a wholly unnecessary and unhelpful move, a rash decision meant to check what the GCC sees as a looming Iranian ”conquest” of Yemen. In private, GCC officials make no bones in saying that they felt compelled to do so because the United States was embracing Iran rather than deterring or defeating it. While all of that is a set of overstatements and exaggerations, it drives home the point that in the absence of a strong American role in pushing back on Iran, the GCC’s default mode is to attack on their own, and that only makes the situation worse, not better.

So, what the Obama Administration offered the Gulf states at Camp David failed to allay their fears or reassure them that the United States was ready to help them address their security concerns. That too is understandable: Washington did not offer a new defense pact or even an explicit nuclear umbrella—just more of the same. Some new weapons. Some new training. Nothing categorically different that was really likely to convince the Gulf states that the United States was making a qualitatively different commitment to Gulf security to ensure the region that a nuclear deal with Iran would not mean American abandonment of the region, let alone a shift toward Iran.

In truth, there is only one way that the United States is going to reassure the Gulf States that it does share their interests and is not going to leave the field open to the Iranians. Not coincidentally, it may be the only way to demonstrate to the Iranians that the U.S. is not abandoning the region—or too fearful of jeopardizing the nuclear agreement to block Iran’s continued aggressive activities around the Middle East. Indeed, it is probably what will prove necessary to force Iran to abandon its aggressively opportunistic regional policy. And that, is to pick a place and take the Iranians on.  

Here there are three possibilities, but ultimately only one conclusion. Yemen is the wrong place for the United States to confront Iran. Yemen is simply not consequential enough to justify making any American investment there; in fact, Washington should be doing everything it can to help the Saudis and the GCC end their own intervention in Yemen, not reinforcing it. Iraq is also the wrong choice. The Iranians are too strong in Iraq now, Iraq is too important to Iran, the Iraqis have a chance of solving their problems and regaining stability, but theirs is a fragile polity, one that probably could not survive a U.S.-Iranian war on their territory. Both we and the Iranians need the Iraqis to sort out their problems, and Iraq will probably need both of our help to do so. Thus, Iraq is also the wrong place at the wrong time.

That leaves Syria. If the U.S. is going to push back on Iran in the aftermath of a nuclear deal, to demonstrate to both Tehran and our regional allies that we are not abandoning the field and allowing (or enabling) the Iranians to make greater gains, Syria is unquestionably the place to do it. Iran’s allies in Syria have been considerably weakened in recent months. Our Arab allies are eager to have the U.S. take the lead there, and President Obama has committed the U.S. to just such a course, even if his actions have fallen woefully short of his rhetoric. This is not the place to describe how the United States might mount such an effort, not the likelihood that it would succeed if the U.S. were willing to commit the necessary resources (which would likely include a heavier air campaign but not ground combat troops). It is simply to point out that in the aftermath of an Iranian nuclear deal, finally executing the Administration’s proclaimed strategy for Syria, may be the best and only way to regain control over the dangerous confrontation escalating between Iran and America’s Arab allies.

See in particularly, Kenneth M. Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb and American Strategy (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2013), esp. pp. 183-223.

For a concurring Israeli assessment, see Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov, “A Nuclear Iran: The Spur to a Regional Arms Race?” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 15, No. 3 (October 2012), pp. 7-12.

“Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race,” The New York Times, December 6, 2011.

Jay Solomon, “Saudi Suggests ‘Squeezing’ Iran over Nuclear Ambitions,” The Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2011.

For the fullest explanation of the Administration’s Syria strategy, see the testimony by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16, 2014. A transcript is available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/transcript-dempsey-testifies-tothe-senate-armed-services-committee-on-the-islamic-state/2014/09/16/a65b6aea-3da3-11e4-b0ea-8141703bbf6f_story.html. For an outside assessment along similar lines, see Kenneth M. Pollack, “An Army to Defeat Assad: How to Turn Syria’s Opposition Into a Real Fighting Force,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), pp. 110-124.

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Regional Implications of a Nuclear Deal with Iran


Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Publication: House Committee on Foreign Affairs


             

The future of U.S. - GCC security cooperation and regional security

Event Information

June 3, 2015

5:00 PM - 6:30 PM AST

Salwa-II

Sheraton Hotel, Doha, Qatar

Sheraton Hotel, Corniche Street, Doha, Qatar

Doha

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on June 3, 2015 regarding the future of U.S.-GCC security cooperation and the implications for the broader Middle East. The panelists were Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center; Tamara Cofman Wittes, director and senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP); and Ken Pollack, senior fellow in CMEP. BDC Director Salman Shaikh moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar's diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Al-Ketbi opened the discussion by reflecting on U.S.-GCC relations in the wake of the May 13-14 Camp David Summit between President Obama and delegations from various GCC countries. In Al-Ketbi’s view, Gulf leaders were concerned that U.S. strategic priorities for the region “focus only on reaching a [nuclear] deal with Iran, while disregarding Iranian interventions.” She pointed to the role of Iran as a destabilizing factor in conflicts such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, while also pointing to the failure of the U.S. to take regional fears about Iran into account, particularly with regards to a potential Iranian role in Bahrain. Al-Ketbi spoke of the need for the United States to take a clear stance in solidarity with the Arab Gulf states – such as “extending its nuclear umbrella” or “signing a strategic partnership” – in order to assure these countries that it was not “turning over the security of the Gulf to Iran.”

While acknowledging Iran’s long-standing attempts to interfere in the Arab world, Wittes held that changing domestic contexts in Arab countries had created new opportunities for Iran to exploit. She noted that a nuclear deal with Iran would not be enough to “push back” Iran’s influence, but contended that an effective response must also address underlying concerns within Arab countries, such as local grievances and poor governance. With regards to the Camp David discussions, Wittes highlighted greater GCC unity on the issue of Syria as a key outcome, as well as coordinated GCC pressure on the United States to get more involved in Syria. Still, she noted, “This is also the place where the United States is most reluctant to get involved.”

Pollack underscored the Obama administration’s reluctance to take stronger action in Syria, saying that “The only thing consistent [about the administration’s policy] is the refusal to get involved.” While he stated that a nuclear deal with Iran would remove at least one destabilizing factor from the region for ten years, he pointed to the region’s ongoing civil wars – in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya – as a key challenge for U.S. policy in the region. Particularly on Syria, he held that the U.S. administration had not put forward any viable alternatives to the present cycle of violence. Creating better alternatives “is the role we’re supposed to play, and that’s where we’re failing,” he cautioned.

Both Al-Ketbi and Wittes highlighted greater GCC unity in facing regional issues, with all except Oman agreeing that Iran was at the top of the list of their security priorities. This only reinforced the gap between U.S. and Gulf visions for regional security priorities. Pollack pointed to the continued U.S. military presence in the Gulf – air force squadrons, naval forces, infantry brigades – as adequate to deter or defeat any “conventional threat” from Iran, but falling short of addressing Gulf fears of proxy conflicts or fomenting civil wars.

In discussing the sectarian nature of many of these civil conflicts, Al-Ketbi contended that the United States had failed to address this sectarianism despite the fact that “it was the invasion of Iraq that was the starting point of this sectarianism.” She contended that U.S. strategy for the region prioritized combatting various manifestations of terrorism, rather than addressing the root causes in various conflicts. She also held that “the United States does not concentrate on massacres committed by the Shia, only those committed by the Sunni.”   

Discussion turned to the future of the American security role in the Gulf, with Wittes reminding the audience that the United States, though the strongest power, was not all-powerful. Though Al-Ketbi likewise conceded that the United States remained the top power in the region, she noted that “the GCC countries are diversifying their [strategic] relationships, perhaps because of the bitterness they feel [toward the United States].” Likewise, Pollack held that China and India would undoubtedly come to play a greater role in providing for Gulf security in the near future. “The question is whether they are going to be productive, responsible, constructive players, or destructive and divisive,” he said, arguing that the United States had a role to play in peacefully integrating rising powers into the existing Gulf security architecture.

In response to a question about potential GCC diplomatic engagement with Iran, Al-Ketbi maintained that attempts had been made at Track-II outreach to build trust between both sides. She maintained, though, that Iran had made it impossible for GCC actors to believe in promises made in either an official or an unofficial capacity. She also defended GCC support to the Egyptian government led by President al-Sisi, saying that “the GCC countries are not supporting Sisi, but Egypt and its stability, which are very important [to them.]”

Pollack and Wittes both responded to suggestions that U.S. policies toward the region were riddled with inconsistencies by suggesting that no great power’s foreign policy is ever fully internally consistent. “As long-time friends and allies, we should be able to recognize that we have differences,” said Pollack of U.S.-GCC relations. They both noted that the United States would have to find new ways to move forward on strategies regarding the region, but developing more inclusive approaches to resolving challenges such as arms proliferation in the Gulf and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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The Future of U.S. - GCC Security Cooperation and Regional Securityمستقبل الأمن الإقليمي والتعاون الأمني بين الولاياتا لمتحدة الأمريكية ودول مجلس التعاون الخليجي


             

The Future of U.S. - GCC Security Cooperation and Regional Security

Event Information

June 3, 2015

5:00 PM - 6:30 PM AST

Salwa-II

Sheraton Hotel, Doha, Qatar

Sheraton Hotel, Corniche Street, Doha, Qatar

Doha

For over four decades, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has nurtured a special relationship with the Arab Gulf countries. The resulting ties have helped formulate common strategic goals with regards to the twin pursuit of security and stability in the region. However, the past few years have seen mounting pressure on this relationship, as the Obama administration’s unwillingness to commit to decisive military action in Syria and its pursuit of a nuclear deal with Iran have fuelled perceptions of a U.S. retrenchment vis-à-vis the Gulf.

The Brookings Doha Center hosted a discussion on the future of U.S.-GCC security cooperation and the implications for the broader Middle East. What will the security environment of the Gulf look like over the next years? What role can or should the U.S. play in this security architecture? Are the Gulf countries capable of taking the lead in regional security affairs and protect collective interests? Can Iran be considered a constructive partner, and can it be incorporated into regional 

             

2015 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Event Information

June 1-3, 2015

Doha, Qatar

UP NEXT: Pluralism in the Islamic world


Tweets by @usislam

On June 1-3, 2015, the Brookings Institution, in conjunction with the State of Qatar, will convene the . The theme of this year’s Forum is “Changing Assumptions,” which relates to historic shifts in geopolitical realities affecting the United States and Muslim-majority countries, as well as to societal and cultural norms.

The Forum’s plenary sessions (WEBCAST—see agenda below) will highlight several dimensions of relations with and within a rapidly changing Muslim world. Panelists will discuss a wide range of topics, including:


-Strategic priorities for the United States and the Middle East


-Pluralism in the Islamic world


-The role of Iran in the region


-Advancing women’s role in an unstable Middle East


-Ending civil wars

The Forum will also convene working and action groups which will focus on current issues confronting the Islamic world. Group topics include:


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Join the conversation on Twitter using #usislam15

             

Iraq after the fall of Ramadi: How to avoid another unraveling of Iraq

The fall of Ramadi was an important setback for Iraq and the United States, but it does not have to be a catastrophe. Hopefully, it will prove to be a wake-up call for Baghdad and Washington, both of whom have become complacent in their approach to the civil war there.

A Step Back

I think it important to start by putting the fall of Ramadi in its proper perspective. Da’ish forces have been battling for Ramadi since December 2013, so while the denouement may have come somewhat suddenly and unexpectedly, this is not a new front in the war and it ultimately took Da’ish a very long time to take the city. Although Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) did eventually retreat from the town and abandoned at least some heavy weapons doing so, most reports indicate they fell back to defensive positions outside the town. They did not simply drop their guns and run pell-mell, as many did in June 2014.

Perhaps of greatest importance, it is highly unlikely that the fall of Ramadi will lead to massive additional gains by Da’ish as happened in June 2014. The city of Baghdad is not in any danger of falling to Da’ish. It is well-defended by tens of thousands of committed Shi’a militiamen and the most seasoned formations in the Iraqi army. Habbaniyah (the town lying between Ramadi and Fallujah) is certainly in danger—and is already under attack by Da’ish. However, it seems unlikely that Da’ish will be able to use Ramadi as a springboard for much more than that. 

Part of the shock that many appear to have suffered from this defeat seems driven by the sense that and that from there on out there would be nothing but Iraqi-Coalition victories leading to the complete liberation of Iraq. We should not confuse the current campaign in Iraq with wars like World War II and the Gulf War where just such a reversal of tide occurred. Simply put, the United States has not committed anything like the resources it committed to those two wars, so there is no reason to expect that this conflict will follow that pattern. The United States has devoted far, far fewer resources to the waging of this war (and our many allies have very limited capabilities). Consequently, it was always likely to be much more of a tug-of-war, with gains interrupted by losses. The trick is to ensure that we are taking two steps forward for every one step back, and not one step forward for every two steps back.

The Importance of the Loss of Ramadi

The reason that the Coalition defeat at Ramadi is important is because of its potential impact on the psychology of both sides. As I noted at the time, was of outsized importance because it reversed a dangerous narrative that held sway among many Iraqis, particularly Shi’a Arabs, after the fall of Mosul. This was the notion that the United States was a paper tiger, only Iran was Iraq’s true ally, only Iran had come to Baghdad’s assistance when Da’ish threatened in June, and only Iranian assistance was necessary to liberate Iraq from Da’ish. Tikrit could have reversed this narrative because the Iranian-backed Shi’a militias were unable to conquer the city themselves even after a bloody month of fighting. However, when Baghdad finally asked for American air support, Da’ish was driven out in less than a week. That impressed upon many Iraqis that Iranian support was not enough, and that only with American help could they liberate major Sunni towns. 

Quite obviously, the fall of Ramadi threatens to reverse that narrative once again. This time, it was the American-backed Iraqi army that was unable to hold a major Sunni town on its own, even with American air support. Especially if the town is retaken by a force that includes Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, Iran’s allies will be able to make the case that Tikrit was a fluke — a product of understandable teething pains as the Shi’a militias mounted their first assault on a Sunni city, never to be repeated. It can only call back into question the necessity, even the utility, of American support. And that can only bolster Tehran’s influence in Baghdad at the expense of Washington’s. (I write this as someone who bristles at the simplistic argument that the geo-politics of the Middle East are a giant chess match between America and Iran. Unfortunately, when it comes to political influence in Baghdad today, it is a zero-sum competition between us.) 

While we make much of the appeal of Da’ish’s religious zealotry, the evidence strongly indicates that many (perhaps most) of Da’ish recruits...are young men drawn to the power and glamour of Da’ish’s revolt against the traditional Middle Eastern power structure. Da’ish is kick ass.

In addition, Ramadi can only help Da’ish’s recruiting efforts. While we make much of the appeal of Da’ish’s religious zealotry, the evidence strongly indicates that many (perhaps most) of Da’ish recruits...are young men drawn to the power and glamour of Da’ish’s revolt against the traditional Middle Eastern power structure. Da’ish is kick ass. They have conquered a vast swath of Iraq and Syria and put a heavy hurt on the conventional militaries of the regimes. Far too many angry, frustrated, and sexually-repressed young Sunni Arab men sign up with Da’ish to become the dangerous rebels-with-a-cause of the Muslim world. The more victories that Da’ish wins, especially against American air power, the more that they burnish that image of power and edgy glamour that is so important to their recruiting efforts. The fall of Ramadi (and Palmyra in the same week) can only help swing .

The Lessons of Ramadi

Why did Ramadi fall to Da’ish? For a lot of reasons. The Obama administration has decided to focus on the tactical—bad weather, an unexpected failure of morale, inadequate antitank weapons—and by doing so feels justified in making only minor “tweaks” to its overarching course of action. Unfortunately, the loss of Ramadi is far more important than that.

For their part, many of the administration’s critics contend that the fall of Ramadi demonstrates that its strategy is wrong or that it has failed outright. They are demanding a fundamentally different approach to Iraq, although predictably critics on the Left are suggesting that the U.S. do less by shifting to containment, while those on the Right are suggesting that the U.S. do far more.

I see the problem differently. I think that was a reasonable one, and still a viable one albeit increasingly more difficult with each setback. I just don’t believe that it is being pursued or resourced properly. I see an administration that became so frightened in August-September 2014 that Da’ish was going to overrun Kurdistan—which would have been a major domestic political problem for the president’s policy of disengagement from Iraq—that it reversed course and agreed to a major new commitment to Iraq, and eventually Syria. According to various senior administration officials, at that time, the president consciously signed up for a massive air campaign, a large-scale program to rebuild and advise the Iraqi armed forces, a concomitant project to arm and train Sunni tribesmen, all of it tied together by a determined effort to forge a new power-sharing agreement to reconcile Iraq’s warring Sunni and Shi’a factions.

Unfortunately, that commitment only seems to have lasted a few months. By late 2014, the United States was already falling short. The Syria piece of the policy, both military and especially political, was going nowhere. In Iraq, the air campaign has been impressive, but hardly pervasive, let alone suffocating. The U.S. is now retraining only a handful of Iraqi army brigades—4-6 based on various accounts. The effort to train and arm Sunni fighters would be a joke were it not so lethally frustrating to the Sunnis themselves. The American advisory effort has been curtailed, kept to trainers and advisers at division level and above. No advisors accompanying Iraqi units in the field. No one to call in airstrikes. And there simply is no U.S.-led political effort to bring about national reconciliation, which is not surprising given how senior Administration officials privately deride it.

The effort to train and arm Sunni fighters would be a joke were it not so lethally frustrating to the Sunnis themselves.

On many of these issues, the administration has tended to blame the Iraqis for the problems: the Iraqis are incapable of negotiating a new political agreement, the Iraqi government refuses to arm and train the Sunnis, the Iraqis can’t or won’t send more battalions for training. While there is truth in all of these claims, they are all excuses for American inaction. Frequently, the United States has shied away from doing more even when the Iraqis have wanted us to do so. For instance, U.S. military officials report that Washington refuses to attach American advisors or forward air controllers to Iraqi field formations because the White House is insistent that not a single American be killed in this fight. (And that despite poll after poll after poll showing that the American people wants to do more, not less in Iraq and Syria, and favors the deployment of American ground troops in both places by as much as a 2-to-1 margin).

Another canard deployed by the administration is that the U.S. lacks the leverage to convince Iraqis to do what we want them to do. They say it as if they believe that influence is something that falls from the sky, rather than something that is created by a commitment of resources and political will. Whenever the United States has made a determined effort to press the Iraqi government to do something, Washington has gotten exactly the result it wanted. At Tikrit (and again at Ramadi), we insisted that no Shi’a militias participate, and the militias were kept out.

An even more important example is what happened in August 2014 when, faced with the Da’ish assault on Erbil, Washington demanded that Nuri al-Maliki step down as prime minister and a new prime minister be chosen to head a national unity government. The U.S. backed up these demands with resources: Washington committed air power and announced that it would provide training, advisors and military equipment; the president appointed a highly-respected special envoy, General John Allen; the U.S. made a full-court diplomatic press with multiple visits by Secretary of State Kerry and enlisted the help of our Arab and European allies. The outcome: the U.S. got exactly what it wanted. Maliki stepped down in favor of a national unity government led by Haidar al-Abadi—and it is worth noting that Abadi was a much better choice than most of the names then being considered. In short, when the United States made an effort to get what we wanted, we got it. The problem has been that since then, we simply haven’t made the same kind of effort. 

Heeding the Warning

There is no reason that the loss of Ramadi has to be the start of yet another unraveling of Iraq. It is a politically alarming but militarily modest setback. But it is a warning that should be heeded. A warning that Iraq is not on a glide path to peace and stability. While such a path exists, like everything in Iraq, it will be long and hard and will require considerable American help for the Iraqis to follow it to the finish. 

In Iraq, there simply is no substitute for American assistance...Either the U.S. does enough to pull the Iraqis through to peace and stability or the country will descend deeper into chaos and civil war.

In Iraq, there simply is no substitute for American assistance, political and military (Iranian assistance will only push the country deeper into civil war) but there is no equilibrium points other than war and peace. Either the U.S. does enough to pull the Iraqis through to peace and stability or the country will descend deeper into chaos and civil war. And doing enough does not necessarily require 160,000 ground troops or $25 billion in annual aid. Just doing what the administration promised and considered back in September 2014 would be a terrific start and may be all that is necessary. At the very least, that would mean: 

Making a determined and sustained effort to engineer a new national reconciliation and power-sharing arrangement among all of Iraq’s factions, as the United States did in 2007-2008. Unfortunately, much as we and they wish it to be otherwise, history has demonstrated that the Iraqis cannot do this without American help.
Providing additional American and other Western military personnel to expand the training of the Iraqi army, advise and accompany Iraqi formations down to at least battalion level in the field, and serve as forward observers to call in air-strikes and other forms of fire support for Iraqi units.
Expanding the program to arm and train Sunni tribesmen as paramilitary adjuncts to the Iraqi armed forces. The U.S. may have to insist on this over the objection of many Shi’a Iraqis. 
Expanding military and non-military assistance to Iraq and the Abadi government as leverage for American diplomats and to reinforce Prime Minister Abadi’s own stature. The Iraqis may or may not have a military need for more weapons (although the decision to expedite the delivery of anti-tank weapons suggests that they do), but there is no question that the Abadi government needs these weapons for political reasons, to push back on his rivals who claim that Iraq can get everything it needs from Iran. Likewise, non-military aid (especially to deal with Iraq’s urgent financial crisis) would highlight America’s ability to provide Iraq with help that Iran simply can’t. 

Even if we do all of this, there is no guarantee that Iraq will all work out okay. The time when we had good, easy answers for the problems of Iraq are long gone. All that we are left with is finding the least bad among what remains. But pursuing these shifts will give the United States and Iraq the best possible chance to achieve enduring peace and stability. Of greater importance still, there is no other course of action that can. Certainly not continuing the half-hearted current approach.

Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Image Source: © STRINGER Iraq / Reuters


             

How to keep Iraq from burning

On May 11, the Center for Middle East Policy hosted from Iraq on the country’s future. Moderated by Senior Fellow , the discussion featured Rafe al-Issawi, who served as deputy prime minister and minister of finance under former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and Atheel al-Nujayfi, governor of Ninewah Province, whose capital, Mosul, is controlled by the Islamic State.  

Dismantle the militias, institutionalize the security forces

Rafe al-Issawi began by asserting that Iraq’s Shiite militias—many of which are backed by Iran—are equally brutal as the (Sunni) Islamic State forces which they are fighting. While the Shiite militias may help defeat IS, Issawi warned that it will result in a fragmented Iraq ruled by militias and warlords. He advocated dismantling the militias and replacing them with government forces that recruit individual members, both Sunni and Shiite, rather than absorbing entire militias into the official cadres.

Issawi presented his vision of a new counterinsurgency approach, which he described as a modified version of General David Petraeus’s model.  His plan would establish “joint committees” composed of representatives from Iraq’s central government, U.S. advisors, and local forces, restructure Iraq’s army into a national, non-sectarian fighting force, and recruit and train Sunni (and Kurdish) fighters as a national guard. 

Issawi argued that all resources should be devoted to unifying Iraqis to fight against the Islamic State, but he also emphasized that creating robust, inclusive political institutions in Iraq is equally important.

Federalism, decentralization of power, and the constitution

Governor Atheel al-Nujayfi offered his vision for Iraq’s post-Islamic State political landscape. Although adamant that Iraq should remain unified, Nujayfi recommended decentralization as outlined in the Iraqi constitution and called for significant provincial autonomy. He explained, “I believe authority in Iraq should be split up, but not Iraq itself.” Nujayfi offered the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as a model.

Issawi agreed that the solutions for building a strong, stable, democratic Iraq are already contained in the constitution; the problem, he said, is that the constitution is not being respected and implemented. “There is no shortage of the right ideas” in Iraq, he said. What is needed is “a real action plan, not just promises.”   

Reconciliation, amnesty, and compensation

Issawi lamented that when it comes to Iraq’s political institutions, “Everything needs to be restored. Everything is damaged. We have to rebuild again.” Reconciliation, especially between Shiite and Sunni communities, is a critical piece of the rebuilding project. However, Issawi warned that it will take time and will require confidence-building measures to restore trust, including amnesty for Sunnis who allied with the Islamic State as a means of protection. Finally, Issawi explained that humanitarian aid and financial compensation for the thousands of refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs) produced by this latest conflagration is essential for Iraq to stabilize itself.

America’s role

Issawi listed four ways the United States can help Iraq toward a more stable future:

Help dismantle the militias and rebuild the national security forces;
Enable the rapid arming of Sunnis and Kurds via the “joint committees”;
Support the creation of a national guard;
Provide financial support to help compensate the thousands of refugees and IDPs.

Issawi said that Iraq’s Sunnis are Washington’s greatest potential allies in the fight against the Islamic State. He declared, “I came [here today] not as a politician but as a man warning his allies that there’s a burning Iraq. Come to extinguish it.”

The future is key

In the end, all the discussants agreed that overcoming Iraq’s current challenges will require commitment to a unified, inclusive, and democratic future. “Is democracy a real solution?” asked Issawi. “Yes. Is democracy a real option? Yes. But it is fragile.” Ultimately, they argued that Iraq must develop political institutions that are capable of resolving its internal conflicts as well as preventing them from reigniting. 

Authors

Jennifer R. Williams



             

The future of Iraq: A conversation with Sunni leaders

Event Information

May 11, 2015

9:00 AM - 10:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium

Brookings Institution

1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20036

Register for the Event

This event will be live-streamed on CSPAN.org »

A significant victory against ISIS in Iraq will require meaningful reconciliation between Iraq's warring communities. The greatest unknown is Iraq's Sunni population. Their isolation from the Iraqi political system, stemming from the divisive policies of the previous Iraqi government, opened the door to ISIS's return to Iraq and lies at the heart of this new Iraqi civil war. If Iraq is to achieve peace again and remain a unified state, one of the most important questions is how to bring Iraq’s Sunnis back into the fold.

On Monday, May 11, the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution will host a conversation with two key Sunni leaders from Iraq. Rafe al-Issawi served as deputy prime minister and minister of finance under former Prime Minister Maliki, and is one of the most prominent Sunni leaders from Anbar province; Atheel al-Nujayfi is the governor of Ninewah Province and one of the most prominent Sunni leaders from Mosul. These leading Sunni officials will discuss the future of Iraq with moderator and Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack. They will explore the Sunni role in leading Iraq going forward, Sunni concerns about marginalization, and what role the United States might play in this delicate but vital process.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #FutureIraq

             

Welcome to Sudayri Arabia

There are at least two ways to look at the dramatic changes to Saudi leadership announced yesterday. One is to see this as King Salman finally setting up the long-overdue generational transition from the sons of the first king, Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa’ud, to his grandsons, as well as empowering some of the best and brightest of that next generation. It is unquestionably true that many of the men that Salman has appointed to new posts yesterday and in preceding months represent some of the most capable, best educated, and most highly-respected figures of the younger generation of Saudi princes and technocrats. It is a happy story, and one that should not be dismissed despite what I am about to tell you.

The other way to see the events in the Kingdom is that it represents a Sudayri coup. At the very least, it is a major consolidation of power by the Sudayri wing of the al-Sa’ud royal family. The Sudayris are the sons and grandsons of King Abd al-Aziz with his favorite wife, Hassa bint Ahmed al-Sudayri. That union produced 7 sons, the largest bloc of full brothers among the dozens of sons of Abd al-Aziz. The late King Fahd was the oldest of them, but they also included the late former Defense Minister Sultan, the late former Interior Minister Nayef, and now King Salman. For decades, the Sudayris constituted an extremely powerful grouping within the royal family and during King Fahd’s reign they effectively ran the country. But their power and cohesiveness inspired sibling rivalries, and many of their half-brothers disliked their policies as much as their efforts to monopolize power.

Today, as a result of Salman’s many changes, nearly every major post in the Saudi cabinet is held by either a Sudayri or a non-royal— able technocrats like Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi or the new Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir. Only Prince Mitaib, the son of the late King Abdullah, remains as a non-Sudayri prince in charge of a key ministry (the National Guard). And although it was widely believed that the aged and ailing Prince Sa’ud al-Faisal was looking to step down as foreign minister— and no one can gainsay the appointment of the highly-capable Adel al-Jubeir as his successor— Sa’ud Faisal’s removal eliminates still another powerful, non-Sudayri prince from the cabinet.

Most stunning of all, the king removed Prince Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz as the crown prince. Prince Muqrin was the last son of Abd al-Aziz in the succession chain, he was relatively young by the standards of Saudi princes (69 years old), and was reportedly picked by King Abdullah to follow Salman in part to prevent the further  monopolization of power by the Sudayris. Since the formation of the Saudi state in 1932, the al-Sa’ud have never removed a crown prince. They did remove a sitting king once (Sa’ud bin Abd al-Aziz in 1964) but never a crown prince. Moreover, this unprecedented move leaves the next two princes in line of succession as Sudayris from the younger generation—Muhammad bin Nayef (55 years old) and Muhammad bin Salman (the king’s son, probably 30 years old). It means that the Sudayris could reign for another 50 years.

There are a number of reasons why this Sudayri consolidation could be of concern to the United States in addition to the fact that it is almost certainly resented by many other Saudi princes, and likely important non-royals as well. The most important of these is that in the past the Sudayris have been associated with internal and external policies that have created problems for the Kingdom. At the level of gross generalization, the Sudayris are typically associated with overspending, unchecked corruption, impious behavior, and a reliance on massive payoffs or repression to deal with domestic discontent. In the foreign policy arena, they have often favored a pro-American, anti-Iranian foreign policy, one that has been quite aggressive by Saudi standards and has risked getting the Kingdom into confrontational situations that the U.S. found unnecessary if not dangerous.

For the most part, the Sudayris now in power are from the next generation. Again, they are much better educated and more worldly than their fathers. We can all hope that they have learned the lessons of past mistakes and won’t repeat them. But there are some worrying signs already. King Abdallah steadfastly (and smartly) resisted getting directly involved in any of the civil wars on the Kingdom’s borders— Iraq, Yemen and Syria (one state removed). While the Saudis claim that they only intervened in Yemen grudgingly, they did not have to do so at all. I regard that intervention as a dangerous mistake, and I note that it happened barely four months after a Sudayri king took over from a non-Sudayri. In a similarly disquieting vein, twice now King Salman has made massive cash payouts to his constituents—a general bonus for all Saudi government workers upon his accession (and most of the Saudi workforce works for the government) and another round of bonuses for the Saudi armed forces and security services which was announced along with the cabinet changes yesterday. It is hard not to see these as the same kind of payoffs made by Roman emperors starting with Caligula to buy the acquiescence of key power bases and potential threats like the military.

Again, this is a very competent group of princes and each individual move can be easily justified by the age and ability of the incoming and outgoing office-holders. But it is worth noting the changing shape of the forest even as we admire the individual trees. At a time when Saudi Arabia is under increasing pressure from low oil prices, the rise of Salafi extremists like ISIS, and four civil wars spilling over across the Middle East— not to mention the longstanding structural problems of the Kingdom’s political, economic and social systems— a shift back to the old, dangerous policies of previous Sudayri rule could create real problems for Saudi stability in the future.

Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack


Image Source: © Jim Bourg / Reuters


             

Iraq's Mr. Abadi comes to Washington

Tomorrow, Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi will meet with President Obama for the first time as prime minister of Iraq. For the past 12 years, there has hardly been an occasion when such a meeting between the U.S. president and the Iraqi prime minister did not come at an important time, but this meeting comes at a watershed moment. Iraq could move in many possible directions, most bad, but some potentially quite good. It is absolutely critical that the Obama administration grasps this opportunity to put Iraq firmly on the right track.

The Tikrit victory

A lot has happened in Iraq recently, much of it well-covered by the international media, at least in its immediate dimensions.

First and foremost was the liberation of Tikrit. As I noted in a post soon after the battle was joined, the most important thing to understand about the battle for Tikrit is that it was planned and initially executed almost entirely by Iraq's Shi'a militias and their Iranian advisors. The militia leaders did not even notify the Iraqi government of their intended attack on Tikrit until six days before it commenced, and offered to allow government forces to participate only on condition that the United States was excluded. Prime Minister Abadi did what he had to do, committing small numbers of troops to the fight and publicly taking ownership of the operation so as to not look irrelevant in his own country.

But then, the best thing of all happened: the militias were stymied by Da'ish fighters, prevented from clearing the city. The government turned to the United States for air support to break the deadlock and the United States, in the persons of CENTCOM Commander General Lloyd Austin and Ambassador Stuart Jones, the U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, agreed to provide everything the Iraqis needed, on condition that the militias back off. This was exactly the right move and the Obama administration deserves credit for seizing the opportunity.

Best of all, within days of the start of U.S. airstrikes, Da'ish was driven from Tikrit. As General Austin and Ambassador Jones (among others) argued, this has begun to change the narrative in Iraq in important ways. For the militia leaders and their Iranian advisors, the whole point of the assault was to demonstrate that they had complete freedom of action and could liberate even large Sunni cities without American support. If they could do so, it would reinforce to Iraqis that they did not need the United States, and the United States could not do anything to stop the Iranian-backed militias. The fact that they failed to take Tikrit after a month, but the U.S. airstrikes resulted in its fall in less than a week has reversed the narrative. While it is just unclear what the average Iraqi believes right now, Iraqi elites—Sunni and Shi'a—increasingly recognize that the Iranians and their allies cannot do what the Americans supporting Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units could. That is huge.

The shift to Anbar

There is some more good news. It looks like Baghdad has chosen not to try to liberate Mosul next, but will instead shift its focus to Anbar to clear much or all of that western province before turning back north. That matters because, as I and any number of other commentators have noted, taking Mosul will be a major challenge, both militarily and politically. Mosul is a massive, multi-ethnic city and the crown jewel of the Da'ish empire, such as it is. Taking it could easily prove more difficult than Tikrit.

The cities and towns of Anbar, in contrast, tend to be smaller and far more homogeneous. It is also likely to be more difficult for the Shi'a militias to get involved there because they won't have much (if any) support from the local populace. Instead, they will be wholly dependent on the government for sustainment, which will allow Baghdad to simply cut off their supplies, as it seems to have eventually done to the militias in the Tikrit fighting.

Going after the smaller cities of Anbar should allow Iraqi army formations to gain valuable combat experience, build their cohesion and leadership, and secure the trust of Iraq's Sunni community. In each operation, with American support, Iraqi security forces can work out both the military and political kinks in their methodologies, and do so in smaller, more easily-managed operations. Hopefully, they can create a sense of momentum that will bolster Prime Minister Abadi and reassure the Sunni community that its liberation is inevitable, while simultaneously giving Sunni Iraqis the confidence that when the ISF comes to town, they can feel safe under its protection. That is critically important given the widespread fear among Sunni Iraqis of the Shi'a militias, which have conducted ethnic cleansing and inflicted punitive retribution in some, perhaps many, of the areas they have retaken from Da'ish.

Refocusing on the long term

As I have warned elsewhere the greatest ongoing problem with the current U.S. approach to Iraq is its continuing focus on short-term operations and neglect of the long-term question of Iraq's political future. This is not an academic question that can be left to some future date. It is the single most important question facing Iraq today, and if it is not addressed properly, it will unravel all of the near-term political and military gains won by Iraqis and Americans.

Without rehearsing the entire issue, the question that every Iraqi wants to know is what kind of Iraq will exist after Da'ish is driven from Iraq—something all Iraqis now see as merely a matter of time. We need to remember that it was former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's subversion of Iraqi democracy and alienation of the Sunni community that caused the state to collapse again, allowed Da'ish to overrun the northwest, and plunged the country back into civil war. If there is not a new power-sharing arrangement among Sunnis and Shi'a that will make the Sunnis feel comfortable rejoining the government—one that assures them of political weight and economic benefits commensurate with their demographic strength, and that will make them feel safe from violent repression by the government—they will continue to fight, with or without Da'ish. As I have warned, in those circumstances, military victory over Da'ish will not end the fighting, it will enflame it.

Here the United States has some important things going for it. First, as I noted above, the United States actually has quite a good team working on Iraq. Ambassador Jones has proven to be smart, energetic and able, and he has some good support. Generals Austin, Terry and Bednarek have similarly handled the military situation with care and skill. And perhaps of greatest importance, we have Prime Minister Abadi himself, whom a wide swathe of Iraqis consider (probably correctly) to be Iraq's last, best hope.

The importance of helping Prime Minister Abadi succeed

Time and again, Abadi has taken difficult, risky steps to pull Iraq in the right direction. His decisions to disband the Office of the Commander in Chief, sack the worst of the political generals appointed by Maliki, accept American military advisers, oppose Hadi al-Ameri (Iran's most important Iraqi ally) as minister of the interior, strike two deals with the Kurds over oil, reach out to Iraq's Sunni leadership, arm Sunni fighters, and request American air support at Tikrit over the objections of the Shi'a militia leaders, all speak to his determination to do the right thing. Every one of those decisions (and a range of others) were opposed by Iran and Iraq's Shi'a chauvinists. They attest to his desire to defeat Da'ish, end the sectarian fighting, repair relations with the Sunnis and bring them back into the fold, limit Iranian influence in Iraq, and expand Iraq's relationship with the United States—exactly our goals in Iraq as well. While Abadi may not be perfect, he was an inspired choice for prime minister and as many Iraqi leaders point out (some as praise, others as condemnation) if Abadi cannot make Iraq work, then probably no one can.

But Abadi needs help. He is a good man in a weak position. He is opposed by a number of important Shi'a leaders aligned with Iran, while most Sunni, Shi'a and even Kurdish leaders fear that he is too weak to succeed and so have not been willing to exert themselves on his behalf—creating a vicious cycle. He is going to have to get strong support by an important external power to reverse that perverse situation. There is no question that the United States could play that role, but doing so is going to mean committing to Iraq in a way that the Obama administration has never been willing to do more than rhetorically.

The events at Tikrit have created an opportunity, a moment when various Iraqi political leaders are reassessing their calculation of the correlation of forces in Iraq. The Iranians do not look quite as strong as they once did, and the Americans suddenly look like they might regain their 2003-2009 form. But this moment will not last forever. What Iraqis are looking for is whether the United States will sustain its commitment to Iraq, and will do so both for the duration of the fight against Da'ish and after.

Iraqis are many things, but forgetful is not one of them. They all remember the disastrous American disengagement from Iraq that began in 2010 as the Obama administration did everything it could to wash its hands of Iraq. It was that disengagement that led in a straight line to the resumption of the current civil war. If the United States is going to abandon Iraq again as soon as Da'ish is defeated, the vast majority of Iraqis are likely to conclude that the country will break down all over again at that point, and so it would be foolish of them to do anything now other than prepare for when that day comes. It is precisely that bet-hedging that produced the return to civil war in Iraq in the first place (and historically always has in civil wars all across the world). It is why the "moral hazard" argument trotted out by the Obama administration to justify their political decision to disengage from Iraq was always belied by both the history of Iraq and the history of civil wars. It was proven disastrously false in June 2014.

But if the United States is going to learn that lesson rather than repeat it, we are going to have to make a long-term commitment to a real partnership with Iraq. The kind of partnership that the Obama administration has talked about endlessly but done almost nothing to realize. Now is the time to make good on that promise.

If Prime Minister Abadi is going to succeed, he is going to need to be able to convince other Iraqis, both Sunni and Shi'a, that he has strong American backing and an enduring American commitment to help Iraq rebuild its security forces, maintain the security of all Iraqis (and long after Da'ish is gone), reform its governmental structure, and begin to provide goods and services to the Iraqi people.

What Abadi needs from the visit

Prime Minister Abadi's visit to the White House thus comes at a critical moment—one where Iran's allies have been taken down several pegs and all Iraqis are looking to see what kind of a commitment the United States is willing to make to actually back Maliki. If all he gets is a warm smile and a photo-op, the moment will be lost. There is a lot that could help him; here is a quick way to think about it:

Additional military assistance

It is largely correct that, as former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel argued, the Iraqis are getting everything they need militarily. But that's beside the point. Right now, Iraqi Shi'a widely believe that Iran has been providing them with everything they need militarily and the United States has been stingily doling out only tiny amounts only when Iraq is desperate. Abadi needs to be able to go to other Iraqi leaders and say, in effect, 'The Americans are ready to be generous with their military assistance—so generous that we don't necessarily need the Iranians.' This actually isn't hard given how much more the United States has to give than Iran, how much is already in the pipeline, and how much Iraq needs. If the president could simply announce a variety of new arms sales—preferably to be paid at a later date when Iraq's finances are in better shape (see below)—from small arms to additional MRAPs (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles), it would go a long way to making that case.

Political assistance

This is critical. There are two things that Abadi needs. Unfortunately he does not seem willing to acknowledge either. The first is help and "encouragement" to expand his staff. This may seem stunning, but right now, Abadi has a tiny little group of people he relies on to run the Iraqi government. It is perhaps a few dozen at most, to do what most countries have thousands for. This many people, no matter how capable they may be, are far, far too few to actually get things done—and these people are obscenely overworked and sleep-deprived. It is a major reason that Abadi is punching below his weight and failing to get things done. He needs American assistance identifying additional personnel and building out a staff that can actually move the rusty wheels of the Iraqi government.

The second, and even more important political task is for the United States to take a more active role in political reconciliation. Simply put, Iraq's Sunni community is badly fragmented—at least as much as they were in 2007-2008, if not more so. They will not be able to come together and negotiate a new power-sharing arrangement that could produce a stable Iraq and end the civil war. Someone is going to have to help them, if not in effect do it for them. Right now, Prime Minister Abadi hopes to do this himself. It is a noble idea, but it is already failing and seems unlikely to work. It would be far, far better to allow Ambassador Jones to play this role instead—speaking to scores of Sunni leaders to determine the minimum necessary requirements of the Sunni community as a whole and acting as their surrogate in negotiations with Prime Minister Abadi or other moderate Shi'a leaders. This is how the United States ended the civil war in Iraq in 2008, with Ambassador Ryan Crocker and his team playing precisely that role. Again, it would be nice if Prime Minister Abadi could handle this himself, but the evidence suggests that it is just not possible because of Sunni distrust of the Shi'a, even Abadi. This is an absolutely critical area where the United States has to convince Prime Minister Abadi to let us help him.

One last point on political assistance deserves mention. Prime Minister Abadi is likely to ask President Obama for help with Iraq's Sunni neighbors—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey. Iraqi prime ministers have been understandably asking the same for over a decade. While the United States should, of course, be willing to help Iraq here, what the president needs to tell the prime minister very directly is that there is no way that the United States is going to change the perspectives—let alone the policies—of any of these states until Iraq's Sunni community feels comfortable with the political future of Iraq. THAT, not what the United States tells them, is their key consideration in Iraq. And consequently, until there is meaningful political reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a in Iraq, all the American jawboning and pressure in the world are not going to do a jot of good. And that too should make him willing to accept an expanded American role in that process.

Economic assistance

Here as well, there is a great deal that the United States can and should do. First, Iraq is suffering mightily from the twin blows of low oil prices and the cost of waging a war against Da'ish. Days after the Abadi-Obama meeting, Iraqi Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari will appeal to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help in enabling Iraq to meet its immediate financial problems (including a $21 billion budget deficit). Full-throated American support coupled with creative financial assistance with the international financial institutions will be very important to Iraq—and very helpful in demonstrating both America's commitment to Iraq, and the myriad ways that the United States can help Iraq and Iran simply cannot.

In that sense, now would be a great moment to announce a major new program of American economic assistance to Iraq. Some of this could and should be direct aid to alleviate some of the economic problems Iraqis are suffering right now as a result of the low oil prices and costs of the civil war. The Iraqis desperately need help with agriculture reform, educational expansion and reform, infrastructure repair, financial sector reform, and capacity building at every level of governance and regulation. Much of this assistance could come in the form of American know-how (and perhaps some short-term financing) coupled with long-term Iraqi financing once oil prices rebound. That said, it is important to note that several major recent polls have now shown American public support for doing more in both Iraq and Syria, including taking very costly steps like committing ground troops. Congress too seems quite willing to appropriate funds for Iraq and Syria as part of the campaign against Da'ish. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the public or the Congress would balk at a new aid package for Iraq.

The bottom line, of course, is that Iraq needs just about everything. Because of the fear of Da'ish, the American people and Congress appear ready to pay more to stabilize Iraq, and the events on the ground—from the accession of Haidar al-Abadi to the recent victory at Tikrit—have created a remarkable opportunity for the United States to secure both its short and long term goals in Iraq. But, as always, doing so is not going to be easy. It is going to require an effort on our part. We are going to have to commit additional aid and assistance to Iraq, both to enable Prime Minister Abadi to advance his agenda (which is our agenda too) and to give American diplomats and generals leverage of their own to complement Abadi's efforts. As part of that, we are going to have to convince Abadi to let us help him put his own house in order, build a staff that can run the country, and allow Ambassador Jones to act as a surrogate for the fissiparous Sunni leadership. That won't be easy, but it will be much easier if the prime minister comes away convinced that he can rely on the United States to be steadfast, committed and generous in a way that we simply have not been for the past five years.

Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack



             

Around the halls: The developing situation in Yemen

In the wake of continuing chaos in Yemen, and the decision of a ten-country coalition—led by Saudi Arabia—to conduct airstrikes against Houthi fighters in Yemen, Brookings experts had a candid dialogue about the developing situation. Below is an edited version of that conversation.

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:


This is an extraordinary step:

A direct attack by Sunni Arab states on an Iranian-backed militia;
The first time the GCC has taken military action outside its own membership; and 
The return of Egypt to fighting on Yemeni territory. 

By the way, Bruce, didn’t we have a conversation just recently about the prospect of Egypt providing an expeditionary force for the GCC states? It feels momentous for the trajectory of the region. Some questions:

Could this campaign distract Sunni governments, and perhaps the United States, from the fight vs ISIS in Iraq and Jordan? 
Will Iran double down on the Houthis?
What will AQAP do?

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director, Intelligence Project, Foreign Policy program:


Air strikes will not defeat the Houthis, and they are too late to save Aden. Are the Saudis prepared to put boots on the ground? Is Cairo?

Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:


That's the danger! Their boots on the ground won't solve the problem either—it will just bog them down in a Yemeni quagmire.

Bruce Riedel:


What are the implications for a nuclear deal? Can you sign a deal with Tehran while your Sunni allies are at war with Iran's proxy in Yemen? And you are giving their Iraqi Shia allies air support in Tikrit?

Tamara Cofman Wittes:


President Obama last August cited Yemen as a model for the United States’ intended counterterrorism approach in Iraq. Maybe the "Yemen model" has a different meaning now: cede the territory to those most willing to bleed for it.

I really wonder how AQAP plays this. Saudi intervention seems like a golden opportunity for them.

Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program :


I'll add to this only that I can't figure out what the Islamic State presence is in Yemen. If big, AQAP has a problem in that the Islamic State will push the sectarian button better, so AQAP will have a serious local rival.

Salman Shaikh, Fellow, Director, Brookings Doha Center and Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:


I've said that the United States has the difficult job, like it or not, to play both referee between Saudi and Iran and ally to its traditional friends in the region. Not easy, I know, but there should have been a much greater effort earlier to push back on Iran's hegemonic ambitions in the region. Saudis and others have been warning for quite some time. Instead, the United States is yet again a "reactive" Middle East power, supporting different (opposing) folks in different places.

I also wonder how secure is Saudi Arabia? Houthis may carry out their threats to attack Saudi. If this carries on, we must keep an eye on dissent within Saudi.

Neither do I rule out Sunnis dissent within Iran's western regions. There have been signs of that recently.

Saudi, I was told, is looking to build a very broad regional coalition to counter Iranian expansionism, which includes Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt.

I also see that 10 countries have pledged support to the Saudis for Yemen, including Jordan, Sudan, Morocco, in addition to Egypt and Pakistan. The Saudis will have to pay for them all.

The Yemeni conflict is now clearly part of a broader regional conflagration. For that reason there is an urgent need to plug the Syrian volcano. Renewed focus on a Syrian a Syrian political transition can contribute to de-escalating regional tensions.

Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Foreign Policy program:


I take a different position than Salman, both with respect to the characterization of Iranian ambitions and the criticism of the Obama administration. As Bruce Riedel has written, Iran's involvement in Yemen is marginal and opportunistic. They didn't invent the Houthi uprising and their investment has been relatively small scale in comparison to other conflicts. Which is why you have never seen a Qassem Soleimani selfie from Aden or anywhere in the vicinity, and you never will. Tehran's real interests lie elsewhere, in Iraq and Syria. I would imagine they will aim to continue to exploit what is likely to remain a very unsettled situation in Yemen. But that hardly qualifies as hegemonic.

As for the United States, I don't know of an American administration that has been anything other than reactive vis-à-vis Yemen. Unfortunately (especially for Yemenis) I think Yemen will simply never rise to the level of a priority that commands proactive American intercession—except if the threat of AQAP is resurgent, which of course may be an inadvertent outcome of the GCC strikes.

My guess is that the Obama administration sees a net benefit in enabling the Saudis to flex their muscles on an issue which is existential, or close to it, for Riyadh but relatively low-priority for the rest of the world. Heck, Washington may have even encouraged this outcome: let the Gulf vent its spleen about the cozy conversations between Secretary John Kerry and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in an arena where they cannot do much additional harm to core United States interests in the region. Meanwhile, the nuclear talks will go on—even if the Iranians can't close the deal—and Washington will focus its energies on IS and Iraq, in parallel to Iran's campaign there.

In my view, the real problem is that Saudi interventions across the region—military and financial—are no less forceful than those of Iran, and they are not inherently stabilizing, except perhaps in the short run.

I can't yet puzzle out how this is likely to impact the Iranian nuclear talks. I'm tempted to say not at all; the negotiations are really silo-ed on both sides, and if they can finally get to a credible formula, I think that producing a somewhat general, possibly unwritten "political framework" is not a terribly high hurdle. There would still be plenty of time for this to crash and burn before June 30th. On the other hand, the Iranian leadership sees the nuclear issue as firmly enmeshed within a broader web of United States efforts to undermine the regime, and it seems conceivable that the United States-sanctified Saudi attack on an Iranian client/ally — undertaken at the precise moment that Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani had to yield the Tikrit battle to United States air strikes would intensify Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei's hesitation about accepting a deal that the hard-liners in his security bureaucracy will see as a capitulation to the West.

Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Foreign Policy program:


One thing though to keep in mind, separate from the big unknown (and potentially disastrous) consequences for Yemen. This is a huge development for Arab politics that will test the bargain that the Saudis sought at the outset of the Arab Uprisings: luring Morocco and Jordan into a support relationship with the GCC: money for security support. That now includes Egypt (and a lot of symbolic Sunni countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, and the Palestinian Authority). There is no doubt the Saudis took the lead on this, that they consolidated the support of GCC (with the exception of Oman) which has propelled them into uncharted leadership territory. Regardless of how it all ends in Yemen, the path will be bloody with a lot of unintended consequences. If ground forces will ultimately be needed from Egypt and Jordan, this could obviously have consequences well beyond Gulf.

The Iranian issue will become more prominent, although I doubt Iran will do any more than provide some backing from the outside in the early stages. But it sets up a tone in the Saudi-Iranian competition that will have impact elsewhere.

The Saudis may also feel that they need to start showing that they are a serious military player; despite investing tens of billions on arms, few people in the region take their power seriously and many wonder what they have done with these resources. They may feel this is an opportunity to register their arrival— but if they are seen to fail, they stand to lose a great deal.

As far as the Egyptian role, it is already generating a heated discussion among Egyptian commentators, for and against, with comparison to Egypt's intervention in the 1960s.

Bruce Riedel:


The Saudis have told me the coalition includes Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan and Pakistan. Notably absent is Oman, which has a border with Yemen.

Aircraft from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Sudan, Morocco and Jordan are part of the air coalition with RSAF. Absent are Pakistan and Egypt so far.

Saudi sources are adamant they don't need foreign ground troops, they can do the ground war alone; 150,000 Army, SANG and MOI troops available they claim. Of course, they don't want to admit Pakistan turned them down two weeks ago.

Operational command of the coalition is in the hands of the Minister of Defense Prince Muhammad bin Salman, 34, the King’s son. He toured the Saudi border provinces over the weekend to prepare the operation.

Among the many odd aspects of this story is the Saudi announcement. Has any country ever announced it is going to war using as its spokesman an ambassador stationed in a foreign country thousands of miles away? Why not the King, Crown Prince or Foreign Minister speaking in Riyadh to the Saudi people? So far they have not spoken.

The Omani absence is also driven by the Sultan’s health question. Although he returned to Muscat on Monday after months in Germany, he has yet to speak to the Omani people. Reports that his health is fully restored and he is cured of cancer are probably wishful thinking.

Pakistan’s absence is also notable. Officially the Pakistani government is “considering” the Saudi appeal for assistance. Like Oman Pakistan shares a border with Iran and is more cautious about how far to jump on the Saudi bandwagon.

Authors

Daniel L. BymanKenneth M. PollackBruce RiedelSalman ShaikhSuzanne MaloneyShibley TelhamiTamara Cofman Wittes


Image Source: © Joshua Roberts / Reuters