Kenneth M. Pollack's Blog, page 13
October 18, 2011
Iran's Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Ambassador to the United States
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Editor's Note: In an interview with SPIEGEL, Kenneth Pollack comments on the alleged Iranian plot to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States. According to Pollack, Iran's leaders may have been spurred on by a weak U.S. economy and troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan.
SPIEGEL: All of Washington is shaking their heads over the alleged Iranian murder conspiracy against the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States. Even U.S. officials said it seems like a Hollywood film. Does the scenario make sense to you?
Kenneth Pollack: It seems quite remarkable, even outlandish. Given the graveness of the charges and the outlandishness of the story, we want to view it with some skepticism. We should also keep in mind that the Iranian government gets blamed for lots of things, not all of which it does, and the United States government makes lots of claims, not all of which prove to be accurate.
SPIEGEL: President Barack Obama doesn't seem at all uncertain. On the contrary, he seems rather determined in his efforts to punish Iran with tough sanctions. He has also said that all options are on the table, which is an indirect military threat.
Pollack: This is the Obama administration, not the Bush administration, and they realized that the whole world was going to be skeptical after the revelations about the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. They're doing this from a law enforcement perspective, so these are not intelligence claims. These are American law enforcement officials saying, 'We have evidence,' and the evidence that they claim to have seems to be fairly impressive.
SPIEGEL: Still a number of questions remain unanswered. Does the US.. government know more than the rest of the world?
Pollack: Probably. We have not seen the records of the wire transfer, and I'm certainly not privy to whatever they have in terms of the phone calls. They're just saying that they have these things, and again, I don't doubt that they do. They don't make these claims unless they have evidence that will stand up in a court of law.
Read the full interview »
Authors
Kenneth M. Pollack
Publication: SPIEGEL
Image Source: Reuters
Editor's Note: In an interview with SPIEGEL, Kenneth Pollack comments on the alleged Iranian plot to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States. According to Pollack, Iran's leaders may have been spurred on by a weak U.S. economy and troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan.
SPIEGEL: All of Washington is shaking their heads over the alleged Iranian murder conspiracy against the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States. Even U.S. officials said it seems like a Hollywood film. Does the scenario make sense to you?
Kenneth Pollack: It seems quite remarkable, even outlandish. Given the graveness of the charges and the outlandishness of the story, we want to view it with some skepticism. We should also keep in mind that the Iranian government gets blamed for lots of things, not all of which it does, and the United States government makes lots of claims, not all of which prove to be accurate.
SPIEGEL: President Barack Obama doesn't seem at all uncertain. On the contrary, he seems rather determined in his efforts to punish Iran with tough sanctions. He has also said that all options are on the table, which is an indirect military threat.
Pollack: This is the Obama administration, not the Bush administration, and they realized that the whole world was going to be skeptical after the revelations about the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. They're doing this from a law enforcement perspective, so these are not intelligence claims. These are American law enforcement officials saying, 'We have evidence,' and the evidence that they claim to have seems to be fairly impressive.
SPIEGEL: Still a number of questions remain unanswered. Does the US.. government know more than the rest of the world?
Pollack: Probably. We have not seen the records of the wire transfer, and I'm certainly not privy to whatever they have in terms of the phone calls. They're just saying that they have these things, and again, I don't doubt that they do. They don't make these claims unless they have evidence that will stand up in a court of law.
Read the full interview »
Authors
Kenneth M. Pollack
Publication: SPIEGEL
Image Source: Reuters
October 10, 2011
Iran’s Covert War Against the United States
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It’s shocking, but not entirely surprising to learn that the United States government has evidence that the Iranian regime was trying to kill Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel al-Jubeir.
Of course, we need to be careful with this claim. It has not yet been conclusively proven, and it would not be the first time that Iran was accused of something it didn’t do. Nor would it be the first time that the U.S. government was convinced of something that later turned out not to be entirely correct (see “Iraqi WMD”).
That said, the confidence of the U.S. government in its claim is striking, and if its contentions are borne out, it would represent a major escalation of Iranian terrorist operations against the United States. That said, it would not necessarily represent a radical departure from the trend in recent Iranian foreign policy.
In particular, while this plot—a mass casualty attack on U.S. soil—would go well beyond what Iran has attempted in the past, it would represent an extrapolation of another pattern, namely the emergence of a more aggressive, risk-tolerant Iranian regime over the past two years.
In 2009, Iran experienced its own version of the Arab Spring. In response to the rigged re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, millions of Iranians took to the streets in protest, demanding the end of the Islamic regime and the creation of a new democracy in its place. Iran’s leaders briefly debated what to do before Tehran’s hardline faction won out and the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ordered its powerful security apparatus to crush the revolt.
This crackdown was not only focused externally on the Iranian people, however. At the same time, Khamenei and other Iranian hardliners—particularly the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard—also purged the government of its more moderate elements. Pragmatists like former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani were sidelined or ousted altogether, and the regime that emerged reflected the Iranian radical perspective more than at any time since the 1980s.
Not surprisingly, this harder-line leadership has pursued a more aggressive, more recalcitrant, and more anti-American foreign policy than at any time since the early days of the revolution. Over the past two years, Iran has ramped up its support for radical Shiite groups in Iraq, who have in turn stepped up their attacks on Iraqi Sunnis, on more moderate Iraqi Shia, and on American troops. In Afghanistan, Iran has provided more assistance and more lethal weaponry to the Taliban, contributing to the rising U.S. and Afghan security-force death toll there. Remarkably, despite the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1929—which imposed unexpectedly harsh sanctions on the regime for its refusal to halt its nuclear program, causing widespread economic hardship in Iran—Tehran thumbed its nose at international offers to negotiate an end to the nuclear impasse. Meanwhile, the regime has steadfastly clung to its Syrian ally, backing its slaughter of thousands of civilian protesters rather than give up its dictatorship.
It is against this backdrop that we should weigh the possibility, as suggested by the U.S. government claim, that Iran may have tried to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States by blowing up a restaurant on American soil. If true, it would suggest three important things about Tehran’s thinking that take us beyond what we already believed:
That the regime believes it is already locked in an undeclared covert war with the United States—perhaps believing that the United States was behind the Stuxnet virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the killing of several Iranian nuclear scientists on Iranian soil. Alternatively, the regime may believe that the Israelis were behind those acts, but that the United States (and Saudi Arabia) egged them on.
That the regime is willing to go way beyond anything it has ever done before to strike blows against the United States in this war. For instance, in the 1990s, the last time the regime (mistakenly) reached a similar conclusion, the most it did was to detonate a truck bomb outside an American military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American servicemen. The Saudi-American tie was there in this attack as well, but at that time, the Iranians stayed off American soil.
That the regime may no longer be concerned about a massive American conventional military retaliation. In the past, that fear has been an important restraint on Iranian action against the United States. Again, if true, this plot suggests that the Iranians may believe either that the United States is so consumed with its own internal problems and so determined to avoid another war in the Middle East that the American people would not countenance any action that might risk escalation with Iran. Alternatively, it may suggest that Iran believes its nuclear program is far enough along to deter conventional American military retaliation.
Authors
Kenneth M. Pollack
Publication: The Daily Beast
Image Source: Reuters
It’s shocking, but not entirely surprising to learn that the United States government has evidence that the Iranian regime was trying to kill Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel al-Jubeir.
Of course, we need to be careful with this claim. It has not yet been conclusively proven, and it would not be the first time that Iran was accused of something it didn’t do. Nor would it be the first time that the U.S. government was convinced of something that later turned out not to be entirely correct (see “Iraqi WMD”).
That said, the confidence of the U.S. government in its claim is striking, and if its contentions are borne out, it would represent a major escalation of Iranian terrorist operations against the United States. That said, it would not necessarily represent a radical departure from the trend in recent Iranian foreign policy.
In particular, while this plot—a mass casualty attack on U.S. soil—would go well beyond what Iran has attempted in the past, it would represent an extrapolation of another pattern, namely the emergence of a more aggressive, risk-tolerant Iranian regime over the past two years.
In 2009, Iran experienced its own version of the Arab Spring. In response to the rigged re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, millions of Iranians took to the streets in protest, demanding the end of the Islamic regime and the creation of a new democracy in its place. Iran’s leaders briefly debated what to do before Tehran’s hardline faction won out and the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ordered its powerful security apparatus to crush the revolt.
This crackdown was not only focused externally on the Iranian people, however. At the same time, Khamenei and other Iranian hardliners—particularly the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard—also purged the government of its more moderate elements. Pragmatists like former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani were sidelined or ousted altogether, and the regime that emerged reflected the Iranian radical perspective more than at any time since the 1980s.
Not surprisingly, this harder-line leadership has pursued a more aggressive, more recalcitrant, and more anti-American foreign policy than at any time since the early days of the revolution. Over the past two years, Iran has ramped up its support for radical Shiite groups in Iraq, who have in turn stepped up their attacks on Iraqi Sunnis, on more moderate Iraqi Shia, and on American troops. In Afghanistan, Iran has provided more assistance and more lethal weaponry to the Taliban, contributing to the rising U.S. and Afghan security-force death toll there. Remarkably, despite the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1929—which imposed unexpectedly harsh sanctions on the regime for its refusal to halt its nuclear program, causing widespread economic hardship in Iran—Tehran thumbed its nose at international offers to negotiate an end to the nuclear impasse. Meanwhile, the regime has steadfastly clung to its Syrian ally, backing its slaughter of thousands of civilian protesters rather than give up its dictatorship.
It is against this backdrop that we should weigh the possibility, as suggested by the U.S. government claim, that Iran may have tried to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States by blowing up a restaurant on American soil. If true, it would suggest three important things about Tehran’s thinking that take us beyond what we already believed:
That the regime believes it is already locked in an undeclared covert war with the United States—perhaps believing that the United States was behind the Stuxnet virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the killing of several Iranian nuclear scientists on Iranian soil. Alternatively, the regime may believe that the Israelis were behind those acts, but that the United States (and Saudi Arabia) egged them on.
That the regime is willing to go way beyond anything it has ever done before to strike blows against the United States in this war. For instance, in the 1990s, the last time the regime (mistakenly) reached a similar conclusion, the most it did was to detonate a truck bomb outside an American military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American servicemen. The Saudi-American tie was there in this attack as well, but at that time, the Iranians stayed off American soil.
That the regime may no longer be concerned about a massive American conventional military retaliation. In the past, that fear has been an important restraint on Iranian action against the United States. Again, if true, this plot suggests that the Iranians may believe either that the United States is so consumed with its own internal problems and so determined to avoid another war in the Middle East that the American people would not countenance any action that might risk escalation with Iran. Alternatively, it may suggest that Iran believes its nuclear program is far enough along to deter conventional American military retaliation.
Each of these would be troubling in its own right. It's why it is so important to substantiate both the plot, and its connection to Iran. Because if it is valid, it represents a very significant set of steps in the wrong direction for Iranian strategy.
Nevertheless, even if the claim is shown to be valid, we should not assume that this means that Iran is an irrational nation hell-bent on harming Americans at any cost, as it is sometimes depicted in the Western press. Even after the 2009 purge, the Tehran regime is not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which was recklessly aggressive to the point of inadvertent suicide. But, if this incredible claim is proven true, it should remind us that Iran also is not a normal country by any stretch of the imagination, and that in a Middle East already in turmoil we now face a more aggressive, more risk-taking Iran that may be looking to stir the pot in ways that it once found imprudent.
Authors
Kenneth M. Pollack
Publication: The Daily Beast
Image Source: Reuters
Iran's Covert War Against the United States
[image error]
It’s shocking, but not entirely surprising to learn that the United States government has evidence that the Iranian regime was trying to kill Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel al-Jubeir.
Of course, we need to be careful with this claim. It has not yet been conclusively proven, and it would not be the first time that Iran was accused of something it didn’t do. Nor would it be the first time that the U.S. government was convinced of something that later turned out not to be entirely correct (see “Iraqi WMD”).
That said, the confidence of the U.S. government in its claim is striking, and if its contentions are borne out, it would represent a major escalation of Iranian terrorist operations against the United States. That said, it would not necessarily represent a radical departure from the trend in recent Iranian foreign policy.
In particular, while this plot—a mass casualty attack on U.S. soil—would go well beyond what Iran has attempted in the past, it would represent an extrapolation of another pattern, namely the emergence of a more aggressive, risk-tolerant Iranian regime over the past two years.
In 2009, Iran experienced its own version of the Arab Spring. In response to the rigged re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, millions of Iranians took to the streets in protest, demanding the end of the Islamic regime and the creation of a new democracy in its place. Iran’s leaders briefly debated what to do before Tehran’s hardline faction won out and the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ordered its powerful security apparatus to crush the revolt.
This crackdown was not only focused externally on the Iranian people, however. At the same time, Khamenei and other Iranian hardliners—particularly the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard—also purged the government of its more moderate elements. Pragmatists like former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani were sidelined or ousted altogether, and the regime that emerged reflected the Iranian radical perspective more than at any time since the 1980s.
Not surprisingly, this harder-line leadership has pursued a more aggressive, more recalcitrant, and more anti-American foreign policy than at any time since the early days of the revolution. Over the past two years, Iran has ramped up its support for radical Shiite groups in Iraq, who have in turn stepped up their attacks on Iraqi Sunnis, on more moderate Iraqi Shia, and on American troops. In Afghanistan, Iran has provided more assistance and more lethal weaponry to the Taliban, contributing to the rising U.S. and Afghan security-force death toll there. Remarkably, despite the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1929—which imposed unexpectedly harsh sanctions on the regime for its refusal to halt its nuclear program, causing widespread economic hardship in Iran—Tehran thumbed its nose at international offers to negotiate an end to the nuclear impasse. Meanwhile, the regime has steadfastly clung to its Syrian ally, backing its slaughter of thousands of civilian protesters rather than give up its dictatorship.
It is against this backdrop that we should weigh the possibility, as suggested by the U.S. government claim, that Iran may have tried to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States by blowing up a restaurant on American soil. If true, it would suggest three important things about Tehran’s thinking that take us beyond what we already believed:
That the regime believes it is already locked in an undeclared covert war with the United States—perhaps believing that the United States was behind the Stuxnet virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the killing of several Iranian nuclear scientists on Iranian soil. Alternatively, the regime may believe that the Israelis were behind those acts, but that the United States (and Saudi Arabia) egged them on.
That the regime is willing to go way beyond anything it has ever done before to strike blows against the United States in this war. For instance, in the 1990s, the last time the regime (mistakenly) reached a similar conclusion, the most it did was to detonate a truck bomb outside an American military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American servicemen. The Saudi-American tie was there in this attack as well, but at that time, the Iranians stayed off American soil.
That the regime may no longer be concerned about a massive American conventional military retaliation. In the past, that fear has been an important restraint on Iranian action against the United States. Again, if true, this plot suggests that the Iranians may believe either that the United States is so consumed with its own internal problems and so determined to avoid another war in the Middle East that the American people would not countenance any action that might risk escalation with Iran. Alternatively, it may suggest that Iran believes its nuclear program is far enough along to deter conventional American military retaliation.
Authors
Kenneth M. Pollack
Publication: The Daily Beast
Image Source: Reuters
It’s shocking, but not entirely surprising to learn that the United States government has evidence that the Iranian regime was trying to kill Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel al-Jubeir.
Of course, we need to be careful with this claim. It has not yet been conclusively proven, and it would not be the first time that Iran was accused of something it didn’t do. Nor would it be the first time that the U.S. government was convinced of something that later turned out not to be entirely correct (see “Iraqi WMD”).
That said, the confidence of the U.S. government in its claim is striking, and if its contentions are borne out, it would represent a major escalation of Iranian terrorist operations against the United States. That said, it would not necessarily represent a radical departure from the trend in recent Iranian foreign policy.
In particular, while this plot—a mass casualty attack on U.S. soil—would go well beyond what Iran has attempted in the past, it would represent an extrapolation of another pattern, namely the emergence of a more aggressive, risk-tolerant Iranian regime over the past two years.
In 2009, Iran experienced its own version of the Arab Spring. In response to the rigged re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, millions of Iranians took to the streets in protest, demanding the end of the Islamic regime and the creation of a new democracy in its place. Iran’s leaders briefly debated what to do before Tehran’s hardline faction won out and the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ordered its powerful security apparatus to crush the revolt.
This crackdown was not only focused externally on the Iranian people, however. At the same time, Khamenei and other Iranian hardliners—particularly the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard—also purged the government of its more moderate elements. Pragmatists like former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani were sidelined or ousted altogether, and the regime that emerged reflected the Iranian radical perspective more than at any time since the 1980s.
Not surprisingly, this harder-line leadership has pursued a more aggressive, more recalcitrant, and more anti-American foreign policy than at any time since the early days of the revolution. Over the past two years, Iran has ramped up its support for radical Shiite groups in Iraq, who have in turn stepped up their attacks on Iraqi Sunnis, on more moderate Iraqi Shia, and on American troops. In Afghanistan, Iran has provided more assistance and more lethal weaponry to the Taliban, contributing to the rising U.S. and Afghan security-force death toll there. Remarkably, despite the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1929—which imposed unexpectedly harsh sanctions on the regime for its refusal to halt its nuclear program, causing widespread economic hardship in Iran—Tehran thumbed its nose at international offers to negotiate an end to the nuclear impasse. Meanwhile, the regime has steadfastly clung to its Syrian ally, backing its slaughter of thousands of civilian protesters rather than give up its dictatorship.
It is against this backdrop that we should weigh the possibility, as suggested by the U.S. government claim, that Iran may have tried to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States by blowing up a restaurant on American soil. If true, it would suggest three important things about Tehran’s thinking that take us beyond what we already believed:
That the regime believes it is already locked in an undeclared covert war with the United States—perhaps believing that the United States was behind the Stuxnet virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the killing of several Iranian nuclear scientists on Iranian soil. Alternatively, the regime may believe that the Israelis were behind those acts, but that the United States (and Saudi Arabia) egged them on.
That the regime is willing to go way beyond anything it has ever done before to strike blows against the United States in this war. For instance, in the 1990s, the last time the regime (mistakenly) reached a similar conclusion, the most it did was to detonate a truck bomb outside an American military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American servicemen. The Saudi-American tie was there in this attack as well, but at that time, the Iranians stayed off American soil.
That the regime may no longer be concerned about a massive American conventional military retaliation. In the past, that fear has been an important restraint on Iranian action against the United States. Again, if true, this plot suggests that the Iranians may believe either that the United States is so consumed with its own internal problems and so determined to avoid another war in the Middle East that the American people would not countenance any action that might risk escalation with Iran. Alternatively, it may suggest that Iran believes its nuclear program is far enough along to deter conventional American military retaliation.
Each of these would be troubling in its own right. It's why it is so important to substantiate both the plot, and its connection to Iran. Because if it is valid, it represents a very significant set of steps in the wrong direction for Iranian strategy.
Nevertheless, even if the claim is shown to be valid, we should not assume that this means that Iran is an irrational nation hell-bent on harming Americans at any cost, as it is sometimes depicted in the Western press. Even after the 2009 purge, the Tehran regime is not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which was recklessly aggressive to the point of inadvertent suicide. But, if this incredible claim is proven true, it should remind us that Iran also is not a normal country by any stretch of the imagination, and that in a Middle East already in turmoil we now face a more aggressive, more risk-taking Iran that may be looking to stir the pot in ways that it once found imprudent.
Authors
Kenneth M. Pollack
Publication: The Daily Beast
Image Source: Reuters
September 11, 2011
In Iraq, Are 3,000 Troops Worse Than None?
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Ken Pollack questions why the Obama administration would consider leaving only some 3,000 troops in Iraq after 2011. According to Pollack, this would mean risking everything that Americans and Iraqis have achieved there, and courting another civil war in a region that cannot afford one.
Ken Pollack questions why the Obama administration would consider leaving only some 3,000 troops in Iraq after 2011. According to Pollack, this would mean risking everything that Americans and Iraqis have achieved there, and courting another civil war in a region that cannot afford one.
In Iraq, are 3,000 troops worse than none?
[image error]
Ken Pollack questions why the Obama administration would consider leaving only some 3,000 troops in Iraq after 2011. According to Pollack, this would mean risking everything that Americans and Iraqis have achieved there, and courting another civil war in a region that cannot afford one.
Ken Pollack questions why the Obama administration would consider leaving only some 3,000 troops in Iraq after 2011. According to Pollack, this would mean risking everything that Americans and Iraqis have achieved there, and courting another civil war in a region that cannot afford one.
September 8, 2011
The United States Doubles Down on Iran and its Nuclear Policy
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Ken Pollack says the United States still can achieve its goals in Iran without the use of force, and can craft a policy that could compel Tehran to relinquish its nuclear ambitions, adhere to prevailing norms on terrorism and human rights, and respect the sovereignty of its neighbors.
August 23, 2011
Something Is Rotten in the State of Iraq
Kenneth Pollack offers perspective on political conflicts and civil wars from the recent past in Iraq. Pollack argues that similar problems could reemerge as U.S. troops withdraw from the country.
June 19, 2011
In Morocco: A Quiet Revolution?
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Kenneth Pollack writes on key elements of Morocco's new constitution, as recently outlined by King Muhammad VI. According to Pollack, the new constitution has the potential to establish a more progressive political system in Morocco and set an important precedent for peaceful, gradual change throughout the region.
Kenneth Pollack writes on key elements of Morocco's new constitution, as recently outlined by King Muhammad VI. According to Pollack, the new constitution has the potential to establish a more progressive political system in Morocco and set an important precedent for peaceful, gradual change throughout the region.
May 26, 2011
An Uncertain Road: Testing the Durability of an Israeli-Palestinian Borders and Security Agreement
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The Saban Center for Middle East Policy held a simulation to test a hypothetical agreement between Israelis and Palestinians on the issues of borders and security. In this Middle East Memo, Kenneth M. Pollack analyzes the simulation's implications for an Israeli-Palestinian border and security agreement.
The Saban Center for Middle East Policy held a simulation to test a hypothetical agreement between Israelis and Palestinians on the issues of borders and security. In this Middle East Memo, Kenneth M. Pollack analyzes the simulation's implications for an Israeli-Palestinian border and security agreement.
May 1, 2011
Iraq and the Death of Bin Laden
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Kenneth Pollack explains why Iraq's internal political developments, not Bin Laden's legacy, will be the most important factor in the future of al Qaeda and Iraq.
Kenneth Pollack explains why Iraq's internal political developments, not Bin Laden's legacy, will be the most important factor in the future of al Qaeda and Iraq.
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