Edward Feser's Blog, page 7

Immortal Souls now available

After some frustratingdelays in distribution, my book ImmortalSouls: A Treatise on Human Nature is now in stock and available from Amazon and Barnesand Noble.  Here are the back covercopy, endorsements, and table of contents:

Immortal Souls provides as ambitious and complete adefense of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical anthropology as is currently inprint.  Among the many topics covered arethe reality and unity of the self, the immateriality of the intellect, thefreedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, the critique of artificialintelligence, and the refutation of both Cartesian and materialist conceptionsof human nature.  Along the way, the mainrival positions in contemporary philosophy and science are thoroughly engagedwith and rebutted.

“EdwardFeser's book is a Summa of the nature of the human person: it is, therefore,both a rather long – but brilliant – monograph, and a valuable work forconsultation.  Each of the humanfaculties discussed is treated comprehensively, with a broad range of theoriesconsidered for and against, and, although Feser's conclusions are firmlyThomistic, one can derive great benefit from his discussions even if one is nota convinced hylomorphist.  Everyphilosopher of mind would benefit from having this book within easy reach.” HowardRobinson, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Central European University

“Feserdefends the Aristotelian and Thomistic system, effectively bringing it intodialogue with recent debates and drawing on some of the best of both analytic(Kripke, Searle, BonJour, Fodor) and phenomenological (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty,Dreyfus) philosophy.  He deftly rebutsobjections to Thomism, both ancient and modern.  Anyone working today on personal identity, theunity of the self, the semantics of cognition, free will, or qualia will needto engage with the analysis and arguments presented here.” Robert C. Koons,Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin

CONTENTS

Preface                                                               

Part I: Whatis Mind?                                        

   1. The Short Answer                                 

   2. The Self                                                        

   3. The Intellect                                             

    4. The Will                                                       

Part II:What is Body?                                                           

   5. Matter                                                        

    6. Animality                                                   

Part III:What is a Human Being?                           

   7. Against Cartesianism                                

   8. Against Materialism                                   

    9. Neither Computers nor Brains                

Part IV:What is the Soul?                                          

   10. Immortality                                              

    11. The Form of the Body                            

Index              

Abortion and subsidiarity

Ever sincethe Dobbs decision permitted statesto set their own abortion policies, Donald Trump has taken the position thatthe issue should stay at the state level. Dobbs itself doesn’t requirethis, and leaves open the possibility of a federal ban.  But Trump nevertheless declines to pursuesuch a ban, and indeed is opposed to such a ban.  Now, a federal ban is in any event currentlypolitically unrealistic, and will likely remain so for the foreseeablefuture.  But some take the view that,even if abortion amounts to murder, it would be wrong to impose a federal baneven if it were politically possibleto do so.  They make their case onfederalist grounds, arguing that a national abortion ban would usurp power thatrightly belongs to the states.  Someargue on natural law grounds, specifically, suggesting that the principle ofsubsidiarity would rule out a federal ban. If this were true, then it would follow that even a pro-life Catholicshould oppose a federal abortion ban. What should we think of this argument?

I think itis a terrible argument, one that rests on a distortion of the principle ofsubsidiarity.  We can see this both fromwhat the principle of subsidiarity actually says, and from how the Church hastreated the issue of abortion.  A classicformulation of the principle is given by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical QuadragesimoAnno.  He famously saysthere that “it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil anddisturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association whatlesser and subordinate organizations can do.”  If this sentence were all there is to theprinciple of subsidiarity, it is easy to see why someone might think itlicenses leaving abortion to the states. But that is not all there isto the principle.  Let us look at thelarger context of this remark from Pius XI. Here is the relevant passage:

When we speak of the reform of institutions, the State comeschiefly to mind, not as if universal well-being were to be expected from itsactivity, but because things have come to such a pass through the evil of whatwe have termed “individualism” that, following upon the overthrow and nearextinction of that rich social life which was once highly developed throughassociations of various kinds, there remain virtually only individuals and theState.  This is to the great harm of theState itself; for, with a structure of social governance lost, and with thetaking over of all the burdens which the wrecked associations once bore, theState has been overwhelmed and crushed by almost infinite tasks and duties.

As history abundantly proves, it is true that on account ofchanged conditions many things which were done by small associations in formertimes cannot be done now save by large associations.  Still, that most weighty principle, whichcannot be set aside or changed, remains fixed and unshaken in socialphilosophy: Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they canaccomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community,so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance ofright order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser andsubordinate organizations can do.  Forevery social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the membersof the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.

The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to letsubordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, whichwould otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly.  Thereby the State will more freely,powerfully, and effectively do all those things that belong to it alone becauseit alone can do them: directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasionrequires and necessity demands.

To forestallconfusion, note that “State” as Pius is using it refers to any more centralgovernment, and thus, in the American context, would apply first and foremostto the federal government rather merely to “state” governments, as that term iscommonly used in the U.S.

Now, whatPius is saying here is indeed, in part, that if some social problem can beadequately addressed by more local institutions (which would include families,municipal governments, and provincial governments), then central governments shouldleave things to them and not intervene. But by no means does Pius leave it at that.  He also says that there are some things thatcentral governments “alone” can do. Naturally, this includes things that are the proper function of anycentral government under normal conditions (such as national defense). 

But it alsoincludes things that more local institutions might in theory be able to handle, but in practice cannot, because of “changed conditions” or therequirements of some particular “occasion.” In particular, says Pius, because of the “individualism” of moderntimes, those intermediate institutions that traditionally came betweenindividuals and central governments have become so weakened that they are nowunable to perform some of the functions they were once able to.  And this has left these functions in thehands of central governments, as the only agencies left which can perform them.  In these ways, the principle of subsidiaritynotwithstanding, there remain many functions which “necessity demands” thatcentral governments perform, either always and in principle or at least undermodern contingent circumstances.

Accordingly,as Fr. Austin Fagothey’s well-known manual of ethics Right and Reason notes, after affirming the principle ofsubsidiarity:

On the other hand, the state should provide a favorableenvironment in which individuals, families, and voluntary associations canfulfill their functions properly.  It hasthe right and duty to intervene when they fail to function as they ought orcannot harmonize their activities for the common good. (p. 394)

Now, thiscan include measures necessary to uphold the institution of the familyitself.  The Catechism of the Catholic Church, in a passage that reaffirms that“following the principle of subsidiarity, larger communities should take carenot to usurp the family's prerogatives or interfere in its life,” also teaches:

The family must be helped and defended by appropriate socialmeasures.  Where families cannot fulfilltheir responsibilities, other social bodies have the duty of helping them and of supporting theinstitution of the family…

The importance of the family for the life and well-being ofsociety entails a particular responsibility for society to support andstrengthen marriage and the family.  Civilauthority should consider it a grave duty “to acknowledge the true nature ofmarriage and the family, to protect and foster them, to safeguard publicmorality, and promote domestic prosperity.” (2209-2210)

Naturally,there is no greater affront to the institution of the family than abortion,which involves the murder of the very human beings for whose sake the familyexists in the first place.  Andnaturally, the Catechism explicitly teachesthat the right to life of the unborn child must be enshrined in law:

The inalienable right to life of every innocent humanindividual is a constitutive element of acivil society and its legislation:

“The inalienable rights of the person must be recognized andrespected by civil society and the political authority… Among such fundamental rights oneshould mention in this regard every human being's right to life and physicalintegrity from the moment of conception until death.”

“The moment a positive law deprives a category of humanbeings of the protection which civil legislation ought to accord them, thestate is denying the equality of all before the law.  When the state does not place its power at theservice of the rights of each citizen, and in particular of the morevulnerable, the very foundations of a state based on law are undermined... As aconsequence of the respect and protection which must be ensured for the unbornchild from the moment of conception, the law must provide appropriate penalsanctions for every deliberate violation of the child's rights.”

Since it must be treated from conception as a person, theembryo must be defended in its integrity, cared for, and healed, as far aspossible, like any other human being. (2273-2274)

Note thatwhat the Catechism is saying is thatthe right to life of innocent human beings, including the unborn, must be affirmed by the state and itspositive law as such.  In no way does it indicate that it isspeaking only of more local governments but not of central governments.  And even if one wanted to argue that suchlaws needn’t be enacted by federal governments if the laws at more local levels sufficed, that would by no meansbe the end of the story.  For themanifest implications of the teaching of Pius XI and of the Catechism is that more centralgovernments not only may, but must take action to prevent abortion ifin practice there is no other way to secure the rights of the unborn.

Hence,suppose a number of states in the U.S. outlawed abortion, but others didnot.  And suppose that there was nopolitically realistic prospect of outlawing it at the state level in thosestates that failed to do so.  But supposealso that it was neverthelesspolitically feasible to impose a federal ban on abortion.  Would respect for the principle ofsubsidiarity require us to refrain from imposing such a ban?  Not at all; on the contrary, when all theconsiderations just spelled out are taken account of, it is clear that we wouldbe obligated to impose a federal banif we could.  For in this scenario, therewould be no other way to protect the right to life that is, as the Catechism says, “a constitutive elementof a civil society and its legislation.” Given what Pius XI calls “the evil of… ‘individualism’” that hasinfected modern Western society and informs “pro-choice” rhetoric, it may be thatcentral governments alone can effectively suppress the evil of abortion.

Here isanother consideration.  In the Church’scanon law, there are some sins so grave that the penalties associated with themcannot be lifted by one’s confessor.  Fora long time, that included the procurement of abortion, the penalty for whichcould, until recently, be lifted only by one’s bishop.  Indeed, at one time only the pope had theauthority to do so.  In his book The Soul of the Embryo, David AlbertJones writes:

In 1588, in a decree called Effraennatam, Pope Sixtus V invoked the power of excommunication inan attempt to restrain the growing practice of abortion during the Renaissance. As his model he took the Decretals V.I2.5 and imposed thesanction not only for abortion but also for administering contraceptive drugs.  He also reserved the ability to lift theexcommunication to the pope alone.  Thecondemnation of abortion as homicide was not in any way novel.  However, several aspects of theexcommunication were novel: it was promulgated to the whole Church (not just inone diocese or region); it was reserved to the pope to be able to lift theexcommunication (not to a local bishop); and it included contraception as wellas abortion.  This meant that anyabortion and any use of contraception anywhere in the Church had to bereconciled personally by the pope. (p. 71)

To be sure,as Jones goes on to recount, this proved unworkable, so that a later popelimited the excommunication to abortion alone and granted local bishops theauthority to lift it.  The point, though,is that the Church has not regarded abortion as something which of its natureought to be dealt with only at the local level. On the contrary, it takes it to be so grave an offense that at one timethe highest authority in the Church, the pope himself, alone could lift thepenalty associated with it.  Whetherlocal or central authorities ought to deal with abortion is a prudential matter.  The principle of subsidiarity does not byitself entail that only local authorities ought to deal with it.  And what is true of the Church is, mutatis mutandis, true also of thestate.

If theappeal to subsidiarity is intended to provide Trump with theological cover,then, it fails.  He and his supportersmay think his position is good politics, but no reasonable case can be made forit on grounds of natural law or Catholic moral theology.

Vinco on Feser in Philosophische Rundschau

German-speakingreaders might be interested in Roberto Vinco’s article “Neo-ScholasticMetaphysics in the 21st Century: An Examination of the Perspective of EdwardFeser,” in the latest issue of the journal PhilosophischeRundschau .

The latest on Immortal Souls

PhilosophersWilliam Vallicella and Christopher Kaczor weigh in on my new book ImmortalSouls: A Treatise on Human Nature . At his blog, Bill writes:“Like all of Feser's books, ImmortalSouls is a model of expository clarity and analytic precision informed byan extensive knowledge of the contemporary literature.”  At Wordon Fire, Chris writes:

Feser offers a tour deforce… The ambitions of Feser’s book are great.  He aims to explicate and defend a view of ahuman person as a unity of a material body and immaterial soul.  He does so with clarity of prose, a widereading of the relevant literature, and a systematic approach which groundsphilosophical anthropology in metaphysics.

Some earlierendorsements:

“EdwardFeser's book is a Summa of the nature of the human person: it is, therefore,both a rather long – but brilliant – monograph, and a valuable work forconsultation. Each of the human faculties discussed is treated comprehensively,with a broad range of theories considered for and against, and, although Feser'sconclusions are firmly Thomistic, one can derive great benefit from hisdiscussions even if one is not a convinced hylomorphist.  Every philosopher of mind would benefit fromhaving this book within easy reach.” Howard Robinson, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Central EuropeanUniversity

“Feserdefends the Aristotelian and Thomistic system, effectively bringing it intodialogue with recent debates and drawing on some of the best of both analytic(Kripke, Searle, BonJour, Fodor) and phenomenological (Heidegger,Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus) philosophy. He deftly rebuts objections to Thomism,both ancient and modern. Anyone working today on personal identity, the unityof the self, the semantics of cognition, free will, or qualia will need toengage with the analysis and arguments presented here.”  Robert C. Koons, Professor of Philosophy,University of Texas at Austin

You canorder from Amazon,Barnesand Noble, or directlyfrom the publisher.

The new Aquinas 101

TheThomistic Institute has launched a new Aquinas 101 learning platform for itswell-known and excellent series of videos. Check it out here.  Press release and further information can befound here.

The popesplainer’s safety dance

Pope Francisrecently added yet another item to the long list of doctrinally problematicstatements he has issued through the course of his pontificate.  Commenting on the plurality of religionsduring a speech at the Catholic Junior College in Singapore, hesaid:

If you start arguing, “My religion is more important thanyours,” or “Mine is the true one, yours is not true,” where does this lead?  Somebody answer.  [A young person answers, “Destruction”.]  That is correct.  All religions are paths to God.  I will use an analogy, they are like differentlanguages that express the divine.  ButGod is for everyone, and therefore, we are all God’s children.  “But my God is more important than yours!”  Is this true?  There is only one God, and religions are likelanguages, paths to reach God.  SomeSikh, some Muslim, some Hindu, some Christian.

As thearticle from which I quote this passage notes, while the Vatican’s initialEnglish translation of the pope’s words attempted to sanitize them, it waslater corrected to make it clear that this is indeed what the pope said.  And what he said flatly contradictstraditional Catholic teaching.  Franciscriticizes those who take one religion to be the true or most important one,and implies that Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, etc. are as equal asdifferent languages are. 

Doublingdown on this, several days later the pope said, in avideo message to a religiously diverse audience:

Contemplate the difference of your traditions like arichness, a richness God wants to be.  Unityis not uniformity, and the diversity of your cultural and religious identitiesis a gift of God.  Unity in diversity.  Let mutual esteem grow among you, followingthe witness of your forefathers.

Here Francisindicates that the fact that there are different religions is a “gift” that God“wants.”

By contrast,stating the Catholic position on Judaism, Islam, and other religions in EcclesiamSuam, Pope St. Paul VI wrote:

Obviously we cannot agree with these various forms ofreligion, nor can we adopt an indifferent or uncritical attitude toward them onthe assumption that they are all to be regarded as on an equal footing, andthat there is no need for those who profess them to enquire whether or not Godhas Himself revealed definitively and infallibly how He wishes to be known,loved, and served.  Indeed, honestycompels us to declare openly our conviction that the Christian religion is theone and only true religion, and it is our hope that it will be acknowledged assuch by all who look for God and worship Him.

Similarly,in DominusIesus, issued during the pontificate of Pope St. John Paul II,we read:

It is clear that it would be contrary to the faith toconsider the Church as one way of salvation alongside those constituted by theother religions, seen as complementary to the Church or substantiallyequivalent to her…  In treating thequestion of the true religion, the Fathers of the Second Vatican Counciltaught: “We believe that this one true religion continues to exist in theCatholic and Apostolic Church.”

Other textscould be cited, but these two suffice to make the point (and also to rebut anyprogressive defender of Pope Francis who might claim that Vatican II somehowsupports him). 

Many furtherexamples of doctrinally dubious statements issued by Pope Francis or under hisauthority could be given.  There is theambiguity of Amoris Laetitia, which mightbe interpreted to allow, in some cases, absolution and Holy Communion for thosein invalid and adulterous marriages who are sexually active and lack a firmpurpose of amendment.  There is Fiducia Supplicans, which permits theblessing of same-sex and adulterous couples (and not just the individuals whomake up the couples).  There is Dignitas Infinita, which states that “thedeath penalty… violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless ofthe circumstances,” contradicting scripture, tradition, and every previous popewho has addressed the matter.  And soon.  (I have discussed the problems withthese three documents here,here,and here,respectively.)

Now, it ispossible for popes to issue badly formulated or even erroneous doctrinalstatements whennot speaking ex cathedra.  It is extremely rare, but it canhappen and has happened with a handful of popes, such as Honoriusand John XXII.  It would at this point inhis pontificate be intellectually dishonest, and indeed frankly absurd, foranyone to continue to deny that Pope Francis is in this company.  In fact, the main difference between Francisand these other popes is that his doctrinally dubious statements are morenumerous and more obviously problematic than theirs.

Yet evenafter a decade of this sort of behavior, there are still some orthodoxCatholics who insist, every time Pope Francis makes one of these dubious remarks,that he has been misunderstood, and that the fault lies not with him but withthe media who report on his words or with critics who interpret himuncharitably.  These “popesplainers” (astheir critics have labeled them) sometimes appeal to what has been called the “infalliblesafety thesis.”  On this view,while popes can err when not speaking excathedra, they cannot make dangerouserrors, and in particular cannot say anything that might lead the faithful intoerror on some matter of faith or morals.

Hence,whenever Pope Francis says something that everyone else takes to be obviouslyhard to reconcile with traditional teaching, these popesplainers judge it a priori to be at least “safe,” so thatanyone who thinks otherwise simply mustbe misunderstanding it.  Into thebargain, they often accuse the critics of the error of private judgment, or of beingschismatic, or of hating the pope or otherwise having bad motives.  Fans of 80s pop music might call this nowroutine set of moves the popesplainer’s “safety dance.”

One problemwith the “safety” thesis is that it is not what the Church herself teaches, astheologian John Joy has shown. Another problem is that it is thelongstanding position of theologians recognized by the Church asorthodox that popes can indeed err onmatters of faith and morals when not speaking ex cathedra.  A third problemis that the Church herself has acknowledged that such errors are not onlypossible, but have in fact occurred.  Forthe notorious Pope Honorius was condemned by his successors and by threepapally-approved councils for giving aid and comfort to heresy, with thecouncils even flatly labeling Honorius himself a heretic.  (I discuss the case of Honorius in detail hereand here.)  Some have defended Honorius against thesecharges, but what is relevant is that popesand papally-approved councils judged Honorius to be guilty of them.  That means that either Honorius was wrong or theselater popes were wrong.  And in eithercase we would have a very serious theological error.  That suffices to show that non-ex cathedra papal teaching is not always “safe.”

What I wantto call attention to here, though, is another problem with the “safety” thesiswhich, as far as I know, no one else has pointed out.  And that is that on close inspection thethesis turns out to be not so much false as entirely vacuous or empty ofinteresting content.  To see what I havein mind, consider a specific case like Pope Francis’s remarks in Singaporeabout the diversity of religions.  Takenat face value, his words suggest that no religion, including Christianity, canbe said to be the one true religion.  Orconsider Dignitas Infinita’s teachingon the death penalty.  Taken at facevalue, the document is saying that the death penalty is always andintrinsically wrong.  Now, both of theseteachings would contradict previous irreformable doctrine.  How can this be reconciled with the Church’sclaim that popes teach infallibly?  Hereare the answers that the pope’s critics and the popesplainers, respectively,would give:

The pope’s critics’answer: Popes can make serious doctrinal errors when not speaking ex cathedra, and that is what hashappened in these cases.  Fortunately, wehave pre-existing teaching to consult in order to determine what the correctdoctrine is.

Thepopesplainers’ answer: Popes cannotmake serious doctrinal errors even when not speaking ex cathedra, so that this must not really be what has happened in these cases.  Those who say otherwise on the basispre-existing teaching put their own authority above the pope’s.

On thesurface, the popesplainers’ answer seems to differ radically from the pope’scritics’ answer.  But when we peer belowthe surface, we find that that is not really the case.  For one thing, the popesplainers typicallyagree with the critics about what the orthodox position would be.  For example, they would typically agree thatit would be heterodox to hold that the Catholic faith is not the one true religion,or to say that the death penalty is immoral intrinsically or of its verynature.  (To be sure, there may also besome among the “popesplainers” who would be happy to depart from orthodoxy onthese matters.  But my argument here isdirected at the orthodox popesplainers.)

How, then,do the popesplainers deal with problematic statements like the pope’s remarksabout the diversity of religions, or DignitasInfinita’s teaching on the death penalty? The answer is that they claim that such statements do not really say what they seem to besaying.  To know what Pope Francis reallymeans, they claim, we need to look at other things he has said, or at theChurch’s longstanding teaching, and read the pope’s more controversial claimsin light of these other sources.

But how dothe popesplainers know this?  After all, Pope Francis himself rarelyclarifies his problematic statements, even when asked to do so.  For example, he still has never responded tothe dubia issued by four cardinals requesting that he reaffirm traditionalirreformable teaching that AmorisLaetitia seems to conflict with.  Hehas for a decade repeatedly made ever more extreme statements against the deathpenalty, without once reaffirming the traditional teaching that capitalpunishment can at least under certain circumstances be licit.  In the case of the pope’s recent commentsabout the diversity of religions, not only did the Vatican remove the sanitizedversion of the pope’s comments and let the more problematic remarks stand, butthe pope doubled down on those problematic remarks just a few days later.

Moreover,the popesplainers do sometimes admit that Pope Francis’s statements can fostermisunderstandings if read in isolation. Consider, for example, Michael Lofton, whohas defended a version of the “safety” thesis.  To his credit, when commentingon Pope Francis’s remarks in Singapore, Lofton acknowledges that thepope sometimes speaks with “ambiguity” and apparent “inconsistency,” “could bemore clear,” “needs to kind of explain himself better,” and sometimes“unnecessarily confuses people.”  Commentingon the pope’s follow-up remarks, Lofton is even more frank,admitting that the pope is sometimes not an “effective communicator,” that hisrecent statement “causes problems, causes confusion,” and that “most people aregoing to come away with an error here” even if there is “some kind of orthodoxsense” in which the pope’s remarks can be interpreted.

Again,though, Pope Francis himselftypically does not explain, qualify, or walk back his controversial remarks in thisway.  For example, in the case of hisrecent comments on the diversity of religions, he hasn’t said that he wasspeaking imprecisely and that people need to go look at more traditional thingshe has said in the past, or at the Church’s longstanding teaching, in order tounderstand what he meant.  It is only defenders of Pope Francis, and not thepope himself, who have done this.  In hismany extreme remarks against the death penalty, the pope has never said that heis speaking with rhetorical flourish, and that his teaching must be interpretedin a way that would reconcile it with the traditional doctrine that the deathpenalty is not intrinsically immoral.  Itis only defenders of Pope Francis,and not the pope himself, who have done that. And so on.

The point isthis.  When we consider that popesplainers themselves acknowledgethat Pope Francis’s controversial remarks need explanation, and that the popehimself is typically not the one whoprovides such explanations but rather the popesplainerswho do so – relying on their own theologicalknowledge, and on their own judgmentsabout what he must have meant – the distance between them and the pope’s criticsturns out to be not as great as it seemed at first to be.  The difference in their positions boils downto this:

The pope’scritics: The pope’s non-ex cathedrastatements can be erroneous when taken at face value, but knowledgeableCatholics can consult previous teaching to determine what the correct doctrineactually is.

Thepopesplainers: The pope’s non-ex cathedrastatements can be misleading when taken at face value, but knowledgeableCatholics can consult previous teaching to determine what he really must havemeant or should have said.

The lineseparating these positions is pretty thin.  The second no less than the first admits thatnon-ex cathedra papal statements canbe problematic, and the second no less than the first admits that Catholics mayapply their knowledge of past teaching to determine what a pope shouldsay.  The critics say “The pope said X,so he is in error” and the popesplainers say “The pope couldn’t make such anerror, so he must not really have meant X.” But they agree that X would be wrong, they agree that the Church’s past teaching suffices to show that X iswrong, and they agree that Catholics’ knowledge of this past teaching justifies them in taking the stand they do toward acurrent pope’s teaching (whether criticizing it as the critics do, or giving ita sanitized interpretation as the popesplainers do).

And now wecan see how the “safety” thesis turns out to be vacuous.  For it amounts to saying that papal teachingis always “safe” insofar as somebody withthe requisite theological knowledge will always be able to come up with some sanitized interpretation of it thatreconciles it with past teaching.  And ifyou are going to say that, then youmight as well say that it is “safe” in the sense that even when it iserroneous, somebody with therequisite theological knowledge will always be able to explain what the correctdoctrine actually is.  The onlydifference is that where the latter approach is frank, the formerobfuscates. 

In short,when all the necessary qualifications are made to it, the popesplainers’“safety dance” becomes pointless, and they might as well just acknowledge that,though historically it happens only very rarely, it is possible for popes tomake serious doctrinal errors when not speaking ex cathedra.

Relatedposts:

Whendo popes speak ex cathedra?

Whendo popes teach infallibly?

Popes,heresy, and papal heresy

Whatcounts as magisterial teaching?

TheChurch permits criticism of popes under certain circumstances

Aquinason St. Paul’s correction of St. Peter

Papalfallibility

Theerror and condemnation of Pope Honorius

CanPope Honorius be defended?

Trump: A buyer’s guide

In the weekssince Iwrote on the dilemma that Donald Trump has put social conservativesin, the problem has only become far more pronounced.  Trump hasstated that a second Trump administration “will be great for womenand their reproductive rights.”  Hisrunning mate J. D. Vance has saidthat if a national abortion ban were passed by Congress, Trump would vetoit.  Though claiming to support pro-lifemeasures at the state level, Trump says thatin Florida, abortion should be legal even past the first six weeks of pregnancy.  And he has saidthat in a second Trump administration, the government would either pay for, orrequire insurance companies to pay for, all costs associated with IVF treatment– even though IVF treatments killmore embryos every year than abortion does, so that an IVF mandatewould be even worse than Obama’s notorious contraception mandate.  Trump hasalso come out in support of legalizing marijuana for recreationaluse.

Meanwhile, newTrump advisor Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. informs usthat Trump has made it clear to him that he won’t be influenced by “right-wingassholes” anymore and will be “listening to more than just that kind of narrowright-wing band that people are terrified of” so that “people are going to seea very different President Trump than they did during the first term.”  He says that he and his fellow former Democrat(and still liberal) Tulsi Gabbard are “going to be on [Trump’s] transitioncommittee picking the people who are going to govern.”  Kennedy, it will be recalled, recently opinedthat abortion should be legal even at “full-term,” and allowedfor some vague restrictions only after the outcry his initialremarks generated.

Thesedevelopments massively reinforce the already ample evidence adduced in myprevious article that Trump is transforming the GOP into a second pro-choiceand socially liberal party.  To be sure,it remains true that KamalaHarris, her running mate TimWalz, and theDemocrats in general are even worse on these issues.  Hence it goes without saying that no socialconservative can justify voting for her. Nor have I changed my mind about the conclusion I drew in the previous article– that the least bad outcome would be Trump defeating Harris, albeit narrowlyenough that it is palpable to the GOP that it cannot in the future take socialconservatives for granted.

But “leastbad” does not entail “not bad.”  And itis imperative for social conservatives to face the hard truth that Trump is,from now on, bound to be very bad for the pro-life cause and for socialconservatism more generally, even if not quite as bad as Harris.  Certainly it would be delusional to supposethat the role he played in overturning Roev. Wade, and the conservative and Christian rhetoric he occasionallydeploys, give any good reason to judge otherwise.  Trump is not someone with sociallyconservative inclinations who is temporarily moving left for short-termpolitical gain.  Rather, he has alwaysbeen someone of socially liberal inclinations who temporarily moved right forshort-term political gain, but has now judged that this is no longer a viableposition and is reverting to type.  Ifthe evidence of his words and actions over the last couple of years left anydoubt about this, his record prior to seeking the GOP nomination eight yearsago should remove that doubt.  Manyconservatives and Christians have convinced themselves that Trump is, howeverimperfect, an instrument by which our decline might be reversed, or at leastpaused.  In reality, his rise is asymptom of our decline and has accelerated it, even if in a different mannerthan that by which the Left has accelerated it.

Trumpfamously prides himself on his skill at “the art of the deal.”  Before socially conservative voters close thedeal with him one last time, they should be clear-eyed about what they areactually getting, as opposed to what they would like to get or what Trump wouldlike them to think they are getting. What follows is a buyer’s guide.

Trump’s state of nature

Trump firstran for president in 2000, competing with Pat Buchanan for the nomination ofthe Reform Party.  He made a point ofcontrasting himself with the famously conservative Buchanan on socialissues.  In his campaign book TheAmerica We Deserve, Trump condemned Buchanan for “intolerance”toward homosexuals.  While he wrote thathe opposed partial-birth abortion, he otherwise characterized himself as“pro-choice” and said “I support a woman’s right to choose.”  These remarks followed upon commentsmade during an interview the previous year, to the effect that wewas “very pro-choice” and that gays serving in the military (then a majorissue) “would not disturb me.”  Heemphasized, in the same interview, that his views were the sort to be expectedof someone who has “lived in New York City and Manhattan all [his] life.”  In short, he was a typical social liberal,not the most extreme sort but certainly not conservative.  It was only when he considered seeking theRepublican nomination in 2012 that hefirst claimed that he had become pro-life. 

Now, whenyou want to know what a politician really thinks, it is especially useful toconsider what he has said when notseeking office, and when he is freely offering his considered opinion ratherthan being asked to formulate, on the spot, a position on some controversialissue of the moment.  Especially usefulin this connection are Trump’s 1990 interviewin Playboy, and his 2007book ThinkBig and Kick Ass in Business and Life, which, though a crassself-help volume, also contains autobiographical elements and an expression ofTrump’s personal life philosophy.  Sourceslike these give a good idea of how he sees the world, and the picture isremarkably consistent over time.

Interestingly,in the 1990 interview, Trump said he had no opinion on abortion.  But he did have much to say about matterssuch as trade, foreign policy, crime, and “the working man,” and his opinionsthen were very much like the opinions he has now.  This tends to confirm what any objectiveobserver would have guessed from the history of Trump’s political career, whichis that the latter issues (rather than “social issues” such as abortion) arethe ones he really cares about.

But what is mostimportant about the interview and the book is what they reveal about Trump’sfundamental values, what he takes life to be about.  In the interview, he says that it is notreally money or material things that drive him. This leads to the following exchange:

Interviewer: Then what does all this – the yacht, the bronzetower, the casinos – really mean to you?

Trump: Props for the show.

Interviewer: And what is the show?

Trump: The show is “Trump” and it is sold-out performances everywhere. I've had fun doing it and will continueto have fun, and I think most people enjoy it.

Later on inthe interview the theme is revisited:

Interviewer: How large a role does pure ego play in your dealmaking and enjoyment of publicity?

Trump: Every successful person has a very large ego.

Interviewer: Every successful person?  Mother Teresa?  Jesus Christ?

Trump: Far greater egos than you will ever understand.

Interviewer: And the Pope?

Trump: Absolutely.  Nothing wrong with ego.  People need ego, whole nations need ego. Ithink our country needs more ego,because it is being ripped off so badly by our so-called allies.

Later still,the interview addresses the question of the ultimate point of this ego satisfaction:

Interviewer: In the deep of the night, after the reportersall leave your conferences, are you ever satisfied with what you'veaccomplished?

Trump: I'm too superstitious to be satisfied.  I don't dwell on the past.  People who do that go right down the tubes.  I'm never self-satisfied.  Life is what you do while you're waiting todie.  You know, it is all a rather sadsituation.

Interviewer: Life?  Ordeath?

Trump: Both.  We'rehere and we live our sixty, seventy or eighty years and we're gone.  You win, you win, and in the end, it doesn'tmean a hell of a lot.  But it issomething to do – to keep you interested.

Now, it isimportant to point out – both in the interests of fairness to Trump, and toallow his critics to see that he is a more complex man than many of them givehim credit for – that in the interview and the book he also emphasizes theimportance of charitable giving.  I thinkhe is sincere about this, and it is a serious mistake to think that Trump is fundamentallymotivated by greed.  He has grave flaws,but that is not one of them.

What Trump is motivated by, as both the interviewand indeed his entire public life make manifest, is egotism, and the imperativeto “win.”  The depressing and indeed uglyconsequences of this view of life are spelled out in Think Big and Kick Ass.  Therehe divides the world into “winners” and “losers,” with the aim of the bookbeing to show how to secure a place in the first category (p. 15).  This is not a goal that can ever be realizedonce and for all, but requires a constant pursuit, so that “you can never rest,no matter how good things are going” (p. 30). And it requires egotism of the kind he evinced in the interview.  “Having a big ego is a good thing,” he writes(p. 279), advising that “everything you do in life, do with attitude” (p. 269)and “[do] not give a crap” what others think about it (p. 271).  Practicing what he preaches, he tells us that“I’m really smart” (p. 148) and “I always think of myself as the best-lookingguy” (p. 269) – though, comically, he pretends that humility too is somehowamong his virtues, writing that “I am not a conceited person and I do not liketo have conceited people around me” (p. 156).

In this“game of life,” says Trump, “money is how you score” (p. 43).  But it isn’t money in itself that givessatisfaction.  Rather, Trump says, it is the“deals” one makes in the course of pursuing success that does so (p. 41).  Quoting the opening lines of his famous firstbook TheArt of the Deal, he writes:

I don’t do it for the money. I’ve got enough, much more than I’ll ever need.  I do it to do it.  Deals are my art form.  Other people paint beautifully on canvas orwrite beautiful poetry.  I like makingdeals, preferably big deals.  That’s howI get my kicks.

What is thebig deal about “deals”?  Trump makes itclear that it is the domination ofthe other person involved that gives deals their appeal.  In ThinkBig and Kick Ass, he writes:

I love to make the big score and to make the big deal.  I love to crush the other side and take the benefits.  Why?  Becausethere is nothing greater.  For me it iseven better than sex, and I love sex.  Butwhen you hit, when the deals are going your way, it is the greatest feeling!  You hear lots of people say that a great dealis when both sides win.  That is a bunchof crap.  In a great deal you win – notthe other side.  You crush the opponentand come away with something better for yourself. (p. 48)

On thematter of sex, Trump boasts of the many women he has “been able to date(screw)” because of his bold attitude (p. 270), and is frank that this includes“married” women (p. 271).  But the readersuspects that what Trump would do with other men’s wives he likely would nottolerate from his own. “Being in a marriage,” he says, is a “business” (p. 21),and as with every other business arrangement, one must make sure that one’s owninterests are protected.  He puts so muchemphasis on this that he devotes an entire chapter to the importance of alwaysgetting a prenuptial agreement whenever one marries (as he has three times).

“I valueloyalty above everything else,” Trump tells us (p. 160).  And evidently, that is precisely because hethinks it is not the normal course of things:

The world is a vicious, brutal place.  It’s a place where people are looking to killyou, if not physically, then mentally. In the world that we live in every day it is usually the mentalkill.  People are looking to put youdown, especially if you are on top… You have to know how to defendyourself.  People will be nasty and tryto kill you just for sport.  Even yourfriends are out to get you! (p. 139)

Crucial toprotecting your interests, Trump emphasizes, is revenge.  This is a majortheme of Think Big and Kick Ass, notonly repeated several times but elaborated upon in an entire chapter of itsown.  “I love getting even… Always geteven.  Go after people that go after you”(p. 29).  “When somebody screws you,screw them back in spades” (p. 183).  “Ifyou don’t get even, you are just a schmuck! I really mean it, too” (p. 190). “You need to screw them back fifteen times harder” (p. 194).  And so on. He relates the case of a former employee who failed to help him when heneeded it, but later faced hard times of her own, losing her business, herhome, and her husband.  This, he says,made him “really happy,” and “now I go out of my way to make her lifemiserable” (p. 180).  He also tells usabout an athlete friend of his who had been betrayed by his manager butdeclined to take Trump’s advice to get revenge. Trump broke off the friendship over this, refusing to associate anyfurther with a “loser,” “schmuck,” and “jerk” who would refuse to get even (p.192).

Now, Isubmit that the view of human life all of this reflects is like nothing so muchas Hobbes’s state of nature.  For Hobbes,human beings in their natural condition are nothing more than self-interestedbundles of appetites, each of whom pursues his own desire-satisfaction andglory in a way that is bound to be at odds with others’ pursuit of their owndesire-satisfaction and glory.  This inevitablymakes social life nasty and dangerous, and the only remedy is to agree by“contract” to follow rules that are in each party’s self-interest, and onlyinsofar as they are in one’s self-interest. There is, for Hobbes, nothing in our nature that can provide any highermotivation, nor can we have knowledge of an afterlife or of any religiousdoctrine that might afford us any higher motivation.

This view ofhuman life is fundamentally at odds both with the tradition of moral andpolitical philosophy deriving from Plato and Aristotle, and with Christiandoctrine.  But again, Trump’s vision isdisturbingly reminiscent of it.  Hisegotism evokes the Hobbesian agent selfishly seeking his own glory and desire-satisfaction;his emphasis on demanding loyalty, while simultaneously getting the better ofothers and taking revenge on enemies as the key to navigating a hostile socialworld, calls to mind the relationship between human beings in a Hobbesian stateof nature; and his obsession with “deals” echoes the Hobbesian view thatcontract alone can yield anything close to beneficial social relationships.  And Trump’s vision of life, like Hobbes’s, isfundamentally at odds with Christianity. Certainly it is hard to think of an ethos that more manifestlycontradicts Christ’s Sermon on the Mount than Trump’s celebration of egotismand revenge (not to mention adultery and divorce). 

The Trumpification of conservatism

Naturally,one can push such an analysis only so far. No actual human being is strictly reducible to a Hobbesian agent,because Hobbes’s conception of human nature is simply wrong (certainly from thepoint of view of the natural law and Christian anthropology I woulddefend).  Nor is Trump without his virtues.  Again, I believe his charitable impulses aresincere, reflecting something like what Aristotle would call the virtue ofliberality.  I think his patriotism issincere, as is his love for his family, all of which reflects the virtue ofpiety.  I think his concern for workingpeople is sincere, and reflects something like the virtue of magnanimity.  His determination in the face of setbacks isimpressive, and reflects a kind of courage. And he can be very funny, which is no small thing in a leader.

The troubleis that Trump’s egotism and obsessive desire to “win” seem more fundamental tohis character than these virtues, and can distort or even overwhelm them – somuch so that he at least approximatesa Hobbesian agent.  And this accounts forthe words and actions that have made him such a controversial figure.

To be sure, thereis an enormous amount of nonsense said and written about Trump.  It is true that too many of his admirers areunwilling to listen to any criticism of him, but it is also true that many ofhis critics are too willing to believeany criticism of him.  And overreactionto this excessive hostility to him is a major reason why the devotion of hisadmirers is often excessive. 

To note someexamples of the nonsense in question, the constantly repeated claim that Trumpsaid after the Charlottesville incident that there are “very fine people” amongneo-Nazis and white supremacists is a myth.  The truth is that he explicitly said that hewas not talking about such people,who, he agreed, should be “condemned.” Trump’s remark about a “bloodbath” if he loses the 2024 election was not(contrary to what is often asserted) a prediction of political violence, butrather about direeffects on the auto industry. Despite what is often alleged, Trump neveradvised people to inject bleach as a treatment for Covid.  Some of the recent prosecutions of Trump areindeed legallyflimsy and manifestly politically motivated.  And so on.

It is alsoquite preposterous to characterize Trump as a “fascist.”  He is nothing as ideological as that.  To be sure, what he wanted Mike Pence to doon January 6, 2021 would have been a very grave offense against the rule oflaw, as my friend and sometimes co-author Joseph Bessette showed in a Claremont Review of Books essay.  That alone should have prevented Republicansfrom ever again nominating him for president. But there is no reason whatsoever to attribute it to a fascistagenda.  It reflects instead the pique ofa man for whom the prospect of losing to Joe Biden was so painful a blow to hisego that he was too willing to believe the theories of those who assured himthe election was stolen, and that the Eastman memos afforded a solution.

But that isbad enough, and Trump does deserve criticism for the disgrace of January6.  Other common criticisms of him are alsoperfectly just.  Take, for example, hispredilection for exaggeration and falsehood. It is not so much that Trump is a liar as that he is a bullshitter, in HarryFrankfurt’s famous sense of the term.  The liar, as Frankfurt points out, cares verymuch about the truth, if only to hide it. The bullshitter, by contrast, is not primarily interested in truth orfalsity so much as in saying whatever is useful for furthering some goal hehas.  That may involve speaking afalsehood, but it might instead require speaking the truth.  The bullshitter doesn’t care so long as it works. 

This is whyTrump will both say things that are true but which other politicians lack thecourage to say (for example, that illegal immigration is a serious problem thatneither party has been willing to deal with) while mixing them with arrestingbut absurd falsehoods that no one else would dare peddle (such as that Mexicowould pay for a border wall).  The formerlend credibility to the latter, and together such remarks function to createthe impression that Trump alone has the boldness and vision to see and do whatneeds to be done.  Sometimes he willpersist for quite a while with some particular bit of bullshit (as with the“birther” narrative about Barack Obama), other times he will deploy it onlybriefly (as when he repeatedthe ludicrous rumor that Ted Cruz’s father was involved in theKennedy assassination).  What determineswhat he says and how long he says it is whatever is necessary in order to “win”and close the “deal.”

Trump isalso rightly criticized for the ugly and utterly disgraceful things he oftensays about people who stand in his way, as when he ridiculed the looks of afemale political rival, and mocked Senator John McCain’s suffering as aprisoner of war.  Trump’s defenderssometimes try to minimize such behavior as mere New York brashness or the like.  But to any objective observer these are clearand grave examples of what moral theologians call the sin of contumely.  They are sinful because they unjustly deprivepeople of the respect they are owed. They are grave because the humiliation they inflict is public, andbecause they greatly exacerbate the bitterness of contemporary social andpolitical life. 

There areother manifestly immoral things Trump has done, such as his proposalto kill the families of terrorists, and his boastingof attempting to seduce a married woman and of taking advantage sexually ofwomen attracted to him because of his fame. And I have cited only some of the words and actions of his that arepublicly verifiable – there are, of course, other grave accusations againsthim, which I leave out only because I do not know whether they are true.  Yet, though when running for president in2015 Trump claimed to be a religious Christian, he alsosaid that he doesn’t ask God for forgiveness for anything he’s done.

All of thesethings are intelligible given that Trump’s personality approximates that of theHobbesian ego seeking to advance its own glory and self-interest (to “win”) inwhatever way seems fitting to it, bound only by whatever terms it hascontracted with others to follow (the “deal”). Except that, unlike those who contract to leave Hobbes’s state of nature,Trump explicitly tells us that when he makes a deal he hopes to “crush” theother side and make sure that he alone truly benefits.

This alsomakes it intelligible why the same man who appointed the justices crucial tooverturning Roe would now endorsepolicies diametrically opposed to the pro-life cause and to social conservatismgenerally.  Given the view of the worldthat Trump has consistently expressed and lived for decades, it would be absurdto suppose he personally cares about or even sees the point of the thingssocial conservatives care about.  Theobvious explanation for why he catered to them for as long as he did is that itwas in his political interests to make such a “deal,” and now that he sees themas mostly a liability, the deal is off.

But that isnot the worst of it.  Again, Trumpexplicitly tells us that he does not enter into a deal with a genuine concern tobenefit the other side.  The aim of adeal, he writes, is to “crush theopponent and come away with something better for yourself.”  If the otherside benefits, that is incidental, a byproduct of Trump benefiting.  Trump’sdefenders often accuse his pro-life critics of insufficient “gratitude” for hisrole in overturning Roe.  This is like saying that a buyer owes a usedauto dealer “gratitude” for selling him a decent car, and that this gratitudeshould keep him from complaining or taking his business elsewhere if the dealerlater tries to sell him a lemon.

In any event,Trump himself is bound to interpret criticism from social conservatives as ingratitude,and here his explicit policy of revenge comes into play – in such a way thatthe situation for social conservatives in a second Trump administration islikely to be even worse than I described in my previous article.  For it’s not just that Trump will no longerpromote their agenda, and it’s not just that he will even advocate policiesthat are positively contrary to that agenda. It’s that, if social conservatives protest or resist this, Trump’svindictive nature is likely to lead him to seek retaliation.  He may well, as he puts it, “get even,” “goafter” them, “screw them back in spades,” “screw them back fifteen timesharder.”

In this way,along with the other ways I’ve described in this article and my previous one,Trump is putting social conservatives in a very perilous position.  And in other respects too, he has done grave damageto the conservative movement.  His egotismconstantly leads him into foolish and sometimes even dangerous behavior, suchas his attempt to pressure Pence into unconstitutional action on January 6, andhis unjust demonization of Republican officials in Georgia who would not do hisbidding.  Such actions have sown divisionwithin the Republican Party and greatly damaged its reputation. 

Trump’s badexample has also rubbed off on too many of his followers.  Aping his predilection for bullshit, too manyof them are prone to crackpotconspiracy theories and woolly “narrative thinking.”  Aping his aggressive boorishness, too many ofthem have become excessively bellicose and more interested in “own the libs” stuntsthan in serious and effective policy proposals. Aping his imperative to “win” and make “deals” above all else, too manyof them have become willing to compromise their principles for electoralvictory.  Awed by the force of hispersonality, too many have become cult-like in their devotion, and intolerantof dissent.  Understandably frustrated bythe fecklessness and cowardice of so many conservatives, they have embracedwhat they wrongly judge to be Trump’s masculine alternative.  Yet being an egotist and a bully is notmasculinity, but rather a cartoonish distortion of masculinity.  If too many conservatives exhibit whatAquinas calls thevice of effeminacy, Trump represents an opposite extreme vice, not thesober, genuinely masculine middle ground.

Trump’sdefenders will respond that the greatest danger nevertheless comes from theLeft.  I agree, as I have made clear overand overand overagain.  But it simply doesn’t follow thatTrump is the remedy.  His essentiallyHobbesian individualist ethos is simply another variation on the liberaldisease that afflictsthe modern body politic, rather than its cure.  Even then, it is less an ideology than merelythe personality type of one man, who is unlikely to leave behind him even acoherent movement, much less a political philosophy, after he is gone.  His legacy will likely be a social conservatismthat is greatly diminished in influence, and a larger conservative movement thatwill be less serious intellectually and remain internally divided indefinitely.

But thoughTrump is far from the instrument conservatives need, he is the instrument theyare for the moment stuck with.  It iscrucial that they be absolutely clear-eyed about what they are getting.  It is reasonable for them to hope that hemight prevent or mitigate some of the damage done by the Left.  But they will have to be constantly on guardto prevent him from inflicting further damage of his own.

The problem with the “hard problem”

RobertLawrence Kuhn is well-known as the creator and host of the public televisionseries Closer to Truth , an invaluablesource of interviews with major contributors to a variety of contemporarydebates in philosophy, theology, and science. (Longtime readers will recall an exchange Kuhn and I had at First Things some years back on thequestion of why there is something rather than nothing, which you can find here,here,and here.)  Recently, Kuhn’s article “Alandscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications”    appeared in the journal Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology.  It is an impressively exhaustive survey ofthe field, and will be extremely helpful to anyone looking for guidance throughits enormous and often bewildering literature. Kuhn kindly includes a section on my own contributions to the subject.

The “hard problem”

Whether bydesign or not, the article marks the thirtieth anniversary since David Chalmersintroduced the phrase “hard problem of consciousness” to label what has inrecent analytic philosophy of mind become a focus of obsessive attention.  Introducing the problem, Kuhn notes:

Key indeed are qualia, our internal, phenomenological, feltexperience – the sight of your newborn daughter, bundled up; the sound ofMahler's Second Symphony, fifth movement, choral finale; the smell of garlic,cooking in olive oil.  Qualia – the feltqualities of inner experience – are the crux of the mind-body problem.

Chalmers describes qualia as “the raw sensations of experience.” He says, “I see colors – reds, greens,blues – and they feel a certain way to me.  I see a red rose; I hear a clarinet; I smellmothballs.  All of these feel a certainway to me.  You must experience them toknow what they're like.  You couldprovide a perfect, complete map of my brain [down to elementary particles] – what'sgoing on when I see, hear, smell – but if I haven't seen, heard, smelled formyself, that brain map is not going to tell me about the quality of seeing red,hearing a clarinet, smelling mothballs. You must experience it.”

Those lasttwo sentences indicate why qualia areregarded by so many contemporary philosophers as problematic.  The problem has to do with the metaphysicalgap that seems to exist between physical facts on the one hand (including factsabout the brain) and facts about conscious experience on the other (especiallyfacts about qualia).

The natureand reality of this gap has been spelled out in various ways.  Consider Chalmers’ famous “zombieargument.”  It is possible atleast in principle, he says, for there to be a world physically identical toour own down to the last particle, but where there are none of the qualia ofconscious experience.  Thus, in thisimagined world, there are creatures who are not only anatomically but alsobehaviorally identical to us, in that they speak and act exactly as we do inresponse to the same stimuli.  But theypossess no inner life of the kind characterized by qualia.  They are “zombies” in the technical sensefamiliar to readers of contemporary work in the philosophy of mind (a sensevery different from that familiar from Nightof the Living Dead and similar movies). But if they can be physically identical without possessing qualia, thenthe facts about qualia must be something over and above the physical facts.

A relatedargument known as the “knowledgeargument” was famously put forward by Frank Jackson.  Imagine Mary, a scientist of the future who,for whatever reason, has spent her entire life in a black and white room, neverhaving experiences of colors.  She has,nevertheless, through her studies come to learn all the physical facts thereare to know about the physics and physiology of color perception.  For example, she knows down to the lastdetail what is going on in the surface of a red apple, and in the eyes andnervous system, when someone sees the apple. Suppose she leaves the room and finally comes to learn for herself whatit is like to see red.  In other words,she comes for the first time to have the qualia associated with the consciousexperience of seeing a red apple.  Surelyshe has learned something new.  Butsince, by hypothesis, she already knew all the physical facts there were toknow about the situation, her new knowledge of the qualia in question must beknowledge of something over and above the physical facts.

As you mightexpect, the lesson many draw from these arguments is that materialism, whichholds that the physical facts are all the facts there are, is false.  And this is taken to show in turn thatconsciousness will never be explicable in neuroscientific terms.  But while this certainly makes qualia aproblem for the materialist, you might wonder why they would be a problem foranyone else.  Can’t the dualist happilytake these implications to be, not a problem, but rather a confirmation of hisposition?  But it’s not that simple.  For arguments like the zombie argument alsoseem to imply that qualia are epiphenomenal, having no causal influence on thephysical world.  And if qualia have nocausal influence on anything we do or say, how are we even talking aboutthem?  Indeed, how can we know they arereally there?

How toresolve such puzzles, and determining whether it is materialism, dualism, orsome alternative view that will survive when they are resolved, is what the“hard problem” is all about.  An enormousamount of ink has been spilled on it in recent decades, as Kuhn’s article shows.  Now, philosophical work can often be of greatvalue even when it is based on erroneous presuppositions, because it can teachus about the logical relationships between certain concepts, and theconsequences of following out consistently certain philosophicalassumptions.  That is why it will alwaysbe important for philosophers to study thinkers of genius who got things badlywrong (which would in my view include Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zeno, Ockham,Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and many others).

In myopinion, the literature on the hard problem is of value in just this way.  We learn from it important things about therelationships between key philosophical ideas, such as the conceptions ofmatter and of consciousness that have dominated modern philosophy.  And it shows us, in my view, that materialismis false, since the conception of matter the materialist operates with rulesout any materialist explanation of consciousness, and denying the existence ofconsciousness in order to get around this problem would be incoherent.  This literature also illuminates the problemthat post-Cartesian forms of dualism have in explainingthe tight integration between mind and body that everyday experiencereveals to us to be real.

Origin of the problem

All thesame, the so called “hard problem” is, in my view, a pseudo-problem that restson a set of mistakes.  There is a reasonwhy ancient and medieval philosophy knew nothing of the “mind-body problem” asmodern philosophers conceive of it, and nothing of the so-called “hard problemof consciousness” in particular.  Andit’s not because they somehow overlooked some obvious features of mind andmatter that make their relationship problematic.  It’s because the problem only arises if onemakes certain assumptions about the nature of mind and/or matter that ancientand medieval philosophers generally did not make, but modern philosophers oftendo make. 

Points likethe ones to follow have often been made not only by Aristotelian-Thomisticphilosophers like me but also by Wittgensteinians like PeterHacker and Maxwell Bennett and Heideggerians like FrederickOlafson.  The key moves thatgenerated the so-called mind-body problem can be found in Descartes, so thatThomists, Wittgensteinians, Heideggerians, and others commonly characterizethem as “Cartesian.”  But variations onthese moves are found in early modern thinkers more generally. 

On the sideof the body, modern philosophy introduced a conception of matter that isessentially reductionist and mathematicized.  It is reductionist insofar as it essentiallytakes everyday material objects to be aggregates of microscopic particles.  A stone, an apple, a tree, a dog, a humanbody – all of these things are, on this view, really “nothing but” collectionsof particles of the same type, so that the differences between the everydayobjects are as superficial as the differences between sandcastles of diverseshapes.  The new conception of matter ismathematicized insofar as it holds that the only properties of the microscopicparticles are those that can be given a mathematical characterization.  This would include size, shape, position in space,movement through space, and the like, which came to be called the “primaryqualities” of matter. 

With color,sound, heat, cold, and other so-called “secondary qualities,” the idea was thatthere is nothing in matter itself that corresponds to the way we experiencethem.  For example, there is nothing inan apple that in any way resembles the red we see, and nothing in ice waterthat in any way resembles the cold we feel. The redness and coldness exist only in our experience of the apple andthe water, in something like the way the redness we see when looking throughred-tinted glasses exists only in the glasses rather than in the objects we seethrough them.  Physical objects, on thisconception, are nothing more than collections of colorless, soundless,odorless, tasteless particles.  Thisincludes the brain, which is as devoid of these qualities as apples and waterare.

On the sideof the mind, meanwhile, the modern picture makes of it the repository of thesequalities that are said not truly to exist in matter.  Redness, coldness, and the like, are on thisview not the qualities of physical things, but rather of our consciousexperiences of physical things.  They arethe “qualia” of experience.  Oftenassociated with this view is an indirectrealist theory of perception, according to which the immediate objects ofperception are not physical objects themselves, but only mental representationsof such objects.  For example, when yousee an apple, the immediate object of your perception is not the apple outsideyou, but rather an inner representation of it. The situation is analogous to looking at someone who is ringing yourdoorbell through a security camera that is generating an image of the person ona computer screen.  What you are directlylooking at is the screen rather thanthe person, and the colors you see on the screen are strictly speaking featuresof the screen rather than the person(even if they are caused by something really there in the person). 

On theindirect realist theory of perception, conscious experience is experience ofthe inner “screen” of the mind itself rather than of the physical world.  The physical world is the cause of what we see on this innerscreen, just as the person ringing your doorbell is the cause of what you seeon your computer.  But we have no directaccess to it, and can know it only by inference from what we see on the innerscreen.  Our awareness of the screeninvolves something called “introspection,” which is analogous to perceptionexcept that its objects are purely mental and known directly, whereas theobjects of perception are physical and known indirectly.  For example, by introspection you directlyknow your experience of the apple and the reddish, sweet, fragrant, etc. qualiaof this experience.  Perception involvesindirect knowledge of an external physical object that is the cause of yourhaving this experience and those qualia.

The mind asconceived of on this picture is often called the “Cartesian theater.”  The reductionist-cum-mathematicizedconception of the physical world I described is often called the “mechanicalworld picture.”  The modern mind-bodyproblem is essentially the problem of determining how these two pictures arerelated to one another, which is why no such problem existed in ancient andmedieval philosophy (or at least not in its mainstreams, though the ancientatomist Democritus noteda paradox facing his own position that is at least in the ballpark).

The problemis that, on the one hand, since the Cartesian theater is characterized byproperties that the mechanical world picture entirely extrudes from thematerial world, that theater itself cannot be part of the material world.  Thus are we left with Cartesian dualism orsomething in its ballpark.  But on theother hand, the separation between them is so radical that it becomes utterlymysterious how the Cartesian theater can get into any sort of epistemic orcausal contact with the mechanistically described material world.  Thus are we left with skepticism and with theinteractionproblem or something in its ballpark.

The “hardproblem of consciousness” is just the latest riff on this post-Cartesianproblematic.  On the one hand, it issaid, neuroscience can shed light on the relatively “easy problems” about howneural processes mediate between sensory input and bodily behavior, but not onthe “hard problem” of why any of this processing is associated withqualia.  On the other hand, it is said, itis hard to see how qualia could be other than epiphenomenal given the “causalclosure of the physical.”  The formerpoint recapitulates traditional Cartesian arguments against materialism and thelatter recapitulates the interaction problem the materialist traditionally raisesagainst the Cartesian.

Dissolution of the problem

From thepoint of view of Aristotelians, Wittgensteinians, Heideggerians and others, whatis needed is, not further efforts to try to find a way to stop this merry-go-round,but rather not to get on it in the first place.  In particular, we need to abandon the backgroundmodern philosophical assumptions that generate the “hard problem of consciousness”and other variations on the mind-body problem. For instance, we need to reject the reductionist-cum-mathematicizedconception of the material world we’ve inherited from early modern philosophy’smechanical world picture.  With naturalsubstances, it is simply a mistake to think of them as no more than the sum oftheir parts, and to suppose that to understand them involves determining howtheir higher-level features arise out of lower-level features in a strictly bottom-upway.

In the caseof a human being or non-human animal, it is a mistake to look for consciousnessat the level of the particles of which the body is made, or at the level of nervecells, or even at the level of the brain as a whole.  Consciousness is a property of the organism as a whole.  The mathematicized description of matter thatthe physicist gives us, and the neural description the physiologist gives us,are abstractions from the organism asa whole, useful for certain purposes but in no way capturing the entirety ofthe organism, any more than a blueprint captures all there is to a home.  We should no more expect to findconsciousness at the level of physics or neuroscience than we should expect tofind Sunday dinner, movie night, or other aspects of everyday home life in theblueprint of a house.

We shouldalso reject the assumptions about perception and introspection inherited from post-Cartesianphilosophy of mind.  As Bennett andHacker show in detail in their book PhilosophicalFoundations of Neuroscience and elsewhere,discussions of the hard problem of consciousness routinely characterize therelevant phenomena in ways that are not only tendentious, but bizarre from thepoint of view of common sense no less than of Aristotelian and Wittgensteinian philosophy. 

For example,consider Chalmers’ remark, quoted above, that seeing a red rose, hearing aclarinet, and smelling mothballs all “feel a certain way.”  It is common in the literature on qualia andconsciousness to see claims like this. The idea seems to be that different kinds of conscious experience aredifferentiated from one another insofar as each has a unique “feel” to it.  But this is not the way people normallytalk.  Suppose you asked the averageperson what it feels like to see a red rose, hear a clarinet, or smellmothballs.  He might suppose that whatyou had in mind was whether these perceptions evoked certain emotions ormemories or the like.  For example, hemight imagine that what you are wondering about is whether seeing the rose evokesa feeling of longing for a girlfriend to whom you once gave such a rose, orwhether hearing the clarinet evokes happy memories of first hearing a BennyGoodman record, or whether smelling mothballs generates a feeling ofnausea. 

Suppose yousaid to him “No, I don’t mean anything like that.  I mean, what is the feel that the experience of seeing red has even apart from thatsort of thing, and how does it differ from the feel that the experience of hearing a clarinet has?”  He would likely not know what you are talkingabout.  In the ordinary sense of the word“feel,” it doesn’t “feel like” anything to see a red rose or hear a clarinet.  Seeing an object is one thing, hearing aclarinet played is another, and “feeling” something (like an emotion) is yetanother thing, and not at all like the first two.  Discussions of qualia routinely take forgranted that there must be some special “feeling” that demarcates one experiencefrom another.  But as Bennett and Hackernote, that is not how we ordinarily do in fact distinguish one experience fromanother.  Instead, we distinguish them byreference to the object of theexperience (a rose versus a clarinet, say) or the modality of the experience (seeing as opposed to hearing).  There is no “feel” on top of that that playsa role in distinguishing one experience from another.

Similarly,it is often said that each experience has a distinct “qualitative character” toit.  There is, we are told, a “qualitativecharacter” to an experience of seeing one’s newborn daughter that is differentfrom the “qualitative character” of an experience of smelling garlic cooking inolive oil.  But as Bennett and Hackerpoint out, this too is an odd way of speaking, and certainly not what the ordinaryspeaker would say.  To be sure, seeingone’s newborn daughter may cause one to feel affectionate, and smelling garlic cookingin olive oil may make one hungry.  Inthat sense there is a different feel or qualitative character to theexperiences.  But all this means, asBennett and Hacker stress, is that personfeels a certain way as a result of the experiences.  It’s not a matter of the experiences themselves possessing some sort of “feel”or “qualitative character.”

Then thereis the fact that in discussions of the hard problem, it is constantly assertedthat one’s experiences involve areddish color, a garlicky smell, and so on. But here too, that is simply not the way people ordinarily talk.  They would say that the rose is red, not that their experienceof the rose is red, and that the garlichas a certain distinctive smell, not that their experience of garlic does. Common sense treats colors, smells, and the like as qualities of thingsout there in the physical world, not as the qualia of our experience of thatworld. 

Now, theseodd ways of talking become intelligible (sort of, anyway) if one thinks of themind on the model of the Cartesian theater. Suppose that what we are directly aware of are only innerrepresentations of physical things, rather than the things themselves.  Then it might seem that we cannot entirely distinguishdifferent experiences by reference to the objects or modalities of theexperiences.  For the experiences could,on this model, be just as they are even if the physical objects didn’t existand indeed even if the organs associated with the different modalities (eyes,ears, etc.) didn’t exist.  How todifferentiate them, then?  Positing aunique “feel” or “qualitative character” for each experience might seemnecessary.  Similarly, if it is only ourown experiences, rather than physical things themselves, that we are directlyaware of, then it is understandable why it would seem that in experiencing areddish color, a garlicky smell, etc. we are encountering the qualia of experiences rather than the qualitiesof physical objects.

Aristotelians,Wittgensteinians, Heideggerians, and others would say that this way of carvingup the conceptual territory is wrong, and that common sense is right.  Of course, others would say that common sensehas it wrong, and that post-Cartesian philosophy was correct to go in thedirection it did.  The point, though, isthat the “hard problem of consciousness” is not something that arises just froma consideration of the relevant phenomena. Rather, it is an artifact of a certain set of philosophical assumptionsthat are read into thephenomena.  And those assumptions are byno means unproblematic or unavoidable. Indeed, the fact that they generate the “hard problem of consciousness”is itself a good reason to question them. (I have argued against the mechanical world picture and the Cartesiantheater conception of the mind in several places.  For example, I do so at length in Aristotle’sRevenge, and also in ImmortalSouls, in chapters 6 and 7 especially.)

All thesame, the contemporary debate about the “hard problem” remains worthy of study –not because it teaches us where the truth about human nature lies, but ratherbecause it illuminates the nature and consequences of certain very common andtenacious errors.

Rawls’s liberal integralism

John Rawls’spolitical liberalism is no more neutral and no less religiously particular thana comprehensively Catholic society.  Ielaborate in “PoliticalLiberalism and Rawlsian Religion,” my latest article at Postliberal Order.

Trump has put social conservatives in a dilemma

Let’s beginwith the obvious.  No social conservativecould possibly justify voting for Kamala Harris and Tim Walz.  They are pro-abortion extremists, as Ryan Andersonshows in an articleon Harris at First Things andDan McLaughlin shows in an articleon Walz at National Review.  Their records on other matters of concern tosocial conservatives areno better.  It goes withoutsaying that they are absolutely beyond the pale. 

Despite hisrecent betrayal of social conservatives, Donald Trump remains lessbad on these issues.  Indeed, hisappointments to the Supreme Court made possible the overturning of Roe v. Wade.  It is understandable that many socialconservatives have concluded that, his faults notwithstanding, they must votefor him in order to prevent a Harris/Walz victory.  The argument is a serious one.  But the matter is not as straightforward asthey suppose, because the problem is not merely that Trump will no longer doanything to advance the pro-life cause. It is that his victory would likely do positive harm, indeed graveand lasting damage, to the pro-life cause and to social conservatism ingeneral. 

For thatreason, a case can also be made for voting for neither Harris norTrump.  Yes, a reasonable person couldjudge that the case for voting for him is stronger.  But before drawing that conclusion, it isimperative for social conservatives carefully to weigh the costs, no less than the benefits, of supporting him.  And it is imperative for those who do decideto vote for him not to simply close ranks and quietly acquiesce to his betrayalof social conservatives.  They mustloudly, vigorously, and persistently protest this betrayal and do everything intheir power to mitigate it.

In whatfollows, I will first explain the nature and gravity of this betrayal.  Then I will set out the relevant moralprinciples for deciding how to vote when faced with a choice between candidateswhose positions on matters related to abortion, marriage, and the like aregravely immoral.  Finally, I will discusshow these principles apply to the present case.

Trump’s threat to social conservatism

First, let’sput aside a common straw man.  Trump’spro-life critics are routinely accused of foolishly demanding that heimmediately push for a national ban on abortion or some other pro-life policyproposal that is currently politically unrealistic.  But I know of no one who is demanding anysuch thing.  The critics’ concerns arevery different.  It is one thing simplyto refrain from pursuing pro-lifegoals for a time.  It is quite anotherthing to abandon those goals outright,and yet another thing to advocate policies that are positively contrary to those goals. The trouble with Trump is not that he has done the first of these things– that much would be perfectly defensible – but rather that he has done thesecond and the third.

Considerfirst his change to the Republican party platform, which not only gutted it ofits longstanding pro-life language, but introduced elements positively contraryto the pro-life cause.  The platform’slongstanding general principle that “the unborn child has a fundamentalindividual right to life which cannot be infringed” was removed.  Only “late term abortion” is explicitly opposed.  Not only was support for a national ban onabortion also removed, but the new platform indicates that the matter should beleft entirely to the states.  Theemphasis is now not on the rights of the innocent but rather on the purelyprocedural question of who gets to determine whether and where abortion shouldbe legal.  The new platform also addsthat the party supports “policies that advance… access to… IVF.”  Into the bargain, the party platform’s supportfor traditional marriage was also removed.

The mannerin which these changes were made is an outrage. As reportedin First Things, theplatform process was rigged in a shockingly brazen manner so that the changescould be rammed through, with social conservatives prevented from having anyinput or even a chance to read the revised platform before voting on it.  When asked whether the platform changes markeda move to the center on Trump’s part, his son Eric answeredthat his father “has alwaysbeen there on those issues, to tell you the truth” and dismissively comparedsocial conservatives’ concerns about abortion and traditional marriage to “worryingabout the spot on the wall in the basement.”

It will notdo to suggest, as some have, that the platform change was merely motivated by reasonableconcerns over the political fallout from the Dobbs decision.  For onething, evenwell before Dobbs, Trumpwanted to make dramatic changes to the platform that would likely anger socialconservatives, but until now lacked sufficient control over the party to do so.  For another thing, even if the controversythat followed Dobbs were the onlyconsideration, Trump did not need to change the platform in the way he did.  He could have let the existing platform standwhile basically ignoring it, as he did in 2020. Or he could have merely softened the platform, preserving the generalprinciple of defending the rights of the unborn while leaving it vague how orwhen this would be done at the federal level. Nor did he need ruthlessly to bar social conservatives from having anyinfluence on the platform process.  Nordid he need to add insult to this injury by having an OnlyFans porn model speak at theconvention.

Some socialconservatives have suggested that while the changes to the platform are bad,they can be reversed after Trump is elected. This is delusional.  Obviously,Trump has judged that he and the GOP are now in a strong enough positionpolitically not only to ignore social conservatives, but even to rub their facesin their loss of influence, without electoral consequences.  And if he wins in November, this will confirmthis judgment.  There will be noincentive to restore the socially conservative elements of the platform, andevery incentive not to do so, given their unpopularity.

Thelong-term consequences for social conservatives are bound to bedisastrous.  Outside the churches, socialconservatism currently has no significant institutional support beyond theRepublican Party.  The universities,corporations, and most of the mass media are extremely hostile to it.  And those media outlets that are less hostile(such as Fox News) tolerate social conservatives largely because of theirpolitical influence within the GOP.  IfTrump’s victory is seen as vindicating his decision to throw socialconservatives under the bus, then the national GOP will be far less likely inthe future even to pay lip service to their agenda, much less to advance it.  Opposition to abortion and resistance toother socially liberal policies will become primarily a matter of local ratherthan national politics, and social conservatives will be pushed further intothe cultural margins.  They will graduallylose the remaining institutional support they have outside the churches (evenas the churches themselves are becoming ever less friendly to them).  And their ability to fight against the moraland cultural rot accelerating all around us, and to protect themselves fromthose who would erode their freedom to practice and promote their religiousconvictions, will thereby be massively reduced.

Trump hasthus put social conservatives in a dilemma. If they withdraw their support from him, they risk helping get Harriselected, which would be a disaster both for them and for the country.  But if they roll over and accept histransformation of the party for the sake of near-term electoral victory, theyrisk long-term political suicide – which would also be a disaster for them andfor the country.

But in factthe situation is much worse than that.  For,again, it’s not just that Trump has gotten the GOP to abandon the goals ofsocial conservatives.  It is that heendorses policies that are positivelycontrary to those goals.  Forexample, when asked about whether he would block the “abortion medication”mifepristone, Trump responded:“The Supreme Court just approved the abortion pill.  And Iagree with their decision to have done that, and I will not block it”(emphasis added).  Echoing Trump, his runningmate J. D. Vance hasalso said that he supports mifepristone “being accessible.”

Trump’sdefenders might claim that he is merely acknowledging a Supreme Courtdecision.  But as Alexandra DeSanctis haspointed out, Trump’s remarks misrepresent what happened.  The court did not “approve the abortion pill.” It merely made the narrow technical determination that those who hadbrought a certain case lacked legal standing.  There is nothing in the decision that requiresanyone to support keeping the abortion pill accessible.  Now, the abortion pill currently accounts forover60% of abortions in the U.S. So, it’s not just that Trump has gotten the GOP to drop the stated goalof ending abortion.  It’s that he positively supports preserving access to themeans responsible for the majority of abortions in the country.

It getsworse.  On the one hand, Trump says thathe is in favor of letting the states decide whether to have restrictions onabortion.  But he has been critical ofthose who have tried to enact such restrictions at the state level.  For example, when Florida governor RonDeSantis signed a law banning abortion after six weeks, Trumpsaid: “I think what he did is a terrible thing and a terriblemistake.”  When the Arizona Supreme Courtruled in favor of enforcing an abortion ban, Trumpcomplained that it “went too far.” It is worth noting that Trump ally and Arizona U.S. Senate candidateKari Lake alsodenounced the ban, and atone point even appeared to adopt Bill Clinton’s rhetoric to theeffect that abortion should “safe, legal, and rare.” 

And it getseven worse.  As already noted, Trump’s new GOP platformcalls for “policies that advance… access to… IVF.”  He has sinceonce again “strongly” emphasized “supporting the availability of fertilitytreatments like IVF in every state in America.” But it is a routine part of the process of IVF to discard unwantedembryos.  Indeed, as the National Catholic Register notes,“more human embryos [are] destroyed through IVF than abortion every year.”  There is no moral difference between killingembryos during abortion and doing so as part of IVF.  So, once again, it is not just that Trump isrefraining from advancing the pro-life cause. He positively supports a practicethat murders more unborn human beings than even abortion does.  And here too we similar positions taken byTrump allies, suchas Senator Ted Cruz.

As theexamples of Vance, Lake, and Cruz indicate, the problem is not confined toTrump himself, but is spreading through the political movement he started.   He is effectively transforming the GOP intoa second pro-choice party.  Indeed, he istransforming it into a second socially liberal party.  Since the Obergefelldecision did for same-sex marriage what Roehad done for abortion, the topic of same-sex marriage has receded into thebackground.  The transgender phenomenonhas taken center stage in debates about sexual morality.  But the legalization of same-sex marriage iswhat opened the door to it, and asI have argued elsewhere, the issues are inseparable.  Once the premises by which same-sex marriagewas justified were in place, it was inevitable that what we have seen over thelast decade would follow.

Trump hassaid that he is “fine with” same-sex marriage, and, again, he removedfrom the GOP platform its statement of support for traditional marriage.  Indeed, hehas made it clear that in his vision for the Republican Party, “weare fighting for the gay community, and we are fighting and fighting hard.”  The president of the LGBT organization LogCabin Republicans hashailed the “radical and revolutionary” changes to the GOP platformas “one of the most important things that’s happened in Republican Partyhistory,” by which Trump “has put his DNA into the party.”

Many ofTrump’s defenders point to the overturning of Roe as evidence that, whatever his faults, he has done so much goodfor social conservatives that it is unseemly to criticize him for his lapsessince.  But there are several problemswith this argument. 

First, itwas by no means a sure thing that the justices Trump appointed to the SupremeCourt would vote to overturn Roe, andit is not clear that Trump himself believed they really would or even wantedthem to.  that he was privately critical of state-levelmeasures to put limits on abortion even prior to Dobbs, and that when the court’s decision was revealed he “privatelytold friends and advisers the ruling will be ‘bad for Republicans’” and wasinitially reluctant to take credit.  Politics rather than principle appearsalways to have been his main concern.  Itseems that he favored talking aboutoverturning Roe, because he judged itto be good politics, but fretted about actuallyoverturning it because he judged that to be bad politics.

Second, the Dobbs decision, while indeed a greatvictory, nevertheless fell crucially short of what pro-lifers had actually longbeen arguing for.  In order to secure amajority, the decision declined to go as far as affirming that the unborn childis a human being with the same right to life that any other innocent humanbeing has.  As Hadley Arkes hasargued, this defect helped open the door to the problems thepro-life movement has faced since Dobbs.

Third, it issilly to pretend that because a politician (or anyone else) does somethinggood, he ought to be given a pass when he does something bad.  And in any event, overturning Roe was for pro-lifers never an end initself, but only a means to the end of banning abortion.  It is quite preposterous to expect them to beso thankful to Trump for providing this means that they refrain fromcriticizing him for doing things that are positively contrary to that end.

By no meanscan it be denied that Harris, Walz, and the Democratic Party in general areworse on the issues that concern social conservatives.  They are more extreme on abortion and onLGBT-related matters, and a threat to the religious liberty of socialconservatives.  But the fact remains thata Trump victory is bound to ratify his transformation of the GOP.  It will no longer be a socially conservativeparty, but a second and more moderate socially liberal party.

How should social conservatives vote?

Catholicmoral theology provides guidelines for voters in situations like this, andbecause these guidelines are matters of natural law, they can also be useful tosocial conservatives who are not Catholic. 

The firstthing to emphasize is that the issues we have been discussing are the most fundamental of all politicalissues.  The family is the basic unit ofall social order, and it is grounded in marriage, which exists for the sake ofthe children to which it naturally gives rise. And the protection of innocent human life is the fundamental duty ofgovernment.  A society that attacks thenatural structure of marriage, that makes of a mother’s womb anything but thesafest place in the world for a child to be, and whose governing authoritiesrefuse to protect the most helpless of the innocent, is a society that iscorrupt in its very foundations.  Mattersof economics, foreign policy, and the like are all of secondaryimportance. 

Twenty yearsago, in “OnOur Civic Responsibility for the Common Good,” Archbishop (nowCardinal) Raymond Burke set out the moral principles which Catholic theologysays ought to guide voters.  Afterdiscussing abortion and other threats to innocent life, and same-sex marriage,he wrote:

Among the many “social conditions” which the Catholic musttake into account in voting, the above serious moral issues must be given the first consideration.  The Catholic voter must seek, above every other consideration, toprotect the common good by opposing these practices which attack its veryfoundations.  Thus, in weighing all ofthe social conditions which pertain to the common good, we must safeguard, before all else, the good of human lifeand the good of marriage and the family. (Emphasis added)

Similarly,the 2002 document “TheParticipation of Catholics in Political Life,” issued by the CDFunder then-Cardinal Ratzinger, teaches:

A well-formed Christian conscience does not permit one tovote for a political program or an individual law which contradicts thefundamental contents of faith and morals… When political activity comes upagainst moral principles that do not admit of exception, compromise orderogation, the Catholic commitment becomes more evident and laden withresponsibility… This is the case with laws concerning abortion and euthanasia…Such laws must defend the basic right to life from conception to natural death.  In the same way, it is necessary to recallthe duty to respect and protect the rights of the human embryo.  Analogously, the family needs to besafeguarded and promoted, based on monogamous marriage between a man and a woman…In no way can other forms of cohabitation be placed on the same level asmarriage, nor can they receive legal recognition as such.

So crucialare these issues that some moral theologians seem to hold that any candidatewho takes an immoral position on them must, accordingly, flatly be disqualifiedfrom consideration under any circumstances. For example, Fr. Matthew Habiger argues:

Can a Catholic in good conscience vote for a politician whohas a clear record of supporting abortion?  Or is it a sin to vote for a politician whoregularly uses his public office to fund or otherwise encourage the killing ofunborn children?  I take the positionthat it is clearly a sin to vote for such a politician…

The argument can be made that voting is a very remote form ofcooperation in abortion.  But is it allthat remote?  The legislator who votesfor abortion is clearly a formal accomplice, giving formal cooperation withabortion.  S/he shares both in theintention of the act, and in supplying material support for the act.  If I vote for such a candidate, knowing fullwell that he will help make available public monies for abortion, or continueits decriminalization, then I am aiding him/her…

It is not sufficient to think that, since candidate X takesthe ‘right position’ on other issues such as the economy, foreign relations,defense, etc. but only goes wrong on abortion, one can in good conscience, votefor him/her.  Abortion deals with the first and most basic human right, without whichthere is nothing left to talk about.

CardinalBurke seems, at least at first glance, to take a similar position, when hewrites:

It is sometimes impossible to avoid all cooperation withevil, as may well be true in selecting a candidate for public office.  In certain circumstances, it is morallypermissible for a Catholic to vote for a candidate who supports some immoralpractices while opposing other immoral practices.  Catholic moral teaching refers to actions ofthis sort as material cooperation, which is morally permissible when certainconditions are met…

But, there is no element of the common good, no morally goodpractice, that a candidate may promote and to which a voter may be dedicated,which could justify voting for a candidate who also endorses and supports thedeliberate killing of the innocent, abortion, embryonic stem-cell research,euthanasia, human cloning or the recognition of a same-sex relationship aslegal marriage.  These elements are sofundamental to the common good that they cannot be subordinated to any othercause, no matter how good.

Thesearguments seem to imply that a candidate’s support for abortion or same-sexmarriage are absolutely disqualifying,so that the principle of double effect cannot justify voting for such acandidate even when there is noviable alternative candidate who does not support these things.

However,that is a more stringent position than the Church and moral theologians havetraditionally taken, and on closer inspection Cardinal Burke does not seem tointend it.  For he goes on to say:

A Catholic may vote for a candidate who, while he supports anevil action, also supports the limitation of the evil involved, if there is nobetter candidate.  For example, acandidate may support procured abortion in a limited number of cases but beopposed to it otherwise.  In such a case,the Catholic who recognizes the immorality of all procured abortions mayrightly vote for this candidate over another, more unsuitable candidate in aneffort to limit the circumstances in which procured abortions would beconsidered legal.  Here the intention ofthe Catholic voter, unable to find a viable candidate who would stop the evilof procured abortion by making it illegal, is to reduce the number of abortionsby limiting the circumstances in which it is legal.  This is not a question of choosing the lesserevil, but of limiting all the evil one is able to limit at the time…

Thus, a Catholic who is clear in his or her opposition to themoral evil of procured abortion could vote for a candidate who supports thelimitation of the legality of procured abortion, even though the candidate doesnot oppose all use of procured abortion, if the other candidate(s) do notsupport the limitation of the evil of procured abortion.  Of course, the end in view for the Catholicmust always be the total conformity of the civil law with the moral law, thatis, ultimately the total elimination of the evil of procured abortion.

Similarly,then-Cardinal Ratzinger, in a2004 memo which emphasizes the necessity of Catholic politicians andvoters to oppose abortion and euthanasia, allows that:

When a Catholic does not share a candidate’s stand in favourof abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons,it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in thepresence of proportionate reasons.

Naturally,among the proportionate reasons that may justify such a vote would be that thealternative viable candidates are even worse on issues like abortion andeuthanasia, as Cardinal Burke says. Burke adds some further important points:

[M]aterial cooperation… is morally permissible when certainconditions are met.  With respect to thequestion of voting, these conditions include the following: 1) there is noviable candidate who supports the moral law in its full integrity; 2) the voteropposes the immoral practices espoused by the candidate, and votes for thecandidate only because of his or her promotion of morally good practices; and3) the voter avoids giving scandal by telling anyone, who may know for whom heor she has voted, that he or she did so to advance the morally good practicesthe candidate supports, while remaining opposed to the immoral practices thecandidate endorses and promotes.

This thirdcondition merits special emphasis.  Somewho argue for voting for Trump as the less bad of two bad options have alsobeen very critical of those who publicly criticize Trump for his betrayal ofthe pro-life cause and of social conservatives. Such criticism, they worry, might lose him votes.  But as Burke’s remarks indicate, one problemwith this attitude is that it threatens to give scandal.  It “sends the message” that socialconservatives put politics over principle, and that winning elections is moreimportant to them than the ends for which they are supposed to be winningelections in the first place, such as protecting innocent life and theinstitution of marriage.  I would addthat another problem is that if politicians who take immoral positions onabortion, same-sex marriage, and the like are not publicly criticized for doingso, this will encourage them to continue taking these positions in the future,or even more extreme positions.  Suchpoliticians should be made to fearthat they will lose votes, since nothing else is likely to deter them.

There is afurther consideration.  As Germain Grisezpoints out in his treatment of the ethics of voting in Volume 2 of The Way of the Lord Jesus:

Since politics is an ongoing process, votes can haveimportant political effects even when not decisive.  The size of the vote by which a candidate winsoften affects the candidate’s power while in office.  Hence, it usually is worthwhile to use one’svote to widen the margin by which a good candidate wins or narrow the margin bywhich a bad one wins.  Moreover, the sizeof a losing candidate’s vote often determines whether he or she will again benominated or run for the same office or another one.  From this perspective, too, it often isworthwhile to use one’s vote for a good candidate or against a bad one. (p.870)

Here is oneway this consideration is relevant to the question at hand.  Suppose Trump not only won the election, butwon by a wide margin, or won without losing a significant number of sociallyconservative voters.  This wouldencourage the GOP in the future to maintain Trump’s changes to the party andcontinue its trajectory in a more socially liberal direction.  But suppose instead that Trump won by a verynarrow margin, or won but lost many socially conservative voters in theprocess, or lost because many socially conservative voters defected.  Thatwould encourage the GOP to reverse course, and move back in a more sociallyconservative direction lest it permanently alienate a major part of itstraditional voter base.

I have beenemphasizing abortion and same-sex marriage, but obviously there are otherimportant issues too.  On inflation,crime, immigration, appointing judges, and so on, Harris is in my opinionmanifestly far worse than Trump.  Indeed,the Democrats in general are in my view now so extremely irresponsible on thesematters that voting for them is unimaginable even apart from their depravedviews on abortion, marriage, transgenderism, and related issues.  It is important to acknowledge, however, thateven if he is not as bad as the Democrats, Trump too has grave deficiencieseven apart from his betrayal of social conservatives.  The most serious of these is his attempt,after the 2020 election, to pressure then-Vice President Mike Pence to setaside Electoral College votes from states Trump contested – something Pence had noauthority to do.  This was avery grave affront to the rule of law, and should have been sufficient toprevent Republican voters from ever nominating him again.

But they did nominate him, so the question is whatto do now, in light of the principles I’ve just been setting out.  The first thing to say is that, though otherissues are of course important, competing candidates’ positions on matters suchas abortion and marriage are mostimportant.  For Catholics and otherscommitted to a natural law approach to politics, comparing candidates’positions on these matters is the first and most fundamental step indetermining how to vote, and only after that should other issues beconsidered.  And as I have already said,the fact that Harris and Walz are worse than Trump on these issues suffices todisqualify them, by the criteria of Catholic moral theology I’ve beendiscussing.  The question is not whetherto vote for Trump or Harris – no one should vote for Harris.  The question is whether to vote for Trump orinstead to vote for neither of the major candidates (by voting for a thirdparty candidate, or for a write-in candidate, or by leaving this part of theballot blank).

The argumentfor voting for Trump is that Harris and the Democrats would do far more damageto the country, not least in the respects social conservatives most careabout.  The argument for sitting theelection out is that the GOP must be punished – either by losing or by onlynarrowly winning – for moving in a socially liberal direction, since its doingso will do enormous damage to the country in the long run unless the loss ofvotes convinces the party to reverse course.

These are inmy opinion both powerful arguments.  Andtogether they imply that the least bad result would be one where Trump wins,but only narrowly, and in particular in such a way that it is manifest that theGOP will in future lose the votes of social conservatives (and thus loseelections) if it does not reverse the socially liberal direction Trump hastaken it in.  Unfortunately, theindividual voter cannot guarantee this result, because he can control only howhe votes, not how others vote.  He can’tensure that Trump gets just enough votes narrowly to win, but loses enoughvotes to punish the GOP for its betrayal of social conservatives. 

But thereare nevertheless some general considerations to guide socially conservativevoters here.  One of them is that thosewho reside in states that Trump will definitely not win anyway should not votefor him, but either abstain or vote for some other conservative candidate as aprotest.  For example, I live inCalifornia (which Trump will definitely lose anyway) and I will not vote forhim, but will instead, as a protest, cast a write-in vote for Ron DeSantis (whoin my opinion was clearly the candidate GOP primary voters should have chosen –though that is neither here nor there for present purposes).  I have also publicly been very critical ofTrump’s betrayal of social conservatives, and have tried to do what I can in mycapacity as a writer to encourage others to make their displeasure known.

Meanwhile, sociallyconservative voters in swing states could, by the criteria set out by Ratzingerand Burke, justify voting for Trump as the less bad of two bad candidates.  But a condition on their doing so is that theymust neither approve of nor keep silent about Trump’s betrayal of the unbornand of social conservatives.  They mustmake their disapproval publicly known in whatever way they are able, so as toavoid scandal and pressure the GOP to reverse the socially liberal course Trumpis putting it on.

The aim ofthis strategy is, again, to prevent the grave damage that Harris would do tothe country, while at the same time preventing the long-term grave damage thatwould be done to the country by having both major parties become pro-choice andsocially liberal.  Trump’s winning is necessaryfor the first, and his winning only narrowly and in the face of strong socialconservative resistance is necessary for the second.

That,anyway, is my considered opinion.  Iwelcome constructive criticism.  But Iask my fellow social conservatives who disagree with me seriously to considerthe gravity of the situation Trump has put us in, and the imperative not to letpartisan passions overwhelm reason and charity when debating what to do aboutit.  ThomasMore, patron saint of statesmen, pray for us.