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Pope Leo XIV on families and the family of nations

Yesterday,Pope Leo XIV delivered an addressto the diplomatic corps at the Vatican.  It was brief and very simple, butelegant and deep and shows the influence of his namesake Leo XIII and of histheological guide St. Augustine.  Theworld, Leo says, is a “family of peoples.” And essential to the wellbeing of nations and the family of nations, hesays, are peace, justice, and truth, wherepeace has justice and truth as its preconditions.  The talk is devoted to elaborating on thesethree themes.  What follows are somecomments on Leo’s remarks.

Peace, Leonotes, is not merely a negative condition, namely the absence of conflict.  True peace between people has as a positive preconditiona purity of heart that entails freedom from pride and vindictiveness, and awill to cooperate and understand rather than to conquer.  Here there is an echo of Augustine’s famousaccount of peace as “the tranquility of order,” where order involves a unity ofpurpose.  Peace in a community requiresagreement on an end, and for Augustine it must be the right end.  What end is that?  For Augustine it is God, and significantly,Leo remarks that “peace is first and foremost a gift.  It is the first gift of Christ.”  (I have more to say about Augustine’s accountof peace in arecent Postliberal Order article.)

Turning tojustice, Leo indicates that this too requires well-ordered societies.  In this connection, he calls attention to LeoXIII’s famous social encyclical RerumNovarum.  Importantly, while hementions working conditions, poverty, and the like, his emphasis is on somethingelse.  He says:

It is the responsibility of government leaders to work tobuild harmonious and peaceful civil societies.  This can be achieved above all by investing inthe family, founded upon the stable union between a man and a woman, “a smallbut genuine society, and prior to all civil society.”  In addition, no one is exempted from strivingto ensure respect for the dignity of every person, especially the most frailand vulnerable, from the unborn to the elderly, from the sick to theunemployed, citizens and immigrants alike.

The phrasein quotation marks is from Rerum Novarum,and it is the one direct quote from that document.  Like Leo XIII and other popes who have setout Catholic social teaching, Leo emphasizes that the health of the family is the fundamental precondition of thehealth of society, and that seeing to the health of the family is one of theduties of governing officials. 

This basictruth of Catholic social teaching is radically at odds with long-prevailingattitudes on both the political left and the political right.  Both, in their different ways, wrongly insiston emphasizing economics rather than morality and culture when addressingsocial problems.  Both have essentiallyendorsed the sexual revolution and its transformation in attitudes aboutdivorce, extramarital sex, homosexuality, and the like, albeit the right hasdone so in a more gradual, piecemeal, and in some cases reluctant manner.  And both have now essentially adopted thelibertarian position that even if one laments the sexual revolution, governmenthas no place in trying to roll it back.  Fromthe point of view of Catholic social doctrine, true social justice cannot beachieved until we at long last abandon these errors.

On the topicof truth, Leo says:

Where words take on ambiguous and ambivalent connotations,and the virtual world, with its altered perception of reality, takes overunchecked, it is difficult to build authentic relationships, since theobjective and real premises of communication are lacking.  For her part, the Church can never beexempted from speaking the truth about humanity and the world, resortingwhenever necessary to blunt language that may initially createmisunderstanding.

Though earlierin his address, he had also called for “carefully choosing our words.  For words too, not only weapons, can wound andeven kill.”

Leo’s pointhere seems to be, first, that one obstacle to truth prevailing in humanrelationships today is the degree to which people’s perceptions are shaped bythe “virtual world” – social media and the like, with the biases, groupthink, hottakes, and emotion-driven commentary that it fosters.  This virtual world is reminiscent of theshadows on the wall of Plato’s cave, which radically distort the understandingof those who dwell in it.

Anotherobstacle to truth, Leo indicates, is the way that language is so often usedtoday as a weapon or a means of obfuscation, rather than a means ofcommunicating for the sake of mutual understanding and describing objectivereality.  Hence the tendency ofpoliticians to use words to flummox opponents, rile up allies, and keepcitizens perpetually off balance and divided; and of ideologues to introducenovel usages so as to lend false plausibility to rank sophistries (think of theviolence done to language by gender theory, for example). 

Leo teachesthat we must remain grounded in objective reality and insist on using languageto convey that reality, even bluntly wherever necessary.  This, he goes on to say, is what charityrequires, for genuine unity between people must be grounded in truth.  And ultimately, he also says, “truth is notthe affirmation of abstract and disembodied principles, but an encounter withthe person of Christ himself, alive in the midst of the community of believers.”

Thisemphasis on truth as ultimately Christocentric once again echoesAugustine.  It also once again echoes LeoXIII, who in Rerum Novarum not onlyemphasizes that getting the family right is a basic precondition of social justice,but also that, even more fundamentally, “no satisfactory solution will be foundunless religion and the Church have been called upon to aid.”  As Leo XIII went on to say in that grand encyclical:

Without hesitation We affirm that if the Church isdisregarded, human striving will be in vain… And since religion alone, as Wesaid in the beginning, can remove the evil, root and branch, let all reflectupon this: First and foremost Christian morals must be reestablished, withoutwhich even the weapons of prudence, which are considered especially effective,will be of no avail, to secure well-being.

One lastremark about Leo XIV’s address.  Hisphrase “family of peoples” is, I think, especially apt today as an implicit correctionto two opposite extreme errors found on the opposite sides of the politicalspectrum.  On the left we find aglobalism that tends to dissolve borders and treats national loyalties as ifthey are somehow inherently suspect.  On theright we find a jingoistic bellicosity that overcorrects for thisglobalism.  To see the world as a familyof peoples is to see what is wrong with both of these extremes.  For distinct peoples have a right to preservewhat defines them as a people, culturally, linguistically, and economically.  But a good member of a family of peoples doesnot bully or intimidate or lord it over other family members.

Greenland and the ethics of annexation

PresidentTrump has repeatedly called for U.S. acquisition of Greenland.  The motivations haveto do with Greenland’s strategic location and access to its mineralreserves.  Neitherthe government of Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory), northe people of Greenland themselves, are in favor of the idea.  Not only is Trump undeterred by those facts,he has repeatedly refused to rule out the possibility of using military forceto annex the island.  For example, inJanuary, when asked whether he could assure the world that he would not resortto military coercion to get control of Greenland, Trumpreplied “No, I can’t assure you” and “I’m not going to commit tothat.”  Asked this month about usingmilitary force to take Greenland, Trump saidthat “it could happen, something could happen with Greenland” and “I don’t ruleit out.”

However,such military action would be manifestly contrary to the criteria oftraditional just war theory.  And even ifthe threat is intended merely as a negotiating tactic (as is likely), it wouldbe contrary to the natural law principles governing internationalrelations.  These facts should be obviousto all, and would have been until recently. But Trump’s most ardent supporters have an alarming tendency reflexivelyto defend even the most outrageous things he does, cobbling together feeble rationalizationsfor words and actions they would condemn had they come from anyone else.  It is worthwhile, then, to set out thereasons why Trump’s statements regarding Greenland are indefensible.

Greenland annexation and just warcriteria

Again, militaryaction to annex Greenland would clearly be unjust.  For it manifestly would not meet the “justcause” criterion of just war theory.  Onecountry can justly make war on another only when the other country is guilty ofsome rights violation grave enough for war to be a proportionate response.  The most obvious example would be when acountry goes to war in order to repel an aggressor.  But neither Denmark nor Greenland is guiltyof aggressing against the United States, or of any other violation of U.S.rights.  Indeed, they are longtime alliesof the U.S. 

The factthat the United States would find Greenland’s location and resources useful forpurposes of defense is irrelevant.  If Iwould find it useful to take over my neighbor’s property in order to protect myown against robbers, that hardly gives me a right to do so.  Indeed, it would make me a robber.  Nor will it doto pretend that governments are somehow not bound by the same moral prohibitionagainst robbery that binds individuals. As St. Thomas Aquinas writes:

As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to themthat they may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to useviolence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice... To take otherpeople's property violently and against justice, in the exercise of public authority,is to act unlawfully and to be guilty of robbery. (Summa Theologiae II-II.66.8)

Theinjustice of wars of territorial expansion is not a matter of controversy amongnatural law theorists in the Thomistic tradition, but has long been thestandard position.  For example, ThomasHiggins’s Man as Man: The Science and Artof Ethics says that “war of aggression is the violent endeavor to depriveanother people of independence, territory, or the like, for the sake ofincreasing one’s own power and prestige… The Natural Law forbids all wars ofaggression” (p. 543).  Austin Fagothey’s Right and Reason notes that “territorialaggrandizement, glory and renown, envy of a neighbor’s possessions,apprehension of a growing rival, maintenance of the balance of power… these andthe like are invalid reasons” for going to war (p. 564).  Fagothey also notes that though it can undercertain circumstances be licit for a country to acquire new land, this wouldnot be true of “land… recognized as the territory of an existing state,” andthat “an existing state may not be deprived of its territory” (p. 547).

The seriousnessof these points cannot be overstated.  Theproblem is not just that the forced annexation of Greenland would amount to robberyon a massive scale.  It is that, becauseit would result in deaths, such an unjust military action would be tantamountto murder.  It would make the president awar criminal.  It would be a massiveinjustice not only against the people of Greenland, but also against theAmerican military, which Trump would be making an instrument of suchcriminality.

A negotiating tactic?

Many ofTrump’s defenders would say that he isn’t serious about resorting to militaryforce, but merely intends such rhetoric as a negotiating tactic.  It is no doubt true that he intends it thatway.  It is also likely true that, at theend of the day, he would refrain from using such force, if only because thepolitical costs would be too great.

It issignificant, though, that in Trump’s most recent remarks, he seemed to draw adistinction between the situation with Greenland and the situation with Canada,which he has repeatedly said also ought to become part of the UnitedStates.  Asked about the possibility ofusing military force to acquire Canada, Trump said: “Well, I think we're not goingto ever get to that point” and “I don’t see it with Canada, I just don’t seeit.”  That is hardly an acknowledgementthat acquiring Canada in such a way would be wrong, and thus to be ruled out absolutely.  It sounds more like a judgment to the effectthat attacking Canada would merely be unnecessary or impractical.  But his answer in the case of Greenland isdifferent.  Again, he said that “it couldhappen, something could happen with Greenland” and “I don’t rule it out,” evenif he also says that that too is unlikely. Overall, his remarks give the impression that he does indeed regardmilitary action against Greenland as at least remotely possible.  There is also the fact that theadministration hasnow stepped up intelligence operations vis-à-vis Greenland.

In anyevent, even if this rhetoric is meant as a negotiating tactic, it is stillgravely immoral.  There are at least twoways that the refusal to rule out military action could function as anegotiating tactic.  Trump mightgenuinely intend to keep the option openin order to frighten Denmark and Greenland into making a deal, even if he doesnot currently have any plan actually to resort to such action.  Or he might merely be bluffing in order to frighten them into making a deal, but wouldnot ever really carry out such action. Either of these tactics would be gravely wrong, though not in the sameway.

John Finnis,Joseph Boyle, and Germain Grisez discuss the difference between genuinelykeeping an option open and merely bluffing in their book Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism,and some of the points they make are relevant to the present topic. 

Consider thefirst possibility, that Trump intends to keep open the option of takingmilitary action against Greenland, but also hopes and believes that he willnever have to carry this threat out.  AsFinnis, Boyle, and Grisez point out, it is a fallacy to suppose that if someonehopes and believes he never has to carry out a threat to do some action, thenit follows that he does not really intend that action.  The reality is rather that “people whofortunately avoid what they only reluctantly intend, or who might have a changeof mind in the future, are people whose minds are now made up” (pp.104-5).  In the present case, if Trumpreally does want to keep the option open, then he does in the relevant sensehave the intention of taking military action against Greenland if he cannot otherwise acquire it.  That remains the case even if he also hopesand believes he will be able to acquire it peacefully.

But as wehave seen, acquiring Greenland this way would violate just war criteria, andthus amount to murder.  As Finnis, Boyle,and Grisez write of keeping open the option of carrying out a murderous act:

It would be doubly conditioned – conditional not only on anadversary’s act in defiance of the threat, but on a choice still to be made toexecute it.  None the less, that doublyconditioned intention would still be a murderous will.  If one intends now to be in a position tocommit murder, should one later decide that the situation warrants it, theneven now one is willing (however reluctantly) to murder. (p. 111)

So, keepingopen the option of taking military action against Greenland, even if intendedjust as a negotiating tactic, is still tantamount to an intention to murder,and is thus gravely immoral.  Considerthen the alternative scenario, on which Trump is merely bluffing.  On this hypothesis, Trump does not in fact intend even to keep themilitary option open.  He simply wantsDenmark and Greenland to think thathe is keeping it open.  Even if this iswhat is going on, it is still gravely immoral for at least three reasons, thefirst two of which are set out by Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez.

First, whena country threatens an immoral military action, it is not only the intentionsof its leaders that are morally relevant. Also relevant are the intentions of everyone else in some way connectedto the action, from soldiers to ordinary citizens.  In the present case, even if Trump himself isbluffing, the bluff can only work if it is not obviously a bluff – that is to say, if a critical mass of peoplethink he really might carry out the threat. And that will lead at least some people (government officials, militarypersonnel, and voters) to decide to support the action if he carries itout.  That is to say, they will form theintention of supporting a murderous action. They will not be bluffing,even if Trump is.  And as Finnis, Boyle,and Grisez write: “Those who deliberately bring others to will what is evilmake themselves guilty, not only of the evil the others will, but also ofleading them to become persons of evil will” (p. 119).  In the case at hand, such a leader “would beinciting the others to intend to kill the innocent” (p. 120), even if he doesnot himself really intend to do so.

Second, itis not just what individuals do or will that is relevant.  The military actions of a country are social acts, acts carried out by thesociety as a whole (understood as what is traditionally called a kind of “corporateperson” or “moral person”). As Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez note, a teamcan rightly be said to intend to win a game, even if certain individual members of the team do not intend thisbut would rather lose.  Similarly, evenif a president is personally bluffingwhen he makes a threat, it doesn’t follow that the communal act of the United States as a country, inmaking the threat, amounts to a bluff. The reason is that “the social act… is defined by its public proposal” rather than by whatthis or that individual might privately think, “and that proposal is not aproposal to bluff” (pp. 122-23, emphasis added). 

Extorted contracts are immoral

The thirdproblem is this.  Even if Trump is merelybluffing, the point of the bluff would be to frighten Denmark and Greenlandinto making an agreement they would not otherwise be willing to make.  But this is sheer extortion andgangsterism.  Moral common sense andtraditional natural law theory alike hold that an agreement cannot be licit orbinding if made under such unjust duress. As one standard manual of moral theology puts it:

The defects that vitiate consent by taking away knowledge orchoice render contracts either void or voidable.  These impediments [include]… fear, which is a disturbance of mindcaused by the belief that some danger is impending on oneself or others… [and] violence or coercion, which is like to fear, the latter being moral force andthe former physical force. (John McHugh and Charles Callan, Moral Theology, Vol. II, pp. 140-41)

To be sure,the reference here is to contracts between individuals, but natural law theoristsstandardly hold that, mutatis mutandis,what is true for agreements between individuals is true for treaties betweennations.  As Fagothey writes, “theconditions for a valid treaty are the same as those for any valid contract,” sothat “if an unjust aggressor is victorious, the treaty he imposes is unjust andtherefore invalid” (Right and Reason,pp. 549-50).  And as another natural lawtheorist says, “a treaty made under duress, say, made under threat of war… canhardly be regarded as binding, or at least should be regarded as rescindible,if the conditions imposed are manifestly and flagrantly unjust” (MichaelCronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol.II, p. 658).

It is nodefense of the president’s comments, then, to say that they are meant as anegotiating tactic rather than seriously evincing an intention to go towar.  For a negotiating tactic of thiskind is itself also gravely immoral.

Pope Leo XIV

Let us prayfor our new pope, Leo XIV.  His choices to take atraditional name and to appear in traditional papal garb (as Benedict XVI didand Francis did not) are small but encouraging signs of a man who subordinateshimself to the papal office and understands the importance of continuity withthe past.

The ethics of wealth and poverty

In my latest essay at Postliberal Order, I discuss whatChrist, the Fathers of the Church, and Aristotle have to say about the moralhazards of riches.

Catholicism and immigration: Reply to Cory and Sweeney

Recently, myarticle “ACatholic Defense of Enforcing Immigration Laws” appeared at PublicDiscourse.  Both Therese Cory and Terence Sweeney haveraised criticisms of the article.  In a new article at Public Discourse, I reply to them.

The pope’s first duty

Let us prayfor the repose of the soul of Pope Francis. We ought to pray no less fervently that God in His mercy will bless HisChurch with a new pope of the kind she most needs at this time in her history.  As the cardinals begin to think about asuccessor, it is appropriate for them, and for us, to recall that the firstduty of any pope is to preserve undiluted the deposit of faith.  It concerns sound doctrine even more than soundpractice, because practice can be sound only when doctrine is sound.  This is something those electing a new popeshould always keep first and foremost in mind. But reminders are especially important today, when the Church facesgreater doctrinal confusion than perhaps at any previous time.

The modern,liberal, secular world does not like to hear such reminders.  When a pope dies, the press will, predictably,praise his personal kindness and concern for the poor and marginalized.  In part, this is merely politeness of thekind appropriate when any person dies. But it also seems to be what is emphasized in commentary on who a pope’ssuccessor ought to be.  The liberal, secularworld’s idea of a good pope is essentially a social worker with the personalityof Mr. Rogers.  It is impatient with theidea that the main reason the papacy exists is to preserve the doctrine handeddown to us by the Apostles, and to unite the faithful around thatdoctrine. 

This is, ofcourse, in part because the modern world is hostile to many of the specifics ofthat doctrine.  But in part it is becauseliberal, secular modernity is founded on the idea that religious doctrine of any kind is a matter of subjective andidiosyncratic opinion that has only private significance.  The modern world cannot fathom how such mere opinion(as it sees it) could still seriously be thought the central concern of anoffice with the public visibility and influence of the papacy.  Hence it focuses its attention on the philanthropicactivities of popes, which it finds more understandable and useful.

But the world’spriorities are not, and never should be, the Church’s.  She must always keep before her mind Christ’sGreat Commission:

Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizingthem in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teachingthem to observe all that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, tothe close of the age. (Matthew 28:19-20)

And popesmust always keep before their minds Christ’s words to St. Peter:

Simon, Simon, behold, Satan demanded to have you, that hemight sift you like wheat, but I have prayed for you that your faith may notfail; and when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren. (Luke 22:31-32)

Christ’scommand is to convert the world to his teaching, the deposit of faith.  Peter’s commission is to preserve that faithand confirm his brethren in it. Naturally, that is not because doctrine is an end in itself.  As the Church’s Code of Canon Law famouslyemphasizes, the salvation of souls is her supreme law.  But the point is precisely that sounddoctrine is the necessary prerequisite of the salvation of souls.  Christ’s commission was not “Go therefore andadvance social justice in all nations.” He did not say to Peter “I have prayed for you, that you may reach outto the marginalized.”  That is notbecause social justice and reaching out to the marginalized are not important.  It is because unless you get doctrine right,you are not going to understand what true social justice amounts to, and youare not going to know what you should be doing for the marginalized once you’vereached out to them.

The priorityof doctrine makes perfect sense when one properly understands the nature of thewill and of the actions that flow from it. As Pope Leo XIII taught, following St. Thomas Aquinas:

The will cannot proceed to act until it is enlightened by theknowledge possessed by the intellect.  Inother words, the good wished by the will is necessarily good in so far as it isknown by the intellect; and this the more, because in all voluntary acts choiceis subsequent to a judgment upon the truth of the good presented, declaring towhich good preference should be given. No sensible man can doubt that judgment is an act of reason, not of thewill.  The end, or object, both of therational will and of its liberty is that good only which is in conformity withreason.  (Libertas5)

Actionfollows from the will, and the will pursues what the intellect judges to begood.  Hence we cannot will rightly, andour actions will not reliably be good in their effects, unless the intellect’sjudgements are correct.  Modern peopleare used to thinking in clichés to the effect that what matters is not what youbelieve, but rather doing the right thing and having a good will.  But the reality is that if what you believe isfalse, your will cannot be aimed at what is actually good (even if you are notculpable for the fact), and what you do will not be the right thing except byaccident.  Hence sound doctrine iscrucial to willing and acting rightly.

This makes itintelligible why, though schism is a very grave sin, Aquinas teaches thatheresy is even worse (Summa TheologiaeII-II.39.2).  Catholics must remain in communion with thepope, but precisely because the pope’s job is to preserve sound doctrine.  It’s not that we must avoid heresy so that wewill avoid schism; rather, the point of avoiding schism is to avoidheresy. 

It alsomakes it intelligible why papal infallibility concerns only doctrine, and not apope’s personal moral character.  TheChurch does not say that a pope cannot do bad things, or that he cannot have abad will.  It claims only that, when heformally defines a matter of doctrine excathedra, in a manner intended to be absolutely final and definitive, hewill not err.

It is nosurprise, then, that the duty of popes to preserve the deposit of faith hasbeen repeatedly emphasized in Catholic tradition.  Here are several examples:

The first condition of salvation is to keep the norm of thetrue faith and in no way to deviate from the established doctrine of theFathers.  For it is impossible that thewords of Our Lord Jesus Christ who said, “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock Iwill build my Church,” should not be verified.  (Formula of Pope St. Hormisdas)

For the Holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peternot so that they might, by his revelation, make known some new doctrine, butthat, by his assistance, they might religiously guard and faithfully expoundthe revelation or deposit of faith transmitted by the apostles.  (First Vatican Council, Session 4, Chapter 4)

The living teaching office of the Church… is not above theword of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening toit devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in accordwith a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit.  (Second Vatican Council, Dei Verbum, Chapter II)

The mission of Peter and his successors is to establish andauthoritatively confirm what the Church has received and believed from thebeginning, what the apostles taught, what Sacred Scripture and ChristianTradition have determined as the object of faith and the Christian norm oflife.  (Pope St. John Paul II, Catechesisof March 10, 1993)

The Pope is not an absolute monarch whose thoughts anddesires are law.  On the contrary: thePope's ministry is a guarantee of obedience to Christ and to his Word.  He must not proclaim his own ideas, but ratherconstantly bind himself and the Church to obedience to God's Word, in the faceof every attempt to adapt it or water it down, and every form of opportunism…  In his important decisions, he is bound to thegreat community of faith of all times, to the binding interpretations that havedeveloped throughout the Church's pilgrimage.  Thus, his power is not being above, but at theservice of, the Word of God.  It is incumbentupon him to ensure that this Word continues to be present in its greatness andto resound in its purity, so that it is not torn to pieces by continuouschanges in usage.  (Pope Benedict XVI,Homily for the Mass of Possession of the Chair of the Bishop of Rome, May 7,2005)

This laststatement, from Benedict XVI, is especially eloquent.  And it reminds us that true humility in apope entails a steadfast refusal to ignore or dilute or obfuscate the Church’straditional teaching in any way, not even when others may delude themselvesthat doing so would be merciful or pastoral or better in line with the signs ofthe times.

May thecardinals take such reminders to heart as they deliberate.  May they elect a man willing to live by, andindeed if necessary even die for, these noble words from the tradition.  St. Peter, pray for us.

The two thieves

Christ wasnot crucified alone.  Of those who diedwith him, Luke’s Gospel tells us the following:

There were also two others, criminals, led with Him to be putto death.  And when they had come to theplace called Calvary, there they crucified Him, and the criminals, one on theright hand and the other on the left… Then one of the criminals who were hangedblasphemed Him, saying, “If You are the Christ, save Yourself and us.”  But the other, answering, rebuked him,saying, “Do you not even fear God, seeing you are under the samecondemnation?  And we indeed justly, forwe receive the due reward of our deeds; but this Man has done nothing wrong.”  Then he said to Jesus, “Lord, remember me whenYou come into Your kingdom.”  And Jesussaid to him, “Assuredly, I say to you, today you will be with Me in Paradise.”(Luke 23:32-33, 39-43, NKJV)

The second manhas come to be known as the “good thief” or the “penitent thief,” because hiswords indicate repentance.  His referenceto fear of God evinces a reverent attitude. His acknowledgement that, in being put to death, he is receiving hisjust deserts shows that he ultimately put righteousness above the goods of thislife.  His plea to Christ indicates faiththat Jesus was who he claimed to be, and could secure for him an eternal reward. 

The firstman has come to be known as the “impenitent thief,” because his words indicatethe opposite of repentance.  He is notreverent, but mocking.  He shows noconcern about whether his punishment is deserved and ought to be accepted, butworries only about saving his life.  Hedoubts and perhaps dismisses altogether the idea that Jesus really is the Christ,and evinces no hope for the hereafter. 

The penitentthief was saved, and it stands to reason that the impenitent thief wasdamned.  Indeed, in his treatment of thesignificance of the two thieves, Thomas Aquinas writes:

As Pope Leo observes (Serm.iv de Passione): “Two thieveswere crucified, one on His right hand and one on His left, to set forth by thevery appearance of the gibbet that separation of all men which shall be made inHis hour of judgment.”  And Augustine onJohn 7:36: “The very cross, if thou mark it well, was a judgment-seat: for thejudge being set in the midst, the one who believed was delivered, the other whomocked Him was condemned.  Already He hassignified what He shall do to the quick and the dead; some He will set on His right,others on His left hand.” (SummaTheologiae III.46.11)

We are usedto hearing, in the story of the good thief, reassurance that salvation ispossible even for the worst of us, and even until the point of death.  And it is indeed that.  We are perhaps less used to thinking of thestory of the two thieves as also a warning about damnation.  But that is how saints Leo, Augustine, andThomas understood it. 

Now, Christexplicitly promises Paradise to the one thief, but we are not told whether hesaid anything to the other.  Is it possiblethat the apparently impenitent thief may also have repented before death?  Interestingly, Matthew 27:44 and Mark 15:32 speakof both thieves reviling Jesus, whereas Luke has one of them reviling him andthe other rebuking the first.  Commentingon this fact, St. Ambrose suggests that “perhaps this other at first reviled,but was suddenly converted” (as quoted inAquinas’s Catena Aurea).  But Ambrose does not suggest that the badthief too may have repented, and if anything the scriptural evidence impliesthe opposite.  Judging just from Matthewand Mark, you’d think neither of them repented. If Luke is essentially telling us that reviling Christ was not in factthe end of the story in the case of one of the thieves, it would be bizarre ifhe didn’t also mention that it was not the end of the story in the case of theother one.

In anyevent, Ambrose goes on to say that “mystically, the two thieves represent thetwo sinful people who were to be crucified by baptism with Christ (Rom. 6:3),whose disagreement likewise represents the difference of believers.”  He appears to mean that the good and badthieves represent, respectively, those among the baptized who persevere inrighteousness until death, and those among the baptized who fall away.

If this isso, then the story of the two thieves gives us, as Aquinas says, a foreshadowingof the Last Judgment, and the eternal salvation or damnation of thosejudged.  Each of us will share the fateof either the good thief or the bad thief, and as with them, which destiny weface will not be a settled matter until we draw our last breath.  The story of the two thieves thus does indeedprovide grounds for hope, but also a grave warning against presumption. 

Relatedposts:

Themeaning of the Passion

Themeaning of the Resurrection

Damnationroundup

On the tariff crisis

Like many othersacross the political spectrum, I’ve been alarmed at the extreme tariff policyPresident Trump announced last week, which was met by a massive drop in thestock market.  As with almost everythingelse he does, the policy was nevertheless instantly embraced with enthusiasmby his most devoted followers, whohave glibly dismissed all concerns and assured us that we are on the cusp of agolden age.  If this does not sound likethe conclusion of careful and dispassionate reasoning, that is because it isn’t.  Whatever the outcome of Trump’s policy, theflippant boosterism with which it has been put forward and defended is contraryto reason.  

Postliberalism and tariffs

It isimportant to emphasize first that the problem has nothing essentially to dowith any dogmatic opposition to tariffs as such, much less with any generalcommitment to libertarian economics.  Iam happy to acknowledge that tariffs can sometimes be a good idea, and my ownapproach to these issues is postliberal rather than libertarian or classicalliberal (or “neoliberal,” “market fundamentalist,” or any of the other epithetsbeing flung about in recent days). 

But neitherpostliberalism nor the fact that tariffs can sometimes be a good idea entailsthat they are always a good idea, orthat the particular draconian tariff regime announced last week is a goodidea.  This is not a matter that can besettled a priori by appeal toabstract principle.  It requires ajudgement of prudence that takes account of myriad concrete and contingentcircumstances.  Several thinkersrepresentative of postliberalism or allied traditions of thought have affirmedthat tariffs are of limited value and sometimes best avoided.  For example, the twentieth-century theologianJohannes Messner, a prominent exponent of Catholic Social Teaching, wrote:

[The] bilateral system [features] differential tariffagreements on the basis of reciprocity. Its various forms are based on methods of protectionism, of safeguardingthe individual national economy by measures to restrict imports.  The means employed to restrict imports[include] prohibitive tariffs… As was shown in the period between the wars…this entails a minimum of international economic cooperation, and nations have paiddearly for it by severe economic losses and chronic mass unemployment.  (SocialEthics, p. 952)

The Catholicdistributist Hilaire Belloc, while defending protectionist tariff policy,nevertheless judges that “the argument in favour of Protection applies toparticular cases only, and turns entirely upon whether an undeveloped part ofthe energies of the community can be turned into new channels or not” (Economics for Helen, p. 126).

Similarly,the contemporary postliberal political scientist Patrick Deneen, commenting inhis 2023 book Regime Change onTrump’s predilection for tariffs, wrote:

Tariffs, however, are generally crude instruments, often usedas much or more for domestic political advantage than true enhancements tonational competitiveness.  Wherenecessary, tariffs can prevent dumping and counteract advantages that foreignmanufacturers receive from public funding. However, they should generally be a policy of last resort, focusedespecially on protecting national manufacture of essential goods such aspharmaceuticals and basic materials. (p. 179)

In responseto Trump’s suggestion that tariffs might some day replace the income tax,postliberal journalist Sohrab Ahmari haswritten:

Replacing tax revenue with tariffs today isn’t workable,given the hugely expanded size and scope of the government.  And jacking up tariffs high enough to coverthe cost would discourage most nations from trading with the US in the firstplace, thus creating a drastic revenue shortfall.

In aNewsweek article thatappeared during the 2024 presidential campaign, postliberal economist PhilipPilkington, while agreeing with Trump that trade imbalances are a serious issue,doubted “whether increased tariffs and protectionism are the best way to dealwith these imbalances.”  There are, hewrote, two problems with this approach:

The first is that it overestimates what protectionism canaccomplish… Tariffs may well help protect domestic industries, but some inAmerican policy circles seem convinced that imposing tariffs will also lead toa spontaneous regrowth of industries lost to globalization.  Many such industries are highly complex andrequire skills, know-how, transport infrastructure, and other inputs that takeyears – maybe even decades – to nurture and develop.  If the American government imposes tariffs onkey sectors and American businesses have a hard time substituting the goodstargeted by the tariffs, the result will simply be a sharp uptick in the priceof the goods.

This leads us to the second problem.  The Trump campaign has signaled a desire toaggressively cut taxes, especially income taxes.  Such cuts would drastically boost the spendingpower of the average American consumer.  Yetif, at the same time, the government is restricting access to cheap foreigngoods with higher tariffs, too much money will be chasing too few goods.  This is a recipe for inflation – perhaps veryhigh inflation.

It is worthnoting that the contemporary writers just mentioned are known for sympathizingwith much of Trump’s agenda.  Naturally,none of this entails that a postliberal could not favor Trump’s tariffproposal, and some postliberals appear to do so.  The point is that there is nothing inpostliberalism in itself that entailseither accepting or rejecting it. 

But I’d addthis caveat.  The “order” part of apostliberal order is no less essential than the “postliberal” part.  And the trouble is that, whatever one thinksin the abstract of a policy like Trump’s, its actual execution tends to chaosrather than order.

The trouble with the Trump tariffs

There arethree basic sets of problems with Trump’s tariff plan, which concern its timing,conception, and execution.  Let’sconsider each in turn.

1. Timing

The countryhas been battered by inflation for four years now.  Polls show that high prices were the primaryconcern both of Trump’s base and of the swing voters without whom he could nothave won the recent election.  Trump madethis a key campaign issue, pledging:“Starting on Day 1, we will end inflation and make America affordable again.”  Yet it is widely acknowledged, even amongdefenders of Trump’s tariffs, that they are likely to drive prices up even higher.  They have also driven the stock market downdramatically, with retirees dependent on 401(k) accounts being the hardesthit.  The result is that consumers willhave to pay even more than the high prices they are already facing, with lessmoney available to do so.

Even if thetariffs were otherwise defensible, it is clear that this would not be the timeto impose them.  Politically, it islikely to be a disaster for Republicans, who will surely lose control ofCongress next year if prices remain high. But more importantly, it is simply unjustto impose greater economic hardship on a public that has already had enough ofit, and to whom relief was promised – especially for the sake of a radicalpolicy that is far from sure to achieve its goal, and even lacks a well-definedgoal in the first place.

2. Conception

That bringsus to the second problem.  As manycritics have noted, despite the economic risks any bold tariff policy is boundto have, the new tariff regime is both draconian and poorly thought out.  Over 100 countries are targeted by thetariffs, some of which are very steep. 

But thereseems to be no serious rationale for many of the specific amounts decidedupon.  It appears that the administration’sbasic formula not only does not make much economic sense, but hasnot even been applied correctly by the administration itself.  The policy focuses on trade imbalances, but atrade imbalance is not by itself necessarily harmful.  For example, a very poor country is bound tobuy less from the wealthy United States than the U.S. buys from it.  But this no more entails that the U.S. isgetting “screwed” by the poor country than the fact that a rich man buys morefrom a poor shopkeeper than the latter buys from the former entails that the shopkeeperis “screwing” the rich man.  Yet tinyLesotho is being hit with a 50% tariff that will inflict vastly more economicdamage on its people than any “harm” Lesotho could ever be imagined to haveinflicted on the U.S.

Furthermore,Israel agreed prior to the announcement of the plan to drop all tariffs on U.S.goods, but was hit with a new tariff anyway. The Taliban in Afghanistan got hit with a new tariff too, but a smallerone.  Russia faces no new tariffs, butUkraine does.  Among others who face themare several small islands, including one we do not trade with and two that areuninhabited.  In some cases, the newtariffs conflict with existing trade agreements.

According tosome explanations of the tariffs, they are meant as a short-term negotiatingtactic.  According to others, they areintended to be permanent.  Naturally, theuncertainty this entails makes rational economic decision-making difficult,which is one reason the stock market has taken such a big hit.  It is also said that tariffs will yield greatrevenue for the U.S. government, allowing it to cut taxes and thereby relieveconsumers hit with price increases.  Butthe more draconian a tariff regime is, the less trade there will be, whichentails that the revenue the U.S. might intheory enjoy from tariffs will not be what it in fact collects.  Obviously,if you charge people 10% or 25% or 50% more for what you are selling, itdoesn’t follow that you will actually make that much more money, because manypotential buyers will simply decide not to buy.

It is saidthat the tariffs will bring back lost manufacturing jobs.  But a tariff cannot by itself do that.  If an industry already exists, protectionistpolicies like tariffs can shield it from foreign competition.  But if the industry no longer exists, atariff won’t necessarily bring it back to life, any more than putting abulletproof vest on a corpse will resuscitate it.  To be sure, the tariff may be among theconditions that make it easier for the industry to revive.  But other conditions (such as the relevantinfrastructure and skilled labor) need to be put in place as well, and evenwhen this is possible it can take many years. There is also the fact that a tariff that on the surface appears to helpAmerican manufacturers can in fact hurt them. If the product a U.S. manufacturer makes requires components that haveto be imported from outside the U.S., then a tariff on those foreign componentswill drive costs up.  And there may be nodomestic supplier that can replace the foreign one.

Lurking inthe background of any draconian tariff proposal is, of course, memory of thenotorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which is widely held to have deepened theGreat Depression.  (It is an example ofwhat Messner had in mind in the quote above, when he notes the grave economicdamage that protectionist policies can inflict.)  While even a policy as extreme as Trump’sneed not have such a dire outcome, many economists are worried that it will atleast lead to a recession.

None of thisentails that there is no serious case for tariffs of any kind.  That’s not the point.  The point is that a tariff policy asambitious and risky as Trump’s should be thought out extremely carefully, andthis one is instead haphazard and reckless. Many Trump defenders will dismiss such concerns on ad hominem grounds, as the sort of thing dogmatic free marketerswould want us to believe.  This is assilly as dismissing an argument in favor of a certain tariff simply on thegrounds that it was given by a socialist. Though as it happens, socialists no less than free marketers sometimesargue against particular tariffs, as, again, some postliberalsdo.  As I’ve said, the advisability ofany particular tariff proposal does not stand or fall with one’s generalphilosophical or economic point of view. In any event, what matters is whether an argument or an objection iscorrect or not, not who raised it.  Thisshould be obvious, but in our hyper-partisan era, reminders of basic points oflogic are constantly necessary.

Defenders ofthe tariff policy also routinely appeal to what has happened to the Rust Belt,and the benefits of restoring U.S. manufacturing jobs and capacities that havebeen lost.  But this fallaciouslysupposes that because the end or goalof a tariff policy is good, it follows that the policy itself must be a goodmeans to achieve it.  This is as silly asarguing that communism must be good and achievable, because those who favor ithave the good motive of helping poor and working people.  It also fails to consider other possiblemeans to the ends the tariff policy is said to be motivated by.  For example, Deneen suggests in Regime Change that the U.S.manufacturing base can be bolstered without heavy reliance on tariffs, by governmentspending to support infrastructure, research and development, and relevant education.  And in the article linked to above,Pilkington proposes, in place of tariffs, new rules governing internationaltrade.

3. Execution

As to theexecution of the tariff policy, there are two basic problems.  The first is the intellectually and morallyunserious manner in which it has been done. Concerns like the ones I’ve set out are waved away rather thananswered.  Trump dismissesthose worried about the policy as “weak and stupid.”  The stock market dive and prospect of higherprices are dismissed as irrelevant by the same people who once pointed to thehealth of the stock market as evidence of the soundness of Trump’s policies, andto high prices as evidence of Biden’s incompetence.  Trump defenders who, twenty minutes ago, wereproclaiming that he would liberate us from hard economic times are now callingon Americans to embrace austerity.

This is agrave failure of statesmanship.  Ordinarypeople, including many working class and elderly people who voted for Trump,are watching their retirement accounts shrink and already high prices lookingto get higher, and are understandably frightened.  It is cruel to dismiss their concerns andsmugly urge them to toughen up and tighten their belts, especially after havingpromised them immediate economic relief. On top of that, this attitude only adds to the fear of looming disaster,because it reinforces the impression that the architects and advocates of thepolicy are driven by cold ideological fanaticism rather than good sense andconcern for the common good.

And again, arational economy needs predictability, and the stability that predictabilitypresupposes.  But the manner in whichTrump’s policy is being executed, no less than its actual content, undermineseconomic stability.

The secondproblem with the execution of Trump’s tariff policy concerns its dubiouslegality.  It is Congress, rather thanthe president, that has primary authority over tariff policy, and it isimplausible to suppose that it has delegated to him authority to impose atariff policy as draconian as the one announced.  It is also risible to pretend that we facesome “emergency” that licenses such action, given that the purported emergencyis merely the continuation of an economic order that has persisted for decadesand through periods of high prosperity, including the period during his firstterm that Trump takes credit for.  Whatwe seem to have here is a textbook case of the demagogic manufacture of an“emergency” to rationalize the acquisition of extraconstitutionalpower. 

It is alsopart of an alarming trend on Trump’s part toward ever more grandiose and indeedunhinged actions and statements.  Thisbegan at least as early as his absurd insistence in 2021 that Vice President MikePence had the constitutional authority to set aside the electoral votes ofstates Trump claims were stolen from him in the 2020 election.  It includes his recent bizarre obsession withannexing Canada; his insistence that Greenland too must be taken over by theU.S., possibly even by military force; his mad scheme to take ownership of theintractable Israel-Palestine conflict and forcibly relocate millions of Gazans;and his flirtation with seeking a third term, despite this being manifestly contraryto the constitution.  These are not thesorts of moves one would expect of a wise statesman motivated by concern for thecommon good.  But they are perfectlyconsistent with what one would expect of a pridefuland vainglorious man whose cult of personalityhas blinded him to normal standards of decency and reasonableness.  Any reader of Plato and Aristotle will alsorecognize in them the marks of the sort of demagogue who tends to arise in thelate stages of a democracy. 

It ispossible that Trump’s arrogance will lead him to persist with his tariff policyno matter how destructive it may end up being, under the delusion that itsimply must work in the long run, nomatter how long or deeply the country has to suffer.  It is also perfectly possible that his senseof what is needed for self-preservation will lead him to change course.  If it does, we can expect him and his mostardent followers to declare vindication, as they always do no matter what theoutcome.  But if the market recovers anda recession is avoided, that will not magically remove the grave defects withthe plan and its execution that I’ve been describing here.  If I accidentally fire a gun in yourdirection but miss, it doesn’t mean that I didn’t put your life at risk, muchless that I did something you should thank me for.

On pride and vainglory

Pride, asAquinas defines it in De Malo, is“the inordinate desire for pre-eminence” (Question 8, Article 2). WithAugustine and the Christian tradition in general, he teaches that it is “thegreatest sin” and indeed “the root and queen of all sins.” Its immediate effectis “vainglory,” which is the vice of habitually seeking to call attention toone’s own imagined excellence. And the daughters of vainglory, Aquinas tells us(Question 9, Article 3), are disobedience, boasting, hypocrisy (by whichAquinas means a tendency to magnify one’s glory by reference to “imaginarydeeds”), contention, obstinacy, discord, and what he calls the “audacity fornovelties” or predilection for bold actions that will call attention to oneselfby bringing “astonishment” to others.

Hence themarks of a prideful and vainglorious man are an unwillingness to submit himselfto any higher authority (which would include prevailing laws and norms);habitual braggadocio and bombastic speech; exaggeration and lying about hisachievements; being obnoxiously quarrelsome; stubborn attachment to his ownopinions in the face of all evidence and superior counterarguments; and a tastefor doing things that are shocking and unexpected.

It stands toreason that a prideful and vainglorious man is bound to be polarizing. On theone hand, his fundamental motivations are to attain pre-eminence, and to do soby drawing attention to his imagined excellence. If he is good at this, thennaturally, he is going to gain a following of some kind. On the other hand,pride and vainglory are objectively ugly character traits, as the daughters ofvainglory make evident and as one would expect from the fact that pride is theworst of sins. Hence, people who see through a proud and vainglorious man’scharade are naturally going to be repulsed by him, especially if they havedecent instincts. 

TheChristian tradition has, after all, held that pride is the characteristic sinof the devil and of antichrist.  It isalso the characteristic sin of the tyrant, who on Plato’s analysis is aconsummate narcissist, and who in the political philosophy of Aristotle andAquinas is defined as the ruler who governs a polity for the sake of his owngood rather than for the common good. There are no villains more repulsive thanthe devil, the antichrist, and tyrants. And yet in all three cases we havefigures who draw many to them. “Satan disguises himself as an angel of light”(2 Corinthians 11:14). It is no wonder that lesser malign figures – pridefuland vainglorious politicians, business leaders, sports stars, entertainers,public intellectuals, and so on – attract many people even as they repulseothers.

Aquinas alsoteaches in De Malo that “prideextinguishes all the virtues and weakens all the powers of the soul.” It is nothard to see how this would be so. If a prideful man is by nature insubordinate,he is not likely to subordinate himself to moral restraints. He may exhibit counterfeits of certain virtues, if thatwould aid in leading others to perceive him as having excellence.  He also may have a certain cleverness or cunningin achieving his ends.  But it will notbe true wisdom, because that requires seeing things as they really are, and hisnarcissism prevents that. He will have allies and sycophants, but is unlikelyto have true friends, because he will ultimately sacrifice the good of others forthe sake of his own good. He may have a certain boldness, but he will not havetrue courage, because his boldness does not serve the true and the good, butonly himself.  And so on.

Scripturefamously teaches that “pride goes before destruction, and a haughty spiritbefore a fall” (Proverbs 16:18). But even apart from scripture, everyone knowsthis from experience. Or almost everyone, because the prideful man himself doesnot see it. Nor do those in thrall to him, since they labor under the samedelusion about his supposed excellence as he does. It goes without saying thatthe greater the following a prideful man has, or the larger the community overwhich he has authority, the greater will be his fall, and theirs.

Scholastic regress arguments

Many arefamiliar with arguments to the effect that an infinite regress of causes isimpossible, as Aquinas holds in several of his Five Ways of proving God’sexistence.  Fewer correctly understandhow the reasoning of such arguments is actually supposed to work in Scholasticwriters like Aquinas.  Fewer still areaware that the basic structure of this sort of reasoning has parallels in otherScholastic regress arguments concerning the nature of mind, of knowledge, andof action.  Comparing these sorts ofarguments can be illuminating.

Causality

In Aquinas’sFirst Way, he famously argues that it is impossible for there to be an infiniteseries of movers or changers, so that a regress of changers must terminate in afirst unchanging changer.  As I’vediscussed in many places (such as at pp. 69-73 of my book Aquinas), Aquinas is not claiminghere that no causal series of anykind can regress infinitely.  Rather, hehas in mind a specific sort of causal series, which commentators sometimes call“essentially ordered series” and sometimes “hierarchical series.”

Heillustrates the idea with a stone which is moved by a stick which is in turnmoved by a hand.  The stick moves thestone, but not by its own power.  Byitself the stick would simply lay on the ground inertly.  It can move the stone only because the handimparts to it the power to move it.  Thehand too, of course, would be unable to move the stick (so that the stick inturn would be unable to move the stone) unless the person whose hand it is deliberatelyuses the hand to move it. 

Thetechnical way of putting the point is that the stick is a secondary cause in that it has causal efficacy only insofar as itderives or borrows it from something else. By contrast, the person who uses the stick is a primary cause insofar as his causal efficacy is built-in ratherthan being derivative or borrowed.  Thestick is a moved mover insofar as it moves other things only because it isitself being moved in the process.  Theperson is an unmoved mover insofar as he can move the stick (and, through it,the stone) without something else having to move him in the process.

Aquinasgives other arguments against an infinite regress in such cases, but this isthe one I want to focus on here.  Thebasic idea is that there cannot be secondary causes without a primary cause,because you cannot have borrowed or derivative causal power without somethingto borrow it from.  This would be true nomatter how long the regress is, and it is important to note that infinity assuch is not really what is doing the work here. Even if we allowed for the sake of argument that the stone in our examplewas pushed by an infinitely long stick, there would still need to be somethingoutside the stick to impart causal power to it. For a stick is just not the sort of thing that could, all by itself,move anything else, no matter how long it is. 

Nor, forthat matter, would it help if the causal series in this case went around in acircle rather than regressing to infinity – the stone moved by the stick whichwas moved by another stick which was moved by the stone, say.  For sticks and stones just aren’t the sortsof things that could move anything by themselves, even around in a circle.  There would have to be something outside thiscircle of movers that introduced motion into it.

Meaning

Now considera second and at first glance very different sort of argument, which isassociated with John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot) and was defended in thetwentieth century by Francis Parker and Henry Veatch in their book Logicas a Human Instrument.  Itappeals to a distinction between instrumentalsigns and formal signs.  An instrumental sign is a sign that is alsosomething other than a sign.  Consider,for example, a string of words written in pen on a piece of paper.  It is a sign of the concept or propositionbeing expressed, but it is also something else, namely a collection of inksplotches.  Now, there is nothing intrinsic to it qua collection of inksplotches that makes it a sign.  Byitself, a string of splotches that looks like “The cat is on the mat” is nomore meaningful than a string of marks such as “FhjQns jkek$9(quyea&b.” 

Suppose wesay that the string of splotches that looks like “The cat is on the mat” hasthe meaning it has because of its relations to other strings of splotches, suchas the ones we see in a dictionary when we look up the words “cat,” “mat,” etc.  That can hardly give us a completeexplanation of how the first set of ink splotches get their meaning, becausethese new sets of splotches are, considered just by themselves, as meaningless as the first set.  They too have no intrinsic meaning, but haveto derive it from something else.

Notice thatwe have a kind of regress here.  And whatthe argument says is that this regress must terminate in signs that do not gettheir meaning from their relations to other signs, but have itintrinsically.  This is what formal signsare.  And unlike instrumental signs, theymust be signs that are not alsosomething else – that is to say, they must be signs that are nothing but signs.  With a sign that is also something other thana sign (a set of ink splotches, or sounds, or pictures, or whatever), themeaning and this additional feature can come apart, which opens the door to thequestion of how the meaning and the additional feature get together.  But a sign that is nothing more than a sign just is its meaning.  Because it just is its meaning, it needn’tderive or borrow its meaning from something else.

The argumentgoes on to say that these formal signs are to be identified with our conceptsand thoughts, which are the source of the meanings that words and sentenceshave.  This in turn provides the basisfor an argument for the mind’s immateriality, as I discuss in Immortal Souls.  The point I want to emphasize for the moment,though, is that we have here an argument that holds that a regress of itemshaving a certain feature in only a derivative way can exist only if there issomething having that feature in a built-in or non-derivative way – which is,at a very general level, analogous to the reasoning Aquinas deploys in theFirst Way.

(As a sidenote, I’ll point out that John Haldane, in Atheism andTheism, develops a line of reasoning which might be seen as anamalgam of these two arguments.  Aperson’s potential for concept formation, he says, presupposes fellow membersof a linguistic community who actualize this potential by virtue of already possessingconcepts themselves.  But their potentialto form these concepts requires the preexistence of yet other members of thelinguistic community.  This regress canend only in a first member of the series, whose possession of concepts need notdepend on actualization by previous members. This “Prime Thinker” he identifies with God.)

Knowledge

A third lineof argument, once again very different at first glance but ultimately similarin structure, concerns epistemic justification. Consider the “problem of the criterion,” of which Michel de Montaignegave a famous statement.  In orderrationally to justify some knowledge claim, we will need to appeal to somecriterion.  But that criterion will inturn have to be justified by reference to some further criterion, and thatfurther criterion by reference to yet some other criterion, and so on ad infinitum.  It seems, then, that no judgment can ever bejustified.

As theNeo-Scholastic philosopher Peter Coffey points out in his Epistemology or The Theory of Knowledge,the fallacy in this sort of argument lies in assuming that the justificationfor a judgment must in every case lie in something extrinsic to the judgment itself.  The skeptical argument fails if there arejudgments whose criterion of justification is intrinsic to them. 

Now, supposeit can be established that we cannot fail to have at least some genuine knowledge.  Onemight argue, for example, that even the skeptic himself cannot coherently raiseskeptical doubts without making certain presuppositions (such as thereliability of the rules of inference he deploys in arguing forskepticism).  Then we would have a basisfor an argument like the following: We do at least have some knowledge; wecould have no knowledge unless there were at least some judgments whosecriterion of justification is intrinsic to them; therefore, there must be atleast some judgments whose criterion of justification is intrinsic to them.

The point isnot to expound or defend this sort of argument here.  The point is rather that such an argument wouldbe a further instance of the general pattern we’ve seen in the otherarguments.  In particular, it would beanother case in which it is argued that there can be a regress of things havingsome feature in only a derivative way (in this case, epistemic justification)only if there is something having it in an intrinsic way.

Action

One lastexample, which concerns action. Aristotle, and Scholastic writers like Aquinas following him, hold that everyaction is carried out for a certain good, and that good is often pursued onlyfor the sake of some further good to which it is a means, which is itselfpursued for the sake of yet some other good. The regress this generates can terminate only in some end that ispursued for its own sake, as good in itself. Naturally, there is a lot more than that to the analysis of action andthe good, but the point is to emphasize that once more we see an instance of anargument fitting the same general pattern we’ve seen in other cases.  A regress of items having a certain featureonly derivatively (in this case, goodness or desirability as an end) canterminate only in something that has that feature intrinsically.

Here aresome features common to such arguments. First, and to repeat, the basic general pattern is to argue that theexistence of items having a certain feature in a borrowed or derivative waypresupposes something having that feature in an intrinsic way.  In one case the feature in question is causalpower, in another it is meaning, in another it is epistemic justification, andin yet another it is goodness or desirability. But despite this significant difference in subject matter, the basicstructure of the inference is the same.

Second,although the arguments are set up by way of a description of a regress of somekind, the length of the regress is not actually what is doing the key work inthe arguments.  In particular, thearguments, on close inspection, are not primarily concerned to rule outinfinities.  Rather, they are concernedto make the point that what is derivative ultimately presupposes what isintrinsic or non-derivative.  This wouldremain the case even if some sort of infinite sequence was allowed for the sakeof argument.  For example, even aninfinite series of causes having only derivative causal power would presupposesomething outside the series which had intrinsic causal power; even an infinitesequence of instrumental signs would presuppose something outside the sequencethat was a formal rather than merely instrumental sign; and so on.

Third, thearguments all essentially purport to identify something that must be true ofmetaphysical necessity.  They are notmerely probabilistic in character, or arguments to the best explanation.  The claim is that there could not even in principle be secondary causes withoutprimary causes, instrumental signs without formal signs, and so forth.  The arguments intend to identity thenecessary preconditions of there being such a thing as causality, meaning,knowledge, or action. 

Hence, whetherone accepts such an argument or not, the claims of empirical science are notgoing to settle the matter, because the arguments are conducted at a leveldeeper than empirical science.  The verypractice of empirical science presupposes causality, meaning, knowledge, andaction.  The arguments in question, sincethey are about the necessary preconditions of those things, are also about thenecessary preconditions of science.  Theyare paradigmatically philosophical in nature.