Edward Feser's Blog, page 3

Lamont on Trump, abortion, and Ukraine

In anarticle at One Peter Five,philosopher John Lamont warns his fellow Catholics and traditionalists that on issuessuch as abortion and Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, Trump is not an ally and must beresisted.

What is ideology?

What doesthe pejorative use of “ideology” amount to, and what is it to be an “ideologue”?  I consider some common accounts beforedeveloping my own in my latest essay atPostliberal Order.

Alasdair MacIntyre (1929-2025)

AlasdairMacIntyre has died. His classic AfterVirtue had a tremendous effect on me when I was an undergrad and still inmy atheist days, greatly reinforcing the attraction to Aristotelian ethics Ihad even then. (The spine of the light mauve cover of my copy, like that of prettymuch any copy printed in the 80s, has long since turned green.)  It was, of course, part of a larger body ofwork which had a similarly great impact on so many people, in philosophy, theology,and beyond. RIP.

Pope Leo XIV on families and the family of nations

Yesterday,Pope Leo XIV delivered an addressto the diplomatic corps at the Vatican.  It was brief and very simple, butelegant and deep and shows the influence of his namesake Leo XIII and of histheological guide St. Augustine.  Theworld, Leo says, is a “family of peoples.” And essential to the wellbeing of nations and the family of nations, hesays, are peace, justice, and truth, wherepeace has justice and truth as its preconditions.  The talk is devoted to elaborating on thesethree themes.  What follows are somecomments on Leo’s remarks.

Peace, Leonotes, is not merely a negative condition, namely the absence of conflict.  True peace between people has as a positive preconditiona purity of heart that entails freedom from pride and vindictiveness, and awill to cooperate and understand rather than to conquer.  Here there is an echo of Augustine’s famousaccount of peace as “the tranquility of order,” where order involves a unity ofpurpose.  Peace in a community requiresagreement on an end, and for Augustine it must be the right end.  What end is that?  For Augustine it is God, and significantly,Leo remarks that “peace is first and foremost a gift.  It is the first gift of Christ.”  (I have more to say about Augustine’s accountof peace in arecent Postliberal Order article.)

Turning tojustice, Leo indicates that this too requires well-ordered societies.  In this connection, he calls attention to LeoXIII’s famous social encyclical RerumNovarum.  Importantly, while hementions working conditions, poverty, and the like, his emphasis is on somethingelse.  He says:

It is the responsibility of government leaders to work tobuild harmonious and peaceful civil societies.  This can be achieved above all by investing inthe family, founded upon the stable union between a man and a woman, “a smallbut genuine society, and prior to all civil society.”  In addition, no one is exempted from strivingto ensure respect for the dignity of every person, especially the most frailand vulnerable, from the unborn to the elderly, from the sick to theunemployed, citizens and immigrants alike.

The phrasein quotation marks is from Rerum Novarum,and it is the one direct quote from that document.  Like Leo XIII and other popes who have setout Catholic social teaching, Leo emphasizes that the health of the family is the fundamental precondition of thehealth of society, and that seeing to the health of the family is one of theduties of governing officials. 

This basictruth of Catholic social teaching is radically at odds with long-prevailingattitudes on both the political left and the political right.  Both, in their different ways, wrongly insiston emphasizing economics rather than morality and culture when addressingsocial problems.  Both have essentiallyendorsed the sexual revolution and its transformation in attitudes aboutdivorce, extramarital sex, homosexuality, and the like, albeit the right hasdone so in a more gradual, piecemeal, and in some cases reluctant manner.  And both have now essentially adopted thelibertarian position that even if one laments the sexual revolution, governmenthas no place in trying to roll it back.  Fromthe point of view of Catholic social doctrine, true social justice cannot beachieved until we at long last abandon these errors.

On the topicof truth, Leo says:

Where words take on ambiguous and ambivalent connotations,and the virtual world, with its altered perception of reality, takes overunchecked, it is difficult to build authentic relationships, since theobjective and real premises of communication are lacking.  For her part, the Church can never beexempted from speaking the truth about humanity and the world, resortingwhenever necessary to blunt language that may initially createmisunderstanding.

Though earlierin his address, he had also called for “carefully choosing our words.  For words too, not only weapons, can wound andeven kill.”

Leo’s pointhere seems to be, first, that one obstacle to truth prevailing in humanrelationships today is the degree to which people’s perceptions are shaped bythe “virtual world” – social media and the like, with the biases, groupthink, hottakes, and emotion-driven commentary that it fosters.  This virtual world is reminiscent of theshadows on the wall of Plato’s cave, which radically distort the understandingof those who dwell in it.

Anotherobstacle to truth, Leo indicates, is the way that language is so often usedtoday as a weapon or a means of obfuscation, rather than a means ofcommunicating for the sake of mutual understanding and describing objectivereality.  Hence the tendency ofpoliticians to use words to flummox opponents, rile up allies, and keepcitizens perpetually off balance and divided; and of ideologues to introducenovel usages so as to lend false plausibility to rank sophistries (think of theviolence done to language by gender theory, for example). 

Leo teachesthat we must remain grounded in objective reality and insist on using languageto convey that reality, even bluntly wherever necessary.  This, he goes on to say, is what charityrequires, for genuine unity between people must be grounded in truth.  And ultimately, he also says, “truth is notthe affirmation of abstract and disembodied principles, but an encounter withthe person of Christ himself, alive in the midst of the community of believers.”

Thisemphasis on truth as ultimately Christocentric once again echoesAugustine.  It also once again echoes LeoXIII, who in Rerum Novarum not onlyemphasizes that getting the family right is a basic precondition of social justice,but also that, even more fundamentally, “no satisfactory solution will be foundunless religion and the Church have been called upon to aid.”  As Leo XIII went on to say in that grand encyclical:

Without hesitation We affirm that if the Church isdisregarded, human striving will be in vain… And since religion alone, as Wesaid in the beginning, can remove the evil, root and branch, let all reflectupon this: First and foremost Christian morals must be reestablished, withoutwhich even the weapons of prudence, which are considered especially effective,will be of no avail, to secure well-being.

One lastremark about Leo XIV’s address.  Hisphrase “family of peoples” is, I think, especially apt today as an implicit correctionto two opposite extreme errors found on the opposite sides of the politicalspectrum.  On the left we find aglobalism that tends to dissolve borders and treats national loyalties as ifthey are somehow inherently suspect.  On theright we find a jingoistic bellicosity that overcorrects for thisglobalism.  To see the world as a familyof peoples is to see what is wrong with both of these extremes.  For distinct peoples have a right to preservewhat defines them as a people, culturally, linguistically, and economically.  But a good member of a family of peoples doesnot bully or intimidate or lord it over other family members.

Greenland and the ethics of annexation

PresidentTrump has repeatedly called for U.S. acquisition of Greenland.  The motivations haveto do with Greenland’s strategic location and access to its mineralreserves.  Neitherthe government of Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory), northe people of Greenland themselves, are in favor of the idea.  Not only is Trump undeterred by those facts,he has repeatedly refused to rule out the possibility of using military forceto annex the island.  For example, inJanuary, when asked whether he could assure the world that he would not resortto military coercion to get control of Greenland, Trumpreplied “No, I can’t assure you” and “I’m not going to commit tothat.”  Asked this month about usingmilitary force to take Greenland, Trump saidthat “it could happen, something could happen with Greenland” and “I don’t ruleit out.”

However,such military action would be manifestly contrary to the criteria oftraditional just war theory.  And even ifthe threat is intended merely as a negotiating tactic (as is likely), it wouldbe contrary to the natural law principles governing internationalrelations.  These facts should be obviousto all, and would have been until recently. But Trump’s most ardent supporters have an alarming tendency reflexivelyto defend even the most outrageous things he does, cobbling together feeble rationalizationsfor words and actions they would condemn had they come from anyone else.  It is worthwhile, then, to set out thereasons why Trump’s statements regarding Greenland are indefensible.

Greenland annexation and just warcriteria

Again, militaryaction to annex Greenland would clearly be unjust.  For it manifestly would not meet the “justcause” criterion of just war theory.  Onecountry can justly make war on another only when the other country is guilty ofsome rights violation grave enough for war to be a proportionate response.  The most obvious example would be when acountry goes to war in order to repel an aggressor.  But neither Denmark nor Greenland is guiltyof aggressing against the United States, or of any other violation of U.S.rights.  Indeed, they are longtime alliesof the U.S. 

The factthat the United States would find Greenland’s location and resources useful forpurposes of defense is irrelevant.  If Iwould find it useful to take over my neighbor’s property in order to protect myown against robbers, that hardly gives me a right to do so.  Indeed, it would make me a robber.  Nor will it doto pretend that governments are somehow not bound by the same moral prohibitionagainst robbery that binds individuals. As St. Thomas Aquinas writes:

As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to themthat they may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to useviolence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice... To take otherpeople's property violently and against justice, in the exercise of public authority,is to act unlawfully and to be guilty of robbery. (Summa Theologiae II-II.66.8)

Theinjustice of wars of territorial expansion is not a matter of controversy amongnatural law theorists in the Thomistic tradition, but has long been thestandard position.  For example, ThomasHiggins’s Man as Man: The Science and Artof Ethics says that “war of aggression is the violent endeavor to depriveanother people of independence, territory, or the like, for the sake ofincreasing one’s own power and prestige… The Natural Law forbids all wars ofaggression” (p. 543).  Austin Fagothey’s Right and Reason notes that “territorialaggrandizement, glory and renown, envy of a neighbor’s possessions,apprehension of a growing rival, maintenance of the balance of power… these andthe like are invalid reasons” for going to war (p. 564).  Fagothey also notes that though it can undercertain circumstances be licit for a country to acquire new land, this wouldnot be true of “land… recognized as the territory of an existing state,” andthat “an existing state may not be deprived of its territory” (p. 547).

The seriousnessof these points cannot be overstated.  Theproblem is not just that the forced annexation of Greenland would amount to robberyon a massive scale.  It is that, becauseit would result in deaths, such an unjust military action would be tantamountto murder.  It would make the president awar criminal.  It would be a massiveinjustice not only against the people of Greenland, but also against theAmerican military, which Trump would be making an instrument of suchcriminality.

A negotiating tactic?

Many ofTrump’s defenders would say that he isn’t serious about resorting to militaryforce, but merely intends such rhetoric as a negotiating tactic.  It is no doubt true that he intends it thatway.  It is also likely true that, at theend of the day, he would refrain from using such force, if only because thepolitical costs would be too great.

It issignificant, though, that in Trump’s most recent remarks, he seemed to draw adistinction between the situation with Greenland and the situation with Canada,which he has repeatedly said also ought to become part of the UnitedStates.  Asked about the possibility ofusing military force to acquire Canada, Trump said: “Well, I think we're not goingto ever get to that point” and “I don’t see it with Canada, I just don’t seeit.”  That is hardly an acknowledgementthat acquiring Canada in such a way would be wrong, and thus to be ruled out absolutely.  It sounds more like a judgment to the effectthat attacking Canada would merely be unnecessary or impractical.  But his answer in the case of Greenland isdifferent.  Again, he said that “it couldhappen, something could happen with Greenland” and “I don’t rule it out,” evenif he also says that that too is unlikely. Overall, his remarks give the impression that he does indeed regardmilitary action against Greenland as at least remotely possible.  There is also the fact that theadministration hasnow stepped up intelligence operations vis-à-vis Greenland.

In anyevent, even if this rhetoric is meant as a negotiating tactic, it is stillgravely immoral.  There are at least twoways that the refusal to rule out military action could function as anegotiating tactic.  Trump mightgenuinely intend to keep the option openin order to frighten Denmark and Greenland into making a deal, even if he doesnot currently have any plan actually to resort to such action.  Or he might merely be bluffing in order to frighten them into making a deal, but wouldnot ever really carry out such action. Either of these tactics would be gravely wrong, though not in the sameway.

John Finnis,Joseph Boyle, and Germain Grisez discuss the difference between genuinelykeeping an option open and merely bluffing in their book Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism,and some of the points they make are relevant to the present topic. 

Consider thefirst possibility, that Trump intends to keep open the option of takingmilitary action against Greenland, but also hopes and believes that he willnever have to carry this threat out.  AsFinnis, Boyle, and Grisez point out, it is a fallacy to suppose that if someonehopes and believes he never has to carry out a threat to do some action, thenit follows that he does not really intend that action.  The reality is rather that “people whofortunately avoid what they only reluctantly intend, or who might have a changeof mind in the future, are people whose minds are now made up” (pp.104-5).  In the present case, if Trumpreally does want to keep the option open, then he does in the relevant sensehave the intention of taking military action against Greenland if he cannot otherwise acquire it.  That remains the case even if he also hopesand believes he will be able to acquire it peacefully.

But as wehave seen, acquiring Greenland this way would violate just war criteria, andthus amount to murder.  As Finnis, Boyle,and Grisez write of keeping open the option of carrying out a murderous act:

It would be doubly conditioned – conditional not only on anadversary’s act in defiance of the threat, but on a choice still to be made toexecute it.  None the less, that doublyconditioned intention would still be a murderous will.  If one intends now to be in a position tocommit murder, should one later decide that the situation warrants it, theneven now one is willing (however reluctantly) to murder. (p. 111)

So, keepingopen the option of taking military action against Greenland, even if intendedjust as a negotiating tactic, is still tantamount to an intention to murder,and is thus gravely immoral.  Considerthen the alternative scenario, on which Trump is merely bluffing.  On this hypothesis, Trump does not in fact intend even to keep themilitary option open.  He simply wantsDenmark and Greenland to think thathe is keeping it open.  Even if this iswhat is going on, it is still gravely immoral for at least three reasons, thefirst two of which are set out by Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez.

First, whena country threatens an immoral military action, it is not only the intentionsof its leaders that are morally relevant. Also relevant are the intentions of everyone else in some way connectedto the action, from soldiers to ordinary citizens.  In the present case, even if Trump himself isbluffing, the bluff can only work if it is not obviously a bluff – that is to say, if a critical mass of peoplethink he really might carry out the threat. And that will lead at least some people (government officials, militarypersonnel, and voters) to decide to support the action if he carries itout.  That is to say, they will form theintention of supporting a murderous action. They will not be bluffing,even if Trump is.  And as Finnis, Boyle,and Grisez write: “Those who deliberately bring others to will what is evilmake themselves guilty, not only of the evil the others will, but also ofleading them to become persons of evil will” (p. 119).  In the case at hand, such a leader “would beinciting the others to intend to kill the innocent” (p. 120), even if he doesnot himself really intend to do so.

Second, itis not just what individuals do or will that is relevant.  The military actions of a country are social acts, acts carried out by thesociety as a whole (understood as what is traditionally called a kind of “corporateperson” or “moral person”). As Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez note, a teamcan rightly be said to intend to win a game, even if certain individual members of the team do not intend thisbut would rather lose.  Similarly, evenif a president is personally bluffingwhen he makes a threat, it doesn’t follow that the communal act of the United States as a country, inmaking the threat, amounts to a bluff. The reason is that “the social act… is defined by its public proposal” rather than by whatthis or that individual might privately think, “and that proposal is not aproposal to bluff” (pp. 122-23, emphasis added). 

Extorted contracts are immoral

The thirdproblem is this.  Even if Trump is merelybluffing, the point of the bluff would be to frighten Denmark and Greenlandinto making an agreement they would not otherwise be willing to make.  But this is sheer extortion andgangsterism.  Moral common sense andtraditional natural law theory alike hold that an agreement cannot be licit orbinding if made under such unjust duress. As one standard manual of moral theology puts it:

The defects that vitiate consent by taking away knowledge orchoice render contracts either void or voidable.  These impediments [include]… fear, which is a disturbance of mindcaused by the belief that some danger is impending on oneself or others… [and] violence or coercion, which is like to fear, the latter being moral force andthe former physical force. (John McHugh and Charles Callan, Moral Theology, Vol. II, pp. 140-41)

To be sure,the reference here is to contracts between individuals, but natural law theoristsstandardly hold that, mutatis mutandis,what is true for agreements between individuals is true for treaties betweennations.  As Fagothey writes, “theconditions for a valid treaty are the same as those for any valid contract,” sothat “if an unjust aggressor is victorious, the treaty he imposes is unjust andtherefore invalid” (Right and Reason,pp. 549-50).  And as another natural lawtheorist says, “a treaty made under duress, say, made under threat of war… canhardly be regarded as binding, or at least should be regarded as rescindible,if the conditions imposed are manifestly and flagrantly unjust” (MichaelCronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol.II, p. 658).

It is nodefense of the president’s comments, then, to say that they are meant as anegotiating tactic rather than seriously evincing an intention to go towar.  For a negotiating tactic of thiskind is itself also gravely immoral.

Pope Leo XIV

Let us prayfor our new pope, Leo XIV.  His choices to take atraditional name and to appear in traditional papal garb (as Benedict XVI didand Francis did not) are small but encouraging signs of a man who subordinateshimself to the papal office and understands the importance of continuity withthe past.

The ethics of wealth and poverty

In my latest essay at Postliberal Order, I discuss whatChrist, the Fathers of the Church, and Aristotle have to say about the moralhazards of riches.

Catholicism and immigration: Reply to Cory and Sweeney

Recently, myarticle “ACatholic Defense of Enforcing Immigration Laws” appeared at PublicDiscourse.  Both Therese Cory and Terence Sweeney haveraised criticisms of the article.  In a new article at Public Discourse, I reply to them.

The pope’s first duty

Let us prayfor the repose of the soul of Pope Francis. We ought to pray no less fervently that God in His mercy will bless HisChurch with a new pope of the kind she most needs at this time in her history.  As the cardinals begin to think about asuccessor, it is appropriate for them, and for us, to recall that the firstduty of any pope is to preserve undiluted the deposit of faith.  It concerns sound doctrine even more than soundpractice, because practice can be sound only when doctrine is sound.  This is something those electing a new popeshould always keep first and foremost in mind. But reminders are especially important today, when the Church facesgreater doctrinal confusion than perhaps at any previous time.

The modern,liberal, secular world does not like to hear such reminders.  When a pope dies, the press will, predictably,praise his personal kindness and concern for the poor and marginalized.  In part, this is merely politeness of thekind appropriate when any person dies. But it also seems to be what is emphasized in commentary on who a pope’ssuccessor ought to be.  The liberal, secularworld’s idea of a good pope is essentially a social worker with the personalityof Mr. Rogers.  It is impatient with theidea that the main reason the papacy exists is to preserve the doctrine handeddown to us by the Apostles, and to unite the faithful around thatdoctrine. 

This is, ofcourse, in part because the modern world is hostile to many of the specifics ofthat doctrine.  But in part it is becauseliberal, secular modernity is founded on the idea that religious doctrine of any kind is a matter of subjective andidiosyncratic opinion that has only private significance.  The modern world cannot fathom how such mere opinion(as it sees it) could still seriously be thought the central concern of anoffice with the public visibility and influence of the papacy.  Hence it focuses its attention on the philanthropicactivities of popes, which it finds more understandable and useful.

But the world’spriorities are not, and never should be, the Church’s.  She must always keep before her mind Christ’sGreat Commission:

Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizingthem in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teachingthem to observe all that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, tothe close of the age. (Matthew 28:19-20)

And popesmust always keep before their minds Christ’s words to St. Peter:

Simon, Simon, behold, Satan demanded to have you, that hemight sift you like wheat, but I have prayed for you that your faith may notfail; and when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren. (Luke 22:31-32)

Christ’scommand is to convert the world to his teaching, the deposit of faith.  Peter’s commission is to preserve that faithand confirm his brethren in it. Naturally, that is not because doctrine is an end in itself.  As the Church’s Code of Canon Law famouslyemphasizes, the salvation of souls is her supreme law.  But the point is precisely that sounddoctrine is the necessary prerequisite of the salvation of souls.  Christ’s commission was not “Go therefore andadvance social justice in all nations.” He did not say to Peter “I have prayed for you, that you may reach outto the marginalized.”  That is notbecause social justice and reaching out to the marginalized are not important.  It is because unless you get doctrine right,you are not going to understand what true social justice amounts to, and youare not going to know what you should be doing for the marginalized once you’vereached out to them.

The priorityof doctrine makes perfect sense when one properly understands the nature of thewill and of the actions that flow from it. As Pope Leo XIII taught, following St. Thomas Aquinas:

The will cannot proceed to act until it is enlightened by theknowledge possessed by the intellect.  Inother words, the good wished by the will is necessarily good in so far as it isknown by the intellect; and this the more, because in all voluntary acts choiceis subsequent to a judgment upon the truth of the good presented, declaring towhich good preference should be given. No sensible man can doubt that judgment is an act of reason, not of thewill.  The end, or object, both of therational will and of its liberty is that good only which is in conformity withreason.  (Libertas5)

Actionfollows from the will, and the will pursues what the intellect judges to begood.  Hence we cannot will rightly, andour actions will not reliably be good in their effects, unless the intellect’sjudgements are correct.  Modern peopleare used to thinking in clichés to the effect that what matters is not what youbelieve, but rather doing the right thing and having a good will.  But the reality is that if what you believe isfalse, your will cannot be aimed at what is actually good (even if you are notculpable for the fact), and what you do will not be the right thing except byaccident.  Hence sound doctrine iscrucial to willing and acting rightly.

This makes itintelligible why, though schism is a very grave sin, Aquinas teaches thatheresy is even worse (Summa TheologiaeII-II.39.2).  Catholics must remain in communion with thepope, but precisely because the pope’s job is to preserve sound doctrine.  It’s not that we must avoid heresy so that wewill avoid schism; rather, the point of avoiding schism is to avoidheresy. 

It alsomakes it intelligible why papal infallibility concerns only doctrine, and not apope’s personal moral character.  TheChurch does not say that a pope cannot do bad things, or that he cannot have abad will.  It claims only that, when heformally defines a matter of doctrine excathedra, in a manner intended to be absolutely final and definitive, hewill not err.

It is nosurprise, then, that the duty of popes to preserve the deposit of faith hasbeen repeatedly emphasized in Catholic tradition.  Here are several examples:

The first condition of salvation is to keep the norm of thetrue faith and in no way to deviate from the established doctrine of theFathers.  For it is impossible that thewords of Our Lord Jesus Christ who said, “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock Iwill build my Church,” should not be verified.  (Formula of Pope St. Hormisdas)

For the Holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peternot so that they might, by his revelation, make known some new doctrine, butthat, by his assistance, they might religiously guard and faithfully expoundthe revelation or deposit of faith transmitted by the apostles.  (First Vatican Council, Session 4, Chapter 4)

The living teaching office of the Church… is not above theword of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening toit devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in accordwith a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit.  (Second Vatican Council, Dei Verbum, Chapter II)

The mission of Peter and his successors is to establish andauthoritatively confirm what the Church has received and believed from thebeginning, what the apostles taught, what Sacred Scripture and ChristianTradition have determined as the object of faith and the Christian norm oflife.  (Pope St. John Paul II, Catechesisof March 10, 1993)

The Pope is not an absolute monarch whose thoughts anddesires are law.  On the contrary: thePope's ministry is a guarantee of obedience to Christ and to his Word.  He must not proclaim his own ideas, but ratherconstantly bind himself and the Church to obedience to God's Word, in the faceof every attempt to adapt it or water it down, and every form of opportunism…  In his important decisions, he is bound to thegreat community of faith of all times, to the binding interpretations that havedeveloped throughout the Church's pilgrimage.  Thus, his power is not being above, but at theservice of, the Word of God.  It is incumbentupon him to ensure that this Word continues to be present in its greatness andto resound in its purity, so that it is not torn to pieces by continuouschanges in usage.  (Pope Benedict XVI,Homily for the Mass of Possession of the Chair of the Bishop of Rome, May 7,2005)

This laststatement, from Benedict XVI, is especially eloquent.  And it reminds us that true humility in apope entails a steadfast refusal to ignore or dilute or obfuscate the Church’straditional teaching in any way, not even when others may delude themselvesthat doing so would be merciful or pastoral or better in line with the signs ofthe times.

May thecardinals take such reminders to heart as they deliberate.  May they elect a man willing to live by, andindeed if necessary even die for, these noble words from the tradition.  St. Peter, pray for us.

The two thieves

Christ wasnot crucified alone.  Of those who diedwith him, Luke’s Gospel tells us the following:

There were also two others, criminals, led with Him to be putto death.  And when they had come to theplace called Calvary, there they crucified Him, and the criminals, one on theright hand and the other on the left… Then one of the criminals who were hangedblasphemed Him, saying, “If You are the Christ, save Yourself and us.”  But the other, answering, rebuked him,saying, “Do you not even fear God, seeing you are under the samecondemnation?  And we indeed justly, forwe receive the due reward of our deeds; but this Man has done nothing wrong.”  Then he said to Jesus, “Lord, remember me whenYou come into Your kingdom.”  And Jesussaid to him, “Assuredly, I say to you, today you will be with Me in Paradise.”(Luke 23:32-33, 39-43, NKJV)

The second manhas come to be known as the “good thief” or the “penitent thief,” because hiswords indicate repentance.  His referenceto fear of God evinces a reverent attitude. His acknowledgement that, in being put to death, he is receiving hisjust deserts shows that he ultimately put righteousness above the goods of thislife.  His plea to Christ indicates faiththat Jesus was who he claimed to be, and could secure for him an eternal reward. 

The firstman has come to be known as the “impenitent thief,” because his words indicatethe opposite of repentance.  He is notreverent, but mocking.  He shows noconcern about whether his punishment is deserved and ought to be accepted, butworries only about saving his life.  Hedoubts and perhaps dismisses altogether the idea that Jesus really is the Christ,and evinces no hope for the hereafter. 

The penitentthief was saved, and it stands to reason that the impenitent thief wasdamned.  Indeed, in his treatment of thesignificance of the two thieves, Thomas Aquinas writes:

As Pope Leo observes (Serm.iv de Passione): “Two thieveswere crucified, one on His right hand and one on His left, to set forth by thevery appearance of the gibbet that separation of all men which shall be made inHis hour of judgment.”  And Augustine onJohn 7:36: “The very cross, if thou mark it well, was a judgment-seat: for thejudge being set in the midst, the one who believed was delivered, the other whomocked Him was condemned.  Already He hassignified what He shall do to the quick and the dead; some He will set on His right,others on His left hand.” (SummaTheologiae III.46.11)

We are usedto hearing, in the story of the good thief, reassurance that salvation ispossible even for the worst of us, and even until the point of death.  And it is indeed that.  We are perhaps less used to thinking of thestory of the two thieves as also a warning about damnation.  But that is how saints Leo, Augustine, andThomas understood it. 

Now, Christexplicitly promises Paradise to the one thief, but we are not told whether hesaid anything to the other.  Is it possiblethat the apparently impenitent thief may also have repented before death?  Interestingly, Matthew 27:44 and Mark 15:32 speakof both thieves reviling Jesus, whereas Luke has one of them reviling him andthe other rebuking the first.  Commentingon this fact, St. Ambrose suggests that “perhaps this other at first reviled,but was suddenly converted” (as quoted inAquinas’s Catena Aurea).  But Ambrose does not suggest that the badthief too may have repented, and if anything the scriptural evidence impliesthe opposite.  Judging just from Matthewand Mark, you’d think neither of them repented. If Luke is essentially telling us that reviling Christ was not in factthe end of the story in the case of one of the thieves, it would be bizarre ifhe didn’t also mention that it was not the end of the story in the case of theother one.

In anyevent, Ambrose goes on to say that “mystically, the two thieves represent thetwo sinful people who were to be crucified by baptism with Christ (Rom. 6:3),whose disagreement likewise represents the difference of believers.”  He appears to mean that the good and badthieves represent, respectively, those among the baptized who persevere inrighteousness until death, and those among the baptized who fall away.

If this isso, then the story of the two thieves gives us, as Aquinas says, a foreshadowingof the Last Judgment, and the eternal salvation or damnation of thosejudged.  Each of us will share the fateof either the good thief or the bad thief, and as with them, which destiny weface will not be a settled matter until we draw our last breath.  The story of the two thieves thus does indeedprovide grounds for hope, but also a grave warning against presumption. 

Relatedposts:

Themeaning of the Passion

Themeaning of the Resurrection

Damnationroundup