Marc Lynch's Blog, page 110

Helping Syria Without War

How should the United States, and the international community, respond to the escalating bloodbath in Syria?  Over the last two months, the overwhelming weight of  editorial and op-ed commentary has been in the direction of calling for military action of some sort --- especially to arm a Free Syrian Army.  The calls for military action span the spectrum:  from John McCain and Lindsey Graham and the FPI-FDD group of conservative hawks to liberal interventionists and even... FP bloggers.  For people desperate to do something to help the Syrian people, and at the same time for people keen to deal a blow to Iran or bring down a long-hated regime in Damascus, the time seems right for some form of military intervention.  

I was a strong supporter of the intervention in Libya. But the diversion of the debate about Syria towards military options has been counterproductive.  None of the military options on offer, including arming the Free Syrian Army, are likely to significantly help the Syrian people and most risk making things far worse.  But the recent display of a broad-based international consensus, including the 137-12 vote in the United Nations General Assembly condemning the regime's violence, and the first meeting of the "Friends of Syria" group on Friday in Tunisia make this a crucial time to seriously explore non-military options which have a more realistic chance to be adopted.. and to succeed.  

In a new report released today by the Center for a New American Security, I argue that if the goal is to help the Syrian people and not just to hurt an Iranian ally then the international response to the Syrian crisis must focus less on whether to use military options than on ways to improve the prospects for a "soft landing" after the fall of the Assad regime.    The report lays out a number of concrete suggestions for mobilizing diplomatic pressure and breaking the intensifying polarization between two Syrian communities in order to push for a political transition. I can't offer any guarantees that this strategy will work quickly or cleanly... but neither can those now recklessly calling for poorly conceived military action. [[BREAK]]

I am not going to summarize every detail of the report in this post -- please download it here.  The first half of the report assesses in some depth each of the major military options which have been put on the table:  No Fly Zones, Tactical Air Strikes, Safe Areas, Armed Observers, and Arming the Opposition.  For each of the first four, I argue that the military means would not respond effectively to the violence, would be far more complicated than advocates acknowledge, and would likely soon pave the way to further escalation upon failure. 

I spend the most time arguing against the currently fashionable idea of arming the Syrian opposition (about whom, as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey noted this weekend, little is
really known). It is unlikely that arms from the outside would come close to evening the balance of power, and would only invite escalations from Syrian regime forces.  While advocates assume that a better-armed opposition would encourage a wave of defections from the Syrian army, it is just as plausible that growing militarization will harden the polarization in Syrian society and the resolve of Syrian troops.   Those currently on the fence, disgusted with Assad but afraid of the future, could well be frightened back onto the side of the regime and move even further away from any kind of realistic political solution.    

Finally, there is the reality of the deeply divided, fragmented nature of the Syrian opposition, which is more than just an inconvenient point to be noted and then waved away.  Most enthusiasts for arming the FSA preface their call by
insisting that it is necessary that the Syrian opposition first unify.  But it hasn't, and shows no signs of unifying politically any time soon. There is quite simply no prospect that the Syrian opposition will unify politically in the time frame envisioned by those who hope to rush weapons to the front lines to protect civilians in besieged areas like Homs.  But this reality doesn't seem to actually blunt their enthusiasm for arming the Syrian opposition anyway. This waving away of supposedly "necessary" conditions reminds me all too clearly of those who insisted that COIN must have a legitimate national partner to work with but then insisted on carrying it out in Afghanistan anyway despite the manifest absence of such a leadership in Kabul.

But the report is not only a brief against military options. It tries to lay out a political and diplomatic strategy to increase the pressure on the Assad regime while building the conditions for a political transition.   Those grappling with the Syria crisis too often do not take seriously enough that Syrians remain sharply divided over the crisis.  Many Syrians continue to support the regime, some out of genuine fear of the future, some out of true commitment, some out of sectarian solidarity, some because they believe the narrative which the regime has crafted about foreign conspiracies. Ignoring or scoffing at their beliefs, or lobbing propaganda across a hostile divide, isn't going to help. No post-Assad Syria is going to be stable if it can't include and command the loyalty of that sizable portion of its population -- and so a political strategy must be designed to engage them in a plan for transition. 

That does not mean engaging Assad or accepting his farcical reform proposals. The report argues that the time for negotiations with the top levels of the Assad regime has passed, and if they refuse to engage immediately then they should be moved towards indictment at the International Criminal Court.  A real choice should be given to lower level state officials, who should understand that their window is rapidly closing to defect or be indicted.  Targeted sanctions should increase the pressure on the top of the regime.  The Friends of Syria group should coordinate international activity, and every possible international forum should be mobilized to isolate and shame the Syrian regime. 

But pressure is not enough.  Efforts should be stepped up to reach out to the broad base of the regime's remaining political support and to persuade them to take a frightening, risky leap into the unknown of a transition.  Particular attention should be paid to breaking through the polarized narratives which have Syrians increasingly living within mutually isolated narrative bubbles. The international community should work to bring credible information about regime atrocities to those Syrians who doubt their reality, and to reassure them about their place in a post-Assad Syria.  To the latter end, I lay out some proposals for drafting a political pact with international guarantees to which the Syrian opposition would commit itself as a way of reassuring those key parts of the Syrian fabric.   This may still be possible, despite the increasing polarization and hardening divide... but not if military options are chosen or major arms flow in to the various groups fighting under the banner of the Free Syrian Army. 

The choice is not between political options which won't work and military options which will work.  The hard truth is that the available military options have little chance of quickly or decisively turning the tide against Assad's regime. They are more likely to simply ratchet the violence up to a higher level, while badly harming the chances of any kind of political transition which could create a stable, inclusive Syria.  I hope that this political proposal will be given a chance, even if its success if far from assured.   Please download the whole report here for more details, and I look forward to discussing the ideas.   

The 'Arm the FSA' Bandwagon

Over the last few days there has been a cascade of politicians and analysts jumping on the bandwagon of arming the Free Syrian Army, from John McCain and Elliott Abrams to FP's Daniel Drezner. It's easy to understand why. The failure of the U.N. Security Council has blocked diplomatic efforts to achieve a political transition and has triggered a clear escalation in violence by Bashar al-Assad's regime. With the horrifying images of the dead and wounded in Homs and elsewhere, many people want to do something to stop the atrocities. But almost everyone who looks carefully at options for military intervention, however, quickly realizes how daunting such an operation would actually be with neither airstrikes nor safe areas likely to succeed and nobody (thankfully) willing to admit to contemplating boots on the ground.

As I expected a few weeks ago, arming the Free Syrian Army has therefore emerged as an attractive option to many. Advocates of arming the FSA argue that providing the internal Syrian opposition forces with advanced weapons, communications, and other support would even the military balance and give them a fighting chance against the Assad regime. It would give them the means to defend their cities and protect the population from security forces. It might allow them to take the fight to Assad and hasten the fall of his regime. Many Syrians on the ground are asking for such assistance. And it would do all this without the risks and costs of Western military intervention.

I have said many times that this is where I think Syria is going, whether or not the United States makes a decision to join the game (thus far, reportedly, it has not, but presumably the option is being debated). I want to find ways to help the Syrian people too, badly. And I can fully understand why this looks like an attractive option. But people need to think far more carefully about the implications of funneling weapons to the Free Syrian Army before leaping into such a policy. Here are some of the questions that need to be asked. [[BREAK]]

First, who exactly would be armed? The perennial, deep problem of the Syrian opposition is that it remains fragmented, disorganized, and highly localized. This has not changed. The "Free Syrian Army" remains something of a fiction, a convenient mailbox for a diverse, unorganized collection of local fighting groups. Those groups have been trying to coordinate more effectively, no doubt, but they remain deeply divided. For all their protestations of solidarity, the Syrian National Council and the FSA show few signs of working well together, while repeated splits and conflicts have emerged in the media within the FSA. So to whom would these weapons be provided, exactly? I expect that what will happen is that foreign powers will rush to arm their own allies and proxies (or are already doing so); which ones are the United States meant to choose? While claims about the role of Salafi jihadists in the armed opposition are likely exaggerated, the reality is that we know very little about the identities, aspirations, or networks of the people who would be armed.

Second, how would the provision of weapons affect the Syrian opposition? Access to Western guns and equipment will be a valuable resource that will strengthen the political position of those who gain control of the distribution networks. Competition for those assets does not seem likely to encourage the unification of the fragmented opposition, and it could easily exacerbate their divisions. What's more, fighting groups will rise in political power, while those who have advocated nonviolence or who advance political strategies will be marginalized. Fighting groups' political aspirations will likely increase along with their military power. The combination of militarization and more ambitious goals will make any political solution that much less likely. And it could increase the fears of Syrian fence-sitters who have stayed with Assad out of fear for their future.

Third, what will the weapons be intended to achieve? I can see at least three answers. Perhaps they'll be meant to be purely defensive, to stop the regime's onslaught and protect civilians. But this relatively passive goal does not seem a likely stable endpoint once the weapons start flooding in. A second possibility is that they'll be meant to give the rebels the power to defeat the regime on the battlefield and overthrow it. But that does not seem realistic, since it would require far more fire power than would likely be on offer to reverse the immense imbalance in favor of regime forces. A third possibility is that they'll be meant to even the balance of power sufficiently to force Assad to the bargaining table once he realizes that he can't win. But the violence of the escalating civil war will make such talks very difficult politically. The provision of arms probably won't be intended to create a protracted, militarized stalemate -- but that does seem the most likely outcome. Is that the goal we hope to achieve?

Fourth, how will Assad and his allies respond to the arming of the opposition? Perhaps they will immediately realize their imminent defeat and rush to make amends. But more likely, they will take this as license to escalate their attacks, to deploy an ever greater arsenal, and to discard whatever restraint they have thus far shown in order to stay below the threshold of international action. It would also be very difficult to stop Russia, Iran, or anyone else from supplying fresh arms and aid to Assad once the opposition's backers are openly doing so. Providing arms to a relatively weak opposition will not necessarily close the military gap, then -- it might simply push the same gap up to a higher level of militarized conflict.

Fifth, what will we do when the provision of weapons fails to solve the conflict? Arming the opposition is held out as an alternative to direct military intervention. When it fails to solve the crisis relatively quickly -- and it most likely will fail -- there will inevitably then be new calls to escalate Western military support to airstrikes in the Libya-style. In other words, what is presented as an alternative to military intervention is more likely to pave the way to such intervention once it fails.

Sixth, what if Assad does fall? The armed opposition groups would then be in the dominant position to shape Syria's future, and they would not likely quickly demobilize or disarm. Should the Syrian state collapse suddenly, these armed groups would be operating in a security vacuum amid accumulated fears and rage. This is not a pretty picture.

There are other questions that should be asked before leaping into the "least bad" option of arming the Syrian opposition, including its legality and its implications for broader regional security. But the six I've outlined above should be enough to at least focus the debate. Arming the Syrian opposition is not a cheap and effective substitute for military intervention, and it is not a generally harmless way to "do something." It does not guarantee either the protection of the Syrian people or the end of the Assad regime. It is more likely to produce a protracted stalemate, increased violence, more regional and international meddling, and eventual calls for direct military intervention. It's probably going to happen whether or not the United States plays a role, though -- but at least we should know what we're getting into.

The UN Fails Syria

The veto cast by Russia and China on Saturday blocked action by the United Nations Security Council to back the Arab League's initiative to stop the killing and facilitate a political transition in Syria.  The vetos came despite a concerted effort by the resolution's backers to meet the most significant objections, in particular their consistently repeated assurance that there would be no military intervention.  It was not the "revenge of the BRICS" as some have suggested, since both India and South Africa backed the 13-2 majority (and Brazil would have done so had it still been on the Council). US Ambassador Susan Rice called the vetos "shameful."  I agree.[[BREAK]]

The failed UN resolution was not perfect, but for all the reasons I outlined last week
it offered the best hope for mobilizing sustained international
pressure on the Asad regime.  It would have sent a powerful signal to
Syrians on all sides of international consensus, held out at least some
hope for a political path, and required observation of the mandated
ceasefire and regular reporting to the Security Council.  Many
sympathetic with the Syrian opposition had blasted the resolution as
worse than nothing since it did not authorize military intervention or,
in its final version, explicitly call for Asad to step down.  They were
mistaken, as I think many now realize.  

The veto will diminish the relevance of the United Nations and increase the odds that Syria will descend even further into a civil war fueled by a flood of weapons and aid to all parties. Before the vote, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton warned that "the endgame, in the absence of us acting together
as the international community, is civil war."  She was right.  The UN's failure won't end regional and international efforts to deal with the escalating brutality, but it will now force those efforts into other, less effective and less internationally legitimate channels.   The already slim prospects for a "soft landing" in Syria, with a political transition deal ending the violence, are now closer to complete collapse. 

I do not believe that we are heading for the direct American military intervention for which a vocal, if small, band of liberal hawks yearn, however.  Nor should there be one.  No advocate of American military intervention has yet offered any suggestions of how specific actions might actually produce the desired goals given the nature of the fighting. Air strikes and no-fly zones can not tip the balance in a civil war environment fought in densely populated urban areas where the U.S. lacks reliable human intelligence; recall that an air campaign took six months to succeed in Libya under much more favorable conditions.  Safe area and humanitarian corridor proposals remain impractical.  Advocates of military action should not be allowed to dodge the question of the likely escalation to ground forces -- which virtually everyone agrees would be disastrous -- after the alternatives fail. And there is zero political appetite for a military intervention:  it is difficult to miss that every single speaker at the United Nations, including the Arab League and Qatar, explicitly ruled one out.

I expect calls to mount for the provision of weapons to the Free Syrian
Army, or for that to simply happen without fanfare. But nobody should be fooled into thinking that this is a panacaea.  Arming the weaker side in a fully-fledged, internationalized civil war is much more likely to produce a painful stalemate than a quick, decisive outcome. Asad's allies will reciprocate with their own support.  That support, along with a military which evidently remains loyal and willing to kill and intensifying sectarian dynamics which could keep fence-sitters with the regime, could keep a civil war going a long time.  Syria would become a regional vortex, 1980s Lebanon on steroids:  a protracted and violent civil war,
fueled by arms shipments and covert, proxy interventions by all parties. Does anyone really think this is a good path?

Whatever the outcome of that battle on the ground, Syria under the Asad regime will never be rehabilitated in the region or the international community.   In a statement shortly before the Council vote, President Obama declared: "The Syrian regime's policy of
maintaining power by terrorizing its people only indicates its inherent
weakness and inevitable collapse. Assad has no right to lead Syria, and has
lost all legitimacy with his people and the international community."  His strong statement, while more than justified, might have been better held until after the vote since it may have fueled suspicions about the objectives of the Arab League initiative. Indeed, Russia's U.N. envoy Vitaly Churkin blamed the resolution's backers for promoting a strategy aimed at "regime change"   But if the goal of the veto was to keep the goals of international action limited, the result will be the opposite.  The end of the UN option will now make the goal of regime change in Damascus more explicit. 

It isn't only the UN which will become less relevant.  The Arab League is also about to become less effective, as the gavel moves from Doha to Baghdad at the end of March.  It isn't just that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is sympathetic to Asad, on the Shi'a side of a new Arab cold war, or deferential to Tehran.  It's that Iraqi politics are themselves an ongoing muddle, leaving little bandwidth for any kind of foreign policy activism.  What's more, Iraq remains something of a pariah in the Arab world, particularly in the Shi'a-phobic quarters of the Gulf Cooperation Council such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (which has already announced that it will boycott the Arab Summit scheduled for Baghdad at the end of March).   Arab divisions will likely become more evident than Arab unity as the crisis escalates, as the GCC pushes its own agenda and the Arab League reverts to its traditional impotence. 

Part of my personal frustration lies in the effect that this will have beyond Syria.  The U.S. and its allies will continue to find other ways to try to deal with the Syrian crisis, even without the UN.  But the failure of the UN to act, as Secretary General Ban Ki Moon suggested, harms the institution itself by revealing its inability to act in defense of the Charter's promise.   The next stages, whether military or not (and I expect not), will more resemble the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns which were launched without international legitimacy. This will significantly undermine the prospects that such actions will
contribute to the positive development of international norms of
atrocity prevention or the more controversial "responsibility to
protect."    That is tragic for an administration which has prioritized the UN and, with the exception of its hopeless diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian file, has done well with it. 

I will have a report coming out soon which lays out some positive policy proposals for how to build more effective international action without war after the UN failure.  Stay tuned. 

 

The Security Council takes on Syria

"Do not
let the Syrian people down; the violence must end," implored Arab League
Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi at the Security Council yesterday.  U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
posed the challenge even more bluntly: 
"We all have a choice: Stand with the
people of Syria and the region or become complicit in the continuing violence
there."  As the death toll rapidly
mounts, French Foreign
Minister Alain Juppe denounced the "shameful silence of the Security
Council."  Most of the people around me in the press gallery at the Security Council seemed to feel the weight of what felt like an historic, urgent public debate. 

But as fierce as the urgency for action in the face of the rapidly escalating body count was the crystal clear rejection of any authorization for military
intervention.  Qatari Foreign Minister Hamed bin
Jassem began the debate by assuring that the League was not calling for a
military intervention, and returned to the floor at the end of the
session to
again stress the point. "We aim to avoid any foreign
intervention, specifically any foreign military intervention," declared the Arab League's Nabel al-Arabi.   U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dismissed fears about another Libya-style
intervention as "a false analogy," and in a press opportunity outside the Council told reporters that "we want to underscore that there is no intention to seek any authority or to pursue any kind of military intervention." Even Juppe, the most passionate voice for the resolution, insisted that "absolutely
nothing in the draft could lead to such intervention."  The Security Council will not be authorizing military action in Syria any time soon. [[BREAK]]

Ruling out a military option is clearly the only way to even hope to pass a Security Council
resolution.  Russian
warnings against military intervention were echoed by the representatives of
India, Pakistan, China and others.  Despite press accounts of a stalemated
Security Council, the effort to assuage such concerns and achieve consensus on
a resolution calling for a peaceful transition could work. Russia's objections focused on a military option which the bill's sponsors had already specifically taken off the table.  The German
representative told reporters afterwards that he had found the Russian
statement "conciliatory," and Juppe maintained that he saw a "window of hope" for agreement.

Many disgusted observers have dismissed the Council's efforts as a charade since it does not contain authorization for military action, or because they believe that the Arab transition plan has no chance of being adopted.  I disagree on the former, since there still remains no compelling case for military action despite the mounting calls for such an
intervention among those desperate to find some way to stop the
killing.  Ruling out military action is right both on the politics at the UN and on the policy.  I agree that it is unlikely that Bashar al-Asad or his opponents will live up to the terms of the transition plan, even if the UN resolution endorses it.  Even if they did, there are problematic aspects to the plan, which could leave Asad with a political role and leave the instruments of regime repression intact. Indeed, Clinton went
out of her way at the UN to distinguish between the regime and the
state, hinting at only a limited and controlled process of political reform once the killing has stopped. 

But meeting the letter of the plan isn't necessary for a resolution to have a real, and potentially highly positive, impact on the Syrian crisis.   Most obviously, a resolution
would signal to Asad and to all Syrians that Russia would no longer be able or willing to protect it from international isolation.  It could send a decisive signal to fence-sitters that the regime can not survive, leading to a sudden wave of defections. It might also wake up Asad and those around him to the reality of the regime's situation, and compel them to begin to deal more seriously with his political opposition.  

The most urgent part of the plan, of course, would be the requirement of a verifiable  end to violence and the pullback of Syrian regime forces.  Few expect that the regime would be
able or willing to do so, particularly at a time when it faces an escalating
tempo of attacks and protests from the Syrian opposition. If the violence and
security presence do not end within 15 days as required, the Syrian
opposition
surely would not be willing or able to sit down for the political
talks.  The record thus far, with regime violence escalating during the monitoring mission despite its commitments, suggests that it will not.  Hamed Bin Jassem's frustration was palpable at the Council: "Our efforts and initiatives have been in vain for the Syrian
Government has not made any sincere effort to cooperate with our
efforts, and,
unfortunately, its only solution has been to kill its own people."  Would it be any different for the UN? 

So much depends on expectations about
what is happening on the ground. 
Western officials constantly say that Asad's days are numbered.  Many well-informed observers, including those who have spent time recently inside Syria, seem to agree.  The economy is deeply struggling under sanctions and the effects of internal conflict, peaceful protests and armed attacks are escalating across the country, and Syria is increasingly isolated internationally.  But
while it is arguably helpful for them to say so, to encourage regime defectors
or fence-sitters, the source of their confidence is not clear. The Syrian
opposition claims to have the military momentum, with their stories of liberated
cities and closing in on Damascus, but the fog of war is heavy,
propaganda abounds, and the truth remains murky. Asad may be
losing political support, but it isn't clear that he needs it to survive
as long as his military machine remains loyal - and thus far there have been
few high level defections such as those we saw in Libya early in the conflict.  

The Arab-Western strategy
at the UN makes a great deal of sense if Asad's days are truly numbered, and
the decisive pressure to remove him will come from the inside.  An international consensus crystallized in a Security Council resolution would limit the regime's options and
send a clear signal to Syrians that their future does not lie with the status
quo.  It could pave the way to more concrete assistance to the Syrian opposition and to more multilateral sanctions targeting its regime. The political transition plan
may not unfold as outlined on paper, but the constant references to toleration and inclusion can reassure frightened elites and minorities that they have a place in post-Asad
Syria.  It would raise the costs of the regime's killing,  as the 15 day reporting requirement creates a series of forcing moments of international attention. 

 If the killing continues and the political plan stalls, as seems depressingly likely, the measures potentially contemplated by the UN such as sanctions, condemnation, or ICC referrals will be seen as inadequate. Pressure will build
for something more, just as the failure of bombing to resolve the situation would inevitably lead to demands for more direct military intervention -- outside the Security Council's mandate, if need be.  This is the veiled threat which Asad will perceive, no matter how many times Western and Arab leaders rule out the use of force.  Short of war, it is easy to imagine the provision of advanced weapons to the opposition or even the
insertion of trainers as a next step short of military intervention... for all the problems which this could pose to a post-Asad Syria.  

In short, there is still hope for the Security Council to have a significant positive effect by passing the resolution supporting the Arab initiative while rejecting military intervention.  Getting a Security Council resolution with 12-13 votes and a Russian
abstention could make a very positive difference.  The advocates for the resolution are right.  It is outrageous, even reprehensible, for the United Nations to stand by in the face of documented atrocities, particularly when the Arab League is asking for its help and the Libya intervention revolved around a norm against regimes using deadly force against peaceful protestors.  This is not about imperialism or international conspiracies or any of the other claptrap flung around the ether.  It's about a regime which refuses to stop killing its own citizens. 

Action is necessary to demonstrate the U.N.'s relevance in responding to such atrocities. Doing so without resort to military force could help to disarm the (in my view, largely tendentious) complaints in the Council about the Libya precedent. At this point, the
game plan should be to
intensify Syria's international isolation, hold out the threat of ICC
indictments, continue with targeted sanctions, help the opposition to
coalesce and commit to a democratic future, and play a support role
in
preparing for a managed transition- all while avoiding a risky,
unnecessary, and ill-advised military intervention.  These steps will
not immediately or decisively end Asad's killing or resolve the crisis. 
But neither will a military intervention.  The intervention in Libya
under far more favorable conditions took half a year to play out.
Bombing Syria would only be the beginning of a new, difficult phase of
the conflict rather than a quick, decisive alternative to the political
strategies now being pursued.  

I remain more hopeful than others about agreement being achieved. I heard a great deal of support for such a resolution supporting the Arab plan while ruling out military action in the Council  yesterday. There are signs that Russia will ultimately decide to not veto such a resolution if it is completely isolated in its position.  Such a resolution won't solve the Syrian crisis overnight, but it could be a pivotal step towards making a solution possible. Let's hope. 

 

Egypt's parliament gets to work

The formal seating of Egypt's Parliament today, after a grueling two months of elections and political turmoil, marks the end of one stage of Egypt's transition. The Islamist-dominated Parliament will begin its work without clearly defined powers or responsibilities amidst a fractured, suspicious political environment. We will now see whether this Parliament will be able to deliver on the hopes invested in electoral legitimacy and emerge as an effective check on the power of the SCAF. In many ways, the real struggles start now.

The first test of the resilience of this path will come in two days, the anniversary of the January 25 revolution. I expect that there will likely be a large turnout that day, with all political forces joining in. The question, though, is what happens after the big crowds go home: do activists decide to try another sit-in and force themselves back onto the political stage? And if they do, has the SCAF learned anything from the past few months and recognized that again resorting to tear gas and violent assaults on protestors will overturn the plans it has proposed for an orderly political transition process?

I don't expect the coming months, during which a constitution is supposedly to be drafted and Presidential elections organized and the transition to civilian rule completed, to go smoothly or easily. I still believe that Egypt would be better served by holding Presidential elections and transferring executive power to a legitimate civilian government more quickly, and allowing more time for a Constitution to be drafted and fully debated. But that doesn't seem to be the path Egypt is taking. So for now, let's just hope that the Parliament asserts itself quickly and effectively, and focuses on truly important issues and isn't sidetracked by debates over religion. Let's hope that the activists who have done so much to drive change in Egypt can work with this Parliament in a common drive to ensure that the SCAF lives up to its promises for a genuine democratic transition by the summer. Let's hope that the SCAF doesn't destroy its own plans by teargassing or murdering protestors in Tahrir this week. [[BREAK]]

The elected Parliament and the expected protests in Tahrir represent two different claims to legitimacy in post-Mubarak Egypt. The Parliament embodies democratic legitimacy, with its powers and its authority coming from elections and the expressed will of the people. Many activists dismiss the elections as a sham and continue to claim revolutionary legitimacy. This divide clearly predates the elections, and has indeed been a constant theme of post-Mubarak politics. The electoral success of Islamists and weak showing by others has exacerbated that disconnect, as has the raw fury among many activists over the outrageous violence by security forces immediately before and again in the midst of the elections. But some in the middle have tried hard to find a path by which the two trends can find common ground pushing the SCAF rather than falling into the trap of targeting each other. I hope they succeed.

There are many problems with the new Parliament and the political process which created it. But the common dismissal of the Parliament by many activists is mistaken. For one, the near complete wipeout of former regime, ex-NDP candidates -- the fullul -- doesn't get nearly enough attention. Before the elections, most people expected the Parliament to be split between the Muslim Brotherhood and rebranded former regime elements. Instead, the fullul lost badly despite lavish spending and well-organized campaigns. Their failure should be seen as a major accomplishment of the revolution, and a vindication of the rejection of the old regime by the vast majority of the Egyptian population. The fact is that there is now a popularly elected Parliament, recognized as legitimate by the SCAF, which is almost completely devoid of figures from the old NDP elite. That's an amazing achievement.

The Islamist majority in Parliament will face its own tests. While many fear that the Islamist majority
will push to impose religious
issues on Egypt, and others anticipate a smooth SCAF-Muslim Brotherhood
alliance, I expect the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party initially to focus on popular economic issues and to assert the powers of the Parliament they dominate. Based on their past history, I suspect that they will play it safe and try to avoid the appearance of imposing their hegemony over others -- but they may also be tempted by power, and I suspect are themselves internally divided. The salafis, never especially internally disciplined and lacking political experience, will have to adapt to the glaring political spotlight and figure out how they will approach such issues. Key liberal figures in the Parliament will likely have an outsized voice, despite their limited numbers, in shaping the debates to come, particularly as Islamists look to present themselves as forming broad coalitions.

It's good that the Obama administration has not panicked in the face of Islamist success, in contrast to most previous administrations which abandoned their rhetorical support for Arab democracy whenever Islamists won. I've been very glad to see Ambassador Anne Patterson and the US Embassy in Cairo reaching out to all the political forces in the last few weeks. Her meetings with the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohammed Badie and with Freedom and Justice Party leaders, and announced plans to meet with the Nour Party, are the right thing to do. So are the similar high-profile meetings with visiting senior administration officials. I was sharply critical earlier this year of Embassy Cairo's public diplomacy and engagement, but Patterson really seems to have changed things for the better. There is simply no way that the U.S. could have avoided talking to and dealing with the largest political trends in the new Egyptian Parliament, especially after pushing so hard for the elections. Such relationships are going to be necessary in the trying months to come. This coming period will also be a difficult test of whether the administration's mostly behind the scenes relationship with the Egyptian military leaders, which has opened it to such intense criticism. Will that relationship now allow it to influence them in the many pivotal choices to come?

The seating of the Parliament completes an important stage in Egypt's roadmap to a political transition. It hasn't been pretty. It hasn't been easy. It hasn't satisfied everyone. The Islamist victories scared a lot of people. The repeated outbreaks of horrific regime violence undermined its appeal. And the next stage is likely to be just as contentious or more so. But at last, the stage is set to discover whether an elected Parliament can jump start a transition to real democracy in an Egypt which so badly deserves it.

 

Should Embassy Damascus be closed?

 

The U.S. Embassy in Damascus is
reportedly planning to shut down if the Syrian government can not -- or
will not -- provide adequate security guarantees.  If the safety of
Embassy personnel is seriously in danger, then of course they should
make the safe call to protect them.  But the security rationale masks a
deeper question:  at what point should Ambassador Robert Ford be
recalled on political grounds?



I argued long and hard for Ford's confirmation as Ambassador, and
for the importance of having someone like him on the ground in
Damascus.  I believe that his performance has more than vindicated that
stance.   But has the usefulness of his presence come to an end? [[BREAK]]

There are
three arguments to withdraw him and close the Embassy, beyond the security concerns.  First, the Asad
regime is too far gone at this point for diplomacy, listens to nobody,
and this leaves little room for traditional diplomacy.  Second, the
rapid and frightening militarization of the conflict has seriously
reduced the space for public diplomacy, as Embassy personnel (and Ford
himself) have few opportunities to get out to engage.  Finally,
withdrawing him would send a strong message to Asad and to the world
that the window has closed on a transition which includes him.   

These arguments all have merit, and the point may soon come where
withdrawing Ford and closing the Embassy would be appropriate.  But we
have not yet reached that point.  All policy choices at this point on
Syria must be guided by three objectives:  ending the violence and
protecting civilians;  hastening Asad's fall;  and creating the
conditions for a successful transition following Asad's fall.  One of
the reasons which I continue to oppose Western military intervention is
that while such a military role it may hasten Asad's fall it would
likely create far less favorable conditions for post-Asad Syria.  The
same goes for a deliberate strategy of arming the Syrian opposition,
which could quickly empower armed militias at the expense of political
leadership and create the conditions for wide-scale civil war following
Asad's fall. 



Would withdrawing Ford and closing the Embassy serve those goals?  At this point, it would have
little effect one way or the other on the violence.  Nor would it likely
have much impact in hastening Asad's fall.  Asad would probably be thrilled to see him gone, frankly. It might matter at the
margins if all major Embassies closed at the same time in a coordinated,
multilateral demonstration of Asad's international isolation ---
something which I would recommend when the time comes. But it isn't
going to a primary driver of political change.



The core question, then, is whether a U.S. diplomatic presence helps
create the conditions for a "soft landing" post-Asad.  At this point, I
believe that it does. The Syrian National Council is still struggling
to create a legitimate, effective and unified external opposition
umbrella, and the State Department is doing what it can to work with
them.  But increasingly the important action is taking place inside of
Syria -- not just the Free Syrian Army, but the local leadership and
opposition groups emerge in villages and cities.  They will likely play a
key role in any post-Asad Syria.  The more opportunity the Embassy has
to engage with, learn about, and forge relationships with these new
forces inside Syria the better.



Beyond the internal opposition and the Asad regime, Ford and the
Embassy also still have the chance to talk with the fence-sitters and
elites whose decision to stick with or abandon Asad will likely
determine his fate. They have legitimate fears about the future, and
doubts about their fate after Asad.   It is just as important to talk
with the business community, minorities, intellectuals, and other elites
at this point as it is to talk with the emerging opposition.   The
business community in particular needs to come to believe that the
sanctions which Asad has brought upon them will increasingly harm their
interests --- but could be quickly removed and their fortunes restored
should Asad and his regime depart and a legitimate, inclusive political
transition begun.



For now, then, Ford and the Embassy should stay in Damascus unless
the security situation is genuinely too dangerous.  The political
benefits of his presence, particularly for preparing for a potential
transition and engaging emergent forces and frightened elites, still
outweight the momentary impact of his withdrawal.  That may change, but
for now I hope they stay.

No military option in Syria

It is time to think seriously about intervening militarily in Syria, argues Steven Cook today. He joins a small but growing chorus pushing for such a move. Some parts of the Syrian opposition have moved toward requesting an
intervention, albeit with serious reservations and furious internal
disagreements, as has the Emir of Qatar and some other Arab officials. And then of course, there are those who have been pushing for hawkish policies toward Syria for years who have seized the moment to push for action, and others who generally support military solutions. This is the kind of temporary coalition which can drive real policy shifts.  

It is easy to understand the urgency behind such a call. The brutality of the Syrian regime has produced unspeakable atrocities which challenge the conscience of the world. The daily death toll, and the horrific videos and images which circulate freely, can easily make the passions overwhelm the interests and push us to set prudence aside. I supported the intervention in Libya, and believe strongly in the importance of advancing regional and global norms against regime violence. 

But the U.S. should not be contemplating military intervention in Syria. Risky, costly foreign policy decisions can not simply be taken to
express moral outrage. They need to have a serious chance of success. None of
the military options currently under discussion have a
reasonable chance of improving the situation at an acceptable
cost, and their failure would likely pave the way to something far
worse. 

Syria is not Libya, and has few of the unique conditions which made that intervention appropriate. The moral outrage at the depradations of Assad's forces, as well as the fevered hopes of those hoping to change the region's strategic equation by bringing down Iran's main Arab ally are not enough, any more than hope is a plan. Military intervention in Syria has little prospect of success, a high risk of disastrous failure,  and a near-certainty of escalation which should make the experience of Iraq weigh extremely heavily on anyone contemplating such an intervention. There is no magic number of deaths at which the U.S. must embark on a self-defeating and foolish adventure.  [[BREAK]]

If Syria really did resemble Libya, then the argument for a similar intervention under the mantle of the Responsibility to Protect would be stronger. But it doesn't. The Syrian opposition is far weaker, more divided, and does not control any territory. There are no front lines dividing the forces which can be separated by air power, no tanks and personnel carriers conveniently driving along empty desert roads to be targeted from the sky. The killing in Syria is being done in densely populated urban environments. There is no UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. The geography and sectarian landscape are different, as is the regional environment and the risk of spillover into nervous neighbors such as Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. 

A no-fly zone (NFZ), the most commonly requested intervention, is almost completely irrelevant to Syrian realities. The Syrian regime is not using helicopters
or fixed-wing airplanes to carry out its crackdown. Controlling Syrian airspace
alone
would do little to affect its ability to act. Syrian anti-aircraft capabilities may be old and unintimidating, but when the U.S. acts militarily it will not take any chances of losing an aircraft. Establishing
a NFZ would require significant preliminary
bombing of Syrian anti-aircraft capabilities, which would be well-primed for the engagement and would not be taken by surprise as they were by the Israeli strike a few years back. Many
Syrian anti-aircraft capabilities are located in
or near urban areas, which raises the risk of significant civilian
casualties.
And, of course, the airspace over Syria -- between Israel, Turkey, Iraq
and Iran
-- is among the most politically sensitive areas in the world.  

A
NFZ would almost immediately escalate to the more aggressive "No Drive
Zone"
which hawks urged in Libya when that conflict stalled. This expanded use
of airpower, rather than the more limited operational details of a NFZ,
are
what should be debated before moving down that path. This
would entail large scale bombing and aerial action
against ill-defined targets in urban environments with extremely limited human intelligence or information on the ground. The fact that most of the killing is
being done in densely packed urban areas makes any effort to intervene
primarily through air power, as in Libya, extremely problematic. A No Fly Zone in Syria is not a
cheap alternative to war - it is war, and one which would quickly become messy. 

Some therefore advocate directly using U.S. and
allied
air power to strike against Assad regime targets. For
some, this seems to be purely punitive, an
expression of moral outrage or punishment. Without a UN mandate, this would of course be illegal. It would also be the classic example of something which would feel good momentarily and then create a world of new problems. Some expect that the Assad regime is highly brittle and would quickly
crumble
in the face of a show of military might, as the regime loses morale and protestors surge forward. Such "shock and awe" offensives, aside from lacking legality and
risking
significant civilian casualties, have an extremely poor track record in
the
real world. The Gaddafi regime did not crumble on first strike, under far better conditions for NATO and the opposition. If the Syrian regime does not fold immediately, then once again the U.S. would be faced with the demand to escalate.  

The Syrian National Council has
recently explored the idea
of the establishment of a Safe Area to protect refugees and
to
create a Syrian version of Benghazi where the opposition could establish
and
build an alternative government. In
reality, this would entail carving out a part of Syria from the
sovereign
control of the state and providing the military means to defend it. Declaring it simply in principle would
set up the nightmare scenarios of Srebrencia in the Bosnian war, in
which the
international community proved unable to protect the civilians under its
umbrella. 

If
Srebrenica is the worst-case, the experience of the relatively
successful
Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq after 1991 should prove
equally
sobering. An operation which was
envisioned as a short term response to crisis, on the expectation of
Saddam
Hussein's imminent fall, instead turned into a decade-long commitment. Maintaining that safe area required
some 20,000 troops, near-constant air-raids, and an increasingly
contentious
international debate at the UN which consumed the Clinton
Administration's
international diplomacy -- and, in 1996, did not prevent one Kurdish
leader from
inviting Saddam's troops in to help settle internal political scores. 

A Safe Area might allow the
Syrian opposition in exile to organize, but it would not be a Benghazi
where an alternative leadership formed
through the indigenous efforts of a militarily and politically
successful opposition. It
would more likely resemble the Iraqi National Congress in the 1990s,
which
established a presence in the Kurdish areas for the largely unrepresentative and ineffectual opposition in exile. That consumed a great deal of
external support, but never proved capable of winning broader support.
Creating
a Safe Area would require a significant and direct investment of troops
and
resources, clearly violate Syrian sovereignty, and likely set up a
long-term
commitment. There is
little reason to believe that such a Safe Area would hasten Assad's
collapse,
or even to expect it to be useful for the humanitarian mission of
protecting
Syrian lives. It would be
concrete, visible evidence of the foreign conspiracy to divide Syria
about
which Assad already speaks.   

If none of these indirect forms of intervention hold out hope for success, what then is left? On the one hand, direct intervention. It is all too easy to imagine the failure of indirect intervention creating a drumbeat for military forces to directly engage Syrian regime forces, not because anyone wanted that but because of the logic of escalation and reputation. And then we will be right back to the Pottery Barn rule, the urgent pressure to deal with the post-regime situation, and the kind of disastrous occupation which eight years in Iraq should have made unthinkable. If repeating the Iraqi disaster in Syria is what advocates of intervention would like to propose, then that should be the terms of the debate. 

Military intervention in Syria to stop the killing appeals to the soul but does not make sense.  That doesn't mean ignoring the slaughter. The United States and its allies must indeed do more to support the
Syrian opposition forces. It should work to achieve a UN Security Council mandate for comprehensive international sanctions against Damascus, and continue to work with its regional allies to build bilateral and regional pressure. Now that Michael McFaul has finally been confirmed as ambassador to Russia, and the Arab League mission has largely failed, the U.S. can hopefully make more progress in shaping a strong Security Council resolution. The U.S. and its allies should push International Criminal Court
indictments and hold the regime accountable for its crimes. More ways could be found to help build the nascent Syrian opposition, and to engage with and support the groups emerging on the ground as opposed to the exile groups. More could be done to plan for a post-Assad future and to communicate to terrified Syrians sitting on the fence that they have a place in that new Syria. I am in the middle of drafting a report offering more concrete proposals along these lines.

I have my doubts about whether the Syrian regime is truly crumbling, as so many claim, but I do believe that the Syrian regime is destroying itself through its repression, losing political support and control over much of the country. The U.S. needs to hasten those processes, not insert itself in the middle with military action which can not hope to succeed.  

Obama's bold move out of Iraq

The
last American troops officially left Iraq before Christmas, mostly completing
an American withdrawal by the end of 2011 which few thought possible when
then-candidate Barack Obama promised it or even when then-President George Bush
formally committed to it. Critics of the withdrawal have blasted Obama for
putting politics over policy, risking the alleged gains of the
"surge" in order to meet a campaign promise. Many of those who played
a role in the desperate attempt to reverse Iraq's 2006 descent into civil war
have entirely legitimate and justifiable fears for Iraq's future. But in fact,
Obama's decision to complete the withdrawal from Iraq was probably better
policy than it was politics -- and it was the right call both for America and
for Iraq.

In
many ways, it would have been safer politically for Obama to keep the residual
force in Iraq which hawks demanded to insulate himself against charges of having
"lost Iraq". But it would have been wrong on policy. It's not just
that the U.S. was obligated by the SOFA to withdraw its forces, once it proved
unable to negotiate the terms of an extended troop presence with the immunity
provisions which the Pentagon demanded. It's that the remaining U.S. troops
could do little for Iraqi security, had little positive effect on Iraqi
politics, and would have soon become an active liability. This is the lesson of
the last two years, when U.S. troops were reduced in number and largely
withdrew to the bases under the terms of the SOFA. The American troop presence
didn't prevent bombings and murders, didn't force political reconciliation,
didn't usher in real democracy, and didn't significantly increase American diplomatic
influence in the region. But nor did Iraq fall apart. Obama's gamble is that
the same sequence will play out in 2012 and that he will have successfully left
behind an Iraq which isn't perfect but which has avoided yet another
catastrophe.

[[BREAK]]
Obama's decision to complete the withdrawal has been widely presented by
critics as politically motivated, made in order to satisfy his political base
at the expense of the national interest. It's true that Obama made the promise
to withdraw from Iraq central to his campaign narrative, and that this
commitment was widely popular (with Iraqis as well as with Americans). And it's
true that Obama should be able to present the withdrawal as a promise kept
during the election campaign.

But
for all that, the political gains are too minimal and the political risks too
high for such considerations to really be driving such a major policy decision.
Iraq dominated the foreign policy debate for years, but at this point very few
people care. It barely shows up in public opinion surveys as a concern of
voters, and stories about Iraq rarely even make it into the media anymore. For
the most part, it seems, Americans just want to forget about it.  Even the formal end of the war which
consumed American politics for nearly a decade barely caused a blip on the
national radar.  On the left,
people seem more agitated by the security contractors who will remain in Iraq
than by the more than 160,000 troops which have been withdrawn, and have not
been inclined to give the administration much credit. On the right, the
withdrawal has been a gift, an opportunity to now hold Obama responsible for
anything which goes wrong in Iraq over the next year and to frame him as weak
on national security.

The
real benefits of completing the Iraqi withdrawal are in the realm of policy,
not politics. This isn't because Iraq has somehow solved its problems, or that
we should not worry about its fate. The emerging Iraq doesn't look much like a
well-functioning, institutionalized democracy governed by the rule of law. It
isn't likely see serious political reconciliation, particularly at the level of
its contentious and dysfunctional political elite, any time soon. It's likely
to have continuing violence, bombings, murders, sectarian fears, and the
potential for serious conflict in disputed territories.

But the fact is that it
has had all of those things with the U.S. troop presence. The American presence
over the last two years has not prevented the low-level violence, has not
blocked Maliki's efforts to centralize power, has not helped build an effective
Iraqi Parliament, and has not advanced political reconciliation. Staying for
another few years wouldn't have done any more on these scores, because
such things are largely out of America's hands.  Iraqis are the main players in Iraq, not Americans, and the
best the U.S. could do was to try to facilitate their political bargains. That
was true before the withdrawal, and it's still true today.

I
argued years ago that only an American withdrawal would force Iraqi politicians
to find a sustainable political equilibrium. I never expected it to be a pretty
one, or to be an easy process. But I would say that this is exactly what has
been happening and what we will see unfold over the coming years. Prime
Minister Maliki was deeply reckless and misguided to try to arrest Vice
President Tareq al-Hashemi -- and yes, it is extremely worrying to watch
Hashemi flee for refuge in the Kurdish areas. Insurgents have carried out some
horrific bombings to try and destabilize the situation. While a lot of people
see this as the opening stage of the coming collapse, I saw it as their testing
the new political arena to see what they can get away with and how far they can
go. That's not a surprise. All Iraqi political actors, from the Sadrists to
Iraqiyya, will do the same. The
test is whether the new Iraq can absorb those provocations and settle down. I
hope and pray that it can. But this was going to happen no matter when the U.S.
withdrew -- and this was the time to do it.

Obama's
decision to withdraw all U.S. troops might not have been his first preference. He
tried to negotiate an extension of the SOFA, and I don't think he would have
had much trouble defending a residual presence of 15,000 troops to an American
public which barely cared anymore. I'm glad that the effort failed. Those
troops would have accomplished little. They would not have prevented the
ongoing low-level violence, the murders and bombings which continue to plague
Iraq. They would not have fostered political reconciliation or checked Maliki's
power grab, any more than they did for the last two years. They would not have
made Iraq a pro-American, anti-Iranian foreign policy player, any more than
they did before. Their main effect would have been to serve as a lightning rod
for Iraqi political criticism, a mobilizing factor for the Sadrists, and a
target for those hoping to strike at Americans.

Withdrawing the last troops
from Iraq was a risk, to be sure -- but it was exactly the kind of bold choice which
needed to be taken.*  It was bold in the best way: not militaristic bluster or bombing things to demonstrate resolve, but having the courage to take a risky but correct decision. I hope and
believe that Iraq will hold together, and avoid a renewed sectarian bloodbath
or state collapse.  That is, if the U.S. can avoid bombing Iran. But that's an
issue for another day.

* last paragraph expanded, 2:20pm - ml.