Marc Lynch's Blog, page 106

Politicizing Benghazi

On September 11, 2012, in the wake of the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and a wave of protests around the region against that absurd YouTube video, an attack in Benghazi killed Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other U.S. officials. American officials were surprised by the attack, shocked and horrified by the death of a close colleague, clearly confused about what exactly had happened, and a bit disorganized in their public statements. Reporters, politicians, and analysts have a number of serious important unanswered questions about the nature of the attack, security arrangements in Benghazi, the real role of al-Qaeda, and the implications for possible future attacks. They might also be asking questions about why the protests so quickly fizzled and why so many Arab governments and political activists denounced the attacks and their perpetrators.

But that's not the debate we're having. Instead, in what passes for foreign policy debate six weeks before a presidential election, Republicans are focused on selectively parsing words to concoct a fantasy of the greatest scandal in American history -- worse than Watergate! As dangerous as the failure to connect dots before 9/11! Grounds for impeachment! The political calculations here are almost painfully transparent, as the Romney campaign desperately flails about for a way to attack Obama on foreign policy and change the subject to anything which doesn't include the phrase "47%." The media, bored with the current electoral narrative and always infatuated with sensational images of Muslim rage and the hint of scandal, is happy to play along. Such is policy debate during election season. [[BREAK]]

The focus of the "BenghaziGate" narrative has been on the conflicting narratives offered by Obama administration officials about what happened. The administration, they argue, intentionally played down the terrorism dimension of the attack for political reasons. A fair reading of administration statements would suggest confusion in the initial fog of war, with conflicting information and carefully guarded assessments which were updated as more evidence came in. Frankly, I don't think the administration did a particularly good job of communicating their stance, or coordinating their message across different officials, and they did seem oddly defensive and reactive as the media narrative gathered steam. But as "scandals" go this is weak stuff indeed.

The campaign against Susan Rice is especially misguided. Rice has energized American diplomacy at the United Nations, restoring it to the center of U.S. foreign policy and playing a particularly central role in securing a Security Council mandate for the intervention in Libya. She has relentlessly pursued a U.N. role in Syria, despite Russian and Chinese objections, and has been a vocal and effective advocate of both the United States and of global norms. Indeed, she is arguably the most successful and important American ambassador to the United Nations since Thomas Pickering, who managed the diplomacy at the United Nations for the liberation of Kuwait in 1990-91. Making her the scapegoat for a non-scandal has more to do with the desperate search for ways to attack Obama and preparing the ground for possible Secretary of State confirmation hearings next year than with anything grounded in reality.

That doesn't mean that there aren't serious questions.
Journalists were absolutely right to dig deeper and to challenge the official narrative, and serious analysts will be struggling for weeks and months to come to assess what really happened. Was this an opportunistic attack by local extremists, or an attack coordinated with and supported by the remnants of al-Qaeda Central? Even if it was opportunistic and unplanned, will its success become a model for future attacks? Will the Libyan government and the popular movements to disarm militias be strong enough to successfully establish state control? What is the significance of the fizzling of the protests across most of the region, and the crackdown by elected governments on the groups behind them? What about other
governments faced with potentially emergent extremist groups, from Tunisia and Egypt to farther afield? How could the U.S. effectively work with those governments to meet such challenges? And at home, does Romney support Arab democracy along with long-time advocates in his party such as John McCain and Bill Kristol, or does he side with those on the GOP right more fearful of the empowerment of Islamists? I certainly don't know the answers to all these questions, even if most contributors to the "debate" seem to have such perfect information.

But instead of those debates, we're treated to a witch-hunt against Susan Rice and a flood of surrogates in the media attempting to exploit the horrific images of a dead Ambassador for political gain. The only bright side is that, well, eventually election season will be over.

The failure of #Muslimrage

Last week's wave of protests and attacks on US Embassies launched a million op-eds (along with an instantly notorious Newsweek cover) about the return of "Muslim rage", the failure of the Arab uprisings, the collapse of Obama's foreign policy, and the inevitability of the clash of civilizations.  When a satirical French newspaper leaped forward to run some more hopefully offensive cartoons, everyone braced for another round of violent protests across the region.  But a funny thing happened on the way to the apocalypose:  almost nothing.  There were a few tiny demonstrations, but most Arab countries (in contrast to Pakistan and Lebanon) saw no mass rallies, no burning embassies, no screaming for the television cameras.   

The fizzling of the protests against that awful YouTube film was obvious before today, of course.  As has been widely noted, the protests last week were actually quite small --- vastly inferior in size and popular inclusion to the Arab uprisings protests last year, and small even in comparison to the ongoing pro-democracy or other political demonstrations which occur on a weekly basis in many Arab countries.  The killing of Chris Stevens and his colleagues, and the dramatic images of broached Embassy walls and al-Qaeda flags, radically inflated Western perceptions about the magnitude of the protests.    

By far the biggest story of popular mobilization today came in Libya,
where tens of thousands came out in Benghazi in an inspiring rally
against militias and against the attack on the U.S. consulate.  Thus
far, millions of opeds have failed to be produced in response.  That's a
pity.   The failure of the Arab world to follow its assigned script
really deserves as much attention as did last week's outburst.   I wish that the relative fizzle of today's protests and the today's large rally in Benghazi denouncing the attack on the
U.S. consulate and militia violence would get even one-tenth of the
media attention lavished upon the supposed meaning of last week's
Embassy attacks. [[BREAK]]

The fizzling of the protest wave and the Benghazi counter-demonstration suggests better questions than the popular choices such as "why do they hate us" or "why are Muslims so angry" or "how badly has Obama failed."  For instance, why were these demonstrations so small? Why did they peter out so quickly when the Danish Cartoons crisis went on for months?  Why did they fail to attract broad-based support outside of their core constituencies?  And why have so many leaders of Arab countries in transition, Islamists included, rushed to apologize and to reassure the United States?   I don't have all the answers, but here's a few possibilities.

First, the interests of key Islamist actors at this time pushed them towards restraint rather than escalation. This is not to say that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, should be seen as "moderate" (an endless, if somewhat futile, debate).  There's little reason to believe that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is less keen to protest offenses to the Prophet or to create a more Islamic society now than they were six years ago.  Their ideology hasn't much changed, nor their membership, nor their willingness to take offense at perceived slights.  But their interests have changed and they found themselves forced to adapt when their initial instincts backfired.  As President, Mohammed el-Morsi has to worry about Egypt's international alliances and reputation, not least with the United States.  As the leading political party in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party needs to worry about how it is perceived in the country at large, and about competition for conservative votes from Salafi rivals.   Their initial instincts were to jump on the protest bandwagon, but they were quickly forced to adapt when confronted with political and structural pressures from at home and abroad.   And so they call for legal measures against blasphemy and for peaceful protests but denounce violence, make the necessary apologies, and seek to tar their Islamist rivals as irrational extremists.  

Second, the Arab uprisings make it harder for a single issue to dominate the public agenda than in the past.  In 2006, the Danish Cartoons could dominate politics for weeks on end because it provided a useful political issue for a variety of Islamists, and most Arab regimes found it convenient to have popular anger directed at Western targets.   But now there are so many other issues competing for space, and far less patience for any attempt to monopolize the arena.  Syria demands attention at the regional level, of course, but local issues are the most potent challengers for attention.  In Yemen a few days ago, for example, more than ten thousand came out to demand an end to the immunity for prosecution granted to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Jordanians are protesting about new internet restrictions. What is more, intense domestic political competition means that other
political forces have little interest in allowing one Islamist trend to
define the public agenda.   A sign seen in Benghazi today reading  "Our Revolution Will Not Be Stolen" could have stood in for the attitude across many of the region's now well-entrenched activist communities. 

The dominance of the local political arena is often missed in analysis which lumps all the protests, large and small, together into a single narrative of "Muslim rage."  Almost every well-reported account of last week's protests in particular countries emphasized the local political issues in play.  In Egypt, salafis were jockeying with Islamists for political attention, while the actual battles outside the Embassy seem to have mostly involved young toughs rather than ideologues. In Yemen, general anger at American policies combined with a concentration of angry young toughs seemed to be the key.  In Lebanon, the greater violence in today's protests than in most other places likely has to do with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's attempt to focus on religious affronts rather than his unpopular stance on Syria.   

Third, while I don't think it's a major factor, perhaps Obama's outreach to the Muslim world hasn't actually been the dismal failure declared in a thousand (oddly similar) opeds after all.  It's true that his Cairo speech and subsequent policies have not granted him enduring popularity or magically generated universal love for America.  But that was never really the expectation or the point. The Danish cartoons protest wave was sustained by the broader
international "clash of civilizations" atmosphere of the middle of that
decade, a seamless narrative of conflict between Islam and the West
fueled by the toxic legacies of the high rhetoric of the war on terror and the occupation of
Iraq.  Obama's outreach efforts sought to break that spiral towards a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, by focusing on issues of "mutual interest and mutual respect."  Last week showed that the extremists hoping to spark a clash of civilizations are still there.  Who thought they weren't?  But their relatively poor showing suggests that something has changed.  And part of that may be that even if American policies remain unpopular, there's no longer a seamless narrative of a war on Islam which makes sense to ordinary people. 

Of course this doesn't mean that we won't see more cycles of outrage and protest over these issues.  A lot of people genuinely care about them, and they have the ability to organize protests, spread their message, and capture local and international media attention.  Sometimes, the interests of key actors will align differently and they will gain more momentum rather than petering out.   In Pakistan and Lebanon, for instance, things are far uglier than in most of the Arab countries -- likely for reasons related to the domestic political situation.  

I eagerly await the rush of opeds and cable news talk shows sure to come soon explaining the real meaning of the relative calm in Cairo and today's rally in Benghazi.  I'm sure I've misread some of the cases here, and that the next week or two might lead to different dynamics playing out.  But questions about these political dynamics, the failure of the mobilization to take hold into a sustained protest, the shifting calculations of key Islamist actors, and the responses by other powerful social forces in places like Libya would be far better questions to be asking than the ones which have dominated the discourse for the last week. 

Jordan Going Darker

The Middle East Channel Editor's Reader #8

King Abdullah's approval this week of a controversial new law imposing potentially draconian controls over Jordan's internet is finally drawing attention to the country's increasingly dangerous political situation. 

The new law's effort to stifle political expression puts at risk the
Jordanian IT sector, which makes up some 14% of the
country's GDP, produces a very significant share of youth jobs, and is one of the few bright spots in its grim economy.  It's hard to see the gain in further alienating disaffected youth and crush their primary source of economic hope at a time of grinding economic problems and simmering political protests (for more background, see May's Jordan, Forever on the Brink).  Jordanians in the IT sector, as well as conbributors to its vibrant political public sphere, point to the irony of the famously dysfunctional Parliamentary system managing to suddenly work so effectively to produce this legislation out of all the real problems in the country it has spent years neglecting. 

It's also hard to see much hope in the regime's response to its political problems.  The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is reportedly again discussing a push for constitutional monarchy which it has intermittently floated for the last five or six years.  But there does not seem to be much of a sense of urgency. Instead, there has been a combination of more repression and more of the same, tired political games: rumors of yet another Prime Ministerial shuffle, plans for a Parliamentary election by the end of the year under an extremely disappointing new election law.   Fears of replicating Syria's bloody chaos
may restrain protestors from fully challenging the King even with these
escalating grievances, a familiar theme in Jordanian political history.  But for how long can this be enough?  And will a disappointing election be a trigger for simmering discontent to turn into something more? 

Last week, as part of our new weekly series of POMEPS Conversations with leading Middle East experts, I sat down with Curtis Ryan, one of the leading American experts on Jordan, to talk about the country's political prospects. 

You can find more of these POMEPS Conversations here, including last week's conversation with Gregory Gause about Saudi Arabia.  For more on Jordan's political situation, see

- Jordan, Forever on the Brink:  POMEPS Brief, May 2012

- Sarah Tobin, "Jordan's Arab Spring:  The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution" Middle East Policy 2012 (paywall)

- Andrew Barwig, "The new Palace Guards:  Elections and Elites in Jordan and Morocco," Middle East Journal 2012 (paywall,  unless Michael wants to liberate it)

- Curtis Ryan, "Identity Politics, Protest and Reform in Jordan," Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 2011 (paywall)

- International Crisis Group, "Dallying With Reform in a Divided Jordan" (May 2012)

- Fida Adely, "The emergence of a new Labor Movement in Jordan," Middle East Report (2012)

- Jillian Schwedler, "The politics of popular protest in Jordan" FPRI (March 2012)

- Tariq al-Tall and Lama Abu Odeh debate political opposition, the nature of the regime,  and Jordanian history. Jadaliyya. 

- Julian Barnes-Dacey. Jordan: Reform Before It's Too Late.  European Council on Foreign Relations (April 2012)

- Jean-Loup Samaan. “Jordan’s New Geopolitics.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (2012).

As always, if I've missed something good let me know and I'm delighted to update! 

The embassy protests and the Arab uprising

Last week's scenes of angry mobs besieging America's embassies in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Tunisia, and
of one of its finest diplomats dead in the streets of a country he had helped to
liberate understandably shocked and horrified Americans. Sensationalist media outlets rushed to exploit the moment, politicians pounced prematurely, and pundits reached for their great book of cliches about the roots of Muslim rage. Somewhere, I have no doubt, a great global assembly of strawmen is convening for anxious discussions about why they had been targeted for burning. This despair is wildly
premature. The embassy attacks do not present the "true face" of the Arab uprisings. They do not mean that the hopes for democratic change have failed, and we have not entered an "Islamist Winter."

The crisis isn't over, of course. Small numbers of protestors continue to rage as the cycle unfolds across the world, and cynical politicians desperate to revive their flagging fortunes are banging the drums of outrage (no, no, I meant Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah). But after one week I am struck by the significant differences between 2006 and 2012 in how Arab and American publics have responded to the cycle of outrage. This week, a wide range of prominent leaders and ordinary citizens publicly rebuked the attacks on U.S. Embassies, and have denounced the riots (even if many continue to voice their right to criticize the anti-Islamic film). The protests, most of which were rather small in the first place, have in most places largely sputtered out, in part because key Islamist forces decided that their interests were better served by restraint than by escalation. What is more, a very significant number
of Arab voices complained publicly over their peers demonstrating over an
obscure film rather than over the
slaughter in Syria or serious domestic challenges in their countries. I
do not remember any similar backlash in 2006. (Please do check out the #muslimrage hashtag on Twitter for a fine outburst of humor over the attempt to gin up a new clash of civilizations.)

This is not to say that there has been some great outpouring of pro-American sentiment masked by the angry crowds shouting "Death to America." American foreign policy is as unpopular as ever, and the anger over this ridiculous film appears to be widespread and real. But the Arab uprisings have empowered multiple, competing voices which will not easily cede the stage to the old forces of Islamist outrage. And without dictators to fan the flames behind the scenes and then shut things down when they went to far -- the game perfected by the Mubaraks, Salehs and Assads of the world over too many years -- even the Islamists with seemingly the most to gain politically by fanning the flames of fury seem to have realized the need for restraint. Finally, thanks to social media links forged between Arab journalists and activists with American journalists and ordinary citizens over the last two years, there may be less dependence on "official" narratives and more opportunities for non-extremists to make themselves heard. Indeed, the real story of last week may utlimately be that it has become harder, not easier, to spark and sustain these "clash of civilizations" dynamics in the wake of the Arab uprising. [[BREAK]]

The comparison to the Danish Cartoons crisis helps to separate out what might be unique either to the Arab uprisings or the Obama administration's policies. The Danish cartoons crisis took place under the Bush administration, well before it began its much needed course correction by replacing Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates and sidelining Dick Cheney later in 2006.
The Bush administration was still in full-on Global War on Terror mode at that time, still occupying Iraq, still deploying all the bold and resolved rhetoric in its arsenal. And it took place at the height of Arab authoritarianism, when all those
friendly secular dictators were comfortably in their palaces. Despite those two key differences from today, the initial outbreak of the Cartoons crisis looked a lot like last week's crisis --- but the subsequent dynamics did not.

Then, as now, a group of Islamist activists brought obscure, local images portraying Mohammed from the West to the Middle East, and then opportunistic extremists used them to whip up a global frenzy. A number of Arab regimes tacitly or overtly supported the escalation of the protests. Several (mostly) Danish Embassies were torched, and over a hundred people were killed. In the subsequent Stupid!Storm, Islamist leaders competed to outbid each other in the rhetorical fury of their denunciations, while those leaders (such as the televangelist Amr Khaled) who timidly tried to de-escalate the crisis were roundly denounced. Protests went on for weeks. The middle ground almost completely disappeared, as the extremes drove the debate and gloomy notions of a "clash of civilizations" gained ever wider currency, to al-Qaeda's delight.

Last week's sudden eruption began in a similar way, but then took a different path. The initial steps look similar, from the discovery of an obscure media insult to Islam by opportunistic Islamists through the rioting outside Embassies. The rapid outpouring of popular outrage and sensitivity to insults to Islam look very similar as well. But equally interesting is what happened next: apologies and condemnation of the attacks (some more grudging than others) from elected leaders, popular demonstrations in a number of Arab countries against the violence, and widespread pushback in Arab public debates against the attempt to hijack popular anger.

In
Libya, almost every elected official rushed to denounce the attacks and
apologize for American losses. Vigils and protests against the violence broke out across the country,
with Libyans rushing to tell Americans that the attackers did not represent
Libya or Islam. The killings in Libya revealed not a latent anti-Americanism,
but the ongoing lack of state capacity. If it does turn out that Stevens was killed in a well-planned attack by al-Qaeda in retaliation for the killing of Abu Yehya al-Libi, this point would stand even more strongly. American and Libyan leaders alike
quickly agreed that the appropriate response was even closer cooperation to
disarm militias, built a functioning state, and complete the democratic
transition.

Such responses did not only occur in Libya. Similar apologies from national leaders and denunciations of the violence by NGOs and activist groups quickly occurred in Yemen, despite the serious hostility towards
American foreign policy prevalent there and the popular hostility to the deployment of US Marines to protect the Embassy. "Nothing is more disgusting than watching a small group of reckless people trying to hijack the extraordinary image of Yemeni protestors throughout more than a year of peaceful struggle," complained one Yemeni activist. Tunisia's government has promised to quickly crack down on the leaders of the attack on the Tunis Embassy. Protests in most other Arab countries proved to be small and
marginal, their importance magnified by media scrutiny: a few hundred here and there, not hundreds of thousands taking over the streets. The expected surge of protests last Friday largely failed to materialize, and by Saturday the wave already appeared to have crested and the streets calmed down. Even Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who had played a key role in pushing rage over the Danish Cartoons into the mainstream in 2006 and who clearly wanted to score points off this latest opportunity for manufactured outrage, came out against attacking embassies.

The sharpest challenge came not in Libya, but in Egypt. The
original protests had been organized by salafis, after the airing of the film
clip on one of their satellite television stations (a human rights lawyer has now filed suit against them). But the small number of Egyptians involved in violent
clashes outside the Embassy in the following days were mostly young punks with
no discernible ideology beyond hatred for the police. These were neither Islamists nor the activists of the early
days of Tahrir Square, but the violent anarchists who had dominated the clashes
in the final months of 2011. The popular anger over the perceived insult to Islam, the
dominance of intra-Islamist political competition in driving behavior, and the
widespread hostility to the United States were nonetheless real and posed a
significant challenge to the future of the U.S.-Egyptian strategic
alliance. The near-complete
absence of any Egyptians willing to stand up for the United States during the
crisis stood in stark, depressing contrast to the outpourings of popular
sympathy from Libya to Yemen. No
vigils for American victims were organized in Cairo of which I am aware (please correct me if I'm wrong).

But despite all of this, Morsi, who initially disappeared and would likely have preferred to ride the wave of a cheap and popular issue, quickly discovered the need to calm things down in order to
maintain working relations with the West. After a sharp
private exchange with Obama and several pointed public American remarks (Obama's "neither an ally nor an enemy" comment was very clearly a message and not a gaffe), Morsi stepped
forward with a televised address apologizing for the violence. The Muslim
Brotherhood withdrew its call for Friday protests against the film, which might have dramatically escalated the crisis. Morsi's grudging but eventually effective response says little about the never-ending debate over the Brotherhood's "true" intentions, but much about how its behavior is shaped by pressures and opportunities.

The violence last week therefore meant less than initially met the
eye but did point to several important points. The Arab
uprising opened space for all forms of political activism, including many
strands of Islamism and nativism. The salafi organizers of protestors against the film did take advantage of the same
opportunities to organize, mobilize and communicate their grievances as did
other activist groups. Such mobs can do considerable damage, especially where state institutions are weak and can't reliably maintain security (Libya, Yemen). Islamism has been transforming Arab public culture for generations, creating ample opportunities to mobilize people in the face of such manufactured outrages. Almost every Arab transition has struggled to deliver
on its early promise, leaving a vast reservoir of frustrated, angry youth ready
to be mobilized into protests and demonstrations. Islamists have taken over increasing political space in much of the region, keeping such issues ripe for mobilization.
Empowered publics and a tightly interconnected media space do
ensure the rapid diffusion of ideas and protest movements across the entire
region. And the Arab uprising did contain a powerful element of popular opposition to the American role in the region, not only among Islamists, rooted in decades of U.S. policies which have not been forgotten.

But there's so much more to it than that. The Islamist protestors using the YouTube film to whip up outrage are only one small voice in a contested, turbulent new public sphere. The new Arab public is far more diverse and self-confident today than it was six years ago, and able and willing to push back against simplistic interpretations. Political jockeying between Muslim Brothers and salafis in transitional countries may create incentives for outbidding on Islamic issues, but the political arena -- both at home and abroad -- offers more countervailing forces and pressure points. Leaders of transitional governments have different political interests than did the old dictators, as do Islamist movements now struggling with the exercise of power amidst ongoing institutional crisis and polarized politics. There are certainly plenty of people and movements on both sides who yearn for a return to the simple politics of a clash of civilizations, but there are many more who are manifestly impatient with such dichotomies and now have the political space to reject them.

The protests last week, particularly the killing of Chris Stevens and his colleagues, were a horrible moment for America and for the Middle East. But it is far too soon to give up on the promise of the Arab
uprisings. Nobody thought that fundamental political change would be easy, that transitions would proceed without turbulence, or that anti-American feelings had simply vanished. But perhaps the end of the crisis matters more than its beginning.

America navigating this turbulent environment will depend in part on bipartisan consensus about the importance of promoting democratic reform in the Arab world. The Obama administration has maintained its poise through a difficult week, despite the crisis abroad and the partisan polemics at home. I only wish I knew whether Romney agreed with him and with the McCains and Kristols of his own party on support for democratic change in the Middle East, or with those trends on the American right who see only Islamist radicalism on the march. Perhaps someone should ask him.

Moments of Truth in Libya and Egypt

I awoke this morning to the horrifying news of the death of U.S.
Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other consular officials during a mob
attack on the consulate in Benghazi, which followed yesterday's
storming of the embassy in Cairo. The embassy riots over an absurd, obscure anti-Islam movie are more "Danish
Cartoons" than "Iranian Hostage Crisis" and were following a depressingly familiar script until the deaths in Libya. But now the stakes are far higher.

It would be a tragic mistake to allow the images from Cairo and Benghazi to undermine American support for the changes in the Arab world. The protesters in Cairo and Benghazi are no
more the true face of the Arab uprisings than al Qaeda was the face of Islam after 9/11. We should not allow the actions of a radical fringe to define our
views of an entire group. The aspirations for democratic change of
many millions of Arab citizens must not be delegitimated by the violent
acts of a small group of radicals.  

But the response to the eruption by empowered publics, elected leaders and influential voices across political
society -- including, especially, Islamists -- really does matter. Authoritarian regimes in the past frequently allowed, or even encouraged, such violent eruptions over these issues. Islamist movements in perennial opposition leaped at the chance to score political points while taking no responsibility for what followed. Today will be a pivotal moment in the urgent debates about how such movements will respond to political power and a stake in the political system. Libya's leaders thus far look to be passing
that test. Egypt's do not. [[BREAK]]  

Libya was the location of the greater horror, with the death of Stevens
and his consular staffers. But across the Libyan political spectrum
there has been an immediate rush of condemnation of the attacks and deep
empathy with the American victims. Mohammed al-Magariaf, president of
Libya's National Council, quickly declared that "in the strongest
possible words, in all languages, we condemn, reject,
and denounce what happened in Benghazi yesterday in the assault on the
US Consulate." Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa Abu Shagur said "I condemn
these barbaric acts in the strongest possible terms. This is
an attack on America, Libya and free people everywhere." Prime Minister
Abd al-Rahim al-Keib offered similar strong condemnation. Libyan
officials have promised to bring those responsible for the killings to
justice. Libyans online have been similarly outraged and appalled.
My Twitter timeline has filled with angry and outraged comments from
Libyans denouncing the attacks and expressing sympathy and support for
the dead Americans. Numerous protests have been announced for the next few days against the attackers.    

In short, the response from Libya suggests a broad national
rejection at both the governmental and societal level of the
anti-American agitation. The leaders have said the right things and
have done their part to quickly pre-empt a spiral of conflict and
recrimination between Americans and Libyans. And the United States has in turn responded with a calm but firm response which unequivocally condemned the attacks but committed to continuing to cooperate with Libyans against a common challenge. And, as President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton both emphasized
repeatedly in their remarks today, many Libyans came to the defense of
the Americans at the consulate -- exactly the right move, isolating and
marginalizing the violent attackers rather than exaggerating and
empowering their claims. And they will need it, as the attacks also
clearly demonstrate Libya's ongoing problems of state capacity -- lack
of adequate capability to ensure security, to disarm militias, or to
police such outbursts. 

In Egypt, on the other hand, President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim
Brotherhood has been notably invisible. To this point, we have heard
no statements from Egyptian government officials condemning the assault
on the embassy, no expressions of concern or sympathy, no suggestion of
any fault on their own side. The Muslim Brotherhood had previously been
planning rallies against the notorious film, and at the time of this
writing has not canceled them. Even when they finally issued a statement condemning the violence in Libya, they were not forthcoming on Cairo. They seem far more concerned at the moment with their domestic political interest in protecting their right flank against Salafi outbidding than with behaving like the governing party of a state. 

Morsi and the Brotherhood do not seem to understand, or perhaps they simply do not care, how important their public stance is today in defining their image. The United States has taken real risks by engaging with the Brotherhood, pushing for democratic change despite their likely victory in fair elections, and insisting that the Egyptian military allow the completion of the transition after Morsi's victory. That was necessary to have any hope of genuine democratic change in Egypt, and the right position to take. But I suspect that many in Washington will feel that they have been repaid with Morsi's silence after the breach of the embassy wall which could well have resulted in the same kind of tragedy as in Benghazi. And that will have enduring effects on the nature and extent of American support for Egypt's transition -- how much harder is it going to be to get debt relief through congress now? It is quite telling that Obama said nothing about Egypt in his remarks about the deaths in Benghazi. 

The response to the attacks by Libyans and Egyptians is in many ways more important than the attacks themselves, and certainly more important than the absurd film. President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are facing a critical test right now ... whether or not they realize its importance. 

Snapshots of Middle East public opinion

I've been busy the last few days with a trip to Iowa -- thanks University of Iowa and Drake University for a gracious welcome!; a panel discussion today on the regional politics of the Syrian crisis (video will be posted soon); a few video interviews for a new series of POMEPS Conversations with Middle East experts (to be launched shortly);  and updates to the POMEPS Arab uprising bibliography (coming soon).  But I wanted to briefly note two intriguing public opinion surveys relevant to Middle East policy debate --- one from the United States, and one from Jordan. Both suggest reasons for doubting popular calls for an activist American policy towards Syria and the broader Middle East.... for better or for worse. [[BREAK]] 

First:  Jordan.  The University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies, which for the last couple of decades has been the most reliable public opinion survey research unit in the Kingdom, just released a fascinating report on Jordanian attitudes towards Syria. Jordan has been one of the states most directly affected by the escalating flow of refugees from the Syrian catastrophe.  After absorbing refugee waves from Palestine and from Iraq, the Syrian influx is putting extraordinary pressure on the Hashemite Kingdom -- although this is too often used an excuse by a regime causing more than enough problems for itself (see: disastrous new election law or absurd new restrictions on online media).   Opponents of reform have found ample opportunity to argue that the current crisis makes it too dangerous to open up... a perspective which I fear will only exacerbate Jordan's internal crisis, but to which security officials cling.  (I continue to believe that Syrian refugees, while a real problem, barely crack the top ten list of problems confronting Jordan -- more attention should be paid to corruption, economic policy, the useless Parliament, tribal unrest, the crackdown on media and internet freedoms, and so much more). 

The CSS survey found that Jordanians are not in the mood to host yet another wave of refugees. 80% of the Jordanian public wants Syrians confined to refugee camps, and 65% doesn't want Jordan to welcome any more Syrian refugees at all. 74% see Syrian refugees outside of designated camps as a threat to Jordan's stability -- with greater numbers agreeing with that stance in the north where most of the Syrian refugees are concentrated. Syrians and their advocates will be profoundly depressed b these results.  

Jordanians are also sharply divided, according to the survey, about what is even going on in their northern neighbor.  45% say that the events in Syria represent a popular revolution, while 41% describe it as a foreign conspiracy.  57% think that the Syrian opposition is tied to foreign powers, a sharp departure from earlier perceptions.   As to what to do, 54% of Jordanians say they would like to see Bashar al-Assad leave office.  But only 5% express support for foreign military intervention --- worth keeping in mind when you hear people saying that Arabs are calling out for American action in Syria. Such findings are also food for thought for those (such as me) who have argued that al-Jazeera and other transnational Arab media have a key role in shaping Arab public opinion --- after a year of non-stop advocacy for the Syrian opposition, how is it that al-Jazeera has only convinced 45% of Jordanians of its interpretative frame?

Over in Egypt, al-Ahram reports that 77% of Egyptians approve of President Mohammed el-Morsi's performance in office.  This is the first poll of its kind that I've seen since his electoral victory;  it's done by an organization about which I don't know much, so I can't speak to its credibility.   To the extent that the poll is considered credible -- and there's a long history of doubtful Egyptian opinion polling -- these results would suggest support far beyond either Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood base or the 51% who voted for him in the hotly contested Presidential runoff.  60% of the respondents said they would vote for Morsi if the elections were held tomorrow-- far more than his share of the vote in the actual elections, but considerably below his approval rating. But I would like to see a lot more polling before coming to any conclusions about solid trends in Egyptian opinion on these matters. 

Meanwhile, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs has just released its regular survey of American views of the world.   While my FP pal Dan Drezner has already related key results of that suvey relevant to the presidential election, I thought I would just highlight some of the key Middle East related results.  I was struck by the fact that 67% now see the Iraq war as "not worth it" -- the highest result since the Chicago Council started asking that question on 2003, and crucial context for any discussion of U.S. policy options towards Syria. 68% believe (correctly) that the invasion of Iraq has not had a positive effect on the spread of democracy in the Middle East -- neocon fantasies aside, if anything Iraq's horrors provided a cautionary tale to most in the region about what could go wrong and probably helped prop up authoritarian regimes in the region by making them look better in comparison. 

Beyond the retrospective view of Iraq, 71% in the Chicago Council survey say (correctly, in my humble opinion) that the Iraq experience should make the U.S. "more cautious about the use of military force against rogue regimes."  This is consistent with a wide range of other polling, which consistently shows very low support for U.S. military action in Syria.  There is just no appetite out there for U.S. military intervention in Syria, no matter how many Washington Post opeds or John McCain speeches argue for one.  ForeignPolicy had previously reported the key findings of this survey on Syria --  a broad desire to do something, but only 22% supporting bombing Syrian targets and 14% support for U.S. troops on the ground in Syria. 

The broader theme is one of humility about what the U.S. can or should attempt to accomplish through military means abroad.  But I was also pleased to see that only 13% of Americans said that the U.S.
should not have taken part at all in the Libyan intervention -- and, at the same time, that
only 7% said that the U.S. should have played "a leading role." 
Apparently leading from behind is just fine with Americans who don't
write for the Weekly Standard or the Washington Post, especially when it
works.   And it's striking that 70% oppose a U.S. military strike
against Iran over its nuclear program without UN authorization. 

Beyond Syria, I was pleased to see that American opinion viewed the Arab uprisings as a positive rather than negative development, with 34% describing the Arab spring as "mostly good" and 24% as "mostly bad."   But a 13 point increase in those saying that the U.S. should end its economic support for Egypt could suggest a broader concern about trends in that transition --- or, perhaps, just a broader inward turn and reluctance to spend scarce money abroad (which I, personally, would find short-sighted).  I think turning our back on the Arab world would be a profound mistake -- but clearly, the case for a continuing American interest in partnering with Arab governments and pushing Arab democracy needs to be made. 

Both the Jordanian and the American surveys discussed here are just snapshots --- but both are revealing of some important trends. I offer them up here more as data points for ongoing discussion than as conclusive evidence.. and only wish there were more such data from the Middle East upon which to draw to credibly assess the views of Arab publics at a time when they matter more than ever.  

A Reading List for the Arab Uprisings

Have you wondered how Middle East specialists have dealt with the Arab uprisings? Do you want to know how the field has responded to the scathing indictment offered by Gregory Gause in Foreign Affairs last summer that "the vast majority of academic specialists on
the Arab world were as surprised as everyone else by the upheavals?" Or are you just looking for new books and articles which might be useful for course syllabi or research projects? 

With the Labor Day weekend marking the traditional launch of a
new academic year, I am delighted to share the new POMEPS bibliography of academic books and journal articles about the Arab uprisings. The bibliography includes books and journal articles,
and will soon be expanded to include selected policy reports written by academics. We won't try to include the many shorter articles such as those published on the Middle East Channel and other online publications. Over the summer, I edited a collection for the Project on Middle East
Political Science of a set of reflections by more than two dozen leading
political scientists about new research opportunities presented by the Arab uprisings. This bibliography shows a field beginning to grapple with and hopefully to deliver on those ideas.[[BREAK]]

The Arab uprisings and the political struggles which have followed
should generate rich intellectual opportunities for new thinking, new
research, and new ideas. No analytical consensus has emerged, nor should it any time soon. Some scholars
claim
theoretical vindication that so many authoritarian regimes survived the
massive protest wave of 2011. Others have attempted to adapt
pre-existing theories which
would seem to have been contradicted rather spectacularly by events. Still others have seized the opportunity to
develop new research programs around the dynamics of mobilization
and contentious politics, international diffusion, information
technology, transitional elections, and the role of international and
transnational actors.    

The articles and books now appearing show a field of experts from a wide range of analytical and political traditions grappling with both the uprisings and the political aftermath. It's very clear that Middle East scholars did not miss the Arab uprisings because they didn't believe Arabs wanted democracy, or because they failed to observe the signs of escalating mobilization. The literature of the last two decades was full of studies of rising political protest, the
transformative
impact of new information technologies and a new public sphere, the
decaying foundations of Arab
regimes, economic deprivations and escalating corruption,
succession problems among republics and monarchies alike, the rejection
of the regional status quo, and so forth. And there were plenty of
studies of Islamist movements, political parties, civil society, and various social
movements. 

Indeed, Lisa Anderson acidly noted in a 2006 review essay that the real problem may have been that academics focused too much
of their efforts on questions about democratization which
manifestly did not exist. It was political scientists sobered by decades of abortive democratization and false promises of change who shifted their focus to explaining the
persistence of authoritarianism, and were thus caught off-guard by the massive region-wide popular wave of protest and fall of several long-serving leaders. While I have argued repeatedly that the uprisings are a manifestation of a deep, structural transformation of Arab politics driven in part by the changing information environment, others have good reason to disagree. They point to the survival of so many other regimes and the frustrations of the revolutionaries, to the frightening lessons of Syria's descent to civil war or Bahrain's remorseless crushing of opposition, or to the continuing role of oil rents or U.S. support for helpful dictators to question the extent of real transformative change. These are good debates to have. Indeed, as with my piece last week on the Arab monarchies, questions matter as much as answers at this point, and it would be a pity if a new consensus settled in prematurely.

I hope that scholars and journalists find this
resource helpful. Please
send us books or articles which we've missed -- we will be constantly
updating, and looking to provide a one-stop resource for academics
working on the topic. And I will just say again that it would be even more helpful if
journal publishers would allow the articles to emerge from behind the
paywall (we will link to as many ungated versions of the papers as
possible). Thanks!

UPDATE: Some quick responses to comments on Twitter: This is meant to be a comprehensive bibliography of academic books and journal articles, not recommendations or endorsements. We will generally include books when they are published in the United States, which means that we may run behind some of the interesting books which appear elsewhere. Based on one reader's excellent suggestion, we hope to add a section on Arabic publications. Remember -- this will be updated regularly, so if you have ideas about new topics, articles or books just send them along. And finally, a big shout out to GW graduate student Chana Solomon-Schwartz for her assistance in preparing and maintaining the bibliography! 

Does Arab monarchy matter?

What does it mean that no Kings have thus far fallen in the Arab uprisings while four non-monarchical rulers (Ben Ali, Mubarak, Qaddafi and Saleh) have toppled from their (non-royal) thrones and a fifth has plunged his country into a brutal civil war?   Is there a monarchical exception in the Arab world?   The significance of monarchy has been one of the most vibrant debates among political scientists over the last two years, as I wrote about a few months ago.  A new article in the Journal of Politics by Victor Menaldo claiming statistical evidence for a monarchical advantage prompted me to revisit these arguments this week.    

The advantages of monarchy have taken on the feel of "common sense" among the public and in academic debates. But I remain highly skeptical about the more ambitious arguments for a monarchical exception.
Access to vast wealth and useful international allies seems a more
plausible explanation for the resilience of most of the Arab
monarchies.  Surviving with the financial resources and international
allies available to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE seems like no great trick. 
The active, concerted economic, political, media (and occasionally
military) Saudi and Qatari support for their less wealthy fellow
monarchs seems to be more important to the survival of the current crop
of kings than the instrinsic institutional characteristics of a
throne.   

There has been a robust academic argument over the possible political benefits of monarchy at least since Lisa Anderson's influential 1991 article "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy."  The operation of dynastic monarchies in relation to other regime types have been detailed and analyzed in important work by Michael Herb and many other political scientists over the last two decades.  That debate intesects in productive ways with broader research trends in political science over the last decade over the many varieties of authoritarianism.  In that context, I certainly don't mean to say that monarchy doesn't matter at all.  It seems
obvious that different regime types will create different incentives,
institutions, and possibilities for political contention.  And the relative survival rate of the monarchies during the Arab uprisings
of the last years is certainly suggestive of something.  But I remain highly skeptical of the stronger theoretical and policy claims about the positive political benefits of Arab monarchy.   

I am particularly unpersuaded by arguments that the Arab monarchies enjoy a distinctive legitimacy.  Some Kings no doubt have been popular due to their personality, their policies, or their ability to play their assigned role effectively.  But it is difficult to reconcile the idea of monarchical legitimacy with the tightly controlled media, carefully cultivated
personality cults, and brutally policed "red lines" which generally characterize such regimes.  The alleged unique legitimacy of Arab monarchs strikes me as a carefully cultivated and ruthlessly policed political myth which could dissolve as quickly as did the universal adoration for Bashar al-Assad or Moammar Qaddafi when challenged.  If monarchy
confers unique legitimacy on, say, King Abdullah of Jordan, then why the
need for a draconian l'ese majeste law criminalizing insulting the King or escalating controls on the online media? 
Why the need for Kuwait to jail someone for posting a YouTube video of a poem criticizing the Emir?  Why such concern among the Saudi leadership over the grumblings of the religious establishment?  

The claim for a unique legitimacy among the Arab monarchies is further undermined by the fact that they have in fact experienced significant political
dissent over the last two years, to which they responded through fairly typical (albeit unusually well-resourced) combinations of
repression and co-optation.   Kuwait experienced the most dramatic, largest and most effective political protests in its history, leading to a political crisis which has shut down Parliament and for the first time brought the perogatives of the royal family directly into the public debate.  Quiet Oman faced unprecedented levels of protest which forced significant political reforms.  Saudi Arabia has faced persistent and growing protest in its Eastern Province, and forcefully cracked down on dissent elsewhere even as it lavished $130 billion on its restive population.  Bahrain's monarchy survived (for now) against truly massive popular mobilization only through the application of a brutal, sweeping campaign of sectarian repression.  Morocco's monarch diverted popular mobilization through an early offer of limited political reforms, while Jordan's monarch struggles with growing  popular mobilization and an ever-shrinking ruling coalition as his regime fails to effectively adapt. In other words, the resources and capabilities of the Arab monarchies may be different from their non-kingly peers, but the challenges facing them from popular mobilization really were not.

Other popular arguments in the literature for the
monarchical exception also strike me as limited. It's true that the
monarchies practice divide and rule, selectively co-opt and repress, and in some
cases allow controlled elections to Parliaments with limited power ---
but is this so different from the games played by Ben Ali, Mubarak, or Assad?  Perhaps monarchies offer a sense of predictability to
politics and reduce the stakes of competition -- but were Syrians or Egyptians really under the illusion that
their leaders might be voted out of office?  Perhaps monarchy allows
all other citizens to know their place and not get any uppity ideas
about a role in governing or oversight of their government's budgets --
but is such a second-class citizenship really viable in today's
political environment?  And can we really say that monarchs are better at
offering an inclusive national identity in the face of the virulent
anti-Shi'a exclusions in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, or the constant
exploitation of Transjordanian-Palestinian identity divides in Jordan? (I'd rather not get into Menaldo's arguments as to why the monarchies have less corruption, since the premise seems so implausible on its face.)

To me, the monarchies look like fairly typical Arab
authoritarian regimes, surviving because they enjoy greater financial
resources, less demanding international allies, and powerful media assets to perpetuate their legitimation myths.  And that means that they will not likely be spared should those assets lose value -- as they well might, given young, often underemployed populations that have some of the highest smartphone and media penetration in the world; dysfunctional political institutions; extravagant promises of public spending which may soon put serious strain on even Gulf budgets;  shifting regional political dynamics and reduced U.S. commitments; and uncertain leadership successions.  The monarchs may be on offense around the region right now, but their defense might not be a strong as it appears.

To paraphrase one of our great living philosopher kings,
the Arab monarchies may be forced to choose among three dreams: the
Saudi King's, Dr. King's and Rodney King's.   The monarchs would like
their own people and the outside world to believe that they survive
because of their effective and benevolent leadership, their unique
political culture, and their distinctive legitimacy which requires no great concessions to meaningful democratic political participation.  But that very myth can
blind them to the ever more urgent calls by reformists for just such
political inclusion, transparency, an end to corruption, and equality of citizenship.  The violent repression and angry protests
in Manama or Qatif provide stark warning of the danger of believing such comforting
mythologies of resilience or legitimacy.  

The discussion of Arab monarchy really should be a debate, of course.  A lot of smart people do think that monarchy matters, and have developed sophisticated arguments and evidence to support the contention.  They may be right.  There's an outstanding literature in political science on the nature of various regime types, to which Middle East specialists have contributed significantly.  But if Gulf regimes start to suddenly fall, as predicted in this forthcoming book by Christopher Davidson, or the popular mobilization which already exists takes on new forms, then the embrace
of the monarchical exception could soon look as foolish as did the
passion for Lebanese consociationalism in the 1960s, the admiration for
the Shah's developmental state in Iran in the 1970s, or the confidence
in the resilience of Arab authoritarian regimes in the 2000s. 

Morsi's Egypt

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi's
sudden move last week to oust the senior leadership of the Egyptian military
broke a long period of political stagnation and began to bring into view the
contours of the emerging political order. It reversed
views of Morsi almost
overnight. Only two weeks ago, most analysts had written Morsi off as a weak
and ineffective executive boxed in by the ascendant military leadership of the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). After his bold move against the
SCAF and reversal of its constitutional decrees, many now fear that he and the
Muslim Brotherhood stand at the brink of nigh-totalitarian domination. [[BREAK]]

Both the earlier dismissal and the
current exaggerated fears seem premature. Egypt's politics remain polarized,
its economy staggering, its institutions decayed. Rules of the game remain in
flux, with the constitution still unwritten, parliament dissolved, and the
judiciary viewed through a partisan lens. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood's
accelerated push for power risks triggering a backlash, not only from
anti-Islamist forces but from centrists uneasy with ideological domination and
from Salafi and other Islamist forces jealous of the movement's position. The
military may have suffered a setback, but it retains great institutional and
economic power, the respect of the Egyptian public, and (lest we forget) guns. Revolutionary
forces have been relegated to the sidelines in recent months, but could
rekindle street politics at any moment. In Egypt's polarized political
environment, fueled by its contentious and turbocharged media and online public
sphere, no consensus is likely to soon emerge.

In short, it is still too early to tell
which direction Morsi will take Egypt, which forces will cooperate, and which forces
will move to resist. There are a number of common theories of the case. One,
pointing to deep-seated mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi's unprecedented
monopoly on formal power, and disturbing moves
against the independent media, demonstrates fear
that he will now seek to impose Islamist hegemony. Another sees the military
still largely in control, sacrificing its aging figureheads and public
political role in exchange for more entrenched power behind the scenes. Still
others see Morsi's move as an important step in advancing the transition from
authoritarianism to a democratic system by establishing civilian control over
the military.

Which of these is correct? Is
Egypt still under SCAF's control, heading toward an Islamist theocracy, on the
road to democracy, or on the brink of economic and institutional collapse that
will make a mockery of the high political games that dominate the headlines? The
rapid shift in the narrative should breed at least some analytical humility.
Many argue the drafting of the constitution will reveal the truth, but it seems
unlikely that any greater interpretive consensus will emerge around that process
than has been seen around any other point in Egypt's long, tortured transition
to a post-Mubarak era.

"Morsi's Egypt" offers a wide range of
analysis of how Egypt got to this point, where it may be going, and how to
understand it all. It ranges widely over the dizzying moves of the last few
months, including controversial moves by the judiciary around the presidential
election ("Calvinball
in Cairo," "Cairo's Judicial Coup," and "Egypt's Injudicious Judges"); the role of
the military ("The Egyptian Republic of Retired Generals,"
"Hard Choices for Egypt's Military," "What Morsi Could Learn from Sadat," and "Cobra and Mongoose Become Lion and Lamb");
the struggles of non-Islamist political forces ("Can Egypt Unite?," and "It ain't just a river in Egypt"); the
Muslim Brotherhood's calculations ("Monopolizing power in Egypt," "Brother knows best," "Bad news for - and from - the Brotherhood,"
and much more, including a special guest appearance by the great Ellis Goldberg. Download "Morsi's Egypt" here! 

Lamborghini Morsi

After long weeks of political gridlock and stagnation, Egypt's elected President Mohammed el-Morsi suddenly .  Over the span of a few days, Morsi removed the head of General Intelligence, the head of the Military Police, the top two senior leaders of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and the heads of all the military services.  In addition to this SCAF-Quake, Morsi also canceled the controversial Constitutional amendments promulgated by the SCAF just before he took office and issued a new, equally controversial amendment and roadmap of his own.  What's more, this all came after he replaced the editors of major state-owned newspapers with people viewed as sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and cracked down on several other critical papers. Zero to 180 in three days -- even Usain Bolt would be impressed by that acceleration.  Swirv. [[BREAK]]

What does it all mean?   It's a bit of a cop-out, but really it's too soon to tell.  As always in Egypt, information is both scarce and abundant.  Nobody really knows what's going on, rumors of every variety fly fast and furious, and everyone has pieced together plausible-sounding theories based on their fears or analytical predispositions.  (Remember, though, as a rule it's almost never as bad as it seems on Twitter.) It will take a while for the full implications to become clear.  Eventually, more reliable information will trickle out about what really happened: were Tantawi and Anan consulted, or did they find out on TV?  did junior officers collude with the Presidents office, or were they equally surprised?  And the behavior of key actors in the coming weeks will shed light on their intentions this weekend:  does Morsi move to impose an Islamist vision or reach out to create a broadly based constitutional convention?  does the military strike back in some form?  Until then, just about everyone -- in Cairo, in Washington, and everywhere else -- is struggling to pierce through the haze and make out what they can.

Taking that uncertainty into account, I can see at least three dominant takes on what's going on.  Those who believe the SCAF remains fully in control see a clever scheme to cement long-term military rule in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood by gently dumping the unpopular figureheads while retaining an institutional hold on power.  Those who fear the Muslim Brotherhood see the makings of a full-scale Ikhwanization of Egypt, with Morsi seizing dictatorial powers, brushing aside the secular bastion of the SCAF, and putting himself in place to shape the new constitution.    And those who still see the prospect for some kind of real democratic transition can find some comfort in an elected President removing the senior leaders of the outgoing military junta without a bloody fight and asserting the principle of political control by an elected President. None of these three strikes me as completely right and all probably have some elements of truth But there's nothing very satisfying about a theory of the case which is equally satisfied with, say, Tantawi remaining in his position or Tantawi being forced out of his position. 

My general take is still that the current phase of Egyptian politics is going to be a long, grinding institutional war of position.  That kind of politics can be deeply frustrating for an engaged public sphere, since so much of it takes place behind the scenes and in indirect maneuvers rather than in thrilling street protests or the realm of public debate.   For example, presumably Morsi and his team have been carefully preparing the ground for this weekend's moves during the weeks where his administration appeared to be passive, floundering, and ineffective.  In this arena, Morsi's moves were a bold and unexpected frontal assault on the senior military leadership, but not a decisive one.  His appointment of the respected jurist Mahmoud Mekki as Vice President could be seen as another such bold move in institutional combat, by potentially co-opting or intimidating the judiciary. But bold as the moves were, they don't instantly wipe away the real power centers in Egyptian politics.  Morsi today is more of a President, but Egypt is a long way from the "Islamic Republic" being bandied about by the Brotherhood's critics. 

The fundamental problem remains one of trust and the absence of legitimate institutions.  The political polarization of the last year and a half, fueled by all too many political and rhetorical mistakes on all sides, has left profound scars.  The Shafiq voters in the Presidential election have hardly reconciled themselves to Morsi, and most activists and revolutionaries remain as alienated as ever from a political struggle dominated by the military and the Brotherhood. On top of the polarization comes the legal Calvinball, where rules and legal institutions are fundamentally contested and no arbiter has uncontested judicial authority.   And then there's the regrettable absence of a Parliament, another casualty of the pre-election institutional warfare. With so much in flux and so much distrust, every move, no matter how minor, becomes deeply laden with potential treachery and disaster.  And this was no minor move. 

In most cases, I would think that the removal of the SCAF's senior leadership and the assertion of civilian control by an elected government would be celebrated as a major triumph in the push for a transition to a civil, democratic state.  But the deeply rooted fears of the Muslim Brotherhood, fueled by recognition of their popular strength and doubts about their democratic convictions, prevents any easy acceptance of that reading in many quarters.  That's why the next few weeks will be crucial, as Morsi makes clear what kind of constitutional process he really intends and as the military and the anti-Islamist trends in Egyptian politics weigh their next moves.  

I think that on balance this should be seen as a potentially positive step, despite the real downside risks of Muslim Brotherhood domination.  It could even be a way to overcome at least one dimension of that deep political and social polarization which has been the legacy of the last political period.  Asserting civilian control and removing the top SCAF leaders were necessary steps which most Egypt analysts didn't expect at this point, and which - lest we forget - have been among the primary demands of the revolution since almost the beginning.  If the golden parachute of some form of unwritten amnesty and appointments to advisory position was the way to get Tantawi and the others to step down without a fight, then this seems a price worth paying.  But that verdict would change if Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood does go on to seek to dominate the new constitutional assembly--- and that should, and will, be a major focus of the coming period.  

Note:  The title of this post pays homage this Kanye/Big Sean/Pusha T banger.  Obviously NSFW.  How I wish someone with skills would do a remix of this one as "Morsi."