Marc Lynch's Blog, page 109

Bahrain's Epic Fail

Nine days ago, the courageous Bahraini activist Alaa Shehabi wrote for Foreign Policy about the then sixty-four day hunger strike by Abd al-Hadi al-Khawaja.  His death, she warned, "could mark a significant breaking point for the
regime's efforts to rehabilitate its tarnished reputation -- and could accelerate
the disturbing trend toward militant radicalization in the opposition." As of today, Khawaja remains thankfully alive. But Bahrain's ill-conceived Formula One race event has nevertheless already turned a harsh international spotlight onto the regime's ongoing repression.  And Shehabi, an academic with dual Bahrain-British citizenship whose husband was only recently released after nine months in prison, has been arrested. 

Shehabi's detention might seem a minor footnote given the ongoing protests, the numbers of other activists and journalists arrested and pressured, Khawaja's hunger strike, and the Formula One controversy.  She hopefully will soon be released. But her detention while assisting journalists  seems particularly symbolic at a time when Bahrain's regime has
sought to burnish its international reputation and suppress critical
media coverage without engaging in serious reforms at home.

This week's Formula One-driven media scrutiny has ripped away Bahrain's carefully constructed external facade. It has exposed the failure of Bahrain's regime to take advantage of the breathing space it bought through last year's crackdown or the lifeline thrown to it by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Iniquiry.  That failure to engage in serious reform will likely further
radicalize its opponents and undermine hopes for its future political stability.  
[[BREAK]]

Bahrain's fierce, stifling repression of a peaceful reform movement in mid-March 2011 represented an important watershed in the regional Arab uprising.  Huge numbers of Bahrainis had joined in street protests in the preceding month, defining themselves as part of the broader Arab uprising and demanding constitutional reforms and political freedoms.  Bahrain's protest movement began as a reformist and not revolutionary
one, and the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry found no evidence that the protests were
inspired or supported by Iran.  

The government's mid-March decision to forcefully clear the streets and bulldoze Pearl Roundabout, with Saudi and GCC support and accompanied by a ferociously sectarian campaign of repression, had region-wide impact.  The crackdown torpedoed a political compromise between regime reformists and opposition moderates which had seemed tantalizingly close. Regionally, it blunted the seemingly irresistible momentum of regional change.  The regime's use of a sectarian narrative
to disrupt a broad-based reform movement triggered sectarian polarization in Bahrain and across
the region. And the Obama administration's grudging acquiescence to the Saudi-driven fait accompli, at almost the exact same time as it began a military intervention in Libya and violence began to spiral in Syria, opened a gaping wound in American credibility.  

A ferocious battle over how to understand the events in Bahrain has unfolded in the months since the crackdown, as anyone who has attempted to report on or discuss it can attest. Supporters of the regime have argued that they did what they must against a dangerously radical, sectarian Shi'a movement backed by Iran, and fiercely contest reports of regime abuses.  The opposition certainly made mistakes of its own, both during the protests leading up to the crackdown and after.  But fortunately the facts of Bahrain's protest movement and the subsequent crackdown have been thoroughly documented by Bahrain's Independent Commission of Inquiry [pdf].   

The BICI report established authoritatively that the Bahraini regime committed massive violations of human rights during its attempts to crush the protest movement. Hundreds of detainees reported systematic mistreatment and torture, including extremely tight handcuffing, forced standing, severe beatings, electric shocks, burning with cigarettes, beating of the soles of the feet, verbal abuse, sleep deprivation, threats of rape, sexual abuse including the insertion of items into the anus and grabbing of genitals, hanging, exposure to extreme temperatures, forced nudity and humiliation through acts such as being forced to lick boots of guards, abuse with dogs, mock executions, and being forced to eat feces (BICI report, pp.287-89). Detainees were often held for weeks or months without access to the outside world or to lawyers.  This, concluded the BICI, represented "a systematic practice of physical and psychological mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to torture, with respect to a large number of detainees in their custody" (Para 1238, p.298).  And then there was the demolition of Shi'a mosques, widespread dismissals from public and private sector jobs and from universities, sectarian agitation in the media, and so much more.
No political mistakes made by the opposition could possibly justify these acts.

The presentation of the BICI report to the King and his senior officials could have been an opportunity for the regime to come to terms with its past mistakes and begin serious efforts at turning a new political page.  Some parts of the regime, reportedly including the Crown Prince, seem to have genuinely hoped to do so. But the moment was lost.  Despite some surface changes, the regime has continued to ferociously repress protests while failing to push for meaningful accountability or serious political change.  Amnesty International recently concluded that the regime had failed to fully meet the recommendations of the BICI report and that "nearly five months after the report's publication, real change has not materialized."  More deeply, "the culture of impunity within the security services
identified in the BICI report has yet to result in any meaningful form of
accountability." 

When I met Shehabi in Washington in February, she warned of the growing
radicalization of the protest movement in the face of this ongoing
sectarian campaign and continued repression. Bahraini protestors have indeed become more radical in the face of such abuses and political stalemate.   It has become harder and harder for opposition leaders to hold out for reform and compromise as resentments grew and positions hardened.  Protests have taken on a harder edge, and reports of violence have become more frequent.  The regime's heavy-handed, sectarian crackdown on opposition has radicalized the opposition and pro-regime communities alike, while discrediting reformists on both sides.  If it is not already too late to reverse this dangerous dynamic then that threshold grows near. If it continues on this path, Bahrain is likely one of the top three regional regimes most likely to face existential challenge in the short to mid-term future. 

I hope that the international backlash this week and the mounting signs of the unsustainability of their domestic strategy pushes Bahrain's leaders to rethink their approach.  They should immediately begin serious efforts at real accountability for abuses, an end to incitement, the release and reinstatement of the victims of political repression, and a genuine political opening. Their actions and words offer little reason to expect that they will, unfortunately, or that they even recognize the approaching abyss.  And this would be truly an epic fail for Bahrain and for the entire region.

UPDATE:  Shehabi was released late yesterday after 7 hours, to my great relief.  Her release changes nothing about Bahrain's underlying problems, unfortunately. 

Cherif Bassiouni: The FP Interview

The United Nations should establish an investigation commission to collect evidence about war crimes in Syria to prepare the ground for any future investigation, leading Arab international law expert Cherif Bassiouni told Foreign Policy during a wide-ranging interview yesterday following his talk at George Washington University's Institute for Middle East Studies [videos of both the interview and the talk will be posted shortly]. He warned that Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh should not count on his immunity deal holding up, discounted the ability of Libya's courts to try Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and blasted Egypt's post-revolutionary trials as focusing on flimsy, marginal cases which avoided dealing with systemic, institutionalized corruption.   

Also, he explained that Moammar Qaddafi was a sex addict whose heavy use of Viagra badly affected his decision-making -- which could complicate the ICC's efforts to convict Saif al-Islam (FP's web editors wanted that to be the lead, for some reason). [[BREAK]]

Bassiouni chaired Bahrain's Independent Commission of Inquiry, which documented and reported on the violations of human rights during last year's crackdown on the protest movement and offered a set of recommendations for reform (it can be downloaded here in PDF form; nobody should be opining on Bahrain these days without reading and internalizing its details). Our conversation began there.

Bassiouni naturally defended the efforts and impact of the BICI. He argued that the creation of the BICI itself deserved some credit: "this is the first time in the Arab world in which a national government established a totally independent international commission to investigate its own violations." The Commission had total independence and access, he argued, even when his team knocked on prison doors at 2am to interview prisoners, and at the end "we produced a report which we read in the face of the King and the Prime Minister and 600 senior officials, which felt like reading an indictment." I tend to agree with Bassiouni that the report's documentation of the regime's abuses will be an enduring contribution, regardless of the implementation of the recommendations -- those violations can never disappear down the memory hole or be denied by regime apologists. They bear witness, and that matters. 

Our evaluation of the Bahraini government's implementation of the BICI recommendations differed, however. I pointed to the regime's very
limited reforms, the regime's refusal to concede in
the
face of Abd al-Hadi al-Khawaja's hunger strike, and Amnesty
International's blunt conclusion that not much has changed. I
relayed the view of many Bahrainis that the government's response to the
Commission's recommendations might check off the boxes while stripping
them of their meaning, and the ongoing examples of repression and abuse.
But he pleaded for a case by case approach. Where efforts have lagged, he pointed to limited institutional capacity,
such as a thinly staffed and trained Attorney General's office. "There has not been a single reported case of torture" since the Commission began its work, Bassiouni argued, while also pointing to the
release of some detainees, the establishment of a follow-up commission,
and other efforts by the government to respond to the BICI
recommendations. "I know we did some good." 

But if he offered a sympathetic view of the Bahraini government's "treatment of the symptoms," he offered scathing critique of its failure to undertake any deeper political or social reforms.













Such broader issues lay outside the BICI's mandate, which only extended to specific human rights violations. Bassiouni's defense of Bahrain's response to the BICI recommendations may be music to the ears of a regime eager for international rehabilitation, but they should pay equal heed to his pessimistic views about the Kingdom's political future. He is clearly disturbed by the emerging trends towards radicalization and the disappearance of the political center in Bahrain, and disappointed with the regime's failure to offer genuine political reform. The core of the problem remains the absolute hold on power by the Sunni
minority. "That can't be. Things have to change. These are the causes. Unless you change the causes, they are still going to have these
problems."

On Yemen, Bassiouni argued that the immunity arrangements for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh would not likely stand up any more than did promises made to former Liberian President Charles Taylor. The demands of justice might have to wait for a new political constellation, in Yemen and internationally, but the GCC immunity deal had no real legal standing. "The fact that there is a political deal at a certain time... is not binding." International law now demands individual accountability for certain crimes, which states do not have the power to waive. Nor does any sort of "former President" status protect him even if offered at home. Those outraged by the impunity granted to Saleh and his people might find some comfort in this view of the transient nature of such guarantees.

Should Syria's Bashar al-Asad be indicted by the International Criminal Court? Not until the evidence has been collected, argued Bassiouni. "I was very concerned with having the Security Council refer the Libya matter to the ICC before the investigation. I have a sense of orderliness about things. Do the investigation first, see what the evidence is, and then indict. You don't start by indicting without getting the evidence." Evidence collected only from abroad and from partisan sources could not suffice, he warned. "Mr. Okampo never had the opportunity to go to Libya to investigate, never had the opportunity to investigate in Darfur. When indictments come out on some evidence gathered from abroad, it undermines the legitimacy of the court. Me fear is that if we do the same with Syria it is simply going to add to it." Such a warning is well taken given the intense politicization of information about the violence in Syria today.

But this problem should not take the instruments of international justice out of the crisis in Syria. Instead of an ICC referral, Bassiouni "would strongly recommend having an investigative commission as was established by the Security Council in the former Yugoslavia." That commission, which Bassiouni chaired for several years, produced a 3500 page report backed by massive documentation which ultimately formed the basis for the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. He urged the same for Syria. But he also warned about repeating the mistakes of the troubled Special Tribunal for Lebanon were such a Special Tribunal for Syria to be established -- a warning which all advocates of international justice in Syria should take seriously. 

Finally, about Qaddafi's Viagra. This came up in our discussion about the competing claims on Saif al-Islam Gaddafi by the ICC and the Libyan interim government, and whether Libyan courts could possibly be "capable and willing" to try him and other top regime officials. "Absolutely not" at the current time, he answered, though it would not be impossible to create an effective body with 5-10 good judges and some training, capacity building, and international support. Such a trial would be conducted according to local law, however, which would not necessarily accord with the statutes of the ICC.  

But Saif personally posed another problem for prosecutors: establishing his role in his father's demonstrably paranoid and capricious decision-making. And here Bassiouni did, indeed, begin to speak about Qaddafi's sex addiction. (I started coughing right about then, as you'll see in the video). Qaddafi, he argued, had serious psychiatric problems for which he had long been self-medicating. He was extremely secretive and paranoid. On top of that, well, let's go to the tape: "Most people don't know, he was almost addicted, he had sexual addiction, consumed enormous amounts of viagra and other similar pills, which had a very serious negative effect when combined with his other medication." How did Bassiouni know this? Sometimes, it's perhaps better not to ask. 

Cautious hope for Syria

Few diplomatic initiatives have faced more skepticism than Kofi Annan's plan for Syria, and for good reason. Annan's six point plan may have been the only game in town, but its limited mandate reflected by necessity the demands of a divided Security Council and seemed to many far too accommodating to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Assad certainly gave little reason to believe its promises, as his forces spent the days leading up to the ceasefire date unleashing ever escalating violence. Syrian opposition and activist views ranged from skeptical to hostile, while those who loudly yearn for a Western military intervention dismissed it as an irritating obstacle to action.

But on Thursday, the ceasefire took effect. Violence did not end, but it dramatically dropped.  That set the stage for today's critical test: would peaceful protestors return to the streets after the brutal onslaught of the last couple of weeks? And how would regime forces respond if they did? Up until now, the answers offer the first, frail glimmers of hope for Syria in a long, long time. I've been watching dozens of videos of Syrians pouring out into the streets today to demonstrate across the country. And while there have again been scattered reports of attacks and efforts to block demonstrations in some cities, there has not been a systematic military response. Today's exhilerating outpouring of popular, peaceful protest does not guarantee anything.  But it does prove that Assad's effort to kill his way to victory has failed.[[BREAK]]

The wave of peaceful protests today offers a tantalizing window into the possibility, however slim, that Annan's plan could halt Syria's seemingly relentless slide to civil war. Assad's failure to break the spirit of opposition despite his brutal
onslaught over the last couple of weeks is genuinely significant. The wave of protest and the much-strengthened international consensus showed that Assad's brutal offensive, and dangerous escalation along the Turkish border, failed to destroy the opposition and helped to unite the international community. The willingness of Syrians to go into the streets today, and for the opposition to generally adhere to peaceful protest for the day, is a vital sign that such a political strategy remains possible and that a mobilized non-violent opposition might take advantage of a ceasefire to recapture political momentum.

Given his lost legitimacy and the economic collapse, I don't believe that Assad can survive at this point without using force. He seems to have believed that he could crush the opposition before his international window closed, but he did not. If Syrians continue to take to the streets and the regime is restrained by international pressure from responding violently, a snowball could begin to roll, especially if those still sitting on the fence or backing the regime out of fear come to see that opposition as peaceful and inclusive rather than as a potentially life-threatening armed force. It would be remarkable to see a non-violent, mass protest movement emerge from the wreckage of civil war like a Phoenix. It may in fact be too much to expect, given the evolution of the status and role of the armed groups within the opposition and the horrors which the regime has inflicted upon the population. But it's something to encourage and to protect. 

It's obviously only a beginning, and one which could be reversed over the weekend. Assad has not even come close to complying with the terms of the Annan plan, which includes far more than a ceasefire. But it's notable that there is now a robust and largely unified international consensus demanding that he comply with the plan -- even from Russia and China, which have a stake in a plan they helped craft. The plan, as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton noted, is not a menu of options from which to choose.  And more demands should be forthcoming. The Security Council is reportedly close to approving a plan for a small observer mission to enter Syria, which would at least initially be a symbolic step to capitalize on the momentum. I suspect that the recent rumblings from Annan about humanitarian corridors, from Turkey about safe zones and invoking NATO Article, and from the Security Council resolution drafters about considering "other means" if the ceasefire fails are meant primarily to pressure Assad to stick to the plan. And I'm very pleased by the growing talk of pushing for an ICC referral at the Security Council should the Annan plan fail, and by the agreement at the recent Friends of Syria conference to create a "Syria Accountability Clearing House" to prepare the ground for future international or transitional justice regardless of the political outcome. 

Nobody believes that this is going to be easy or fast or fully satisfying, least of all Annan.  Everything could easily go wrong if and when regime forces launch a major attack on protestors, or if there's an opposition attack against those forces. I don't believe that Assad will intentionally negotiate his own downfall, or trust his intentions for a minute.  The contours of a political transition haven't even begun to be discussed publicly. Syrian opposition activists are highlighting ongoing violations and warning furiously that Assad should not be trusted. And a lot of external supporters of the Syrian opposition don't want a political process to succeed since it would block the path towards the military intervention they advocate, and are already agitating to declare the Annan plan dead.

But that would be a mistake at this point. The fetish for military intervention among so many in the Syria policy debate has been counter-productive. The Obama
administration and most of the key governments involved in the Syria
crisis clearly believe that military intervention and arming the
opposition are bad ideas -- not viable solutions which they are
avoiding for political reasons, but potential fiascos which they are
avoiding out of prudence. I expect that the U.S. and the United Nations will try to keep this process alive while pushing Assad and the opposition for self-restraint and for a political roadmap. They should, even through the likely setbacks, stumbles, and reversals to come. This may be the last chance to avoid a catastrophic descent into years of protracted insurgency and proxy warfare. I hope it survives the weekend and takes root, even if most everyone recognizes that it likely will not.   

Making the Arab League Matter

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Few international institutions have been more congenitally
irrelevant than the League of Arab States. It's problems are structural: a
Charter rooted in the protection of state sovereignty, an autocratic and inept
membership, a façade of Arab unity hardly concealing the reality of deep
political divisions. The Arab League for
long decades has been little more than a punchline for sad jokes about the failed hopes
of unified or effective Arab action.

Some believe that this began to change over the last
year. Certainly, it was startling to see
the Arab League suddenly acting on regional security issues. Its rapid, unified response to Muammar
al-Qaddafi's brutal crackdown in Libya, likely tipped the balance at the United Nations in favor of
NATO's military intervention. It has
played an important role in the Syria crisis, from its
suspension of Assad's Syria to its unprecedented (albeit failed) observer
mission and (also failed) bid for to a Security Council resolution. Some of its steps were intriguingly novel,
such as the unprecedented suspension of Libyan and Syrian membership over the
killing of their own people. And the summit recently held in Baghdad may have
finally prodded some baby steps towards Iraq's reintegration into the Arab
world.

But this burst of activity was misleading. The revitalized
Arab League was really a puppet show, as the GCC led by Qatar and Saudi Arabia used
the conveniently empty vehicle of a moribund Arab League to pursue their
agendas. The Arab League offered a more
useful regional organization than the GCC for acting on Libya and Syria,
especially at the United Nations. With traditional Arab powers like Egypt, Iraq and Syria
flat on their backs there was nothing to block them from doing so on such
issues. The focus of attention at the Security Council debate on Syria was Qatari Foreign Minster Hamed Bin Jassem, not Arab League Secretary General Nabil el-Arabi. The supposedly revitalized
Arab League has shown little ability to act effectively on more contentious
issues, to coordinate policies on Syria, to provide meaningful assistance to
transitional member regimes, or to generate new ideas on the Palestinian issue.
The GCC more often looked to non-Arab Turkey than to its Arab League partners
for concrete support.

But this could change. Indeed, implausible as it sounds to long-time observers of the region,
the Arab League may over the next few years emerge as a more interesting
institution than it has ever before been -- and more consequential than the
currently dominant GCC. The key GCC states
only dominate today because of their wealth and general lack of internal
problems, the unusual cooperation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the internal
weakness of traditional Arab powers such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. As those states get their acts together, and the inevitable conflicts within and between
Gulf states reappear, the Arab League might actually become interesting.[[BREAK]]

The Arab League, for all its flaws, has one core advantage:
it is the only regional organization which brings together all of the
self-identified Arab states. As such, it
will likely remain the privileged regional interloctor for the United Nations
and the focus of any kind of pan-Arab diplomacy. It can not easily be replaced by the GCC, no
matter how much that idea might appeal to Doha or Riyadh, or by some sort of
Parliament of Arab Peoples which would lack official standing or institutional cohesion.  

There will be a need for such a regional organization. Pan-Arab identity
at the popular level has grown vastly stronger through the Arab uprisings of the
past year and a half. This emergent
pan-Arabism will ensure both their continuing focus on these shared regional
issues -- whether Syria or Palestine -- and their relentless disappointment with
the performance of their leaders.  Young
Arabs may have little use for the Arab League as an institution, but it's the
only regional organization they've got. It is the only formal site for the
robust political battles over collective Arab norms, initiatives, or policies.  

The GCC has clearly taken the lead role in Arab diplomacy
over the last year. But the current dominant GCC position within the Arab
League is a bubble. At least some of the traditional Arab powers such as Egypt,
Iraq, Libya, and Syria which are currently consumed by domestic chaos will in
the coming years get their houses in order and retake their place as regional
great powers. As they do so, the GCC
will not be able to sustain its artificial domination of Arab institutions. Egypt,
in particular, is likely to seek to use its traditional leadership of the Arab
League (which is physically based in Cairo and has long had an Egyptian
Secretary-General) as a pathway back into regional politics once its domestic
transition resolves sufficiently to actually have a foreign policy. Potentially emergent powers excluded from the
GCC, such as a new Libya or new Iraq, will likely try to empower an institution
which includes them.

The biggest driver of change in the Arab League will be the increasing domestic diversity of its members. For decades, Arab states increasingly resembled one another in
their internal political structures. Almost all Arab states were entrenched autocracies, with at best limited
forms of superficial democratic participation. Almost all were close American military and political allies and part of a common security architecture. Almost all were content to sideline the
Palestinian issue and cooperate with the United States against Iraq, Iran and al Qaeda,
regardless of the feelings of their people. Even the traditional divide between monarchies and republics lost
meaning as presidents such as Hafez al-Assad and Hosni Mubarak sought to hand
over power to their sons.  

The Arab uprisings have introduced significant diversity
into this isomorphic mix. It's
impossible to know how any of these emergent transitions will turn out, of
course -- can anyone really offer a firm prediction about how the Egyptian
mess or the nascent Libyan state will resolve? But more diversity
seems almost inevitable, as does a greater role for public opinion in foreign policy. Most Arab regimes -- including monarchies like Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco -- will face turbulent politics and be more responsive to
public opinion, whatever constitutional forms they take (or else, like Bahrain, retreat into sullen alienation and stifling repression at great cost to their own future). The need
of these governments to respond to public opinion will likely push them
toward more popular foreign policies, even if some continue to try to stick to the
old games. 

Identity will also increasingly divide as well as
unite -- though, as should be obvious to all students of pan-Arabism, this has always been the case. The potent popular pan-Arabism
ensures that there will be no easy shift to local or domestic issues alone. But
the definition of Arabism will remain deeply contested, with very concrete
implications. For instance, the GCC
prefers to use Sunni identity as a unifying force amongst its Arab allies and a
useful weapon against Iran, the Syrian regime, and their own domestic Shi'a
populations -- a formula potentially challenged by a Shi'a-led, semi-democratic
Iraq. Islamists of some variety seem
likely to play a greater role in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya (at least), which
poses a challenge to regimes which have demonized and repressed their own
Islamists.   

The Arab League might therefore take on a very different
feel as these domestically transforming states begin to play a meaningful
regional role. The Gulf monarchies will remain influential, of course, though
they will likely return to their bickering ways. An Egypt which pursues a relatively popular
foreign policy might regain the regional power and influence which the decrepit
Mubarak regime had squandered. A Libya
not completely eccentric and self-marginalized could compete at the level of
wealth. A successful, inspirational
Tunisian democracy could offer a voice of moral authority. A somewhat stabilized Iraq actively engaged in
Arab politics could introduce new views of Iran and of the political role for
Shi'a communities with implications for regional security arrangements. And what role might be played by a new Syria
-- either with an Assad regime which has survived as an international pariah
engulfed in protracted civil war or with some new kind of regime?

Decisions made over the last year might also provide an
entry for new kinds of collective action through the auspices of the Arab
League. The Saudis and Qataris might
have had purely strategic goals in mind when they invented a
new standard of Arab legitimacy by which leaders should not kill their own
people. But that normative standard
has now been articulated repeatedly and used to suspend the membership of both
Libya and Syria. This is a major
departure from the Arab League Charter's traditional endorsement of state
sovereignty. It is not inconceivable
that emergent new powers could seek to institutionalize this new norm of
conditional sovereignty.  Could Aryeh
Neier's creative idea of an Arab War Crimes Tribunal gain purchase? Could
Bahraini or Saudi Shi'a begin to find a forum not dominated by the Gulf states
to press their grievances?

I would not want to push this argument too far. I certainly wouldn't predict the inevitability
of an effective, unified Arab League. Little in history or current trends would
suggest any confidence in that. I don't expect the Arab League to follow the
EU template any time...well, ever (ASEAN might be a more useful comparison,
with more regional identity but less economic complementarity). But as we all attempt to peer ahead into the
kind of regional politics to which the Arab uprising might give birth, it seems
worth considering how an Arab League which incorporates these changing states
could  become a far more interesting
organization...and even a valuable part of a transformed, better Middle East. 

The irrelevance of America's withdrawal from Iraq

On December 15, 2011, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the formal end of America's military presence in Iraq. The withdrawal came after the inability to reach
agreement on a revised Status of Forces Agreement which would have
allowed a limited number of troops to remain under legal conditions
acceptable to the Pentagon.  While the vast majority of Iraqis and
Americans supported the departure of America's military presence, some
supporters of a long-term U.S. military presence warned of disaster.  Some, like Senator John McCain and the Romney campaign, continue to fume that we no longer occupy Iraq and complain that Obama has lost what Bush gained. But
in fact, the American departure has hardly mattered at all -- and that's a good thing.

This isn't to say that Iraq has emerged as a peaceful, democratic
paradise or an enthusiastic pro-American ally. Hardly.  That was never in the cards, after the disastrous invasion and bungled occupation led to a horrific civil war and a near-failed state.  Iraq today remains a violent, poorly
institutionalized place with deep societal fissures and unresolved
political tensions.  But little has happened in the months since the
U.S. withdrawal which differs significantly from what had been happening
while the U.S. remained. The negative trends are the same ones which plagued Iraq despite the presence of U.S. troops in 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. The U.S. presence contributed to some of those problems, helped deal with some, and  failed to resolve others.  But it had always struggled to convert its military presence into political leverage, and by 2011 it had become almost completely irrelevant. 

The real story of America's withdrawal from Iraq is how little impact it has really had on either Iraq or the region.  There are even signs that the withdrawal has helped to nudge Iraqis onto the right path, though not as quickly or directly as I might have hoped. This
month's death toll was the lowest on record since the 2003
invasion, while Iraqi oil exports are at their highest level since 1980. Baghdad successfully hosted an Arab Summit meeting, which may have done little for Syria but did go further to bring Iraq back into the Arab fold than anything since 2003.  Maliki's jousting with his domestic foes and efforts to balance Iraq's ties with Tehran with improved Arab relations are what needs to happen for Iraq to regain a semblance of normality.   It isn't pretty, and probably won't be any time soon, but there's absolutely no reason to believe that it would look any better with American troops still encamped in the country.  Thus far, Obama's risky but smart gamble to end the U.S. military presence in Iraq is paying off. [[BREAK]]

This is not to say that there aren't reasons to worry about Iraq's future.  There are many.  It is troubling that Maliki has driven Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi into exile on terrorism charges and has rebuffed all efforts at meaningful cooperation with his political rivals. It is troubling that core constitutional issues such as the oil law and the limits of federalism remain unresolved. It is troubling that violence and terrorism continues to claim Iraqi lives and unsettle its politics.  It is troubling that the Iraqi Parliament appears inept and incompetent, as tirelessly chronicled by Reidar Visser, and that the rule of law has gained little purchase. 

But what's striking is that these problems are the same ones which
kept us all up nights in previous years. None of these trends is remotely new, and few have become palpably worse since the American departure.  Iraqis have been worried about
the centralization of power in Maliki's office and his authoritarian
tendencies for the last four years.  Iraq's political and sectarian
factions have failed to reconcile or achieve meaningful political unity
despite intense U.S. pressure to do so for years.  Various militant
groups have been carrying out bombings, revenge killings,
assassinations, and acts of terrorism for years. 

But the key point is that extending the U.S. presence beyond 2011 would likely have had almost no impact on any of these trends.  By serving as a lightning rod for political criticism in a very hostile Iraqi political arena, an unpopular extension might well have made them worse.  The argument that the U.S. would have more influence over Iraqi politics if it had not withdrawn its troops simply has very little foundation.  A stronger argument can be made that a residual U.S. force would have provided a needed safety net in the difficult political battles to come, for instance in the relationship between Baghdad and the Kurdish areas.  But even there it isn't obvious that troops inside of Iraq would make a significant difference --- and the safety net itself might have retarded progress towards the necessary compromises.  

All told, Obama's decision to complete the withdrawal from Iraq along his original timeline has been largely vindicated.  Disaster has yet to occur, and some positive signs can be glimpsed from within the haze of a hotly contentious and murky political scene.   And American troops are no longer trapped in the middle.  That's probably the best that could have been hoped for out of the disastrous invasion and occupation of Iraq --- a mistake which we should all hope is not repeated in Syria, Iran or anywhere else.   

The Muslim Brotherhood's Presidential Gambit

The Muslim Brotherhood resolved months of speculation this weekend by announcing its intention of nominating Deputy Supreme Guide Khairet al-Shater for Egypt's Presidential election.  It may not seem so surprising for a country's largest political force and the largest Parliamentary faction to field a Presidential candidate. But it was. The announcement sent an earthquake through Cairo's already wildly careening political scene.  I'm happy to admit that I was taken by surprise. 

What was the Brotherhood thinking? The nomination of Shater seems to have been a response to threats and opportunities a rapidly changing political arena, rather than the hatching of a long-term plan.  But many Egyptians would disagree, seeing it instead as the culmination of a long-hatching conspiracy with the SCAF.  I think it will reveal itself to be a strategic blunder which has placed the Brotherhood in a no-win situation.  But clearly they had their reasons for making such an uncharacteristically bold move. How will it affect the endlessly turbulent and contentious Egyptian political transition? And could Khairat al-Shater really replace Hosni Mubarak as the President of Egypt? [[BREAK]]

I've been studying Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood for many years, and have
interviewed most of its senior leaders (including Shater) multiple
times.  And I'll admit that I was surprised.  So were most other
MB-watchers I follow.  That's in large part because it contradicts what I had heard for months from Brotherhood leaders in private and in public, and has dubious political logic. What's more, the decision appears to have been
controversial inside the Brotherhood's leadership, and seems to have
taken even many of its own top people by surprise.  There are at least three reasons to consider the Brotherhood's move surprising, despite the obvious temptation that any political party would have to seek the top political position which it believes it can win:  its promises to not field a candidate; the strategic risks of seeking the Presidency; and the stakes of nominating Shater himself. 

First, the Muslim Brotherhood had promised for months to not field a Presidential candidate. They left little room for ambiguity in their promises.  Indeed, it held this position so strongly that senior reformist leader Abd al-Moneim Abou el-Futouh had broken bitterly with his organization over his determination to run, and the Brotherhood leadership had in turn threatened to expel any members who worked on his campaign. This was not a minor, off-handed promise --- it had been a central, often-repeated feature of the Brotherhood's political message for many months. 

The Brotherhood-bashing over this reversal may have been a bit over the top ("Boo hoo. Call the wahmbulance. Politics ain't beanbag", quipped FP's house cynic in response to the finger-pointing). But putting forward a candidate didn't simply break a frequently repeated public promise.  It also fit a broader narrative (justified or not) about the Brotherhood's steadly creeping ambitions and broken vows. Many of these complaints were themselves exaggerated, particularly over the Brotherhood's alleged conspiracies with the SCAF and over-performance in the Parliamentary elections. But the accusations took on a new intensity this month as a wave of liberals and independents quit the Constitutional Assembly in protest over perceived Islamist domination. 

The second reason for surprise was that the move carries significant political risks for little obvious advantage.  The Brotherhood has long worried about the perception that it seeks to dominate Egyptian politics and sought to avoid triggering the crystallization of an anti-Islamist front.  Most analysts expected the Brotherhood to practice self-restraint in order to avoid provoking these fears, and this was generally the message which Brotherhood leaders attempted to signal.  But there's no question that the Brotherhood has become increasingly assertive as it has established its power in the transitional environment, and less willing to back away from confrontation or back away from its own preferences.  

Advancing a candidate, while in line with this newly found willingness to flex its muscles, nevertheless creates a no-win situation for the Brotherhood. Backing an acceptable but non-Brotherhood Presidential candidate would
have protected their core interests without triggering fear in others.  If a Brotherhood candidate wins, then the movement would control the Parliament, the Constitutional Assembly, and the Presidency. It would therefore stand alone in the face of the military, and would bear full responsibility for whatever happened in Egypt's economy, politics and society in the coming period.  

If it loses the election, then it would conclusively shatter its own carefully cultivated air of invincibility.  And victory is not certain. I've
been genuinely impressed with Shater's forceful presence, confidence, and
intellect when I've interviewed him.  In person, he is charismatic and impressive, calm and
careful but capable of dominating a discussion. But Shater is not a
charismatic front-man likely to enthrall the mass Egyptian public on
television or in public speeches.  He might find it tough going
to unite an Islamist Presidential field already divided, at least for
now, between Abou el-Fotouh, the surprisingly omnipresent Hazem
Salah Abou Ismail, and Mohammed Salim al-Awwa.    In contrast to the
Parliamentary elections, Muslim Brotherhood members alone would not
likely be enough to carry the day in a high-turnout Presidential
election -- and Shater has not proven an ability to appeal beyond the
organization he dominates.  Finally, his presence in the race could well
galvanize the non-Islamist vote to rally behind a consensus candidate
such as Amr Moussa.

The third reason for surprise was the candidate himself.  If the Brotherhood needed to field a candidate, then it could have turned to one of its well-known political leaders.   Choosing Khairat el-Shater raises the stakes considerably.  Shater is the Deputy Supreme Guide, and in the view of most MB-watchers the real power behind the throne.  Either his victory or his defeat would have more serious potential negative repercussions for the Brotherhood as a whole than if a less central figure had been offered up as a candidate.  There can be no doubting that with Shater, the Brotherhood has gone all-in for victory.  And that in turn puts the organization's reputation very much on the line, win or lose.

So why did the Brotherhood do it?  There are two, diametrically opposed arguments circulating --- each, of course, firmly held as the obvious truth by its proponents.  The first is that Brotherhood's hand had been forced by the SCAF's mismanagement of the political process and alleged targeting of the Brotherhood. Some Islamist leaders seemed to share overheated fears of an approaching "1954 moment" in which the army again cracked down on Islamists and reasserted authoritarian rule.  While expected, the Brotherhood's attempts to use its Parliamentary power to rein in the SCAF and the SCAF's counter-moves to block Parliamentary action were, by this reading, pushing Egypt towards a political showdown.  The MB has turned sharply against the Ganzoury government in recent weeks, after initially cooperating with it. Shater's nomination is therefore in this scenario a response to threat, the next step in an escalating conflict between the Brotherhood and the SCAF.  

A second popular argument, held by many of the Brotherhood's critics, is precisely the opposite:  that Shater's nomination represents the culmination of the long-standing collusion between the Brotherhood and the SCAF.  In this reading, Shater's assuming the Presidency will complete a bargain by which the former will be handed political power in exchange for guarantees of the latter's core interests.   The public spats are dismissed as political theater designed to camoflouge the conspiracy.  But in this reading, the fix is in and the Brotherhood is set on seizing the opportunity. 

The reality is likely some combination of threat and opportunity, as the Brotherhood seeks to navigate Egypt's turbulent politics.  They may have preferred to find a candidate to support from outside the organization, but couldn't find a suitable one among the contenders.  Perhaps they feared what the leading alternatives might do with regime power: Moussa perhaps rallying anti-Islamist forces and rolling back their gains, Abu Ismail capturing Islamist sympathies and votes and shunting the Brotherhood to the sidelines.  They may have realized that they were at the peak of their power right
now, with Parliament under their control and other parties in disarray,
and may never get another shot at the Presidency.  Or maybe it's all of the above, and more.

The next two months are going to be a wild period for Egyptian politics which will make or break its deeply troubled but still -- just barely -- viable transition. The Constitution is supposedly to be drafted, the President elected, and power transferred from the SCAF to a civilian government within this short time frame.  Meanwhile, the economy continues to badly struggle, frustrated activists continue to protest, and relations with the U.S. are badly strained.  Shater's entry into the Presidential race just introduces one more wild card into this loaded deck.  At least Egyptian politics won't be boring.

The Arab Uprising

 I am delighted to announce the official publication of my book The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (PublicAffairs). The seeds of the book can be found in my very first response to the Tunisian protests, written on January 5, 2011, which rooted them in the "wages of Arab decay" and predicted far more unrest to come.  The Arab Uprising offers a necessarily preliminary but hopefully stimulating interpretation of the meaning of the uprisings, what they have accomplished, how they have reshaped power politics and political norms in the Middle East, and their implications for American foreign policy. 

 Why do I term the events of the last fifteen months "The Arab Uprising"?  Because that best  captures what is truly unique about this period.  I don't like the term "Arab Spring" -- a term I am embarrassed to have evidently coined -- in part because they began in the dead of winter and arguably ended in their most potent form before the turn of the season.  "Arab Revolutions" is premature, since we don't yet know whether any of the Arab countries will manage fully successful revolutionary change.  "Arab Awakening" is misleading, since Arabs were hardly sleeping -- indeed, as the book details at length, the previous decade had been consumed by popular protest, rising dissent, and ever more contentious public spheres.The term "Arab uprising" captures the two most crucial dimensions of these events:  "Arab" because of the intense identification across borders and diffusion effects throughout the region; and "uprising" because of the surge of popular protest across almost every country.  

 The Arab Uprising roots the events since December 2010 in the broader sweep of Arab political history. It looks back to the great popular mobilization and ideological conflicts of the "Arab Cold War" of the 1950s and 1960s, to economic and political protests in the early 1980s, and to the abortive democratization efforts in several Arab countries in the early 1990s.  It traces the great wave of popular protest and the structural transformation of the Arab public sphere during the decade of the 2000s.  And then it carefully traces the evolution of this wave of Arab uprisings, from the first few months of a tightly integrated and seemingly unstoppable regional protest wave to the March 2011 counter-attack by the forces of the status quo and the impact of the descent into horrific violence in Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen.   

The book does more than retrace the political history of the uprisings, however.  It attempts to offer a systematic framework for understanding the new regional politics, including a reading of the new balance of power and the long-term implications of the empowerment of publics at the domestic and regional levels.  It assesses the rise of Islamist movements, the new regional struggle for Syria, the struggles of both Turkey and Iran, and the implications for Israel.  And it discusses America's options for the region, arguing that Realists, neoconservatives and liberal interventionists alike have failed to offer useful guides to the emerging regional politics. 

 I am very excited that The Arab Uprising has finally dropped.  It wasn't easy writing in the midst of rapidly developing events, trying to hit a moving analytical target while keeping up with events in so many different countries.  I could not have done it without the steady stream of high quality analysis produced by my colleagues for The Middle East Channel, upon which I rely heavily in my narrative.  I hope that you will all buy the book the book will stimulate productive debate and discussion over the coming weeks, and I look forward to your feedback!    

When the Empire Struck Back

Exactly one year ago, I was in Doha to speak at the Al Jazeera Forum, where a remarkable group of Arab politicians, intellectuals and activists had assembled to talk about the seemingly unstoppable momentum of the changes sweeping the region. Moncef Marzouki, then a human rights dissident and now President of Tunisia, told me about his hopes for crafting a genuinely democratic constitution -- hopes which al-Nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi assured me he shared. Tareq el-Bishri gave a long speech about how Egypt's 1952 revolution gave way to despotism and military rule; the youth activists in the audience could hardly mask their boredom with the old man, but perhaps should have listened more carefully. The Libyan revolutionaries at the conference were treated like rock stars, as were the youth activists from Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries. The mood was celebratory and electric, though tinged by anxiety over the atrocities in Libya and reports of Qaddafi's forces moving towards Benghazi.

But in retrospect, the week of March 12 marked the precise turning point away from the "New Hope" of those dizzying Tahrir days towards the grimmer, darker political struggles to come. I never made my scheduled trip from Doha to Manama. That week, the Empire struck back:[[BREAK]]

-Saudi Arabia helped ruin Bahrain. The GCC intervention to crush the Bahraini protest movement terminated U.S.-backed efforts by the more moderate elements within the Bahraini regime and opposition to find a political solution. Instead, the Bahraini regime and its Saudi backers launched a scorched-earth campaign against the opposition, with a massive and unjustifiable campaign of arrests, torture, repression, abuse and arbitrary dismissals which have been fully documented in the report of the Bahrain Independent Committee of Inquiry (pdf). The crackdown succeeded in the short term, clearing the streets and cementing the regime's hold on power, but that momentary advantage came at the cost of a generation's worth of lost legitimacy and challenges to come. It also badly hurt American credibility, as Arabs across the region pointedly noted the public silence of the United States on the crackdown in a Gulf ally.

The crackdown in Bahrain also introduced the virus of sectarianism, which had to that point been virtually non-existent in the Arab uprisings, at home and regionally. The Bahraini regime and the Saudi media tarred the opposition as Iranian-backed provocateurs, emphasizing their Shi'a identity through relentless propaganda and denying to them the identity of democracy and human rights campaigners which they had to that point successfully claimed. The ability of this regime-led sectarian frame to take hold in certain quarters, both inside the region and abroad, represents one of the true tragedies of the entire Arab uprising.

-King Abdullah bought off the home front. The "day of rage" called for March 11 in Saudi Arabia failed spectacularly. The Saudi regime then moved aggressively to shore up its own domestic standing. King Abdullah went on Saudi TV to announce a massive new public spending campaign, which amounted to "a total estimated volume of $130 billion... larger than the total annual government budget was as recently as 2007." The regime also worked through powerful Islamist networks to guarantee that they would not join in any protest movement. This not only consolidated the Saudi home front, at least for the time being, but also offered a model for other Gulf states to follow.

-The Libyan intervention. With Qaddafi's forces closing in Benghazi and the Arab League calling for international action, the United Nations approved a no-fly zone for Libya and NATO began its military intervention. This intervention clearly remains highly controversial and its ultimate success in creating a democratic, stable and unified Libya remains in doubt. The intervention clearly fit within the overarching narrative of the Arab uprisings and played an important role in keeping the hope for change alive. I remain quite convinced that the intervention was the right thing to do, that it saved many lives and helped to usher in a profound change for the better in Libya.

But at the same time, the shift from popular, peaceful mobilizations from below to an international military intervention inescapably shifted expectations about the nature of the uprisings. Al-Jazeera's screens which had for months been filled with powerful images of protestors chanting slogans were now dominated by battle scenes and war coverage. Even though the Libya intervention came against a murderous regime, it did contribute to the shift towards this darker second chapter.

- Yemen jumped the tracks. That same week, snipers opened fire on protestors in Yemen's Sana'a University. That horrific moment of violence triggered a wave of official defections and a split in the military. While some hoped that this would lead to the quick fall of the President Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime, instead it led to a long stalemate. The incredibly resilient and creative Yemeni protest movement found itself trapped between the competing centers of military power, and increasingly shut out of political dialogues which focused upon the traditional opposition parties. Whether or not the GCC transition plan which has finally removed Saleh from the Presidency succeeds in moving Yemen forward, the long months of stalemate and the horrible images of violence and human tragedy in Yemen further blunted regional momentum.

- Egypt's referendum. Also in that same week, Egyptians voted overwhelmingly in favor of a constitutional referendum which charted the path for a problematic, military-led transition. The high turnout and the strong support for the constitutional referendum delivered the first major setback to Egyptian activists, many of whom had campaigned against the referendum but now found their mobilization efforts swamped by the electoral process. The vote emboldened the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which now claimed a popular mandate for their transition timeline. The vote foreshadowed the clashes to come over the summer between protestors and the regime, as well as the results of this winter's Parliamentary elections.

- Syrian protests. As if all of this was not enough, the same week saw the first significant popular demonstrations break out in Syria. The heavy handed response by Syrian security forces set in motion the spiral of repression and mobilation which has brought the country to civil war and unspeakable violence. Syrian protestors and the regime alike may have been influenced by the intervention in Libya, with activists hoping to attract a similar intervention and the regime determined to prevent such an escalation from beginning. Saudi and Qatari efforts to drive Arab and international action against the Syrian regime, whether out of concern for the killing or hostility to Iran, have been a defining feature of the following year.

That's quite a week. In retrospect, it appears clear that the dramatic, nearly simultaneous events in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Yemen during a single week exactly one year ago ushered in a qualitatively new phase in the Arab uprisings. It's difficult today to even remember the dizzying excitment of those first few months, when everything seemed possible and the entire Arab world seemed bound together in a single narrative of inevitable change. The escalating violence, the grim determination of regimes to hold power, the fragmentation of the regional agenda, the stalled transitions, the rise of Islamists, the nasty sectarianism -- all of this has led many observers and analysts to turn away from their early enthusiasm.

But that's premature. We are still in the early stages of a profound structural transformation in the Arab world, and there's no going back to the old status quo. The Arab uprisings are far from over, no matter how much the Arab regimes would like them to be. Don't forget: Darth Vader might have seemed in control during The Empire Strikes Back but we all know what happened in The Return of the Jedi.

In the meantime, buy my book!

Can the ICC take on Syria?

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Last week, CNAS released my report
"Pressure Not War," which attempted to lay out a path forward on Syria which
could accelerate a political transition without a military intervention.  It's generated a great response, and a lot of hopefully productive debate.

I was surprised that the most interesting and heated arguments focused upon my recommendation to take top Syrian regime officials to the International Criminal Court if they do not immediately move towards a ceasefire and political transition. This was only one of a number of layered, interlocking
proposals designed to offer a non-military alternative to protect
Syrian civilians and accelerate progress towards a durable political
transition. Even if it didn't materialize, the rest of the arguments about the limits of military options and the ways to advance a political solution would still apply.   So I wasn't expecting that one point to draw so much attention.

But I'm glad that it did, since I would like to see international justice at the center of the debate.  Despite all the obvious obstacles, I don't agree that the ICC and the instruments of international justice can not be brought into play against Bashar al-Assad and the top officials of the Syrian regime.  I see a real possibility that Syria could be referred if it is made a top diplomatic priority, and mounting such a diplomatic campaign would be useful even if the effort failed.  But there is a serious and ongoing discussion about whether using the ICC as a instrument of pressure is desirable, even if possible -- for Syria, or for building global norms against impunity for atrocities. [[BREAK]]

The most common objection to the ICC recommendation was that a referral was
impossible without UN Security Council agreement which would not be forthcoming.  The argument is straightforward.  Syria is not a state party to the ICC.  The Court therefore has no jurisdication to indict its citizens without referral from the Security Council.  Russian and Chinese support for Damascus means that the Security Council will not authorize such a referral.  The ICC, therefore, can not play a role and an ultimatum would be an empty bluff. I was aware of all this when I wrote the report, obviously, so why did I nevertheless call for referrring Syrian officials to the ICC?  

First, there actually is a legal argument for involving the ICC even if the Security Council stays blocked, which rests on the fact that Syria, unlike Libya, is a signatory to the Treaty of
Rome even if it has not acceded to the Court.  Its 2000 signature does create some obligations, as a colleague of mine explains:

"the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) governs the
obligations of states that have signed but not ratified a treaty.
Article 18 says they must "refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty" (unless they have signaled their intent
not to ratify it).  That would seem to be the legal obligation on Syria
at this point."

Another international lawyer friend of mine proposes a second path (*):

"if the Syrian National Council were recognized as the legitimate representative of Syria, then this could support an article 12(3) filing by the SNC to the ICC to accept jurisdiction for the conflict here--they can do this without formal ratification of the Rome Statute (and the fact that Syria did sign the treaty could help give this some legal heft), and it would then allow an initiation of an investigation without the SC."

But both paths, while plausible, are less promising than it initially appears.  In such a highly charged, contenti0us case it seems unlikely that this legal gambit would survive the political firestorm to follow.   Even if it worked against Syria, it would probably have the longer-term result of undermining the legitimacy and the international acceptance of the ICC.  For reasons I elaborate upon below, I would oppose going this route if it had the effect of undermining the evolving legal international order dealing with atrocities and impunity. 

My thinking on the viability of the ICC rested more on political than legal logic.  Put simply, the Russian and Chinese veto is not simply an unalterable fact of nature which must be accepted.  An impressive consensus has been built at the
international level condemning the Syrian regime's abuses, including a 137-22
General Assembly Vote, an even more sweeping vote at the UN Human Rights
Council, and a unanimous statement (not resolution) from the UN Security
Council.  The UN's Human Rights Council recently released a damning, detailed report on the atrocities in Syria, and High Commissioner Navi Pillay has called for referral to the ICC.  Even the Security Council recently issued a unanimous, albeit nonbinding, statement demanding that Syria allow its humanitarian representative "free and unfettered access" to investigate the deteriorating situation. In short, there is very high-level, intense and growing attention both publicly and inside international institutions to Syrian human rights abuses and atrocities which most agree meet the criteria which would merit investigation.    

The Russian and Chinese vetoes at the Security Council which stand in the way are not necessarily insurmountable. As the Financial Times pointed out recently, China has reversed its objection to ICC referrals twice:  in 2005 allowing the referral of Sudan over Darfur, and in 2011 allowing the referral of Libya. China may well again reverse course and accept an ICC
referral, especially if lobbied heavily by the Gulf states on which it depends for energy and if this were seen as the price of blocking an international mandate for military intervention. Without Chinese cover, Russia might find it difficult to stand alone in the
way... and might find its diplomatic efforts better focused elsewhere.

Will this be easy?  Of course not.  But thus far, as I pointed out in the report, the US and its allies have not yet even attempted to pursue this route because they preferred to keep open Assad's exit option.  As Hilary Clinton testified last week, Assad may fit the definition of a war criminal but "such a step often makes it difficult for a leader to step down."  But the time for this logic is rapidly passing, since Assad has shown no interest in such a deal while the atrocities mount. Ad hoc measures which are useful tactically but undermine the strategic
goal of constructing robust norms against regime violence should be
avoided unless there is a clear and overwhelming case that it is
necessary to end violence and achieve a transition. 

At any rate, there is no way to know what is possible without trying.  Pushing for this would
be productive even if it isn't immediately accomplished.  At a minimum, pressure at the UN in this
direction would keep Syrian regime atrocities at the center of international attention and would put the onus for inaction squarely on the small and dwindling number of states standing in the way.  And are we to believe that
somehow getting UN authorization for an ICC referral is more difficult than getting authorization for military action?

A different line of argument last week made a compelling and thoughtful case that the push for indictments in Syria
would harm the cause of international justice by instrumentalizing the Court as
a political pawn of the Security Council or the United States.  Generically, the ICC must remain insulated from great power politics in order to establish its independence and integrity, by this argument. If it takes its lead from the political preferences of the United States or even the Security Council, it would lose the judicial autonomy essential for developing the rule of law. More specifically, Alana Tiemessen argues, the ICC must avoid having its indictments turn into bargaining chips if it hopes to remain credible.

I take
these arguments very seriously.  I believe that building legitimate international norms against impunity for atrocities should be at the center of U.S. and international strategy not just for Syria but across the Middle East and broader world politics. This is why I opposed the immunity deal granted to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and supported the intervention in Libya.  It's why I saw an opportunity in the Bassiouni report on Bahrain, but have been so disappointed by the regime's refusal to seriously implement its findings.  Long ago, I argued against the NATO intervention in Kosovo because it undermined the international legitimacy and legality of humanitarian intervention, and today I worry for the same reason about Anne-Marie Slaughter's suggestion that intervention in Syria should be carried out without Security Council authorization.   Whatever actions we take should build rather than undermine the foundations of global norms against impunity for atrocities.

But I also believe that the broad consensus already expressed across
multiple international institutions about the nature of Syrian regime atrocities reduces the force of this critique.  As noted above, the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly have overwhelmingly and formally endorsed international attention to the Syrian atrocities.  I would argue that the ICC was created precisely to deal with such atrocities, and that bringing it into
play would build rather than undermine those norms.  This is a debate which is well worth having -- and one which I look forward to continuing.  

(*) I added this second path a few hours after the original publication of this post. 

While I'm on the road...

I've been in Doha for the week, and so haven't been able to blog or produce a video blog. But since I've got wireless access for the moment, I wanted to draw attention to a few things of note which have dropped while I've been on the road.

 -  I was absolutely floored and thrilled that the Middle East Channel was named as a finalist in the "Website Department" for the 2012 National Magazine Awards for Digital Media -- the Ellies.  It's a testimony not just to the Middle East Channel's editorial team but to the community of academics, journalists and policy analysts who have contributed so much over the past year.   Thanks to everyone! 

 - The National Interest has published my response to Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev's article on Libya and the "new Wilsonianism" in American foreign policy. I argue that the Obama  administration's approach to the Middle East "may be neo-Wilsonian, but it is a careful and pragmatic example of the breed." Read it here. 

 - I contributed this comment to the Economist's debate over intervention in Syria.   You won't be surprised that I continue to regard military intervention as unwise and unlikely to either protect Syrian civilians or to hasten a political transition.  Read the full argument here. 

 - POMEPS has released a new briefing on the Syria crisis collecting recent Middle East Channel articles and analysis. You can read my introduction and download the brief here.  You can also watch a video of a recent POMEPS panel discussion on Syria here or on C-Span -- I particularly recommend the detailed and thoughtful discussion of the nature of the uprising in Damascus by Salwa Ismail of SOAS, but there's plenty of interesting material there. 

 - The Kindle edition of my book The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East is now available for pre-order.  It will be released March 22, five days before the paper version is published.    We will be officially launching the book in Washington DC on March 27 in a CNAS event and reception featuring me and Hisham Milhem -- RSVP here! 

  Back soon!