Marc Lynch's Blog, page 105

Failing Syria's refugees

   -- The Middle East Channel Editor's Blog -- 

 There are plenty of strong reasons for the United States and
the international community to remain deeply cautious about taking a deeper
role in Syria's internal war. Concerns about the nature of the Syrian opposition and the unintended effects of arming them, fears of a slippery slope from limited to direct military involvement, and questions about international legitimacy remain as urgent as ever.  But what could possibly justify the failure to
adequately address the humanitarian needs of the expanding Syrian refugee
population?  

Nobody can seriously question the
magnitude of the Syrian refugee crisis. There are now more than 465,000
refugees registered with UNHCR in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and North Africa. By
past experience, this likely dramatically undercounts the real number as many
refugees shy away from registering with official organizations. That does not
count the internally displaced, which likely number in the hundreds of
thousands. Most of the refugees are living in harsh conditions, inside or
outside of camps.  [[BREAK]]

But, as with the Iraqi refugee crisis of the mid-2000s, the international community is once
again failing to respond to this urgent humanitarian problem. The United
States has given almost $200
million to help Syrian refugees, and Britain
some $85 million. But it clearly is not enough. As a harsh
winter approaches, international relief agencies report significant
shortfalls in their funding appeals and failures to deliver on promised
contributions. UNHCR reports that donors have met only 35 percent of its $500
million appeal. Save the Children claims a $200 million shortfall and only 50
percent funding of its refugee relief needs. On Tuesday, the United Nations World Food Programme expressed deepening concerns over rapidly deteriorating food security inside Syria, compounded by inhibited distribution with the escalating and expanding conflict. Meanwhile, host governments complain
of the economic and social burden, and many fear their destabilizing
impact.

The international community should have learned more from its poor
performance in dealing with Iraqi refugees over the last decade, of the deep human cost and the long-term destabilizing effects of such refugee flows.  Dedicating serious resources to assisting Syrian
refugees seems like an obvious and core part of any effort to contain and mitigate the regional fallout of
the crisis -- whether or not Assad quickly falls, and regardless of the questions surrounding military intervention. 

The shortcomings of the international response to the Syrian
refugee crisis across the region is difficult to fathom given its obvious
humanitarian and strategic importance. It is even more difficult to justify
given that helping refugees offers such an obvious way to "do something"
without committing to military options deemed unwise. Humanitarian aid to the
Syrian refugees should be a high priority that does not get lost in the ongoing
debates over arming the opposition, the course of the internal war, and
possible military interventions.  The problem here is not really the United States, which has provided the largest share of official relief, but rather the Gulf states which have not matched their words of support with money, other states which typically step up in such situations, and the broader donor community. 

POMEPS and The Middle East Channel recently spoke with Northwestern
University Assistant
Professor Wendy Pearlman, who has just returned from over a month in Jordan
interviewing Syrian refugees. Watch the video here:

 

 

For more from the Middle East Channel on Syrian refugees, see:

- David Kenner, "Winter is Coming"  (Nov 1)

- Justin Vela, "Turkey's Men in Syria" (Sep 18)

- Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, "Syrian Spillover" (Aug 10)

- Stephen Kalin, "Little Solace for Syrian Refugees in Egypt" ( Aug 10)

- Justin Vela, "No Refuge" (Mar 7)

- Nicholas Seeley, "Jordan's open door for Syrian refugees" (March  1)

December 2012

Cover Image: 






Link: 


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/node/141...



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Story1 Section: 


Cover Story



Story1 Title: 


The 2012 Global Thinkers List



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Feature



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The Stories You Missed in 2012



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David Rothkopf



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The Opposite of Thinking



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Issue Number: 


197

Morsi's Mixed Moves

Egypt has had quite a week, even by its inimitable standards.  President Mohammed el-Morsi brokered a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, returning Egypt to the regional political balance and proving to be the pragmatic, realistic leader for which many had hoped.  Almost immediately afterward, his government announced a preliminary deal with the IMF for a desperately needed $4.8 billion loan.  But then, just as Morsi stood poised to bask in the international acclaim, he suddenly released a Presidential decree granting himself extraordinary powers and triggering a surge of popular mobilization protesting his decisions.

Morsi's move should be seen in the context of Cairo's intensely
polarized, gridlocked politics rather than as some pure expression of
Islamist intent.   His power is more impressive on paper than in
reality.   But there is no real question that Morsi went too far: 
decrees changing the rules of the game and placing the executive above
any appeal were dangerous and wrong when done by the SCAF, would have
been dangerous and wrong if done by a President Shafik, and they are
dangerous and wrong when done by Morsi. They should be reversed.  But
that will no more solve the underlying problems than last week's
Israel-Hamas ceasefire will solve the enduring problems of Gaza.   [[BREAK]]

Morsi's decree raises some truly troubling issues for Egypt's
transition.  It sparked large protests, violent clashes, judicial backlash,
resignations from his administration, rare unity among opposition
politicians, and severe new doubts about Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood's political intentions. Cairo is bracing itself for dueling
protests scheduled for Tuesday, with few signs yet that either side is
preparing to back down.  But the last year should have taught us to be less inclined
to see the sky falling
at the first sign of outrage on Twitter than we used to be.  The political crisis has been exacerbated by the now familiar pattern of exaggeration, hyperbole, and false rumors spreading like wildfire through the media and the internet to a polarized public primed to believe the worst.   And it has been fueled by the deeply unfortunate polarization which has poisoned Egyptian politics over the last year, for which both the Islamists and their rivals bear their share of responsibility.  

The surge of popular and institutional mobilization against Morsi's move are positive signs, since these are the only way to push back against executive overreach in the absence of a Parliament, a Constitution, or any institutionalized avenues of political contestation.   Will the mobilization against Morsi's decree be another January 25th
(unlikely), another round of the violent, pointless chaos of November
and December 2011 (hopefully not), or -- in the best case -- a return to
the unified, politically focused, and effective shows of popular force
like those in the spring and early summer of 2011?  Or will the mobilization and counter-mobilization succumb to the poisonous dynamics of an escalating existential battle between Islamists and their enemies which could destroy any hope of finding a shared foundation for a new constitutional order? 

Morsi's Gaza triumph has rapidly faded from the Egyptian public arena in the face of the political crisis sparked by his power grab.  But it remains an important part of the puzzle of Egypt's new politics. The eruption of Israel-Hamas fighting was rightly seen as the first real test of Morsi and his elected Egyptian Islamist government.  Many thought he would seize the moment to escalate against Israel, tear up the Camp David Treaty, engage in reckless rhetoric to demonstrate radical credentials, or reveal the true extremism lurking behind a mask of moderation.  Instead, he behaved as every bit the pragmatic statesman.  It is too soon to know whether the cease-fire will hold, the Gaza
blockade will be lifted, or precisely what responsibilities Egypt has
now taken on as guarantor of the agreement.  But in the short term, 
Egypt emerged looking a more effective diplomatic player than at any
time in a decade of the long
twilight of the Mubarak regime or the chaotic post-revolutionary
transition. 

He did so by positioning Egypt as an important mediator between Hamas and Israel and winning the confidence of Washington while
also expressing pro-Palestinian views in line with those of the
Egyptian and broader Arab public.  Moves such as sending his Prime Minister to Gaza to express sympathy won political points even as he pursued a cautious, fairly traditional set of Egyptian interests towards Gaza.  The Muslim Brotherhood helped keep the streets relatively quiet, whatever its members felt privately, giving him space for diplomacy.  And he showed that he could use both the Muslim Brotherhood's ties to Hamas and the
Egyptian intelligence service's ties to Israel to become an effective
broker.  In short, on the regional stage Morsi's Egypt proved the adept practitioner of Realpolitik inflected with tactical appeals to Arab and Islamic identity.   This is the role which Erdogan's Turkey played so effectively over the past few years -- and which Morsi's Egypt is now bidding to fill.

Had Morsi stopped there, there would have been a clear narrative of a pragmatic, effective new Egyptian government.  But of course, he did not.  Instead, he made his unprecedented bid to centralize power in the office of the Presidency, a bold Calvinball move redefining the rules of the game in mid-play which immediately ignited a new political crisis.   Opposition politicians ceased their bickering for the moment to unify around a denunciation of the power grab. A larger than normal crowd descended on Tahrir and protest broke out around the country, along with depressingly familiary violent clashes between security forces and the opposition.  Meanwhile, Muslim Brotherhood supporters mobilized in counter-demonstrations.   Rumors ran wild about coming moves to prosecute political enemies, purge the media, and more.    

A case could have been made for Morsi's Constitutional Decree had he not pushed it too far.  The judiciary has played an erratic, unpredictable and politicized role throughout the transition, with its controversial decisions such as the dissolution of Parliament.  Its Calvinball approach to the rules, in the absence of either a Constitution or a political consensus, introduced enormous and unnecessary uncertainty into the transition and badly undermined the legitimacy of the process.  Morsi was not the only one who despaired of Cairo's political polarization and institutional gridlock.  But none of that can justify his assertion of executive immunity from oversight or accountability, declaring his decisions "final and binding and cannot be appealed in any way or to any entity."  And then there was Article VI, asserting the power to do literally anything "to protect the country and the goals of the revolution."   That Morsi was elected has nothing to do with his attempt to place himself above the law.  Nor does the expiration date of his extraordinary powers (after Parliamentary elections and the Constitutional referendum) reassure in the slightest. 

The pushback which is now taking place on the streets and in the courthouse and in the public sphere is exactly what needs to happen, even if the increasing turn towards existential opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood rather than toward specific political issues is disturbing.   For all the polarization and ugliness of the street clashes, this intense engagement with politics and unwillingness to accept Morsi's diktat are positive signs of the vitality of Egypt's vibrant, ornery and contentious new politics.  It shows yet again that there is no going back to the old patterns of Egyptian or Arab politics.   The dissolution of Parliament, failure to produce a constitution, and politicization of the judiciary has left Egyptians with no legitimate institutional channels by which to contest executive power.  The ability of other political forces to push back through such extra-institutional means is crucial to maintaining de facto checks and balances on the President.  De jure would be better.  

Both Morsi and his rivals seem determined to push this fight towards what could be a truly ugly conflict rather than to seek the grounds for compromise.  There is such a compromise to be had, however.  Morsi has to back away from his claims of executive immunity, but the judiciary and other power centers need to stop blocking any political development.   Morsi has to accept the urgent need for yet another try at putting together an inclusive and representative Constitutional Assembly, abandoning once and for all the odd notion that an electoral majority should entitle Islamists to majoritarian dominance of the drafting of a foundational document.  But his opponents need to be willing to actually sit on such an Assembly rather than quitting at the first sign of trouble to register their symbolic dissent.  The cycle of violent repression of protests has to stop, with the security forces showing more restraint and protestors doing more to police their own ranks.  I think it's important (though I suspect I am in a distinct minority on this) to get a legitimate Parliament back in place -- whether by reinstating the  dissolved one in its entirety, holding by-elections for the seats deemed unconstitutional, or holding entirely new elections.   

Overall, at its core, both the Brotherhood and its opponents need to take steps to break the cycle of polarization and start to somehow build the common ground on which a successful transition will depend.  They have not been good at this throughout the transition; in particular, I still believe that the Brotherhood blundered badly in breaking its promise to not seek the Presidency, and that both Egypt and the Brotherhood would have been better off had they kept their word.  There are a million other poor decisions by all actors along the way.  But there's no going back to fix those mistakes, only the opportunity for both sides to seize this crisis to change direction.   I don't think anyone is optimistic that such an accord will be reached.  We will see this week whether either side wants to find one and is willing to take the first steps to repair the deep ruptures in Egypt's transitional politics.  

 

Will Arabs turn out for Gaza?

Israel's assassination of senior Hamas military commander Ahmad Jabari and launching of a major air campaign against Gaza on Wednesday poses the first serious test of the effect of the Arab uprisings on Israel. Egyptian President Mohammed el-Morsi declared that "Egypt today is different from yesterday, and Arabs today are different from yesterday."  Israel is gambling that he's wrong, that the Arab uprisings have changed little, and that Arab leaders will continue to act much as they did during its 2008-09 war against Gaza, controlling popular anger while doing little beyond perhaps some more heated rhetoric.  

This poses the first real test of some of the biggest questions about the real strategic significance of the Arab uprisings of the last two years.  Do the uprisings really constrain Israel's ability to wage wars such as the 2006 war against Hezbollah or 2008/09 war against Gaza?  In what way?  Would the empowerment of a mobilized Arab public force Arab leaders to adopt significantly different policies towards Israel? 
Would democratically elected Islamist leaders like Morsi really change core foreign policy positions such as the commitment to the Camp David peace treaty? Would intense political competition, popular mobilization, or different ideologies outweigh the cold calculations of Realpolitik and hopes for international acceptance?  It's far too soon to know the answers to these profound questions -- and the signals are mixed. [[BREAK]]

First, images and video from Gaza have been circulating widely through Arab (as well as international) social media and satellite television channels.  The anger and identification which those images have sparked across the region, across ideological trends and across borders, suggests that there has been little change in the centrality of the Palestinian issue to Arab concerns.  Syria has clearly disrupted the traditional lines of political consensus, intensifying the bitter arguments, mutual recriminations and charges of hypocrisy, while the relentless stream of images of death devastation from Syria have perhaps had a numbing effect.  But overall I don't see much evidence that Arabs aren't focused on or outraged over the attack on Gaza.  

At the same time, it's important to recognize how strikingly little popular mobilization there has been in the Arab world over Gaza thus far.  Protests have happened, of course, but they have been relatively small and contained in Ramallah, Tunisia, Yemen and elsewhere.  The quite significant protests in Amman have remained largely focused on the lifting of fuel subsidies and political reform (including previously unheard of chants calling for the overthrow of the King) rather than shifting focus to Gaza.  Even in Cairo, Muslim Brotherhood mobilization and a major sermon by Yusuf al-Qaradawi in al-Azhar seems to have produced only a march of a few thousand.  I think it's safe to say that most of us would have expected more. 

This may soon change, of course, if the war continues for an extended period.  As much as it likely prefers to lead the charge against Israel,
the Muslim Brotherhood may well see an interest for now in controlling and
moderating the level of public pressure on the President.  But if other
Egyptian forces, Islamist and secular, begin to mobilize in a big way it
will be exceedingly difficult politically (and ideologically) for the
Brotherhood to remain restrained. Jordanians involved in extraordinary protests may not continue to avoid the emotive appeal of the Palestinian issue.  The unifying and intensifying effects of the new Arab public sphere may take hold and build momentum, sparking demonstrations across the region.  But we haven't really seen this yet. 

Israelis and many in the West might draw comfort from these early signals to conclude that the Arab uprisings won't matter much in the course of a war with Gaza.  Perhaps Arab publics are now so focused on domestic issues that they have either lost interest in the Palestinian cause, or don't want to be distracted from pressing their local demands.   Or perhaps the fever of the Arab uprisings has broken, and that Arab regimes who have long been comfortable with Israel and hostile towards Hamas are again strong enough continue their traditional patterns of rhetorical posturing while suppressing popular mobilization and blocking significant policy shifts.

Such conclusions are premature.  The conflict has only just begun. If this extends into a longer
battle, with or without an Israeli ground offensive into Gaza, it seems
likely that protests will begin to mount and calculations will change. The caution of Arab leaders is at least in part
imposed by their recognition of what an unstable and complex moment
this is, and how quickly it could spiral out of control.  Morsi in particular is painfully aware of his precarious position, trapped between conventionally defined Egyptian interests and the passions of most Egyptians (not only Islamists). 

Regional leaders are trying to position themselves in support of Gazans, but very
cautiously.  And so Tunisia's President Moncef Marzouki spoke with Ismail
Haniya, and its Foreign Minister is scheduled to visit Gaza on
Saturday.  Egypt has sent its Prime Minister -- but, notably, not
President Morsi himself.  Qatar, which had invested heavily in a new outreach to Gaza and Hamas, has been relatively muted, calling for a UN Commission of Inquiry but not yet more.  Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, after an unusually long silence, has
canceled his scheduled trip to Gaza and instead will remain in Cairo to
consult with Morsi.  The Arab League has called an emergency meeting,
which may get around to convening this weekend.  All seem likely to
focus their efforts on pushing Hamas and Israel to accept a
ceasefire, and on mobilizing international support for their
efforts.

Morsi has demonstrated his preference to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy here, offering some sympathetic rhetoric and a visit from his relatively anonymous Prime Minister but thus far avoiding dramatic gestures such as opening the border with Gaza or throwing Camp David on the table.  But as much as Morsi values solidifying relations with the U.S. and the
international community, and is constrained by the status quo orientation of the Egyptian military and foreign policy apparatus, he may also see real opportunities to gain domestic popularity and assert
Egyptian regional leadership.  Morsi's conversations with Erdogan may be
implictly focused as much on coordinating to avoid a bidding war over
Gaza which pushes both countries towards overly risky moves.  But it is
not clear that such a stance can be maintained if the tempo of protests
and the human toll of the war escalates.  

The coming days will, among many other things, offer some of the first real evidence about the strategic effects of the Arab uprisings.  It is important to recognize how limited the response of the Arab public and leaders has been thus far.  But it's also important to recognize how quickly this could change, and how unsurprising this would be should it happen.  The Arab uprisings have introduced far greater
unpredictability and complexity into everyone's calculations, raising the potential payoff to dramatic political gestures and decreasing the confidence of rulers that they can safely ignore public demands.   All of those ready to confidently dismiss the possibility of such rapid developments should go back first to read what they wrote about Tunisia in December 2010, Egypt in January 2011, or Syria in February 2011.  All the more reason for all parties to push hard for a ceasefire now, so that it isn't put to a test.  

On to the next one

President Barack Obama's solid, hard-fought re-election victory represents a significant moment not only for America but for its changing relations with the Middle East. While the election was not primarily fought on foreign policy issues, I don't fully agree with my Foreign Policy friends that foreign policy didn't matter. Obama's strong, consistent, and significant lead on his handling of national security and foreign policy -- with, if judged by the debates and the campaigns, the rest of the world (outside of the economically nefarious China) defined overwhelmingly in terms of the Middle East -- both defined him as a leader and blocked potential lines of Republican attack. It may not have been decisive for many voters but that doesn't mean it wasn't a crucial background feature of the evaluation of the incumbent. Had he not been viewed so positively on foreign policy, it would have mattered. 

So what now? The election campaign, and not only the outcome, should be seen as the rout of the neo-conservativism of the disastrous 2001-06 period of the Bush administration and the consolidation of a broad, bipartisan foreign policy consensus. This new consensus began when the Bush administration cleaned house at the end of 2006 and carried out its major course correction, and has been developed, changed, and institutionalized by Obama over the last four years. It was telling that in the foreign policy debate, Romney desperately attempted to embrace the very Obama policies which his conservative base had long denounced as worse than disastrous. Some GOP hawks will probably argue that he lost because he failed to articulate such a clear, hawkish foreign policy vision. But it seems more likely that Romney's polling showed that Obama's approach resonated with the
American popular mood and that he stood little to gain beyond his base with an open embrace of the failed Bush policies of 2001 to 2006.

What about Benghazi? In retrospect, I suspect that the intense focus on Benghazi hurt Romney more than Obama. I suspect that most voters quickly recognized Benghazi for the Republican pseudo-scandal it always was, and received it at roughly the same wavelength as Donald Trump demanding a birth certificate. The prospect of a hammer blow to bring down the incumbent enemy may have thrilled the base, but the very fact of its identification with Fox News and the right wing bubble limited its ability to travel farther. So did the fact that it fairly clearly was not a "scandal" of any significance. Yes, the tragic deaths revealed serious, relatively low-level, issues with inter-agency coordination and communication, and more major issues about intelligence and the changing nature of al Qaeda's strategy and organization. But it was never the scandal which Republicans so desperately wanted it to be, nor Libya the failure so many believe it to be. Hopefully the real issues can now be addressed outside of the partisan frenzy. 

At the same time, by sucking up an unbelieavable amount of the air in the foreign policy debate, Benghazi crowded out a much more serious debate which might have taken place about Syria, Egypt, and the Arab spring. Now, I believe that Obama has done a very good job in responding to the major developments in the Middle East over the last few years -- a case I've made before and will make again. But there could have been a serious, difficult argument about the costs of Egypt's transition, the merits of democracy against stability, the implications of rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements, the inconsistency toward Bahrain and the Gulf, the sustainability of a drone-based counter-terrorism strategy, the horrific stalemate in Syria, the long-deceased Israeli-Palestinian peace process, or even war with Iran. The Obama campaign was ready for those arguments (I offered some unpaid advice to the campaign on such issues, for what it was worth, though they hardly needed it). But instead we got little more from Romney than vapid paeans to American leadership and complaints about apology tours. Again, perhaps now we can have that debate -- and, given their own deep internal differences over whether, say, their support for democracy outweighs their fear of Islamism, Republicans might take the lead in sorting out their own ideas on these difficult issues.

What about the new Obama administration? Obama's caution and pragmatism in the face of regional turmoil, along with his real commitments to helping with democratic transitions, finding a path to Israeli-Palestinian peace, engaging moderate Islamists and fighting al Qaeda, are unlikely to change. His team clearly believes, correctly in my view, that the emerging Arab world neither wants nor needs the American rhetorical claims to leadership for which so many American pundits seem to yearn. Nor does he (or the country) have any interest in risky new military adventures. Here are a few places his second administration might usefully push:

- Syria: There's no quick solution for Syria's ever worsening conflict, including military ones. The new administration should not, and I expect will not, contemplate any kind of military intervention, but something more needs to be done to block the Syrian regime's use of air power. It needs to continue its renewed efforts to build a more effective Syrian political opposition, to try to broker a political transition, and failing that to mobilize international consensus for war crimes prosecutions of Bashar al-Assad's regime. 

- Iran: With military action in the background but not imminent, and sanctions taking a real political and economic toll inside of Iran, now seems to be the right time to begin a serious effort at real talks with Iran over its nuclear program -- and to be prepared to take yes for an answer.

- Israel and the Palestinians: The new administration should try to take advantage of the reorientation of Hamas toward Qatar, and work with Egypt to make a serious push to finally reconstitute a representative and legitimate Palestinian negotiating partner. It should also do what it can to encourage the renewal of a peace camp in the upcoming Israeli election. Those two steps would at least set the stage for a possible return to peace talks, though I don't think anyone's optimistic. 

- The Arab transitions: The administration has done a much better job than credited on Egypt and the other Arab transitions. It needs to continue that engagement behind the scenes with all actors, from the military to the Muslim Brotherhood to liberals and beyond, to try to keep the endlessly rocky transition on track. It needs to stay engaged with Libya, which is not yet even close to the failure portrayed in the media. But it also needs to be much more direct and forthright in pushing friendly regimes -- especially Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan -- to enact serious reforms before their political crises spiral out of control. 

- Al Qaeda: While al Qaeda is far weaker than it was four years ago, its new adaptations and franchise strategies will require some rethinking. The implications for al Qaeda and for the United States of the rise of Islamist governments and movements, and the intense battles between Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi trends, will require careful new thinking. Paradigms which made sense a few years ago may no longer have as much traction. And there will have to be a serious reckoning with the drone program, both legally and strategically.

The pages of Foreign Policy and the Middle East Channel will no doubt be filled with advice for the second term in the coming days on these and other issues. But for today, a heartfelt congratulations to Barack Obama. He has got his four more years. Let's hope he does something with them.  

On To The Next One

President Barack Obama's solid, hard-fought re-election victory represents a significant moment not only for America but for its changing relations with the Middle East.  While the election was not primarily fought on foreign policy issues, I don't fully agree with my Foreign Policy friends that foreign policy didn't matter. Obama's strong, consistent and significant lead on his handling of national security and foreign policy -- with, if judged by the debates and the campaigns, the rest of the world (outside of the economically nefarious China) defined overwhelmingly in terms of the Middle East - both defined him as a leader and blocked potential lines of Republican attack.  It may not have been decisive for many voters but that doesn't mean it wasn't a crucial background feature of the evaluation of the incumbent.  Had he not been viewed so positively on foreign policy, it would have mattered. 

So what now?  The election campaign, and not only the outcome, should be seen as the rout of the neo-conservativism of the disastrous 2001-06 period of the Bush administration and the consolidation of a broad, bipartisan foreign policy consensus.  This new consensus began when the Bush administration cleaned house at the end of 2006 and carried out its major course correction, and has been developed, changed, and institutionalized by Obama over the last four years.  It was telling that in the foreign policy debate, Romney desperately attempted to embrace the very Obama policies which his conservative base had long denounced as worse than disastrous.   Some GOP hawks will probably argue that he lost because he failed to articulate such a clear, hawkish foreign policy vision.  But it seems more likely that Romney's polling showed that Obama's approach resonated with the
American popular mood and that he stood little to gain beyond his base with an open embrace of the failed Bush policies of 2001 to 2006.  

What about Benghazi?  In retrospect, I suspect that the intense focus on Benghazi hurt Romney more than Obama.  I suspect that most voters quickly recognized Benghazi for the Republican pseud0-scandal it always was, and received it at roughy the same wavelength as Donald Trump demanding a birth certificate.  The prospect of a hammer blow to bring down the incumbent enemey may have thrilled the base, but the very fact of its identification with Fox News and the right wing bubble limited its ability to travel farther.   So did the fact that it fairly clearly was not a "scandal" of any significance.  Yes, the tragic deaths revealed serious, relatively low-level, issues with inter-agency coordination and communication, and more major issues about intelligence and the changing nature of al-Qaeda's strategy and organization.  But it was never the scandal which Republicans so desperately wanted it to be, nor Libya the failure so many believe it to be. Hopefully the real issues can now be addressed outside of the partisan frenzy. 

At the same, time, by sucking up an unbelieavable amount of the air in the foreign policy debate, Benghazi crowded out a much more serious debate which might have taken place about Syria, Egypt and the Arab spring.  Now, I believe that Obama has done a very good job in responding to the major developments in the Middle East over the last few years -- a case I've made before and will make again.  But there could have been a serious, difficult argument about the costs of Egypt's transition, the merits of democracy against stability, the implications of rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and salafi movements, the inconsistency towards Bahrain and the Gulf, the sustainability of a drone-based counter-terrorism strategy, the horrific stalemate in Syria, the long-deceased Israeli-Palestinian peace process, or even war with Iran. The Obama campaign was ready for those arguments (I offered some unpaid advice to the campaign on such issues, for what it was worth, though they hardly needed it).  But instead we got little more from Romney than vapid paeans to American leadership and complaints about apology tours. Again, perhaps now we can have that debate -- and Republicans might take the lead in sorting out their own ideas on these difficult issues.

What about the new Obama administration?  Obama's caution and pragmatism in the face of regional turmoil, along with his real commitments to helping with democratic transitions, finding a path to Israeli-Palestinian peace, engaging moderate Islamists and fighting al-Qaeda, are unlikely to change.  His team clearly believes, correctly in my view, that the emerging Arab world neither wants nor needs the American rhetorical claims to leadership for which so many American pundits seem to yearn.  Nor does he (or the country) have any interest in risky new military adventures.   Here are a few places his second administration might usefully push:

 -  Syria:  There's no quick solution for Syria's ever worsening conflict, including military ones.  The new administration should not, and I expect will not, contemplate any kind of military intervention, but something more needs to be done to block the Syrian regime's use of air power. It needs to continue its renewed efforts to build a more effective Syrian political opposition, to try to broker a political transition, and failing that  to mobilize international consensus for war crimes prosecutions of Bashar al-Assad's regime. 

  -  Iran:   With military action in the background but not imminent, and sanctions taking a real political and economic toll inside of Iran, now seems to be the right time to begin a serious effort at real talks with Iran over its nuclear program -- and to be prepared to take yes for an answer.

  - Israel and the Palestinians:   The new administration should try to take advantage of the reorientation of Hamas towards Qatar, and work with Egypt to make a serious push to finally reconstitute a representative and legitimate Palestinian negotiating partner.  It should also do what it can to encourage the renewal of a peace camp in the upcoming Israeli election.  Those two steps would at least set the stage for a possible return to peace talks, though I don't think anyone's optimistic. 

  - The Arab transitions:   The administration has done a much better job than credited on Egypt and the other Arab transitions. It needs to continue that engagement behind the scenes with all actors, from the military to the Muslim Brotherhood to liberals and beyond, to try to keep the endlessly rocky transition on track.  It needs to stay engaged with Libya, which is not yet even close to the failure portrayed in the media. But it also needs to be much more direct and forthright in pushing friendly regimes -- especially Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan -- to enact serious reforms before their political crises spiral out of control. 

  - Al-Qaeda:   While al-Qaeda is far weaker than it was four years ago, its new adaptations and franchise strategies will require some rethinking.  The implications for al-Qaeda and for the U.S. of the rise of Islamist governments and movements, and the intense battles between Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi trends, will require careful new thinking.   Paradigms which made sense a few years ago may no longer have as much traction.   And there will have to be a serious reckoning with the drone program, both legally and strategically.  

 The pages of Foreign Policy and the Middle East Channel will no doubt be filled with advice for the second term in the coming days on these and other issues.     But for today, a heartfelt congratulations to Barack Obama. He has got his four more years.  Let's hope he does something with them.    

Kuwait's Moment of Truth

Last night's violent clashes in Kuwait have brought its
long-brewing political crisis to a dangerous point. It did not have to be this
way, in a Gulf state that has long stood out for its robust public sphere,
electoral traditions and vibrant parliament. But a series of unusually
provocative steps by both the royal family and the opposition, in the context
of a long-running battle over the powers of parliament and accountability for
the royal family, have taken their toll and tempers are running hot. After months
of growing popular mobilization and a complex crisis of political institutions,
Kuwait's political future suddenly seems deeply uncertain. 

Before it gets too late to de-escalate, the
Kuwaiti leadership needs to offer meaningful political concessions, including
standing down on its deeply controversial plans for a December election,
relaxing its attempt to shut down public dissent, and allowing a greater
parliamentary role in the selection of cabinet ministers. It seems to have
instead decided that now is the time to crack down hard before things get out
of hand. Its repressive turn and the galvanizing effect on a mostly moderate
opposition offers a troubling echo of Bahrain's brutal path ... one which the
Kuwaitis seemed uniquely well-placed to avoid, but now looms large. Kuwait's
long-developing political crisis is discussed in depth in the essays collected
in today's new POMEPS Briefing, "Kuwait's
Moment of Truth." [[BREAK]]

Kuwait's problems have been evident for quite
a while, as popular mobilization interacted with repeated efforts to assert
parliamentary authority over successive governments appointed by the emir.
Those political battles were moving ever closer to the royal family itself,
particularly allegations of corruption (which last November drove the prime
minister from office) and demands for parliament's right to interrogate royal
government ministers. The long political stalemate at the top coincided with
the growing assertiveness of a wired youth movement, the troubling rise
of a
new kind of sectarianism, and the success
of Islamists and tribal figures in the February 2012 elections. Indeed, I included an assault by regime security forces
on dissident Kuwaiti academic Obaid al-Wasmi in my January 5, 2011
essay on the crumbling
foundations of the Arab order - before the fall of Ben
Ali, before the Egyptian uprising, and before most observers sensed the
impending regional Arab uprising. 

Unlike many Gulf states, Kuwait's current
crisis comes within the context of a long-history of public, contentious
politics. To its great credit, Kuwait has a long history of parliamentary
politics, and its vibrant and creative youth movement has been active for over
half a decade. Its experience with contentious and parliamentary politics,
along with massive oil wealth and solid U.S. political support, should have
left Kuwait better equipped to handle rising political turbulence. But the
popular and parliamentary challenges to royal authority seem to have knocked
the emirate off-balance. The arrest of opposition figure Musallam al-Barrak for
his public warning to the Emir ("We will not allow you, your highness, to
take Kuwait into the abyss of autocracy.") and its ban on public demonstrations
does not suggest a confident regime.

The popular mobilization in Kuwait should
quickly dispel any notions of the
Gulf being immune to the underlying drivers
of the Arab uprising. The youth
movement in Kuwait is every bit as wired,
impatient and engaged as in other Arab countries -- and has been active since at
least 2006. Online activists and politicians besides
Barrak have increasingly openly mocked and challenged the al-Sabah family, though going after the Emir himself marks an escalation. Last November, in an unprecedented challenge to the
authority of the royal family, parliamentary opposition and popular
mobilization -- which included the shocking
occupation of the parliament building by
protesters -- forced the resignation of Prime Minister Nasser Mohammed
al-Sabah over allegations of corruption. The massive
protest on October 21 was possibly the largest
in the history of Kuwait. Opposition leaders are huddling
to decide on a strategy after last night's
clashes, but do not seem inclined to back down as a wave of popular anger
pushes them forward. They plan a major protest on Sunday, November 4, in
defiance of the regime's ban on public assembly.

After years of jockeying with its opponents,
the regime has pushed back hard, in ways that look likely to backfire. In June,
the emir
suspended the troublesome parliament for the
first time in Kuwaiti history; it was subsequently dissolved after the Constitutional
Court ruled the February 2012 election void. The emir then unilaterally
announced changes to the election law that outraged the opposition, which has
declared its intention to boycott the elections called for December 1. The
government banned public gatherings of more than 20 people, and warns
of even harsher penalties after the violent
clashes last night. It is also reportedly
planning to prosecute international NGOs for
reporting on its human rights violations and political crackdown. Barrak, the
opposition figure whose arrest galvanized the recent protest, will
reportedly be charged with undermining the status of the emir (he was released on bail pending his detention).

While the drivers of the tension in Kuwait
have much in common with the other Arab uprisings, particularly the impatient
and mobilized youth, it is important to keep local conditions well in mind.
Many Kuwaitis support the regime against the opposition, and there is a long
history of public politics to fall back upon. Crucially, this is not currently
a mobilization for the overthrow of the regime. Most protesters want to see a
constitutional monarchy and political reforms, not revolution. But the lessons
of other cases -- notably Bahrain -- suggest that the Kuwaiti regime's current
course of action poses a real risk of radicalizing its opposition and setting
in motion unpredictable popular forces. (Unconfirmed rumors such as those reported by Mohammed al-Jassim that Saudi and UAE leaders pushing their Kuwaiti counterparts to crack down only exacerbate such fears.)

Kuwaitis are proud of their parliament, angry
about corruption, and determined to see greater transparency and
accountability. Their demands thus far focus on such relatively moderate
reforms. But it is unclear whether the regime can make such concessions.
Parliamentary selection or approval of the prime minister and
cabinet, rather than appointment by the emir, would fundamentally
change the enduring logic of family rule in Kuwait. As Nathan
Brown noted last December, "the old
[political order] is fraying, but it is not quite clear what is replacing
it." POMEPS Briefing 15, "Kuwait's
Moment of Truth," explains how we
got here and what to expect next.

A Barometer for Arab Democracy

 Arab public opinion is increasingly important following the Arab uprising, the empowerment of public forces, the more open online and traditional media, and the contentious political transitions in some countries.  I've recently discussed the findings of opinion surveys in Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt, as well as Pew's extraordinary survey of global Muslim attitudes.  Now I'd like to point out some of the key findings of the second wave of the Arab Barometer, conducted in seven countries in the months immediately before and after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings.  Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal and Michael Robbins, the scholars who lead the Arab Barometer project, have just published an article detailing some of its key findings about democracy in the Journal of Democracy.  They show that Arabs continue to strongly support democracy as the best form of government, even as understandings of democracy continue to evolve, while Islamism at the time of the survey seemed to be receding rather than advancing with broad Arab publics. [[BREAK]]

The Arab Barometer is different from other surveys out there for a few reasons.  First, it's done by academics and for academics, which means there is less attention to the current events of the day (approval of particular governments, views of the United States) and more to the underlying attitudes.  Second, it uses a very careful methodology to the best practices of the field, in contrast to a lot of other surveys in the region done on the cheap or in support of a particular agenda.   Third, all of its data is open access and available to all researchers.   Finally, its battery of questions is explicitly designed to be comparable with the Barometers in Latin America, Africa and Europe.  This strength is also a weakness, of course, for those who want insights into the current mood in these countries more than they do longer-term trends -- these survey results are more useful to highlight change and continuity in public attitudes over time than to answer extremely current ticks in political preferences. 

That said, the findings are quite interesting.   Support for democracy in the abstract remains very high across all the countries surveyed.  But it actually dropped somewhat in several countries in the years between the two waves.  Support for democracy dropped by almost ten points in Lebanon and five points in Jordan, though it remained high in absolute terms everywhere. 

The Barometer found very interesting differences in how Arabs thought about democracy in different countries, however.  It asks a battery of questions about the meaning of democracy, asking respondents to specify whether they understand democracy primarily in political terms (i.e. free and fair elections) or in economic terms (i.e. reducing inequality or provision of services).  There was some evidence that the political understanding of democracy increased in the wake of the Arab uprising:  in Algeria, there was an 11 point increase from the first wave to the second in those identifying political rather than economic dimensions as most important;  in Yemen, where the question was not asked in the 1st wave, 61% identified political dimensions.  But in Egypt, conducted in the summer of 2011 after the revolution, the survey found an overwhelmingly economic view of demcoracy. Only 6% named "free
and fair elections" as the most essential characteristic of democracy, while 
77% named economic factors such as low inequality, elimination of
corruption, or provision of basic necessities to all. 

The survey also found strong support for the notion that "reform should proceed gradually" across most countries, although overall there was a 12 percentage point drop in support for gradual reform between the two waves (from 89.5% to 77.7%).  Algerians seem to have grown particularly impatient; in a survey done after January 2011, support for gradual reform fell from 91.4% to 63.3%.   Significant drops were also seen in Yemen, also carried out after January 2011 (from 87% to 69%), and -- less significantly -- in Jordan (90% to 85%). 

The survey found a huge decline in political interest in Lebanon and Palestine, and overall in 2nd wave almost all countries converged to between 33%-40% on the question of "interest in politics."  But the survey also founda  huge increase in civic engagement from the 1st to the 2nd wave. The most dramatic increase came in Yemen, with 23% increase, but the survey also found a roughly 9% increase in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine. 

The survey's findings on religion broadly accord with the Pew survey that support for Islamist views of politics is receding rather than surging.   Overall, those saying that religion should not influence how people vote in elections went from 67.8% in the 1st wave to 81.2% in the 2nd wave.   There was also a decline in support for the idea that more religious people should hold public office (from 44.6% to 38.5%).  The idea that religion is primarily a private matter gained support, from 53.7% to 65.1%. In Egypt, only 37% said that men of religion should influence government decisions
and 87% say they should not influence how citizens vote.  80% said that
religion is a private matter, and only 47% said they trusted the Muslim
Brotherhood.  Support for the idea that laws should be made in accordance to will of people remained stable (from 62.9% to
64.5%), but there was a slight increase in the belief that laws should be made in accordance with shari'a (from 67.3% to
73.4%).  Actual Muslims living in the Arab world generally do not see a contradiction in these positions; only 30.2% in both waves agreed that democracy and Islam were incompatible.  In short, perhaps there is an upsurge in Islamism in the Arab world, then, but this survey wave did not detect one.

I've written often about the promise and the pitfalls of survey research in the Arab world.   These findings, like all the others, should be seen as snapshots offering only partial visibility into the real attitudes of Arab citizens and how those views matter.  But the Arab Barometer is a particularly well-designed specimen of such research. It should be supplemented with other kinds of data, from voting patterns to social media data to ethnography, but its value should not be dismissed.  

The New Salafi Politics

Few
developments associated with the Arab uprisings have generated as much concern
of late as the rapid emergence of Salafi movements into the public arena. The performance
of al-Nour Party in Egypt's parliamentary elections stunned many observers.
Waves of attacks on Sufi shrines in Tunisia and Libya, denunciations of secular
citizens, and loud calls for the imposition of sharia have raised fears at home
and abroad. The violent protests over the anti-Islam YouTube film, the deadly
attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, and the emergence of Salafi-jihadist
trends within the Syrian opposition have made these political concerns ever
more urgent.

Who are
these new Salafi movements? How should we interpret their rise? I am pleased to announce the publication of our new POMEPS
Brief, available as a free PDF download, which collects more than a dozen recent ForeignPolicy.com
essays on Salafis across the Arab world, including a detailed look at Salafi
politics in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Lebanon, Bahrain, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. The
picture that emerges is troubling -- but also unexpectedly reassuring. These
well-funded and well-entrenched subcultures will likely continue to thrive in
the open, contentious new Arab political realm. But how they will behave, the
response they will generate from other political trends and societal sectors,
and how they will approach political institutions remains very much in
question.[[BREAK]]

The
"troubling part" of their ascent doesn't require a great deal of
elaboration. While many Salafis are simply religious individuals comfortable
when surrounded by the like-minded, the more assertive of them have advanced a
hard-edged, intolerant agenda that has driven a sharp polarization around
religion in several Arab countries. Their attacks on movie theaters, Sufi
shrines, and Western culture have frightened and angered secular trends in
these countries, particularly religious minorities and women who fear for their
place in the emerging societies. Attacks on U.S. embassies by Salafi-jihadist
groups have frightened and angered the United States, and prompted concerns
about a resurgence of al Qaeda. 

But there
are also reasons for some optimism. As several of the essays in this collection
point out, Salafism is not a unified trend. Its adherents belong to a wide
range of movements with very different orientations toward politics, many of which
push toward political quiescence and an inward-looking focus on the cohesion of
their own communities. Because Salafi subcultures generally lack the kind of
disciplined organization that characterizes the Muslim Brotherhood, they
struggle to act in any sort of organized fashion. 

Blaming
the Arab uprisings for Salafism is misguided. It is not as if these trends did
not exist before their eruption into the public realm. Salafi movements were
increasingly prominent in Egypt in the years prior to the revolution, with
television stations and prominent public faces. Salafi subcultures across the
region were fueled by funding streams from the conservative Gulf states. In
some countries, such as Egypt, they were also often tacitly (or openly)
supported by intelligence services keen to promote competitors to the Muslim
Brotherhood and -- to the conspiracy minded -- to drum up communal tensions
with attacks on churches or outrageous statements when this served the
interests of the ruling regimes. The financial flows from the Gulf show few
signs of abating, but it is intriguing to consider the possible impact of a
decrease of this latter sort of support from the "deep state" -- or their continuation as a way to undermine and challenge the Brotherhood from within. 

It is easy
to understand the alarm over high profile public arguments over outrageously reactionary
comments by Salafi figures, but public clashes over issues advanced by the Salafis
are also not necessarily a bad sign. It seems better to have these brought out
into the public realm than hidden in shadows. It is actually reassuring to see their
public advances increasingly beaten back by competing movements, an outraged
and controversy-minded press, and calculating politicians. The backlash against
the outrageous statements by popular Salafi television preachers reveals as much
as their initial comments -- and indeed tells us far more than the bland
reassurances of the designated spokesmen for the movements. These public
battles reveal the limits of their influence and the real radicalism of some of
their ideas relative even to their own societies. They may also sometimes
reveal real pools of popular support for their ideas in conservative societies
such as Egypt's, which is important to recognize rather than turn away
from. 

Open
politics challenges the Salafis as much as empowers them. Since its electoral coming
out party, Egypt's al-Nour Party has fragmented and faced serious internal
tensions. Its decision to approve of an IMF loan on grounds of extreme
contingency seems sure to anger the faithful, and suggests that for better or
for worse ultimately even these most ideological of Islamists will prove
pragmatic in their pursuit of self-interest. They will likely face increasing
challenges as their members grow disenchanted with the benefits of the
democratic process and perhaps return to demands for greater doctrinal purity. In
short, as much as the leaders of these movements may have enjoyed their public
profile it also poses severe challenges.

Finally,
the Salafi challenge has been forcing Muslim Brotherhood-style groups in
countries such as Egypt and Tunisia into open confrontation. Egyptian and
Tunisian Salafis have been biting at the heels of the ruling Islamists. In
Egypt some Salafis are gearing up to mobilize against a constitutional draft
pushed by the Muslim Brotherhood, while Tunisian Salafis are none to happy
about Ennahda's decision to drop its heavily promoted
"anti-blasphemy" constitutional clause. From their positions of power
such Islamists no longer have the luxury of empty posturing or of ignoring real
challenges to stability or national interests. While Salafis and Brothers have
been tussling over supporters for many years, the stakes have never been higher
nor the electoral sorting mechanism more direct. The Muslim Brotherhood can no
longer take its Islamic flank for granted, forcing it to shed its carefully
calculated ambiguity maintained over decades. 

A recent
video of Tunisian Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi meeting with Salafis has
been widely taken as a scandal, revealing secret collaboration between the two
trends, for instance. But his comments could also be read as a warning to impatient Salafis
-- to back off, avoid confrontational moves, and be more patient. It is unclear whether they have any intention of taking this advice.  With a
significant proportion of Brothers harboring Salafi sympathies and Salafis
moving into the political realm once identified with the Brothers, we can
expect those political battles over the Islamic vote to only intensify. Islam
may be ever more the coin of public rhetoric in transitional Arab societies,
but there is no unified Islamist movement able to take advantage. Indeed, the fragmentation
and battling of competing Islamist groups, along with the alarming rhetoric
from some of those quarters, which may frighten mainstream voters, should be a
blessing for liberal and secular groups, if only they can take advantage. 

The same
can be said of the emergence of the Salafi-jihadist groups. While much remains
unclear, there appears to be a new al Qaeda strategy focused on building ties
with local jihadist movements, including the various Ansar al-Sharia factions. This
is clearly a climb-down from the post-9/11 period for al Qaeda Central, and a
more localized and disaggregated threat varying widely across arenas. Combined
with the magnet of a radicalized Syrian insurgency (see below), it could
represent the next adaptation of a resilient, if still very small, jihadist
movement. That jihadist movement looks more like the localized campaigns
of the 1990s than the exaggerated ambitions of a unified Islamist movement
under Salafi-jihadist tutelage imagined in the years after 9/11. We should avoid
the temptation to inflate the threat of these disparate movements or to
conflate radically different events and trends into a single narrative of
Islamist or al Qaeda resurgence.

One
crucial difference in these new localized jihadist groups is that whereas
before they targeted secular, pro-American leaders such as Mubarak, now their
violence and extremism poses a direct threat to the political interests of
Islamist leaders in Egypt and Tunisia. From a U.S. perspective, having the
Muslim Brotherhood take the lead in combatting Salafi-jihadists on their own
turf, for their own interests, would be a major success in the broader campaign
against such groups. The Brotherhood also finds itself in the very
uncomfortable position of taking a lead role in cracking down on "Islamic
extremists." It has not been so long since they were the targets of such
repression. This competition is one major reason why it is wrong to conflate
all signs of Islamist political success into a narrative of a supposedly resurgent
al Qaeda. 

And then,
there is Syria. As a recent ICG report made clear, initially marginal Salafi-Jihadist
groups have made significant inroads into the Syrian opposition. They appear to
have benefited disproportionately from financial and arms flows from the Gulf,
and to have adapted many of the military and communication innovations of al Qaeda
in Iraq. For the jihadist community it does appear that Syria is the new Iraq,
both operationally and as a propaganda frame for advancing a narrative, which
had fallen into deep disrepute over the last few years (I'll be writing more on
this soon). They will likely continue to bring sectarianism, extremist views,
and Iraq-style tactics into Syria regardless of whether or how Western
countries intervene, and to enjoy ready access to cash and foreign fighters
regardless of whether or how Western countries attempt to control such flows.

In short,
the emergence of the Salafi trend into the public life of many Arab countries
is an important recent development. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate the
unity of the Salafi trend or its place within these transitional societies. They
are a vital part of the emerging public landscape. Their participation in
electoral politics and public life should be encouraged -- even as their
stances should be condemned and their opponents supported in the effort to
build tolerant, inclusive Arab societies. A contentious political battle over
Islamic symbols will likely continue to be a prominent feature of Arab politics
in coming years. Hopefully, the essays in this POMEPS Briefing collection will
be a useful guide to the current state of play.

Tunisia's political turmoil

Last month's frightening scenes of mobs attacking the American Embassy and an American school in Tunisia  should focus Washington's attention on the birthplace of the Arab uprising.  President Moncef Marzouki has made great efforts to apologize for the attacks, to emphasize his government's commitment to democracy, and to crack down on what they clearly label an extremist minority. But concerns over the emerging salafi challenge should not distract attention from the deeper issues confronting one of the most hopeful of the Arab transitions.   The protests themselves were rooted in a deeply contentious political arena facing rising polarization around the role of Islam, anxiety about the drafting of the constitution, and the failure of the transitional government to effectively respond to a deep jobs crisis.

A new public opinion survey released by the International Republican Institute shows that Tunisians  have a grim view of their future. They remain overwhelmingly focused on a disastrous economy rather than on Islamist cultural issues.  But they are also exceedingly keen to see the drafting of a new Constitution completed -- and by a spread of 52%-41%, Tunisians said they would prefer a democratic
Tunisia which was unstable and insecure over a non-democratic system
which was prosperous and secure. This latest snapshot of public attitudes demonstrates again both how Tunisia's revolution has stalled.. and why there is still reason for hope. [[BREAK]]

The headline of an IRI survey which found 67% of Tunisians saying that the country is going in the wrong direction -- the highest since IRI began polling in March 2011 -- might be "it's the economy, stupid."  Large majorities identify economic issues as their primary concern: 60% describe the economy as bad or very bad, while 81% mention jobs as one of their top three issues, followed by "Developing the economy" (51%) and "Living Standards" (49%).  85% say that unemployment is the top problem facing the country, followed by economic crisis (63%). A rather stunning 57% of respondents say that they are not currently employed. 

Their concerns are warranted.  The 2013 World Development Report, as Erik Churchill points out, is full of horrifying statistics about Tunisia's jobs crisis.  This ongoing economic and jobs crisis threatening Tunisia's transition only highlights the foolishness of the Congressional decision to deny funding to the State Department's new program for economic assistance to transitional Arab governments.  Meaningful economic assistance seems far more important than democracy assistance or military cooperation for supporting a democratic future for Tunisia.  It is pure folly to cut such assistance programs now.   

If the economy is the overwhelming background issue for  Tunisians, politics also seems to matter.  A massive 86% majority say that "completing the Constitution" is important or very important to them, and 73% want it put to a popular referendum rather than simply approved by the Constituent Assembly.   There is still strong support for democracy, even admidst crisis, as noted above.   But enthusiasm for popular mobilization may be fading:  a sizable
minority (30%) describes "strikes and sit-ins" as one of the top
problems facing the country, and another 28% complain about  violence
and vandalism.

Looking ahead to the next elections, Ennahda remains by far
the strongest political party in the IRI survey, with 27% saying they
intend to vote for the Islamist party in the next election and no other
party exceeding 6%.   But there's a lot of volatility.  41% say they
don't know who they will vote for.  Only 59% now say that they voted
correctly in the previous election, down from 89% at the beginning of
2012, and only 39% say they intend to vote for the same party this
time. 

What about secularism?  50% now say that they would accept the Tunisian government being secular -- the highest number recorded in an IRI survey. But 64% would prefer a strongly or moderately Islamist government -- down 15 points from January, but still a strong majority.  This is useful context for the renewed attention to the salafist or jihadist challenges. Where Tunisia initially managed to avoid the worst forms of polarization around religion, over the last year Islamist conservatism and especially the role of women and attempts to criminalize blasphemy have become highly sensitive issues in constitutional debates and in public life.  The outrageous charging of a woman raped by the police with indecency has drawn appropriate international condemnation, as well as protests on her behalf which have predictably received far less Western attention than the YouTube protests did.

The escalating battles over Islam in Tunisia's public sphere have raised the temperature at a time of great uncertainty.  But despite the raw angers and fears which these issues raise, it isn't all bad. That public contention has made it ever more difficult for Ennahda to maintain its carefully cultivated ambiguity.  It forces them to confront the divergent demands of governing and popular mobilization, and to decide whether to play to the conservative street or seek the calmer middle.  In other words, the very polarization and hot contention which is raising the political temperature and causing such worry may actually be a sign that an open public sphere and the prospect of elections is working as it should.   As in Egypt, actually putting a legitimate constitution in place and resolving the deep uncertainty about basic rules and principles would go a long way towards cooling these conflicts --a point clearly recognized by the 86% of Tunisians who view completing the Constitution as a top priority. 

It's worth looking through the IRI survey for a snapshot of current Tunisian attitudes and trends since the revolution.  The mixture of anger and hope among Tunisians, and their deeply divided views on core constitutional issues, shines through the numbers. Nobody ever thought these transitions would be easy.  But the sheer fact of real politics in countries such as Tunisia, with open contention and elections whose outcome is not known in advance, remains a fundamental change which should be nurtured and supported.