Should Embassy Damascus be closed?

 

The U.S. Embassy in Damascus is
reportedly planning to shut down if the Syrian government can not -- or
will not -- provide adequate security guarantees.  If the safety of
Embassy personnel is seriously in danger, then of course they should
make the safe call to protect them.  But the security rationale masks a
deeper question:  at what point should Ambassador Robert Ford be
recalled on political grounds?



I argued long and hard for Ford's confirmation as Ambassador, and
for the importance of having someone like him on the ground in
Damascus.  I believe that his performance has more than vindicated that
stance.   But has the usefulness of his presence come to an end? [[BREAK]]

There are
three arguments to withdraw him and close the Embassy, beyond the security concerns.  First, the Asad
regime is too far gone at this point for diplomacy, listens to nobody,
and this leaves little room for traditional diplomacy.  Second, the
rapid and frightening militarization of the conflict has seriously
reduced the space for public diplomacy, as Embassy personnel (and Ford
himself) have few opportunities to get out to engage.  Finally,
withdrawing him would send a strong message to Asad and to the world
that the window has closed on a transition which includes him.   

These arguments all have merit, and the point may soon come where
withdrawing Ford and closing the Embassy would be appropriate.  But we
have not yet reached that point.  All policy choices at this point on
Syria must be guided by three objectives:  ending the violence and
protecting civilians;  hastening Asad's fall;  and creating the
conditions for a successful transition following Asad's fall.  One of
the reasons which I continue to oppose Western military intervention is
that while such a military role it may hasten Asad's fall it would
likely create far less favorable conditions for post-Asad Syria.  The
same goes for a deliberate strategy of arming the Syrian opposition,
which could quickly empower armed militias at the expense of political
leadership and create the conditions for wide-scale civil war following
Asad's fall. 



Would withdrawing Ford and closing the Embassy serve those goals?  At this point, it would have
little effect one way or the other on the violence.  Nor would it likely
have much impact in hastening Asad's fall.  Asad would probably be thrilled to see him gone, frankly. It might matter at the
margins if all major Embassies closed at the same time in a coordinated,
multilateral demonstration of Asad's international isolation ---
something which I would recommend when the time comes. But it isn't
going to a primary driver of political change.



The core question, then, is whether a U.S. diplomatic presence helps
create the conditions for a "soft landing" post-Asad.  At this point, I
believe that it does. The Syrian National Council is still struggling
to create a legitimate, effective and unified external opposition
umbrella, and the State Department is doing what it can to work with
them.  But increasingly the important action is taking place inside of
Syria -- not just the Free Syrian Army, but the local leadership and
opposition groups emerge in villages and cities.  They will likely play a
key role in any post-Asad Syria.  The more opportunity the Embassy has
to engage with, learn about, and forge relationships with these new
forces inside Syria the better.



Beyond the internal opposition and the Asad regime, Ford and the
Embassy also still have the chance to talk with the fence-sitters and
elites whose decision to stick with or abandon Asad will likely
determine his fate. They have legitimate fears about the future, and
doubts about their fate after Asad.   It is just as important to talk
with the business community, minorities, intellectuals, and other elites
at this point as it is to talk with the emerging opposition.   The
business community in particular needs to come to believe that the
sanctions which Asad has brought upon them will increasingly harm their
interests --- but could be quickly removed and their fortunes restored
should Asad and his regime depart and a legitimate, inclusive political
transition begun.



For now, then, Ford and the Embassy should stay in Damascus unless
the security situation is genuinely too dangerous.  The political
benefits of his presence, particularly for preparing for a potential
transition and engaging emergent forces and frightened elites, still
outweight the momentary impact of his withdrawal.  That may change, but
for now I hope they stay.