Bryan Caplan's Blog, page 128

The Hansonian Moralist, by Bryan Caplan

I've repeatedly criticized my dear friend Robin Hanson's subordination of morality to the view he calls "dealism."  Not only is the doctrine absurd.  It also fails on its own terms because Robin's proposed deals consistently fail the market test. 

Indeed, Robin's whole persona violates the basic principles of salesmanship.  Instead of trying to show the world that he's a regular relatable Joe, Robin routinely publicizes views most people find abhorrent.  He positively goes out of his way to inform people that they're a bunch of hypocrites.  Dale Carnegie would not approve.

Only recently, though, did I realize that where Robin fails as a dealist, he excels as a moralist - in three distinct ways.

First, Robin often constructs sound original moral arguments.  His arguments against cuckoldry and for cryonics are just two that come to mind.  Yes, part of his project is to understand why most people are forgiving of cuckoldry and hostile to cryonics.  But the punchline is that the standard moral position on these issue is indefensible.

Second, Robin's moral arguments actually persuade people.  I've met many of his acolytes in person, and see vastly more online.  This doesn't mean, of course, that Robin's moral arguments persuade most readers.  Any moral philosopher will tell you that changing minds is like pulling teeth.  My point is that Robin has probably changed the moral convictions of hundreds.  And that's hundreds more than most moralists have changed. 

Third, Robin takes some classical virtues far beyond the point of prudence.  Consider his legendary candor.  Strategically, it's folly, provoking mockery and abuse.  Unless, of course, you embrace the virtue of honesty as essential to a life well-lived.  St. Jerome once had a dream where God told him, "You are not a Christian, but a Ciceronian."  Robin should have a dream where the Singularity tells him, "You are not a dealist, but a puritan."

Two requests for the comments:

1. List original Hansonian moral arguments, whether or not you accept them.  They need not be explicitly framed as moral arguments; any determined effort to debunk conventional moral judgments counts.  Please provide URLs.

2. Identify original Hansonian moral arguments that led you to revise your moral views.

Closing testimonial: While I think Robin's quest for immortality is conceptually flawed, I would be overjoyed to know he will live forever. 




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Revolution: Two Minimal Conditions, by Bryan Caplan

Here's an extremely tempting argument for violent revolution:

1. The existing government is tyrannical, as evidenced by a giant list of specific, well-documented, horrifying crimes against humanity.

2. It is our right, if not our sacred duty, to overthrow tyranny.

3. Tyrannies usually crush non-violent efforts to overthrow them.

4. Tyrannies rarely give in to isolated violent efforts to overthrow them.

5. So the only effective way to exercise our right/duty to overthrow tyranny is to band together for violent revolution.

Once you accept this basic framework, there's only one step where empirical details make a big difference: Premise #1.  As a result, opponents of revolution often wind up apologizing for demonstrable horrors, and seem like awful people. 

On reflection, however, Premise #2 is grossly overstated - for two distinct reasons.

First, overthrowing any particular tyranny often involves committing a new giant list of specific, well-documented, horrifying crimes against humanity.  The mere fact that you're fighting tyranny doesn't magically keep your hands clean.  Indeed, the rhetoric of tyranny makes it psychologically easy to rationalize whatever new crimes against humanity you end up committing.

Second, overthrowing any particular tyranny typically leads to the rise of a new tyranny.  The reasons are familiar: Tyranny arises out of a culture of contempt for human rights, so it's much easier to set up a replacement tyranny than some non-tyrannical system.

Once you see the holes in Premise #2, moreover, Premises #3 and #4 are less critical.  Perhaps non-violent revolution - or lone wolf violence - can overthrow tyranny.  But if these strategies (a) unleash the flood gates of new human rights abuses, or (b) culminate in a new tyranny, their effectiveness at overthrowing tyranny is immaterial.

These insights lead straight to two new minimal conditions for morally permissible revolution.  Namely: Fomenting revolution is wrong unless you have strong reasons to believe that (a) your revolution will not lead to big, new human rights abuses, and (b) your revolution will not replace one tyranny with another. 

Finding revolutions that run afoul of these strictures is child's play.  The Arab Spring revolutions violated them.  So did most of the movements for colonial independence - including American independence.  But the largely non-violent revolutions in the former Soviet bloc might make the cut.  What makes them special?  For starters, the focus on abolishing specific bad policies like censorship, state ownership, militarism, and emigration restrictions - rather than gleefully handing the reins of power to a new group and assuming its members will use their new-found power wisely and justly. 

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ISIS and Reproach, by Bryan Caplan

When historians write the history of ISIS, they will probably treat it as part of the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  But they should also closely connect it to the Arab Spring.  Without the Arab Spring, an internecine civil war would not have broken out in Syria; and without such a civil war in Syria, ISIS wouldn't have had half a country in which to incubate. 

But will historians connect the dots?  For the Iraq War connection, historians' leftist sympathies are probably strong enough to overpower the natural human reluctance to cry over spilled blood.  For the Arab Spring, however, historians' dominant ideology actually reinforces their aversion to reproach.  Googling "Arab Spring disaster" continues to return very few pertinent high-status hits.  There is one op-ed in the New York Times, but its "disaster" isn't the Arab Spring, but ISIS itself. 

Google's top hit (sans quotes) remains Daniel Greenfield's decidedly non-mainstream 2013 piece in Frontpage Mag.  While I reject Greenfield's hawkish worldview, he is right to reproach Arab Spring boosters like Thomas Friedman for their failure to reproach themselves.  These two Greenfield passages have been lodged in my head since I first read them about a year ago:

"The term 'Arab Spring' has to be retired. There is nothing springlike
going on," Friedman says. "It's best we now speak of the 'Arab Decade'
or the 'Arab Quarter Century.'"

Why not the Arab millennium or the Arab trillion years. Like the guy
who keeps predicting the world will end, it's safest to set your dates
as far as possible. And 10-25 years later, no one will remember what
Friedman predicted let alone that he even existed.

When your predictions don't succeed, just postpone them as far as
possible. The people who promised us a positive transformation are now
promising us a Thirty Years War.

And:

Friedman's argument is that of the man who sets a house on fire because
it's in bad shape. Well you can't blame him. It was a bad house. Now
it's a pile of burning rubble.

It is tempting to say that mainstream historians would be open to Greenfield's points if he made his points with civility.  But I doubt it.  The fruitfulness of "dredging up the past" is hard enough to swallow without a side dish of crow.

P.S. Please point out any solid counter-examples in the comments.

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Environmental Econ Textbook Bleg, by Bryan Caplan

What's the best undergraduate environmental econ textbook?  Constraints:

1. It has to be engaging enough to hold the attention of someone who isn't taking an environmental econ course.

2. It should have decent empirics on the cost-savings of taxes and tradable permits over direct regulation.

Update: Matthew Kahn's shameless self-promotion of his Fundamentals of Environmental and Urban Economics has won me over.  A steal at $1.

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Tetlock and Counter-factual History, by Bryan Caplan

I've long been fond of counter-factual history.  Like: If Prinzip hadn't assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, North Korea wouldn't be a Communist dictatorship.  Or: If Lenin had died in early 1917, the Communists wouldn't have taken over Russia, and the Nazis probably wouldn't have taken over Germany. 

In many cases, I freely admit that counter-factual history is hard and hazy.  I make no confident claims about what the world would be like today if Christianity had never arisen.  In other cases, however, I think counter-factual history is pretty easy and clear - especially if we're only discussing the following decade or two rather than the entire subsequent history of mankind.  If Julius Caesar hadn't been assassinated in 44 B.C., it's very likely he would have remained the leader of the Roman Empire for another 5-10 years, and the civil war that followed his death would not have occurred.  Would the Roman Empire have lasted longer or shorter?  Beats me.

Question: How can I reconcile my qualified confidence in counter-factual history with my admiration for Philip Tetlock's Expert Political Judgment ?  Doesn't he expose such pontification as pure conceit? 

I think not.  Contrary to populist readers, Tetlock's work doesn't show that political experts don't know what they're talking about.  What it shows, rather, is that experts are overconfident on topics that are controversial among experts.  Tetlock freely admits that naive extrapolation of existing patterns is often highly predictive.  But he deliberately refrains from posing such questions to experts because they're too easy.  When designing his survey, Tetlock explicitly picked question to "Pass
the 'don't bother me too often with dumb questions' test." 

When I make confident claims about counter-factual history, I'm normally doing this easy extrapolation.  If Prinzip hadn't killed the Austrian Archduke, it's very likely that Europe would have remained at peace for at least a few more years.  Sure, another international incident could have struck the very next day.  But international incidents shocking enough to spark major wars very rarely occur. 

Similarly, if Lenin had died in early 1917, we have strong specific evidence that his followers wouldn't have violently overthrown the Kerensky government.  Sure, another radical party could have tried Lenin's approach in his stead.  But events like Lenin's coup aren't just very rare in general.  They're so rare that I've studied this critical period in Russian history for decades without hearing about any other party that seriously pondered a Lenin-style coup against Kerensky.  Of course, given a few more decades, other horrific events might have ruined Russia, clouding long-run prediction.  But it's still probable that the Russian Civil War that followed World War I wouldn't have happened if Lenin had died the day Kerensky gained power.

In sum, while Tetlock's work does highlight serious pitfalls of counter-factual history, there's no reason to abandon the subject.  As long as you (a) explore what would have happened if potent-but-rare events had gone otherwise, (b) extrapolate from long-run trends, and (c) discuss short- to medium-run consequences, your efforts are not in vain.

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Smith's Benevolent Baker Quote, in Song, by Bryan Caplan

All good economists love the Adam Smith quote about the baker:

But
man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it
is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be
more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour,
and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he
requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind,
proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this
which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this
manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those
good offices which we stand in need of. It
is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.

But it was only this morning, when listening to Sirius Radio's 40s station, that I realized Irving Caesar's song "I Want to be Happy" gets Smith's point across more succinctly and memorably.  The refrain:

I want to be happy

But I won't be happy

Till I make you happy, too

Here's the song performed by Ella Fitzgerald.  I hope to hear economists humming it from now on...



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The Ubiquity of Useless Learning, in Song, by Bryan Caplan

You've got a love a rap video that ends with, "If you can't explain why a subject is applicable to most people's lives, that subject should not be mandatory."



HT: Jason Arentz

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The Environmental Continuum: Reply to Alex Epstein, by Bryan Caplan

Alex Epstein, author of The Moral Case for Fossil Fuels , replies to my criticism and questions over at Forbes.com.  Overall, I'm dissatisfied with his responses.  Here's why, point by point.  Alex is in blockquotes, I'm not. 

I'll address some of his technical questions later on, but I want to
acknowledge that I have not fully worked out how the government should
handle every form of pollution and welcome the contribution of others in
doing so. But here's my contention: we cannot come up with the best
policies until we all agree on the baseline question of whether we are
to use a humanist or naturist standard of value.

Alex makes it sound like there's a binary choice: either we go 100% with the humanist standard or 100% with the naturist standard.  But it's entirely possible to go with a weighted average: say 85% humanist, 15% naturist, or 50/50, or whatever.  And as far as I can tell, most people do in fact take an intermediate position, though almost everyone leans humanist. 

Given this continuum of possible positions, it's extremely unlikely we will ever "all agree" on the correct weights.  Fortunately, Alex exaggerates the importance of this improbable consensus.  With simple democratic voting, for example, the best policies will be adopted as long as 50%+1 accept the correct weights.  In any case, Alex's case for fossil fuels remains effective as long as most people put high weight on the humanist side.

I disagree with Caplan's assessment of the state of our debate, that
"Most people, laymen and philosophers alike, think we should protect the
environment primarily for the sake of humanity." Most people,
laymen and philosophers alike, have been exposed to sloppy thinking
about standard of value (and to environmentalist propaganda) since
youth. Thus, most people routinely devalue human life and routinely
demean the profound value that is fossil fuels.

The key word in my statement is "primarily."  Yes, there is plenty of naturist rhetoric out there - plus a dollop of sheer misanthropy.  But few people take it very seriously.  How can we tell?  For starters, look at what Americans' name as the nation's "most important problem."  "The economy" almost always tops the list.  "The environment" is near the bottom. 

Alternately, consider how rarely mainstream politicians advocate any specific policies that clearly impoverish most of their citizens for the sake of unspoiled nature.  If voters took naturist standards seriously, politicians could win major elections by saying, "I'm going to impose a 300% tax on fossil fuels to save Mother Earth," or "I'm going to ban meat-eating."  This rarely happens.

Alex then moves on to the three questions I posed to him.

1) How does your view functionally diverge from the "common good"
view you condemn as "immoral"?  If talk about individual rights means
anything, shouldn't there be noteworthy cases where you favor stricter
pollution controls than utilitarians? Weaker controls?"

Let's assume that the utilitarians in question, unlike most
utilitarians in practice today, have an objective, unprejudiced, and
informed assessment of the nature of fossil fuels' impacts on human
life. Such a utilitarian, for example, would be absolutely against a tax
on CO2, properly recognizing that as a tax on progress for the sake of
avoiding a problem (climate danger) to which fossil fuels are a major
part of the solution.

"Absolutely against" is a serious overstatement.  A sensible utilitarian could recognize that fossil fuels are part of the solution, but still insist that a moderate carbon tax is also part of the solution.  Indeed, the sensible utilitarian might say, "Imposing a moderate carbon tax increases the incentive to find ways to produce energy with lower carbon emissions."  The fact that we use fossil fuels to clean up fossil fuels does not imply that taxing fossil fuels is self-defeating; you've got to look at the net effect.

Even in that case, there is one difficulty of comparing my position
to "utilitarians" because there is no consensus among utilitarians about
what constitutes the "greatest good for the greatest number" on any
issue. Utilitarians are always disagreeing about how to calculate the
utilities. More generally, the problem with the "greatest good" or
"common good" approach is that the notion of the common good is
inherently vague.

True, but the same goes for every plausible moral standard.  (Objectivists often appear to disagree, for example, on what "promotes the survival of man qua man.")  But pointing out the vagueness of utilitarianism actually makes it even harder to see how Alex's standard functionally diverges from this rival ethical approach.  If he wants to clarify, Alex needs to (a) describe what he sees as the well-informed utilitarian position on fossil fuels, then (b) highlight his disagreements with this position.

But there is a principled difference that would apply to any variant of the utilitarian approach.

The role of government, in my view, is not to calculate the overall
benefits and harms of a technology. It is to define a threshold at which
a technology violates people's rights by significantly damaging or
imperiling them.

Is "significant damage or imperiling" a gross or a net standard?  I.e., suppose a new energy source gives everyone $5000 per year in improved medical care, but imposes $1000 per year in respiratory disorders.  Does your standard say this is permissible or not?  If you say no, then many of your arguments for fossil fuels are beside the point.  (Think about your time series for weather-related deaths).  If you say yes, then it seems like government does have to calculate overall benefits and harms after all. 

This threshold, as I indicated earlier, must be based
on what is possible given the current state of technology and the
current state of risk in a society. For example, in early industrial
cities, when we could not avoid most of the ravages of human emissions
(which are almost always more dangerous than machine emissions), the
technology and infrastructure didn't exist to combat them, so you cannot
say that human emissions are illegal. But you can and should pass laws
protecting people from the forms that are both dangerous and
preventable.

This is another case where Alex talks as if the world is binary when it plainly isn't.  "Preventable" and "dangerous" both lie on a continuum.  There is plenty that could have been done to reduce emissions even in early industrial cities.  Most obviously: A modest tax on coal.  What's the point?  Making the air a little less dangerous.

If it can be objectively established that a given use of a technology
significantly damages or imperils anyone, then either the technology
cannot be used in that way or the users of it need to compensate the
damaged parties in some way.

However, the determination of whether
someone is damaged or imperiled needs to be made contextually. We are
necessarily exposed to all sorts of small risks by living among other
people, and even apart from other people we're subject to natural risks
of all sorts (especially when we don't have the technologies that make
us safe from nature). The damage or risk caused by a technology is only
significant when it stands out from this background level. And what this
background level is will be relevant to the technological development
of the society.

Your position combines a superficially strict standard - no one can be significantly damaged or imperiled - with a massive loophole for "context."  Can you see why this is intellectually dissatisfying?

2) What is the evidence that the marginal benefits of fossil fuels
are enormous or even positive--i.e., that it is good for an average
American to use a little more rather than a little less fossil fuel?

One theme of the book is the marginal benefit of the opportunity
of every additional Calorie of energy. (Caplan observes that I only use
the word "marginal" once, but that is only because the terminology is
not used much except by economists.) Energy is our ability to use
machines to improve our lives.

Yes, but you have to subtract the unpleasant side effects of fossil fuels.  When you do, the marginal benefits of fossil fuels in rich countries remain unclear.

The enormous opportunity that more (fossil fuel) energy production
provides us plus the ability of modern fossil fuel technology to cheaply
produce energy with ever-smaller risks and side-effects means that
there is no reason to have any inclination whatsoever to reduce
(including tax) energy use.

How can you say this?  You've acknowledged that fossil fuels - like every energy source - have some unpleasant side effects.  Reducing fossil fuel consumption trades a little extra convenience for a little less unpleasantness.  What makes you think this is clearly a bad deal, especially in rich countries?

We can see historically that had we heeded the warnings in the 1970s
that we already had enough energy, the consequences would have been
disastrous.

Yes, but your strongest evidence comes from the developing world.  This isn't really relevant to my question.

More energy improves lives in many ways, documented in the
book, and some of them are profound. For example: the advent of the
coal-hungry internet. Any legal measures to constrict marginal fossil
fuel usage in the developed nations in the 1980s would have hampered the
development of that technology. And any attempt to constrict FFs now
will hamper future technologies. That would have been disastrous.

"Any attempt" would have been "disastrous"?  That's absurd.  "Would have imposed high costs for small gains" might be true, but I'm still waiting to see the evidence.

Moreover, we have no right to do it.

By your own standard, wouldn't there be a right to do it if marginal fossil fuel use "significantly damaged or imperiled" anyone?  And if you're factoring in context, doesn't the context change when we're focusing on marginal uses?

3)  Isn't the textbook environmental economics approach of putting
a price on pollution a better policy than the combination of
technology-and-law that you propose?

No. Putting a price on pollution is one variety of the technology-and-law approach. Policies designed to put a price on pollution are enacted by law.

Trivially true, but you're missing the point.  Conventional environmental regulations give detailed orders about how polluters have to reduce pollution.  Pollution taxes specify a price and let polluters figure out the cheapest way to comply.  There is a lot of evidence that the latter approach roughly halves the cost of pollution clean-up.  So why does it fail to pique your interest?

Devising and implementing them require sophisticated technologies
to quantify emissions.

"Requires"?  Not really.  You don't need sophisticated technologies to tax coal.  Technology can definitely make emissions pricing work better, but that's a weaker claim. 

I don't mean to be finicky.  But much as I admire Alex's book, his replies to my questions seem to consistently assume the real world fits neatly into simple binary categories.  It doesn't.  Fossil fuels really can be great overall but bad at the margin.  And if so, there is a simple case for moderate taxes on fossil fuels.  This simple case might, on deeper consideration, be wrong.  But it needs to be engaged, and I don't see that Alex has vigorously engaged it.  Yet.







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Lawson's Economic Freedom Bet, by Bryan Caplan

In the face of Jeff Sachs' challenge, Bob Lawson proposes a bet on economic freedom:

"Dear Tyler,

I read with obvious interest your post (and the paper itself) about
the endogeneity of institutions. Leaving aside my issues with the IV
literature, I decided to take the bait regarding Jeff Sachs' challenge
to, "Go back to 1960 and choose any measure of institutional quality you
want. Then see how well it predicts cross-national growth since then."

Ok, I will.

The Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index was first published in
the mid 1990s, and the first year of data is 1970. So I'll have to start
in 1970 instead of 1960.

Here is a regression with growth from 1970-2010 on the lhs, and EFW and GDP per capita in 1970 on the rhs.

[...]

A one-unit higher EFW score in 1970 correlates to 0.84 percentage
points in higher annual growth over the next 40 years. A one unit EFW
score improvement during the first decade, 1970 to 1980, correlates to a
1.00 percentage point higher annual growth rate over the 40 years.

I don't know if that satisfies Jeff Sachs' challenge, but it works for me.

Lawson's bet:

Looking forward, I've constructed a back-of-the-envelope indicator
that combines each country's EFW rating in 2000 and with its change from
2000-2010. The top 20 (combined highest level & most positive
change) versus the bottom 20 (combine lowest level & most negative
change) countries are:

Top 20 - Bottom 20
Hong Kong - Haiti
Romania - Cameroon
Rwanda - Senegal
Singapore - Guinea-Bissau
Bulgaria - Mali
Cyprus - Bolivia
Unit. Arab Em. - Algeria
Chile - Guyana
Mauritius - Gabon
Lithuania - Ecuador
Slovak Rep - Burundi
Albania - Cote d'Ivoire
Jordan - Chad
Switzerland - Togo
Bahamas - Congo, Rep. Of
Malta - Central Afr. Rep.
Taiwan - Argentina
Korea, South - Myanmar
Finland - Zimbabwe
Estonia - Venezuela

I'm willing to bet anyone $100 (up to 10 people) that the Top 20
group will outgrow the Bottom 20 group by at least 1 full percentage
point per year (on average) over the the next 20 year period
(2015-2035).

Who will accept the challenge?

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Voltaire Reconsidered, by Bryan Caplan

Voltaire never actually said, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."  But Voltaire would probably embrace this line - just like legions of other smart, well-meaning people.  Interpreted poetically, it's a sublime human rights slogan.  But interpreted literally, the Voltairean maxim is rather silly.  Let's walk through its flaws step by step. 

Suppose for starters that you know for sure that X is true.   Unfortunately, X is so unpopular that loudly asserting your right to say X inevitably gets you killed.  Question: Should you make a point of loudly asserting your right to say X?  Probably not.  You can do so much with the gift of life.  Why is asserting the right to say X so much more important that everything else you'll experience and accomplish by remaining alive? 

Sure, you can devise hypotheticals where courting death by asserting the right to say X is an admirable choice.  Maybe standing up for the right to say X will, via your death, save many innocent lives, or replace an awful tyranny with something much better.  Maybe you only have ten minutes left to live, and want to go out with a noble bang.  Except in such unusual circumstances, however, throwing your life away to speak a few forbidden words seems not only imprudent, but wrong.  Any true friend would beg you to come to your senses and shut your piehole.

Now consider: If standing up for your own right to utter truth X is a grave mistake, why is standing up for someone else's right to do the same any better?  Indeed, common sense morality says you have only modest obligations to help perfect strangers in dire need.  Why then should you assume a blanket obligation to die in defense of strangers' rights to speak when they could easily remain silent?

Notice: So far, I've assumed that dangerous-to-say claim X is definitely true.  Question: Should you be more willing to suffer on behalf of the truth or error?  Truth, of course.  The right to do wrong is important, but how could it possibly outshine the right to do right? 

All this yields the following moral rank ordering: staying alive> asserting your own right to say truths> asserting others' right to say truths > asserting others' right to say falsehoods.  Voltaire's maxim seems a gross overstatement.  Indeed, it's basically backwards.

Of course, you can flatly deny everything I've said.  But should you take that route, consider these two awkward facts. 

1. The world provides ample opportunities to die defending people's right to make offensive statements.  Reposting Charlie Hebdo cartoons on your Facebook page is only getting your feet wet.  If you're really ready to die for free speech, travel to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and start handing out copies of the cartoons in person.  Martyrdom for civil liberty awaits you.

2. Almost no professed Voltairean takes such actions. 

My point is not that Voltaireans are hypocrites, but that they run afoul of the Argument from Conscience.  The fans of Voltaire are fine people.  The fact that Voltaire's most ardent admirers don't throw themselves on their swords for freedom of speech shows that, deep down, they too realize that their maxim is only eloquent bravado.

P.S. Lest I be misunderstood, I staunchly defend the right to say things I disagree with.  But I think it's almost always a bad idea to perish in defense of this right.  Call me cowardly if you like.  I'm just being honest.

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