Eugene Volokh's Blog, page 13

[David Bernstein] What Does the Rabbi Who Conducted Your Wedding Say About Your Religious and Political Views?

[Very little. ]

I agree with everything Josh says about the inappropriateness of anyone attacking judicial nominee Rebecca Taibleson on the basis of religion, and specifically because the Reform rabbi who married Rebecca and her husband supports LGBT causes.

And while this is sort of religious attack is very inappropriate in general, I also want to point out that it's not just inappropriate but absurd in this particular context.

First, Reform Judaism openly supports allowing Jews to define Judaism in their own terms. So there is zero reason to think that because a Reform rabbi marries you, you agree with either that Rabbi or the official Reform position on any given issue, much less every issue.

For that matter, the fact that you got married by someone is a particularly poor indication of your political and religious values.

Why do people choose a particular rabbi to marry them?

"We just moved to the area, and this is the only rabbi we know."

"We have friends who referred us to this rabbi as doing beautiful ceremonies."

"It's the rabbi from my childhood who saw me grow up, and it would be particularly meaningful to have this rabbi do my marriage."

"The bride's parents live in X, where we are holding the wedding, and Rabbi Y is the only rabbi in town."

"The groom's family belongs to Temple Beth X, and as part of their membership dues the rabbi conducts weddings of congregants for free."

"This is the only rabbi in town willing to do intermarriages."

And so on. You know what I've never, ever heard any Jewish couple say?: "We chose this rabbi because we checked the rabbi's theological and political views, and they align 100% with ours."

Conflict of Interest Watch: Rebecca Taibleson's father is Michael Krauss, a retired law professor who was my colleague at Scalia Law for many years. I don't think I ever met Rebecca, though.

Random Trivia Watch: The vast majority of conservative Jewish judges since the Reagan era have been men. If Taibleson is confirmed, she will join Neomi Rao as one of two Trump-appointed Jewish women.

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[Josh Blackman] An Unfair and Uninformed Attack On Rebecca Taibleson's Jewish Faith

[The Jewish Federation is a widely regarded Jewish charity that supports all Jews, and it is beyond the pale to attack a person based on their Rabbi.]

Last month, I wrote about President Trump's nomination of Rebecca Taibleson to the Seventh Circuit. In recent weeks, I've heard rumors of opposition to Taibleson's nomination on the right. All candidates should be subject to public scrutiny, but one set of attacks, I think, crossed the line.

Taibleson has been attacked for donating a small sum of money to the Milwaukee Jewish Federation. In most cities with a Jewish population, the Federation exists as an umbrella organization that supports all Jewish causes. The Federation supports Jewish education, summer camps, services for seniors, helps Jewish people in times of crisis, and more. To be sure, there are Jewish people on the far left of the aisle. (Trust me, I know.) And they support all sorts of DEI activities. But the Federation also supports conservative and orthodox groups as well. And in our current moment, the Federation has been steadfast on support for Israel. Am Yisrael Chai. The people of Israel live.

My kids go to a JCC camp, which is funded by the Jewish Federation of Houston. Do I approve of everything the Federation does? Of course not. But I support much of their work, and have financially supported the Federation of the years.

I agree with Mike Fragoso's analogy to Catholic Charities:

But, you see, Taibleson donated a paltry sum to the Milwaukee Jewish Federation and they support LGBT rights. The Milwaukee Jewish Federation is the blanket Jewish social-services organization in Milwaukee, sort of like a Jewish version of Catholic Charities. Should we think that Brett Kavanaugh supports open borders because he volunteered for Catholic Charities? That will be news to the illegal aliens getting caught up in Los Angeles's renewed ICE sweeps. The fact is that you can infer malice in most any charitable act if only you choose to approach it in bad faith.

Another attack is far more scurrilous: that the Rabbi who married Rebecca and her husband supports LGBT causes. I think going after a person's spiritual leader, and house of worship, is beyond the pale. Full stop. The Religious Test Cause, whatever it means, should ensure that we do not scrutinize how a person worships the almighty. Moreover, most Reform synagogues have inclusive policies for gays and lesbians. But that doesn't mean everyone who attends the synagogue agrees on those issues. As I've said many times before, there is no single standard of Judaism. There is no Jewish equivalent of a pope. In a given synagogue, worshippers are not required to agree with their rabbi on everything or anything. Indeed, it is an old pastime for people to complain about everything their rabbi says and does.

Do we really want to start scrutinizing the particular religious beliefs of a judicial candidate? I think the answer has to be no.

Tomorrow is Rebecca's hearing, on Constitution Day fittingly enough. I hope these attacks concerning religion stay out of the proceedings.

The post An Unfair and Uninformed Attack On Rebecca Taibleson's Jewish Faith appeared first on Reason.com.

[Eugene Volokh] Ex-Congressman George Santos Loses Lawsuit Against Jimmy Kimmel and ABC

From Santos v. Kimmel, decided today by Second Circuit Judge Raymond Lohier, joined by Judges José Cabranes and Richard Sullivan:

Santos's suit arose after Kimmel, using various fictitious names, submitted requests to Santos for personalized videos through the Cameo platform. Santos fulfilled each request, and Kimmel then aired the videos on JKL as part of a mocking series of segments titled "Will Santos Say It?" …

[1.] In a copyright action, the affirmative defense of fair use "excuses what might otherwise be considered infringing behavior, allowing courts to avoid rigid application of the Copyright Act when it would stifle the very creativity the Act is meant to promote." Under the Copyright Act, we consider the following non-exclusive factors in determining whether fair use has been established: "(1) the purpose and character of the use … ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used … ; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."

In assessing the "purpose and character of the use" factor, we "focus[ ] chiefly on the degree to which the use is transformative, i.e., whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character." … Santos does not dispute the District Court's finding that the purpose of [Kimmel's] allegedly infringing use was "to comment on the willingness of Santos … to say absurd things for money." He argues instead that this was also his original purpose in making the videos.

But whether a secondary use is transformative turns on what a reasonable observer thinks, not the subjective intent of the copyright holder or that of the secondary user. As Santos's original allegation acknowledges, a reasonable observer here would think the videos conveyed "feelings of hope, strength, perseverance, encouragement, and positivity," not a willingness to say absurd things for money.

Santos also contends that Kimmel's false representations demonstrate bad faith and thus nullify the fair use defense. We disagree. It is true that "[f]air use presupposes good faith and fair dealing." But Santos's complaint contradicts any claim of a purpose on the Defendants' part to "supplant" Santos's "commercially valuable right" in the videos. To the contrary, the complaint paints a portrait of defendants motivated by (sarcastic) criticism and commentary. We thus agree with the District Court that the first factor strongly supports a finding of fair use….

[I]t is [also] clear on the face of Santos's complaint that Santos has not suffered market harm within the meaning of the fourth fair use factor because "[w]e ask not whether the second work would damage the market for the first (by, for example, devaluing it through parody or criticism), but whether it usurps the market for the first by offering a competing substitute." … "[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market." …

[2.] Santos[ alleges] direct breach of contract … under the Cameo Terms of Service. Santos is not party to the Terms of Service to which users (like Kimmel) must agree and that Santos alleges were breached. Under Illinois law, which governs the Terms of Service, there is a "strong presumption against conferring benefits to noncontracting third parties." Indeed, "the implication that the contract applies to third parties must be so strong as to be practically an express declaration." Here, Santos identifies nothing close to an "express declaration" that the relevant provisions of the Terms of Service apply to him or other noncontracting parties. Indeed, other provisions of the Terms of Service do contain third-party beneficiary language, indicating that when the parties to that agreement intended to allow provisions of the contract to be enforced by third parties, they said so expressly.

[3.] We next address Santos's breach of implied contract claim. Under New York law, which governs this claim, we consider "the intent of the parties and the surrounding circumstances" to determine "[w]hether an implied-in-fact contract was formed and, if so, the extent of its terms." In this case, however, Santos's complaint does not "allege, in nonconclusory language, … the essential terms of the parties' … contract, including those specific provisions of the contract upon which liability is predicated." Nor does Santos plausibly allege that there was "an indication of a meeting of minds of the parties constituting an agreement" that Kimmel would adhere to the Terms of Service.

[4.] Finally, Santos challenges the District Court's dismissal of his fraudulent inducement claim for failure to allege any out-of-pocket loss as required under New York law. We agree with the District Court's conclusion that Santos failed to allege that he suffered any actual out-of-pocket loss as the victim of the alleged fraud…

Nathan Siegel, Eric Feder, and Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel (Davis Wright Tremaine LLP) represent defendants.

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[Eugene Volokh] Monday Open Thread

[What's on your mind?]

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[Eugene Volokh] Plaintiff Must "Reconcile Herself to the Fact That Litigation Is Often Accompanied by Public Attention and Scrutiny"

["Outside of certain narrow and presently inapplicable circumstances, federal lawsuits are public proceedings and members of the public are free to comment on them."]

Owen v. Askew, decided today by Judge Ann Aiken (D. Ore.) rejected Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause (see also this supplement), seeking to hold defendant Boyce "in contempt for violation of the preliminary Injunction." That preliminary injunction, which was narrower than the TRO I had blogged about, "enjoin[ed] Defendants from engaging in harassment directed at Plaintiff or her business and particularly from seeking to have Plaintiff's online storefronts removed during the pendency of this action." From the court's opinion:

Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Boyce has commented on the ongoing lawsuit and that Plaintiff has been the target of hostile commentary on the Internet by third parties. The motion and its supporting exhibits do not show that Ms. Boyce has engaged in harassment of Plaintiff.

Nor does it show, beyond Plaintiff's speculation, that she has encouraged others to do so. The various Emergency Supplements include voluminous exhibits showing third parties expressing their support for Ms. Boyce or their antipathy to Plaintiff, but these comments do not constitute harassment and, even if they did, the Preliminary Injunction does not serve to enjoin individuals who are not before the Court.

Plaintiff complains that Ms. Boyce has "mocked" these proceedings and expressed her opinion that she will ultimately prevail, but it is not clear how Plaintiff believes either sentiment is a violation of the Preliminary Injunction. Outside of certain narrow and presently inapplicable circumstances, federal lawsuits are public proceedings and members of the public are free to comment on them. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this action, she must reconcile herself to the fact that litigation is often accompanied by public attention and scrutiny.

Plaintiff's filings point to various statements made about the case by third parties, some of which are just harsh criticism of plaintiffs, but some of which might be seen as threats (e.g., "White bitches always steal ima kill you"). It also points to what seems to be a call for violence against the judge ("The judge who put a gagging order on the true creators of the magnetic hair clip, needs to be taken out! It's because of racist white people in positions of authority, why racism still goes unjecked today. The judge needs to be eradicated, eliminated, taken out!!"). But the judge's point is that Boyce can't be held in contempt based on those third party statements, even if they stemmed from Boyce's criticisms of plaintiff and of the earlier TRO opinion.

The general sentiments in the opinion are right, I think, though this still leaves the question of what constitutes forbidden "harassment." The short opinion doesn't tell us. Neither does the preliminary injunction. And, based on decades of studying harassment laws of various sorts, I don't think there's a well-established legal definition of the word "harassment."

Lay dictionary definitions (e.g., "to vex, trouble, or annoy continually or chronically") are generally too vague to be useful. There are more precise definitions in various laws, but they vary sharply from law to law.

Some statutes define harassment to include only threats. Some define it as unwanted speech to a person. Some define it as including at least certain kinds of unwanted speech about a person that is sufficiently distressing. Some define it to cover speech that creates a "hostile, abusive, or offensive environment" in a workplace, educational institution, place of public accommodation, or the like based on race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and the like. Some expressly exclude speech or conduct that has a "legitimate purpose," though generally without defining which purposes count. I therefore worry about these sorts of injunctions that ban "harassment," without any real definition of the term.

The post Plaintiff Must "Reconcile Herself to the Fact That Litigation Is Often Accompanied by Public Attention and Scrutiny" appeared first on Reason.com.

[Jonathan H. Adler] What Should We Call the "Shadow Docket"?

[Should it be the interim docket? The emergency docket? The emergency orders docket? The short order docket? Something else?]

In today's New York Times, Adam Liptak reports on the emerging debate among commentators and Supreme Court justices about what to call the Supreme Court's docket of requests for emergency or interim relief.

As Liptak notes, this docket was initially coined the "shadow docket" by Will Baude in an article that sought to draw attention to this component of the Court's work, and bring it out of the shadows. Mission accomplished. This aspect of the Court's work is now analyzed and debated.

Now that the "shadow docket" is no longer in the shadows, does it need another name? As I noted here, Justice Kavanaugh thinks it should be called the "interim docket." Liptak reports on what other justices have said.

Justice Elena Kagan said in July at a judicial conference that she has used the term "shadow docket" in dissent "when I was feeling particularly annoyed." . . .

Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. is not a fan of such critiques. In a 2021 speech, he said the term "shadow docket" was nothing less than an assault on the legitimacy of the court.

"The catchy and sinister term 'shadow docket' has been used to portray the court as having been captured by a dangerous cabal that resorts to sneaky and improper methods to get its ways," he said. "This portrayal feeds unprecedented efforts to intimidate the court and to damage it as an independent institution."

Most justices seem to have settled on the "emergency docket" to describe the court's fast track. Justice Kagan said that was her preferred term, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett said the same thing last week on the "Advisory Opinions" podcast. . . .

Professor Baude, whose article started the debate, said last week that "interim orders docket" was fine with him. But he added that he regrets nothing about coming up with "shadow docket."

The post What Should We Call the "Shadow Docket"? appeared first on Reason.com.

[Jonathan H. Adler] Why Trying to Undo the Endangerment Finding Is A High-Risk (and Low-Reward) Deregulatory Strategy

[EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin says the Endangerment Finding is the "holy grail" of climate policy. Perhaps it's really they great white whale.]

Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lee Zeldin is pursuing an aggressive strategy to reduce the burden of environmental regulation on the American economy. In line with the Trump Administration's Executive Orders, he is emphasizing deregulatory measures relating to energy development and consumption, with a particular focus on climate change. As I have noted before, some parts of this deregulatory agenda are more legally defensible than others.

My latest Civitas Outlook column focuses on Zeldin's effort to roll back EPA climate regulation, and where the EPA may face difficulty.

Zeldin's most ambitious undertaking in this regard may also be the most legally vulnerable. On July 29, the EPA proposed to not only repeal regulations limiting greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles, but also to rescind the so-called "endangerment finding"—the legal predicate for nearly all of the EPA's greenhouse gas regulations under the Clean Air Act. In this regard, the EPA is not seeking merely to undo regulations from the Obama and Biden administrations. It is also seeking to make it more difficult for future administrations to put such regulations back in place unless and until the EPA is instructed to do so by Congress. This is a high-risk strategy. . . .

The primary reason it is difficult to undo the endangerment finding is that the statutory standard is so easy to meet. For purposes of the Act, the question is not whether climate change is catastrophic, nor whether climate adaptation is preferable to mitigation, nor whether federal regulation of sector-specific emissions is rational or cost-beneficial, nor whether such regulations represent a serious or rational way to address the threat of climate change. Nor is the question whether the science is unequivocal, nor is it whether there is certainty about the likely effects of increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions over any given time period. Rather, the question is simply whether the EPA Administrator can "reasonably anticipate" that the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere can have negative effects on health or welfare—effects which the Act defines to include the impact on climate, "economic values," and "personal comfort and well-being."

While the EPA suggests that a less-alarmist interpretation of existing climate science is one reason to undo the endangerment finding, relying upon a draft report prepared for the Department of Energy, its primary argument is that the Clean Air Act "does not authorize the EPA to proscribe emission standards to address global climate change concerns." The problem is that this argument is almost certainly foreclosed by Massachusetts v. EPA, which expressly concluded that the Act "authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the event that it forms a 'judgment' that such emissions contribute to climate change." The EPA suggests one way to address this constraint is to note that domestic motor vehicle emissions are a small (and shrinking) share of global emissions, but Section 202 of the Clean Air Act (unlike some other provisions of the Act) conspicuously lacks any requirement that motor vehicle emissions contribute significantly to the problem.

In its proposed rulemaking the EPA tries to argue that intervening Supreme Court decisions counsel a reconsideration of what the Clean Air Act means. Under these decisions, most notably West Virginia v. EPA and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the EPA argues that the Clean Air Act should not be interpreted to grant the EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in order to control climate change. Were it a matter of first impression, this argument would have substantial force (especially before the current court), but that is not where we are. The Massachusetts decision may have been wrong (as I believe it was), but it nonetheless represents the Court's authoritative interpretation of what the Clean Air Act provides on this point, and the Supreme Court rarely reconsiders its prior statutory holdings.

While many critics of the endangerment finding want to focus on climate science, it is worth noting that the primary arguments the EPA put forward in its proposed rulemaking are legal, not scientific. The EPA references the recent Department of Energy Climate Working Group report that critiques prior National Climate Assessments and presents a less alarmist view of climate science, but the EPA (correctly) recognizes that it is the legal issues here that will (and should) predominate.

Speaking of the Climate Working Group, it is apparently no more. After the initial report was released and put out for public comment, environmentalist organizations sued, claiming DOE violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), and asked a court to enjoin the federal government from relying upon the report in any form. While it was unlikely a court would embrace this extreme remedy, it appears concerns about FACA compliance going forward convinced DOE to disband the working group, and that is what the Energy Secretary did. Going forward, this may make it more difficult for the EPA to rely upon the group's work in the endangerment finding repeal rulemaking, as it was only a draft report, and it is not clear how it will be revised in response to public comment if the working group no longer exists.

My Civitas Outlook column concludes:

Administrator Zeldin has referred to the endangerment finding as "the holy grail of the climate change religion." Perhaps so. But recall that in the Arthurian legend, only the purest of heart and soul may reach the grail. Accordingly, it may take a purer legal strategy, and one that relies upon Congress, if the endangerment finding is to be undone.

The post Why Trying to Undo the Endangerment Finding Is A High-Risk (and Low-Reward) Deregulatory Strategy appeared first on Reason.com.

[Eugene Volokh] Leonard Cohen's "There Is a War" (First Released 1974)

There's more going on in the song, but here's an excerpt (actually, two excerpts merged, out of order) that's been on my mind; it seems pretty clear that Cohen's commentary is not an endorsement:

There is a war between the rich and poor
A war between the man and the woman
There is a war between the left and right
A war between the black and white
A war between the odd and the even …
There is a war between the ones who say there is a war
And the ones who say that there isn't

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[David Bernstein] Campus Violence and Threats Against Jewish Students Since October 7, Part I

For obvious reasons, everyone is talking about political violence in the US. Coincidentally, I have been working on two lists for an appendix to an article I am writing about hostile environment law. The first list, below, is of actual physical battery. The second is of threats and intimidation against Jewish individuals or institutions like Hillel. Since the article is not done and won't be out for a while, I thought it would be helpful to others working on related topics, and of course to curious blog readers, to see these lists. Note that these are not complete lists, but only contain incidents regarding which I could find public sources. I know of two cases of battery against Jewish students, one at Johns Hopkins and one at George Mason, that aren't on my list, and presumably there are many more. Note that while some of these incidents are more serious than others, they are listed in chronological order, not order of gravity.

Part I. Assaults and Physical Violence
This section documents reported incidents of physical violence directed against Jewish students or visibly Jewish individuals on or adjacent to U.S. university campuses. Entries are arranged in chronological order. For reading ease, I will delete the citations, but I'm happy to send them to anyone who requests them. Most of these assaults are attributable to anti-Israel activists, but in some cases the precise motivation (beyond targeting a Jewish student or students) is unknown.

Drexel University (Oct. 2023) — (Philadelphia, PA)
The door of a Jewish student's dorm suite in Race Hall was intentionally set on fire. The incident was investigated as arson and antisemitic harassment by local police and federal authorities.

Oct. 26, 2023 – Tulane University (New Orleans, LA):
During a campus rally in support of Israel, an anti-Israel counter-protestor swinging a pole struck a Jewish student in the face, causing visible injuries. Tulane police confirmed arrests.

Nov. 5–6, 2023 – UMass Amherst (Amherst, MA):
After an Israel solidarity event, a Jewish student carrying a flag was punched and the flag spat on. The suspect was arrested and barred from campus.

Nov. 10, 2023 – Ohio State University (Columbus, OH):
Two Jewish students were attacked near campus, with one reporting he was punched 'because he was Jewish.' The case was investigated as a hate crime.

Nov. 2023 – Harvard University (Cambridge, MA):
A Jewish student recording a protest 'die-in' at Harvard Business School was physically assaulted by demonstrators. Two students were charged with assault and battery. In February 2025, a Boston judge dismissed hate crime charges, but assault charges remained; the defendants were referred to a first-offender program.

February 26, 2024 – UC Berkeley (Berkeley, CA):
Students broke into Berkeley's Zellerbach Playhouse and rioted outside an event organized by Jewish student groups featuring an Israeli speaker. Approximately 200 protesters surrounded the building, chanting "Intifada" and "You can't run! You can't hide! We charge you with genocide!" while banging on the building's windows and doors. Students attempted to attend the event were harassed and assaulted by the protesters. One student was grabbed by the neck and another student was spat upon. Protesters shattered windows and broke open an entrance to the building. The audience to be evacuated from the building under a police escort. Berkeley Chancellor Carol Christ and Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost Ben Hermalin publicly acknowledged reports that Jewish students were subjected to "overtly antisemitic expression" including "allegations of physical battery, as hate crimes."

March 4, 2024 – Tufts University (Medford, MA):
At a student government meeting discussing anti-Israel resolutions, a Jewish student reportedly asked an anti-Israel student to stop laughing as the pro-Israel Jewish students presented their position. In response, the laughing student said, "Shut up b*tch," and spat on the Jewish student.

Apr. 25–May 2, 2024 – UCLA (Los Angeles, CA):
During the Palestine Solidarity encampment, Jewish students reported being physically blocked from entering parts of campus. A federal judge later ruled UCLA had failed to protect equal access.
Jewish students also reported: (1) a Jewish student who was lawfully filming the encampment being slapped by a UCLA teaching assistant; (2) another Jewish student was pepper-sprayed by a protestor; (3) a student from Israel being assaulted by protestors.

April 2024 - Northwestern University (Chicago, IL)
At the Northwestern "encampment," a Jewish Northwestern student photojournalist was identified by a masked student by name and physical description to hundreds of encampment members. Protestors then surrounded the student, shouting, "Shame! Shame! Shame!" In a separate incident, an encampment members assaulted a Jewish Northwestern student lawfully recording the encampment. Jewish students reported ordered to "go back to Germany and get gassed" and were spat at while walking past the encampment." [This one is on the borderline between intimidation/threat and battery, depending on where the spit landed.]

April 29, 2024 – Princeton (Princeton, NJ)
Jewish student David Piegaro was filming the aftermath of the arrests of several students involved with a Princeton encampment when a man, who later turned out to be a Princeton administrator, grabbed him and threw him down the marble stairs of a building. Piegaro suffered a concussion and rib injuries. Princeton officials pressed charges against Piegaro, claiming that he initiated the incident by bumping into the administrator's arm. Piegaro was found not guilty at trial by a judge, and now has a lawsuit pending against Princeton.

April 30, 2024 – Yale (New Haven, CT):
Protesters at Yale established checkpoints around the green guarded by so-called "marshals." These "marshals" physically prevented entry unless one was committed to "being committed to Palestinian liberation and fighting for freedom for all oppressed peoples." As a result, numerous Jewish students were physically prevented from accessing relevant areas of campus.

May 1, 2024 – UCLA (Los Angeles, CA):
Jewish student Elinor Hess was shoved, kicked, and pulled by the hair while attempting to retrieve a flag that fell within an anti-Israel encampment. She sustained a concussion and required medical treatment. The assailant was initially charged with felony assault, but prosecutors later downgraded the charges to misdemeanors.

Jun. 10–11, 2024 – UCLA (Los Angeles, CA):
Rabbi Dovid Gurevich of UCLA Chabad was surrounded by masked protesters, called 'pedophile rabbi' and told to 'go back to Poland,' and had his phone knocked away. Sources: The Forward:

May 2024 – Reed College (Portland, OR):
After antisemitic vandalism in dorms, a Jewish student was struck in the head with a rock while in her room, sustaining injuries. The attack was captured on surveillance cameras.

Aug. 31, 2024 – University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA):
Two Jewish students wearing kippot were assaulted in Schenley Plaza, one struck with a bottle and suffering a concussion. Police arrested suspects.

Sept. 15, 2024 – University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI):
A Jewish student was assaulted outside a dorm and subjected to antisemitic slurs. Police classified it as aggravated assault and ethnic intimidation.

Sept. 27, 2024: University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA):
A Jewish student at the University of Pittsburgh wearing a Star of David necklace was attacked by a group of people who used antisemitic language.

Apr. 2024 – Yale University (New Haven, CT):
Student journalist Sahar Tartak was assaulted while covering a protest, when a demonstrator jabbed her in the eye with a flagpole. She lost consciousness and was hospitalized.

Apr. 2024 – Emory University (Atlanta, GA):
At a protest outside Emory Chabad, a Jewish student was shoved and verbally abused. Chabad leaders described the attack as part of a climate of intimidation.
Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, MD):
An Israeli doctoral student was attacked during a pro-Palestinian protest. The university confirmed video evidence and promised to investigate.

November 6, 2024 - DePaul University (Chicago, IL)
Two Jewish students were physically assaulted by masked attackers while visibly supporting Israel. The attackers shouted antisemitic remarks during the attack. In April 2025, one suspect, Adam Erkan, was formally charged with a hate crime and aggravated battery in connection with that November 2024 assault. Another suspect remains at large.

Dec. 10, 2024 – Columbia University (New York, NY):
During a campus rally, a Jewish student was punched in the face. Columbia confirmed that disciplinary proceedings were underway.

July 31, 2025 – Florida State University (Tallahassee, FL):
A female graduate student approached a male student in the campus library who was wearing an Israeli Defense Forces t-shirt. After engaging in an expletive-laden tirade, she shoved him while apparently reaching for his drink. The offending student was arrested and charged with misdemeanor battery, and expelled from FSU.

Dates unknown – George Mason University (Fairfax, VA):
In a letter to the university community, university president Greg Washington alluded to two occasions on which "George Mason experienced unlawful activity associated with violent antisemitic actions by students."

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[Eugene Volokh] Transgender Kent State Prof Loses First Amendment + Discrimination Claim Related to "Weeks-Long, Profanity-Laden Twitter Tirade Insulting Colleagues and the University"

A short excerpt from the long decision in Patterson v. Kent State Univ., decided Friday by Judge John Nalbandian, joined by Judges Danny Boggs and Richard Allen Griffin:

GPat Patterson, a transgender professor at Kent State University, sued the university on several discrimination and retaliation claims. The claims arise out of Kent State's response to Patterson's weeks-long, profanity-laden Twitter tirade insulting colleagues and the university….

Patterson alleged that certain university actions—"(1) the Dean revoking her offer to lighten Patterson's credit load, (2) the Dean's '[r]evocation' of Patterson's leadership role in the Center, and (3) the English department's denial of the tenure-transfer request" through which Patterson sought to transfer] "from Kent State's Tuscarawas campus to the English department on the main campus"—were discriminatory or retaliatory. No, said the court.

[A.] The court concluded that the actions weren't retaliation against First-Amendment-protected speech:

[To be protected against retaliation by a public employer, the plaintiff's] speech must address a matter of public concern, and the plaintiff's interests in speaking on those matters must outweigh the state's interest in promoting effective and efficient public services….

Speech involves a matter of public concern when it deals with "any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community." "The linchpin of the inquiry is … the extent to which the speech advances an idea transcending personal interest or opinion" and instead impacts our shared social or political life. Allegations of public corruption, for example, touch on matters of public concern. So do remarks about government inefficiency or major government policy decisions. And so do statements exposing governmental discrimination.

On the other hand, speech about internal personnel disputes or management doesn't cut it. Run-of-the-mill "employee beef" doesn't implicate the public concern just because it's been spilled to the public. That's because "the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs." The government, as an employer, must "enjoy wide latitude in managing [its] offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Put simply, "complaining about your boss and coworkers is not protected by the First Amendment just because you work for the government."

Patterson's tweets didn't involve a matter of public concern. The gist of the month-long diatribe was to complain about [Dean] Munro-Stasiuk's and [Prof.] Mazzei's decisions on how to handle new academic programming. Munro-Stasiuk and Mazzei were repeatedly called out as "cishet white admin ladies" engaged in "F*ckery," "shit," "trans antagonism," and "epistemic violence" who were "quite literally killing [Patterson]." Mazzei was singled out as a "usurper" and "cishet white admin with zero content expertise" whose field of study was a "sentient trash heap," and who was guilty of "back-stabbery" and "horizontal violence." These are complaints about other Kent State faculty members and their workplace decisions—"employee beef," plain and simple.

The tweets are insulting, disparaging, and targeted. They use profanities, and they describe Munro-Stasiuk and Mazzei in terms of their race and sex. Complaining about and insulting your coworkers simply doesn't implicate a matter of public concern.

Patterson frames the tweets as publicizing Kent State's alleged transphobia and exposing discrimination in the workplace. In fairness, a few tweets do make more general references that sound less like targeted insults. For example, one tweet states: "Academia is fundamentally racist, heterosexist, cissexist, ableist, classist & sexist." In isolation, perhaps that qualifies as protected speech. But the tweet is swarmed on either side by other attacks on Munro-Stasiuk and Mazzei. Indeed, that same tweet's very next sentence accuses Professor Mazzei of "violen[ce]." A public employee can't blend protected speech with "caustic personal attacks against colleagues," and then use the protected speech to immunize those attacks.

And even if the tweets did involve a matter of public concern, they still wouldn't receive protection. Kent State's interest as an employer in administering effective public services outweighs Patterson's interest in this kind of trash talk.

There's a way to raise awareness of discrimination without engaging in profanity-laced and race- and sex-based aspersions against colleagues. The tweets created serious strife within the Kent State community, causing Munro-Stasiuk and Mazzei to feel harassed and insulted. And it led to a dysfunctional work environment for several months.

Mazzei had to text Munro-Stasiuk, for example: "I'm really thinking continuing [having Patterson involved] is unhealthy for the potential program and school, at this point. It's clearly already having an impact. I have concerns." Munro-Stasiuk also testified to how noxious things had gotten. "The foundation of [revoking the offer]," she stated, "was the toxic, hostile tweets that Dr. Patterson had been posting over the course of over a month …. [I]t was escalating, continually targeting [Mazzei], in particular, continually targeting Lauren Vachon and Suzanne Holt, to a certain extent myself." The Dean discussed how Patterson had "show[n] over, and over, and over again" a refusal to be collaborative or respectful and was "completely trying to undermine the process." In short, Patterson had compromised any "ability to lead any initiative" and any "ability to work in the Center, or the [major.]"

Kent State's business is educating students. When an employee seriously undercuts the university's power to do its basic job, the Constitution doesn't elevate the employee over the public that Kent State exists to serve.

All told, "[t]he First Amendment does not require a public employer to tolerate an embarrassing, vulgar, vituperative, ad hominem attack, even if such an attack touches on a matter of public concern." When "the manner and content of an employee's speech is disrespectful, demeaning, rude, and insulting, and is perceived that way in the workplace, the government employer is within its discretion to take disciplinary action."

Here's a longer excerpt of the Tweets:

June 19: Patterson criticized the "two cishet1 white ladies in charge, with [no] content expertise in this area" (Mazzei and Munro-Stasiuk) and called Mazzei a "usurper."June 23: In response to the idea that insulting colleagues on social media was "unprofessional," Patterson wrote, "No the fuck it isn't."June 26: "Academia is fundamentally racist, heterosexist, cissexist, ableist, classist & sexist…. [B]lock[ing] multimarg2 faculty from leading is violent."June 29: Clarifying who the tweets were about, Patterson referred to people "on the main campus" (Munro-Stasiuk and Mazzei) acting in "a kind of translash." "[T]he minute I raise an equity issue, I'm suddenly read as a problem to be neutralized." Patterson also denounced Kent State's "[i]nstitutional transphobia" and "overt trans antagonism."June 30: "I wish there'd have been a grad practicum called Oh, The Places They'll Go: How to Navigate F*ckery as a Multimarg Faculty Member." Patterson again criticized "the white cishet admin with zero content expertise" who would be leading the new major (Mazzei).July 3: "Thanks for coming to my TED talk on how u can claim to be a trans ally all you want, but if you pull sh*t to bar trans ppl's access to life chances, ur still a transphobe. Also, if ur a bystander who watches someone do this mess & don't intervene? Also a transphobe."July 5: Patterson criticized "individual back-stabbery" and the "horizontal violence … [of people in higher education] who see you as competition & want you to fail," and declared that "the whole damn system is killing you a bit more each day."July 6: "I need you to understand the death-dealing & soul-murdering consequences that result from profoundly privileged administrators not grasping the insidiousness with which inequity & violence show up in multimarg faculty & staff workplaces. Y'all are quite literally killing us."July 8: "Absolutely zero surprise it's a poli sci prof. Forgive the generalization but that discipline is a sentient trash heap."July 10: "I'd like to talk about the epistemic violence of a university attempting to create a [gender-studies] major, but blocking scholars, with whole PhDs in the discipline, from leading the effort. Please. Tell me another discipline where admins try to pull this shit. I'll wait."

[B.] The court also concluded that Patterson hadn't sufficiently shown evidence of transgender identity discrimination. Among other things, the court reasoned,

Patterson … points to the committees' discussion of whether the English department needed more faculty with backgrounds in LGBT studies, claiming that this is direct evidence of discrimination. That argument conflates a professor's scholarly discipline with a professor's personal traits. An Italian person may offer to teach Italian classes, but if a university doesn't need more Italian classes, that's not direct evidence of animus against Italian people. So there's no direct evidence of discrimination….

And the court concluded there wasn't enough circumstantial evidence of such discrimination, either.

[C.] And the court rejected Patterson's claim of discrimination based on perceived disability:

The disability claim rests on one stray remark that Professor Holt made to Mazzei. Recall that Patterson sent several messages to Holt and Lauren Vachon venting at Mazzei; Holt and Vachon then became worried about whether they could work with Patterson. In her deposition, Mazzei recalled Holt saying "that she [Holt] had very deep concerns about Dr. Patterson's stability, mental stability, and that the communications were spiraling downward." Patterson points to this "mental instability" reference to invoke the disability protections of the Rehabilitation Act.

This isolated comment is not the kind of evidence that courts have found satisfies the "regarded as disabled" definition. "Personality conflicts among coworkers (even those expressed through the use (or misuse) of mental health terminology) generally do not establish a perceived impairment on the part of the employer." Holt's remark simply expressed her concern about Patterson's uncollegial and unprofessional attitude. At most, it is a "mere scintilla" of evidence—insufficient to survive summary judgment.

Daniel James Rudary (Brennan Manna & Diamond, LLC) represents the university.

The post Transgender Kent State Prof Loses First Amendment + Discrimination Claim Related to "Weeks-Long, Profanity-Laden Twitter Tirade Insulting Colleagues and the University" appeared first on Reason.com.