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Normative Ethics Books
Showing 1-50 of 191
Utilitarianism (Paperback)
by (shelved 5 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.68 — 25,761 ratings — published 1861
The Nicomachean Ethics (Paperback)
by (shelved 5 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.01 — 63,591 ratings — published -350
What We Owe to Each Other (Paperback)
by (shelved 5 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.85 — 723 ratings — published 1999
Normative Ethics (Paperback)
by (shelved 4 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.79 — 119 ratings — published
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Paperback)
by (shelved 4 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.83 — 23,650 ratings — published 1785
Reasons and Persons (Paperback)
by (shelved 3 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.27 — 1,990 ratings — published 1984
Intelligent Virtue (Hardcover)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.84 — 159 ratings — published 2011
Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Volume 0)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.39 — 100 ratings — published 1996
Utilitarianism: For and Against (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.65 — 319 ratings — published 1973
After Virtue (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.18 — 6,739 ratings — published 1982
Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.16 — 4,756 ratings — published 1844
Rights of Man (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.02 — 10,539 ratings — published 1791
On Liberty (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.96 — 45,035 ratings — published 1859
On What Matters: Volume One (Hardcover)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.18 — 254 ratings — published 2011
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.03 — 832 ratings — published 1985
Moral Theory: An Introduction (Elements of Philosophy)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.79 — 153 ratings — published 2002
The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.74 — 2,552 ratings — published 2003
A Theory of Justice (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.95 — 13,855 ratings — published 1971
Principia Ethica (Paperback)
by (shelved 2 times as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.79 — 1,032 ratings — published 1903
CÓMO CONQUISTAR La SU PRIMERA: $ 1, 000,000.00 (Spanish Edition)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.67 — 3 ratings — published
On Liberty - John Stuart Mill (Audiobook)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.44 — 25 ratings — published
The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin (Hardcover)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.94 — 3,122 ratings — published 1844
Wages, Price and Profit (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.32 — 2,276 ratings — published 1898
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.26 — 9,810 ratings — published 1880
The Subjection of Women (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.88 — 3,873 ratings — published 1869
Fear and Trembling (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.00 — 33,625 ratings — published 1843
Eleven Theses on Feuerbach (Audiobook)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.06 — 981 ratings — published 1888
The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.67 — 6 ratings — published
The World as Will and Representation, Volume I (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.22 — 11,501 ratings — published 1818
Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.88 — 3,956 ratings — published 1821
Philosophy of Mind (Kindle Edition)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.92 — 438 ratings — published 1817
Phenomenology of Spirit (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.97 — 21,252 ratings — published 1807
The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.03 — 413 ratings — published 1841
The Way Towards the Blessed Life; Or, the Doctrine of Religion (Bibliolife Reproduction)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.60 — 10 ratings — published 2009
A lasting peace through the federation of Europe; and, The state of war (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.12 — 8 ratings — published 2009
The Age of Reason (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.12 — 9,592 ratings — published 1794
رسالة في التسامح (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.79 — 2,897 ratings — published 1763
Offences Against Oneself and An Open Letter (Audiobook)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.67 — 3 ratings — published
The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.43 — 666 ratings — published 1789
The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680-1790 (Hardcover)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.26 — 872 ratings — published 2020
The Right and the Good (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.01 — 93 ratings — published 1930
The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (Hardcover)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 5.00 — 1 rating — published
Ethics (British Moral Philosophers)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.64 — 67 ratings — published 1912
HURSTHOUSE:ON VIRTUE ETHICS PAPER (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.78 — 178 ratings — published 1999
Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems (Oxford Moral Theory)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.00 — 1 rating — published
Grundbok i normativ etik (pocket)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.05 — 39 ratings — published 2005
The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Paperback)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 3.89 — 44 ratings — published 1997
Ethics Through History: An Introduction (Kindle Edition)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.00 — 11 ratings — published
The Development of Ethics, Volume 2: From Suarez to Rousseau (Hardcover)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.62 — 8 ratings — published 2008
The Development of Ethics, Volume 1: From Socrates to the Reformation (Hardcover)
by (shelved 1 time as normative-ethics)
avg rating 4.40 — 10 ratings — published 2007
“DEONTOLOGY AND CONCEQUENTIALISM, A NOVEL APPROACH: Consequentialism and Deontology (Deontological Ethics) are two contrasting categories of Normative Ethics, the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental principles that determine the morality of human actions (or non-actions). Their supposed difference is that while Consequentialism determines if an action is morally right or wrong by examining its consequences, Deontology focuses on the action itself, regardless of its consequences.
To the hypothetical question “Should I do this man a little injustice, if by this I could save the whole humanity from torture and demise?”, the philosopher Immanuel Kant, a pure deontologist (absolutist) answers: “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus” (Do justice even if the whole world would perish).
Superficially, it seems that a decent deontologist don’t care about consequences whatsoever. His/her one and only duty is to invariably obey to pre-existing, universal moral rules without exceptions: “do not kill”, “do not lie”, “do not use another human as a means to an end”, and so on.
At this point I would like to present my thesis on this subject. The central idea here is that deontological ethics only appears to be indifferent to the consequences of an action. In fact, it is only these very consequences that determine what our moral rules and ethical duties should be. For example, the moral law “do not kill”, has its origin to the dire consequences that the killing of another human being brings about; for the victim (death), the perpetrator (often imprisonment or death) and for the whole humanity (collapse of society and civilization).
Let us discuss the well-worn thought experiment of the mad axeman asking a mother where their young children are, so he can kill them. We suppose that the mother knows with 100% certainty that she can mislead him by lying and she can save her children from certain death (once again: supposing that she surely knows that she can save her children ONLY by lying, not by telling the truth or by avoiding to answer). In this thought experiment the hard deontologist would insist that it is immoral to lie, even if that would lead to horrible consequences. But, I assert that this deontological inflexibility is not only inhuman and unethical, it is also outrightly hypocritical. Because if the mother knows that their children are going to be killed if she tells the truth (or does not answer) and they are going to be saved if she tells a harmless lie, then by telling the truth she disobeys the moral law “do not kill/do not cause the death of an innocent”, which is much worse than the moral rule “do not lie”. The fact that she does not kill her children with her own hands is completely irrelevant. She could have saved them without harming another human, yet she chose not to. So the absolutist deontologist chooses actively to disobey a much more important moral law, only because she is not the immediate cause, but a cause via a medium (the crazy axeman in this particular thought experiment).
So here are the two important conclusions: Firstly, Deontology in normative ethics is in reality a “masked consequentialism”, because the origin of a moral law is to be found in its consequences e.g. stealing is generally morally wrong, because by stealing, someone is deprived of his property that may be crucial for his survival or prosperity. Thus, the Deontology–Consequentialism dichotomy is a false one.
And secondly, the fact that we are not the immediate “vessel” by which a moral rule is broken, but we nevertheless create or sustain a “chain of events” that will almost certainly lead to the breaking of a moral law, does surely not absolve us and does not give us the right to choose the worst outcome. Mister Immanuel Kant would avoid doing an innocent man an injustice, yet he would choose to lead billions of innocent people to agonizing death.”
― NOVEL PHILOSOPHY: New ideas about Ethics, Epistemology, Science and the sweet Life
To the hypothetical question “Should I do this man a little injustice, if by this I could save the whole humanity from torture and demise?”, the philosopher Immanuel Kant, a pure deontologist (absolutist) answers: “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus” (Do justice even if the whole world would perish).
Superficially, it seems that a decent deontologist don’t care about consequences whatsoever. His/her one and only duty is to invariably obey to pre-existing, universal moral rules without exceptions: “do not kill”, “do not lie”, “do not use another human as a means to an end”, and so on.
At this point I would like to present my thesis on this subject. The central idea here is that deontological ethics only appears to be indifferent to the consequences of an action. In fact, it is only these very consequences that determine what our moral rules and ethical duties should be. For example, the moral law “do not kill”, has its origin to the dire consequences that the killing of another human being brings about; for the victim (death), the perpetrator (often imprisonment or death) and for the whole humanity (collapse of society and civilization).
Let us discuss the well-worn thought experiment of the mad axeman asking a mother where their young children are, so he can kill them. We suppose that the mother knows with 100% certainty that she can mislead him by lying and she can save her children from certain death (once again: supposing that she surely knows that she can save her children ONLY by lying, not by telling the truth or by avoiding to answer). In this thought experiment the hard deontologist would insist that it is immoral to lie, even if that would lead to horrible consequences. But, I assert that this deontological inflexibility is not only inhuman and unethical, it is also outrightly hypocritical. Because if the mother knows that their children are going to be killed if she tells the truth (or does not answer) and they are going to be saved if she tells a harmless lie, then by telling the truth she disobeys the moral law “do not kill/do not cause the death of an innocent”, which is much worse than the moral rule “do not lie”. The fact that she does not kill her children with her own hands is completely irrelevant. She could have saved them without harming another human, yet she chose not to. So the absolutist deontologist chooses actively to disobey a much more important moral law, only because she is not the immediate cause, but a cause via a medium (the crazy axeman in this particular thought experiment).
So here are the two important conclusions: Firstly, Deontology in normative ethics is in reality a “masked consequentialism”, because the origin of a moral law is to be found in its consequences e.g. stealing is generally morally wrong, because by stealing, someone is deprived of his property that may be crucial for his survival or prosperity. Thus, the Deontology–Consequentialism dichotomy is a false one.
And secondly, the fact that we are not the immediate “vessel” by which a moral rule is broken, but we nevertheless create or sustain a “chain of events” that will almost certainly lead to the breaking of a moral law, does surely not absolve us and does not give us the right to choose the worst outcome. Mister Immanuel Kant would avoid doing an innocent man an injustice, yet he would choose to lead billions of innocent people to agonizing death.”
― NOVEL PHILOSOPHY: New ideas about Ethics, Epistemology, Science and the sweet Life
“No science and no analysis of the future consequences of various actions taken today can in itself tell us what to do. We need, in addition, to factor in what kind of future we value, and to what extent we care at all about the future compared to more immediate concerns here and now. The later aspect is usually modeled and economics by the so-called discount rate, which has played a prominent role in discussions of climate change on a decadal and centennial time scale, but hardly at all in the context of longer perspectives or the various radical technologies[.] We are less used to thinking about ethical issues on long time scales, so our intuitions trying to fail us and lead to paradoxes. These issues need to be resolved, because dodging the bullet would in my opinion be unacceptably irresponsible.”
― Here Be Dragons: Science, Technology and the Future of Humanity
― Here Be Dragons: Science, Technology and the Future of Humanity
