Keith Parsons's Blog, page 9

The Argument from First-Order Ethical Beliefs for Moral Realism

As far as I can tell, the argument from ordinary language
originated with John Post, but has also been defended by Quentin Smith.  The argument begins with the observation that
“our first-order ethical beliefs imply that ethical sentences have truth-value
and sometimes correspond to moral facts that obtain independently of our
beliefs about whether they obtain” (p. 158). 
For example, when the average person says, “Rape is morally wrong,” they
typically do not mean that rape is wrong for them but okay for rapists.   On the contrary, they mean that rape is
morally wrong for everyone.  Or,
similarly, it violates ordinary usage to say, “It all comes down to a personal
decision in the end as to whether it is wrong to torture newborn babies for the
fun of it.”  More formally, we may say:

(1)  
Ordinary ethical sentences and commonsense first-level
moral beliefs imply moral realism (or “Moral realism tacitly seems to be true
in ordinary commonsense moral attitudes”).

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Semantic vs. Ontological Ethical Naturalism vs. Divine Command Theory

Jonathan Berg, in his essay “How could ethics depend on religion?”, notes there are various versions of the ‘Divine Command Theory’ of ethics.  In its strongest form, the Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a theory about the very meaning of words, what Jonathan Harrison has called a linguistic theory.  After describing various problems with the linguistic version of the DCT, Berg then states that divine command theorists might abandon the linguistic version of the DCT in favor of a more extensional version, holding that although ‘the good’ and ‘God’s will’ do not mean the same thing, they amount to the same thing.  That is, God wills whatever is good, and whatever God wills is good.  This yields the intended equivalence without requiring the troublesome semantic claims.



Interestingly, such a move would seem to be parallel to the move advocated by Charles Pidgen in defense of ethical naturalism; Pidgen argues that while the semantic form of ethical naturalism is probably false, the truth of the ontological version of ethical naturalism does not depend upon the truth of the semantic version of ethical naturalism.



References



Berg, Jonathan. “How Could Ethics Depend on Religion?” In A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, 525-533.



Harrison, Jonathan. “Comments on Professor Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17 (1956): 257-58.



Pidgen, Charles. "Naturalism." In A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, 421-431.

William Davis's Argument from Objective, Nonutilitarian Value to Theism

Here is an excerpt from Davis's chapter in Reason for the Hope Within.

While many human activities are pursued because
of their usefulness (utility), and some are valuable only in the eyes of a few
people (nonobjective), there are kinds of human activity which possess
objective, nonutilitarian value.  Two
obvious examples of this are self-sacrificial love and artistic beauty (which
may be useful, but don’t need to be).  If
everything (including humanity) is the result of random, impersonal forces
which encouraged only survival, then it seems highly unlikely that the process
would yield organisms (humans) which recognized values like these which aren't survival conducive.  But values like
these are what we would expect if humans (and the human environment) were
created by a personal, loving God.  God’s
existence is a much better explanation for the existence of nonutilitarian value
than any explanation without God.

Source: William C. Davis, “Theistic Arguments” Reason for the Hope Within (ed. Michael J. Murray, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 39.



Davis's Argument Formulated



Here is my attempt to provide the logical structure of Davis's argument.



(1) There are kinds of human activity (e.g., self-sacrificial love and artistic beauty) which possess objective, nonutilitarian value.

(2) If theism were true, we would expect human activities which possess objective, nonutilitarian value.

(3) If metaphysical naturalism were true, we would not expect objective, nonutilitarian value.

(4) Therefore, theism is probably true. [abductive inference from (1)-(3)]




Is this an inductively correct argument? Please feel free to discuss in the combox.

The Pope's Tweets are Official Church Doctrine

LINK

Leiter on the Plantinga/Nagel Saga

LINK (HT: ex-apologist)

Senor on Craig/Moreland vs. Draper on Kalam Cosmological Argument

LINK

Arguing from Moral Ontology to Theism by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives

1. Defintions



Moral ontology is the branch of meta-ethics concerned with the ontology or metaphysics of moral facts and properties.  Within the field of moral ontology, it is a commonplace that the nature of moral facts and properties fall into one of three categories: natural, nonnatural, or supernatural.  Natural facts and properties are those facts and properties studied by the natural and social sciences, including sociology, psychology, and biology.  Supernatural facts and properties are those facts and properties studied by religion and theology.  Nonnatural facts and properties are a bit harder to define.  In the broad sense, the nonnatural refers to anything that is not natural and hence includes the supernatural.  In the narrow sense, nonnatural facts and properties are irreducible, sui generis facts and properties that cannot be further analyzed or explained.  Unless otherwise stated, I shall use the term ‘nonnatural’ in the narrow sense.



Ethical naturalism is the view that moral facts and properties are nothing but natural facts and properties,  whereas ethical supernaturalism is the view that moral facts and properties are nothing but supernatural facts and properties.  Since both ethical naturalism and ethical supernaturalism claim that moral facts and properties ultimately reduce to some other type of facts and properties, the two theories may be grouped together as ‘reductive’ theories.  In contrast, ethical nonnaturalism is non-reductive, since it claims that moral facts and properties are irreducible.



Unfortunately, many writers assume that moral objectivism entails ethical nonnaturalism.  Geoffrey Sayre-McCord observes, “Objectivism in ethics has suffered from the mistaken assumption that objectivists must hold that moral properties are nonnatural …”[1].  The metaphysical nature of moral properties can only be determined by a thesis about moral semantics, not by the “metaphysically neutral” theory of moral objectivism.[2] Mere (moral) objectivism neither logically entails nor makes probable the view that moral properties are nonnatural properties.  As John Post writes, moral objectivism does not require “some shadowy Platonic realm ‘out there,’ perhaps beyond space and time.”  Rather, moral objectivism is simply the view that there is an objective “truth of the matter as regards the correctness or incorrectness of our value judgments.”[3]



2. An Argument from Moral Ontology to Theism by Eliminating Naturalistic Alternatives



Here I want to sketch one way to formulate an argument from moral ontology to theism which I haven't seen explicitly discussed as such in the literature on religion and morality. One method of arguing from objective moral truths to traditional theism is by a process of elimination: start with the premise that objective moral truths exist and then show that objective moral truths cannot be natural or nonnatural properties.  Although I am not aware of anyone who has explicitly defended just such an argument in precisely that way, Michael Beaty, Carlton Fisher, and Mark Nelson allude to such an argument in a recent essay.[4] More formally, such an argument may be formulated as follows:





(1) There are objective moral truths.

(2) If there are any objective moral truths, they must be truths about natural, nonnatural, or supernatural facts or properties.

(3) Objective moral truths are not truths about either natural or nonnatural facts or properties.

(4) Therefore, objective moral truths must be truths about supernatural facts or properties. [from (1)-(3)]

(5) If theism were true, we would expect supernatural facts or properties to exist.

(6) If metaphysical naturalism were true, supernatural facts or properties would not exist.

(7) Therefore, theism is probably true. [abductive inference from (4)-(6)]



Notes



[1] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms” Essays on Moral Realism (ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 20.

[2] David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 22.

[3] John F. Post, The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 252, 256.

[4] Michael Beaty, Carlton Fisher, and Mark Nelson,
“Editors’ Introduction” Christian Theism and Moral Philosophy (Macon,
Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1998), 2-13.

J.P. Moreland's 1993 Moral Argument for Theism

J.P. Moreland argues that traditional theism is the best
explanation for the truth of ethical nonnaturalism in the broad sense, a
correspondence theory of moral truth, and the falsity of ethical egoism.[1]



Definitions



non-natural property: an attribute that is not a scientific, physical characteristic of physics or chemistry (e.g., being a C fiber, having negative charge, being magnetic).[2]



Moreland's Argument Formulated



We may represent Moreland’s
argument with the following structure:






(1) Irreducible, nonnatural value properties do exist and are a part of the furniture of the universe.

(2) The truth of moral propositions is determined by correspondence with moral facts.

(3) We have moral obligations that seem to require duties that often go against our own best interests.

(4) The best available explanation of (1)-(3) is that God exists.

(5) Therefore, God exists. 




Moreland's Defense of (1)



Moreland defends (1) by appealing to “our common sense moral intuitions.”[3] He writes:

Similarly, consider the claims “Kindness is a virtue;” “Humans have value;” “Persons have value.”  Or, as Roderick Chisholm says, “Mercy as such is good.”  In spite of what Nielsen says, these are synthetic a priori propositions, where at least on the surface, it seems like just as “Red is a color” commits one to the existence of red and color, “Kindness is a virtue” commits one to the existence of kindness and virtue. … “Mercy as such is good” commits one to non-natural properties that do exist and are part of the furniture of the universe.[4]

Although in one instance Moreland defines the term ‘non-natural’ in a way implicitly compatible with the term’s broad sense (and hence moral facts and properties could be either supernatural or sui generis),[5] in several other instances he refers to irreducible moral properties.[6]  Hence, nonnaturalism in the narrow sense is the position with which he seems to most sympathize and in effect endorses.



Notes



[1] J.P. Moreland, “Ethics Depend on God” Does God Exist? The Debate Between Theists & Atheists (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1993), 120, n. 1.




[2] See J.P. Moreland, “The Ethical Inadequacy of Naturalism” Promise (May/June 1996): 36-39. Cf. J.P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1987), 112, 113 n. 6, 120, 122; Moreland 1993, 36, 120 n. 1.



[3] Moreland 1993, 122, n. 4.



[4] Moreland 1993, 113.



[5] Moreland 1996.



[6] Moreland 1987, 112, 113 n. 6, 120, 122; Moreland
1993, 36, 120 n. 1.

A Question about Palestinian Statehood

(This is only indirectly related to metaphysical naturalism and theism, so please forgive me if this seems too off-topic for you.)



In light of the recent decision about the UN's decision to recognize Palestine as a Non-Member Observer State and the opposition to that status by the U.S., Israel, and others, I have a simple question.



If North Korea gets to be recognized as a full member of the UN, then what objective basis is there for excluding Palestine? Most of the international community opposes the policies and actions of North Korea, but I'm not aware of anyone suggesting that North Korea should be stripped of its UN membership. Why should Palestine be treated differently?

Dispatches from the Culture Wars: Make the Boy Scouts Truly Private

If the Boy Scouts of America want to invoke their right as a private organization to discriminate against homosexuals and nontheists, then they should not receive any form of government assistance.



LINK