Keith Parsons's Blog, page 7
December 14, 2012
December 12, 2012
Ted Rall comes out?
I've occasionally referred to Ted Rall, the cartoonist and author, as an example of an ultraliberal theist who was indistinguishable from a godless humanist (especially a left-wing godless humanist) on ethical matters. But in a recent column, he says
Interesting.
On one hand, it's mildly encouraging to see someone resolve the intellectual tensions in their views by adopting what I think is a more sensible position.
On the other hand, it's mildly annoying as it deprives me of an example I could use when I feel like arguing that nonbelief in God can be irrelevant in ethical and political matters.
Maybe I should pay more attention to how atheism can matter.
Science isn’t reconcilable with faith. Rubio knows that. But he also knows what would happen to his presidential aspirations if he admitted the truth.
God is a lie.
If you believe in God, you are stupid.
If you think the earth is 6,000 years old, that humans and dinosaurs coexisted, and/or that climate change isn’t real or caused by people, you are an idiot.
Since many of my readers believe in God, the words above will cost me sales and clients. Optimists might argue that being forthright about my beliefs will attract at least as many new customers. But that’s not the way the world works.
Interesting.
On one hand, it's mildly encouraging to see someone resolve the intellectual tensions in their views by adopting what I think is a more sensible position.
On the other hand, it's mildly annoying as it deprives me of an example I could use when I feel like arguing that nonbelief in God can be irrelevant in ethical and political matters.
Maybe I should pay more attention to how atheism can matter.
December 10, 2012
One Reason Why Strong Pro-Gay Marriage Supporters Should Be Worried
Whether the United States and the States should authorize same-sex marriage, in my opinion, should remain a matter of federal legislative public policy, and of state constitutional law and/or legislative public policy. Therefore, I strongly oppose the thesis that the United States and/or the states as a matter of federal constitutional law are obliged to authorize same-sex marriages or their functional equivalents. I also oppose the repeal of DOMA (Defense of Marriage Act) by Congress, or its whole or partial nullification by the courts.
So what I would like now is call the readers’ attention an important matter bearing upon the future federal constitutional status of same-sex marriages, now sub judice in Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, and United States v. Windsor; No. 12-307.
The matter in question is suggested by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html...). In this case the Court held that a Texas statute making it a crime for two person of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause. The Court accordingly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 189 (1986). Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority (i.e., himself, and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), declared (bracketed matter added):
Given the heavy reliance in Lawrence upon the decision of the ECHR concerning private, consensual homosexual conduct, Justice Kennedy and the other sitting justices would now be remiss were they not to take into account in Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor recent relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. That court has held that the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family, as guaranteed by Article 12 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, was not violated by Austrian law that denied the legal possibility of same-sex marriage. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Application no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010 (final 22 November 2010) [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4... ]. That court also ruled that the denial of same-sex marriage by Austrian law did not constitute unreasonable discrimination in violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with the requirement in Article 8, that there shall be no interference by public authority with the right of a person to respect for his private and family life unless such interference is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society of certain specified interests.
The ECHR in Schalk and Kopf observed:
27. Currently six out of forty-seven member States grant same-sex couples equal access to marriage, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
Significantly the Schalk and Kopf opinion explained in paragraph 46 that because “the Convention was a living instrument which had to be interpreted in present-day conditions, [the ECHR] had only used that approach to develop its jurisprudence where it had perceived a convergence of standards among member States.” The concurring opinion by Judge Malinverni (joined by J. Kovler) pointed out, moreover, “the Court cannot, by means of an evolutive interpretation, ‘derive from [the Convention] a right that was not included therein at the outset.’”
The Schalk and Kopf decision was recently confirmed by the ECHR in Affaire Gas et Dubois v. France, application 25951/07, 14 March 2012 [final June 15, 2012; http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/p... ]. In this case, the court held that, under the circumstances, the refusal of French public authority to allow a woman to adopt her same-sex partner’s child was not discriminatory. The court noted in paragraph 66 that Schalk and Kopf held that the Convention did not impose on governments the obligation to open marriage to a homosexual couple.
Currently, among the forty-seven members of the Council of Europe, there are now eight countries that authorize same-sex marriages (adding Denmark and Iceland). An additional fourteen have a form of civil union or registered partnership for same-sex couples. Twenty nine countries do not legally recognize same sex marriages; and of these eight have constitutional bans. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recognit... see http://hub.coe.int/ for list of member states of Council of Europe; accessed December 10, 2012).
Read more »
So what I would like now is call the readers’ attention an important matter bearing upon the future federal constitutional status of same-sex marriages, now sub judice in Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, and United States v. Windsor; No. 12-307.
The matter in question is suggested by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html...). In this case the Court held that a Texas statute making it a crime for two person of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause. The Court accordingly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 189 (1986). Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority (i.e., himself, and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), declared (bracketed matter added):
Of even more importance [referring to the famous Wolfenden Report of 1957, which lead to the repeal by the British Parliament of laws punishing homosexual conduct in 1967], almost five years before Bowers was decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today’s case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home had been searched, and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.. R. (1981) ¶ 52. Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.
Given the heavy reliance in Lawrence upon the decision of the ECHR concerning private, consensual homosexual conduct, Justice Kennedy and the other sitting justices would now be remiss were they not to take into account in Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor recent relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. That court has held that the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family, as guaranteed by Article 12 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, was not violated by Austrian law that denied the legal possibility of same-sex marriage. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Application no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010 (final 22 November 2010) [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4... ]. That court also ruled that the denial of same-sex marriage by Austrian law did not constitute unreasonable discrimination in violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with the requirement in Article 8, that there shall be no interference by public authority with the right of a person to respect for his private and family life unless such interference is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society of certain specified interests.
The ECHR in Schalk and Kopf observed:
27. Currently six out of forty-seven member States grant same-sex couples equal access to marriage, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
28. In addition there are thirteen member States, which do not grant same-sex couples access to marriage, but have passed some kind of legislation permitting same-sex couples to register their relationships: Andorra, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In sum, there are nineteen member States in which same sex couples either have the possibility to marry or to enter into a registered partnership (see also the overview in Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 26, ECHR 2008).
Significantly the Schalk and Kopf opinion explained in paragraph 46 that because “the Convention was a living instrument which had to be interpreted in present-day conditions, [the ECHR] had only used that approach to develop its jurisprudence where it had perceived a convergence of standards among member States.” The concurring opinion by Judge Malinverni (joined by J. Kovler) pointed out, moreover, “the Court cannot, by means of an evolutive interpretation, ‘derive from [the Convention] a right that was not included therein at the outset.’”
The Schalk and Kopf decision was recently confirmed by the ECHR in Affaire Gas et Dubois v. France, application 25951/07, 14 March 2012 [final June 15, 2012; http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/p... ]. In this case, the court held that, under the circumstances, the refusal of French public authority to allow a woman to adopt her same-sex partner’s child was not discriminatory. The court noted in paragraph 66 that Schalk and Kopf held that the Convention did not impose on governments the obligation to open marriage to a homosexual couple.
Currently, among the forty-seven members of the Council of Europe, there are now eight countries that authorize same-sex marriages (adding Denmark and Iceland). An additional fourteen have a form of civil union or registered partnership for same-sex couples. Twenty nine countries do not legally recognize same sex marriages; and of these eight have constitutional bans. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recognit... see http://hub.coe.int/ for list of member states of Council of Europe; accessed December 10, 2012).
Read more »
Recent Paper on Skeptical Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil
I just discovered this.
Justin P. McBrayer, "CORNEA and Inductive Evidence," Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 77-86
Abstract:
Justin P. McBrayer, "CORNEA and Inductive Evidence," Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 77-86
Abstract:
One of the primary tools in the theist’s defense against “noseeum” arguments from evil is an epistemic principle concerning the Conditions Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access (CORNEA) which places an important restriction on what counts as evidence. However, CORNEA is false because it places too strong a condition on what counts as inductive evidence. If CORNEA is true, we lack evidence for a great many of our inductive beliefs. This is because CORNEA amounts to a sensitivity constraint on evidence, and inductive evidence is often insensitive. So unless a theist is also an inductive skeptic, she must abandon CORNEA in responding to this sort of argument from evil.
New Book: God and Evil (includes transcript of second Craig-Tooley Debate)
I was able to preview this book at Google Books. In so doing, I discovered that the book contains a transcript of the second debate between William Lane Craig and Michael Tooley on God's existence. It also contains a chapter on evil and divine hiddenness.
Straw Manning the Opposition: a Christian Apologist on Two Common Atheist Arguments
Robin Shumacher at The Christian Post recently wrote an article entitled, "A Look at Two Common Atheist Arguments." I want to quote the first two paragraphs of the article in full.
While one may wonder why the Master's program didn't require that students read entire books and instead simply opted for "meaty book excerpts," let's put that to the side. At least the program required that students read something written by atheists!
Read more »
Behind my desk is a huge binder containing essays and meaty book
excerpts of atheist literature. The likes of Russell, Hume, Nietzsche,
Sartre, and many more scientists and philosophers make up this hefty
collection of anti-Christian thought.
Part of my Master’s
requirement was that I read the binder in its entirety and write
summaries of every argument so that each was thoroughly impressed upon
me. Needless to say, that took some time, but it was time well spent.
While one may wonder why the Master's program didn't require that students read entire books and instead simply opted for "meaty book excerpts," let's put that to the side. At least the program required that students read something written by atheists!
Read more »
Atheist Ethicist: Morality and God: Is This an Important Question?
Over at The Atheist Ethicist, Alonzo Fyfe asks, "Does it matter if morality is grounded in God or not?"
LINK
LINK
December 9, 2012
Atheist Persecution
"According to its survey of some 60 countries, the seven where expression of atheist views or defection from the official religion can bring capital punishment are Afghanistan, Iran, Maldives, Mauritania, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan."
LINK
LINK
Swinburne on the Perfect Goodness of God
In Chapter 11 of The Coherence of Theism (revised edition, hereafter: COT), Richard Swinburne argues (among other things) that the following sentence makes a coherent statement:
(PG) There is a person who is perfectly good.
Perfect goodness is one of the divine attributes that theists use to define the word 'God'. In order to show that the statement 'God exists' makes a coherent statement, Swinburne attempts to show that each of the divine attributes that are used to define the word 'God', and to clarify the meaning of the statement 'God exists', can be used to make coherent statements.
Swinburne takes himself to have shown (in previous chapters of COT) that the following sentence makes a coherent statement:
(BOP) There is a person who is both omniscient and perfectly free.
Swinburne's method of showing a sentence to express a coherent statement is to show that some other statement which is known to be coherent entails the statement in question. So, since Swinburne has previously argued that (BOP) makes a coherent statement, all he needs to do in Chapter 11 to show that (PG) makes a coherent statement, is to show that (BOP) entails (PG).
The following is an email exchange that I had recently with Richard Swinburne about a key argument in Chapter 11 of COT on this issue.
=======================
On 23/11/2012 21:19, Bradley Bowen
wrote:
Mr. Swinburne,
I have recently been studying Chapter
11 of your book The
Coherence of Theism (revised
edition), and have a question about your argument for the claim
that "it is logically necessary that an omniscient and perfectly
free being be perfectly good." (COT, p.188)
I have put your understanding of the
divine attribute of perfect goodness into a formal definition:
A person P is perfectly good if and only if (a) P is so
constituted that P always does the morally best action (when there is
one), and (b) P is so constituted that P does no morally bad action. (see COT, p.184)
I have also attempted to state your
argument (see COT, p.208) as follows:
(PFO1) An omniscient person O will know
of any action whether or not that action is morally good or morally bad, and
will know this because of O’s nature (i.e. O has the attribute of omniscience).
(PFO2) A perfectly free person F will
do those actions that F believes are morally good and avoid those actions that
F believes are morally bad, and will act this way because of F’s nature (i.e. F
has the attribute of perfect freedom).
(PFO3) It is logically possible for a
person to be both omniscient and perfectly free (at the same time).
Therefore:
(PFO4) Any person P who is both
omniscient and perfectly free (at the same time) will do those actions that are
morally good and avoid those actions that are morally bad, and will act this
way because of P’s nature (i.e. P has the attributes of omniscience and perfect
freedom).
There appears to be a disconnection
between the conclusion of this argument, which is in terms of doing actions
that are "morally good" and the definition of the divine attribute of
perfect goodness, which is in terms of doing the "morally best action
(when there is one)".
How do you bridge the apparent logical
gap between the idea of doing "morally good" actions and doing
"the morally best" action?
Bradley Bowen
Kirkland, Washington
USA
=============================
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012
10:48:21 +0000
From: richard.swinburne
To: bbowen
Subject: Re: The Perfect Goodness of God
Dear Bradley,
Thank you for
your email. What I wrote, and what you quote from me, is that a perfectly good
being ‘always does the morally best action’ (when there is one). I emphasize
the ‘when there is one’.
Sometimes among the actions open to such a being will be two equal best
actions, that is actions such that they are both better than any other action
open to that being and each is just as good as the other. That is a situation
with which we are often ourselves confronted. Some beings (including God, but
not including humans) may also have a choice among an infinite number of
actions, each of which is less good than some other action which he could do.
For example, God has a choice of how many solar systems to create; and on the
assumption that solar systems are good things, then the more of them the
better. So however many he creates, he could do better by creating more. In
that case, since it is not logically possible that such a being could do either
the best action or an equal best action, his perfect goodness would consist
simply in doing an action of the relevant kind (e.g. creating solar systems),
but it wouldn’t be the best or equal best action, but it would be a
good action. What you have labelled (PFO4) does follow from the premises which
you state; but I could have drawn the stronger and more complicated conclusion
that P will always do an action which is morally the best if there is one, or
an equal best action (when there
is no best) if there is one, or (if there is no best or equal best action) a good
action. With best wishes
Richard Swinburne
=======================================
On 27/11/2012 19:39, Bradley Bowen
wrote:
Mr. Swinburne,
Thank you for your
response to my question about the argument for your claim that "it is
logically necessary that an omniscient and perfectly free being be perfectly good."
(COT, p.188)
Your key point:
"What you have
labelled (PFO4) does follow from the premises which you state; but I could have
drawn the stronger and more complicated conclusion that P will always do an
action which is morally the best if there is one, or an equal best action (when
there is no best) if there is one, or (if there is no best or equal best
action) a good action."
To draw this stronger
conclusion, it seems to me that stronger premises would be
required, but I believe that you accept the stronger premises.
Here is one way to
strengthen the premise about the relationship of omniscience to perfect
goodness:
(PFO1') An omniscient
person O will know of any action whether or not that action is morally good or
morally bad,
and if an
action is morally good will know whether it is the morally best action among
available alternative morally good actions ,
and will know this
becauseof O’s nature (i.e. Ohas the attribute of omniscience).
A similar adjustment
could be made to the premise about the relationship between perfect freedom
and perfect goodness:
(PFO2') A
perfectly free person F will do those actions that F believes are morally good
and avoid those actions that F believes are morally bad, and F will do the action that F
believes is the morally best action among available alternative morally good
actions (when there is such an action), and will act this way because of F’s nature
(i.e. F has the attribute of perfect freedom).
Do you agree that the premises need to be strengthened in order to draw the
stronger conclusion?
Bradley Bowen
Kirkland, Washington
USA
=======================================
Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2012 12:34:29
+0000
From: richard.swinburne
To: bbowen
Subject: Re: The Perfect Goodness of God
Dear Bradley,
Unless I have missed something, your
(PFO1') is the same as your
(PFO1), and your (PFO2') is the
same as your (PFO2), and so they don’t constitute any strengthening of the
argument. You are however right that in order to get the ‘stronger and more
complicated conclusion’ which I described in my previous email, I do need a
stronger premise. The requisite premise is: a perfectly good being will – in so
far as it can – do what it believes is the best action, or (if it believes that
there is no best action but an equal best) do what it believes to be the equal
best action, or (if it believes that there is no best, and no equal best) will
do what it believes to be a good action. Given that premise and the premise about omniscience in the form that an omniscient being will have true beliefs about
which actions are best or equal best or good, and a premise that an omnipotent being will be able to do such actions, the
conclusion follows. With best wishes
Richard Swinburne
================================
From:Bradley Bowen [image error]
Sent:Sat 12/08/12 7:46 PM
To:Richard Swinburne
Mr. Swinburne,
Thank
you for your suggested revision of my reformulation of an argument from p.208
of The Coherence of Theism (revised
ed.):
You are however
right that in order to get the ‘stronger and more complicated conclusion’ which
I described in my previous email, I do need a stronger premise. The requisite
premise is: a perfectly good being will – in so far as it can – do what it
believes is the best action, or (if it believes that there is no best action
but an equal best) do what it believes to be the equal best action, or (if it
believes that there is no best, and no equal best) will do what it believes to
be a good action.
Here is
how I would reformulate the argument, based on your suggested enhancement:
(PFO1*) An omniscient person O will know
of any action whether or not that action is a morally best action for
O or an equal best action for O, or just a good action (that is
neither a best nor an equal best action) for O, or a morally bad action
for O, and will know this because of O’s nature (i.e. because O has the
attribute of omniscience).
(PFO2*) A perfectly free person F will
do an action - in so far as it can - when F believes the action
is a morally best action for F or (if it believes that there is no best
action but an equal best) do what it believes to be an equal best
action for F, or (if it believes that there is no best, and no equal best) will
do what it believes to be a good action for F, and will not do any action it
believes to be a morally bad action for F, and will do these actions (and
refrain from morally bad actions) because of F's nature (i.e. becuase F has the attribute of
perfect freedom).
(PFO3*) It is logically possible for a
person to be both omniscient and perfectly free (at the same time).
Therefore:
(PFO4*) Any person P who is both
omniscient and perfectly free (at the same time) will do an action that is
a morally
best action for P or (if there is no best action but an
equal best) do an equal best action for P, or (if there is no best, and no
equal best) will do a good action for P, and will not do any action that
is a morally bad action for P, and will do these actions (and refrain from
morally bad actions) because of P's nature (i.e. becuase P has both the attribute
of omniscience and the attribute of perfect freedom).
I
believe the qualification "in so far as it can" in (PFO2*) falls out
because an omniscient being who judges and action to be a morally best action
for itself to perform is also judging that action to be one that is possible
for itself to perform, since ought implies can, and similar reasoning applies
to other moral categories (equal best, morally good, morally bad).
Do you
think this is a reasonable and enhanced reformulation of the argument on
p. 208 of The Coherence of Theism?
Bradley Bowen
Kirkland, Washington
USA
==================================
(PG) There is a person who is perfectly good.
Perfect goodness is one of the divine attributes that theists use to define the word 'God'. In order to show that the statement 'God exists' makes a coherent statement, Swinburne attempts to show that each of the divine attributes that are used to define the word 'God', and to clarify the meaning of the statement 'God exists', can be used to make coherent statements.
Swinburne takes himself to have shown (in previous chapters of COT) that the following sentence makes a coherent statement:
(BOP) There is a person who is both omniscient and perfectly free.
Swinburne's method of showing a sentence to express a coherent statement is to show that some other statement which is known to be coherent entails the statement in question. So, since Swinburne has previously argued that (BOP) makes a coherent statement, all he needs to do in Chapter 11 to show that (PG) makes a coherent statement, is to show that (BOP) entails (PG).
The following is an email exchange that I had recently with Richard Swinburne about a key argument in Chapter 11 of COT on this issue.
=======================
On 23/11/2012 21:19, Bradley Bowen
wrote:
Mr. Swinburne,
I have recently been studying Chapter
11 of your book The
Coherence of Theism (revised
edition), and have a question about your argument for the claim
that "it is logically necessary that an omniscient and perfectly
free being be perfectly good." (COT, p.188)
I have put your understanding of the
divine attribute of perfect goodness into a formal definition:
A person P is perfectly good if and only if (a) P is so
constituted that P always does the morally best action (when there is
one), and (b) P is so constituted that P does no morally bad action. (see COT, p.184)
I have also attempted to state your
argument (see COT, p.208) as follows:
(PFO1) An omniscient person O will know
of any action whether or not that action is morally good or morally bad, and
will know this because of O’s nature (i.e. O has the attribute of omniscience).
(PFO2) A perfectly free person F will
do those actions that F believes are morally good and avoid those actions that
F believes are morally bad, and will act this way because of F’s nature (i.e. F
has the attribute of perfect freedom).
(PFO3) It is logically possible for a
person to be both omniscient and perfectly free (at the same time).
Therefore:
(PFO4) Any person P who is both
omniscient and perfectly free (at the same time) will do those actions that are
morally good and avoid those actions that are morally bad, and will act this
way because of P’s nature (i.e. P has the attributes of omniscience and perfect
freedom).
There appears to be a disconnection
between the conclusion of this argument, which is in terms of doing actions
that are "morally good" and the definition of the divine attribute of
perfect goodness, which is in terms of doing the "morally best action
(when there is one)".
How do you bridge the apparent logical
gap between the idea of doing "morally good" actions and doing
"the morally best" action?
Bradley Bowen
Kirkland, Washington
USA
=============================
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012
10:48:21 +0000
From: richard.swinburne
To: bbowen
Subject: Re: The Perfect Goodness of God
Dear Bradley,
Thank you for
your email. What I wrote, and what you quote from me, is that a perfectly good
being ‘always does the morally best action’ (when there is one). I emphasize
the ‘when there is one’.
Sometimes among the actions open to such a being will be two equal best
actions, that is actions such that they are both better than any other action
open to that being and each is just as good as the other. That is a situation
with which we are often ourselves confronted. Some beings (including God, but
not including humans) may also have a choice among an infinite number of
actions, each of which is less good than some other action which he could do.
For example, God has a choice of how many solar systems to create; and on the
assumption that solar systems are good things, then the more of them the
better. So however many he creates, he could do better by creating more. In
that case, since it is not logically possible that such a being could do either
the best action or an equal best action, his perfect goodness would consist
simply in doing an action of the relevant kind (e.g. creating solar systems),
but it wouldn’t be the best or equal best action, but it would be a
good action. What you have labelled (PFO4) does follow from the premises which
you state; but I could have drawn the stronger and more complicated conclusion
that P will always do an action which is morally the best if there is one, or
an equal best action (when there
is no best) if there is one, or (if there is no best or equal best action) a good
action. With best wishes
Richard Swinburne
=======================================
On 27/11/2012 19:39, Bradley Bowen
wrote:
Mr. Swinburne,
Thank you for your
response to my question about the argument for your claim that "it is
logically necessary that an omniscient and perfectly free being be perfectly good."
(COT, p.188)
Your key point:
"What you have
labelled (PFO4) does follow from the premises which you state; but I could have
drawn the stronger and more complicated conclusion that P will always do an
action which is morally the best if there is one, or an equal best action (when
there is no best) if there is one, or (if there is no best or equal best
action) a good action."
To draw this stronger
conclusion, it seems to me that stronger premises would be
required, but I believe that you accept the stronger premises.
Here is one way to
strengthen the premise about the relationship of omniscience to perfect
goodness:
(PFO1') An omniscient
person O will know of any action whether or not that action is morally good or
morally bad,
and if an
action is morally good will know whether it is the morally best action among
available alternative morally good actions ,
and will know this
becauseof O’s nature (i.e. Ohas the attribute of omniscience).
A similar adjustment
could be made to the premise about the relationship between perfect freedom
and perfect goodness:
(PFO2') A
perfectly free person F will do those actions that F believes are morally good
and avoid those actions that F believes are morally bad, and F will do the action that F
believes is the morally best action among available alternative morally good
actions (when there is such an action), and will act this way because of F’s nature
(i.e. F has the attribute of perfect freedom).
Do you agree that the premises need to be strengthened in order to draw the
stronger conclusion?
Bradley Bowen
Kirkland, Washington
USA
=======================================
Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2012 12:34:29
+0000
From: richard.swinburne
To: bbowen
Subject: Re: The Perfect Goodness of God
Dear Bradley,
Unless I have missed something, your
(PFO1') is the same as your
(PFO1), and your (PFO2') is the
same as your (PFO2), and so they don’t constitute any strengthening of the
argument. You are however right that in order to get the ‘stronger and more
complicated conclusion’ which I described in my previous email, I do need a
stronger premise. The requisite premise is: a perfectly good being will – in so
far as it can – do what it believes is the best action, or (if it believes that
there is no best action but an equal best) do what it believes to be the equal
best action, or (if it believes that there is no best, and no equal best) will
do what it believes to be a good action. Given that premise and the premise about omniscience in the form that an omniscient being will have true beliefs about
which actions are best or equal best or good, and a premise that an omnipotent being will be able to do such actions, the
conclusion follows. With best wishes
Richard Swinburne
================================
From:Bradley Bowen [image error]
Sent:Sat 12/08/12 7:46 PM
To:Richard Swinburne
Mr. Swinburne,
Thank
you for your suggested revision of my reformulation of an argument from p.208
of The Coherence of Theism (revised
ed.):
You are however
right that in order to get the ‘stronger and more complicated conclusion’ which
I described in my previous email, I do need a stronger premise. The requisite
premise is: a perfectly good being will – in so far as it can – do what it
believes is the best action, or (if it believes that there is no best action
but an equal best) do what it believes to be the equal best action, or (if it
believes that there is no best, and no equal best) will do what it believes to
be a good action.
Here is
how I would reformulate the argument, based on your suggested enhancement:
(PFO1*) An omniscient person O will know
of any action whether or not that action is a morally best action for
O or an equal best action for O, or just a good action (that is
neither a best nor an equal best action) for O, or a morally bad action
for O, and will know this because of O’s nature (i.e. because O has the
attribute of omniscience).
(PFO2*) A perfectly free person F will
do an action - in so far as it can - when F believes the action
is a morally best action for F or (if it believes that there is no best
action but an equal best) do what it believes to be an equal best
action for F, or (if it believes that there is no best, and no equal best) will
do what it believes to be a good action for F, and will not do any action it
believes to be a morally bad action for F, and will do these actions (and
refrain from morally bad actions) because of F's nature (i.e. becuase F has the attribute of
perfect freedom).
(PFO3*) It is logically possible for a
person to be both omniscient and perfectly free (at the same time).
Therefore:
(PFO4*) Any person P who is both
omniscient and perfectly free (at the same time) will do an action that is
a morally
best action for P or (if there is no best action but an
equal best) do an equal best action for P, or (if there is no best, and no
equal best) will do a good action for P, and will not do any action that
is a morally bad action for P, and will do these actions (and refrain from
morally bad actions) because of P's nature (i.e. becuase P has both the attribute
of omniscience and the attribute of perfect freedom).
I
believe the qualification "in so far as it can" in (PFO2*) falls out
because an omniscient being who judges and action to be a morally best action
for itself to perform is also judging that action to be one that is possible
for itself to perform, since ought implies can, and similar reasoning applies
to other moral categories (equal best, morally good, morally bad).
Do you
think this is a reasonable and enhanced reformulation of the argument on
p. 208 of The Coherence of Theism?
Bradley Bowen
Kirkland, Washington
USA
==================================
December 7, 2012
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