Keith Parsons's Blog, page 5

Ex-Apologist on Craig’s “Holy Spirit Epistemology”

This isn’t brand new; I just saw it mentioned on EA’s post listing his favorite posts of 2012 and I don’t remember seeing this before. EA criticizes Michael Martin’s objections to Craig’s Holy Spirit epistemology and then offers his own objection.

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Published on January 01, 2013 16:58

Empty Defense of an Empty Tomb: A Reply to Anne A. Kim's Misunderstandings

I finished this essay many years ago, but due to my hiatus never got around to publishing it until now. It will be announced on the Secular Web’s “What’s New?” page very soon. It can be accessed immediately by using the link below, however.

Abstract: William Lane Craig has argued for the historicity of Jesus' empty tomb on the basis of ten lines of evidence. In response, Jeffery Jay Lowder argued that Craig had not yet shown that any of his ten items of evidence make the empty tomb more probable than not. Anne A. Kim has attempted to defend some of Craig's arguments against Lowder's objections, but as Lowder shows in this response to Kim, Kim has repeatedly misunderstood his points and attacked caricatures of his arguments rather than his actual arguments.

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Published on December 29, 2012 22:41

Connecting via Social Media

Here are two ways you may connect with me “socially” if you’re so inclined.

Atheist Nexus

Here

I have very little on that site at this time, but if you’d like to “connect” in a more social fashion feel free to drop by and send a request.

Google Plus

Here

Facebook

I have a Facebook account, but I am not a fan of Facebook, so I’m not interested in building out my connections there.

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Published on December 29, 2012 11:56

The Loftus-Torley Exchange

It seems to me that Torley clearly has the upper hand in this exchange so far. As a debate judge, I would “flow” the entire “debate” to Torley up to this point. But that doesn’t mean game over for Loftus, however. In each case, I think Loftus has strong replies available.

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

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<span style="color: black;">Here's my central criticism of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). It's novel and was published in <i>Analysis</i> last year.</span></div>
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</div><a href="http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/20... more »</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe... src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe..." border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe... src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe..." border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe... src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe..." border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe... src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe..." border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe... src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/TheSe..." border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/TheSec..." height="1" width="1"/>

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Published on December 27, 2012 11:12

Erik Wielenberg: An Inconsistency in Craig’s Defence of the Moral Argument

Abstract. I argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence
of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine command theory (DCT). Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections but Craig fails to provide an adequate account of why these connections hold. Thus, Craig’s critique of non-theistic moral realism is at odds with his DCT. Since the critique and DCT are both essential elements of his defence of the moral argument, that defence is internally inconsistent.

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Published on December 25, 2012 00:22

Further Comments on http://subversivethinking.blogspot.co...

Further Comments on http://subversivethinking.blogspot.co...

I shall restrict myself to one small comment on what is a very long post that covers a great deal of ground very quickly.

In my previous post, I wrote this: "Question: Is there a
first cause in causal reality? If so, then, causal reality begins
with that first cause. Moreover, it might seem right to say that
causal reality begins to exist with that first cause. (Of course,
"begins" here is not temporal; it is simply causal.)

This elicited the following commentary: "I
think Oppy's question is pretty confused. He asks whether a first cause
exists "in" the causal reality, when actually the question is whether
there is a first cause OF the causal reality. Only in latter case, it
follows that "If so, then, causal reality begins with that first cause"."

I am thinking of causal reality as the collection of all causal relata. If causal relata are all events, then causal reality is the collection of all causal events (together with the causal relations that hold between them). If causal relata are all states, then causal reality is the collection of all causal states (together with the causal relations that hold between them). If causal relata are diverse -- including, say, events, states, objects, agents, and so forth -- then causal reality is the collection of all of these events, states, objects, agents, and so forth (together with the causal relations that hold between them).

Let us introduce the neutral term ' (causal) thing' to cover all of the events, states, objects, agents, or whatever that belong to causal reality. The causal relation -- the relation of cause and effect -- at least partially orders these (causal) things: for any two things, either one is causally prior to the second, or casually posterior to the second, or causally unrelated to the second. For the sake of argument, let's suppose that the causal relation is a total order, so that there are no two (causal) things that are causally unrelated. (Note that this is a controversial assumption. I make it here because it is irrelevant for the main point at issue, not because I think that there is no further discussion to be had about it.)

Given that causal reality is totally ordered, there are two possibilities: either there is an infinite regress under the causal relation, or there is a first cause. So there is a genuine question about whether there is a first cause (so long as there is a genuine question about whether there is an infinite regress under the causal relation.) However, IF there is a first cause, then -- a fortiori -- it belongs to causal reality (it belongs to the collection of causal things).

In short: there is no confusion in my question, or in the comments that come after. Causal reality is a collection of (causal) things. If there is a first cause, then it is the first element IN causal reality. You might think -- as theists do -- that God is the first cause IN causal reality. However you CANNOT sensibly suppose that God is the cause OF causal reality: it is obvious from the accepted definitions of terms that causal reality CANNOT have a cause.

It is worth noting that, if, for example, you think that only events can be causal relata, then the first cause will be something like God's making natural reality. In this case, God somehow "participates" in the first cause, but is not identical to it. (God is not an event, so -- if only events can be causal relata -- then God cannot be the first cause.) Of course, I have taken no stance in the above discussion on what the terms of the causal relation actually are.

I guess it goes without saying that the "charitable reinterpretation" of the rest of my remarks turns out to be nothing of the sort ...

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Published on December 22, 2012 22:06

Does Belief Require Understanding?

Imagine going to the library at a university with a nuclear physics program and picking up a copy of a peer-reviewed journal in nuclear physics. I'm assuming that you, the reader, are like the 99.99999% of the population by having no ability whatsoever to understand anything in that journal. Unintimidated by the subject matter, you browse the table of contents and randomly pick an article. You try to read it, but discover that there are literally no nouns or verbs in the article you understand. Other than words like "if," "then," "and," or," and "but," you have literally no idea what any of the other words mean. Now suppose you have it on good authority that the article does, in fact, make at least one empirical claim, albeit one that requires a Ph.D. in nuclear physics to understand. Call that claim 'C.'

If you have no ability whatsoever to understand anything in the article, is it possible for you to believe C?

What does this have to do with the philosophy of religion? Well, if belief requires understanding, then it seems to me that this has potentially interesting consequences. For example, consider the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. On the assumption the doctrine is coherent, it seems to me that many people, including many Christian theologians and philosophers, agree that the doctrine of the Trinity is hard to understand. And that makes me wonder. Out of all the people who claim to believe the doctrine of the Trinity, how many even understand it?

I am not sure what, if anything, is the ultimate significance of this point. But I don't think I've run across this point in the philosophy of religion literature. (If I'm mistaken, I'd welcome any points to writers who have discussed it.)

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Published on December 22, 2012 18:27

Herman Phillipse on God, Ethics, and Evolution

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Published on December 21, 2012 21:20

Oxford Handbook of Atheism contents

Here's the contents list of a book coming out in about a year, with some chapters appearing online earlier. It should be interesting...

The Oxford Handbook of Atheism

[FINAL CONTENTS LIST]

Editors: Stephen Bullivant (St Mary’s University College)

and Michael Ruse (Florida State University)

Introduction:
The Study of Atheism – Stephen Bullivant (St Mary’s) and Michael Ruse
(Florida State)

Part 1: Definitions and Debates

1.
Defining ‘Atheism’ – Stephen Bullivant (St Mary’s)

2.
The Case against Atheism – T. J. Mawson (Oxford)

3.
Critiques of Theistic Arguments – A. C. Grayling (Birkbeck)

4. Arguments
for Atheism –
Graham Oppy (Monash)

5.
Problems of Evil – Michael L. Peterson (Asbury)

6.
Atheism and Morality – Erik J. Wielenberg (DePauw)

7.
Atheism and the Meaningfulness of Life – Kimberly A.
Blessing (Buffalo State)

8.
Aquinas and Atheism – Brian Davies (Fordham)

Part 2: History of (Western) Atheism

9.
The Pre-Socratics to the Hellenistic Age – David Sedley
(Cambridge)

10.
The Roman Empire to the End of the First Millennium – Mark Edwards
(Oxford)

11. The
Medieval Period – Dorothea Weltecke (Konstanz)

12.
Renaissance and Reformation – Denis Robichaud (Notre Dame)

13.
The Age of Enlightenment – Alan C. Kors (Pennsylvania)

14.
The Nineteenth Century – David Nash (Oxford Brookes)

15.
The Twentieth Century – Callum Brown (Dundee)

16.
New Atheism –
Thomas Zenk (Berlin Free)

Part 3: Worldviews and Systems

17.
Humanism –
Stephen Law (Heythrop)

18.
Existentialism – Alison Stone (Lancaster)

19.
Marxism –
Peter Thompson (Sheffield)

20.
Analytic Philosophy – Charles Pigden (Otago)

21. Jewish
Atheism –
Jacques Berlinerblau (Georgetown)

22.
Buddhism –
Andrew Skilton (SOAS)

23.
Jainism –
Anne Vallely (Ottawa)

24.
Hinduism –
Jessica Frazier (Kent)

Part 4: Atheism and the Natural Sciences

25.
Naturalism and the Scientific Method – Michael Ruse
(Florida State)

26.
Atheism and the Rise of Science – Taner Edis (Truman)

27.
Atheism and Darwinism) – David P. Barash (Washington)

28.
Atheism and the Physical Sciences – Victor J. Stenger (Colorado)

Part 5: Atheism and the Social Sciences

29. Atheism
and the Secularization Thesis – Frank L. Pasquale and Barry A. Kosmin (ISSSC)

30.
Psychology of Atheism –Miguel Farias (Oxford)

31.
Atheism and Cognitive Science – Jonathan Lanman (Oxford)

32.
Atheism and Societal Health – Phil Zuckerman (Pitzer)

33.
Atheism, Gender, and Sexuality – Melanie A. Brewster (Columbia)

34. Atheism,
Health and Well-being – Karen Hwang (Center for Atheist Research)

35.
Conversion and Deconversion – Ralph W. Hood and Zhuo Chen (Tennessee)

Part 6: Global Expressions

36.
A World of Atheism: Global Demographics – Ariela Keysar
(Trinity) and Juhem Navarra-Rivera (Connecticut)

37.
Western Europe – Lois Lee (Cambridge)

38.
North America – Ryan T. Cragun (Tampa), Joseph H. Hammer (Iowa
State), Jesse M. Smith (Colorado)

39. Central and
Eastern Europe – Irena Borowik (Jagiellonian), Branko Ančić (Institute for Social
Research), Radosław Tyrała (AGH)

40.
Islamic World – Samuli
Schielke (ZMO, Berlin)

41.
India –
Johannes Quack (Heidelberg)

42. Japan – Sarah Whylly
(Florida State)

Part 7: Atheism and the Arts

43.
Literature –
Bernard Schweizer (Long Island)

44.Visual
Arts – J. Sage Elwell (TCU)

45.Music
– Paul Bertagnolli (Houston)

46.Film – Nina Power
(Roehampton)