Keith Parsons's Blog, page 8
December 7, 2012
Must Read: One of the Main Reasons Ex-Apologist Thinks Christianity is False
This was posted in 2007, but I just saw it for the first time today. EA defends an inference to the best explanation that Jesus was a failed eschatological prophet. The combox includes an exchange with "Tim," who I think is Tim McGrew.
LINK
(HT: Wes)
LINK
(HT: Wes)
December 6, 2012
Brooke Alan Trisel: Intended and Unintended Life
Abstract:
Some people
feel threatened by the thought that life might have arisen by chance.
What is it about “chance” that some people find so threatening? If life
originated by chance, this suggests that life was unintended and that it
was not inevitable. It is ironic that people care about whether life in
general was intended, but may not have ever wondered whether their own
existence was intended by their parents. If it does not matter to us
whether one's own existence was intended by one's parents, as will be
hypothesized, then why should it matter whether there was some remote
intent behind the creation of the first unicellular organism(s) billions
of years ago? I will discuss three possible scenarios by which life
might have originated. I will then argue that, in regard to whether
one’s individual life can be meaningful, it does not matter whether life
was intended or arose by chance. If complex life was unintended and is
rare in this universe, this is not a reason to disparage life, but a
reason to appreciate and value our existence.
LINK
Some people
feel threatened by the thought that life might have arisen by chance.
What is it about “chance” that some people find so threatening? If life
originated by chance, this suggests that life was unintended and that it
was not inevitable. It is ironic that people care about whether life in
general was intended, but may not have ever wondered whether their own
existence was intended by their parents. If it does not matter to us
whether one's own existence was intended by one's parents, as will be
hypothesized, then why should it matter whether there was some remote
intent behind the creation of the first unicellular organism(s) billions
of years ago? I will discuss three possible scenarios by which life
might have originated. I will then argue that, in regard to whether
one’s individual life can be meaningful, it does not matter whether life
was intended or arose by chance. If complex life was unintended and is
rare in this universe, this is not a reason to disparage life, but a
reason to appreciate and value our existence.
LINK
Is Theism Explanatorily Bankrupt?
A very brief email exchange between a Christian and Gregory Dawes (author of Theism and Explanation).
LINK
LINK
William Lane Craig on the Prior Probability of the Resurrection
Prior to examining the specific evidence for and against Jesus' resurrection, how probable is it that God raised Jesus from the dead? According to many Christian apologists, the answer is "not low" -- at least, the answer is "not low" for theists. Are they right?
Read more »
Read more »
CNN: Washington to start issuing same-sex marriage licenses
Washington State's new law allowing same-sex marriages has gone into effect!
I'm proud of my state tonight.
LINK
I'm proud of my state tonight.
LINK
December 5, 2012
An Explanatory Argument from Moral Ontology against Metaphysical Naturalism (v2.0)
(The following is a revised version of my "Arguing from Moral Ontology by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives.")
1. Definitions
Moral ontology is the branch of meta-ethics
concerned with the ontology or metaphysics of moral facts and properties. Within the field of moral ontology, it is a
commonplace that the nature of moral facts and properties fall into one of
three categories: natural, nonnatural, or supernatural.
In order to define
these three categories, allow me to first define some other terms. A physical entity is an entity which is either
(1) the kind of entity studied by physicists or chemists today (e.g., atoms,
molecules, gravitational fields, electromagnetic fields, etc.); or (2) the kind
of entity studied by physicists or chemists in the future, which has some sort
of nomological or historical connection to the kinds of entities studied by
physicists or chemists today.[1]
A natural entity is an entity which is either a
physical entity or an entity that is ontologically or causally reducible to a
physical entity. A natural entity is causally
reducible to a physical entity just in case the natural entity's causal
powers are entirely explainable in terms of the causal powers of the physical
entity. A natural entity is ontologically reducible to a physical entity
just in case the natural entity is nothing but a collection of natural entities
organized in a certain way. [1] Nature is the spatio-temporal universe of
natural entities.[1]
A supernatural person is a person that is not
part of nature but can affect nature. Examples
of supernatural persons include God, angels, Satan, demons, ghosts, etc.[1]
Like a supernatural
person, a non-natural entity is not part
of nature. Unlike a supernatural person, however, a non-natural entity is
unable to affect nature. Abstract objects and Platonic Forms are examples of
impersonal non-natural entities.
Corresponding to these three kinds of entities (natural, supernatural, and non-natural) are three views about moral ontology. Ethical naturalism is the view that moral properties are ultimately reducible to natural properties. For example, moral goodness is ultimately reducible to human flourishing. Ethical supernaturalism is the view that moral properties are ultimately reducible to supernatural properties. For example, moral obligations are ultimately reducible to God's commands. Ethical nonnaturalism is the view that moral properties are irreducible, that is, that moral properties cannot be reduced to any non-moral properties. For example, moral values like goodness and badness exist as Platonic Forms or abstract objects.
Unfortunately, many
writers assume that moral objectivism entails ethical nonnaturalism.
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord observes, “Objectivism in ethics has suffered from
the mistaken assumption that objectivists must hold that moral properties are
nonnatural …”[2]. The metaphysical nature of moral properties can only be
determined by a thesis about moral semantics,
not by the “metaphysically neutral” theory of moral objectivism.[3] Mere
(moral) objectivism neither logically entails nor makes probable the view that
moral properties are nonnatural properties. As John Post writes, moral
objectivism does not require “some shadowy Platonic realm ‘out there,’ perhaps
beyond space and time.” Rather, moral
objectivism is simply the view that there is an objective “truth of the
matter as regards the correctness or incorrectness of our value judgments.”[4]
2. The Argument from First-Order Ethical Beliefs for Objective Moral Properties
(1) Ordinary ethical sentences and commonsense first-level
moral beliefs imply objective moral properties.
(2) There are no empirical or a priori reasons to believe
that first-level moral beliefs are all false.
(3) It is more reasonable to believe there are objective moral properties than not
to believe this.
(4) There is no reason to believe that the conjunction of
(1) and (2) is a defective reason to believe objective moral properties.
(5) Therefore, the belief in objective moral properties is indefeasibly
justified.
(6) Therefore, there are objective moral properties.
(See here for more about this argument.)
3. The Evidential Argument from Unknown Identity against Ethical Naturalism
Let E be the failure of ethical naturalists to locate the exact identity of natural moral properties.
(7) E is known to be true.
(8) E is more probable on the assumption that ethical naturalism is false than on the assumption that ethical naturalism is true.
(9) The prior probability of ethical naturalism is not significantly higher than its denial.
(10) Therefore, other evidence held equal, ethical naturalism is probably false.
4. The Unintelligibility Argument against Ethical Non-Naturalism
The following argument was inspired by William Lane Craig. Craig writes:
This suggests the following argument. (Not that Craig would agree with it in its present form.)
(11) If ethical non-naturalism is true, then moral properties are a brute fact.
(12) The hypothesis that moral properties just exist as a brute fact is unintelligible, i.e., it doesn't make any sense.
(13) If a hypothesis is unintelligible, it is probably false.
(14) Therefore, ethical non-naturalism is probably false.
5. The Moral Ontological Argument against Metaphysical Naturalism
(6) There are objective moral properties.
(15) If there are any objective moral properties, they must be natural, nonnatural, or supernatural properties.
(16) Objective moral properties are not natural properties. [from (10)]
(17) Objective moral properties are not nonnatural properties. [from (14)]
(18) Therefore, objective moral properties must be supernatural properties. [from (6), (15), (16), and (17)]
(19) If there are supernatural properties, there exists at least one supernatural being. [by definition]
(20) Metaphysical naturalism entails the nonexistence of supernatural beings.[by definition]
(21) Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is false. [from (18)-(20)]
1. Definitions
Moral ontology is the branch of meta-ethics
concerned with the ontology or metaphysics of moral facts and properties. Within the field of moral ontology, it is a
commonplace that the nature of moral facts and properties fall into one of
three categories: natural, nonnatural, or supernatural.
In order to define
these three categories, allow me to first define some other terms. A physical entity is an entity which is either
(1) the kind of entity studied by physicists or chemists today (e.g., atoms,
molecules, gravitational fields, electromagnetic fields, etc.); or (2) the kind
of entity studied by physicists or chemists in the future, which has some sort
of nomological or historical connection to the kinds of entities studied by
physicists or chemists today.[1]
A natural entity is an entity which is either a
physical entity or an entity that is ontologically or causally reducible to a
physical entity. A natural entity is causally
reducible to a physical entity just in case the natural entity's causal
powers are entirely explainable in terms of the causal powers of the physical
entity. A natural entity is ontologically reducible to a physical entity
just in case the natural entity is nothing but a collection of natural entities
organized in a certain way. [1] Nature is the spatio-temporal universe of
natural entities.[1]
A supernatural person is a person that is not
part of nature but can affect nature. Examples
of supernatural persons include God, angels, Satan, demons, ghosts, etc.[1]
Like a supernatural
person, a non-natural entity is not part
of nature. Unlike a supernatural person, however, a non-natural entity is
unable to affect nature. Abstract objects and Platonic Forms are examples of
impersonal non-natural entities.
Corresponding to these three kinds of entities (natural, supernatural, and non-natural) are three views about moral ontology. Ethical naturalism is the view that moral properties are ultimately reducible to natural properties. For example, moral goodness is ultimately reducible to human flourishing. Ethical supernaturalism is the view that moral properties are ultimately reducible to supernatural properties. For example, moral obligations are ultimately reducible to God's commands. Ethical nonnaturalism is the view that moral properties are irreducible, that is, that moral properties cannot be reduced to any non-moral properties. For example, moral values like goodness and badness exist as Platonic Forms or abstract objects.
Unfortunately, many
writers assume that moral objectivism entails ethical nonnaturalism.
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord observes, “Objectivism in ethics has suffered from
the mistaken assumption that objectivists must hold that moral properties are
nonnatural …”[2]. The metaphysical nature of moral properties can only be
determined by a thesis about moral semantics,
not by the “metaphysically neutral” theory of moral objectivism.[3] Mere
(moral) objectivism neither logically entails nor makes probable the view that
moral properties are nonnatural properties. As John Post writes, moral
objectivism does not require “some shadowy Platonic realm ‘out there,’ perhaps
beyond space and time.” Rather, moral
objectivism is simply the view that there is an objective “truth of the
matter as regards the correctness or incorrectness of our value judgments.”[4]
2. The Argument from First-Order Ethical Beliefs for Objective Moral Properties
(1) Ordinary ethical sentences and commonsense first-level
moral beliefs imply objective moral properties.
(2) There are no empirical or a priori reasons to believe
that first-level moral beliefs are all false.
(3) It is more reasonable to believe there are objective moral properties than not
to believe this.
(4) There is no reason to believe that the conjunction of
(1) and (2) is a defective reason to believe objective moral properties.
(5) Therefore, the belief in objective moral properties is indefeasibly
justified.
(6) Therefore, there are objective moral properties.
(See here for more about this argument.)
3. The Evidential Argument from Unknown Identity against Ethical Naturalism
Let E be the failure of ethical naturalists to locate the exact identity of natural moral properties.
(7) E is known to be true.
(8) E is more probable on the assumption that ethical naturalism is false than on the assumption that ethical naturalism is true.
(9) The prior probability of ethical naturalism is not significantly higher than its denial.
(10) Therefore, other evidence held equal, ethical naturalism is probably false.
4. The Unintelligibility Argument against Ethical Non-Naturalism
The following argument was inspired by William Lane Craig. Craig writes:
First, it's difficult even to comprehend this view. What does it mean to say, for example, that the moral value Justice
just exists? It's hard to know what to make of this. It is clear what
is meant when it is said that a person is just; but it is bewildering
when it is said that in the absence of any people, Justice
itself exists. Moral values seem to exist as properties of persons, not
as mere abstractions—or at any rate, it is hard to know what it is for a
moral value to exist as a mere abstraction. Curiously, since the
abstract object Justice is not itself just (just as Quickness is not quick or Laziness
lazy), it would seem to follow that in the absence of any people
justice does not exist—which seems to contradict the hypothesis!
Atheistic moral Platonists seem to lack any adequate foundation in
reality for moral values but just leave them floating in an
unintelligible way.
This suggests the following argument. (Not that Craig would agree with it in its present form.)
(11) If ethical non-naturalism is true, then moral properties are a brute fact.
(12) The hypothesis that moral properties just exist as a brute fact is unintelligible, i.e., it doesn't make any sense.
(13) If a hypothesis is unintelligible, it is probably false.
(14) Therefore, ethical non-naturalism is probably false.
5. The Moral Ontological Argument against Metaphysical Naturalism
(6) There are objective moral properties.
(15) If there are any objective moral properties, they must be natural, nonnatural, or supernatural properties.
(16) Objective moral properties are not natural properties. [from (10)]
(17) Objective moral properties are not nonnatural properties. [from (14)]
(18) Therefore, objective moral properties must be supernatural properties. [from (6), (15), (16), and (17)]
(19) If there are supernatural properties, there exists at least one supernatural being. [by definition]
(20) Metaphysical naturalism entails the nonexistence of supernatural beings.[by definition]
(21) Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is false. [from (18)-(20)]
Query
Say, just as a matter of interest, can anybody tell me who or what determines which ads are displayed when we look at Secular Outpost? I have been getting one that says "Liberty University: Training Champions for Christ since 1971." It has a faint image of someone who seems to be having an orgasm. Is it kind of peculiar that an atheist site would be carrying ads for fundamentalist schools (Liberty was founded by Jerry Falwell)? Also, there is one ad saying that three people have unfriended me on Facebook. (I'm crushed, utterly) Another ad shows a young woman wearing socks, panties, and a T-shirt reading "Meh." Now I'm old, not dead, so I do not object too strenuously to the depiction of a young woman partially undressed. However, I do wonder why such an ad is displayed in such a venue as SO. Anybody buying "Meh" T-shirts out there? Just curious. 
December 4, 2012
Brooke Alan Trisel: God's Silence as an Epistemological Concern
No abstract of the argument is available, but I did find a summary of the main argument.
(1) If humankind was created for a purpose by God and had a role to play in carrying out this
purpose, then God would want us to have a possibility of achieving our role so that he would
have a possibility of achieving his goal.
(2) For us to have a possibility of achieving the purpose for which we were created, we would need
to understand our role in carrying out this purpose.
(3) The purpose for which humanity was created is unclear in the Bible and elsewhere.
(4) Despite the lack of clarity regarding the purpose of life, God has not provided any
clarification about his purpose or our role.
(5) God would not have chosen to remain silent about our role in carrying out his purpose
because, following from the first premise, this would be self-defeating.
(6) Therefore, humankind was not given a role to play in carrying out a purpose of God.
From the article's conclusion:
Links:
Publication Version (behind a pay wall)
Pre-Publication Version (free)
Citation:
Trisel, B. A. (2012), God's Silence as an Epistemological Concern. The Philosophical Forum, 43: 383–393.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2012.00433.x
(1) If humankind was created for a purpose by God and had a role to play in carrying out this
purpose, then God would want us to have a possibility of achieving our role so that he would
have a possibility of achieving his goal.
(2) For us to have a possibility of achieving the purpose for which we were created, we would need
to understand our role in carrying out this purpose.
(3) The purpose for which humanity was created is unclear in the Bible and elsewhere.
(4) Despite the lack of clarity regarding the purpose of life, God has not provided any
clarification about his purpose or our role.
(5) God would not have chosen to remain silent about our role in carrying out his purpose
because, following from the first premise, this would be self-defeating.
(6) Therefore, humankind was not given a role to play in carrying out a purpose of God.
From the article's conclusion:
Christians believe that God created humanity as a means to fulfilling a purpose. However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, God’s continuing silence about his purpose and our role is evidence that we were not created by God to fulfill a purpose. God, if he exists, would have provided us with feedback by now if he had created humanity as a means to fulfilling an end.
Links:
Publication Version (behind a pay wall)
Pre-Publication Version (free)
Citation:
Trisel, B. A. (2012), God's Silence as an Epistemological Concern. The Philosophical Forum, 43: 383–393.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2012.00433.x
John Post's Book on Naturalism and Ethics
I just discovered this book while linking to John Post's home page in my last post.
From Nature to Norms: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Morals (BookSurge, 2008)
Book Description:
LINK
From Nature to Norms: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Morals (BookSurge, 2008)
Book Description:
A meticulously scripted and thoughtfully considered monograph about the abyss between morality and biology, From Nature to Norm: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Morals proves as inventive as it is original. It combines the highest degree of originality with careful attention to potential objections, all in accord with Stravinsky’s rule: To enjoy to the full the conquests of daring, we must demand that it operate in a pitiless light. Author and philosopher John F. Post explains how what seems an impossibility often proves to be a failure of the imagination. With wit and candor, he urges his readers to recall Stravinsky’s rule and to ponder the relationships between the moral and biological dimensions of humankind. His is a dialogue to forge a path between the moral and the biological by way of forming a synthesis of these two crucial elements of human being.
LINK
Keith Parsons's Blog
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