Keith Parsons's Blog, page 4
January 10, 2013
Swinburne's modal argument for the existence of the soul
By Agnieszka Rostalska and Rafal Urbaniak
Abstract & Introduction: Richard Swinburne (Swinburne and Shoemaker 1984; Swinburne 1986) argues that human beings currently alive have non–bodily immaterial parts called souls. In his main argument in support of this conclusion (modal argument),roughly speaking, from the assumption that it is logically possible that a human being survives the destruction of their body and a few additional premises, he infers the actual existence of souls. After a brief presentation of the argument we describe the main known objection to it, called the substitution objection(SO for short), which is raised by Alston and Smythe (1994), Zimmerman (1991)and Stump and Kretzmann (1996). We then explain Swinburne’s response to it(1996). This constitutes a background for the discussion that follows. First, we formalize Swinburne’s argument in a quantified propositional modal language so that it is logically valid and contains no tacit assumptions, clearing up some notational issues as we go. Having done that, we explain why we find Swinburne’s response unsatisfactory. Next, we indicate that even though SO is quite compelling (albeit for a slightly different reason than the one given previously in the literature), a weakening of one of the premises yields a valid argument for the same conclusion and yet immune to SO. Even this version of the argument, we argue, is epistemically circular.
Does Religion Cause More Harm Than Good?
I don’t know.
To be more precise, it seems obvious to me that religion causes both harm and good. What I don’t know is whether the harmful effects happen more often than the beneficial ones (or if the former somehow qualitatively outweigh the latter). Allow me to explain.
It seems to incredibly simplistic to say either "religion is always bad" or "religion is always good." There are clearly people who are motivated, by religion, to do good things, such as donate their money to charity, do volunteer work, be honest, kind, compassionate, etc. The fact that such people exist disproves the claim that religion is always bad. (Nontheists may think that such theists are doing the right things for the wrong reasons, but that is irrelevant. Such people show that religion can be good.)
Of course, there are also people who are motivated, by religion, to do bad/evil things, such as fly airplanes into buildings, execute others who renounce their religion, oppose scientific progress, protest at funerals, etc. The fact that such people exist disproves the claim that religion is always good. (Theists may think such people are doing the wrong things for the wrong reasons, but that is irrelevant. Such people show that religion can be bad.)
This is why I think a better approach is to admit that both outcomes are possible and instead try to figure out what is more likely.
I've yet to find anything in writing which actually tackles this issue in an intelligent way. In my experience, what usually happens is some atheist will point to examples of bad things done in the name of religion; the theist will respond by saying the actions are inconsistent with the ethical teachings of the religion and/or point out atheist atrocities. What nobody seems to do is to analyze this in a statistically valid way, by figuring out what is representative of theistic behavior and secular behavior. That's much harder than tossing out "what about the crusades?" and "Stalin killed millions of people!" epithets.
The fact that a claim is hard to justify doesn't excuse making the claim without justification. The moral of the story is that people should stop making claims about whether atheism or theism lead to an overall balance of good (or evil) unless they can back up those claims.
As an epilogue, if anyone is aware of a study which does try to do this, I’d love to hear from you.
January 8, 2013
January 7, 2013
Inquiry vs. Partisanship
In response, I have the following comments.
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January 6, 2013
What's wrong with gay sex?
Mr
Jarvis, a Christian, was asleep in bed, dreaming of the Last Judgement.
In his dream, Jarvis found himself seated next to God in a great
cloud-swept hall. God had just finished handing down judgement on the
drunkards, who were slowly shuffling out of the exit to the left. Angels
were now ushering a group of nervous-looking men through the entrance
to the right. As the men were assembled before Him, God began to speak.
God: So who’s next? Ah, yes, the active homosexuals . So tell me, Jarvis, what shall we do with them?
Jarvis: You’re going to punish them, aren’t you?
God: Why do you say that?
Jarvis: Because to engage in homosexual behaviour is wrong, of course.
The Appeal to The Bible
God gently rubbed his chin and looked quizzically at Jarvis.
God. Wrong? Is it wrong?
Jarvis: Yes. You say so yourself in The Bible.
God: Ah. The Bible.
Jarvis: Yes. Look right here. “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is an abomination.” Leviticus 18.22
God. Well, I may have been a little hasty. I’m not sure about that bit now.
Jarvis. Not sure? You’re God! You don’t make mistakes!
God: Perhaps I am not the real God. Perhaps I’m merely a dream God – a figment of your imagination.
Jarvis: Oh.
God. Also, why do you assume The Bible is one hundred percent reliable?
Jarvis: You mean it’s not?
God:
I didn’t say that. But look, if you plan entirely to base your morality
on the contents of just one book, you had better be sure it is the
right book. And you had better be sure to what extent it can be relied
upon, hadn’t you?
The Lord pointed to The Bible lying in Jarvis’s lap.
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January 5, 2013
Episcopal Church Allows Bishops in Celibate Same-Sex Unions
“Men in a civil union will now be allowed to become bishops in the Church of England, but they are not allowed to have sex.”
So begins this article by CNN here. (As one of the readers said in a comment, “The best first sentence in an article ever. What a laugh to get the day started.”)
Not that the Episcopal Church cares about my opinion, but if they were to ask for it, I would have three questions:
(1) What’s the point?
(2) If homosexual sex is forbidden, how about other, non-sexual forms of contact between romantic partners, such as kissing or hand-holding? If the former is forbidden because the Bible forbids it, then why would the latter be okay?
(3) Do you actually believe that two homosexuals in a civil union are going to obey this rule and not have sex?
Thomas Paine on the Immorality of the (Alleged) Virgin Birth
The story, taking it as it is told, is blasphemously obscene. It gives an account of a young woman engaged to be married, and while under this engagement she is, to speak plain language, debauched by a ghost, under the impious pretense (Luke, chap. I., ver. 35), that "the Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee." Notwithstanding which, Joseph afterward marries her, cohabits with her as his wife, and in his turn rivals the ghost. This is putting the story into intelligible language, and when told in this manner, there is not a priest but must be ashamed to own it.
Source: Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason , Part II, Chapter II, “The New Testament”
January 4, 2013
Good and bad ways of influencing the beliefs of others
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There
are many ways in which we seek to influence other people’s beliefs. We might employ
procedural reason and rational persuasion of course. We might try to formulate
a cogent argument. Or we might try to shape the beliefs of others in other ways,
by way of threats, brainwashing, peer pressure, and indoctrination (through
endless repetition, etc.), for example.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br>
As a
philosopher, I value reason. Indeed, like most people nowadays, I consider the
use of reason to shape the beliefs of others to be, on the whole, a good thing,
and the use of techniques like threats, brainwashing, peer-pressure and
indoctrination to be a bad thing. But why should reason be preferred to these
other methods of shaping belief?<br>
<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;"></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">One
important difference between using reason and those other methods is that threats,
brainwashing, peer pressure, etc. can be just as effectively employed to produce
false beliefs as true ones. They are not truth-sensitive. Try using reason to
influence the beliefs of others, on the other hand, and you will find that
reason is a double-edged sword. It will not necessarily favour your beliefs
over those whose minds you seek to change. Reason favours the truth. As a
result of engaging in reasoned argument with your intellectual adversary, you
may find your opponent can show that you are the one that is mistaken (this is a
risk that some “educators” are not prepared to take – in which case they are likely
to find those other methods of shaping belief rather more attractive).</span></div>
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January 3, 2013
Ordination of Women Priests
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January 1, 2013
Ontology 101 part 2
The following three criteria can be used to
generate a set of categories of kinds of entities:
C1. Is this entity a natural entity?
C2. Is this entity able to affect nature?
C3. Is this entity a person?
I modified the second criterion slightly, to avoid dragging in a fourth criterion:
(C2*) Is this entity able to affect a natural entity?
We are looking at various pairings of these criteria to see whether some combinations can be eliminated as being incoherent. In the previous post, I briefly considered the pairing of (C1) and (C2*), and now I will consider the pairing of (C1) and (C3).
Natural vs. Personal
N P
T T
T F
F T
F F
NP1: Natural and Personal
Theists and atheists usually disagree about whether human beings are natural entities, but agree that human beings are persons. Christians and other theists generally believe that human persons are composed of a physical entity (a physical body) and supernatural entity (a soul). Atheists generally don't believe in souls or other supernatural entities, so most atheists are naturalists who believe that there are physical entities that are persons, and thus that there are natural entities that are persons. This combination of metaphysical categories should be retained not because it is obvious that naturalists are correct, but simply because it would beg the question in favor of theism and supernaturalism to eliminate this combination from the start.
I see this as similar to the reason for retaining the combination of epistemological categories known as synthetic a priori. A key question in epistemology is whether there are such a things as synthetic a priori truths. So, in epistemology, you want to start out with a categorization of truths that includes synthetic a priori, and then arguments and debates occur in epistemology to determine whether this combination of categories is coherent, and whether there are any such truths.
Similarly, you want to start out with a metaphysical category of natural entities that are persons, and thus allow arguments and debates to occur in metaphysics to determine whether this combination of categories is coherent, and whether there are any such entities.
NP2: Natural and Non-Personal
This combination is a no-brainer. A rock is a physical entity that is clearly not a person, so a rock is a natural entity that is non-personal. Thus, it is logically possible for something to be a natural entity that is a person, because there actually are such entities. Atheists and theists agree on this point, as do naturalists and supernaturalists.
NP3: Non-Natural and Personal
If God exists, God would be a paradigm case of a non-natural entity that is also a person. Ghosts, angels, and demons would also be examples of non-natural entities that are persons. Naturalists deny the existence of non-natural persons, especially the existence of God. But not all naturalists believe that the sentence 'God exists' is logically incoherent. Many naturalists believe that the existence of God is logically possible, but that there is in fact no such being.
Some atheists believe, for example, that the idea of a 'non-embodied person' contains a logical contradiction, but other atheists believe that the idea of a 'non-embodied person' is coherent; they just think that there are in fact no such persons.
In any case, since theists are committed to the existence of non-natural persons, it would beg the question against theism to eliminate this combination of categories from the start. Theists need to present arguments in support of the coherence of this combination of categories, and atheists and naturalists need to argue either for the incoherence of this combination or else for the view that there are in fact no such persons.
NP4: Non-Natural and Non-Personal
If numbers are entities, as I argued in the previous post, they certainly are not physical entities, so it would appear that they are non-natural entities. Numbers are clearly not persons, so it appears to me that numbers are non-natural entities that are non-personal. Thus, it appears that this combination of categories is logically possible, because there are in fact entities that fall under both of the categories.
To be continued...
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