Keith Parsons's Blog, page 13
November 8, 2012
Pre-Op MTF TS Nudity in a Women's Restroom?
In an earlier post, I mentioned Lydia McGrew's team blog, What's Wrong with the World. I've been reading several of the articles there and came across this.
"There is no bottom of the hill"
Dr. McGrew blogs about a recent case in American state of Washington, where a pre-operative ("pre-op")* Male-to-Female (M2F) transsexual named Colleen Francis. Although the news report does not refer to Colleen Francis as a pre-op
M2F, I am assuming that she must be pre-op otherwise the teenage girls
would not have identified her as a man. Based on the photo of Francis in the news reports, I am assuming that she has breasts but has not yet had the "bottom" surgery that would remove/transform her male genitalia into female genitalia. This fact will be important for reasons which will soon be obvious.
Francis demanded that Evergreen State College allow her to fully use the women's locker room. What makes this case interesting is that Francis is not merely demanding the right to use a toilet, in a stall with the door closed, in the women's locker room while transitioning from male to female. Rather, Francis apparently demanded the right to sit naked in the sauna inside the women's locker room, exposing her male genitals to any women or girls who happened to be there at the same time. A couple of teenage girls saw Francis in the sauna and complained that there was a "man" in the sauna.
I consider myself extremely supportive of the transgender community, but I'm having a hard time seeing how Francis's demand is reasonable. It seems to me that a pre-op F2M transsexual should not be going topless in a men's locker room if they have not had a complete removal of their breasts; F2M transsexuals should not be going bottomless in a men's locker room unless they are "post-op," i.e., unless they have had the "bottom" surgery. (I doubt this issue would ever come up since presumably the F2M would fear for their safety.) Likewise, I don't think a M2F transsexual should be fully naked in a women's locker room unless they are post-op.
Dr. McGrew argues that this should be treated as a case of indecent exposure. I am inclined to agree.
So I end this post with a question to all of you who, like me, consider themselves supportive of persons who are transgendered. Is Francis's demand reasonable? Why or why not?
"There is no bottom of the hill"
Dr. McGrew blogs about a recent case in American state of Washington, where a pre-operative ("pre-op")* Male-to-Female (M2F) transsexual named Colleen Francis. Although the news report does not refer to Colleen Francis as a pre-op
M2F, I am assuming that she must be pre-op otherwise the teenage girls
would not have identified her as a man. Based on the photo of Francis in the news reports, I am assuming that she has breasts but has not yet had the "bottom" surgery that would remove/transform her male genitalia into female genitalia. This fact will be important for reasons which will soon be obvious.
Francis demanded that Evergreen State College allow her to fully use the women's locker room. What makes this case interesting is that Francis is not merely demanding the right to use a toilet, in a stall with the door closed, in the women's locker room while transitioning from male to female. Rather, Francis apparently demanded the right to sit naked in the sauna inside the women's locker room, exposing her male genitals to any women or girls who happened to be there at the same time. A couple of teenage girls saw Francis in the sauna and complained that there was a "man" in the sauna.
I consider myself extremely supportive of the transgender community, but I'm having a hard time seeing how Francis's demand is reasonable. It seems to me that a pre-op F2M transsexual should not be going topless in a men's locker room if they have not had a complete removal of their breasts; F2M transsexuals should not be going bottomless in a men's locker room unless they are "post-op," i.e., unless they have had the "bottom" surgery. (I doubt this issue would ever come up since presumably the F2M would fear for their safety.) Likewise, I don't think a M2F transsexual should be fully naked in a women's locker room unless they are post-op.
Dr. McGrew argues that this should be treated as a case of indecent exposure. I am inclined to agree.
So I end this post with a question to all of you who, like me, consider themselves supportive of persons who are transgendered. Is Francis's demand reasonable? Why or why not?
November 7, 2012
November 4, 2012
Atheism and the Case Against Christ by Matt McCormick
I've spent a great deal of time reading and researching the (a)theism debate. When asked for reading suggestions, I usually stick with either Arguing about Gods by Graham Oppy, and Logic and Theism by Jordan Howard Sobel. While these books are great at examining the arguments for theism in general, they usually seem far removed from the personal beliefs that many individuals hold. I am hesitant to recommend popular atheism books because I generally find their arguments less than satisfactory. Now, I finally have a worthwhile recommendation. Professor Matt McCormick’s Atheism and the Case Against Christ examines the central tenets of the Christian faith: the resurrection, claims of the supernatural/miraculous, the reliability of Biblical testimony, religious epistemic standards and faith.
As I see it, the central question that McCormick’s work attempts to address is “Should we believe that Jesus Christ was resurrected from the dead based on the evidence provided to us by the Bible?” Typically, we can anticipate two claims from the believer. The first is “Yes, we should believe based on sufficient evidence.” The second option is more fideistic in nature, “Although we lack sufficient evidence, we should believe based on the evidence we do have.” There may be intermediary responses (i.e. I have personal evidence, such as divine revelation, that justifies my belief but doesn’t necessarily justify the belief of others), but his work primarily deals with these more popular responses. You can find some responses to the other range of responses on his blog, and in the chapter Why So Serious? in the book. (here, here, and here are some starting points.)
One of the most popular arguments from Christian apologists is the historical argument for the resurrection. They argue that the best way of explaining the accounts found in the Gospels (which they argue are historically reliable), is that Jesus actually rose from the dead. No naturalistic explanation can adequately account for the history found in the gospels, and the most likely explanation is that Jesus actually rose from the dead. Atheists have generally attacked the premise that the Gospels are historically accurate: pointing to inconsistencies between accounts, alleged inaccuracies, and point to the other sensational accounts from gospels which were left out of the Bible. McCormick takes a novel approach which I think best exemplifies why relying on the Bible as historical evidence for the resurrection is problematic.
In a chapter titled The Counterevidence Problem , McCormick introduces the “counter-evidence principle”:
“It is reasonable to draw a conclusion C on the basis of a body of information E only if it is reasonable to believe that the evidence that would show the opposite conclusion, if there were any, would have been included in E.”
Imagine a police detective who obfuscates the evidence in order to procure a “guilty” decision from the jury. The jury, who is far removed from the process of gathering and organizing the evidence, is coming to a decision based on the assumption that those who were compiling the evidence share their concern for truth. If the jury had knowledge about the detective’s motives, they would have reason to doubt their own conclusion of “guilty”. It is likely that the police detective ignored evidence that might have proven the criminal’s innocence, and framed the narrative of the available evidence in such a way to procure a guilty verdict.
If we use this principle to examine the account of the resurrection of Jesus, McCormick argues, we can see that it is not satisfied. From a body of psychological research that McCormick surveys in an earlier chapter, we know that people “who are motivated to arrive at a particular judgment or conclusion engage in a biased memory search to access hypotheses, inference rules, and instances from past behavior that are most likely to support their desired conclusion.” (McCormick 143) If there were evidence that the story of the resurrection were not true, we have no reason for suspecting that it would survive the centuries of motivated believers who sought to thread together a narrative that would substantiate their creed.
Further, we know that the epistemic status of believers in first century Palestine was far less developed than our own. The basic scientific knowledge that we take for granted, such as the Earth orbits the Sun, was simply not known. Only a tiny sliver of the population was literate, and their mathematical abilities were roughly equivalent to a modern third-grader’s knowledge. Even the most well-educated, knowledgeable first century Palestinian simply did not have access to the knowledge about how the natural world operates that we have today. We know today that highly motivated believers still think that Elvis or Tupac Shakur are alive, despite pictures of their corpses, reports in the media, and hospital records. With a sophisticated argument that can’t be fully explored here, McCormick argues that if this evidence doesn’t deter motivated believers in the case of Elvis or Tupac, it’s not difficult to imagine that a less privileged epistemic community would accept sensational accounts about a person whom they deeply admired and cherished.
McCormick then turns his attention towards the second answer to the original question, those who take the claim of the resurrection based on faith rather than sufficient historical evidence. The most poignant chapter towards this end is You Already Don’t Believe in Jesus: The Salem Witch Trials. I have previously reviewed a version of this chapter when it was featured in The End of Christianity, but I’d like to expand on it here. This chapter suggests that believing in the resurrection of Jesus Christ based on the evidence available to us is inconsistent with the rejection of other supernatural theses. In particular, McCormick argues that in order to be epistemologically consistent with our standards of evidence, one would have to accept that there were witches in Salem.
The chapter begins with a survey of the historical evidence we have for the resurrection, and highlights one of the more popular versions of the historical argument from Gary Habermas. The historical accounts found in the Gospels are often being confirmed by historical and archaeological evidence. We have early Christians that were willing to be martyrs for their faith, including Paul who originally persecuted Christians but after a spiritual experience became convinced of the truth of Christianity. We have hundreds or thousands of purported witnesses for Jesus’ various miracles: healing the sick, raising the dead, turning water into wine, etc. The historical argument concludes from the available evidence that the best explanation for the evidence is that the resurrection literally happened. Naturalistic explanations, such as a hoax or group illusion, simply don’t fit the explanatory bill.
In other parts of the book, McCormick takes to task the reliability of these claims, but the focus on this section is the uncomfortable conclusion that a believer must reach if they wish to be consistent in their standards for sufficient evidence.
During the late 17th century, over 150 people were accused, tried, or prosecuted for witchcraft. We have accounts of testimony from witnesses, from respected experts, and from the accused themselves. The investigations were thorough, the accusers came from a diversity of backgrounds. We have court transcripts that involve community leaders, medical experts of the time, and religious leaders. Arguably, we have a greater amount and better quality of evidence for witchcraft in Salem than we do for the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
The believer has a few lines of response: (1) bite the bullet and admit that there were witches in Salem, (2) deny the analogy between Salem and Jesus Christ, or (3) deny that evidence matters (which leads the believer back to the Believe it anyway! response that is examined in the book as well). Option (1) is uncomfortable for most believers - they won't want to acknowledge that those in Salem were guilty of witchcraft, especially with the wide variety of more plausible explanations available.
The second option seems ad hoc, and inevitably results in special pleading on behalf of the Jesus story. Any explanation that attempts to purport a difference between the two will have to acknowledge how much more evidence (not to mention better quality, including court transcripts and eye-witness accounts) we have for the Salem Witch Trials. Consequently, we need not be committed to the Salem case in order to make the point. We could concentrate on any seemingly supernatural case that has similar justification and run the same argument. Ultimately, all of these responses fail. If the believer wishes to be epistemically consistent, they must give up their belief in the literal resurrection of Jesus Christ.
It is a testament to this book that with this review I was only able to scratch the surface of the material available to the reader. I highly recommend getting your hands on a copy and reading through it in its entirety. It is available on Amazon here. Professor McCormick will also be giving a series of talks on the book, which you can find a list of on his blog.
As I see it, the central question that McCormick’s work attempts to address is “Should we believe that Jesus Christ was resurrected from the dead based on the evidence provided to us by the Bible?” Typically, we can anticipate two claims from the believer. The first is “Yes, we should believe based on sufficient evidence.” The second option is more fideistic in nature, “Although we lack sufficient evidence, we should believe based on the evidence we do have.” There may be intermediary responses (i.e. I have personal evidence, such as divine revelation, that justifies my belief but doesn’t necessarily justify the belief of others), but his work primarily deals with these more popular responses. You can find some responses to the other range of responses on his blog, and in the chapter Why So Serious? in the book. (here, here, and here are some starting points.)
One of the most popular arguments from Christian apologists is the historical argument for the resurrection. They argue that the best way of explaining the accounts found in the Gospels (which they argue are historically reliable), is that Jesus actually rose from the dead. No naturalistic explanation can adequately account for the history found in the gospels, and the most likely explanation is that Jesus actually rose from the dead. Atheists have generally attacked the premise that the Gospels are historically accurate: pointing to inconsistencies between accounts, alleged inaccuracies, and point to the other sensational accounts from gospels which were left out of the Bible. McCormick takes a novel approach which I think best exemplifies why relying on the Bible as historical evidence for the resurrection is problematic.
In a chapter titled The Counterevidence Problem , McCormick introduces the “counter-evidence principle”:
“It is reasonable to draw a conclusion C on the basis of a body of information E only if it is reasonable to believe that the evidence that would show the opposite conclusion, if there were any, would have been included in E.”
Imagine a police detective who obfuscates the evidence in order to procure a “guilty” decision from the jury. The jury, who is far removed from the process of gathering and organizing the evidence, is coming to a decision based on the assumption that those who were compiling the evidence share their concern for truth. If the jury had knowledge about the detective’s motives, they would have reason to doubt their own conclusion of “guilty”. It is likely that the police detective ignored evidence that might have proven the criminal’s innocence, and framed the narrative of the available evidence in such a way to procure a guilty verdict.
If we use this principle to examine the account of the resurrection of Jesus, McCormick argues, we can see that it is not satisfied. From a body of psychological research that McCormick surveys in an earlier chapter, we know that people “who are motivated to arrive at a particular judgment or conclusion engage in a biased memory search to access hypotheses, inference rules, and instances from past behavior that are most likely to support their desired conclusion.” (McCormick 143) If there were evidence that the story of the resurrection were not true, we have no reason for suspecting that it would survive the centuries of motivated believers who sought to thread together a narrative that would substantiate their creed.
Further, we know that the epistemic status of believers in first century Palestine was far less developed than our own. The basic scientific knowledge that we take for granted, such as the Earth orbits the Sun, was simply not known. Only a tiny sliver of the population was literate, and their mathematical abilities were roughly equivalent to a modern third-grader’s knowledge. Even the most well-educated, knowledgeable first century Palestinian simply did not have access to the knowledge about how the natural world operates that we have today. We know today that highly motivated believers still think that Elvis or Tupac Shakur are alive, despite pictures of their corpses, reports in the media, and hospital records. With a sophisticated argument that can’t be fully explored here, McCormick argues that if this evidence doesn’t deter motivated believers in the case of Elvis or Tupac, it’s not difficult to imagine that a less privileged epistemic community would accept sensational accounts about a person whom they deeply admired and cherished.
McCormick then turns his attention towards the second answer to the original question, those who take the claim of the resurrection based on faith rather than sufficient historical evidence. The most poignant chapter towards this end is You Already Don’t Believe in Jesus: The Salem Witch Trials. I have previously reviewed a version of this chapter when it was featured in The End of Christianity, but I’d like to expand on it here. This chapter suggests that believing in the resurrection of Jesus Christ based on the evidence available to us is inconsistent with the rejection of other supernatural theses. In particular, McCormick argues that in order to be epistemologically consistent with our standards of evidence, one would have to accept that there were witches in Salem.
The chapter begins with a survey of the historical evidence we have for the resurrection, and highlights one of the more popular versions of the historical argument from Gary Habermas. The historical accounts found in the Gospels are often being confirmed by historical and archaeological evidence. We have early Christians that were willing to be martyrs for their faith, including Paul who originally persecuted Christians but after a spiritual experience became convinced of the truth of Christianity. We have hundreds or thousands of purported witnesses for Jesus’ various miracles: healing the sick, raising the dead, turning water into wine, etc. The historical argument concludes from the available evidence that the best explanation for the evidence is that the resurrection literally happened. Naturalistic explanations, such as a hoax or group illusion, simply don’t fit the explanatory bill.
In other parts of the book, McCormick takes to task the reliability of these claims, but the focus on this section is the uncomfortable conclusion that a believer must reach if they wish to be consistent in their standards for sufficient evidence.
During the late 17th century, over 150 people were accused, tried, or prosecuted for witchcraft. We have accounts of testimony from witnesses, from respected experts, and from the accused themselves. The investigations were thorough, the accusers came from a diversity of backgrounds. We have court transcripts that involve community leaders, medical experts of the time, and religious leaders. Arguably, we have a greater amount and better quality of evidence for witchcraft in Salem than we do for the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
The believer has a few lines of response: (1) bite the bullet and admit that there were witches in Salem, (2) deny the analogy between Salem and Jesus Christ, or (3) deny that evidence matters (which leads the believer back to the Believe it anyway! response that is examined in the book as well). Option (1) is uncomfortable for most believers - they won't want to acknowledge that those in Salem were guilty of witchcraft, especially with the wide variety of more plausible explanations available.
The second option seems ad hoc, and inevitably results in special pleading on behalf of the Jesus story. Any explanation that attempts to purport a difference between the two will have to acknowledge how much more evidence (not to mention better quality, including court transcripts and eye-witness accounts) we have for the Salem Witch Trials. Consequently, we need not be committed to the Salem case in order to make the point. We could concentrate on any seemingly supernatural case that has similar justification and run the same argument. Ultimately, all of these responses fail. If the believer wishes to be epistemically consistent, they must give up their belief in the literal resurrection of Jesus Christ.
It is a testament to this book that with this review I was only able to scratch the surface of the material available to the reader. I highly recommend getting your hands on a copy and reading through it in its entirety. It is available on Amazon here. Professor McCormick will also be giving a series of talks on the book, which you can find a list of on his blog.
November 2, 2012
October 29, 2012
Lydia McGrew's Team Blog
This isn't new, but worth mentioning. Lydia McGrew has a team blog, What's Wrong with the World: Dispatches from the 10th Crusade. Its stated purpose is to oppose Jihad and Liberalism. Liberalism is defined in a way that seems to include atheism.
LINK
LINK
October 28, 2012
Loftus and Reppert on Probabilities
John Loftus stirs the pot with his recent post, "Should We Think Exclusively in Terms of Probabilities or Not?"
Victor Reppert responds in, "But How Shall we Follow Probabilities?"
I think I agree with Loftus when he writes, we "should think exclusively in terms of the probabilities." If I understand Reppert, I am pretty sure he agrees also.
I'm not convinced, however, that a Christian's degree of belief that Jesus rose from the dead must necessarily exceed that which can be justified based on the evidence. I agree with Reppert that "a Bayesian-rational person makes proper conditionalizations on his prior probabilities" and that "a Bayesian-rational person can conclude that Jesus rose from the dead." Similarly, a Bayesian-rational person can conclude that Jesus was (and still is) dead.
(As an aside: it would be interesting to learn what prior probability Reppert assigns to the Resurrection. By way of comparison, I think Swinburne assumes it is 0.5.)
It is obvious that it is possible that a Christian's degree of belief that Jesus rose from the dead could exceed that which is Bayesian-rational. It is also obvious that a non-Christian's degree of belief that Jesus did not rise from the dead could exceed that which is Bayesian-rational. So what? Now what? Unless someone has some way to show that the majority of Christians or non-Christians fit those categories, respectively, this is not a philosophically significant conclusion.
Victor Reppert responds in, "But How Shall we Follow Probabilities?"
I think I agree with Loftus when he writes, we "should think exclusively in terms of the probabilities." If I understand Reppert, I am pretty sure he agrees also.
I'm not convinced, however, that a Christian's degree of belief that Jesus rose from the dead must necessarily exceed that which can be justified based on the evidence. I agree with Reppert that "a Bayesian-rational person makes proper conditionalizations on his prior probabilities" and that "a Bayesian-rational person can conclude that Jesus rose from the dead." Similarly, a Bayesian-rational person can conclude that Jesus was (and still is) dead.
(As an aside: it would be interesting to learn what prior probability Reppert assigns to the Resurrection. By way of comparison, I think Swinburne assumes it is 0.5.)
It is obvious that it is possible that a Christian's degree of belief that Jesus rose from the dead could exceed that which is Bayesian-rational. It is also obvious that a non-Christian's degree of belief that Jesus did not rise from the dead could exceed that which is Bayesian-rational. So what? Now what? Unless someone has some way to show that the majority of Christians or non-Christians fit those categories, respectively, this is not a philosophically significant conclusion.
Atheistic Objections to FFRF's Winter Solstice Banner
Ophelia Benson blogs about FFRF's request for an "equal time" display of a "Winter Solstice banner" at a courthouse in Texas. Here is the text of the banner, which I believe is the same text the FFRF has been using on banners and other displays for at least 15 years.
Again, I realize this is nothing new, but I'd like to summarize some atheistic objections to FFRF's Winter Solstice banner.
While atheists can celebrate the Winter Solstice, it isn't an atheistic 'holiday.' It has nothing to do with atheism. So why should atheists care about or celebrate the Winter Solstice? I, for one, could not care less about the Winter Solstice. (Just to prevent any misunderstandings: I am not criticizing those atheists who do celebrate the Winter Solstice. Rather, my point is that it's inappropriate to represent the Winter Solstice as if it were an atheistic holiday.)
Is it true that "there are no gods, no evils, no angels, no heaven or hell"? Many of FFRF's members and supporters are people who merely lack the belief that such things exist; they also lack the belief that such things do not exist. The viewpoint expressed by the FFRF banner isn't representative of all its members.
The message is unnecessarily adversarial, especially the last sentence. As if it weren't enough to say that supernatural beliefs are false, the banner says that religion "hardens hearts and enslaves minds." Notice that religious displays--such as Christmas trees, nativity scenes, and so forth--never or virtually never have banners with disparaging remarks about nonbelievers. When was the last time you saw a Nativity scene with a banner that said, "Atheism is but foolishness motivated by sin to justify an immoral lifestyle"? So why does the FFRF have to end its banner in a way that is so disparaging towards theists?
I do agree with FFRF that the government shouldn't be showing a preference for one religious holiday display over others--so I can see the value in the request for an "equal time" display--but I disagree with the way they have chosen to make that point. Not only are the banners rude, but I think the banners do far more harm than good to the public perception of atheists.
“At this Season of the Winter Solstice, may reason prevail. There are
no gods, no devils, no angels, no heaven or hell. There is only our
natural world. Religion is but myth and superstition that hardens hearts
and enslaves minds.”
Again, I realize this is nothing new, but I'd like to summarize some atheistic objections to FFRF's Winter Solstice banner.
While atheists can celebrate the Winter Solstice, it isn't an atheistic 'holiday.' It has nothing to do with atheism. So why should atheists care about or celebrate the Winter Solstice? I, for one, could not care less about the Winter Solstice. (Just to prevent any misunderstandings: I am not criticizing those atheists who do celebrate the Winter Solstice. Rather, my point is that it's inappropriate to represent the Winter Solstice as if it were an atheistic holiday.)
Is it true that "there are no gods, no evils, no angels, no heaven or hell"? Many of FFRF's members and supporters are people who merely lack the belief that such things exist; they also lack the belief that such things do not exist. The viewpoint expressed by the FFRF banner isn't representative of all its members.
The message is unnecessarily adversarial, especially the last sentence. As if it weren't enough to say that supernatural beliefs are false, the banner says that religion "hardens hearts and enslaves minds." Notice that religious displays--such as Christmas trees, nativity scenes, and so forth--never or virtually never have banners with disparaging remarks about nonbelievers. When was the last time you saw a Nativity scene with a banner that said, "Atheism is but foolishness motivated by sin to justify an immoral lifestyle"? So why does the FFRF have to end its banner in a way that is so disparaging towards theists?
I do agree with FFRF that the government shouldn't be showing a preference for one religious holiday display over others--so I can see the value in the request for an "equal time" display--but I disagree with the way they have chosen to make that point. Not only are the banners rude, but I think the banners do far more harm than good to the public perception of atheists.
October 24, 2012
God on a cow
Catholics see Jesus on burnt toast. Muslims don't do images, so they see "Allah" in Arabic script on various objects. Inside vegetables that have been cut open is a perennial favorite.
Here is one of these miracles from Turkey: a cow, intended for sacrifice in the present Eid, which appears to vaguely perhaps have "Allah" written on its side.
Here is one of these miracles from Turkey: a cow, intended for sacrifice in the present Eid, which appears to vaguely perhaps have "Allah" written on its side.
Is This What Happens When Children are Homeschooled?
This is a letter to the editor of a New Zealand paper, The Northern Outlook.
HT: Evan Fales
HT: Evan Fales
October 23, 2012
Paul Kurtz, January 25, 1925 - October 21, 2012
(The following was written by Eddie Tabash and posted with permission)
I take great pride in being the major financial backer of Internet Infidels. The intellectual fire power that this website brings to bear in the quest to refute supernatural claims is a sheer delight in a world so riven with superstition. My actual induction, as it were, into freethought organizations was in 1995, when Paul Kurtz brought me into the three organizations he founded: the Center for Inquiry, Council for Secular Humanism and Committee for Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal. Dr Kurtz died on October 21, 2012, at the age of 86. He also founded Prometheus Books, the largest individual publisher of atheistic and other skeptical books. His best individual writings for atheism, in my view, were contained in two of his books. In The Transcendental Temptation, he made a comprehensive argument that challenges to the paranormal/supernatural were seamless. The empirical method should be applied to all miraculous claims, be they those of religion or those of pseudo science. In Forbidden Fruit, he argued that moral values could be reliably rooted in a naturalistic foundation. His life's work and his passing should be noted by freethinkers and skeptics, everywhere.
See also:
"Remembering Paul Kurtz" by our very own Herb Silverman, published in The Washington Post
I take great pride in being the major financial backer of Internet Infidels. The intellectual fire power that this website brings to bear in the quest to refute supernatural claims is a sheer delight in a world so riven with superstition. My actual induction, as it were, into freethought organizations was in 1995, when Paul Kurtz brought me into the three organizations he founded: the Center for Inquiry, Council for Secular Humanism and Committee for Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal. Dr Kurtz died on October 21, 2012, at the age of 86. He also founded Prometheus Books, the largest individual publisher of atheistic and other skeptical books. His best individual writings for atheism, in my view, were contained in two of his books. In The Transcendental Temptation, he made a comprehensive argument that challenges to the paranormal/supernatural were seamless. The empirical method should be applied to all miraculous claims, be they those of religion or those of pseudo science. In Forbidden Fruit, he argued that moral values could be reliably rooted in a naturalistic foundation. His life's work and his passing should be noted by freethinkers and skeptics, everywhere.
See also:
"Remembering Paul Kurtz" by our very own Herb Silverman, published in The Washington Post
Keith Parsons's Blog
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