Sean Jacobs's Blog, page 237
December 10, 2018
The forgotten kingdom
Image credit��Roland��Mandiaya��Sumani��Seini.
Before the creation of the nation-states of Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, and Mali many ethnic groups in these regions were politically organized as kingdoms or acephalous��societies.��In kingdoms, the king was the head and in many acephalous��societies��in Northern Ghana, the��tindana��was the custodian of the land. In kingdoms, there were visibly marked hierarchies, which facilitated��the day-to-day running of the community. Acephalous��societies��were (at least conceivably) more egalitarian because they did not recognize the rule of a chief and the community rarely answered to a higher authority. The��tindana��managed the community by administering issues relating to land use by community members.
It is these types of acephalous��societies��that��Naa��Gbewa��met when he settled in��Pusiga��to found the��Mamprugu��kingdom, which would later birth the��Dagbamba,��Nanumba, and other ethnic groups that recognize him as an ancestor.
Roland Mandiaya Sumani Seini, who promotes African heritage,��embarks on a project of self-discovery through his documentary film��The Forgotten Kingdom? Chronicle of the North��(released via free screenings in Tamale and later in Accra)��which traces the roots, history and lineage of the��Mossi-Dagbamba. This film maps the relationships among the��Mamprusi,��Kusaasi,��Dagbamba,��Nanumba,��Mossi,��Waale,��Builsa, et al.
While in the��postcolony, the creation of the nation-state and national identity have often been presented in opposition to ethnic identity (a category which existed before slavery and colonization), this documentary demonstrates the importance of knowing ethnic history and tradition to the self-actualization, self-rediscovery and agency of not just individual members of these groups but inter-ethnic relations as well.
Too often many Africans overlook the opportunity to learn about their lineage, roots, and history so as to reconnect with their ancestors and participate in the transmission of knowledge from generation to generation. This documentary is a first step��on the ancestral journey of self-discovery and ethnic agency.
Through interviews with custodians of culture, such as chiefs across related ethnic groups, and historians in universities in Ghana and Burkina Faso, the film discusses the evolution of��Mossi-Dagbamba��ethnic groups from precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial times. While the��Mamprugu��Kingdom was founded in��Pusiga��around the 11th century, by the 15th century all the sister ethnic groups had crystallized into independent groups with recognized systems of governance, and developed languages. Despite the full development of these sister groups, various traditions and cultural items like the dress, food, and festivals like the��Bu��um��(Fire Festival) and��Damba��still bind these groups together.
The Forgotten Kingdom?��traces the roots of the descendants of��Naa��Gbewa��to Zamfara in Northern Nigeria, as well as to Chad and Mali, taking note of the survival of ethnicities, kingdoms, and cultures in the face of colonial violence from French, German and British��imperialisms. The film disrupts the notion of imaginary borders that impose national identities on Africans while strongly encouraging them to suppress their ethnic identities.
By drawing on the knowledge of custodians of culture like chiefs and griots,��Seini��not only legitimizes indigenous oral epistemologies transmitted for several generations, but also participates in the documentation of these histories through mediated forms in the documentary film genre.
Seini��embarks on a journey to dismantle the stereotypical images of Northern Ghana that��Southern Ghanaian media often gleefully perpetuate in order to dehumanize the people of the North.��These��stereotypical images often mirror the Manichean images perpetuated by Western imperialist establishments to justify the (neo)colonization of the Global South. It is not uncommon to see Southern media frame Northern��Ghanaian��ethnicities and cultures as primitive, uncivilized, violent, resistant to Western modernization among others.��This transnational mapping of ethnic histories and identities complicates the descendants of��Naa��Gbewa��in the North and challenges us to re-examine the single story through which many Ghanaians have been socialized.��Seini��disrupts identities established by imaginary borders by nuancing the histories, cultures and lived realities of these inter-related ethnic identities in��the��colonially constructed nation-states of Ghana, Burkina Faso and Togo.
Although this documentary film is a timely piece, it would have made a stronger statement if it had embarked on dismantling the deeply patriarchal systems embedded in knowledge preservation by presenting the perspectives of priestesses, female chiefs, and female descendants of��Yennenga��(the woman who connects the��Dagbamba��and the��Mossi). These societies were not built and maintained by men alone and therefore diverse perspectives should have been presented for us to see the ways in which women were part��of building these groups, as well as their roles in the ethnic imaginary.
Seini���s��stated goal in��The Forgotten Kingdom?��is to foster peace and unity among the people of the North. He also hopes to ultimately support the��establishment of a university��to continue the work of human resource development, knowledge creation and preservation in the region.
There is the need for more projects like this documentary film to�����re-right�����the history of Africans from the perspectives of Africans so that continental Africans and Africans in the diaspora are equipped with the tools to trace their ancestry and lineage in their own journeys of self-discovery.
December 9, 2018
The narrative of homophobia in Africa
Image credit Niko Knigge via Flickr.
The anthropologist��Harri��Englund��writes��of “homophobic liberals” in Malawi.��Who are they?
Malawians.
Poets in Malawi.
Indigenous��poets in Malawi,��writing and��performing��in Chichewa,��the��most widely spoken��indigenous��language.��Pangani��and��Chiwamba��are two��of the��poets.
They write in Chichewa, for��Chichewa audiences, bringing��dialogue and debate in our fluid, alliterative,��mother tongues.��With��great actors,��such performances are in turn educative, challenging, innovative, and��great fun.��They challenge��minds��in the name of entertainment, use scorn and ridicule, words to��taunt,��question norms and values.
Historically, artists��have��used such��gifts to��challenge and debate��ideas��and thought in society.��As��vehicles of “change,” we tend to think of artists as “liberals.”�� And that���s��the challenge. How can��Pangani��and��Chiwamba��use their art to��challenge misogyny,��gendered violence��and��ritual killing of Malawi���s albino people, and yet be��blind to��demonization of��Malawi���s queer minorities? How can��they��actually use their verse to demonize queer Africans?
Our��challenge��may be��in the language we��are using.��Liberal, for example, is��a��loaded term. From the western perspective it���s highly partisan, a��term of contempt, or pride, depending on one���s political persuasion.��The polar opposite, conservative,��has similar emotional undertones.
Yet, do those terms translate, trans-literate in our circumstances?
They are English language words, but current usage is very different in��Trump���s America compared to��Malawi today.��The same applies to��most��women���s and gay liberation terms.
Females��are��a numerical majority in��Africa. The power imbalances, gender inequities, misogyny��are��a very visible day to day reality in��our��communities.��Starting discussion around��them��is a step that has to be taken, a thing that has to be done. When that ball starts rolling, it is hard to stop. And,��in much of Africa,��it is rolling.��Malawi��has had a female head of state, Joyce Banda.
Our albino siblings are another very visible cause.
Homosexuality is a different challenge.��We��are as yet an invisible, abstract concept in the minds of most of our country mates, with��scarcely the same appeal as��other liberal causes.
Englund��mentions��the flood of��Christian missionaries to Sub-Saharan Africa��over the last��40 years or so. Almost without exception,��they are��Christian conservatives from the South and middle US states,��interested in��African souls. They have been well received, preaching gospels of Christ saving��souls, redemption��and prosperity in��conditions of the��deepest poverty. US conservative values leaked into that��narrative.
So, Zambia,��neighboring��nation��to Malawi, proudly��proclaims itself a “Christian Nation.”��This is not seen as a foreign identity. President��Chiluba��who made the proclamation was a��fervent (US) Pentecostal. Just like in US conservative circles, “prostitutes,” “drug addicts” and homosexuals��are vilified��identities.
The vitriol of homophobia has been��imported from the American Right, out of��context, and made, by way of religion, african. The official interest by��western countries in promoting human rights has fallen foul of��decades old religious right indoctrination.��This has��translated into a fight of “africanness” against the “foreign culture” of “homosexuality.”
And, worst of all,��we queer Africans are invisible and remain so in very significant ways.
At the “barazas” where the poets�����sing, the��homophobic recitals will resonate with��the��masses. The poets��equate homosexuality with cultural imperialism��as they emphasize indigenousness in Chichewa. Missing will be the counter narrative that fellow Africans, Malawians who are queer,��are present��but invisible.
Years of��demonization��have set attitudes, hearts and minds.
Indeed the narrative of foreignness of��homosexuality resonates with��masses in Uganda, Tanzania,��Malawi��and most other African countries.��The poets, leaders of change and thought as they might be, have to surmount this cultural mountain in their own thought before they can��introduce it to their audiences.
It will happen. Our world view bubbles are shrinking. The hyper connectedness��of social media��we live in makes it inevitable. Queer Africans are coming out of their closets, becoming more visible. The discourse of our��foreignness��dissolves in��face of our visible��presence.�� The persecution of��invisible, demonized, queer African��minorities, with��roots in our recent pasts, cannot survive in a world where��queer Africans are visible,��holding parades��and��prides challenging homophobia.��The demonization��only holds in the vacuum.
The identities, liberal, or homophobe, are cultural, political. They don���t necessarily fit what might be happening on the ground, nor are they a perfect mirror of the narrative of homophobia in Africa.
It hurts that at the moment, in our public spaces, we continue to be vilified and held in contempt. We are as yet unable��to provide��a counter narrative understandable by our people. We��will continue to fall foul of it, but the tide���s turning, in our favor.
December 8, 2018
Everything must fall
Image credit Daylin Paul.
The first few images of Everything Must Fall, a documentary about the Fees Must Fall student protests that rocked South Africa, are a little perplexing.��The film opens with the 2013 installation of Adam Habib as the vice chancellor of the University of Witwatersrand. As Habib gives his inaugural address, speaking on how the university represents ���the country���s pain and its euphoria,��� his words are juxtaposed with��archival footage of��student protest dating back to the 1980s.
It���s an unexpected choice, but one that��makes more sense as the documentary continues. This film is about explaining context and circumstances. It���s been three years since the first #FMF protests���South Africa���s largest student protest since 1976���and the broader issues and images associated with it are now well known. The protest was at the time covered by��mainstream media��and by the protest participants themselves��on myriad��social media.��There have been numerous books, at least three quality documentaries,��a musical, and���currently touring���a play��that address Fees Must Fall and its implications, consequences and controversies.��Yet,��amidst these dives into the larger meaning, granular details and explanations are lost.
In��Everything Must Fall, Desai touches on the less-covered aspects of FMF. The fact that at Wits it started as protest against outsourcing and the exploitative��conditions��suffered by workers at the institution, and the role of��intersectionality��and its friction with masculine politics (liberation politics were notorious��for sidelining women) from the earliest days of the protest. The escalating��conflict��between students, private security and���in the protests��� last weeks���riot police in armored vehicles is also��explored.
Desai helpfully uses a timeline in to orient the viewer. In place of a narrator, tweets flutter across the screen highlighting developments, and��interspersed with accounts��of FMF as told, most powerfully,��by the participants themselves. Habib, the film establishes early on, is a product of the radical left in South Africa��and a former student activist.��Yet, he��now finds himself fending off student demands for free and decolonized education���ones he professes to agree with���behind��technocratic, though not necessarily inspiring, arguments for fiduciary responsibility in the face of government intransigence.
Contrasting��Habib���s sober��managerialism, student leader��Shaaera��Kalla��is the documentary���s��pragmatic idealist. Throughout the film, whether in interviews or in��footage from the protests,��Kalla��is seen��encouraging, admonishing,��and negotiating with��her fellow protesters.
Both Habib and��Kalla��struggle with their circumstances, the former more obviously than the latter. Habib as a ���scholar of the left��� is aware of the injustice of neoliberal education but is unable to act on this belief without the promise of more funding from the government. ���We see ourselves as progressives but in a kind of managerial position,��� Habib says. ���We���re governed by the systemic parameters and when spaces open up we take the opportunities.���
It is here how one can see why Habib is a contrary, and sometimes frustrating figure for so many. Described as a ���scholar of the left��� in the film,��Habib��can astutely describe the injustice of neoliberalism in education and can critique his own role in it. Yet despite this awareness he does not act upon it and approaches his role as a vice chancellor as a bloodless technocrat. If you were a person who thinks politics is something that should be turned into action, say an activist academic or student protester, you might find this vexing to say the least.
Kalla, more subtly, must manage a fractious student movement, including men who resent female leaders and political divisions between students aligned with either��the ruling ANC��or��the��Economic Freedom Fighters��(EFF).
If the protest, as depicted in the film, has a best self then��Kalla��probably��embodies it.��Near the end of the documentary, she is shot and severely injured by rubber bullets��fired by��the police��with who��she was attempting to negotiate. The��film slows in lament for her, lingering over the description of the shooting and the physical pain of her recovery in its aftermath.
Inevitably for a single documentary, while the film comes close to telling the entire story of Fees Must Fall at the University of Witwatersrand, it only briefly��acknowledges��activism at other campuses, including��protests at poorer, black universities,��which were long ongoing before the shut-down of South Africa���s formerly white institutions.
This point is made in the film by Leigh-Ann Naidoo, an academic and activist herself. Naidoo is one of several academics who appear throughout the film who were sympathetic to the movement and, to some extent, became identified with it. Academics had been part of the protest in both 2015 and 2016. Throughout ���Everything Must Fall��� academics��such as��Naidoo��offer details,��as well as broader historical analysis,��placing FMF in the broader context of post-Apartheid protest. Others appear in critical moments in the footage. When Wits agrees to end outsourcing, it is Wits politics lecturer��Lwazi��Lushaba��who makes the announcement. During a fraught scene when students demand to be admitted to a staff meeting, a Wits staff member attempts to choke Wits anthropology lecturer Kelly Gillespie.
In contrast to Desai���s best known documentary,��Miners��Shot Down,��Everything Must Fall��does not make an overt��or��specific argument,��preferring instead to be descriptive��yet��clearly��sympathetic to the demands of��students.There��are some voices missing from the documentary. Though ever present in the file footage, student leader��Mcebo��Dlamini��(a sometimes��controversial��figure) is not interviewed for the documentary.��And then Wits��SRC president,��Nompendulo�����Ulo�����Mkhatshwa,��also appears only in file footage.
According to an end note, Desai did approach then-minister of higher education, Blade��Nzimande, for an interview but was turned down. If representatives from the police or security companies were��approached, there is no mention of this.��Perhaps��more of a loss are the perspectives of ordinary police officers who exchanged rubber bullets for rocks and were from the same working class communities as many of the striking students.
Two years after Fees Must Fall and it’s worth taking stock. Many of the FMF leaders have moved on from university campuses while some still live with the fallout.��Fasiha��Hassan, who is featured��in the film, has joined the ANC communications��department��ahead of next year���s��election. She was also was awarded an international student peace prize for her activism during FMF���for which she was��criticized��by some other activists. Other activists are still fighting suspension from their universities and at least one is awaiting sentencing for criminal charges springing from the protests.��Dlamini��has split the difference and is still fighting a criminal case while��campaigning��to become ANC Youth League president later this year.
There is some irony in the fact that��Fees Must Fall��was a rejection of the politics��that preceded it,��and��so many of its leading figures��are now engaged in the same��organized party politics.��But it���s also part of the familiar life cycle of the South African student leader, as others have��noted.��They��emerge with book bags, bullhorns and radical rhetoric. They organize protests (generally in the lenient study weeks leading up to the exam period), march, graduate and enter formal politics usually under the umbrella of the ANC or one of its affiliates. They���re then replaced by a new crop of student leaders and the cycle starts anew.
But as��Kalla��notes at the end of the film, yesterday���s student leaders don���t decide the future of Fees Must Fall. ���It is a collective process that we hold in very sacred regard. Students will ultimately take this where it needs to be and I have faith that we will achieve our demand for free, decolonized education. But not without a fight.���
December 7, 2018
The lady is not for turning
Image via Wikimedia Commons.
Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala served as Nigeria���s finance minister twice since its return to democracy: first from 2003 to 2006 under Olusegun Obasanjo and more recently, from 2011 to 2015, under Goodluck Jonathan. Now she has written a book, published by an American academic press, ostensibly about those experiences.
Dr. Okonjo-Iweala comes from a family of academics. Her mother, Kamene, was a renowned sociologist and her father, Chukwuka, an economist (he is also a local king in the Delta region, and a former UN official and government official in Ghana.) �� She had her elementary education at the legendary St. Anne���s School Molete, which is one-hundred and forty-nine years old. Then completed her secondary education at the prestigious University of Ibadan International School. She then proceeded to Harvard where she obtained her Bachelor���s degree in Economics. She later obtained a PhD in Rural Economics and Development from MIT. Prior to becoming Nigeria���s Finance Minister in 2003, she worked at the World Bank where she rose to become the Vice President for Africa and later one of the several Managing Directors at the Bank. Upon Nigeria���s return to democracy in May 1999, she became an important figure in the shaping of neoliberal economic policies for the new administration, first as an adviser to Obasanjo and later as Finance Minister, where her office literally became an outpost of the IMF/World Bank. She helped populate both Obasanjo and Jonathan���s administrations with current or former employees of the World Bank/IMF and other sympathizers of neoliberal economic policies. Many of these people later constituted her kitchen cabinet. The neo-liberal policies of the two administrations she worked for were largely responsible for the selling of national assets to individuals and cronies of the regimes in the name of privatization and commercialization. It wasn���t surprising when opposition to these policies became an important trope for the book that chronicled Okonjo-Iweala���s tenure as Finance Minister in Nigeria.
There aren���t many books by African finance ministers of their tenure, so her book would certainly elicit anticipation in some circles.�� The book is dramatically titled Fighting Corruption is Dangerous: The Story Behind the Headlines and opens with a story of the kidnapping of the Kamene Okonjo, which she blames on intimidation by those that were benefitting financially from what she calls the ���oil subsidy scam��� because the alleged kidnappers did not ask for money.�� In her telling, they wanted her to announce on national radio and television that she was resigning from her job as Finance Minister and returning to the United States. According to Okonjo-Iweala, this incident happened because of her stance on corruption in the oil industry, especially the illegal payment of subsidies to oil marketers.
The kidnapping of Okonjo-Iweala���s mother is depicted as a game, which makes jest of the general insecurity ordinary Nigerians confront on a daily basis.�� The community where Okonjo-Iweala���s parents live and many communities in Nigeria are known to have recorded many incidents of kidnapping before and after the episode she described. This includes the kidnapping of the king of a nearby Ubulu-Uku community, a senior government official of the state, Professor Hope Eghagha, and the wife of retired Army General Oluwole Rotimi.
Kidnapping became rampant during the oil insurgency in the Delta and continued into the present so it cannot be conclusively said that there is a correlation between these acts of brigandage and the fight against corruption. The only correlation is the general breakdown in law and order as a result of the incompetency of the administration and the overall socio-economic downturn resulting from the neo-liberal economic policies of the Obasanjo and Jonathan administrations that Okonjo-Iweala helped shape.
The story about her mother���s kidnapping, instead of an up-close view, is merely a device for four interrelated arguments to support the book���s claim that fighting corruption is dangerous. The first of these is the book���s suggestion that, Okonjo-Iweala���s anti-corruption campaign resulted in the kidnapping of her mother; secondly, she claims that her ethnicity warranted an opposition to her because some ethnic groups presume that the office of the Finance minister is their birthright, thirdly, Okonjo-Iweala���s feminist ideology warranted anti-feminist opposition to her fight against corruption and finally that some ideologues from the left were opposed to her anti-corruption crusade. These are the reasons Okonjo-Iweala concludes that fighting corruption in Nigeria is dangerous.
So far so good. However, what becomes clear, is that Okonjo-Iweala sees every disagreement with her economic policies as an attack on her person because of her gender, ethnic identity or her previous role as a World Bank employee.
Nigeria has a subsidy regime that started with the administration of General Yakubu Gowon in the early 1970s. The subsidy regime has been a recurring decimal in the annals of oil politics in Nigeria during the oil boom of that era and cannot be said to be a new thing as described in the book. It is what every regime has had to grapple with over the years. However, in the discussion of what she considers subsidy scam, she discounts the larger issue that surrounds the subsidy regime. For example, Nigeria imports refined oil for its local consumption. That makes the local price of premium motor spirit susceptible to the fluctuating oil market. The Obasanjo administration licensed private individuals to build refineries and over 16 years later, none has been built and nowhere was this stated in the book. Secondly, she argues that the whole subsidy regime is a scam but never admits to the culpability of the Jonathan administration and of course herself (the Coordinating Minister of the Economy) to such a scam.�� Blame it on others seems to be the fulcrum of the entire argument of the book.
Okonjo-Iweala borrowed straight from the neo-liberal mantra that government should get out of the way when she writes, at the start of the book, that ���The overwhelming majority of Nigerians are honest, hardworking citizens who want what citizens elsewhere want���for their government to provide peace, stability, and basic services and then get out of their way so they can live their lives.��� While the majority of Nigerians want stability and peace, they also want a government that serves their interest by providing social services such as education, health and an economy that works for everyone, not the one that works for a few as it is now.
Describing Nigeria as a troubled country without giving proper context to why it is troubled fits into the prevailing narrative of Africa as a troubled continent that needs rescue.�� Nowhere is this narrative more prevalent than in the second chapter where she described how she was ���begged��� to leave her work in the West (as a World Bank employee) for the wilderness of Nigeria. This fits into the larger narrative of the ���savage-savior��� metaphor aptly elucidated by Makau Mutua in his book, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/1...). It also fits the narrative of the white savior industrial complex aptly described by Teju Cole as a situation where Africa—in this case Nigeria— is considered so helpless that you would need some saviors from the West to come rescue it from what I call the permanency of economic retardation.
This chapter also shows how she constituted a ���rescue team��� made up mainly of present and former employees of International Financial Institutions. The chapter never hid her preference for those with Western experience and this speaks to her claim of being Nigeria���s savior. In addition, she reconstructed the story of her being paid in United States dollars in ways that suggest she voluntarily dropped the idea of being compensated in dollars without disclosing that it was a court judgment that stopped the payment and asked her to refund all salaries paid to her in that amount to the government. She had insisted on being paid in US dollars upon her assumption of office as finance minister in 2003 with an annual salary of US$240,000 which is a violation of the Code of Conduct for Public Officers which frowns against maintenance of a foreign account. It is also a violation of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) Act No 6 of 2002 which prescribes a yearly salary of N794,085.00 ($2185) for every minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.�� However, she failed to mention how Obasanjo���s dissatisfaction with her performance as Finance minister led to her being transferred to the Foreign Ministry where she later resigned. Rather, she constructed a story of resignation that never accounted for being transferred to another ministry that she thought was beneath her. She also did not disclose how she lobbied the Jonathan administration to return as Finance Minister rather, she claimed that private sector leaders came to beg her for the job. It is in this chapter that she actually began to show how every constructive opposition to her economic policies were seen as a personal attack on her. She singled out individuals such as Omoyele Sowore, publisher of Sahara Reporters and Femi Falana, a highly-respected lawyer in Nigeria as those who led the attack on her. However, she never affirmed how many of those so-called attackers merely pointed out the flaws in her economic policies, which were detrimental to most Nigerians. While Okonjo-Iweala argued that Mr. Falana singled her out for criticism. It is incontrovertible that the same Mr. Falana actually fought alongside Omoyele Sowore and others for the restoration of democracy in Nigeria. In the many years of military rule in Nigeria (1985-199), Falana was incarcerated without trial several times for speaking out against economic inequality and other forms of injustice occasioned by neoliberal economic and political practices in Nigeria. The same can be said for Omoyele Sowore who, as a student activist in college, fought for the restoration of democracy. Basically, the duo of Sowore and Falana had merely continued their critique of economic policies that are detrimental to the wellbeing of Nigerians, which Okonjo-Iweala claims are personal attack.
Even more interesting is the fact that the book chronicled Okonjo-Iweala���s to and fro with Nigeria���s National Assembly in ways that see the assembly as the opposition contrary to the spirit of the constitution that sees the assembly as an independent organ. Every invitation to the assembly to give account of the stewardship of her ministry is considered an attack on her person such that the reader might be convinced that she would rather serve under a dictatorial government than a democracy. The National Assembly of Nigeria is expected to provide an oversight on the executive arm, surprisingly; the book seems not to recognize this constitutional role. Instead, the book paints a picture of the national assembly as one of those who always ���attack��� her. Painting the national assembly in this way suggests either a lack of understanding of constitutional governance by Okonjo-Iweala or a mere display of disdain for every criticism regardless where such criticism comes from. Okonjo-Iweala writes the same way about the governors of Nigeria���s 36 states as if the governors are expected to be appendages to the federal government, especially the office of the minister. For example, when the then governor of Edo state, Adams Oshiomhole, complained about what he called the illegal withdrawal of $2billion from the Excess Crude Account���an account operated by the Federating States and the Central Government. Okonjo-Iweala opined that Oshiomhole attacked her because she blocked him from obtaining a foreign loan. To her, any state governor that criticizes her is automatically seen as ���attacking her person��� regardless of the policy disagreements that may have warranted such criticism. While I admit that the current Nigerian system is not perfect and there are flaws in the National Assembly as well as the 36 states, I also believe that respect for the constitution is what creates a strong governance system in any society.
Furthermore, another argument made by her is the claim that, ���there were ethnic jingoists who disliked the idea of someone from my Igbo ethnic group holding what they perceived as a powerful position that they believed belonged to their own ethnic group��� (107). This assertion feeds into the prevalent narrative in Nigeria that a section of the country, specifically the Hausa-Fulanis tend to dominate what is considered to be ���juicy��� ministries and parastatals especially the Finance Ministry. This is not exactly true because, since independence in 1960, more southerners have held the position of Finance Minister more than those from the North. For example, between October 1st 1960 and September 14, 2018 when Kemi Adeosun resigned as Finance Minister, Nigeria have had 23 Finance ministers and only seven have come from the North, the rest have been from the South including the first Finance Minister (1960-1966), Festus Okotie-Eboh who is from the same Delta state as Mrs Okonjo-Iweala.
There are some historical inaccuracies such as describing Goodluck Jonathan as the first person from a minority group to become president leaving out General Yakubu Gowon, the longest serving Nigerian leader (1966-1973). Okonjo-Iweala says she was the first person to serve as a coordinating minister of the economy leaving out Chief Obafemi Awolowo who served as Vice-Chairman of the ruling council and Finance Minister during the reign of Gowon and of course Ernest Shonekan who was appointed by the Babangida Administration as Head of the Transition Council overseeing the economy before Babangida was forced out of power by popular protest in August of 1993 paving the way for Shonekan and later Abacha to become Head of State.
Finally, it is hard to find any evidence of the fight against corruption by Okonjo-Iweala in the entire book. She presided over the economy under two administrations adjudged to be some of the most corrupt in the history of the country. For example, electricity is a major challenge in the country and the $16 billion that Obasanjo administration under which Okonjo-Iweala served spent on the power sector was mismanaged and power is still at the level it was before the administration came to power in 1999. Over $32 billion was said to have been lost to corruption during the Jonathan administration because state coffers were turned into personal coffers by the president and his cronies and it is hard to fathom that a Finance minister who coordinates the economy can feign ignorance of the monumental fraud that took place under her watch. At best, the book highlights how narratives can be reconstructed in ways that turns principled opposition into personal attacks in an attempt to provide cover for someone who might be seen as culpable in the mismanagement of Nigeria���s wealth for about 16 years. If anything is dangerous, it is not admitting to one���s culpability in the scheme of monumental fraud in the history of Nigeria.
December 6, 2018
Mapping the African land rush
Image credit Andrea Moroni via Flickr.
In 2013, the journalist Fred Pearce, one of the��most authoritative environmental journalists in the��United Kingdom,��published a book,��The Land Grabbers: The New Fight over Who Owns the Earth, in which he details how��African governments are selling long leases on large tracts of land to people with dubious track records, and no obvious agricultural experience. In South Sudan for example, it was rarely clear who had sold what��land��to whom, as leases on hundreds of thousands of hectares were granted under poorly written contracts without basic definitions of right to land and of compensation for land.
Since the 2007-08 commodity price boom there appears to have been a surge in Large Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs) in developing countries, especially through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). Most available information came from media reports because timely and reliable data on land acquisitions is scarce��for reasons��that include difficulties tracing the activity of financial investors, and reluctance of host governments to report deals that may be politically sensitive.
However, successive efforts to collect data systematically and a vast literature on case studies have since improved the availability of data and confirmed a trend of increasing interest in international land-based investments,��leading to fears of “land grabs.”
The��International Land Coalition��in partnership with several research centers has published��Land Matrix��which includes transnational and domestic deals (purchase, lease or concession), initiated since the year 2000 and covering an area of 200 hectares or more.��These records are derived from a variety of sources, including a crowdsourcing function of the website.
The largest number of acquisitions since 2000 has been recorded in Africa.
via Landmatrix.orgInvestments potentially offer crucial opportunities to recipients, but the possible risks of LSLAs are associated with property rights in the first��place and with the issue of land concentration.
The current wave of land acquisitions is taking place in contexts where many people have only insecure land rights, leaving them vulnerable to dispossession. This has clearly emerged both in the case studies literature in Africa and in econometric analysis mainly��based on Land Matrix.
In a study on Sub-Saharan Africa,��Cotula��et al.��(2009) observe that most if not all productive land targeted for potential investment was likely to have already been claimed by farmers, herders, hunters or foragers, and point out that there may be substantial negative implications in the context of complex and insecure land rights, essentially because existing land uses and claims may go unrecognized.
Is the issue between foreign investors and people? In a provocative article in 2011, Liz Alden Wily��wrote��that while discontent in the current land rush focuses on foreign enterprise, the problem is fundamentally between people, especially the rural poor and the state. The degree of legal��protection of customary land rights is crucial, and the actual wave of FDI may discourage progress in this direction.
via Landmatrix.orgNational and especially international investors have targeted Africa with massive deals, a pattern of acquisitions that does not depend on the concentration of investments in sectors that usually operate on large scale. The data indicate acquisitions of average and median sizes of respectively 10 and 48 thousand hectares, often with government discretionary allocation.
The combination of commercial pressure on land and insecure rights in Africa, where rising land inequality is already a problem may lead to ���excessive��� land concentration, which is a strong determinant of income inequality.��We know that asset inequality has a negative impact on long term growth and that high levels of inequality once established are very difficult to reverse. It would be wise to worry now about the possible��consequences of the African land rush.
December 5, 2018
Eritrea and Ethiopia’s economic dividend
Image credit Yemane Gebremeskel Twitter via Wikimedia Commons.
In July this year, a historic peace deal was signed between the heads of state of Eritrea and Ethiopia. For two decades, the two countries had been stuck in a ���no war, no peace��� stalemate with highly militarized borders, no diplomatic cooperation,��and no cross-border trade, investments or transport.
By signing the deal, the heads of state most importantly agreed that the two countries will re-establish close political, economic, social, cultural��and diplomatic ties, and that both nations will work on regional peace.��Embraced by the public on both sides of the border, the peace deal has been hailed as a positive step towards boosting peace and security in the Horn of Africa region. Surprisingly though, no one has yet offered an analysis of what the peace deal means for the economic prospects of Eritrea and Ethiopia. This article makes some predictions, arguing that both countries stand to benefit economically. But the potential upside is much larger for Eritrea. This is, however, a potential that has many obstacles to overcome before it can be realized.
Eritrea
Eritrea has often been likened to North Korea, a dictatorship considered a rogue state by the international community. While this comparison is debatable, a few similarities are striking. Since independence in 1991, Eritrea has been ruled by one man, Isaias��Afwerki, who has consistently��quashed��all forms of political resistance.��Most of the federal budget is spent on��defense.��All citizens have to serve an 18-month military service, which for many people has been extended��indefinitely. The country is in extreme economic hardship: there are��few��formal employment opportunities, and an acute scarcity of consumer goods due��to��foreign currency shortages. Most people who can afford to live a decent life in Eritrea receive remittances from relatives abroad���relative to its��estimated��population (between 3.5 million and��six��million people), Eritrea has one of the world���s largest diasporas.��
Political freedom and economic hardship have been deteriorating over the years in Eritrea. Because of this, many Eritreans have fled the country. The famous Lampedusa shipwreck in 2013, for example,��was carrying mostly Eritrean migrants.��Afwerki��has for years been��criticized��by the international community and Eritrean opposition figures abroad for not doing anything about the dire situation.��His response has mostly been to blame Eritrea���s hardships on the military threat from Ethiopia.��
Now that there officially is no military threat��from its��neighbor, the hope is that Eritrea��will move away from bolstering its military capacity��and��focus on real development efforts instead. Additionally, when trade-routes to Ethiopia are��fully��reopened, Eritrea��will have��immediate access to a market of over 100 million people. And Ethiopia will surely be interested in investing in Eritrea, perhaps on conditions��favorable��to��the latter��given Ethiopia���s interest in accessing��a��key��sea port��in��Assab��on��the Red Sea��coast.
This is mostly speculation at this point though.��Seeing that��Isaias has legitimized his rule based on the military threat from Ethiopia, will the Eritrean people accept all these reforms without political reform as well? It remains to be seen.��
What��has��been seen though in��the wake of the peace deal,��is��thousands of Eritreans��crossing the border to Ethiopia.��Most of these��people��are crossing the border as refugees, planning not to return to Eritrea. Is this good or bad for Eritrea? That���s up for interpretation. The most natural interpretation is obviously that it���s bad. A country being emptied of its people, most of whom are young and able to work, does not bode well for future development. However, Eritrea has not been able provide decent employment opportunities for its people for many years now. In fact, Eritrea���s economic model has been based on remittances from abroad. So in that sense, an economic model that is based on a massive diaspora is not harmed by a growing diaspora.
In summary, even with increasing number of people leaving Eritrea, it���s difficult to see how the peace deal can make things worse in the country. The status quo might persist, but if there���s any change, it���s not a long shot to predict change for the better.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia, on the other hand, seems to have been doing��fairly well��despite the military stalemate with Eritrea.��Real per capita GDP has been growing at an annual rate of 7.5 per cent since 2004, one of the world���s fastest growth rates in this time period. The growth has mainly been driven by state investments in infrastructure, most importantly transport and energy. With the state���s grand industrialization plans, pundits are anticipating the growth to continue. Numerous and massive export-oriented industrial parks are being built��at an incredible pace��across the country. In parallel, the Ethiopian government is courting foreign investments from both East Asia and the West��to set up factories in these industrial parks.
However, the state-led development project in Ethiopia is somewhat��fragile.��There is a widespread perception that a disproportionate share of the growing economy has gone to ethnic��Tigrayans, who form the core of the ruling party in Ethiopia. The system of ethnic federalism is showing cracks���people belonging to the two major ethnic groups, Oromo and Amhara (who together represent approximately 61 per cent of the country���s population) have been staging anti-government protests because of corruption in the political system and lack of equal economic benefits.
Some argue that the peace deal with Eritrea is making ethnic violence worse.��By opening the border, Ethiopia is allowing separatist groups that were previously banned in the country to enter.��Indeed, in September, large-scale ethnic violence coincided with the return of 1,500 fighters from the Oromo Liberation Front, which had long been in exile in Eritrea.
Yet,��there���s little conclusive evidence that the peace deal with Eritrea��significantly��impacts ethnic violence in Ethiopia���with or without the peace deal, the issues with ethnic strife persist. Moreover, the ethnic��conflict��in Ethiopia does not��appear��to have thwarted the development trajectory. If anything, the reforms��introduced under��Ethiopia���s new Prime Minister,��Abiy��Ahmed, which aim to increase political freedom, give reason for optimism.
Seeing that Ethiopia has been doing quite well throughout the “no war, no peace” stalemate with Eritrea (at least according to economic indicators), does the peace deal really mean anything for Ethiopia���s economic prospects?��There is��one��potential trade-related upside.��Both��foreign and domestic investors in Ethiopia will tell you that high transport costs are still a major bottleneck for continued export growth in the landlocked country. For now, firms in Ethiopia are paying massive fees to Djibouti to clear containers through��its��port. But Eritrea can unlock old trade routes, most realistically through the port of��Assab, where Ethiopia cleared two-thirds of its trade until 1998.��Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia has already started talking about re-opening roads to Eritrea���s Red Sea ports. So don���t be surprised if the city of��Assab��re-emerges as Ethiopia���s main trade port, as it once was, most likely benefitting both Eritrea and Ethiopia.��
Economic forecasting is a perilous exercise. The economic consequences of the peace might turn out to be different than outlined in this article. What seems like a near-certainty though is that the relationship between the two countries has the largest impact on Eritrea���and Eritrea���s economy is therefore the largest question mark after this peace deal. What political rhetoric will Isaias adopt after years of blaming his country���s economic woes on the military threat from Ethiopia? There are early signs of hope in Eritrea:��the indefinite national service might be shortened to the original 18 months of military service.��But Eritrean���s are rightfully skeptical after years of promises without action.��So��let���s keep a close eye on Eritrea���s president in the time ahead.
The Mandelas at Harlem’s Africa Square
Image credit Otto Yamamoto via Flickr.
During the weeks that preceded Nelson and Winnie Mandela���s rally in Harlem, posters in storefront windows, on vacant buildings and lampposts throughout the community announced their impending arrival, ���Harlem Salutes Nelson Mandela; Keep the Pressure On. Thursday, June 21,��1990 2PM-7PM, Africa Square.���
It had only been four months since Nelson Mandela���s release from prison. Harlem was a stop on the Mandela���s international political tour that continued through the end of the year. The tens of thousands of African Americans at the��Mandelas��� rallies in��Harlem, the Bronx,��Bedford Stuyvesant,��Los Angeles��and Miami��reflected African Americans��� deep political investment in South Africa.
I was a 16-year-old eager consumer of African history and politics��waiting on the south side of 125th Street, across from the Victoria Theater. I was squeezed among the tens of thousands staring expectantly at the large stage��erected��at Africa Square��for the��Mandelas, in the shadow of the��Hotel Theresa.
The sun was going down when the icons of��African��liberation arrived and approached the front of the stage, clenched right fists raised. The first couple of��African��nationalism stood smiling before the throng of adoring African Americans.
We cheered with pride as Winnie hugged pan-Africanist and Harlem activist Queen Mother Moore, who was on stage with business leader Percy Sutton, pan-Africanist activist��Elombe��Brath, rapper Flavor��Flav��of Public Enemy, and a few others who I either did not recognize or do not recall.
I had no doubt that this special moment was part of an African political renaissance that would buttress Third World solidarity in the US.
���There is an umbilical cord that ties us together,��� Mr. Mandela told us. Then added,��”My only regret is that I am unable to embrace each and every one of you.” He said that Harlem, whose events he had followed for 30 years, ���signifies the glory of resistance.”��The��rapture in the crowd after seeing Mandela and hearing his voice��was��immense.
Meanwhile��Ms. Mandela greeted us with ���Amandla!��� Elated and full of love, we thundered back, ���Awethu!��� Harlem, she said, is�����the Soweto of America��� and she called for an immediate end to Apartheid.
What I did not know at the time was that thirty years earlier, at that same intersection, Third World solidarity in the US had its��symbolic��beginning. In 1960,��Fidel Castro stayed��with his entourage at the Hotel Theresa, while in New York to address the UN General Assembly. During his��brief��stay, Castro refashioned Harlem into the center of Third World and anticolonial solidarity, in the heart of New York, the��center��of First World capitalism. He invited African American leaders to the hotel to meet with him, including Malcolm X and Langston Hughes. In a dramatic play on Cold War tensions, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India also each traveled to Harlem to greet the Cuban leader.
Framed in the context��of Castro���s time in Harlem, and the subsequent defining events of Third World solidarity, anti-racism, and��anticolonialism,��the��Mandelas��� Harlem rally had added meaning.
At 16, I was not aware of this historical nuance. I regarded Mandela���s freedom and the couple���s presence in Harlem as significant steps toward our pan-Africanist triumph over global white supremacy. I could not have��known��that rather than inaugurate a new age, the��Mandelas��� appearance marked an ironic end to��that era.
Africa in African American Popular Culture and Politics
The��Mandelas��� visit and the winds of change blowing��through��South Africa capped��30��years of unprecedented African American involvement in African affairs and culture, which reached its high point during the 1980s.
In politics, at no point before or since��then��have African American elected officials���not to be confused with leaders who are African American���exercised sway of such depth and unified magnitude, or demonstrated such outpouring of interest and solidarity with African affairs. During the late 1970s increasing numbers of radical African American leaders transitioned from activism to electoral politics and brought a sense of pan-Africanism and Third World solidarity with them into the halls of power. A large enough segment of the African American community was invested in African issues for African American lawmakers to embrace African affairs within their political agendas. Apartheid in South Africa allowed lawmakers and activists in the 1970s and 1980s to seize the moral high ground and compel Congress, universities, and corporate boards to accept positions of the Third World left and pan-Africanists on US policies that were central to altering US relations with white-minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa.
Jesse Jackson���s presidential campaigns, the Congressional Black Caucus, Free South Africa Movement,��and��TransAfrica, in addition to countless local and grassroots organizations, raised the legitimacy of African affairs in US politics and political discourse, during the 1980s.
Harlem during the 1980s enlivened my sense of connection to Africa. The��African street vendors on 125th��Street created a market-like atmosphere. I had the luxury of lazy afternoons spent in politically oriented bookshops��like Liberation Bookstore on the corner of 131st��Street and Lenox Avenue, and the crowded kiosks of MART 1.2.5, where my friends and I purchased chew sticks, Muslim oils and incense, and procured recordings of lectures by Dr. John Henrik Clark, Joseph Ben-Jochannan, and Malcolm X. Africa, it seemed to me, was not distant, but, rather, everywhere.
In those days, popular hip-hop also carried African-centered themes and aesthetics. Groups from the X-Clan, to the Brand Nubians, Queen Latifah, the Jungle Brothers, and KRS-1, while not lacking in misogyny, imbued Afrocentricity with hipness and relevancy. Fittingly, in 1986,��Stetsasonic��released ���A.F.R.I.C.A (Free South Africa!).��� Local music video programs in New York featured the group���s video regularly throughout the remainder of the decade.��
I saw it as natural that��during their US tour the��Mandelas��highlighted many of these connections.
The Decline of the Third World Politics in the US
The appearances at the Hotel Theresa of Castro in 1960 and the��Mandelas��at Harlem���s Africa Square in 1990 bookend a period of Third World solidarity and pan-Africanism in African American politics and popular culture.��Nelson Mandela���s freedom��and the��Mandelas��� international tour did not end��Apartheid��but left no doubt that its end was imminent. Resistance to white-minority rule in Africa, and anti-colonialism generally, had been the tie that bound African American engagement with African affairs.��The end of abject white supremacy in Africa was the African American consensus on Africa. Multiracial elections in South Africa in 1994��did not��completely��end African American engagement with Africa. But��in subsequent years,��Africa���s��presence in��African American politics and popular culture��rapidly decreased.
December 4, 2018
Cape Town’s Inner Ugly
Patricia De Lille (center) in better days with other DA leaders, Helen Zille and��Lindiwe��Mazibuko. Image credit Democratic Alliance via Flickr.
The Democratic Alliance (DA), has governed��South Africa���s��Western Cape province since 2009 and Cape Town, its largest municipality, since 2006.��For the majority of this time, Patricia de Lille was��Mayor of Cape Town.��Months of heated DA infighting culminated in the��ousting��of a faction loyal to De Lille.��She resigned as��mayor��and announced her intention to found a��new political party. De Lille was key to the DA, a party rooted in��Apartheid��white politics, repositioning itself as a party of the city���s coloured poor and working classes to build a semi-permanent electoral majority in the city and the province. Since De Lille���s��departure, her��allies��have��accused the��DA��of regressive, racist attitudes.��They have��revealed details of how local, mostly white,��DA��leaders��opposed��the��development��of��well-located affordable housing��projects,��thus��actively undermining attempts to redress spatial��Apartheid��in one of the most unequal, racially segregated metros in the world.��What is��De Lille���s political legacy, and is she the champion of��poor and working people��that she claims to be?
A long way from Pan Africanism
Like many senior South African politicians, including current president Cyril��Ramaphosa, De Lille cut her teeth as a trade unionist. Having served as��vice��president of the National Council of Trade Unions, she became a national executive member of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1990.��Both NACTU and the PAC presented themselves as more radical, black-centered��alternatives to the��African National Congress���s��non-racial politics. The PAC��was launched��in 1959 as a breakaway from the ANC. Uncompromising Africanists within the ANC had differed with other members on principles such as non-racialism and considered the Freedom Charter too conservative. The PAC initially refused to participate at CODESA, the official negotiations that preceded South Africa���s first democratic elections of 1994. When it eventually joined,��De Lille led the PAC delegation.
After 1994,��De Lille��served as the party���s parliamentary chief whip.��She developed a reputation as a fearless parliamentarian by exposing cover-ups involving fellow��MPs.��During the Mandela presidency,��she��delivered a speech in Parliament wherein she��, including cabinet ministers, alleged to be��Apartheid-era spies. When ANC insiders decided to leak��a dossier containing evidence of massive corruption in the procurement of��billions of Rands (hundreds of millions of��US dollars)��worth of defense equipment (known as��the Arms Deal),��it was��De Lille��who��presented the dossier to��Parliament.��For most of the post-Apartheid��period��she��has been one of South Africa���s most popular politicians. A��survey��in 2004 found her to be the second ���most favoured and trusted politician�����in the country,��second��only��to��Thabo Mbeki, who was president at the time. That��she was the most popular among coloured respondents and second most popular among white respondents made her a prime target for recruitment to the DA.
De Lille has traversed a near unbelievable political path, leaving the PAC in 2003 to found and lead the Independent Democrats (ID).��In��2010, in a surprise move,��she agreed to merge her party with the DA, which itself was born of a merger of the pitifully rebranded New National Party, previously the National Party���the��original director-producers of��Apartheid���and the white-led liberal Democratic Party.��De Lille was a sought-after recruit because of her exceptional popularity among coloured voters in the Cape.��The merger consolidated opposition against the ANC, strengthened the DA���s support��in��coloured��communities��and positioned De Lille to take over as Mayor of Cape Town.
Recent revelations��of internal DA��affairs have��confirmed that factionalism is rife within the party and the long-running characterization of the��DA��as an��organization led by��racists��and attracting racist��voters,��is valid. Former DA leader and current Western Cape Premier Helen Zille is a known apologist��for colonialism,��having previously tweeted:�����for those claiming the legacy [of colonialism] was ONLY negative, think of our independent judiciary, infrastructure, piped water etc.�����At a later point, Zille also tweeted:�����I agree, there was absolutely nothing positive about slavery or the slave trade. If you read the transformed��[South African]��history textbooks��(issued in a democratic SA), you will see the acknowledgement that despite its many evils, colonialism helped end slavery in parts of Africa.��� JP Smith, a prominent, white��DA Mayoral Committee (Mayco) member is��accused of stating��unashamedly in a caucus meeting that he considers ���transformation�����(how affirmative action and racial redress towards greater equality is��referred to in��South Africa)��a swear word and that the term sets off alarm bells for him. Additionally, the weakness of��DA leader��Mmusi Maimane has been exposed. He��has��offered little to��challenge his��party���s��image as a white neoliberal PR machine that��deploys black leaders strategically while only��paying��lip service to anti-racism.
Embracing the DA approach
De Lille has tried to distance herself from the DA ethos, saying she had been�����abused�����by the party, echoing sentiments expressed by her allies about its racist culture and claiming that a cabal within had not only frustrated the implementation of progressive projects,��but also conspired to tarnish her name and expel her. However, De Lille tended to embrace the party���s neoliberal agenda in Cape Town and followed through on a number of regressive approaches implemented by her predecessors. Municipal Ward 54 is illustrative in this regard.
Ward 54 comprises wealthy suburbs along some of Cape Town���s most picturesque beaches. JP Smith is a former Ward 54 councillor and��is the��current��Mayco��member for Safety, Security��and Social Services, a role he held in De Lille���s administration. As ward councillor he led an aggressive�����broken windows���-based campaign��(the��rightwing��policy prescription��dreamed up by the��conservative��Manhattan Institute)��against petty crime and homelessness.��While crime rates in��picturesque��suburbs like Sea Point, on the edge of downtown Cape Town,��declined, this approach simply shifted��crime and homeless people to other parts of the City.��Sea Point��is patrolled by a combination of municipal law enforcement and a large contingent of private security personnel paid for by the local ratepayers��� association, whose��sponsors��are mainly property development and real estate companies including global giants like Knight Frank and Sotheby���s International Realty.
In 2016,��Ward 54��Councillor��Shayne��Ramsay,��announced on Facebook��that��having ���met with residents, City staff, colleagues and��Mayco��members to discuss this increasingly difficult problem,�����she would lead a ���march against grime��� to ���walk along the promenade until 21h00, kindly as king anyone who is planning on sleeping overnight, to move along.��� According to��Ramsay, Sea Point���s ���garbage bins are treated as buffet tables��� and Cape Town���s homeless community is comprised of ���criminals (who are in and out of crowded prisons), mentally retarded or social outcasts, and those who are generally down on their luck.�����Given��De Lille���s posture as a champion of the poor, one would have expected that she rebuke the councillor or at best��distance herself from such utterances. She did not.��Ramsay��made a half-hearted��public apology and��got��a slap-on-the-wrist fine of R10,000��from a��DA��party disciplinary hearing,��but��at no point did we see a concerted effort to have the councillor replaced.
The City of Cape Town under De Lille has broadly maintained this�����broken windows�����approach to dealing with issues such as��illicit��drugs, homelessness and sex work,��the latter��of��which remains illegal in South Africa. The strategy has��contributed to��the��harassment and abuse of homeless people and sex workers, and encourages racial profiling by local law enforcement and aggressive neighborhood watch groups.
Poster issued by the City of Cape Town, seen on 11 November 2018. Photo credit��Suhair��Solomon.Prioritizing the promotion of tourism, the attraction of corporate investment��and the marketing of Cape Town as a ���world class city��� has been a hallmark of the governing party���s development agenda, including under De Lille���s tenure. This year Travel and Leisure���s�����World���s Top Cities�����to visit��ranks��Cape Town at number 12, just ahead of Rome, while according to the 90,000 Brits who voted in the��2017��Telegraph Travel Awards, Cape Town��is the��world���s greatest city. This despite the city���s atrocious inequality and��extremely high murder rate. According to University of Cape Town research the city has an annual murder rate of 69 per 100,000, up marginally since 2016/2017.��Crime in other South African cities��declined over the same period.��Tourists, however, as with those who can afford to live in the modern, efficient inner city, are mostly insulated from the worst of Cape Town���s violent crime and service delivery failures. Informal settlements and working-class townships, unsurprisingly, bear the brunt��of physical, social and structural violence.
Against the backdrop of gross financial mismanagement at municipalities across the country, Cape Town has a relatively clean record. After a decade of clean audits, the City received its first qualified audit for the 2016/2017 financial year. However, there have been serious irregularities uncovered in relation to inner city property deals, the latest of which involves the sale of well-located public land at a potential loss of up to��R140 million��(about $10 million). The De Lille administration oversaw an��enormous boom��in inner city real estate prices, with the rapid expansion of luxury developments, including in working class areas,��such as Woodstock and Salt River on the fringes of the Cape Town��central business district. While inner city residents and property investors will laud the achievements of local government in recent years, gentrification has ripped through well-located communities of��color��and the majority of Cape Town citizens have not experienced significant improvements in living conditions.
Deep-rooted denialism
Regardless of official policy and rhetoric, the DA has never been serious about informal settlement��upgrading��in Cape Town. Local law enforcement regularly carries out illegal evictions in informal settlements. A factor contributing to the governing party���s indifference is that the poorest informal settlements are almost exclusively black African, while the DA���s voter base in the region is largely white and��coloured, with the latter racial groups comprising the majority of Cape Town���s population, including its poor. There is in fact a perverse incentive to discourage urban migration and informal settlement growth, evident in the frequent illegal evictions and in Helen Zille���s reference to informal settlement learners as�����education��refugees�����from other provinces. (The bizarre practice of referring to South Africans migrating between provinces in search of opportunity and a better life as refugees, doesn���t raise any eyebrows in the DA.)
The Social Justice Coalition (SJC) has conducted major campaigns for dignified sanitation and for safety and security in informal settlements.��The organization���s headquarters are in Khayelitsha, Cape Town���s largest informal settlement, about 30 minutes from the city��center. Current and former leaders of the SJC explain that initially there was hope that De Lille would be sympathetic to the organization���s urgent campaign demands for the realization of basic rights to decent sanitation and safety. She engaged meaningfully with the organization��when she took over as Mayor in 2011, even inviting leaders to meet with her at her office.��An ongoing problem is��the��lack of��decent��toilets��in Khayelitsha. Residents have complained about toilets��being��unsafe��(women have been raped��and people robbed when attempting to use isolated or poorly lit toilets), unsanitary, broken, poorly maintained and in insufficient supply.��In��2012, she promisingly oversaw the implementation of a janitorial service, advocated for by the SJC, for the maintenance of communal toilets provided by the City.��However, by 2013 De Lille had begun to prioritize the inner city and demonize the SJC, perhaps because the movement had identified major shortcomings in the implementation of the janitorial service and demanded these be addressed. Around this time��Ses���khona��People���s Rights Movement, strongly aligned with the local opposition ANC��(while the ANC controls national government, it has been in opposition in Cape Town since 2006),��and with no links to SJC, embarked on opportunistic protests involving the dumping of human feces in public spaces. De Lille conveniently lumped the groups together in public statements, undermining the SJC���s campaigns.
The City has��consistently underspent��a substantial grant provided by the National Treasury to municipalities towards infrastructure for the benefit of poor households, and for improving density and spatial integration. These funds could��be��used��for the upgrading of��informal settlements but��are��lost because of a refusal,��by��leaders like De Lille and Zille,��to acknowledge��the rights of informal settlement residents to have their dignity respected and protected. In 2016 former SJC Deputy Secretary General Dustin Kramer��wrote: ���The SJC, and many thousands of residents, have asked for something very clear: a plan for long-term��sanitation infrastructure in informal settlements. A plan. People often don���t believe us when we explain that the City has no plan for long-term infrastructure. They display real shock that the City not only flatly refuses to produce one, but also viciously attacks us for asking.��� Two years on there is still no plan.
The beast that is��Apartheid��spatial planning
It has been stated repeatedly, without any reasonable response from the DA, that since 1994 not a single affordable housing unit has been built in the Cape Town��city��center��or its immediate surrounds. Prior administrations failed to address the problem of��Apartheid��spatial design,��and the DA and De Lille fared no better.
Under South African law, in accordance with the��constitutional��right to housing, municipalities are responsible for providing temporary accommodation to evictees who would be rendered homeless. However, the City distances itself from private evictions and has failed to plan adequately for meeting its rehousing obligation.��The De Lille administration���s response to the large-scale private eviction of poor families from gentrifying neighborhoods was for the most part callous and ignorant of the law.
Hopolang��Selebalo,��the��former Head of Research at the NGO��Ndifuna��Ukwazi,��wrote in 2016 on a case that is representative of the gentrification-driven forced removals���reminiscent of the forced removals under the Group Areas Act during apartheid���that have for several years been common��near the city��center:
The mayor has shown her lack of understanding of the law and her constitutional obligation in a case where eviction would amount to homelessness. Mayor De Lille���s claim that the families would be jumping the housing queue is false.��Temporary alternative accommodation, as provided in line with court judgements, is not the same as formal housing allocation. In the absence of proactive state interventions to curb the mass evictions of poor families, typical of gentrification in Woodstock, the state has an obligation to provide such families with temporary alternative accommodation.
Under previous DA mayors,��Blikkiesdorp, a notoriously dangerous, overcrowded relocation camp was built to rehouse displaced residents and evictees, and has been called a�����dumping ground for unwanted people.�����Patricia��De Lille oversaw the construction of a second massive relocation camp called��Wolwerivier. The camp is about 30km north of��downtown Cape Town, utterly isolated, has no nearby bus or train stations��or��schools or clinics, yet displaced families with nowhere to go are still being sent there by the municipality because ���there are no other options available.��� It is the fault of those who governed that��after��all these years, the only options available��to displaced people��are the horrific ones that Zille and De Lille built.
De Lille would have us believe that addressing spatial inequality was always on her agenda. In reality, campaigning by social movements like Reclaim the City, the SJC, Save the Philippi Horticultural Area, the Bo-Kaap��Civic Association and others, coupled with the efforts of hard-working, dedicated public servants in local government who operate beyond the scope of political mudslinging, brought the redress of��Apartheid��spatial planning and development of well-located affordable housing in Cape Town into public discourse, and forced De Lille to engage. Her attempt to caste herself as a champion of this cause is disingenuous and��opportunistic, as one would expect from a career politician laying the groundwork for the launch of a new party. Campaigns for affordable housing, including the occupation of inner-city public buildings, and the work of local government insiders who have supported activists��� efforts, have yielded the possibility of well-located social housing on a number of new sites as well as at previously identified locations, like the Salt River Market site��(built on the edge of a working class, mainly coloured and African immigrant section of the gentrifying suburb), a project that has been in the pipeline for more than a decade without implementation.
Police attempt to suppress non-violent protests in Bo-Kaap��on 20 November 2019. Image credit Ashraf Hendricks for��Groundup.Alongside affordable housing campaigns, working-class inner-city residents have attempted to resist the kinds of exclusive developments that are associated with gentrification and forced removals.��In November,��residents of Bo-Kaap,��an inner-city neighborhood that has been the home of people of Cape Malay heritage since the time of slavery,��attempted to block a crane��from entering their neighborhood to start construction of an apartment complex that the community had attempted to formally��opposed. Violent suppression of community protest is a routine reality in South African cities. Again, in Cape Town this violence tends to occur well outside the CBD. However,��in the case of the Bo-Kaap��protests,��non-violent��resistance against a notoriously unscrupulous property developer��was met with deplorable��police brutality��and it happened in the��city��center. The event is surely an indication that the unsustainable approach of extreme two-tiered development, with the poor being left to fight daily for the right to live with dignity, is reaching a breaking point. The inner-city bubble, oblivious to the brutal lived realities of most Capetonians, is being pierced.
If De Lille���s new party is to prove itself different from the DA, she can no longer pretend to be on the side of the dispossessed while protecting the interests of the rich. A party that opposes the toxic politics of the DA could be good��for the city, however, De Lille has betrayed the trust of��its citizens��and it��may��take a great deal for her to earn��that trust��back.
December 3, 2018
Student protests and the weakness of democracy in Ghana
Image credit Dominic Chavez for the World Bank via Flickr.
On the morning of��October 22, 2018, students at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology��(known more by its acronym��KNUST),��the second largest university in Ghana,��planned a peaceful demonstration��over a wide set of grievances��that��soon��turned violent.
Even before local police and military officers arrived with guns and armored vehicles, a large group of students began to smash windows and burn cars.��Students targeted key administrative buildings��and security checkpoints, damaging and looting��property.
After an emergency meeting, the Ashanti Regional Minister, a regional administrator appointed by the President, declared a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and all students were told to leave campus by the following day. At that point, the��governing party��politicians announced that the university would be closed indefinitely. Faculty and students had no idea when they might be able to return to campus and resume classes.
This was a major and unexpected political crisis in what is widely touted as one of the most consolidated democracies in Africa. What was the cause of the student uprising?��Identifying leaders and causes proved somewhat difficult at first, so most people trying to make sense of the protests, took their��cue��from the media.��Local media coverage was circumscribed and focused narrowly on the proximate causes for conflict. The story was��oversimplified. Many media outlets reported a single cause for the ���riots���: students were resisting the current Vice Chancellor���s move to integrate traditionally all-male residence halls. But, this decision had been implemented months earlier and was not the immediate catalyst for the student action.
International media (including that of other African countries) has not covered the campus crisis, leaving Ghana���s democratic status untarnished.��Ghana usually gets depicted as a site of robust, but peaceful democratic politics with a series of free and fair elections and room for political dissent. The lack of close analysis of the protests,��also missed��an��opportunity to understand how informal political institutions can play a key role in mitigating authoritarian actions.
The��media��also missed��the underlying rationale for making��campus��dorms co-ed. The objective was��to provide more rooms to females in centrally-located halls so they wouldn���t have��to walk as far late at night, risking sexual assault and harassment. The��heavy��stigma of sexual assault��not only��hindered reporting by��young��women about the frequency of these experiences, but also��weakened the��public communication of the rationale for these��reforms.��None of this��context��was mentioned in any of the media accounts of the protests.
Also rarely mentioned by the media was a different type of campus security problem. Unquestionably the most immediate catalyst for the protests was an incident of brutality just a few days earlier between a campus security officer and a student.��The��weekend��before the protests, a series of social media posts had spread false rumors that the student had been beaten so severely that he was still in a coma, or had permanently lost his memory. In reality, the student was hospitalized but thankfully recovering from his injuries. Students and concerned observers did not share widely��the fact��that the student had been intoxicated and attempted to stab the campus security with a knife during the encounter.
This was not the first complaint about the harshness of campus security, however. Students had repeatedly reported incidents, but felt that the university administration was not responding adequately.
The administration��had fired several campus security officials, as well as a teaching assistant who was��earlier��shown caning a student in a video that resurfaced and went viral after the campus protests, but they did not communicate these actions effectively to the student body.
Hyper-partisan divides at the national level further obscured the complexity of these multiple student grievances and serious communication gaps between��the��university administration and students at��the��campus��level. Rather than trying to uncover the root causes for student protests��and facilitate student input on real solutions, sections of the media and politicians refracted the conflict through the lens of national party allegiance and opposition.
The��ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) government initially ignored the existing formal rules for mediation of the conflict��and��dissolved the��university���s��Governing Council.��The government established an�����Interim Council,�����removing the Vice Chancellor of KNUST, who was known to be an opposition NDC party supporter.
The��local branch of the University Teachers Association of Ghana��(UTAG) recognized this fundamental threat to academic freedom. By the end of the��first��week, KNUST lecturers had resolved to go on strike��and were mobilizing to convince the other��nine public universities in Ghana��to shut down in solidarity with KNUST.
Even more important than the threat to academic freedom, however, this threatened democracy and the rule of law in Ghana.��The historical record on this is not promising. The formal political institutions for mediating such conflicts were initially disregarded by��whoever was��in power.
Looking back over the post-independence period in Ghana, university students have protested before, but the government response has varied with the��level��of democracy in the political system. Generally, more authoritarian regimes, either single-party or military types, have tended to crack down with more force on student uprisings than in more recent years under a more competitive multi-party system. The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), formed in the 1965/66 academic year out of the then three public universities�����student unions, namely��the��University of Ghana, University of Cape Coast��and KNUST, in order to challenge the growing autocracy��of����the��single-party CPP regime��led by Nkrumah.
NUGS subsequently criticized the policies of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) led by General��Ignatius��Acheampong in the 1970s. Several student demonstrations were staged against the regime���s proposed “UniGov” project.��In 1977, the SMC proposed the concept of Union Government (UNIGOV),��a��political system with no political parties where the military, police and civilians��would��form a union to govern Ghana.��The military government responded by sending the police and the military to contain student demonstrators at the University of��Ghana. The violent confrontation resulted in the death of the then-president of NUGS. The SMC then placed all public universities under the control of the Ministry of Education so as to deny them autonomy. The students protested this move by staying away from lectures, and the SMC government ordered all universities to be closed.
Another remarkable incidence of student-government confrontation happened under the��Jerry��Rawlings�����PNDC��military��regime��in the 1980s. After enduring criticism from the student union over its human rights record, PNDC activists attacked the NUGS during its��congress��at��KNUST in May 1983. Many students sustained various injuries. The students set ablaze some state vehicles. After the student uprising, a warrant was issued for��the��arrest of the president and secretary of NUGS for treason. Following this incident, the universities were closed down for almost a year.
The return to multiparty democracy did not end confrontation between students and the state.��Instead, the conflicts have been less violent and less prolonged. The introduction of fees in the late 1990s was met with student resistance. The response from the government and the university management varied, but Legon and KNUST were closed down for a short period.
In��the October 2018��student protest, the initial government response seemed to echo the more authoritarian patterns in Ghana���s history, but then, those actions were softened.��Finally, one week after the violent student protests and threatened faculty walkout, the��government of Ghana dialed back their position and agreed to uphold the formal political institutions.
This was a crucial move��on the side of government, signaling respect for the��formal political rules of mediation as well as the��independence of the university from partisan manipulation.
The events��reveals��the importance��of informal political institutions��in this��emerging democracy. The��government initially rejected the idea but then later��appealed to��the Asantehene, the current king of a precolonial political system, to play a key role in the mediation.��After the democratic transition, the 1992 constitution allowed the��Governing��Council to appoint the Chancellor, rather than having the Head of State automatically serve as Chancellor for all of Ghana���s universities, as had��been the practice of the recent��authoritarian past. Since 2005, the��Asantehene��had��been named and served��as the Chancellor of KNUST.
On��November 13, 2018, the��Asantehene��acting in his capacity as Chancellor, addressed the Governing Council of the university after the swearing in of new government appointees. He promised to set up a five-member committee to be headed by a retired Supreme Court Justice to��look into��all��of��the grievances. The��Asantehene��encouraged��a��broad��and transparent��investigation��of all complaints saying:
Anybody who has any concerns, knows of whatever that would help in the smooth administration of university, whatever has gone on, whatever;��the students, if they have issues, they should go to tell the committee;��the alumni if they have any issues, they should tell the committee;��the Vice Chancellor will also be given the opportunity to also;��whether if there��is��any accusations against him to also appear;��everybody would be allowed in an open frank manner, so that we can get to the bottom of what has happened.
Ironically, in such a highly polarized partisan atmosphere,��where every actor is seen in the color of their political party, a non-elected political figure��was��asked to intervene, to��draw on deep roots of legitimacy��in order��to fill in the cracks left by electoral competition.
In sum, the government���s initial response to the student protests revealed some of the weaknesses of the hyper-partisan politics in Ghana. The tendency to view conflict in terms of political party rivalry obscured the serious grievances held by students about gender equality and campus security. The media also reduced what was a very complex situation to a single and erroneous representation of events. What helped to pull faculty and students back together was the important role of civil society organizations. Both the teacher associations and student groups on campus as well as the chieftaincy institutions in the region helped to facilitate a constructive dialogue to begin to resolve differences and chart a peaceful path forward.
The weakness of democracy in Ghana
Image credit Dominic Chavez for the World Bank via Flickr.
On the morning of��October 22, 2018, students at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology��(known more by its acronym��KNUST),��the second largest university in Ghana,��planned a peaceful demonstration��over a wide set of grievances��that��soon��turned violent.
Even before local police and military officers arrived with guns and armored vehicles, a large group of students began to smash windows and burn cars.��Students targeted key administrative buildings��and security checkpoints, damaging and looting��property.
After an emergency meeting, the Ashanti Regional Minister, a regional administrator appointed by the President, declared a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and all students were told to leave campus by the following day. At that point, the��governing party��politicians announced that the university would be closed indefinitely. Faculty and students had no idea when they might be able to return to campus and resume classes.
This was a major and unexpected political crisis in what is widely touted as one of the most consolidated democracies in Africa. What was the cause of the student uprising?��Identifying leaders and causes proved somewhat difficult at first, so most people trying to make sense of the protests, took their��cue��from the media.��Local media coverage was circumscribed and focused narrowly on the proximate causes for conflict. The story was��oversimplified. Many media outlets reported a single cause for the ���riots���: students were resisting the current Vice Chancellor���s move to integrate traditionally all-male residence halls. But, this decision had been implemented months earlier and was not the immediate catalyst for the student action.
International media (including that of other African countries) has not covered the campus crisis, leaving Ghana���s democratic status untarnished.��Ghana usually gets depicted as a site of robust, but peaceful democratic politics with a series of free and fair elections and room for political dissent. The lack of close analysis of the protests,��also missed��an��opportunity to understand how informal political institutions can play a key role in mitigating authoritarian actions.
The��media��also missed��the underlying rationale for making��campus��dorms co-ed. The objective was��to provide more rooms to females in centrally-located halls so they wouldn���t have��to walk as far late at night, risking sexual assault and harassment. The��heavy��stigma of sexual assault��not only��hindered reporting by��young��women about the frequency of these experiences, but also��weakened the��public communication of the rationale for these��reforms.��None of this��context��was mentioned in any of the media accounts of the protests.
Also rarely mentioned by the media was a different type of campus security problem. Unquestionably the most immediate catalyst for the protests was an incident of brutality just a few days earlier between a campus security officer and a student.��The��weekend��before the protests, a series of social media posts had spread false rumors that the student had been beaten so severely that he was still in a coma, or had permanently lost his memory. In reality, the student was hospitalized but thankfully recovering from his injuries. Students and concerned observers did not share widely��the fact��that the student had been intoxicated and attempted to stab the campus security with a knife during the encounter.
This was not the first complaint about the harshness of campus security, however. Students had repeatedly reported incidents, but felt that the university administration was not responding adequately.
The administration��had fired several campus security officials, as well as a teaching assistant who was��earlier��shown caning a student in a video that resurfaced and went viral after the campus protests, but they did not communicate these actions effectively to the student body.
Hyper-partisan divides at the national level further obscured the complexity of these multiple student grievances and serious communication gaps between��the��university administration and students at��the��campus��level. Rather than trying to uncover the root causes for student protests��and facilitate student input on real solutions, sections of the media and politicians refracted the conflict through the lens of national party allegiance and opposition.
The��ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) government initially ignored the existing formal rules for mediation of the conflict��and��dissolved the��university���s��Governing Council.��The government established an�����Interim Council,�����removing the Vice Chancellor of KNUST, who was known to be an opposition NDC party supporter.
The��local branch of the University Teachers Association of Ghana��(UTAG) recognized this fundamental threat to academic freedom. By the end of the��first��week, KNUST lecturers had resolved to go on strike��and were mobilizing to convince the other��nine public universities in Ghana��to shut down in solidarity with KNUST.
Even more important than the threat to academic freedom, however, this threatened democracy and the rule of law in Ghana.��The historical record on this is not promising. The formal political institutions for mediating such conflicts were initially disregarded by��whoever was��in power.
Looking back over the post-independence period in Ghana, university students have protested before, but the government response has varied with the��level��of democracy in the political system. Generally, more authoritarian regimes, either single-party or military types, have tended to crack down with more force on student uprisings than in more recent years under a more competitive multi-party system. The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), formed in the 1965/66 academic year out of the then three public universities�����student unions, namely��the��University of Ghana, University of Cape Coast��and KNUST, in order to challenge the growing autocracy��of����the��single-party CPP regime��led by Nkrumah.
NUGS subsequently criticized the policies of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) led by General��Ignatius��Acheampong in the 1970s. Several student demonstrations were staged against the regime���s proposed “UniGov” project.��In 1977, the SMC proposed the concept of Union Government (UNIGOV),��a��political system with no political parties where the military, police and civilians��would��form a union to govern Ghana.��The military government responded by sending the police and the military to contain student demonstrators at the University of��Ghana. The violent confrontation resulted in the death of the then-president of NUGS. The SMC then placed all public universities under the control of the Ministry of Education so as to deny them autonomy. The students protested this move by staying away from lectures, and the SMC government ordered all universities to be closed.
Another remarkable incidence of student-government confrontation happened under the��Jerry��Rawlings�����PNDC��military��regime��in the 1980s. After enduring criticism from the student union over its human rights record, PNDC activists attacked the NUGS during its��congress��at��KNUST in May 1983. Many students sustained various injuries. The students set ablaze some state vehicles. After the student uprising, a warrant was issued for��the��arrest of the president and secretary of NUGS for treason. Following this incident, the universities were closed down for almost a year.
The return to multiparty democracy did not end confrontation between students and the state.��Instead, the conflicts have been less violent and less prolonged. The introduction of fees in the late 1990s was met with student resistance. The response from the government and the university management varied, but Legon and KNUST were closed down for a short period.
In��the October 2018��student protest, the initial government response seemed to echo the more authoritarian patterns in Ghana���s history, but then, those actions were softened.��Finally, one week after the violent student protests and threatened faculty walkout, the��government of Ghana dialed back their position and agreed to uphold the formal political institutions.
This was a crucial move��on the side of government, signaling respect for the��formal political rules of mediation as well as the��independence of the university from partisan manipulation.
The events��reveals��the importance��of informal political institutions��in this��emerging democracy. The��government initially rejected the idea but then later��appealed to��the Asantehene, the current king of a precolonial political system, to play a key role in the mediation.��After the democratic transition, the 1992 constitution allowed the��Governing��Council to appoint the Chancellor, rather than having the Head of State automatically serve as Chancellor for all of Ghana���s universities, as had��been the practice of the recent��authoritarian past. Since 2005, the��Asantehene��had��been named and served��as the Chancellor of KNUST.
On��November 13, 2018, the��Asantehene��acting in his capacity as Chancellor, addressed the Governing Council of the university after the swearing in of new government appointees. He promised to set up a five-member committee to be headed by a retired Supreme Court Justice to��look into��all��of��the grievances. The��Asantehene��encouraged��a��broad��and transparent��investigation��of all complaints saying:
Anybody who has any concerns, knows of whatever that would help in the smooth administration of university, whatever has gone on, whatever;��the students, if they have issues, they should go to tell the committee;��the alumni if they have any issues, they should tell the committee;��the Vice Chancellor will also be given the opportunity to also;��whether if there��is��any accusations against him to also appear;��everybody would be allowed in an open frank manner, so that we can get to the bottom of what has happened.
Ironically, in such a highly polarized partisan atmosphere,��where every actor is seen in the color of their political party, a non-elected political figure��was��asked to intervene, to��draw on deep roots of legitimacy��in order��to fill in the cracks left by electoral competition.
In sum, the government���s initial response to the student protests revealed some of the weaknesses of the hyper-partisan politics in Ghana. The tendency to view conflict in terms of political party rivalry obscured the serious grievances held by students about gender equality and campus security. The media also reduced what was a very complex situation to a single and erroneous representation of events. What helped to pull faculty and students back together was the important role of civil society organizations. Both the teacher associations and student groups on campus as well as the chieftaincy institutions in the region helped to facilitate a constructive dialogue to begin to resolve differences and chart a peaceful path forward.
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