Sean Jacobs's Blog, page 179
May 5, 2020
Women’s political consciousness in Senegal

Road photography between Dakar and Mbour. Image credit Carsten ten Brink via Flickr CC.
This post is part of our series ���Talking back: African feminisms in dialogue.��� It is dedicated to guest editor Rama Salla Dieng���s late sister, Nd��ye Anta Dieng (1985-2019).
I have known Ruth Bush for many years and we share a passion for reading Francophone literature, especially by African writers. The year I lived in Bristol, where she teaches, Ruth introduced me to AWA: La revue de la femme noire, one of the earliest independent African women���s magazines published between 1964 and 1973. At the time, Ruth was digitizing the magazine into an online archive as part of a fascinating project she started with Dr. Claire Ducournau. We started a conversation on the topic and she later invited me to the exhibition of the project at the Mus��e de la Femme Henriette Bathily in Dakar, which was co-produced with IFAN-Cheikh Anta Diop and launched as part of that year���s Ateliers de la Pens��e.
Earlier this year, I had a project that required me to write an article I provocatively titled: “‘The left and its leftovers’: Documenting women���s political activism in Senegal between 1950 and 1979��� as part of the Revolutionary Left in Africa Conference. I discussed with Ruth and she shared valuable material with me. I decided to focus not only on AWA���s voice through its editorial choices, but also critically analyze AWA���s silences in what was to become a central period for the revolutionary left in Senegal; from liberation movements and social movements culminating in May 1968, the musings of political pluralism, and last but not least, the rise and rise of a female political consciousness.
Rama Salla Dieng
Your passion has led you to dedicate a book to analyzing institutions, authors and ideas involved in the complex architecture behind your book, Publishing Africa in French. Can you please tell us more about this research, its motivations and findings?
Ruth Bush
My research began from a love of work by writers such as Aim�� C��saire, James Baldwin, Cheikh Hamidou Kane and Richard Wright, who lived in Paris in the mid-20th century. I was living in Paris and learned a lot about the city and its paradoxes through these writers: its claims to represent freedom and the avant-garde alongside its deeply rooted social and racial inequalities. It was illuminating to connect these writers��� literary work to larger political debates concerning decolonization and tiers-mondisme that came to the surface via journals and publishing houses such as Pr��sence Africaine and Editions Maspero. I spent a lot of time during my PhD working in the archives of publishing houses (many held at the Institut m��moires de l�����dition contemporaine. I looked at readers��� reports on manuscripts submitted by African writers, including Cheikh Hamidou Kane and Malick Fall, in this period. These reveal how these manuscripts were evaluated and according to what notions of aesthetic value they were measured. This led to the central concern of my book, which is to diagnose the structural inequalities and forms of domination that obtained in the French literary field during the period of decolonization (from 1945���1967), and to show how African writers and publishers actively negotiated these contexts. The book shows how the material contexts of literary production and reception (from paper shortages following WWII and anthology culture, to self-publishing and the distribution networks of Pr��sence Africaine on the African continent) were intrinsically linked to ideas of autonomy and aesthetic freedom.
Rama Salla Dieng
Your analysis takes place in a specific political context: To what extent was the French language a battlefield of literary resistance or revolution between editors and authors? And, what were the roles of literary translation in such a vibrant context?
Ruth Bush
This is such an important question. The French language has been, and continues to be, a battlefield, shaped by political contexts and institutions such as the Acad��mie Fran��aise, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, and respective national education systems on the African continent. Senghor acted as a passeur for many African writers in the 1950s and 1950s, given his close friendship with Paul Flamand from Editions du Seuil, we can see his influence too in some relatively conservative decisions about language and genre. Literary prize culture has also been a space for consolidating the status of hegemonic languages, as seen in the institutional history of the Grand Prix Litt��raire d���Afrique Noire.
The ���language question��� continues to spark avid debates concerning the ���Africanization��� of French (seen in work by Ahmadou Kourouma, Boubacar Boris Diop, and Tobias Warner���s recent book. Overall, it often seems there is less inguistic experimentation in francophone African writing than in anglophone African writing���though this is changing, and partly through contact with other media. Language varies hugely, from the urban Wolof of Dakar, which blends in French and English, to Nouchi in Abidjan to Camfranglais in Yaound��. There are of course literary works that use these spoken registers in the francophone space, but still relatively few. The arguments made for producing literary texts in African languages also varies widely across francophone sub-Saharan Africa, and there have been important initiatives here. The publishing scene has, I think, been less concerned with material presentational details in publishing such as glossaries, footnotes, and italicization that have attracted widespread polemical comments in the anglophone space.
Literary translation clearly has an important ethical and social role to play in the African publishing landscape, but faces challenges in terms of sustainable funding models and training support. These challenges are structural and political. The final chapter of Publishing Africa in French discusses the French translations of novels by Amos Tutuola, Chinua Achebe, and Peter Abrahams. It shows how translators appropriated these writers��� work in ways that enriched the French language, and in ways (especially in the case of Tutuola, translated by Raymond Queneau) that often marginalized the author���s subjectivity. This is also a structural issue, where translations of African works have continued to be mostly produced by non-African translators based in the global North. There is an urgent imperative to translate and re-translate African literature. This imperative fuels ideological debates concerning pan-African identities. It���s also underpinned by the material realities of the African literary commons (the pool of linguistic and imaginative resources on which writers draw). My current book project explores new archival sources on the translations of early francophone African “classics,” and research on more recent initiatives to build literary translation infrastructure on the African continent through independent publishing, prizes, festivals such as Bakwa, C��ytu, Cassava Republic, Writivism, or the Mabati-Cornell Kiswahili Prize.
Rama Salla Dieng
With Claire Ducournau (Universit�� Paul-Val��ry Montpellier 3), you led an AHRC-funded project on Popular Print and Reading Cultures in Francophone Africa, which digitized the pioneering francophone African magazine AWA: la revue de la femme noire (1964-1973) can you please tell us more about what inspired you to focus on AWA? Was it a fascination for Annette Mbaye D���Erneville, one of its founders, or the idea of francophone women organizing in the immediate post-independence period?
Ruth Bush
It was both of these things which inspired this work. This project was a collaboration between myself and Claire Ducournau, alongside the Mus��e de la Femme-Henriette Bathily and IFAN-Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar. Annette Mbaye d���Erneville is very well known in Senegal for her inspiring work as a journalist and former program irector of the national radio, and poet. She had a very popular radio show called Jigeen ��i degluleen (Women, listen!) in the 1970s and 1980s, and is still known as “Tata Annette” by many people today. The digitization of AWA: La revue de la femme noire was accompanied by the production of a multimedia exhibition, held in Dakar, Montpellier and Bordeaux in 2017���19. I became interested during my PhD in print culture that existed on the African continent beyond the contours of the French literary field and its institutions and came across AWA while working in the National Archives in Senegal in 2009. It jumped out as a fiercely independent publication produced in Dakar at the Imprimerie Abdoulaye Diop at a time when most press was dominated by French-owned monopolies.
AWA���s blend of content is very eclectic: political news, profiles of inspiring career women and celebrities (Younousse Seye, Miriam Makeba���), fashion photography, literary texts by writers including Birago Diop, Virginie Camara, Joseph Zobel, and translations of Cuban and American writers. The readers��� letters pages are particularly fascinating and give a glimpse of how the magazine curated correspondence with a network of readers in West Africa, and further afield in Brazil, Martinique, Eastern Europe, and Israel. This was a magazine that was also actively read by women in Senegal, albeit an elite part of the population. The traces of female solidarity across borders are inspiring. AWA���s editorial team were mostly female, though many men contributed to its pages, offering advice and pointers which might be read as mansplaining today, but which were clearly integral to how the magazine���s founders saw the need for collaboration and “complementarity” between genders at this point in history.
Rama Salla Dieng
You explain in an insightful article titled Mesdames, Il faut Lire! that AWA was more a glossy magazine interested in ���re-fashioning��� la Femme Noire, and preparing her for the task of nation-building; does this mean that AWA did not have a feminist consciousness?
Ruth Bush
AWA did not explicitly describe itself as “feminist,” and at times actively rejects the term. But its militancy lies in its form and material history. Retrospectively we might position AWA within the plural feminist movements of the 20th century���especially the idea of the “Modern Girl,” which has been traced in the parallel women���s magazine culture from Japan to Egypt to the United States in this same period. But AWA is not a highly commercialized magazine���it received very limited revenue from advertising, and there are, for example, no adverts for skin-lightening creams found in other magazines of the period. AWA���s contributors wanted a space in which to debate how to combine the pleasures and challenges of womanhood with the task of nation-building, through reproductive labor, and through new career avenues, from politics and law, to being a sports woman, secretary, or radio presenter. It���s also key to situate AWA in relation to women���s associations and women���s local level community organizing across francophone West Africa in this period and to recall again the bias of AWA towards a certain elite segment of the population. This is something the editorial team were clearly AWAre of and attempted to tackle in various ways in response to calls from their readers.
Rama Salla Dieng
If AWA still existed, what in your opinion, would it look like today?
Ruth Bush
When the exhibition was launched, there were a couple of people who contacted us to say they were inspired to start a new AWA magazine. I don���t know if those initiatives have yet come to fruition, but it���s exciting to think that historical examples can inspire new incarnations. AWA���s longevity was stalled by a lack of funding and its desire to retain complete autonomy. The editors refused to sell the magazine to French press entrepreneur, Michel de Breteuil; Breteuil subsequently launched his own women���s magazine, Amina, which continues to be produced and widely distributed today. In 2018, an American artist, Fahamu Pecou, made a painting, exhibited in NYC, inspired by AWA. His painting, titled “Jig����n Bu B��s Fenkna,” features AWA���s masthead against the indigo dye found in West African fabrics, superimposed by portraits of two strong and strikingly dressed female figures. One is masked and the other stares directly at the viewer. I think that AWA would exist in the digital realm inhabited by these two women, if it still existed. It would continue to be bold in content, beautiful in aesthetic, and I hope it would retain its founder���s sharp sense of humor!
Rama Salla Dieng
If you were to cite three lessons from women organizing offline that you learned from your work on AWA, what would those be?
Ruth Bush
One, retain autonomy and own the means of production (or borrow them from good friends). Two, remember who your readers/public are and listen to them. And, three, keep laughing.
Rama Salla Dieng
What three recent novels from francophone writers would you recommend? Why?
Ruth Bush
I���ve been reading lots of African campus fiction recently, in French and in English. I enjoyed Mbougar Sarr���s De purs hommes, Fran��ois Nk��m�����s Le cimeti��re des bacheliers, and J��r��me Nouhoua�����s Le piment des plus beaux jours. They show���in very different contexts���how fiction can nourish reflection about institutionalized, bureaucratic and dehumanized spaces in the university. I also read V��ronique Tadjo���s poetic meditation on the Ebola crisis this summer���En compagnie des hommes���and was once again impressed by her stunning command of narrative voices.
Rama Salla Dieng
In the context of ���fallism��� and ���decolonial��� claims in South Africa, the UK, etcetera, what are your views on the future of ���La Francophonie���?
Ruth Bush
I���m very interested in how these “decolonial” claims are echoing in francophone spaces on the continent���especially in public universities, which are suffering the structural effects of the LMD system, massification and ongoing aftermaths of structural adjustment policies, and which are increasingly multilingual spaces. Colleagues in those universities have suggested that these debates about decolonizing the curriculum and the staff body took place much earlier (e.g. in 1968 student protests. There remains an embedded pedagogical tradition inherited from the French higher education system, but initiatives such as the Ateliers de la Pens��e are pushing at the boundaries, rethinking epistemic diversity and the ecology of knowledge production and circulation on the continent. The ways in which epistemic diversity can encompass multilingualism, without reproducing imperial paradigms or hierarchies, is an important next step. I think translation���as a creative practice, an ethic, and writerly craft���has a crucial role to play here. I���d be interested to hear your thoughts about this question, Rama!
Rama Salla Dieng
Are you a feminist yourself?
Ruth Bush
Yes. I grew up with a feminist historian mother who convened Women���s Studies reading groups in our living room in the 1980s and early 1990s. The matriarchs of my family have been very important figures in my life: one working-class grandmother who grew up in Northern England at a time when women were not encouraged to pursue education, lived through the difficulties of bringing up children during WWII, and retained a strong and intelligent sense of who she was. My other grandmother was from a middle-class background; she did study at university and went on to campaign actively in the peace movement, taking me and my brother on marches when we were small. My mother was never dogmatic about imparting her views, but I see now how much has rubbed off on me, especially since becoming a mother myself last year and facing a new set of challenges defined by this changing aspect of who I am. I enjoy reading feminist writers of fiction and non-fiction���of late books about motherhood (Adrienne Rich, Sheila Heti, Maggie Nelson, Leila Slimani). As a feminist, I try to support women colleagues, students, friends, and strangers whenever needed, and to anticipate situations where gendered injustices (including issues affecting LGBTQ+ communities) might arise. These everyday forms of feminist practice are essential to building a more equal forms of society.
Rama Salla Dieng
How do you practice self-care?
Ruth Bush
Self-care very often comes in the form of a piece of cake and a cup of tea. Since having my daughter, I am also much stricter about my working hours. Academic work can easily fill the whole week, but I find I am more relaxed if I spend weekends with friends, at the park, and pottering in the garden, and keep my evenings screen free as far as possible. I am also now trying to reduce my overseas travel for work���this is partly for reasons of self-care and recognizing the benefits of slower modes of thought and reflection, but also due to the unsustainability of long-distance air travel in the context of our shared climate crisis.
Decolonizing the Lens

Still from Our Lady of the Nile."
This year marks 26 years since the horrifying genocide in Rwanda and the 100 days of slaughter that went unheeded by the world. The killings began��on the night of April 6, 1994,��and left almost one million dead and wounded, while an entire country sank into traumatic shock. This is usually a season for mourning for Rwandans since then��and the collective mood is generally heavy and downcast for days on end. An entire generation of Rwandans has since come of age under the living and breathing memory of these events. History has also come under heavy scrutiny, and the hideous tangle of Belgian colonial policies that created and nourished the flames of division between Tutsis and Hutus has been excavated and discussed extensively in books and art over the past two decades.��
I would not go as far as to say that academic, literary or creative production from and about Rwanda is profuse or plentiful, given that production from the African continent as a whole remains marginalized and misappropriated, and exists outside of most international frameworks of distribution and promotion. Within that, East Africa occupies an even more marginal space. But since 2006, Rwandan novelist Scholastique Mukasonga, who writes in French, has blazed her own singular and prolific trail. Born in a large Tutsi family in the Gikongoro region, Mukasonga���s life from the age of four was marked by a series of expulsions and displacements. She grew up in a refugee camp, and has recounted the crippling fear of violence that was part and parcel of her daily life in her memoirs. As a writer, Mukasonga has significantly broadened the historical frame of the genocide in Rwanda by referring to pogroms against the Tutsis in the fifties, sixties and the seventies, events that shaped and eventually culminated in the genocide of 1994.
Now, Mukansonga���s internationally acclaimed 2012 novel Our Lady of the Nile arrives as a stunningly beautiful new feature film from French-Afghan writer and director Atiq Rahimi.
The novel has not only taken Mukasonga on a journey of international success, but also offers a glimpse into the actively cruel, racist and misogynistic policies of the Belgian colonial authorities. Set in an all-girls Catholic boarding school, two Tutsi girls who have been admitted based on a quota system allotting ten percent of slots to Tutsis endure horrific anti-Tutsi violence as gossip, jealousies and rivalries between teenage students escalate into a killing frenzy (while the Belgian nuns and teachers literally shut their ears and doors to the ���purge,��� locking themselves in safety).
Our Lady of the Nile has stayed steadily in the limelight in the last few years. The original French publication in 2012 was followed by the English translation in 2014, as the book garnered awards and acclaim. And now, Rahimi has given it yet another life by bringing it to the big screen. Admirably shot entirely in Rwanda, with Rwandan actors and with plenty of dialogue in Kinyarwanda, Rahimi���s film is visually breathtaking, tightly edited and an emotional rollercoaster. It is no surprise that it has already snapped up some awards at film festivals. The film is divided into four acts that are interspersed with haunting and lyrical passages narrated by a kind old witch, Nyirimongi���a Greek chorus-like device that becomes an objective, moral vector and our calm respite as the tragedy unfolds.
Rahimi���s adaptation makes some interesting moves with regards to the interpretation of the novel. Teasing out the main plot arcs, the film compresses the time span of the story to the few weeks building up to climactic violence against the two Tutsi girls enrolled at the elite boarding school. The novel���s timeline is much longer, and describes the village in which the school is located, while narrating a complicated regional history through local characters who are not part of the Our Lady establishment.
Rahimi���s boarding school tragedy follows a potentially conventional trajectory, with the first section, titled ���Ubuziranenge��� (Innocence), portraying a somewhat ���normal��� routine in which the pupils exist in relative harmony and are united against the authority of the teachers, nuns and priests. The girls discuss boyfriends, get caught copying exams, argue with teachers over their curriculum and cut lines for the bathroom. Rahimi also conveys nostalgia for days gone by with an occasional slow motion scene or long shots of lush landscapes that will soon come to represent a paradise lost. The gorgeous cinematography can feel bewildering given Rahimi���s lingering close-ups of beautiful young women, but by the end of the film, it is clear that, while there is a proclivity to aestheticizing, this is no sexualized fetish cam.
Innocence is, of course, soon thwarted as the school bully, Gloriosa, abetted by her meek companion, Modesta, set out to put their two Tutsi classmates, Virginia and Veronica, in their place. A local Belgian artist, De Fontaneille, harbors a fetish for Tutsi women that helps drive a sense of division as the shocking plot unfolds. Mukasonga���s novel, and now Rahimi���s film, explore what is called the ���Hamitic hypothesis��� that is often cited as the ideological basis of Belgium���s deliberate underdevelopment of the Hutus. Cunningly alluding to the Hamitic myth through a church sermon scene, Rahimi introduces the viewer to the Biblical story, which claims that the descendants of Ham, son of Noah, populated the areas by the river Nile, and thus remain related to Europe. In Rwanda, it was the Tutsis who were made to fit this category, and in a boarding school literally built on the banks of the Nile, the character of creepy De Fontaneille embodies a preoccupation with this racialized myth. He is openly obsessed with Tutsi women, their facial features, their necks and their blood lineage.
“Je vous aime” ( I love you people), De Fontaneille languidly tells Veronica and Virginia, then proceeds to spin for them a convoluted myth about Tutsi queens. By drawing a sketch of Veronica and lavishing compliments upon her about the shape of her nose, all in front of her classmates, De Fontaneille sets Gloriosa on a jealous and destructive path. She decides that the revered statue of the Madonna near their school must be given an authentic Hutu nose. ���Our statue has a minority nose,��� Gloriosa fumes. Later in the film, she physically climbs upon her friend���s back in the dead of the night to replace the statue���s nose: ���You���ll soon have a nice Rwandan nose,��� is Gloriosa���s demented, nationalist declaration to the statue. With the fires of hate and revenge officially fueled, the next three acts���titled Ikizara (Sacred), Umuziro (Sacrilege) and Igitambo (Sacrifice)���give us a glimpse into the actual 1973 pogroms that took place at schools and universities with the intention of purging Tutsi students enrolled on quotas.
A master stroke in Rahimi���s interpretation is the focus on direct and lived impacts of the invisible iterations of racism that colonialism creates and sustains: the inferiority complexes generated through European ideas of beauty; the promotion of ���good��� taste and refinement through European food leading to shame and alienation towards one���s local culture; and finally, what the Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong���o has called the psychological and spiritual subjugation coming from the imposition of colonial language at a young age.
Some of the contemporary African boarding school narratives I have read engage similar tropes. Tsitsi Dangarembga���s Book of Not, like Mukasonga���s book, teases out the complicated reality of co-existing with schoolmates when racial and ethnic lines remain so tautly drawn. The battles that rage outside spill over into the inside. Ng��g�� wa Thiong’o���s memoir In the House of the Interpreter, for example, gives us a glimpse into a boys boarding school as anti-colonial war rages outside. Here, too, Christianity, European refinement, physical education and language superiority are meted out in the same toxic cocktail seen as fine and ���elite��� colonial education.
In the film, several shots of nuns bolting the iron gates of the Our Lady mark the ways in which these women���s bodies and their virginity is constantly controlled. ���We���re accountable for the virginity of the girls,��� the Mother Superior explains when a student shocks the establishment by getting pregnant out-of-wedlock. As the film progresses, the gates���which also symbolize a forcibly united post-independence Rwanda, mirrored in the structure of this school���are rendered futile. Soon enough, the violence is brought right into the classrooms and the dormitories as young men rape and kill.
In Decolonising the Mind, Ng��g�� wrote that colonialism meant that the ���night of the sword and the bullet was followed by the morning of the chalk and the blackboard.��� Our Lady of the Nile illustrates this by allowing the audience to eavesdrop on some infuriating lectures dished out by deadpan teachers proclaiming racist ideas, such as the notion that ���Africa has no history,��� or reprimanding characters with the adage, ���You are expected to be good citizens, good Christians.��� In one of the school assemblies, students are explicitly told, ���I have heard girls only speak Kinyarwanda. Our code of conduct forbids the use of this language.��� In addition to Christian chastity, the French language and glorified Western history, the ideals of good taste (code for European refinement) are also playfully dissected. The young women taste foreign foods like foie gras and caviar and find them repellent. Amidst the giggles, Gloriosa reminds them, ���You girls have to get used to this kind of food ��� At official dinners, you won���t be eating beans and bananas.���
Rahimi also layers the film with archival imagery, with the perhaps pedantic goal of revealing horrifying facets of Belgian history. In one old photo the girls discover, they are puzzled about why one of the men���s faces is crossed out with a red marker. It is a 1960 photo of Patrice Lumumba at the event of his controversial speech commemorating Congo���s independence, and when King Baudoin of Belgium had famously stormed off. Such intertextual elements are artfully woven throughout and serve to emphasize the acute impact of European imperialism not just in Rwanda, but on the African continent more widely.
Women���s narratives about boarding schools expose the realm of the intimate and the domestic as a space of war. The origins of violence can be traced to seemingly banal, spiteful rivalries over who���s more beautiful. We see the brainwashing in action as the girls gush over photos of the Belgian queen, who they proclaim as ���beautiful.��� They are also fascinated with De Fontaneille; they visit him in hopes of becoming his muses. Virginia���s character remains an important counterpoint here. Always sage, analytical and prescient, she places her faith in pre-colonial systems of belief as the crisis threatens to worsen. She visits Nyirimongi, who lives in the mountains, and pleads for help. The message here seems to be that the colonial edifice upon which independent Rwanda was built cannot yield solutions or peace. Instead, we are going to have to return to older histories and alternative, non-Eurocentric approaches.
However, the Rwandan women students of Our Lady are not complicit recipients or foolish mimics of ordained behavior. Characters switch to speaking in their native language when required. Some find ways to hang out with their boyfriends and are certainly not invested in virginity. Catholicism is part of the school���s fundamental structure, but for the women, it is often no more than a charade. When a classmate suddenly dies, they all participate in the Christian prayers, but in the dead of the night, they whisper: ���I���m sure they lied to us,��� concluding that ���[n]othing���s fair in this world when you are a woman.��� As an alternative to the Christian prayers, they choose to mourn their friend under the inky twilight with a beautiful, traditional dance in the rain, reminiscent of scenes from Julie Dash���s Daughters of the Dust. Though this is hardly the world of the Northern Ireland series, Derry Girls, all the young women show spunk and attitude in some form or another. And the consistent representation of these women as empowered and independent-minded is the real redeeming feature of a film that could have easily succumbed to a depiction of these women as victims of society, family, institutions, war and the country itself.
While films about Rwanda have tended to focus on the events of 1994, Our Lady of the Nile is a game-changer because of its attempt to map the lesser known moments that contributed to and then culminated in the final horror of 1994. That said, the film does not significantly complicate the main political narrative about Tutsis as victims, Hutus as victimizers and Europe as the silent instigator. Human rights reports and the occasional memoir or documentary have attempted to argue that Hutu civilians suffered abuses too, and that the story is far more nuanced. But Rwanda occupies a complicated place in the world���s imagination. The current president, Paul Kagame, has held power since 2000 and has been heavily criticized for his forced reconciliation and social re-engineering programs. Perceived as the epitome of a benevolent tyrant, he does command respect in neighboring countries that complain of their own leaders��� corruption, inefficiency and a lack of heartfelt commitment to their people���s advancement. Given the intense rigidity of the current national narrative, it would be difficult to move the needle too much. Additionally, Mukasonga, who lost a shocking 27 family members in 1994, brings her personal experience to bear in her novel and by extension, the film.
Our Lady of the Nile��is a difficult but gripping book, and it is not surprising that Rahimi, himself a war refugee, saw a powerful film in the material and took on the challenge of bringing it to the screen. The challenge here is not only of cinematic adaptation, but of producing and distributing such a story within the context of a lopsided film industry that makes it hard for such movies to succeed outside the frameworks of festivals and small screenings.��And this year, a cruel season has dawned upon us all��as a global pandemic threatens livelihoods and collective sanity. Sadly, it has stemmed the flows of art, literature and culture.��Our Lady of the��Nile��was scheduled to make the rounds with screenings in different cities, and while these are now cancelled, I still hope that there is a way for the world to see this gorgeous film in the near future.
May 4, 2020
The new normal

New Orleans, USA. Image credit Derek Bridges via Flickr CC.
��� Nigerian Christian hymnSome have food but cannot eat, some can eat but have no food, we have food and we can eat, glory be to you my lord.
I am from Lagos in Nigeria. Lagos is a port city, the most populous in Nigeria and one of the fastest-growing cities in the world. I now live in another port city, New Orleans, Louisiana. Where I live in New Orleans, we���re on the cusp of something ��� ordinary. We���re in a moment that feels different but evokes sameness; the tree birds are chattering as remarkably as yesterday, even if the pace of our world has slowed. There are fewer cars, and less pedestrians on the streets, but Westworld just premiered its new season on HBO and take-out is still available.
Social life remains relatively undisturbed, already socialized towards disconnectedness by personalized technology: Spotify and Netflix distract our souls; on-demand consumption remains our prerogative, Uber Eats, Instacart and Amazon deliver sustenance to our bodies; text, video messaging, and dating apps lift our emotional spirits. We���re mostly dancing and cooking (sheltering) in place, longing for our old lives back.
But our social lives, relatively intact though scaled back because of the virus, have the opposite fortunes of our devastated economic life. The virus is erasing the wider economy, and specific sectors, like the restaurant industry, have been decimated. Because our social and economic lives are intertwined, we feel the current economic disruption deep in the marrow.
Some of us, the middle class and affluent, are facing the sort of existential uncertainty we usually defer until death or illness. While others, those of us already heavily policed by the state���immigrants, the working class, black and brown bodies���are facing the same ambiguous existence we���ve always known, except the moment is compounded by everyone else’s anxieties. But the future isn���t as inscrutable as we fear. There are at least two ways to be clairvoyant, by examining history and observing contemporary but parallel realities.
Right after 9/11, there was significant shuddering at what the future would look like. And when it came, it was what some of us already knew: hyper surveillance and militarized security. For much of white America the changes were invisible, like the suspension of habeas corpus to foreigners, allowing the indefinite detention of ���enemy combatants,��� the No Fly List which put restrictions on many Muslim sounding travelers long before the Muslim Ban, and electronic eavesdropping on US citizens.
And the most visible changes were initially shocking but soberly accepted among Americans: National Guard personnel armed with assault rifles arrived at airports, stoically preserving our peace with their frightening presence. Military presence in US airports has receded since, but vestiges of our former fear remain in the security screening process, K-9 patrols, and the occasional weapon-bearing military person. Today, our social lives have adjusted robustly to this new normal, because our economic lives are intact.
While 9/11 produced war and global surveillance, it was also an attack on the American psyche, symbolically represented by the financial industry. America���s greatest act of social defiance was to reignite its economic motor. Ergo the $15b bailout to the airline industry and other billions spent across various economic sectors. America���s response was captured perfectly by George W. Bush a few weeks after 9/11 when he said, ���Get down to Disney World in Florida. Take your families and enjoy life, the way we want it to be enjoyed.��� After all, our social lives only find meaning in consumption: it was business as usual.
If 9/11 offers a broad perspective on the doggedness of the US economic system and the social adaptability of Americans, ever accommodating as long as commerce and consumption remain uninterrupted, then Hurricane Katrina is a site specific example of what happens when the world completely changes but everything remains the same. Because, while Katrina temporarily sunk New Orleans��� restaurant industry, the city rebounded spectacularly.
Katrina was such a comprehensive disaster that the end of the city seemed more possible than a recovery. Before the hurricane, tourism, with visitor spending predominantly anchored by hotels and restaurants visits, contributed about $6 billion to the city���s economy, funding a third of the city’s operating budget. Immediately following Katrina The New York Times reported only about three or four restaurants of the city���s estimated 3,400 were still functioning. The economic cost to New Orleans was about $75 billion, the human loss stood at 1,200 people (or more). For restaurants in particular the situation was remarkably dire.
Ten years later, Mayor Mitch Landrieu in his 2015 State of the City Address would say ���… we are in the midst of a retail and restaurant boom.��� He was right. New Orleans is back to normal and even more prosperous than before: economic output has grown by about 26 percent since Katrina and tourism spending has jumped by around 50 percent, reaching a record $9b in 2018. Restaurants have rebounded spectacularly, growing by 24 percent since Katrina. While the general economic trends have been positive, the specific rewards are uneven, with black New Orleanians benefitting the least. The economic distance between black and white New Orleans began before the hurricane and picked up right after. More than 75,000 of the 175,000 Black New Orleanians who fled the city after Katrina never returned. Today the share of black residents has dropped from 67 percent to 59 percent, and half of all black households earn less then $23,237 per year. In the restaurant industry specifically, black workers are more likely to be clustered in low wage jobs while ���the highest paid occupations in the full-service restaurant industry are disproportionately filled by white workers.��� And to remove any doubt that everything equilibrates back to inequality in the US, whether for labor or employer, let this pre-Katrina statistic, which persists still, marinate in your spirit: minority-owned businesses, which make up about 40 percent of all businesses in New Orleans, only receive 2 percent of total sales receipts.
The coronavirus pandemic is as much a public healthcare crisis as it is an economic crisis, without precedent yet parallel to Katrina. The coronavirus pandemic has brought with it the same desperate calls for federal aid, including for the restaurant industry, that was widespread during Katrina. Now as with then, everyone acknowledges ���the early and strong role of the federal government is critical in these mega-catastrophes.���
But, as usually happens in disorienting times like these, there is an intermediary step. Spurred by a desire to be helpful and faith in the free market, private citizens, businesses, and civic actors mobilized to take action. Restaurant kitchens were reconfigured into community resource hubs and kitchens. Formerly restricted content from food sections of publications like the New York Times emerged from behind paywalls to offer recipes for free. Big food and beverage brands, like Patron tequila, created emergency relief funds to assist restaurant workers. And individuals generously contributed to crowdfunding campaigns, supporting restaurants and their workers.
But as usually happens, both free market and philanthropic responses are ultimately impotent in the face of systemic crises���philanthropy itself a consequence not a solution for problems arising from the free market. All these efforts are a precursor to government relief.
The loose set of collective demands from restaurants were twofold. For their employees, they asked the government to stabilize incomes by offering paid sick leave and expanding unemployment benefits. For themselves they sought cost abatement and capital injection through rent relief, low to zero percent interest loans, debt forgiveness, and tax suspensions and holidays. On March 27, 2020, the government speedily obliged when the President signed a $2T relief package. It goes a long way to meet the demands, but falls short of industry specific relief that would recapitalize restaurants. Without additional intervention it seems many restaurants will die. But what exactly does this mean?
The restaurant industry is one where labor is segregated by race and gender, underpaid and uninsured. An industry fed largely by an industrial agricultural system that��either extracts profits from the environment with little consequences, or offers ethically sourced produced to just a few for a lot. An industry where on the higher end is great food at fat prices in spaces that drive up real estate values, pushing property prices higher and poorer people further. And on the lower scale, working poor people, making barely enough to keep them going, serve low nutrition meals to other working poor people, who can���t afford quality housing because of predatory development. Let it die.
This old god prioritizes the capital of a few people over the labor and lives of many. Relief keeps the status quo intact by taxing workers to subsidize owners. Stimulus checks and unemployment benefits offered to workers will be used to finance consumption (rent, food, healthcare, etc), which only concentrates wealth with the owners of these services. Similarly government guaranteed loans or grants to business owners are essentially the government financing the capital expenditure of businesses. Capital expenditure is money spent by owners to acquire or maintain assets. Assets generate returns. What is wealth if not this: the sedimented, accrual of returns, pressed down, shaken together and running over?
Americans famously say ���there���s no such thing as a free lunch” yet we don���t always abide this axiom. This very American stimulus package is an ���eat now, pay later,” relief for restaurant workers. Deficit spending, which this relief bill is, is financed by future tax increases, or service cuts or future borrowing or future inflation, which means future interest rate hikes and increased borrowing costs for workers (and owners).
Instead of this relief bill, we should be demanding a new system that works for owners and workers alike, one that provides quality housing, healthcare, food, childcare, education, leisure, and work. Instead of bailing out restaurants, we should make people whole.
We need a fiscal policy that does three things.��First it should include reparations: repaying historical debts to African Americans and Indigenous People. There is precedent for this: The US government paid interned Japanese Americans, and land dispossessed Alaskan Natives. Internationally, Germany made reparation payments to Israel for the Holocaust.
Second the policy must eliminate poverty for all US residents. One option is by instituting a Federal Jobs Guarantee which would achieve full national employment by providing jobs to all working age residents, with accompanying benefits including healthcare, childcare, paid family and sick leave and vacation. This creates a competitive labor market that eliminates exploitation. The government did this during the Great Depression.
Finally the policy must equalize opportunity for the next generation through ���baby bonds,��� which are trusts endowed by the government and given to each child at birth. The amount disbursed is based on the wealth position of the child���s family. The trust grows at a guaranteed rate of return and matures when the child reaches voting age. At maturity the trust will be restricted to asset building expenditures, like tertiary education and home ownership.
These three policy recommendations as packaged together are the product of long study by structural economist William Sandy Darrity whose research on racial wealth disparity proves that working the margins herds everyone towards safety.
These measures would fit neatly into the Green New Deal, a legislative proposal that tackles climate crises and economic inequality. Whether all of this is the exact answer is irrelevant. This historic moment calls for a complete retooling of our economic system���not a cheap resurrection of the old master.
May 3, 2020
Talking back: African feminisms in dialogue

Girls walking together outside Yomelela Primary School, Khayalitsha, Cape Town, South Africa. Image credit Karin Schermbrucker for UN Women via Flickr CC.
This post is the introduction to our series “Talking back: African feminisms in dialogue.” It is dedicated to guest editor Rama Salla Dieng‘s late sister, Nd��ye Anta Dieng (1985-2019).
In recent years, various forms of feminist organizing have emerged from the Cape to Cairo. We have seen South African students demonstrate on campuses around the country to resist gender-based violence, and to denounce structures of economic oppression (#FeesMustFall), as well as the coloniality of their curriculum and universities (#RhodesMustFall). We have witnessed Egyptian and Sudanese women and youth taking to the streets to reclaim a fairer and more equitable society, and denounce the violence with which their organizing has been met. In Uganda, scholars such as Stella Nyanzi faced imprisonment because of speaking truth to power (she was recently released). In Kenya and Botswana queer activists are pushing for the decriminalization of same-sex relations. On social media, Francophone African women have used the hashtags #VraieFemmeAfricaine, #Nopiwouma, #BalanceTonSaiSai, or #Doyna to challenge patriarchy, sexism, and gender-based violence.
In the coming weeks, a series of posts on this site called Talking Back: African feminisms in Dialogue will discuss issues that are the daughters of our times. It focuses on the connections and disruptions in African feminist thought and practice. It asks a simple question: How are young feminist scholars using their life experiences as sources and resources for theorizing their feminism? In attempting to answer this question, a deliberate effort is made to reflect on the politics of gender, ���belonging,��� and knowledge production, since delineating these concepts also requires a focus on the power dynamics at play.
Genealogies of African feminisms
African feminisms do not start with colonialism, yet similar to the history of African societies, they are still conflated with the encounter with ���others.��� The rich legacies of feminist ancestors who led in public life in pre-colonial times���including Njinga Bandi of 17th century Angola, Yennega of 14th century Burkina Faso, the Kahina of Algeria and Lingeer Ndate Yalla Mbooj of the Waalo Kingdom in Senegal���have been acknowledged. Yet, this focus on exceptional women and indeed, the shift from ���woman-as-heroine��� in the 1960s to ���woman-as-victim��� in the 1980s reveals the mainstream focus on the ���status of women��� (Andrea Cornwall 2005). Indeed, there are many other women who were not queens, but would today be qualified as feminists. Although there are claims that feminism is far from being elitist, there has been a deliberate erasure of voices of generations of women from Africa, the Caribbean, India, and Latin America.
African feminists have provided a vibrant counter-response and have actively contributed to transform these representations of African women, and indeed gender, in feminist scholarship and organizing internationally. A founding moment for the emergence of global south feminists was the conference held at Wellesley College in 1975. The conference was an opportunity for feminists from Africa, Asia, and Latin America to express their disagreement vis-��-vis some of the intellectual positions and social attitudes of certain American and European feminists, and to critique the homogenization of women and the universalism of questions relating to gender, race, and social classes. It was at Wellesley that African participants���such as Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, Bolanle Awe, Marie Angelique Savane, Fatema Mernissi, Filomena Steady, Nawal El Sadaawi, Niara Sudarkasa, and Dina Osman, among others���met and decided to create what would become the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD), an organization to support training, research, and advocacy by and for African women. Following meetings in Zambia and Senegal, AAWORD was finalized in 1977.
Seminal works by African feminists contributed to a shift in feminist scholarship internationally to acknowledge that difference and context matter, because the issues feminisms seek to address���structures of sexism, domination, patriarchies, oppression and inequalities���vary according to the social structures that engendered them. Some of these works sought to question the still colonial lens through which ���southern��� and African feminisms were being theorized. For instance, claiming the fluidity of gender (Amadiume 1987), or that age/seniority is more important in power relations than sex before colonialism/Christianity in subsaharan Africa (Oyewumi 1997), or even question the relevance of gender for understanding African societies (Nzegwu 2006). Other feminists have reclaimed that the Yor��b�� did do gender, questioning the selective use of language in defense of a matriarchy that was, in fact, profoundly patriarchal (Nzegwu 1998, Bakare-Yusuf 2003).
Feminist African scholars also theorized gender in social sciences in Africa (Imam, Mama & Sow 1997), while reclaiming African sexualities (Tamale 2011), and queer Africa (Ekine and Habbas 2013, Mathebeni 2014). They were pivotal to infrastructuring African feminist scholarship with platforms to discuss feminism in Africa (the journal Feminist Africa at the Africa Gender Institute in Cape Town, the African Feminist Forum (AFF) and its Charter of Feminist Principles for African Feminists), while organizing to articulate the various forms and shapes of feminist engagement on the continent. This centrality of self-identifying and collectively organizing is illustrated in the most important work of women in CODESRIA (the Council of Social Science Research in Africa) founded in 1973, AAWORD, created in 1977, and the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), founded in 2001.
From the 2000s to today, diverse variants of feminisms have blossomed on the African continent and in the diaspora. Social media has also contributed to new platforms of creativity, dialogue and activism on feminist issues such as African Feminist Forum, MSafropolitan, HOLAA!, and AdventuresFrom, to name a few. Currently, the #MeToo movement, which was started a decade ago by Tarana Burke, an American civil rights activist (and a victim of sexual violence herself), has sparked a worldwide movement to break the silence around sexual violence and harassment. Feminists in Africa and the global south have asked whether #MeToo was a west-only movement and have engaged in/from spaces such as churches (#ChurchMeToo), mosques (#MosquesMeToo), and in the international development sector (#AidToo).
For Mina Salami, who is behind MSafropolitan and is author of the forthcoming book Sensuous Knowledge, three main strands have emerged since the 2000s to complement postcolonial feminisms (radical, Afrocentric and grassroots). These are: 1) liberal feminism, which focuses on individual choices and freedoms, such as sexual rights, equality in the workplace, gender gaps, and internal household dynamics, but fails to address the consequences of neoliberalism; 2) the millennial or 4th Wave African feminism, which is represented by young women organizing across the continent from marches to student protests, blogging and vlogging, and artivism; and 3) Afropolitan feminism and Afrofuturist feminism. These feminisms are forward-looking and propose a transnational approach to feminism that is inclusive of (if not sometimes led by) the African diaspora. Feminism has gained momentum globally. And more and more African feminists are being recognized for their work including Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie whose TED talk: ���We should all be feminists��� and short book Dear Ijeawele have resonated worldwide.
This series
The African Feminist Charter has beautifully highlighted the centrality of creating an inclusive, plural, and political definition of what it means to embrace feminism as African women:
By naming ourselves as feminists we politicize the struggle for women’s rights, we question the legitimacy of the structures that keep women subjugated, and we develop tools for transformatory analysis and action. We have multiple and varied identities as African feminists. We are African women, we live here in Africa and even when we live elsewhere, our focus is on the lives of African women on the continent. Our feminist identity is not qualified with “ifs,” “buts,” or “howevers.” We are feminists. Full stop.
Although are as many (African) feminisms as there are African feminists, in this series we use the term feminisms to acknowledge pluralism and diversity, and seek to theorize it and reclaim it from our various standpoints. Not all of us are academic, yet we reclaim our various activities as sites from which we can conceptualize and embody our feminist activism. In addition, this series seeks to highlight how each of us defines our feminism on our own terms, and do not seek to establish an identity through resistance. In doing so, we take a political as well as an ideological stance; identifying as such is a way of acknowledging, showing solidarity with, and placing ourselves in the continuity of previous generations of women fighting back against the sexism and patriarchy forcefully imposed on them. This series is a way for us, as African feminists, to reclaim the intersectionality and polysemy of our struggles. The following interviews address topics ranging from digital activism, women organizing online and offline, and writer���s and academics perspectives.
This allows us to re-claim feminism away from the exclusive territories and vocabularies (and policing) of academia, to allow ourselves to color outside the lines, re-locate or just re-claim feminisms in the interstices of our daily realities and solidarities.
The Talking Back series will consist of conversations with: Annette Joseph Gabriel (Ghana, France) and Mame Fatou Niang (France, Senegal); award-winning writer Mouhamadou Mbougar Sarr (Senegal); Francoise Moudouthe (Cameroon/France) of the pan-African feminist blog Eyala; Rosebell Kagumire (Uganda) of the pan-African feminist digital platform Africanfeminism; Tiffany Mugo (South Africa) of the pan-African feminist digital platform HOLAA; Nana Darkoa (Ghana) of AdventuresFrom; Dr. Ruth Bush of the University of Bristol; and an interview with Ndeye Debo Seck (Senegal) of the Coll��ge d���Education Moyen Waly Thiobane, Kaffrine.
Ghana responds to the coronavirus

Independence Square, Accra, Ghana. Image via Piqsels CC.
On April 19, President Nana Akufo-Addo (in office since January 2017) gave his seventh address to the nation since he first announced a lockdown on March 30 to curb the spread of the coronavirus in major cities like Accra and Kumasi. The president emphasized that restrictions on public gatherings are still in place. All schools are to remain closed, but ���businesses and other workplaces can continue to operate observing staff management and workplace protocols, with the view to achieving social distancing and hygiene protocols.���
According to the Ghana Health Service, as of April 27, about 106,090 people have been tested for COVID-19. The country has 1,671 confirmed cases with 188 recoveries and 16 confirmed deaths.
Some of the government���s efforts to ease the burden of the pandemic on the population include the suspension of water bills from April to June, tax suspension for some health workers who provide essential services, suspending electricity bills for low-income Ghanaians and, more recently, distribution of food to people in need. The government has also supported the disinfection of public spaces like major streets and markets in cities such as Accra and Tamale. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education has worked with the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation to provide online, TV, and radio lessons for primary, junior and senior high schools in the country.
Although these efforts seem commendable, it is important to not lose sight of the fact that economically marginalized people are feeling the effects of the pandemic the most; from the threats to their livelihoods, housing challenges, struggles to social distance, access to basic amenities, and access to credible information about the virus, among others.
A couple of weeks ago, more than 1,000 residents in Old Fadama, a suburb of Accra, were rendered homeless following a demolition exercise carried out by the Accra Metropolitan Assembly. Demolishing the homes of poor residents while the city of Accra was under lockdown tells us all we need to know about how the government is addressing the needs of working class people.
The destruction of the homes of some residents of Old Fadama means that many including children have had to sleep in the open and have been subjected to the vagaries of the cold harmattan weather, mosquito bites, etc. This situation puts these residents at risk of contracting the virus, as they have little to no way of observing social distancing rules, access to running water and access to other resources to practice basic hygiene. Although the Accra Mayor, Mohammed Adjei Sowah, said that displaced people will be provided with temporary housing, many are still sleeping in the streets.
Meanwhile, there has been growing stigma toward COVID-19 patients in the country. This stigma can be attributed to inadequate education about the virus. Although citizen-led groups and opinion leaders have taken it upon themselves to produce educational content in some indigenous languages, many Ghanaian languages have yet to be covered especially in mainstream media campaigns.
In addition, people with disabilities have been largely excluded from media campaigns about the virus. In a statement to Sanatu Zambang Studios (a media organization in Tamale), the Northern Regional Association of the Deaf (NRAD) lamented the lack of education on the virus for deaf people, and called on media organizations to provide education on the coronavirus in sign language.
It seems that the abundance of fake news stories also drowns some efforts to provide accurate information about the virus. The stigma towards people who test positive for COVID-19 means that many who fear they may have it shy away from testing and treatment. In early April, there were reports that a patient ran away from quarantine in the Tamale Teaching Hospital. On April 16, it was reported that another person who tested positive for the virus in Wa in the Upper West Region also ran away. Both patients were foreign nationals. As we look for ways to address stigma, it is imperative for us to consider how when coupled with xenophobia it results in situations where patients would rather run away than receive treatment.
Furthermore, the media should re-examine the role it plays in facilitating the stigma of COVID-19 patients by being more ethical in reporting these stories. Some media organizations have shown the faces of people who have recovered from the virus, inadvertently directing stigma to these people and their families. Others have mentioned the names of patients and their families in broadcasts. Ghana���s National Media Commission should work actively to address these issues and should put in place measures to sanction media organizations that expose patients and recovered patients to harm in this way.
At the same time, the media faces the immense challenge of fake news, which is being shared on WhatsApp and other social media platforms via friend and family networks, social group chats, and religious networks, among others. Many of these fake news stories, which are usually packaged via videos, audios and texts, are produced from unverified sources. Some are locally produced or imported conspiracy theories about the virus that are unfounded. The spread of disinformation is facilitated easily by many people���s inability to distinguish credible information from fake news, due to a deep lack of media literacy in our communities. Government efforts to curb this spate of disinformation have only gone as far as debunking untruths about the number of confirmed coronavirus cases in the country.
In the last few weeks, the state has involved the police and military to ensure that people in the country follow the rules about quarantine, social distancing and other directives regarding the lockdown in some major cities. That most of these police and military personnel walk around with firearms to ���safeguard��� these directives means that our communities have been reconfigured as war zones, and violence is used to confront civilians who break these protocols.
The involvement of the military and police in other African countries such as South Africa, Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria has resulted in catastrophic consequences. Beyond the physical abuse of civilians, it was reported on April 6 that one such encounter resulted in the death of a man in Ashaiman, Accra.
Historically, policing has been a tool utilized by the colonizer to enact violence on the colonized. Furthermore, having lived through a series of military coups d�����tat, coupled with curfews where the rights of civilians have been abused with impunity, we need to re-examine the way that we use these law enforcement institutions to fight the virus. According to criminology scholar Justice Tankebe, policing in many traditional Ghanaian societies ���was a collective responsibility of all individuals��� not the vesting of power in institutions and individuals to enact violence on the citizenry. Given the violent history and nature of the military and the police, a more humane approach to addressing violations of COVID-19 protocols would be more effective.
At a very critical time when the government should be exploring avenues to make things easier for the most marginalized in our society through various social support measures, the state has participated in worsening the lives and living conditions of many of these residents.
There is one bright spot: the Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research (NMIMR) and the West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP) at the University of Ghana announced on April 11 that the research institutes had successfully sequenced genomes of COVID-19. According to Professor Abraham Anang, the director of the NMIMR, this genome sequencing ���will strengthen surveillance for tracking mutations of the virus and aid in the tracing of the sources of community infections in people with no known contact with confirmed cases.��� The scientists have since shared their work with other scientists around the world through an open access platform. A few days ago, the Kumasi Centre for Collaborative Research developed rapid diagnostic testing kits, which would help facilitate and decentralize coronavirus testing across the country.
Ghana���s response to the coronavirus

Independence Square, Accra, Ghana. Image via Piqsels CC.
On April 19, President Nana Akufo-Addo (in office since January 2017) gave his seventh address to the nation since he first announced a lockdown on March 30 to curb the spread of the coronavirus in major cities like Accra and Kumasi. The president emphasized that restrictions on public gatherings are still in place. All schools are to remain closed, but ���businesses and other workplaces can continue to operate observing staff management and workplace protocols, with the view to achieving social distancing and hygiene protocols.���
According to the Ghana Health Service, as of April 27, about 106,090 people have been tested for COVID-19. The country has 1,671 confirmed cases with 188 recoveries and 16 confirmed deaths.
Some of the government���s efforts to ease the burden of the pandemic on the population include the suspension of water bills from April to June, tax suspension for some health workers who provide essential services, suspending electricity bills for low-income Ghanaians and, more recently, distribution of food to people in need. The government has also supported the disinfection of public spaces like major streets and markets in cities such as Accra and Tamale. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education has worked with the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation to provide online, TV, and radio lessons for primary, junior and senior high schools in the country.
Although these efforts seem commendable, it is important to not lose sight of the fact that economically marginalized people are feeling the effects of the pandemic the most; from the threats to their livelihoods, housing challenges, struggles to social distance, access to basic amenities, and access to credible information about the virus, among others.
A couple of weeks ago, more than 1,000 residents in Old Fadama, a suburb of Accra, were rendered homeless following a demolition exercise carried out by the Accra Metropolitan Assembly. Demolishing the homes of poor residents while the city of Accra was under lockdown tells us all we need to know about how the government is addressing the needs of working class people.
The destruction of the homes of some residents of Old Fadama means that many including children have had to sleep in the open and have been subjected to the vagaries of the cold harmattan weather, mosquito bites, etc. This situation puts these residents at risk of contracting the virus, as they have little to no way of observing social distancing rules, access to running water and access to other resources to practice basic hygiene. Although the Accra Mayor, Mohammed Adjei Sowah, said that displaced people will be provided with temporary housing, many are still sleeping in the streets.
Meanwhile, there has been growing stigma toward COVID-19 patients in the country. This stigma can be attributed to inadequate education about the virus. Although citizen-led groups and opinion leaders have taken it upon themselves to produce educational content in some indigenous languages, many Ghanaian languages have yet to be covered especially in mainstream media campaigns.
In addition, people with disabilities have been largely excluded from media campaigns about the virus. In a statement to Sanatu Zambang Studios (a media organization in Tamale), the Northern Regional Association of the Deaf (NRAD) lamented the lack of education on the virus for deaf people, and called on media organizations to provide education on the coronavirus in sign language.
It seems that the abundance of fake news stories also drowns some efforts to provide accurate information about the virus. The stigma towards people who test positive for COVID-19 means that many who fear they may have it shy away from testing and treatment. In early April, there were reports that a patient ran away from quarantine in the Tamale Teaching Hospital. On April 16, it was reported that another person who tested positive for the virus in Wa in the Upper West Region also ran away. Both patients were foreign nationals. As we look for ways to address stigma, it is imperative for us to consider how when coupled with xenophobia it results in situations where patients would rather run away than receive treatment.
Furthermore, the media should re-examine the role it plays in facilitating the stigma of COVID-19 patients by being more ethical in reporting these stories. Some media organizations have shown the faces of people who have recovered from the virus, inadvertently directing stigma to these people and their families. Others have mentioned the names of patients and their families in broadcasts. Ghana���s National Media Commission should work actively to address these issues and should put in place measures to sanction media organizations that expose patients and recovered patients to harm in this way.
At the same time, the media faces the immense challenge of fake news, which is being shared on WhatsApp and other social media platforms via friend and family networks, social group chats, and religious networks, among others. Many of these fake news stories, which are usually packaged via videos, audios and texts, are produced from unverified sources. Some are locally produced or imported conspiracy theories about the virus that are unfounded. The spread of disinformation is facilitated easily by many people���s inability to distinguish credible information from fake news, due to a deep lack of media literacy in our communities. Government efforts to curb this spate of disinformation have only gone as far as debunking untruths about the number of confirmed coronavirus cases in the country.
In the last few weeks, the state has involved the police and military to ensure that people in the country follow the rules about quarantine, social distancing and other directives regarding the lockdown in some major cities. That most of these police and military personnel walk around with firearms to ���safeguard��� these directives means that our communities have been reconfigured as war zones, and violence is used to confront civilians who break these protocols.
The involvement of the military and police in other African countries such as South Africa, Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria has resulted in catastrophic consequences. Beyond the physical abuse of civilians, it was reported on April 6 that one such encounter resulted in the death of a man in Ashaiman, Accra.
Historically, policing has been a tool utilized by the colonizer to enact violence on the colonized. Furthermore, having lived through a series of military coups d�����tat, coupled with curfews where the rights of civilians have been abused with impunity, we need to re-examine the way that we use these law enforcement institutions to fight the virus. According to criminology scholar Justice Tankebe, policing in many traditional Ghanaian societies ���was a collective responsibility of all individuals��� not the vesting of power in institutions and individuals to enact violence on the citizenry. Given the violent history and nature of the military and the police, a more humane approach to addressing violations of COVID-19 protocols would be more effective.
At a very critical time when the government should be exploring avenues to make things easier for the most marginalized in our society through various social support measures, the state has participated in worsening the lives and living conditions of many of these residents.
There is one bright spot: the Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research (NMIMR) and the West African Centre for Cell Biology of Infectious Pathogens (WACCBIP) at the University of Ghana announced on April 11 that the research institutes had successfully sequenced genomes of COVID-19. According to Professor Abraham Anang, the director of the NMIMR, this genome sequencing ���will strengthen surveillance for tracking mutations of the virus and aid in the tracing of the sources of community infections in people with no known contact with confirmed cases.��� The scientists have since shared their work with other scientists around the world through an open access platform. A few days ago, the Kumasi Centre for Collaborative Research developed rapid diagnostic testing kits, which would help facilitate and decentralize coronavirus testing across the country.
May 1, 2020
The undeclared war in Somalia

Somali National Army soldiers. Public domain image credit Stuart Price for AU-UN Photo.
This post is from a new partnership between the Kenyan website The Elephant and Africa Is a Country. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site every week. Posts are curated by Contributing Editor Wangui Kimari.
Though COVID-19 may be said to have stopped the world, the US, supported by Kenya and Ethiopia, continues to do drone strikes in Somalia, in what Rasna Warah narrates as the decades old “undeclared war” against the country.
While the United States was waging what appeared to be a losing war against COVID-19 (the death toll is currently the highest in the world), its military was carrying out a high-tech battle against Al Shabaab thousands of miles away. On April 7th, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) confirmed through a press release that Yusuf Jiis, described as ���one of the foundational members of the terrorist group,��� was killed in an air strike on April 2nd. The strike occurred in the vicinity of Bush Madina in Somalia���s Bay region, approximately 135 miles west of Mogadishu.
This was the second time that a ���high value��� Al Shabaab target was killed in a US air strike. In 2014, the influential Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was also killed in an air strike. It was assumed that Godane���s death would weaken the group and reduce its capacity to carry out terrorist activities, but this did not happen. Terrorist attacks in Somalia���and in Kenya���continued and resulted in scores of deaths.
���Al Shabaab remains a disease in Somalia and is an indiscriminate killer of innocent people and their only desire is to brutalize populations inside Somalia and outside of Somalia,��� said US Army Maj. Gen. William Gayler, AFRICOM���s director of operations, who was quoted in the press release. ���Putting pressure on this network helps contain their ambition and desire to cause harm,��� he continued.
AFRICOM commander, Gen. Stephen Townsend, stated, ���While we might like to pause our operations because of the coronavirus, the leaders of Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab and ISIS have announced that they see the crisis as an opportunity to further their terrorist agenda, so we will continue to stand with and support our African partners.���
The April 2nd air strike was probably a response to the Al Shabaab attack on the US Manda Bay base in Lamu County in Kenya on January 5th this year. An American soldier and two US contractors were killed in that attack. The base, known as Camp Simba, is situated along the shores of the Indian Ocean, not far from the Somalia border. The Americans were killed when a rocket-propelled grenade hit a plane piloted by contractors from L3 Technologies, an American company hired by the Pentagon to carry out surveillance missions in Somalia.
It is unclear whether any Kenyans were killed in the attack, as the Kenyan government is notoriously secretive about Kenyan casualties, especially those involving the Kenya Defence Force (KDF). However, there were rumors that Kenyan soldiers hid behind bushes when the attack was taking place and did not make any attempt to fire at the terrorists, which left the US soldiers frustrated and dumbfounded.
There were no investigations by the local media on how the terrorist outfit managed to enter a secure US military installation and shoot at not just a plane, but also at a few stationary helicopters and even a fuel storage area. However, the New York Times did establish that injured Americans were flown to Djibouti (where AFRICOM has a base) for treatment. The New York Times further estimated that ���the attack most likely cost the Pentagon millions of dollars in damages.���
The killing of Jiis was barely reported in the local or international press, but what is clear is that despite a looming health crisis at home, the US has not reduced its military operations abroad. According to the Foundation for Defense of Democracy���s Long War Journal, AFRICOM actually stepped up its air campaign against Al Shabaab in the first three months of this year, targeting the group 33 times in 2020 (more than half of 2019���s total). Samar al-Bulishi, a US-based expert on the ���War on Terror��� in East Africa, believes that ���Al Shabaab���s actions [in Manda Bay] are a likely response to the United States��� rapidly expanding undeclared war in Somalia.���
Since the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC, the US has also employed drone technology and ���surgical strikes��� against suspected terrorists in Somalia, which became more common during President Barack Obama���s administration. AFRICOM, which began operations in 2007, and which is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, has been key in carrying out US military operations in Africa.
Many of these operations are not known because they are carried out via drones and not through direct combat. It is estimated that US drone attacks have killed between 900 and 1,000 Somalis in the past three years alone and that the Pentagon carried out 63 drone attacks in Somalia last year. Amnesty International has been documenting these drone attacks and claims that many of the casualties are, in fact, civilians, not terrorists. This has raised questions about whether such attacks are counterproductive in that they generate fear and loathing of the US government among the general civilian population.
Dual track policy
The United States government���s policies towards Somalia have been largely shaped by its experiences there in the early 1990s and by President George Bush���s War on Terror following the September 11th terror attacks.
The US withdrew its troops from Somalia in 1993 after the October ���Black Hawk Down��� incident, also known as ���The Battle of Mogadishu,��� which led to the death of 18 US soldiers in Mogadishu. This led to the ���no-American-boots-on-the-ground��� policy. This policy entailed financially supporting African forces on the ground to act on behalf of the United States, but not actually sending US military personnel to the conflict zones. This policy has in recent years been implemented through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is largely funded by the European Union and supported by the United Nations and the United States.
Since 2010, the US has also adopted a ���dual track��� policy in Somalia, whereby the US government deals with both the Somali government in Mogadishu while simultaneously engaging with regional entities and clan leaders. This policy has led to the bizarre and counter-productive scenario whereby former warlords and militia leaders are on the payroll of the US while they simultaneously engage with a government they oppose or undermine.
American investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill says that the US policy towards Somali warlords and terrorists has been contradictory and quite often self-defeating. In an article published in the online The Nation magazine in September 2011, the journalist claimed that several Somali warlords have for years been backed and armed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in violation of a UN Security Council arms embargo imposed on Somalia when the civil war started.
In its war against Al Shabaab, the United States has also relied on Somalia���s most pro-west neighbors, namely, Ethiopia and Kenya, for support. Kenya is currently the largest recipient of US security assistance in subsaharan Africa. About 200 military personnel are stationed in Kenya (mostly in Manda Bay) to train Kenyan military personnel. This and the fact that the US and the European Union support the Kenya Defence Force in Somalia is why Kenya finds it so difficult to withdraw its forces from Somalia���too much money is at stake. (If Kenya had to use its own resources to keep its troops in Somalia, it might have withdrawn its forces as soon as it achieved its mission of liberating the Somali port city of Kismaayo from Al Shabaab���s clutches in 2012.)
Folly of the Kenyan incursion
Kenya���s military operations in Somalia have been problematic from the start. In a video that was recently posted on social media, the late Kofi Annan talks about why he warned Kenya against militarily intervening in Somalia. Annan stated that when he was in the midst of negotiating a peace deal between the government and the opposition after the bloody 2007 elections in Kenya, there was already talk in Kenyan government circles of Kenyan troops entering Somalia.
Annan advised the then government of Mwai Kibaki to not entertain such an idea because it would create insuperable conflicts of interest���not only because Kenya is Somalia���s neighbor, but the country also hosts a sizeable ethnic Somali population that would be forced to take sides if Kenya���s incursion into Somalia got ugly. Kibaki ignored this advice and sent Kenyan forces into Somalia in October 2011.
Kenya���s invasion of Somalia had at least two devastating impacts. One, Al Shabaab terrorist attacks on Kenyan soil became more frequent and more deadly, as witnessed during the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013, the Garissa University College attack in April 2015, and the attack on the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi last year, which killed a combined total of more than 200 people. US military and other installations in Kenya are also becoming more vulnerable to attack, as witnessed in Manda Bay.
Two, Kenya���s support of the Jubaland leader Ahmed Madobe has created a perception that Kenya is interested in ruling Jubaland by proxy by installing an ally there. This has led to mistrust between the weak but internationally recognized Federal Government of Somalia and the Government of Kenya���a suspicion made worse by Somalia���s dispute with Kenya over maritime waters in the Indian Ocean.
The taking of sides in an internal conflict has made Kenya���s border areas with Jubaland in southern Somalia more, not less, insecure. This became evident in March this year in Mandera, along the Kenya-Somalia border, where a conflict seems to be brewing between the Jubaland forces loyal to the Jubaland leader Ahmed Madobe and the Somalia National Army forces under the command of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. Some sources claim that this is a clan-based war between Madobe���s Ogaden-dominated forces and the Marehan, the clan to which Farmaajo belongs. However, it is difficult to assess the situation on the ground because neither the Kenyan nor the Somali government have made a statement on the conflict along Kenya���s border area, except that some sort of stalemate/ceasefire has been agreed upon (apparently mediated by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed).
However, according to Rashid Abdi, the former Horn of Africa Project Director at the International Crisis Group, the conflict is likely an attempt by President Farmaajo to reconfigure local politics ahead of the Somali elections later this year (that is, if they do take place, given the coronavirus pandemic). Farmaajo would like to assert his authority on the various federal Somali states, especially in Jubaland, which is run virtually autonomously by Madobe with little reference to Mogadishu, and with a heavy Kenya Defence Force presence.
Madobe ascended to power in September 2012 when Kismaayo, the prized port that was Al Shabaab���s main economic base, fell to Kenyan and Madobe���s Ras Kamboni forces. It was a major victory for the Kenyans, and also ensured that Madobe became the region���s kingpin.
In May 2013, Madobe declared himself president of the self-styled state of Jubaland, which was not recognized by the central government in Mogadishu. An ���election��� in October 2019, saw him reassert his authority in the region (though it must be said that Al Shabaab still controls large parts of the territory).
Lessons from Afghanistan
Lessons must be learned from the US military operations abroad since 9/11. The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq may have led to short-term gains, but proved devastating in the long-term. The Iraqi people have suffered sectarian conflict for decades, and more recently have had to endure the brutality of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Iraq is more unstable now than it was under Saddam Hussein. It is must be remembered that the founder of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, spent four years in Camp Bucca, a US detention center in southern Iraq during the war waged in 2003 by President George Bush and his ally Prime Minister Tony Blair. It is believed that his imprisonment at the camp instilled in him the idea of an ���Islamic Caliphate,��� the stated goal of ISIS.
US military operations abroad have had the net effect of increasing, not decreasing, the terrorist activities of fundamentalist Islamic groups such as ISIS, which appears to not have been completely defeated, but to have merely gone underground. US military interventions have increased levels of conflict, especially in Iraq, and led to much bloodshed. In Afghanistan, the prolonged US military presence served to unify and strengthen the Taliban. Civilian deaths in drone attacks also created mistrust of the US government, whose military operations in neighboring Pakistan have also been criticized.
It would be unfortunate if Somalia became another Afghanistan, where nearly two decades after the US invasion and subsequent heavy US military presence, the Taliban, rather than being vanquished, has emerged as a stronger and more emboldened political force.
‘We are workers, not heroes’

Healthworker in Liberia. Image via US AID on Flickr.
Writing in the UK Guardian in March 2020, the Liberian nurse and union leader George Poe Williams, feared that, like during the Ebola crisis, COVID-19 will lead to deaths that could be avoided unless we abandon austerity policies and build a strong public health system. The correct policy response would also require jobs in the public sector, and that health workers get proper working conditions. “We health workers are not heroes,” Poe Williams wrote. ���We should not become martyrs at work. We are professionals. We need personal protective equipment so that we can maintain health while saving lives. We need adequate staffing and well-equipped health systems. We need strong public funding for our sector.���
During the Ebola crisis in 2014, health workers in Liberia made concrete choices about life and death: they had to choose between which patients to try to save and those who were likely to die; they had to choose between going to work risking infection (and death) or not going to work. At the time of Ebola, the National Health Workers Union of Liberia (NAHWUL), of whom Poe Williams is a member, fought for better resources and personal protective equipment (PPE). Today, Poe reflects that a lack of response from the authorities contributed to the fact that eight percent of Liberian health workers died.
The health sector in many countries was in crisis even before the COVID-19 crisis. Underfunding and understaffing of the public health system means that many in the world do not have access to health. The logical consequence should be to build a public health system, possibly with international development assistance.
Since COVID-19 went global, we have seen strikes from health workers around the world, which may seem unusual, considering medical staff are seen as essential workers and rarely go on strike.
Admittedly, some strike threats have been about pay. While ���ghost workers��� are reported on public payrolls in Kenya, i.e. names often of friends or the family of politicians, Nigerian doctors and Liberian nurses dropped off payrolls in 2020 and 2018 respectively. It is not uncommon for public employees in African countries not to be paid wages for work performed. Even when the Ebola virus came to Liberia in 2014, NAWHUL was in such a strike���or a slow-action���for the payment of non-paid wages, but it was interrupted to return to work to counter the Ebola virus.
Both the Liberians in 2014 and the Nigerians in 2020 combined payroll requirements with protective equipment requirements. In most cases this is what���s needed: training and protection requirements. This is also the main requirement of professional associations across Africa: that workers have PPE. It’s about fear of death and professionalism, not greed.
While health care professionals around the world are defined as essential and exempt from coronavirus measures, they also have exceptions to labor rights. The right to strike is restricted for reasons of public health, based on international labor conventions. But both the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Global Association of Public Employees, PSI (Public Service International) point out that in many countries, the limits on rights limitation are far beyond acceptable. This is just one of the reasons why healthcare workers often have low wages, such as in the UK and the United States; income for workers is defined as income to be able to meet workers��� family’s basic needs). In 2014, the salaries of health workers in Liberia were described as “ridiculous” by a Norwegian TV anchor. Across the world, the health sector, with a large number of migrants and a majority of women, is characterized by heavy work pressure and part-time and short-term contracts, while also suffering from under-staffing and unsustainable shift schemes.
In 2016, the WHO recommended creating at least 40 million new jobs in health and social care, especially in poor countries, to reach the sustainability goals by 2030. This year came a new report from WHO that the world needs 9 million new nurses. In Nigeria alone, 500,000 to 600,000 nurses are needed. At the same time, the African Union, the United Nations Development Program and the International Labor Organization fear that the COVID-19 crisis could lead to the loss of 20 million jobs in Africa.
African heads of state are now confronted with a health care system they have neglected for years. African elites have often traveled abroad for treatment. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe died at a hospital in Singapore. Nigerian President Mohammadu Buhari has traveled to the UK several times (one time for almost two months), while one of his predecessors, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, preferred the hospitals in Saudi Arabia (he eventually died there). African heads of state are to blame, but we must also remember a long history of international demands. Underfunding of the health sector is also linked to borrowing requirements for public savings from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. But today even the IMF recommends increased investment in the Nigerian health care system.
Social security is also an integral part of the decent working life agenda in Sustainability Goal 8 of the United Nations, which unfortunately is often reduced to mean just job creation (in the private sector). Trade union PSI recalls that although the right to health is enshrined in no less than 150 countries’ constitution, privatization has meant that access to health is unfairly distributed and dependent on class. Without private health insurance, which is often linked to work, the right for many becomes a theoretical exercise. In Africa, many of the 70 percent of the informal sector’s workforce have weak or poor access to health. During the coronavirus crisis we are reminded that this is not only unfair, but dangerous for the more privileged of us.
It is not only the health workers at PSI who insist that public health is more resilient, strong and fair. A partially privatized health care system is fragmented and unable to effectively coordinate infection control. To address the coronavirus crisis, both Ireland and Spain have nationalized health enterprises. In Norwegian aid, health and education are two of the most important development goals. Both should be linked to job creation and workers��� rights.
April 30, 2020
Corona, how are you?

Nairobi. Image credit Amy the Nurse via Flickr CC.
Five days after the first COVID-19 case in Kenya���a young, middle-class returnee to Nairobi���was announced, the word ���corona��� was beginning to go around in western Kenyan villages. We had come here to look for the sedimented remains of past epidemics and anti-epidemic interventions. We were looking for latent residuals of colonial sleeping sickness and malaria, AIDS and cancer, when this future pandemic caught up with us. At this point, people still shook hands and touched (a week later, many didn���t), and young people played with the word ���corona��� like it was a novel token. Sylvanus, proud father of seven and devout member of the Legio Maria Church, seemed thrilled by exclaiming the name of the new affliction, followed by somewhat surprising bursts of laughter. He rather enjoyed challenging our seriousness about the matter. He did not fear it, ���No, because this is a disease for whites.���
We took a stroll along the shore of Lake Victoria facing the Ugandan border, passing a fishing settlement. It was some years since we had been there and the children ran after us in friendly excitement. Their high-pitched calls rang out like the familiar: ���Mzunguuu (white person), how are youuu?��� But there was an unexpected variation: ���Coronaviruuus, how are youuu?��� As we continued walking, the childrens��� choir shifted to a cheekier whisper behind our backs: ���Corona! Corona!��� which went quiet each time we turned around���probably the point of the game. Returning to the main road, the looks of fishermen and market women felt more intense than usual, though not (yet) hostile. As we climbed in the car, Sylvanus whispered ���Corona ��� ��� and shared a bright, disarming laughter with those around us. Driving back towards town, many eyes seemed to follow us. Young men shouted ���Corona��� as we navigated speedbumps. One added ���bye-bye.��� A mother waiting for a bus waved us away dismissively. ���As if we were Chinese,��� our colleague Jehu remarked indignantly.
���Mzungu��� had for the moment morphed into ���Corona.��� White man had become a virus. As we got back to Kisumu city, the address began to carry a latent sense of threat (though the market women during the evening���s shopping were cheerful as ever). This scene was not unfamiliar. Twenty-five years earlier, when Wenzel and his colleagues from the Kenyan Ministry of Health collected blood and stool samples from schoolchildren in the area, they had been called kachinja, ���blood-stealers��� and once were attacked. Since colonial occupation, similar scares have occurred all over Africa (as depicted by the Congolese painter Tshibumba Kanda-Matulu). As we were writing this blog, social media posts emerged about COVID-19 vaccine research, one picturing French doctor Didier Raoult, allegedly warning ���Africans not to take Bill Gates���s vaccine that contains poison���; another claiming that Obama promised ���not to allow white people to kill Africans with their toxic vaccines.��� Nothing new here���except that now, the calls for resistance, as well as the menace itself, originate from afar, and are given credibility by the faces of ���international��� figures appearing on one���s smartphone.
There is a rich literature on African stories about post/colonial Europeans and their African government-helpers, especially doctors and scientists, deploying alien tools (electricity, cars, syringes, condoms, tape-recorders, etc.) for nefarious aims. Much of this writing concedes some truth to the ���rumors��� arguing against their colonial dismissal as mere ���misunderstandings.��� Such stories, the argument goes, reference experiences of oppression and exploitation (be it specific local situations, layered colonial histories, or the global political economy) and translate racist violence into locally meaningful, some call them ���cultural��� idioms. The scholarly value of these interpretations of rumor notwithstanding, there was something else at stake as the young men waved us the corona bye-bye. One quarter century ago, we could displace their accusations by means of interpretation. These were not really about the tiny blood samples Wenzel collected for his doctoral thesis as a medical anthropologist seeking to contribute to peoples��� health, but expressed an awareness of historical and global exploitation. And his respectful and critical recognition of these covert meanings served to position himself as different from the colonial agents at whom the rumors were really targeted.
Now, with the coronavirus pandemic, the white man is actually the threat they make him out to be. He, or she, is more likely than others to carry the virus. Instead of washing his hands after visiting someone���s household, he should do so before greeting anyone. The COVID-19 epidemic has an inverted directionality. It runs against both a century-old colonial narrative of Africa as a diseased continent and millennial pandemic predictions of bushmeat-eating African villagers unleashing viral threats to the world. Now, Europe is the pandemic epicenter, even though within Europe, the disease still follows well-worn tracks of racial and social inequality. Europeans, and the Kenyans close to them, bring it to Kenya, not Chinese builders and businesspeople as initially claimed (and who were the first to offer their help). The Kenyan president therefore prohibits European planes from landing and quarantines their crews. And urban, middle-class Kenyans carry the virus upcountry to forest and bush. On Kenyan TV, villagers urge their educated urban relations to stay in the city, as they threaten the lives of their elders if they come home to visit (or to shelter from draconian anti-epidemic measures).
Whites feature here as a threat in a direct, embodied way���not as mere symbols of historical violence or effigies of the global economic order. Their touch and breath can be lethal. And yet, the epidemic also reveals the same whites as terminally weak, challenging centuries-old assertions of enlightened mastery over humans and non-humans alike. Nigerian film producer Moses Inwang���s much-shared list of lessons from corona opens with ���China won the 3rd world war without firing a missile,��� followed by ���Europeans are not as educated as they appear��� (a similar point was made in The Lancet), and ���rich people are less immune than the poor.��� In other recent ���African��� epidemics���HIV and Ebola���the figure of the benevolent and potent white person still prevailed. Help flowed from north to south to stem an affliction perceived as originating in Africa. Now, this image is replaced by a combination of danger and impotence mutually enforcing each other, which evokes neither gratitude nor inferiority. One of the most recent anti-vaccination trial memes features a painting of an African woman wielding a knife below the face-mask of a white, male doctor, underscoring that ���we���re different from our ancestors.���
Nairobi MP John Kiarie captures the paradox of residual power and infirmity in a tweet from March 28, which warns of harrowing COVID-19 death-tolls and calls for radical action. Before his climax, ���Ignore and die!��� he says:
A UK bound plane just landed at [Jomo Kenyatta International Airport]. The [Kenya Airports] Authorities says the plane landed without anybody on board and it’s here to EVACUATE the UK nationals in the country. It will be leaving by midnight. The US Embassy has also announced that planes will be landing Friday and Saturday to evacuate their citizens from the country. The UK and US are currently badly hit by the COVID 19 pandemic. (���) Practically their citizens would be safer in Kenya than they will be in those countries. Then here comes the question, why are these countries evacuating their citizens suddenly!? Is it that they are seeing something that we have not yet seen? Definitely yes.
Where does this leave the European anthropologists, who departed from Kenya on one of these last planes that arrived empty at night? Our traditional interpretation of local fears as (significant) rumors no longer offers redemption���we are what they address us as. Our knowledge about what happens is not superior, nor more effective than that of those who call us ���Corona.��� More importantly, our detached and benevolent claim to ethnographic participant observation, always from a position of privilege and relative security, is put into question at precisely the moment when true participation finally becomes inevitable. Now it is us who ���are participated��� (as the old aid-worker joke went) by the pervasive virus that is in every touch���maybe in our body, maybe in that of the other. It challenges differentiation, threatening pathogenic communion. And the escape route that we had been able to count on for six decades of post-colonial anthropology is finally being withdrawn���the return flight home, in the worst case the medical evacuation at ���unlimited expense.���
It was the Kenyan president���s ban on flights to Europe that gathered us all in the eerie silence of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, as we boarded the flight just before the midnight curfew deadline. We got away ok, on the last plane, and did not turn into pumpkins. But, we left with a sense of an ending brought about by coronavirus. As if some irreparable damage has been done to the position of the old white man of any age or gender, and it is not yet evident what new anthropological persona will emerge from it. It is ���bye-bye Corona��� indeed, and maybe it was time. And yet, we know that COVID-19 has not yet fully arrived in Kenya, along with the inevitable suffering that the epidemic and the anti-epidemic measures is likely to bring about.
The insurgency in Cabo Delgado

Cabo Delgado, 2018 (St��phane Neckebrock, via Flickr CC).
A violent insurgency in the resource-rich northern province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique is threatening to destabilize East and Southern Africa. The brunt is being borne by the local population���they make up 85 percent of the 900 lives lost and more than 170,000 of them are currently displaced. Around 3,000 private and public structures are destroyed or damaged.
Then on April 11, there were reports of a massacre of between 50-70 people in the Muidumbe district. A day before, a helicopter operated by South African mercenaries working for a Russian private security firm hired by the Mozambican government to fight the insurgents was downed. In October 2019, seven members of Russian private security forces from the Wagner group were killed by insurgents.
The violent activities by the insurgency, known as Ahlu Sunnah Waj-Jama���a (ASWJ), began in October 2017. The attackers have been emboldened, hoisting a flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) over Moc��mboa da Praia, on March 23. Since June 2019, ISIL has claimed 30 attacks on Cabo Delgado. The ASWJ is a breakaway group from a 1998 breakaway group of the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO). In late 2019, ASWJ in Mozambique was added to Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). On April 6 and 7, ASWJ specified their political goal of establishing an Islamic government. Yet this group and its grievances emerged over a long period of regional disenfranchisement and recurrent humanitarian crisis induced by climate change. To fully understand the multi-layered forces at play in Cabo Delgado requires a threefold approach: engagement with the complexities of political economy on the ground; a regional lens on the security dimensions of the conflict; and acknowledgement of the deteriorating environmental conditions (especially climate).
The attacks began only after the discovery of massive reserves of oil and gas in the region. These vast deposits have attracted both external investors and external threats. The insurgency is part of a much wider geopolitical struggle (especially in neighboring Tanzania), but also a national struggle among the elites in Mozambique, for these mineral riches.
The ASWJ is exploiting particular grievances surrounding this discovery and the ongoing, widespread poverty in Cabo Delgado, the least developed province in Mozambique. Most of the members of the ASWJ have been described as young uneducated youth, between 20 and 35 years of age, with few economic opportunities. Interviews with residents of Cabo Delgado often suggest that the group is comprised of locals. The new extractive industries are perceived as providing work mainly to outsiders (from the southern provinces and/or from outside the country), while pushing local youths out of their traditional work (fishing and subsistence agriculture). Illegal activities remain the sole means of survival for some.
It has been known since 2018 that ASWJ was more criminal than jihadi. It first profited from the heroin trade route in the region���allegedly Mozambique���s biggest export at the time. Alongside illegal logging, mining, and human trafficking, some estimated ASWJ made up to several million dollars per week���a lot of resources to recruit a desperate population. Militarized responses by the state, alongside declining human rights standards (due process, treatment of prisoners, media restrictions and attacks on journalists), might have further alienated this population and driven recruitment.
Illicit funds allowed for the group���s rapid expansion and transnational linkages to criminal syndicates and others in support of jihadism. Mobility across porous borders in the region also facilitated such growth. Mozambique was identified in the 2019 Basel AML Index as at highest risk for terrorist financing due to poor border control and weak institutions.
The linkages between multiple non-state armed groups in East Africa are growing fast. Conflicts once driven by local grievances in individual countries have become transnationalized. The combatants on both sides of these attacks illustrate not only how a regional conflict is emerging, but also the massive transnational, private interests involved. The struggle is privatized, as are the profits and the security responses. Here, the state is the weakest dog on the block, if present at all, and is mostly concerned with assisting the private sector in extraction. This is where private mercenaries are stepping in to help���further blurring the lines of sovereignty.
Lacking capital, and in order to attract and protect investors, Mozambique maintains a narrative of stability and peace conducive to investment. This has produced authoritarian state behavior to combat the insurgency including abuse of suspected insurgents, among others. But it has also meant the inclusion of private armies, backed by powerful state allies. Russian military and/or Russian private mercenaries are growing in number, fighting and dying alongside Mozambican soldiers. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Mozambican counterpart Filipe Nysusi signed energy and security agreements in August 2019. Political analyst Sergey Sukhankin sees this as Russia���s well-established ���Syrian model������that is, offering para-military services in exchange for resource extraction rights���playing out in Mozambique.
But it is not only ASJW or the Russians with such ambitions in Cabo Delgado. Many nationals of various counties���including in the West���are known to have engaged in various sorts of damaging and illicit trade. China is investing heavily in Mozambique, and is logging Cabo Delgado extensively. South Africa is continuing to invest in exploring gas in the Rovuma basin and wants a stable neighbor. The United States has conducted naval exercises in the Mozambique Channel off Pemba and the gas fields. France also claims several islands in the Mozambique Channel.
But there is one material factor underlying this entire process: climate change. Climate change has long been known to be severely impacting the poor in Mozambique and increasing levels of poverty. The people of Cabo Delgado are highly vulnerable. Essentially a subsistence economy, survival in these areas depends on local resources, especially rain-fed farming and fishing. Climate change means both people and landscape are highly susceptible to tropical cyclones and sea level rise. The dramatic increase in extreme weather events in this region has produced a nearly permanent humanitarian crises in recent years. The 2019 cyclones Idai and Kenneth were particularly devastating���and the first time two such storms came in quick succession. With Kenneth, floodwater ���covered the coastal town of Pemba.��� Kenneth was the strongest and most northern cyclone to make landfall in Mozambique. Cyclones were not supposed to happen that close to the equator where the Coriolis force is too weak, yet this is no longer the case.
The heavy rainy season of 2019/2020 was also unusual with the December 2019 flooding leading to widespread damage. Thousands of fishermen were affected by lost and damaged boats, and farmers lost about 4,000 hectares of usable land. Infrastructure is weak at best in Cabo Delgado, and the flooding led to the collapse of a vital bridge over the Montepuez River, leaving an estimated 1,000,000 people isolated.
These climatic changes have exacerbated tensions brought on by the mass appropriation of natural resources currently underway. The community has also been dramatically affected by the redistribution of wealth from the extractive industries away from the local population. Resettlements have heightened preexisting grievances, disrupting traditional power structures, and land use���land vulnerable to capture by elites. Such resettlement recalls the social trauma of similar schemes by both the colonial Portuguese military and the ruling party FRELIMO. Multinational mining giant Rio Tinto has been behind similar resettlements in the nearby province of Tete and accused of neglect by Human Rights Watch. The jobs promised by the discovery of the gas fields remain low for the local population as they are unskilled. The International Labor Organization recognized back in 2015 that jobs in these extraction industries ���will be limited if there is no local capacity.���
Yet developing such capacity has lagged. Attempts by NGOs to increase non-timber forest products and sustainable income-generating activities in Cabo Delgado bore little benefit. Attempts by the private sector (like Catalisa) to accelerate commercial horticultural production and smallholder farmers in Cabo Delgado have been marred by resettlements and climate change���and these efforts, in fact, are part of major energy group Total Mozambique���s liquefied natural gas project tied to the deposits.
Why are the people impoverished if their region is so resource rich? It is this ongoing economic abjection that has contributed to the radicalization of a brand of Islam that refuses to recognize the government, state institutions, local leaders and imams���the ASWJ. A short video, shared widely on social media, is telling. The group says they are:
occupying [territory] to show that the government is unjust. [They] humiliate the poor and give advantages to the bosses. (���) We intend [to set up] an Islamic government … We are children of this area ��� We want to take the military out, because [for us] they are pigs.
This reveals how the conflict is over economic inequality and injustices of the state foremost, and far less about radical Islam.
In March 2020, the African Regional Forum on Sustainable Development expressed ���the urgent need to deal with climate change and silence the guns��� in Africa. It identified how problems of climate change and unemployment (especially among youth) are directly linked to increasing forms of violence and instability���two variables clearly present in the Cabo Delgado insurgency. This complex relationship shows the urgent need for distinct types of research into climate security based on local conditions and community needs for socioeconomic reproduction.
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