Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 221

Colin Gray's essays on strategy (II): Why 3 strategic classics remain relevant

In his 14th essay, Colin
Gray makes a good argument that all you really need to do to understand
strategy is read and re-read Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz. "These three
books constitute the strategic canon," he advises.

He adds an interesting thought: "It is only the generality
of strategic ideas in the three classics that saves them from utter irrelevance
to the supremely pragmatic and ever changing world of the practicing strategist."
I'd go a step farther and say that their very generality is what makes them so
useful. War is chaotic, crammed with startling details and unexpected turns. In
2004 and 2005, as I was writing Fiasco
and so trying to understand the war in Iraq, I took all those details and
developments and sat down with Clausewitz and T.E. Lawrence for a month. Both
books helped me "make sense" of what I had seen -- Clausewitz in strategic terms,
Lawrence more on the tactical and cultural.

Cronin reviews a new RAND report on the possibility of a U.S. conflict with China

It is always nice to see a
RAND document that actually come to some conclusions, however tentative.
Maybe they are outgrowing the motto, "RAND -- Providing an intellectual hospice
for the conventional wisdom."

By Patrick Cronin

President, Best Defense Academy of Frenemy-American
Relations

China
appears well on its way to becoming America's next peer competitor. Over the
next twenty years, a modernizing People's Liberation Army will challenge
regional militaries and better keep foreign powers out of its near seas. As a
result, according to a new RAND report, the
U.S. Armed Forces will "become increasingly dependent on escalatory options for
defense and retaliatory capabilities for deterrence."

In "Conflict with
China: Conflict, Consequences and Strategies for Deterrence," James
Dobbins, David Gompert, David Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell consider triggers for
U.S.-China conflict and their operational and strategic implications.

The paper first examines "occasions for conflict" and
includes situations involving the Korean
Peninsula, Taiwan,
cyberspace, the South China Sea, Japan,
and India.
The scenarios, all judged to be plausible if unlikely, are listed in descending
order of probability, with conflict over North Korea thought to contain
"significant potential" for escalation.

Similar hazards entail the other potential confrontations
considered by the authors. Thus, the discussion on cyberspace suggests how
China's putative success in stealing others' electrons could precipitate
kinetic action. For instance, a Chinese attempt to disrupt U.S. communications and intelligence could
catalyze attacks on satellites and a blockade on China's vital sea lines of
communication. The latter refers to an abiding Chinese concern over its
so-called "Malacca dilemma," a reference to how closure of the critical Malacca Strait
joining the Indian and Pacific oceans might cripple resource-dependent China. Such a
scenario could well be casualty-free and yet bring about monumental economic
loss and regional upheaval.

The 25-page report's sheer economy of verbiage is one of its
strengths. While the authors no doubt could have amplified on the scenarios -- from
the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean or Iran to Pakistan -- an exhaustive
review of potential conflicts would have added little to the conclusions. Their
main interest is to think through operational implications of current trends.  [[BREAK]]

And
the impact on future military operations is sobering. A reduced ability to
project power to defend allies and partners in East Asia
would drive our military procurement in the direction of "enhanced weapons,
ranges, geography, and targets" to ensure the survivability of our platforms
and bases. Further, we would need improved means of eliminating critical "Chinese
forces, launchers, sensors, and other capabilities," even eventually "Chinese
satellites and computer networks."

Chinese
military gains appear to target the Achilles' heel of U.S. modern networked battle
systems, and it is a logical deduction to assume a comparable set of Chinese
capabilities could be similarly put at risk. But looking ahead that may be as
good as it gets, as the authors assume an almost inexorable Chinese ability to
further close the qualitative military gap with America. "Barring unforeseen
technological developments that assure survivability for U.S. forces and C4ISR," they write, "it will not
be possible or affordable for the United States to buck these
trends."

This
will leave the United States
with a bleak choice between escalation (and deterrence based on Chinese fear of
escalation) and acquiescence to a rising China. Escalation is inherently
risky and could lead to nuclear war, and the latter cedes American power and
hands to China
precisely what it may wish to achieve with its growing military might.

The
throwback to bipolar strategic logic will seem anachronistic to some but is
arguably a helpful refresher on just what a rising China will mean with respect to our
military preponderance in the Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately, especially
without a renewal of the American economy in the years ahead, the United States'
options for dealing with these challenges are somewhat underwhelming.

The
authors focus on three ideas: economic interdependence, building partnership
capacity, and drawing China
into more cooperative security endeavors. All of these are unobjectionable and
sound general activities to be undertaken. The high degree of economic
interdependence is certainly a barrier to conflict. As one leading Chinese
scholar recently told me, "We are not worried about military tensions provided China stays on
track to become your largest trading power." But it would have been useful if
authors had also considered how such strong economic ties could make it seem
safer to conduct a balance of power competition, as geopolitics and
globalization coexist.

The
second notion of building partnership capacity is worthwhile. However, it also
has serious limits, because every nation in the region wishes to avoid
offending a rising China
that is also its largest or second largest trading partner. It is easier for Vietnam
to buy Russian Kilo-class submarines
than front-line American hardware. Similarly, note that U.S. military transfers to the Philippines have thus far been limited to a
1960s-era Hamilton
class Coast Guard cutter). As with pressure on U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan, China may well believe that over time it can
demand reduced U.S.
military cooperation with its neighbors.

The
authors also call for modifying the U.S.-China strategic relationship. That is
fine, too, but before one does that, it's worth reflecting on whether any
coherent framework exists and, if so, whether that framework is genuinely
shared across policy elites even within the current administration. It is here
that the authors' call for persuading China to buy-into a more cooperative relationship
in the region is sensible if not all that compelling (and ultimately the test
is whether such reasoning is compelling to the Chinese, not other Americans). At
a minimum, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that China will embrace our pivot to Asia if only we
invite China
to join in more multilateral security ventures. Chinese leaders are simply apt
to see any strengthening of America's role in the region as antithetical to
their national interests. As my colleague Robert Kaplan has written, the
Indo-Pacific region is witnessing a triumph of realism.

In
sum, the idea of mutual economic assured destruction, investing in partners,
and cooperative security are at best necessary but insufficient elements of a
strategy. They hardly seem a substitute for the kinds of new forces and
operational adaptations implied in the report's analysis. Economic cooperation
alone is insufficient to bar the outbreak of hostilities. So, we can agree with
the authors that while the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China should not be exaggerated,
neither should it be summarily dismissed. The distillation of the authors'
thinking incorporated into this useful paper should be a starting point for
deeper analysis.

My favorite Marine photo from WWII

[image error]

By Eric
Hammel

Best Defense guest photo curator

Tom has kindly asked me to select and
discuss my "favorite" photo from my latest -- and probably final -- book,
Always
Faithful: U.S. Marines in World War II Combat, The 100 Best Photos.
Each photo in the book bears a caption that identifies only the operation in
which it was taken. It is left to the reader to decide what they see in the
photo, not read what I think.

I don't have a favorite. I selected
each of them from a collection numbering in the thousands, which I have been
over many times during the past six or seven years. But some have more meaning
to me than others. The selection you see here is one that holds great personal
significance. It is of a handful Marines about to crest a hill on Okinawa. My
late father fought on Okinawa as a U.S. Army combat medic attached to an infantry
company. He was wounded and evacuated. He arrived home just in time to start my
personal ball rolling. I think of my father every time I see this photo.

What I see is a technically deficient
photo; it's overexposed. But it perfectly captures an important truth about
combat, and life: beware what's on the other side of the hill. A little of the
body language the combat photographer captured suggests the caution veterans
exhibit when they sense or anticipate danger. But look more closely: they're
up, they're advancing, they're ready for anything. In a moment they will be
gone.

" ...will be gone." On a meta
level, this photo represents -- to me -- the imminent passing of the World War
II generation. These were the men who raised me, who taught me, who mentored
me, who inspired me. And, for the most part, they have already advanced into
the great light that will take us all -- willingly, bravely, realistically,
with heads held high.

21: For real this time

[image error]

The 21st Navy skipper
of the year was fired, for "poor personnel management." (As I noted the other day, that guy down in Norfolk actually had been counted by Navy Times as fired back in the spring, so he wasn't no. 21.) This time it was
the CO of the minesweeper Fearless.

Also, the skipper of the USS Momsen,
who had been charged with rape, etc., pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to 10 years behind bars, with the understanding as part of the plea that he
would serve 42 months.

Retired Navy
Capt. John Byron comments:

In the scheme of things, this is a pretty tough
sentence. 42 months incarceration, probation for the rest of the ten years, maybe
registered sex offender, loss of some benefits and retirement, professional
disgrace, doubtless fallout in his family life. There are many other ways this
could have been handled, from start to finish. That it was seen as an egregious
felony is credit to the Navy system and this person's chain of command.

The plea deal kept the two women off the
witness stand. Would guess that was a major consideration for the prosecution.

The message this sends to the fleet is inescapable: we meant what we said.

I'm
proud of my Navy.

(2 HTs to RD)

 

Van Creveld's deceptively simple for formula for measuring military power --and Peter Mansoor's rip on van Creveld

For some reason, in my research for my book on American
generalship, I read a lot about military effectiveness over the summer -- parts
of the
classic Millett and Murray series and of John Ellis' Brute
Force, plus the conclusion of Martin van Creveld's
Fighting
Power. I finally realized that the issue was not really central to my
book, but the books still were worth reading.

Here is van Creveld's deceptively simple formula: "the
military worth of an army equals the quantity and quality of its equipment
multiplied by its fighting power." (P. 174) (Paul Gorman had something
similar in his on-line papers.) The question, of course, is how does one
create and assess this fighting power? -- and that issue is what his book
explores.

That said, check out this crack by Professor Doctor Colonel Peter Mansoor
on page 255 of The
GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945:

Few American commanders of the World War II era would agree
with authors such as Martin van Creveld that the Germany army was more
effective. While the cream of the Wehrmacht, the panzer and panzer grenadier
divisions, were more combat-effective organizations and a match for the divisions
of the Army of the United States, the bulk of the German army was not composed
of these units. The average German infantry division could not defeat an
American infantry division in battle, while American infantry divisions consistently
proved their ability to accomplish their missions against the enemy divisions
in their front.

Colin Gray's 40 maxims on strategy: 3 big reasons the Americans screwed up in Iraq

40 Maxims on Strategy
would be a much better title for Gray's book than the actual one, which is Fighting
Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy. I was put off by that
title but bought the book after I saw Gen. Mattis recommend it.

It is good stuff. Here are some of the things I underlined:

The socio-cultural context has been emphasized here because
it has been, and remains, the prime area of strategic weakness in the behavior
of the U.S. superpower.

(p. 5)

... strategy must convert one currency (military behavior)
into another (political effect).

(p. 11)

Competent strategy is all but impossible in the absence of a
continuous dialogue between policymakers and soldiers.

(p. 12)

Tom again: These aren't the only reasons, of course. But
they are a good start.

Gray also made me think I should go back and read Thucydides
again. Last time I used a tiny print Penguin Classic edition because I was
reading it on my commute on the Metro. This time I think I will try the big
fat Landmark edition with all the maps, which I have lying around
somewhere.

America is muddling through middling relationship with the Middle Kingdom

By Peter Bacon

Best Defense Academy of Frenemy-American Relations

At SAIS the other day, the Kettering Foundation and the
Institute for American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
held a high-powered conference on the future of U.S.-China relations, featuring
pretty much all the big names in the China racket. If you weren't selected to
be one of the illuminati, here is what you missed:

--Professor David Lampton of SAIS summed up the conference's
assessment of Sino-American relationship as "not in the best of times, but not
in the worst of times." Both Professor Lampton and Rear Admiral Eric McVadon
both identified believe that the relationship has evolved over the past decades
from a one-dimensional, anti-Soviet Cold War partnership to a "three-legged
stool," of security, economic, and culture relations. Elites within both
countries bolstered this relationship: Tao Wenzhao, a senior fellow at CASS,
argued that the recent meetings between elites such as Hu Jintao and President
Obama, and between Joe Biden and Hu's putative successor Xi Jinping augured
well for future
Sino-American relations. Indeed, Wenzhao remarked that one Chinese official
observed that "Mr. Jinping [had] never spent so much time with a foreign guest"
as he did with Biden. The conference's keynote speaker, former National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, similarly identified the Hu-Obama
communiqué issued during the two leaders' meeting as "a real blueprint of
strategic objectives shared and 34 tangible paragraphs elaborating on them and
tasks ahead for the relationship."

--The panelists overall still felt quite uneasy about the
future of the Sino-American relationship. Stephen Orlins, President of the
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, memorably remarked on his experience
on Chinese television when he was asked by a Chinese audience member "why every
U.S. policy was designed to oppose China's rise." Tellingly, Orlins continued,
"everyone in the audience [stood] up and [started] to applaud." Brzezinski,
similarly, wondered whether the anti-China rhetoric from the field of
Republican candidates could engender "a more Manichean vision of the world"
within the American government. Panelists on public perceptions of the United
States and China confirmed this: Yuan Zheng, a Senior Fellow from CASS, found
in studies from 2008 to 2010 that "ordinary Chinese have mixed feelings towards
the US, just as [ordinary Americans] with China." Indeed, he continued, "56 percent of
those Chinese surveyed felt that American policy was two-sided, geared towards 'cooperation
and containment.'" Andrew Kohut, President of the Pew Research Center, also
pointed out that 58 percent of Americans felt that the United States needed to get
tougher with China on trade, while 56 percent of Americans simultaneously felt that
the United States and China needed to build better relations.

--Panelists and speakers at the conference argued that these
ambivalent tensions necessitated a global condominium between America and
China, or, in the words of Brzezinski, "to act towards each other as though we
were part of a G-2 without proclaiming ourselves to be a G-2." This "basic generalization"
of Brzezinski followed on statements made by other speakers such as David
Lampton and Tom Fingar of Stanford University who both argued that without
Sino-American cooperation and leadership, problems of international economic
management, collective security, or climate change would not be dealt with.
Fingar further argued that each power needed to pursue this cooperative
partnership even if we had not reached a state of mutual trust between the two
powers. The "very real, very now" nature of issues such as climate change and
its impact on national security and ever-changing threats to global security
necessitated a partnership even as publics and elites remained distrustful of
each other.

Rebecca's war dogs of the week: Stupid Labradors become bilingual aces

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense goddess of dogginess

It
seems that India is attempting to infuse its military workings dogs with a
little James Bond style mojo.



According
to reports out this week, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) is claiming to
have a one-of-a-kind elite war-dog team. Details of
this new force, comprised of six Labrador Retrievers called Bomb Drop Dogs
(BBD) who've been trained at the ITBP's National Training Centre for Dogs,
range from the intriguing to the insignificant bordering on painfully obvious.



According
to a report in the Telegraph, India's BBDs boast a
variety of Mission Impossible worthy skills including the ability to: "carry
explosives in their teeth, sneak into terrorists' lairs, drop remote-controlled
bombs, hide secret cameras, understand instructions in English and Hindi and
interpret body language."



But
in a statement to The Pioneer that outlined the scope of this
program and its aims, the Additional Director General of the ITBP, Dilip
Trivedi, said that the team of six BBDs would go a
long way to "minimise casualties of our soldiers" because BBDs could "approach
the target and secretly plant explosives. When it goes off, the terrorists
would be exposed and thus easily targeted. As they are smaller in size to men,
these canines are not easily spotted by the enemy. According to the situations,
they further lower themselves and approach targets by crawling." (This is the
painfully obvious part, History of Military Working Dogs 101.)



Still,
another, more compelling point of view was given to the Telegraph by the Indo-Tibetan Police Force's spokesman, DK
Pandey (who was also sure to make assurances about the focus on the dogs'
safety):

It's
the first time in India such a dog squad has been successfully trained in
dropping of bombs, video and audio devices and other equipment inside enemy
hideouts. They will be carrying them in their mouth and drop it inside the
suspected hideout and when [the dogs] report back to their handler and
commander, then only the next step will be taken -- triggering the blast through
remote control,' [Pandey said.]

While
noteworthy, I'm not ready to concede that India's BBDs yet have a paw up in the
wide world of MWDs. While I don't doubt that these Labs are highly trained or
that these dogs are capable of learning such intricate tasks, India's BBD force
still appears to be in the early stages. There are no reports that this
training has been put to use or proven successful and effective in the field.
Let's put this one in the wait-and-see pile. 

Rebecca's war dogs of the week: Stupid Labradors become bilingual James Bonds

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense goddess of dogginess

It
seems that India is attempting to infuse its military workings dogs with a
little James Bond style mojo.



According
to reports out this week, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) is claiming to
have a one-of-a-kind elite war-dog team. Details of
this new force, comprised of six Labrador Retrievers called Bomb Drop Dogs
(BBD) who've been trained at the ITBP's National Training Centre for Dogs,
range from the intriguing to the insignificant bordering on painfully obvious.



According
to a report in the Telegraph, India's BBDs boast a
variety of Mission Impossible worthy skills including the ability to: "carry
explosives in their teeth, sneak into terrorists' lairs, drop remote-controlled
bombs, hide secret cameras, understand instructions in English and Hindi and
interpret body language."



But
in a statement to The Pioneer that outlined the scope of this
program and its aims, the Additional Director General of the ITBP, Dilip
Trivedi, said that the team of six BBDs would go a
long way to "minimise casualties of our soldiers" because BBDs could "approach
the target and secretly plant explosives. When it goes off, the terrorists
would be exposed and thus easily targeted. As they are smaller in size to men,
these canines are not easily spotted by the enemy. According to the situations,
they further lower themselves and approach targets by crawling." (This is the
painfully obvious part, History of Military Working Dogs 101.)



Still,
another, more compelling point of view was given to the Telegraph by the Indo-Tibetan Police Force's spokesman, DK
Pandey (who was also sure to make assurances about the focus on the dogs'
safety):

It's
the first time in India such a dog squad has been successfully trained in
dropping of bombs, video and audio devices and other equipment inside enemy
hideouts. They will be carrying them in their mouth and drop it inside the
suspected hideout and when [the dogs] report back to their handler and
commander, then only the next step will be taken -- triggering the blast through
remote control,' [Pandey said.]

While
noteworthy, I'm not ready to concede that India's BBDs yet have a paw up in the
wide world of MWDs. While I don't doubt that these Labs are highly trained or
that these dogs are capable of learning such intricate tasks, India's BBD force
still appears to be in the early stages. There are no reports that this
training has been put to use or proven successful and effective in the field.
Let's put this one in the wait-and-see pile. 

Hey, it turns out that income inequality really is a major national security issue

About a year
ago, when I began thinking aloud in this blog
about income inequality as a national security issue, I worried if that
argument was a stretch. So I was pleased to see George Packer sprinkle holy water on it in the new issue of Foreign Affairs:

This inequality is the ill that underlies all
the others. Like an odorless gas, it pervades every corner of the United States
and saps the strength of the country's democracy. But it seems impossible to
find the source and shut it off. For years, certain politicians and pundits
denied that it even existed. But the evidence became overwhelming. Between 1979
and 2006, middle-class Americans saw their annual incomes after taxes increase
by 21 percent (adjusted for inflation). The poorest Americans saw their incomes
rise by only 11 percent. The top one percent, meanwhile, saw their incomes
increase by 256 percent. This almost tripled their share of the national
income, up to 23 percent, the highest level since 1928.