Van Creveld's deceptively simple for formula for measuring military power --and Peter Mansoor's rip on van Creveld

For some reason, in my research for my book on American
generalship, I read a lot about military effectiveness over the summer -- parts
of the
classic Millett and Murray series and of John Ellis' Brute
Force, plus the conclusion of Martin van Creveld's
Fighting
Power. I finally realized that the issue was not really central to my
book, but the books still were worth reading.

Here is van Creveld's deceptively simple formula: "the
military worth of an army equals the quantity and quality of its equipment
multiplied by its fighting power." (P. 174) (Paul Gorman had something
similar in his on-line papers.) The question, of course, is how does one
create and assess this fighting power? -- and that issue is what his book
explores.

That said, check out this crack by Professor Doctor Colonel Peter Mansoor
on page 255 of The
GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945:

Few American commanders of the World War II era would agree
with authors such as Martin van Creveld that the Germany army was more
effective. While the cream of the Wehrmacht, the panzer and panzer grenadier
divisions, were more combat-effective organizations and a match for the divisions
of the Army of the United States, the bulk of the German army was not composed
of these units. The average German infantry division could not defeat an
American infantry division in battle, while American infantry divisions consistently
proved their ability to accomplish their missions against the enemy divisions
in their front.