Bryan Caplan's Blog, page 143

"A Bet Disconcerts Him": Kant on Betting and Beliefs, by Bryan Caplan

Kant just went up a full notch in my eyes.  From The Critique of Pure Reason , via David Gordon, via Wlodek Rabinowicz.


The usual touchstone, whether that which someone asserts is merely
his persuasion -- or at least his subjective conviction, that is,
his firm belief -- is betting. It often happens that someone
propounds his views with such positive and uncompromising assurance
that he seems to have entirely set aside all thought of possible
error. A bet disconcerts him. Sometimes it turns out that he has
a conviction which can be estimated at a value of one ducat, but
not of ten. For he is very willing to venture one ducat, but when
it is a question of ten he becomes aware, as he had not previously
been, that it may very well be that he is in error. If, in a given
case, we represent ourselves as staking the happiness of our whole
life, the triumphant tone of our judgment is greatly abated; we
become extremely diffident, and discover for the first time that
our belief does not reach so far. Thus pragmatic belief always
exists in some specific degree, which, according to differences in
the interests at stake, may be large or may be small.

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How I Teach When I Really Want My Students to Learn, by Bryan Caplan

A month ago, my eleven-year-old sons still didn't know how to tie their shoes.  I volunteered to teach them.  As a professional educator, I was tempted to teach shoe-tying the same way I teach econ: With a scintillating lecture.  Since I really wanted my sons to learn how to tie their shoes, however, I did no such thing.  Instead, I followed these six steps.

Step 1: Make the task easier.  They were struggling to tie their shoes on their feet.  So I had them place their shoes on the table and learn to tie them there.  I also ordered easy-to-grip flat shoelaces to replace the round laces that came with the shoes.

Step 2: Break shoe-tying into a dozen sequential actions: cross the laces, pull the laces tight, form left and right rabbit ears, etc.

Step 3: Show them how to do the first action.  Then place my hands over their hands while they do the first action.  Then have them do it on their own, correcting any deviations from best practice.  Repeat.  Repeat.  Repeat.

Step 4: Practice only ten minutes per day regardless of success to avoid frustration.

Step 5: Once they reach near-mastery on the first action, tack on the second action and go back to Step 3.  Keep tacking on actions until they master the whole sequence.

Step 6: Now, practice the same sequence with shoes on the feet.  Repeat to mastery.

I almost - but not quite - went full behaviorist.  95% of the lesson was hands-on.  Instead of lecturing, I recited shoe-tying catechisms: "Make the rabbit ears.  Hand one-third up the lace.  Make the rabbit ears.  One-third.  Not half.  Make the rabbit ears.  Both ears."  I never challenged my sons to ponder the deep nature of shoe-tying; I only wanted to impart the practical skill.  When they made mistakes, I asked them to recite the catechism, correcting any deviations as they happened.

My lessons were fully effective.  Before long, my sons were experts - and so they will remain for their whole lives.  Which led to an awkward realization: My technique for teaching shoe-tying is much more effective than my technique for teaching economics.  In my experience, only 5-10% of my students master the material by the final exam.  And even my best students tend to quickly forget most of what they learned. 

I'm tempted to lament the Iron Laws of Pedagogy.  But my shoe-tying experience tells me that's a cop-out.  I know how to make my students learn more.  If filling my students with life-long knowledge were my top priority, I'd replace my thoughtful lectures with catechisms.  I'd make the students chant aloud with me.  I'd break every lesson into baby steps, and drive the students to master them one by one.  How?  I'd randomly and mercilessly put students on the spot, pressing them to apply the lesson aloud - and correct the slightest misstep.  We'd meet seven days a week for half an hour, endlessly recapping what we've learned.  Sure, I'd cover far less ground.  Yet after a semester, my students would know the basics for a lifetime.

Why don't I do this?  While I could say, "The best way to teach shoe-tying is radically different from the best way to teach economics," that's an excuse.  The truth: I don't teach econ the same way I teaching shoe-tying because I'd hate it, and my students would hate me. 

I don't wish to be a mere drill sergeant who turns raw recruits into competent economists.  I want to be an artist who turns economics into a magical journey.  I want to challenge my best students, not teach to the lowest common denominator.  And my students, for their part, want to sit back and relax.  They don't want me to randomly shine the classroom spotlight on them, ask questions, demand answers, and make them feel stupid over and over until they know what they're talking about.  One midterm, one final: That's enough stress for a semester.

Now that you've heard my pedagogical confession, you might expect me to turn over a new leaf.  I probably won't.  I love old-fashioned teaching too much to walk away.  And what's the point of adopting more effective teaching techniques if students refuse to take my classes?
 
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21 Short Claims About Political Motivation, by Bryan Caplan

Yesterday I wrote:

If you want lots of X, but are too ignorant to evaluate X's
indirect effects, you probably just really love X.  If you want lots of
ice cream, but are too ignorant to evaluate ice cream's effect on your
health, you probably just really love ice cream.  If you want lots of
government, but are too ignorant to evaluate government's overall
consequences, you probably just really love government.

Lest you think I'm picking on liberals, I now proceed to broadly generalize my initial claim.

1. If you want lots of defense spending, but are too ignorant to evaluate defense spending's overall
consequences, you probably just really love defense spending.

2. If you want lots of liberty, but are too ignorant to evaluate liberty's overall
consequences, you probably just really love liberty.

3. If you want lots of education, but are too ignorant to evaluate education's overall
consequences, you probably just really love education.

4. If you want lots of labor regulation, but are too ignorant to evaluate labor regulation's overall
consequences, you probably just really love labor regulation.

5. If you want to invade lots of countries, but are too ignorant to evaluate the overall
consequences of invading countries, you probably just really love invading countries.

6. If you want lots of environmental regulation, but are too ignorant to evaluate environmental regulation's overall
consequences, you probably just really love environmental regulation.

7. If you want lots of deregulation, but are too ignorant to evaluate deregulation's overall
consequences, you probably just really love deregulation.

8. If you want lots of taxes on the rich, but are too ignorant to evaluate taxes on the rich's overall
consequences, you probably just really love taxes on the rich.

9. If you want lots of tax cuts, but are too ignorant to evaluate tax cuts' overall
consequences, you probably just really hate taxes.

10. If you want lots of freedom of speech, but are too ignorant to evaluate freedom of speech's overall
consequences, you probably just really love freedom of speech.

11. If you want strict drug laws, but are too ignorant to evaluate drug laws' overall
consequences, you probably just really love drug laws.

12. If you want to end drug prohibition, but are too ignorant to evaluate drug prohibition's overall consequences, you probably just really hate drug prohibition.

13. If you want much lower population, but are too ignorant to evaluate much lower population's overall
consequences, you probably just really hate people.

14. If you want much higher population, but are too ignorant to evaluate much higher population's overall
consequences, you probably just really love people.

15. If you want much lower business taxes, but are too ignorant to evaluate business taxes' overall
consequences, you probably just really hate business taxes.

16. If you want drastic welfare cuts, but are too ignorant to evaluate welfare cuts' overall
consequences, you probably just really hate welfare.

17. If you want much lower immigration, but are too ignorant to evaluate immigration's overall
consequences, you probably just really hate immigration.

18. If you want much higher immigration, but are too ignorant to evaluate immigration's overall
consequences, you probably just really love immigration.

19. If you want lots of trade restrictions, but are too ignorant to evaluate trade restrictions' overall
consequences, you probably just really love trade restrictions.

20. If you want far fewer unions, but are too ignorant to evaluate unions' overall
consequences, you probably just really hate unions.

21. If you want lots more government health care, but are too ignorant to evaluate government health care's overall
consequences, you probably just really love government health care.

Note that in each case, I say "probably."  There actually is an elegant moral framework that justifies strong moral views in the face of deep ignorance.  I call it weak deontology.  On this view, some policies are morally obligatory unless there is strong
evidence that their consequences are very bad.  See the forced organ donation hypothetical or my common-sense case for pacifism. 

But does anyone really
think that ignorant political activists are this philosophically sophisticated?  Emotion-driven stories of the form, "If you want lots more X, but are too ignorant to evaluate X's overall
consequences, you probably just really love X" are none too flattering.  But if you listen to the silly way most activists talk, the unflattering story seems very true. 

Disagree?  What if I amend my statement to, "But if you listen to the silly way most activists who disagree with you talk, the unflattering story seems very true"?

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Liberal Authoritarianism, by Bryan Caplan

Critics often view liberals as deeply authoritarian.  Most liberals naturally object to this unflattering claim.  Critics notwithstanding, liberals don't relish using the power of government.  They don't have a raw preference for forcing everyone live their way.  Instead, liberals maintain, they favor using the power of government to advance liberal aims because such policies have good overall consequences.

Are liberals seeing their collective motivations clearly?  Not really.  For starters, most liberals - like most human beings - don't know enough social science to begin to weigh policies' overall consequences.  The best they can do, as Kahneman explains, is covertly change the subject, then answer easier questions.  To evaluate the overall consequences of raising the minimum wage, for example, you need to know the elasticity of labor demand.  Few laymen even understand the concept of elasticity, so they mentally substitute easier questions like, "Would I be happy if employers gave
low-skilled workers a raise?"

How does this show that most liberals aren't consequentialists?  Well, if most liberals don't know enough social science to weigh policies overall consequences, most can't honestly say, "I'm a liberal because using the power of government to advance liberal aims has overall good consequences."  If a liberal spends near-zero mental effort studying policies' consequences, something other than his beliefs about policies' consequences must be driving his liberalism. 

Such as?  Sheer love of government isn't the only possibility, but it's a good guess.  Consider: If you want lots of X, but are too ignorant to evaluate X's indirect effects, you probably just really love X.  If you want lots of ice cream, but are too ignorant to evaluate ice cream's effect on your health, you probably just really love ice cream.  If you want lots of government, but are too ignorant to evaluate government's overall consequences, you probably just really love government.

At this point, the thoughtful liberal may clarify his position: "When I claimed that liberals were consequentialists rather than authoritarians, I was only talking about liberal policy wonks like me who do know a lot of social science."  When a liberal grasps the connection between the minimum wage and labor demand elasticity - and hundreds of other esoteric policy points - his consequentialist self-portrait becomes fairly credible. 

Does this really refute critics' charge that liberals are authoritarian?  It depends.  You could define an authoritarian as "someone who relishes the use of government power."   On this definition, liberal wonks plausibly escape the authoritarian charge. 

But that's an awfully strong definition.  I'd suggest a more reasonable definition: an authoritarian is "someone who doesn't mind the use of government power."  This doesn't mean that you're an "authoritarian" if you favor using government power under any circumstances. What it means, rather, is that you're an authoritarian unless you have at least a modest presumption against using government power.

On the latter definition, "I'm a consequentialist" doesn't rebut the authoritarian accusation.  It confirms it.  Why?  Because consequentialism is inherently authoritarian! 

Suppose government forcing everyone to do A has slightly better consequences than the next-best alternative of leaving people alone.  True to his name, the consequentialist announces, "We should force everyone to do A."  A nay-sayer raises his hand and says, "What's the big deal?  I don't want to do A.  Leave me alone."  The clever consequentialist responds, "My calculations of the overall consequences take your reluctance into account.  So we should still force you to do A."  The nay-sayer nays, "The overall consequences are only slightly better.  Just leave me alone." 

In the end, the consequentialist has to either abandon consequentialism or say, "I refuse to leave you alone.  Although the difference between the best and second-best is small, you have to do A whether you like it or not."  And isn't that an awfully authoritarian attitude?

P.S. I leave the writing of the companion post on "Conservative Authoritarianism" as an exercise for the reader.

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Why Does High-Pressure Salesmanship Work?, by Bryan Caplan

[Warning: Minor spoilers].

Just finished The Wolf of Wall St .   Though based on a true story, the ugly facts are usually easy to minimize: Most investment firms aren't run by stoned sociopaths, and most investment firms' customers make money.  But one ugly fact is hard to shrug off: people with a talent for high-pressure salesmanship often get rich.

Why does high-pressure salesmanship work?  Many economists will lazily invoke textbook asymmetric information.  High-pressure salesmanship works because... adverse selection.  High-pressure salesmanship works because... moral hazard.  High-pressure salesmanship works because... signaling. 

None of these textbook stories remotely makes sense.  Adverse selection, moral hazard, and signaling should all thwart high-pressure salesmen by making their potential clients wary.  "If your stocks are so great, why are you trying so desperately to sell them to me?"  "You probably get paid on commission, so I don't trust you."  "If you're so great at picking winners, convince me by giving me $500 in complimentary stock.  Call me back once my account doubles in value."  High theory aside, everyone knows how to avoid being fleeced by high-pressure salesmen: Utterly refuse to deal with them.  Hang up or walk out.

If standard economic theory can't explain the power of high-pressure salesmanship, what does?  Psychology, of course.  Some human beings make important decisions on emotional grounds - and most human beings dislike saying "no."  High-pressure salesmen carefully study and coldly prey upon these weaknesses.  The best high-pressure salesmen get rich - even though most of their customers would have been better off without them.

How can a libertarian say such things without having his head explode?  By the power of hypothetical reasoning.  High-pressure salesmanship and the human weakness that sustains it are hardly unique.  Human weakness is all around us - and whenever human weakness exists, there are craftier human being waiting to cash in.  Cult leaders cash in on believers' weakness.  Pick-up artists cash in on women's weakness.  Gold-diggers cash in on men's weakness.  Faith healers cash in on their patients' weakness.  Should government try to regulate all of these things?  No?  Then why should government regulate high-pressure salesmanship?

None of this means, of course, that I'm indifferent to these problems.  I'm all for voluntary remedies.  First and foremost: Urging everyone to consistently use the defensive strategies that everyone knows.  When you encounter a high-pressure salesman, cult leader, pick-up artist, gold-digger, or faith-healer, utterly refuse to deal with them.  Hang up or walk out.

Yes, you could call this "blaming the victim."  But when a wolf is eating sheep, preaching at the sheep is far more effective than preaching at the wolf.

P.S. Hope to see you at Capla-Con this weekend, where wolves and sheep alike can hone their social skills. :-)









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The Economist: Give Tetlock Final Cut , by Bryan Caplan

A year ago, The Economist wrote another stylish but insubstantial editorial.  The topic: the Arab Spring.  The opening:

Roughly two-and-a-half years after the revolutions in the
Arab world, not a single country is yet plainly on course to become a
stable, peaceful democracy. The countries that were more
hopeful--Tunisia, Libya and Yemen--have been struggling. A chaotic
experiment with democracy in Egypt, the most populous of them, has
landed an elected president behind bars. Syria is awash with the blood
of civil war.

No wonder some have come to think the Arab spring is doomed.
The Middle East, they argue, is not ready to change. One reason is that
it does not have democratic institutions, so people power will decay
into anarchy or provoke the reimposition of dictatorship. The other is
that the region's one cohesive force is Islam, which--it is argued--cannot
accommodate democracy. The Middle East, they conclude, would be better
off if the Arab spring had never happened at all.

That view is at best premature, at worst wrong. Democratic transitions
are often violent and lengthy. The worst consequences of the Arab
spring--in Libya initially, in Syria now--are dreadful. Yet as our special report argues, most Arabs do not want to turn the clock back.

What's so bad about the editorial?  It confidently predicts that the Arab Spring will ultimately have good consequences:

Egyptians, among others, are learning that democracy is neither just a
question of elections nor the ability to bring millions of protesters
onto the street. Getting there was always bound to be messy, even
bloody. The journey may take decades. But it is still welcome.

At the same time, however,  the piece (a) proposes no clear measure for good consequences, and (b) makes no testable predictions.  Does the rise of ISIS show The Economist was wrong a year ago?  What if ISIS takes over Syria and Iraq and holds it for ten years? 

The Economist is hardly the worst offender here.  I pick on them because they're awesome at fostering the illusion of wisdom.  Indeed, The Economist exemplifies the "often wrong but never in doubt" experts that the great Tetlock exposed in his Expert Political Judgment.  Which gives me an idea.  The Economist - or any comparable publication - wants to turn over a new epistemic leaf, they should give Tetlock final cut.  Hand him the penultimate version of the magazine, give him a red pen, and let him delete all the elastic punditry.

The only strong objection to this reorganization is that the Tetlock cut of The Economist would lose piles of money.  Almost no one wants to read a magazine free of elastic punditry.  But if you're a fan - much less an editorialist - that's an awkward argument to make.

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Evaluating The Arab Spring: What Would Tetlock Say?, by Bryan Caplan

I was never optimistic about the Arab Spring.  But the spread of the hellish Syrian Civil War into Iraq leaves the net-effect-so-far quite a bit worse than I expected. 

You could say, "You're no expert on this topic, so your faulty foresight is understandable."  As far as I can Google, though, foresight demonstrably better than mine is very scarce.  If you Google "Arab Spring disaster" or "Arab Spring success," almost all of the hits "explain" good or bad things that have already happened.  It's almost as if Tetlock's critique of experts' epistemic vices had never happened.  Which leads me to the following questions.

1. Who actually made testable predictions about the overall effects of the Arab Spring?  E.g. on democratization, economic growth, or body count?

2. What were their predictions?

3. Which predictions were right?  Which were wrong?

4. Did anyone make any bets about the overall effects of the Arab Spring?  At all?!

P.S. If you feels that events have vindicated your superb foresight on the Middle East, it's not too late to start making testable predictions.  And publicly betting on them.

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A Hardy Weed: How Traditionalists Underestimate Western Civ, by Bryan Caplan

Last month, I debated Stephen Balch from Texas Tech's Institute for the Study of Western Civilization.  As I perused their website, I realized that despite our differences on immigration, we had a lot of common ground.  This jumped out at me:

Western civilization has remade the
world. Most of the West's inhabitants live lives of which their
ancestors could only dream: doubly long, rich in diet, teeming with
comforts and diversions, and, most of all, endowed with the gift of
liberty--not just for a privileged few, but for the many.

During our exchange, however, Balch rarely discussed the wonders of Western civilization.  Instead, he emphasized its fragility.  Preserving Western civilization is a constant struggle even without immigrants, he said.  Every twenty years we breed a new generation of barbarians called children.  To preserve our society, we have to teach each wave of juvenile barbarians to appreciate the Western civilization that makes everything possible.  Admitting non-Western immigrants places even more stress on our limited civilizing resources.

My question: Does it really make sense to praise Western civilization to the skies, then lament its fundamental fragility?  Imagine someone told you, "The Tesla is the best car in history.  But explodes unless you wash it three times a day."  The obvious response is, "A car that requires that much maintenance to avoid disaster sounds like a crummy car, all things considered."  This is especially true because even dysfunctional cultures normally maintain themselves with ease.  Self-perpetuation is what cultures do.

The enemy of Western civilization could leap on Balch's angst.  "Western civilization's biggest fans admit it has an eggshell skull.  This morbid fragility demands a negative evaluation, even if everything else pro-Western thinkers claim is true."

Fortunately, the fragility thesis is flat wrong.  There is absolutely no reason to think that Western civilization is more fragile than Asian civilization, Islamic civilization, or any other prominent rivals.  At minimum, Western civilization can and does perpetuate itself the standard way: sheer conformity and status quo bias. 

But saying that Western civilization is no more fragile than other cultures is a gross understatement.  The truth is that Western civilization is taking over the globe.  In virtually any fair fight, it steadily triumphs.  Why?  Because, as fans of Western civ ought to know, Western civ is better.  Given a choice, young people choose Western consumerism, gender norms, and entertainment.  Anti-Western governments from Beijing to Tehran know this this to be true: Without draconian censorship and social regulation, "Westoxification" will win. 

A big part of the West's strength, I hasten to add, is its openness to awesomeness.  When it encounters competing cultures, it gleefully identifies competitors' best traits - then adopts them as its own.  By the time Western culture commands the globe, it will have appropriated the best features of Asian and Islamic culture.  Even its nominal detractors will be Westernized in all but name.  Picture how contemporary Christian fundamentalists' consumerism and gender roles would have horrified Luther or Calvin.  Western civ is a good winner.  It doesn't demand total surrender.  It doesn't make fans of competing cultures formally recant their errors.  It just tempts them in a hundred different ways until they tacitly convert.

Traditionalists' laments for Western civilization deeply puzzle me.  Yes, it's easy to dwell on setbacks.  In a world of seven billion
people, you can't expect Western culture to win everywhere
everyday.  But do traditionalists seriously believe that freshman Western civ classes are the wall standing between us and barbarism?  Have they really failed to notice the fact that Western civilization flourishes all over the globe, even when hostile governments fight it tooth and nail?  It is time for the friends of Western civilization to learn a lesson from its enemies: Western civ is a hardy weed.  Given half a chance, it survives, spreads, and conquers.  Peacefully.

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Embarrass Me Now, Please, by Bryan Caplan

I'm now writing the most number-crunching parts of The Case Against Education: one chapter on education's selfish return, another on its social return.  The work is grueling, and haunted by the fear that I've made an early mistake that invalidates all my efforts.  Several true friends have spent hours in my office watching me walk through my work.  But I'm still nervous.  I don't want to toil for years only to be severely embarrassed when an eagle eye like Justin Wolfers exposes a critical error.

So I'm turning to you, EconLog readers, for help.  I'd rather release a flawed draft and endure mild embarrassment now than released a flawed book and endure deep embarrassment in 2017.   So embarrass me now, please.  Here's an Excel spreadsheet on which all my calculations depend. 

What am I doing?  Snapping together the following pieces:

1. 2011 Census numbers on average income for full-time, full-year workers, broken down by high school dropouts, high school only, B.A.s, and advanced degree holders.  I assume that the average dropout finished 10th grade, then quit school.

2. 2000-2013 St. Louis Fed numbers on unemployment rates, broken down by high school dropouts, high school only, B.A.s, and M.As.  I assume that the average dropout finished 10th grade, then quit school.

3. The punchline from my ability bias literature review, which concludes that 45% ability bias is reasonable.

4. The punchline from my sheepskin effect literature review, which concludes that, in percentage terms, the last year of high school has 3.4 times the effect of one regular high school year, the last year of college has 6.7 times the effect of one regular college year, and the last year of an advanced degree has 6.2 times the effect of a regular advanced degree year.

5. The CBO's numbers for private sector benefits as a fraction of pre-tax income, by education class.

6. Four student archetypes:

a. The Excellent Student, who has the raw ability of the typical advanced degree holder. 

b. The Good Student, who has the raw ability of the typical B.A. without an advanced degree.

c. The Fair Student, who has the raw ability of the typical high school grad who never went to college.

d. The Poor Student, who has the raw ability of the typical high school dropout.

By construction, a person whose educational attainment and raw ability "match" gets the observed income and unemployment rate for people with his educational attainment.  If you're a Poor Student who finished 10th grade, then stopped, you get the observed averages for drop-outs: $21,107 income and 9.8% unemployment rate.  If you're a Good Student who finished a B.A. but not an advanced degree, you get the observed averages for B.A.s: $59,415 income and 3.4% unemployment. 

However, if your educational attainment and raw ability don't match, I use (1) through (5) to compute your outcomes.  While an Excellent Student who drops out of high school earns much less than the typical advanced degree holder, he earns much more than the typical high school dropout thanks to his high raw ability.

7. Last, the spreadsheet calculates alternate "naive" estimates that set ability bias to 0%.

I'm happy to clarify my work in the comments or via email.  All feedback is welcome, but I deeply appreciate the revelation of demonstrable errors.  If you find any, bless you for embarrassing me now when the cost is mild.

P.S. Using Excel does not count as "demonstrable error."  It's my comparative advantage.

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Some Questions About Partisan Expulsion, by Bryan Caplan

Suppose you're an embarrassment to your political party.  In many countries, your party can formally expel you.  This serves three functions. 

First, damage control.  The fact that your party expelled the embarrassment mitigates your guilt-by-association. 

Second, prevention.  After you're expelled, your future behavior will bring little further shame to your former associates. 

Third, deterrence.  The fact that parties can expel embarrassments gives members an incentive to watch their mouths and control their behavior.

As far as I can tell, however, neither the Democrats nor the Republicans have the power to expel members.  Which raises some questions.

1. Is it strictly true that Democrats and Republicans cannot expel party members?  Or are there procedures they never (or almost never) use?

2. If expulsion were an option, who would the Democrats expel?  Who would the Republicans expel?

3. How would this change the style of American politics?

4. Would it have any effect on actual policy?

Please show your work.

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