Bryan Caplan's Blog, page 141

Immigrants Are Good for Cosmopolitan Tolerance, by Bryan Caplan

When I debated Mark Krikorian, he bemoaned immigrants' effect on Americans' patriotic solidarity.  I think he's making a mountain out of a molehill, but Mark's concerns were much on my mind during my recent visit to New York City. 

I saw no sign that New York was lacking in patriotic solidarity.  But one cultural difference was clear: Cosmopolitan tolerance was in the air - even compared to DC.  On the streets of New York, a world of accents and languages nonchalantly mingled.  People from all over the world amicably talked, walked, and traded.  And no matter where they came from, all the people of New York excelled at minding their own business. 

To be fair, an alert nativist could have extracted a few negative concessions from me as I toured.  The Asian pedestrians in Chinatown did seem a tad inconsiderate, especially the ones with poor control of their sun umbrellas.  But the nativist could do no more than harp on foreigners' sporadic venial sins - while desperately forgiving his countrymen's faux pas.

What makes New York City so culturally distinctive?  The obvious explanation is that immigrants are good for cosmopolitan tolerance.  Bringing the world's nationalities together to rub shoulders humanizes the Other.  It dissolves paranoid anxiety.  It tests in-group bias against palpable facts.  Simply strolling around New York makes nativism intellectually and emotionally hard to sustain.  Yes, you could try to teach cosmopolitan tolerance with sermons, but you'd probably fail.  Ubiquitous foreigners educate far more effectively than holier-than-thou preaching ever could.

The lesson: Even if Mark is right, immigration presents a cultural trade-off: You surrender some patriotic solidarity, but receive extra cosmopolitan tolerance in return.  And if this really is our choice, it is not a tough call.  Opt for all the cosmopolitan tolerance you can get. 

Why?  Because truth be told, patriotic solidarity is a mixed blessing at best.  Think of all the countries wrecked by excessive patriotic solidarity.  Cosmopolitan tolerance, in contrast, is good through and through.  I must be failing the Ideological Turing Test, because I can't even figure out what social disasters nativists will try to pin on cosmopolitan tolerance. 

So I ask them: What country has ever suffered from cosmopolitan tolerance run amok?  From focusing on people's common humanity rather than superficial differences?  From judging people on their merits instead of their origins?  From living and letting live?



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What Do Constitutions Do? Star Trek Edition, by Bryan Caplan

Political scientist and game designer Chris McGlothlin has a neat Facebook post on Star Trek and the Constitution, building off the classic episode "The Omega Glory."  Here's Chris, reprinted with his permission:

As
both a political science professor and a Trekkie, it's more difficult
for me than most to sit through the Original Show episode "The Omega
Glory", which you may remember as The One Where the Planet is Exactly
Like Earth, Except for One Thing. You may also recall it as the one
where Gene Roddenberry came to your house, stood behind you while you
watched, and periodically interjected, "Get it? Get it? Yangs and Kohms--like 'Yankees' and 'Communists.' You're welcome--it's just my gift."


The show ends when Kirk hands the utterly baffled primitive
tribespeople a copy of the U.S. Constitution--one they demonstrably
can't read or pronounce properly. Then, it's mic drop from Shatner and a
quick beam-up to the ship in time to lay down more tracks for The
Transformed Man.

Let's be nice here and pretend the tribe
figures out the proper words in a reasonable time, since language never
seems to be a problem for anyone else on Star Trek. This society is
still pretty much doomed.

Don't get me wrong: I revere the U.S.
Constitution which has both protected freedom and provided me a
comfortable living. But I also appreciate it's not for beginners.


For instance, we never see a copy of the Bill of Rights in the bundle
of aged parchments Kirk leaves them. Sure, the Yangs promise to respect
the words--even for their Kohm enemies--but without the Amendments,
those Kohms are goners. Sure, they're still safe from bills of attainder
(whew!), but are otherwise on their way to the headsman's axe.

Even
if the Yangs opt not to be bloodthirsty, they have ahead of them all
the Framers' misfires like "What? An Electoral College? What is this ****?! Damn you, Kirk!" And since there's no mention of judicial review
in any of the documents they have, the Kohms had better hope this
planet's copycat nature includes a Arburymay v. Adisonmay (or whatever
they'd call it) on the docket soon. Otherwise, we're once again left
with dead Kohms stacked up like cordwood.

I hope that by Picard's time they realize no away team is complete without a political scientist.

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Huemer's Moderation, by Bryan Caplan

Mike Huemer, to repeat, is my favorite philosopher.  Here are some highlights from his recent working paper, "Is Wealth Redistribution a Rights Violation?" [footnotes omitted]

There are at least three broad views one might take concerning the foundation of
property rights:

a. The Extreme Realist View: Property rights are moral rights that individuals possess, which are in every aspect and detail independent of social conventions, laws, and the state.

b. The Extreme Legalist View: Property rights are in every aspect and detail dependent on government-created laws. (N.B., property rights are normally understood as not only legal but also moral rights; this is why theft is not just illegal but unethical. The Legalist View is not merely that certain legal rights are dependent on laws, but that the relevant moral rights are dependent on laws.)

c. The Moderate View: Certain broad aspects of property rights are natural, independent of conventions and laws; however, other aspects and details of property rights must be settled by conventions or laws.

Which of these views are plausible...?

The Extreme Realist View... [is] highly implausible on reflection. Consider an example from the economist David Friedman: if I fire a thousand megawatt laser at my neighbor's house, I thereby violate his property rights. On the other hand, if I turn on a lamp in my house, knowing that some photons will go out the window and hit my neighbor's house, I do not thereby violate his property rights. The only physical difference between these two actions lies in the number and energy levels of the photons that I send my neighbor's way. So there must be some principle governing the number and energy levels of photons that one may send onto another person's property (of course, the principle need not be formulated in those terms): there is some amount of light at which it first becomes a rights-violation. But it is not plausible that this is determined purely by natural law. We need some sort of convention or (human-made) law to settle the matter.

[...]

We might be tempted, then, by the Extreme Legalist View: perhaps all questions about property rights are to be settled by government-made laws. Again, the claim here would not be the trivial one that the legal questions are settled by laws, but the ambitious claim that the moral questions as to one's property rights are entirely settled by laws. This view can be broken into two component theses: (i) Laws that recognize a particular set of property rights are necessary for the existence of moral property rights; without legal rules governing property, there would be no property rights. (ii) Laws that recognize a particular set of property rights are sufficient for the existence of moral property rights; for example, the existence of such conventions or laws makes it pro tanto morally wrong to take, damage, or use an item that, according to the conventions, belongs to another person, without that person's permission.

But both theses are implausible. Begin with (i), the idea that laws are necessary for property rights. Suppose you are exploring a remote wilderness region outside the jurisdiction of any government, when you come upon a clearing containing a rude hut. The hut appears to have been built by a hermit, who is its only inhabitant. Since property rights depend entirely upon governmental laws, and none are in force here, you determine that the hermit does not own the hut. Over his vociferous protestations, you decide to spend the night in the hut, eat some of the food that the hermit has grown and gathered, and then paint the hut lime green. You don't need to do any of these things; you just do them for fun. If there really are no property rights in this situation, you have just as much right to do these things as the hermit does.  Notice that my claim is not that in this scenario, the hermit has the full set of property rights exactly as they would be if a U.S. citizen bought some land in the United States and built a house on it. My claim, in accordance with the Moderate View of property rights, is only that there is at least some elementary, core notion of property that applies in the scenario.

Now consider thesis (ii), that certain kinds of laws are sufficient for property rights to exist. In the pre-Civil War U.S., ownership of human beings was recognized in the southern states, both conventionally and legally. Thus, thesis (ii) would imply that a slave was genuine property of his master, in a morally loaded sense. This need not preclude the possibility of arguing that some other distribution of property would be preferable (perhaps one in which no one were assigned a property right in another human being). But, given the laws as they were, one would have to say that a master in fact had the moral rights regarding his slaves that go along with property - the right to determine how his slaves were used, to sell them, bequeath them, and so on. One would have to say that for a slave to escape from his master, or for a third party to help a slave to do so, was an act of theft. I find this, to say the least, implausible...

We might be tempted to simply postulate that there are certain moral constraints, independent of the actual laws, that the state must respect in order for its establishment of a given class of property rights to be legitimate (e.g., to succeed in generating moral obligations on the part of citizens to respect the property rights that the state purports to establish). One of these constraints would be that a person may not be the property of another person. Presumably, there would be other constraints as well. But at this point, we seem to have abandoned the central idea of the Legalist View, in favor of the Moderate View of the foundations of property rights. And if we are content to posit a constraint such as "a legitimate property rights regime may not assign ownership of a person to another person," it is unclear why we should not be equally content with such constraints as "a legitimate property rights regime must assign initial ownership of a person's labor to that person" and other norms of the sort that would define a traditional conception of natural property rights.

The upshot is that only the moderate view of property rights is plausible. On this view, the objective moral principles governing property leave certain matters unsettled - how much light one may shine at a neighbor's property, how high above someone else's land one may fly, and so on. It is for laws and conventions to settle those matters. But the laws and conventions are not completely unconstrained; they must respect certain broad normative truths about property.

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A Non-Conformist's Guide to Success in a Conformist World, by Bryan Caplan

I've been a non-conformist for as long as I can remember.  "All the other kids love sports" never seemed like a good reason why I should feel - or pretend to feel - the same way.  "None of the other adults are wearing shorts and flip-flops" never seemed like a good reason why I should make myself uncomfortable.  It wasn't mere elitism on my part.  "All the other Princeton economists take general equilibrium models seriously" was no more compelling to me than "All the other teens want their own car."

Non-conformism at my intensity rarely allows real-world success.  Doing well almost always has a big social element; going solo gets you nowhere.  Yet by conventional standards, I've succeeded.  I have a dream job for life and enough money that I don't think about money.  How did I pull it off?

Some of it's luck - especially the luck of being in the right place at the right time to meet the right people.  (Thank you, Tyler Cowen).  But in hindsight, I also played my cards fairly well.  If you're a non-conformist who hopes to succeed in our conformist world, my favorite strategies will probably work well for you, too.  In no particular order:

1. Don't be an absolutist non-conformist.  Conforming in small ways often gives you the opportunity to non-conform in big ways.  Being deferential to your boss, for example, opens up a world of possibilities.

2. Don't proselytize the conformists.  Most of them will leave you alone if you leave them alone.  Monitor your behavior: Are you trying to change them more often than they try to change you?  Then stop.  Saving time is much more helpful than making enemies.

3. In modern societies, most demands for conformity are based on empty threats.  But not all.  So pay close attention to societal sanctions for others' deviant behavior.  Let the impulsive non-conformists be your guinea pigs.

4. During childhood, educational institutions' threats are by far the most real.  While "This is going on your permanent record" is usually an empty threat, "Do as we say or you will suffer at the next educational level" is not.  Vivid anecdotes about billionaire dropouts aside, the modern labor market remains extremely credentialist, and there's no reason to think this will change anytime soon.

5. A non-conformist attitude toward education is dangerous because academic status is painfully linear and cumulative.  To go to college, you must finish high school; to finish high school, you have to finish all the 12th-grade requirements; to finish the 12th-grade requirements, you have to finish all the 11th-grade requirements; and so on. 

6. Fortunately, the content of modern education is neither linear nor cumulative.  You can safely forget most of what you didn't feel like learning right after the final exam. 

7. Although teachers and students urge you to conform across the board, good grades in hard classes are virtually the only thing with long-run consequences.  You can live with C's in P.E.  Or ugly nicknames.  Or exclusion from the cool kids' clique.

8. Educational success hardly guarantees career success.  But educational credentials open a lot of doors - including most of the doors to non-conformist-friendly careers in academia, science, and yes, bureaucracies.

9. Most bureaucrats are deeply conformist, but bureaucratic (lack of) incentives are great for non-conformists.  Think job security.

10. Social intelligence can be improved.  For non-conformists, the marginal benefit of doing so is especially big.

11. Treat your family fairly, but remember that relatives - especially older relatives - are the lords of empty threats.  Despite all their criticism, they probably love you too much to do more than nag you.

12. When faced with demands for conformity, silently ask, "What will happen to me if I refuse?"  Train yourself to ponder subtle and indirect repercussions, but learn to dismiss most such ponderings as paranoia.  Modern societies are huge, anonymous, and forgetful.

13. Most workplaces are not democracies.  This is very good news, because as a non-conformist you'll probably never be popular.  You can however make yourself invaluable to key superiors, who will in turn protect and promote you.

14. Spend the first year of any job convincing your employer he was right to hire you, and he'll spend your remaining years on the job convincing you not to leave.  This advice is almost equally useful for conformists, by the way.

15. Despite everything, the world has more greatness than you can savor in a lifetime.  And in the modern world, finding greatness is remarkably easy.  Stop complaining, stop feeling sorry for yourself, and suck the marrow out of life.

16. Hiring your non-conformist friends is a great way to make your life better... but only if they follow these rules, too!



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The Economist on Overparenting, by Bryan Caplan

Though I'm no fan of The Economist's editorials, their science coverage remains outstanding.  Check out their latest piece on overparenting.  You could say I'm biased because the piece draws so heavily on my work, but as a pedantic professor, you'd expect me to find fault with any third party's popularization.  Happily, there's no fault to find:

Bryan Caplan, an economist at George Mason University, says it does not.
In "Selfish Reasons To Have More Kids", he points to evidence that
genes matter far more than parenting. A Minnesota study found that
identical twins grow up to be similarly clever regardless of whether
they are raised in the same household or in separate ones. Studies in
Texas and Colorado found that children adopted by high-IQ families were
no smarter than those adopted by average families. A Dutch study found
that if you are smarter than 80% of the population, you should expect
your identical twin raised in another home to be smarter than 76% but
your adopted sibling to be average. Other twin and adopted studies find
that genes have a huge influence on academic and financial success,
while parenting has only a modest effect.

The Economist, unlike many of my critics, gets the limits of my position:

The crucial caveat is that adoptive parents have to pass stringent
tests. So adoption studies typically compare nice middle-class homes
with other nice middle-class homes; they tell you little about the
effect of growing up in a poor or dysfunctional household.

The piece even manages to swiftly connect the dots between parental irrelevantism and natalism:

The moral, for Mr Caplan, is that middle-class parents should relax a
bit, cancel a violin class or two and let their kids play outside. "If
your parenting style passes the laugh test, your kids will be fine," he
writes. He adds that if parents fretted less about each child, they
might find it less daunting to have three instead of two. And that might
make them happier in the long run. No 60-year-old ever wished for fewer
grandchildren.

P.S. Hope to see you at the Open Borders Meet-Up on August 3.  Email me for details.

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Evolution and Moral Intuition, by Bryan Caplan

When backed into a corner, most hard-line utilitarians concede that the standard counter-examples seem extremely persuasive.  They know they're supposed to think that pushing one fat man in front of a trolley to save five skinny kids is morally obligatory.  But the opposite moral intuition in their heads refuses to shut up.

Why can't even utilitarians fully embrace their own theory?  The smart utilitarian answer blames evolution.  Scott Sumner:

Other "counterexamples" take advantage of illogical moral intuitions
that have evolved for Darwinian reasons, like discomfort at pushing a
fat man in front of a trolley car to prevent even more deaths.

I'm the first to concede that human beings haven't evolved to be perfect truth-seekers.  But what's the epistemically sound response to the specter of evolved bias?  "Be agnostic about every belief that, regardless of its truth, helps your genes," is tempting.  But it's also absurd. 

How so?  Virtually every moral philosophy - including utilitarianism - agrees that a happy life is better than (a) death, or (b) suffering.  But evolutionary heavily favors these value judgments!

If you aren't convinced that life is better than death, or that happiness is better than suffering, you swiftly drop out of the gene pool.  And since human beings are social animals, we're evolved to value the lives and happiness of the people around us as well as our own.  Should we therefore dismiss our anti-death, anti-suffering views as "illogical moral intuitions
that have evolved for Darwinian reasons"?

The moral nihilist, who bites even more bullets than the utilitarian, can enthusiastically agree.  Everyone else, however, has to say, "Yes, it's logically possible that we're evolved to falsely believe that life and happiness are better than death and suffering.  But after calm reflection on this potential bias, I remain convinced of the merits of life and happiness."  And if you use this approach for life and happiness, why not try it for murdering innocent fat guys?

None of this means that moral intuition is infallible.  Serious intuitionists question their moral intuitions all the time.  The reasonable response to evolved biases, though, is to calmly review suspect beliefs - not dismiss the obvious. 

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What to Learn from The Catcher in the Rye, by Bryan Caplan

I recently re-read J.D.Salinger's 1951 classic, The Catcher in the Rye , prompting Tyler to do the same.  My top reactions:

1. Other than losing his brother Allie, Holden has no external problems.  He is a rich kid living in the most amazing city in the world.  Rather than appreciating his good fortune or trying to make the most of his bountiful opportunities, Holden seeks out fruitless conflict.  If you still doubt that happiness fundamentally reflects personality, not circumstances, CITR can teach you something.

2. Nothing on Holden's Five Factor personality googles.  I say he's high in Opennness, low in Conscientiousness, high in Extroversion, low in Agreeableness, and high in Neuroticism.

3. Although I was a teen-age misanthrope, anti-hero Holden Caulfield is more dysfunctional than I ever was.  My dream was for everyone I disliked to leave me alone.  Holden, in contrast, habitually seeks out the company of people he dislikes, then quarrels with them when they act as expected.

4. Even if Holden's enduring antipathy for "phonies" were justified, it's hard to see why the epithet applies to most of its targets.  Consider this passage:

One of the biggest reasons I left Elkton Hills was because I was
surrounded by phonies. That's all. They were coming in the goddam
window. For instance, they had this headmaster, Mr. Haas, that was the
phoniest bastard I ever met in my life. Ten times worse than old
Thurmer. On Sundays, for instance, old Haas went around shaking hands
with everybody's parents when they drove up to school. He'd be charming
as hell and all. Except if some boy had little old funny-looking
parents. You should've seen the way he did with my roommate's parents. I
mean if a boy's mother was sort of fat or corny-looking or something,
and if somebody's father was one of those guys that wear those suits
with very big shoulders and corny black-and-white shoes, then old Haas
would just shake hands with them and give them a phony smile and then
he'd go talk, for maybe a half an hour, with somebody else's parents.

Translation: Haas is cordial to everyone, but likes some people more than others.  What precisely is "phony" about that?  For Holden, the main symptom of phoniness is that someone appears to like something Holden doesn't.  But he never wonders, "Is it possible that other people sincerely like stuff I don't?"

5. If phonies are your biggest problem, your problems are none too serious.

6. You might think that only a navel-gazing New York intellectual could write CITR, but Salinger experienced far worse things than phonies.  He fought in the D-Day invasion and the Battle of the Bulge.  He entered a liberated concentration camp in April, 1945.  Yet strangely, the moral of CITR isn't that Holden's self-pity is shameful.

7. I doubt Salinger was being Straussian.  Like most of CITR's fans, he thought Holden has important things to teach us.  Yet the book's deepest and most important lesson is that Holden's thoughts are profoundly shallow and unimportant.  The Holdens of the world should stop talking and start listening, for they have little to teach and much to learn.

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Some Empirics of Moral Philosophy, by Bryan Caplan

From the noble Jason Brennan:

This reminds me further of a talk I saw at a recent free market
conference. The presenter was talking about how most philosophers are
nihilists who believe that morality is bogus nonsense. I said, "You'll
be delighted to hear that we don't have to speculate about what
philosophers believe. Here are the results of the PhilPapers survey,
and it shows that most philosophers, including most moral theorists,
actually think the opposite!" He said, at the time, "Oh, that's great to
hear. I guess I should give them more credit." However, shortly
thereafter, in another session, he went back to strawmanning the field.

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Scott's Utilitarian Leniency, by Bryan Caplan

Scott's recent posts on utilitarianism sent me digging for his doubts about open borders.  But if you read him literally, Scott never falters.

My views on this are kind of hard to explain.  I am convinced by
Bryan Caplan's arguments on utilitarian grounds.  And yet I view this
issue as being different from all other policy issues in one key
respect.  This is the only good policy reform that I can think of that
might well make Americans significantly worse off.  In other cases
what's good for the world is generally good for America, or perhaps
roughly neutral.  So is it too much to ask for Americans to agree to
open borders?  Not if everyone was like Jesus.  But although I'd
personally vote in favor in a referendum, if I were a typical middle
class American with the same level of selfishness that I currently have,
I might vote against.  That's why I prefer to work for more modest
gains, such as a rate of immigration of say 1% per year (i.e. 3 million
people.)  I believe that would greatly reduce illegal immigration.  I'd
prefer a balance of low and high skilled workers.  I realize that this
would reduce the amount that we could plausibly do with low wage
subsidies, but it's still the right thing to do.  (Bryan will say that
in 1850 I would have favored "gradually" reducing slavery.)

If you are confused by my wishy-washy views on immigration, here's an
analogy. On purely utilitarian grounds I'd have to say that
transferring my entire pension to the poor of Dhaka is probably a good
idea.  If you hooked me up to a lie detector I'd have to say it's the
"right policy." But I don't do it because of the thought of still
grading papers at age 83, and because I'm a selfish bastard.
 Fortunately, that dilemma doesn't occur on any of the public policy
issues I discuss in my blog.  I always say what I believe (rightly or
wrongly) is the right policy.  I just don't talk about the sort of
proposals that Peter Singer might contemplate.

What's noteworthy about this passage isn't that Scott disavows a clear-cut application of the utilitarian principle.  He disavows nothing.  What's noteworthy, rather, is that for once, Scott is vocally forgiving of non-utilitarians.  Instead of ridiculing opponents of open borders for their cognitive illusions, Scott suggests that utilitarianism asks too much. 

My question for Scott: Why is open borders the one issue where you seem to opt for moral leniency?  (Perhaps this reflects a change of heart?)

Followup question if he's got time: Why are you so quick to grant that open borders is a net negative for natives?  Sure, low-skilled natives who rent would probably lose.  But most natives aren't low-skilled and do own land.

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The Argument from Conscience, by Bryan Caplan

The Argument from Hypocrisy (a close cousin of the "demandingness objection") is one of the strongest objections to utilitarianism.  (Strangely omitted from Scott's inventory).  The argument has two steps.

Step 1. Note that utilitarianism implies extreme moral demands.  For example, maximizing total happiness requires you to give away all your surplus wealth to the needy - at least needy people whose behavior is unlikely to respond much to incentives, such as children.

Step 2. Point out that even the staunchest utilitarians are light-years away from fulfilling these extreme moral demands.  Even Peter Singer "only" gives 20%.

To put the Argument from Hypocrisy conversationally: "Your view implies that you should give away all your surplus wealth to needy kids.  But you don't.  If even explicit utilitarians like you don't seem to take their views seriously, why should anyone else?"

To be fair, there is an obvious though embarrassing reply to Argument from Hypocrisy.  Namely: "Like most humans, I'm deeply morally flawed.  I know utilitarianism is true, but I'm too weak to live by it.  Saint Paul had it right: 'For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do.'"

On reflection, however, a variation on the Argument from Hypocrisy is largely immune to the Pauline reply.  I call it the Argument from Conscience. 

Instead of harping on utilitarians' moral weakness, the Argument from Conscience begins by singling out the most morally exemplary utilitarians. 

Take Bill Dickens.  I've known Bill for almost a quarter-century.  In all these years, I have repeatedly witnessed him spontaneously take unpleasant actions out of a sense of moral duty.  I have never witnessed him treat another person badly.  Ever. 

While Bill Dickens is a man of conscience, he's also officially a utilitarian or near-utilitarian.  How could his extreme scrupulousness possibly discredit his utilitarian philosophy?  Simple.  Like every other utilitarian, his behavior is wildly at odds with utilitarianism's demands. 

Although Bill gives generously to charity, he consumes far more than he needs to keep working.  He skis in Colorado.  He goes to GenCon.  Bill also clearly prioritizes his contractual obligations above the desperate need of total strangers - even when repeated play is unimportant.  If Bill forgot to tip a waiter, he would strive to make amends to the aggrieved waiter - not mail the waiter's tip to Oxfam.

The upshot: If Bill Dickens told me, "Like most humans, I'm deeply morally flawed.  I know utilitarianism is true, but I'm too weak to live by it," I wouldn't believe him.  Bill is a paragon of decency.  If he really believed he morally owed vast sums to the poor, he'd skip GenCon and fork over the money.  Since he doesn't, I infer that despite his official position, utilitarianism seems almost as crazy to him as it does to me.  The same goes for every earnest yet non-compliant utilitarian.  Utilitarianism doesn't just go against their interests.  It goes against their consciences.

To put the Argument from Conscience conversationally: "You live by your conscience.  If you really thought utilitarianism was true, you would live up to it.  Yet you don't.  If even scrupulous utilitarians like you don't take the view
seriously, why should anyone else?"

And that, my utilitarian friends, is the Argument from Conscience.  The problem isn't that your doctrine is too good for you.  The problem is that you're too good for your doctrine.

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