Governing the Commons Quotes

“The power of a theory is exactly proportional to the diversity of situations it can explain.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“One can … get trapped in one's own intellectual web.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Scientific knowledge is as much an understanding of the diversity of situations for which a theory or its models are relevant as an understanding of its limits.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Organizing is a process; an organization is the result of that process.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“In some settings, however, rampant opportunistic behavior severely limits what can be done jointly without major investments in monitoring and sanctioning arrangements.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Driven by a concern with institutions, we re-enter the world of the behavioralists. But we do so not in protest against the notion of rational choice, but rather in an effort to understand how rationality on the part of individuals leads to coherence at the level of society. (Bates 1988, p. 399)”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“As long as a single center has a monopoly on the use of coercion, one has a state rather than a self-governed society.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Confusing a model – such as that of a perfectly competitive market – with the theory of which it is one representation can limit applicability still further.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Theoretical inquiry involves a search for regularities. It involves abstraction from the complexity of a field setting, followed by the positing of theoretical variables that underlie observed complexities.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“But until a theoretical explanation -based on human choice – for self-organized and self-governed enterprises is fully developed and accepted, major policy decisions will continue to be undertaken with a presumption that individuals cannot organize themselves and always need to be organized by external authorities.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Since Garrett Hardin's challenging article in "Science" (1968), the expression "the tragedy of the commons" has come to symbolize the degradation of the environment to be expected whenever many individuals use a scarce resource in common.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. (Hardin 1968, p. 1,244)”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Unfortunately, many analysts – in academia, special-interest groups, governments, and the press – still presume that common-pool problems are all dilemmas in which the participants themselves cannot avoid producing suboptimal results, and in some cases disastrous results.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“Godwin and Shepard (1979) pointed out a decade ago that policy scientists were doing the equivalent of “Forcing Squares, Triangles and Ellipses into a Circular Paradigm” by using the commons-dilemma model without serious attention to whether or not the variables in the empirical world conformed to the theoretical model.”
― Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“«Трагедія спільного», «дилема в'язня» та «логіка колективної дії» — тісно пов'язані концепції в моделях, які визначають загальноприйнятий спосіб аналізу багатьох проблем, що з ними стикаються люди, намагаючись досягти колективного добробуту. В «серці» кожної з цих моделей — проблема «зайців-безбілетників». Завжди, коли людину неможливо усунути від отримання благ, які отримують всі інші, для кожного з'являється мотив не робити свій внесок у спільні зусилля, але користуватися зусиллями інших. Якщо всі учасники обирають «заячу» модель поведінки, то колективне благо не створюється. Спокуса «безбілетництва», однак, може домінувати у прийнятті рішень, і тому все закінчується тим, чого ніхто не хотів. Окрім того, деякі можуть створювати блага, тоді як інші — «безбілетничати», що призводить до меншого, ніж оптимальний, рівня забезпечення колективного добробуту. Тож ці моделі є надзвичайно корисними для пояснення того, як цілком раціональні індивідууми можуть за деяких обставин показати нераціональні з точки зору всіх зацікавлених сторін результати.”
― Елінор Остром, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

“«Гра «дилема в'язня» зачаровує вчених. Той парадокс, що індивідуально раціональні стратегії можуть привести до колективних ірраціональних результатів, кидає виклик вірі в те, що раціональні людські істоти можуть досягти раціональних результатів.”
― Елінор Остром, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action