Patrick Link

“The founding conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was held in May 1963 while the world’s press was saturated with reports of the savage police response to the civil rights marches in Birmingham, Alabama. The assembled African leaders sent President John Kennedy an eloquent message: “The Negroes who, even while the [OAU] Conference was in session, have been subjected to the most inhuman treatment, who have been blasted with fire hoses cranked up to such”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“Above all else, the sinking of Force Z demonstrated that the dominance the battleship had enjoyed in naval warfare had finally come to an abrupt end. For almost half a century, the battleship had reigned supreme as the arbiter of victory at sea. Throughout its life the torpedo had been a relatively ineffective weapon, and one which could be countered with relative ease, but which was now becoming increasingly effective when used by destroyers and submarines. Also, a new generation of aircraft had entered service which had the speed, capacity and agility to launch highly effective torpedo attacks. The torpedo bomber was a weapon that had finally come of age. What this battle demonstrated was that relatively cheap, mass-produced aircraft, if flown with skill and daring, and used in sufficient numbers, could prove more than a match for a hugely expensive battleship. So, 10 December 1941 marked a real historical milestone. In geopolitical terms, the sinking of Force Z signalled the imminent end for the British defence of Singapore – its surrender to the Japanese in turn marking the start of the disintegration of the British Empire. In the field of military and naval history, that date marked something of equally momentous importance. It was the day when the battleship ceased to be the dominant arbiter of naval power. In effect, 10 December 1941 marked the death of the battleship.”
― Angus Konstam, Sinking Force Z 1941: The day the Imperial Japanese Navy killed the battleship

“Stevenson had written Kennedy in June 1963 that the Africans wanted to know whether the United States stood “for self-determination and human rights” or whether “we will give our Azores base . . . priority.” Despite Kennedy’s uneasiness and the strong opposition of a few U.S. officials, the administration’s policy was clear: the base in the Azores was more important than self-determination in Africa. In the final analysis, as a German scholar concludes, “What worried the [Kennedy] administration was not Portugal’s use of the arms in Africa, but the danger that it might become public. In fact the administration . . . continued to deliver weapons to Portugal.”54”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“Under President Richard Nixon, U.S. policy developed an even more pronounced pro-Portuguese bent, consistent with the administration’s support for white-ruled Africa. The most notorious manifestation was the December 1971 executive agreement that gave Portugal $436 million in credits for the use of the Azores base until February 1974. It was, noted the New York Times, “one of the largest economic assistance packages negotiated in many years in exchange for foreign base rights,” and it would “prop up the Lisbon Government’s floundering economy,” exhausted by a decade of colonial wars.56 As Amílcar Cabral told the UN Security Council in Addis Ababa the following February, “Portugal would not be in a position to carry out three wars against Africans without the aid of her allies.”57 CUBAN”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom