Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book Quotes

“I do not know of any other country, in modern times, for which idealism has been such a key component of its foreign policy as for Castro’s Cuba. Was it worth it? In terms of Cuba’s narrow interests, certainly not. Cuba drew no tangible benefits from its presence in Angola. If, however, one believes that countries have a duty to help other countries—and internationalism is at the core of the Cuban revolution—then the answer is emphatically yes, it was worth it. Any fair assessment of Cuba’s foreign policy must recognize its role in changing the course of southern African history despite Washington’s best efforts to stop it. There is no other instance in modern history in which a small underdeveloped country has shaped the course of events in a distant region—humiliating one superpower and repeatedly defying the other.”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“What about Cuba? What was its vision of freedom in southern Africa? In Angola it supported the government of Agostinho Neto, who was authoritarian, eager to improve the lot of the people, and who lent courageous support to the liberation fighters of South Africa and Namibia. Neto died in 1979, and the government of President dos Santos grew increasingly corrupt and indifferent to the plight of the common people. It had, however, two important pluses: it continued to support the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa and, for all its faults, it was far better than the alternative, Jonas Savimbi. The Cuban troops did not stay in Angola for more than a decade, however, to keep dos Santos in power. They stayed to defend Angola from South Africa. They stayed to help the ANC and SWAPO. They stayed because the Cuban leaders were convinced that their departure would provide an opportunity for South Africa to impose Savimbi on Angola and a puppet regime on Namibia. They stayed, in other words, to hold the line against apartheid.”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“Since the beginning of the negotiations, Castro’s instructions had been to be polite as long as the other side was polite, but not to allow insults: “Be very calm, laugh, and smile,” but if the others became offensive, then “put them in their place.” Aldana behaved accordingly. “Cuba would have no problem . . . announcing publicly that the negotiations had deadlocked,” he began. He then went where Ndalu had not dared to go, stressing “the ignorance, the racism and the contradictions” that characterized American society. He said that it was not surprising that in a country whose president mistook Brazil for Bolivia (as Reagan had done) and placed Jamaica in the Mediterranean (another Reagan lapse), the population would not know “what Angola is and what Namibia is.” This was not the kind of language that Crocker was used to hearing.”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“The Cubans were convinced that South Africa had a few nuclear bombs. (In fact, it had six.)32 They believed that Pretoria would not dare to use them, at least as long as the Cuban army did not enter Namibia. Nevertheless, they took whatever precautions they could. As Castro explained, “Our troops advanced at night, with a formidable array of antiaircraft weapons, . . . in groups of no more than 1,000 men, strongly armed, at a prescribed distance from one another, always keeping in mind the possibility that the enemy might use nuclear weapons.”33”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“The previous evening, Adamishin had told Risquet that Crocker had warned him that “[South Africa] will not withdraw from Angola until the Cuban troops have left the country” and that the South African military “feel every day more comfortable in Angola, where they are able to try out new weapons and inflict severe blows on the Angolan army.” Crocker’s message was clear: if Havana and Luanda wanted Pretoria to withdraw from Angola, they would have to make significant concessions.28 Castro was not impressed. “Ask the Americans,” he told Adamishin: “If the South Africans are so powerful, . . . why haven’t they been able to take Cuito? They’ve been banging on the doors of Cuito Cuanavale for four months. Why has the army of the superior race been unable to take Cuito, which is defended by blacks and mulattoes from Angola and the Caribbean? The powerful South Africans . . . have smashed their teeth against Cuito Cuanavale . . . and they are demoralized.”29”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“The well-connected lobbying firm of Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly had been counseling him since the previous summer—for a $600,000-a-year contract. “He was meticulously coached on everything from how to answer his critics to how to compliment his patrons,” the Washington Post reported.117”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“On June 17, 1985, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) was established in Windhoek. In his inaugural speech, the chairman of the TGNU set the tone: “The people of Namibia are tired of the ravages of war and of the involvement of the international community in the struggle for the liberation of Namibia.” When the chairman spoke of “international” involvement, he meant the United Nations and Resolution 435, not South Africa. President Botha, who presided over the ceremonies, was blunt. “We . . . have a message for the world,” he said; “for Soviet strategists, shifting their pieces on the international chessboard; for Western diplomats, anxious to remove at any cost this vexatious question [Namibia] from the international agenda; for SWAPO terrorists lurking in their lairs in Angola—we are not a people to shirk our responsibilities. . . . The people of Southwest Africa,” Botha concluded, “cannot wait indefinitely for a breakthrough”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“Eventually it came to health care. Here a remarkable exchange took place among Cubans, while the Angolans listened in silence. It began when Rodolfo Puente Ferro, the able Cuban ambassador in Angola, said, “There are regions, provincial capitals, where really there is no medicine. The sick are given prescriptions, but then they have to go to the witch doctor, to the traditional healer, because there is no medicine. The mortality rate is high because of this lack of medicine.” The Cuban health authorities had tried to help, offering fifty-five types of medicine that were manufactured in Cuba, “that are really necessary and indispensable for the diseases that are found in Angola.” They had offered them at cost—$700,000 for a six-month supply. After months of silence, the Angolans had finally asked for twenty-nine of these medicines, but they had not yet been shipped because Luanda had failed to release the requisite letters of credit. Castro asked, “Can we manufacture this medicine for $700,000?” After Puente Ferro confirmed that this was possible, Fidel continued, “Well . . . then let’s do it and send it to Angola, and let them pay later. . . . We don’t want to make any profit with this medicine; we will sell it at cost. . . . If the situation is critical, we’ll send it on the first available ship, and let them pay later.” He insisted, “We cannot let a man die in a hospital, or a child, or an old person, or a wounded person, or a soldier, or whoever it may be, because someone forgot to write a letter of credit or because someone didn’t sign it. Besides, we’re not talking about large quantities. We won’t go bankrupt if you can’t pay. We won’t be ruined. If we were talking about one hundred million dollars, I would have to say, ‘Comrades, we cannot afford it.’ But if we’re only talking about $700,000 . . . We can handle it.”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“wrote to Fidel Castro that Neto would allow SWAPO, the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) to have military camps in Angola and that he would grant them “every facility” to receive help from other countries, especially Cuba and the Soviet Union.97 Castro was eager to help. “The struggle for liberation is the most righteous endeavor,” he said.98 Helping SWAPO, the ANC, and ZAPU became a tripartite effort: the Cubans provided most of the instructors, the Soviets the weapons, and the Angolans the land.”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“The Chinese have told UNITA that Peking would continue its aid,” the CIA reported, “but was concerned about how it would reach UNITA if Zaire was no longer able to act as a transit area.” South Africa offered to help. Beijing held its nose, and with Pretoria’s assent in 1979 it delivered “550 to 600 tons of weapons” to Savimbi through Namibia.18”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“Among American newspapers, the New York Times offered by far the best and most extensive coverage of the war in Angola, and it was the New York Times that first revealed the existence of a U.S. covert operation there. In a front-page article on September 25, Leslie Gelb wrote that “millions of dollars are being poured covertly into Portugal and Angola by East and West,” including the Soviet Union and the United States. (The Soviets, he hastened to say, were “far more” involved in both Portugal and Angola than the Americans.)60 The article provoked nothing but total silence. “It was, and still is, a mystery to me why the Gelb report had so little public impact in the United States when it was published,” Nathaniel Davis writes.61 The explanation is suggested by a stern editorial in the Washington Post that appeared two days after Gelb’s article. The editorial endorsed the covert operation in Portugal, but not that in Angola. “The operation there seems much closer to the questionable crudely anti-communist adventures that have so marred the CIA’s past,” it observed. But this was not the point. The point was that the secret had been betrayed: “The disclosures illuminate the strange new semi-public setting in which ‘secret’ operations must now be devised. . . . Some would consider this anticipation of exposure as a healthy deterrent or even as just retribution for past excesses. We find it deplorable. The United States still has, we believe, reason to conduct certain covert operations abroad—Portugal is an excellent example. It should not be necessary to point out that covert operations must be covert. ‘National security’ unquestionably has been overworked as a rationale for secrecy but it has not lost all validity.”62”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“The CIA’s talk of a peaceful solution was a smokescreen. “As is typical of such clandestine operations,” Hyland writes, “the policy discussion was cryptic.”53 Just as it was better not to mention any possible collusion with South Africa, so it was better to shroud IAFEATURE in a mist of peace. This was particularly true in light of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, passed by Congress in December 1974, which stipulated that the CIA had to report “in a timely fashion, a description and scope” of covert operations to eight congressional committees. And Congress, in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, was an unreliable partner. “It can be assumed,” the Davis task force warned, “that there would be strong Congressional opposition to any US involvement in support of one of the contending factions [in Angola].”54 Through the summer and the fall of 1975, the administration briefed the relevant congressional committees about IAFEATURE, but the briefings were less than candid. Representative Diggs, who chaired the Congressional Black Caucus and was a bitter foe of South Africa, would have strenuously objected had he known the true scope of the operation. “[We were told that] South Africa was not going to be any part of this. . . . So we were not going to ‘be embarrassed’ by South Africa,” Senator Biden noted in January 1976.”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“Beyond the desire to give U.S. prestige a shot in the arm, Kissinger justified his policy by arguing that an MPLA victory would encourage armed struggle and subvert Vorster’s détente in southern Africa. He was right, but South Africa’s détente was, as Neto said, a “chimera,” and violence was inevitable as long as apartheid ruled South Africa, a racist regime dominated Rhodesia, and Namibia was occupied. Just as the MPLA’s victory in Angola brought hope to South African blacks, strengthened SWAPO, and spurred the United States to seek majority rule in Rhodesia, so IAFEATURE’s success would have strengthened the forces of racism and apartheid in southern Africa. And what for? To teach Brezhnev the rules of détente?”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“I stressed to Neto that the way we treat the population is key to gaining their support. . . . I stressed how the thuggish behavior of the FNLA (robberies, assaults, murders, rapes, unbelievable savagery) engenders widespread hatred even among people who are not politicized. Later, there will be [time for] propaganda, political education, . . . but simply treating people well . . . can garner the massive support of the population.50”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“Under President Richard Nixon, U.S. policy developed an even more pronounced pro-Portuguese bent, consistent with the administration’s support for white-ruled Africa. The most notorious manifestation was the December 1971 executive agreement that gave Portugal $436 million in credits for the use of the Azores base until February 1974. It was, noted the New York Times, “one of the largest economic assistance packages negotiated in many years in exchange for foreign base rights,” and it would “prop up the Lisbon Government’s floundering economy,” exhausted by a decade of colonial wars.56 As Amílcar Cabral told the UN Security Council in Addis Ababa the following February, “Portugal would not be in a position to carry out three wars against Africans without the aid of her allies.”57 CUBAN”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“Stevenson had written Kennedy in June 1963 that the Africans wanted to know whether the United States stood “for self-determination and human rights” or whether “we will give our Azores base . . . priority.” Despite Kennedy’s uneasiness and the strong opposition of a few U.S. officials, the administration’s policy was clear: the base in the Azores was more important than self-determination in Africa. In the final analysis, as a German scholar concludes, “What worried the [Kennedy] administration was not Portugal’s use of the arms in Africa, but the danger that it might become public. In fact the administration . . . continued to deliver weapons to Portugal.”54”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“The fact that the United States did not invade Cuba has given Kennedy’s pledge more weight than it deserves. The documents that have been declassified suggest that the prospect of an invasion was “shunned”33 because of its potential cost—the toll in American lives, the risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union spiraling into global war, the negative impact on the allies and on public opinion worldwide—rather than scruples pursuant to the purported noninvasion pledge. Furthermore, Cuba would soon be overshadowed by Vietnam.”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“pressure that the water would strip bark off the trees, at whom the police have deliberately set snarling dogs, are our own kith and kin.”5”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom

“The founding conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was held in May 1963 while the world’s press was saturated with reports of the savage police response to the civil rights marches in Birmingham, Alabama. The assembled African leaders sent President John Kennedy an eloquent message: “The Negroes who, even while the [OAU] Conference was in session, have been subjected to the most inhuman treatment, who have been blasted with fire hoses cranked up to such”
― Piero Gleijeses, Piero Gleijeses' International History of the Cold War in Southern Africa, Omnibus E-Book: Includes Conflicting Missions and Visions of Freedom