John G. Messerly's Blog, page 125

Transhumanism and Religion

Transhumanism is: 

The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities … transhumanism is a way of thinking about the future that is based on the premise that the human species in its current form does not represent the end of our development but rather a comparatively early phase.1

Transhumanism appears to have nothing in common with religion, defined as: “the belief in and worship of a god or gods, or any such system of belief and worship…”2 In transhumanism the gods play no role.

Yet the two are not entirely dissimilar. Religious people generally want to overcome the limitations of the body and live forever, just like transhumanists. Arising before transhumanist ideas were conceivable, religions had no other option but to advise their followers to accept death and hope for the best. Religious beliefs provided comfort in the face of death and natural evils before the advent of science and technology. We might think of religion as premature transhumanism. Religion is not the opposite of transhumanism but a seed from which transhumanism can grow.

However today the comfort provided by archaic religious superstitions impedes advancement and therefore should be set aside. We need to grow beyond religion. But must we relinquish religious beliefs now, before science gives us everything we want? Yes. The most important reason to abandon religious belief is religion’s opposition to most forms of progress. For the most part religion has opposed: the elimination of slavery, the use of birth control, women’s and civil rights, stem cell research, genetic engineering, and science in general. Religion is from our past; it opposes the future.

Can humans function without the old religious narratives? They can, they just need new narratives based on a scientific worldview. Such narratives could be transhumanist, of humans playing their role as links in a chain leading to greater forms of being and consciousness; or perhaps they will focus on the idea that cosmic evolution is the story of the universe becoming self-conscious through conscious beings like ourselves. Whatever shape those narratives take, they must be informed by the belief that humans can evolve into something much more than they are now.

But against this seemingly infinite temporal background, what of the significance of a single, finite human life, and what is the significance of all of cosmic evolution? We are significant if we play our part in advancing evolution, if we accept our role as the protagonists of the evolutionary epic. And if we succeed our post-human descendants will understand these ultimate questions, giving our own lives—by then long past—a significance we can now hardly fathom. For the moment we must take solace in the hope that the better world we imagine is indeed possible.

1. This quote is from the Humanity+ website’s FAQ section.

2. From “The Cambridge International Dictionary of English.”

 

Having introduced transhumanists ideas to university students over the years, I am familiar with typical objections to transhumanist philosophy: if we don’t die the world will become overpopulated; not having a body would be yucky; this is all science fiction; lots of things can go wrong; technology is bad; death makes life meaningful; immortality would be boring; etc.

So I was surprised after yesterday’s post to receive hostile responses of the “we shouldn’t play god,” or “we should let nature take its course” variety. You can find similar critiques at links like : “The Catholic Church Declares War on Transhumanism”  and “Transhumanism: Mankind’s Greatest Threat.” Here is a statement from the latter: 

Various organizations desire to use emerging technology to create a human species so enhanced that they cease to be humans. They will be post-humans with the potential of living forever. If these sciences are not closely monitored and regulated, transhumanists’ arrogant quest to create a post-human species will become a direct assault on human dignity and an attack on God’s sovereignty as Creator. We must decide on an unmovable line now, one that upholds human dignity based on Biblical Truth.

It is no longer enough to be pro-life; we have now entered a time when we must be pro-human. Education about the full implications of these emerging sciences is a key to be able to directly confront these assaults on humanity.

If one truly believes that humans should accept their fate, that they were specially designed and created by the gods, and that the divine plans includes evil and death, then the condemnations of transhumanism are justified. But will this opposition succeed? I doubt it. Most do not desire to go back to the middle ages, when believers prayed sincerely and then died miserably. Today some still consult faith healers, but the intelligent go to their physicians. Everything about technology plays god, and letting nature takes its course means that half the people reading this article would have died in childbirth or from childhood diseases before the advent of modern medicine.

Still there are good reasons to be cautious about designing and using future technologies, as Bill Joy outlined more than a decade ago in “Why The Future Doesn’t Need Us.”  (Here is my published criticism of Joy’s argument.) Yes, we should be cautious about the future, but we should not stand still. Do we really want to turn the clock back 100 years before computers and modern medicine? Do we really want to freeze technology at its current level? Look before we leap, certainly, but leap we must. If we do nothing, eventually we will go extinct: asteroids will hit the planet, the climate will change irrevocably, bacteria will evolve uncontrollably, and in the far future the sun will burn out. Only advanced technologies give us a chance against such forces.

If we do nothing we will die; if we gain more knowledge and the power that accompanies it, we have a chance. With no risk-free way to proceed, we should be brave and bold, unafraid to guide our own destiny.

 

 

 

Perhaps the best way to illuminate the choice is to consider a previous choice human beings faced in their history. What should they do about disease? Should they pray to the gods and have faith that the gods will cure them, or should they use science and technology to find the cures themselves? In hindsight the answer is clear. Praying to the gods makes no difference, whereas using modern medicine has limited death and disease, and nearly doubled the human lifespan in the last century. When medieval Europeans contracted the plague they prayed hard … and then died miserably. Other examples also easily come to mind. What is the best way to predict weather, harness energy, capture sound, achieve flight, communicate over great distances, or fly to far off planets? In none of these cases is doing nothing and hoping for the best a good bet. All of the above were achieved through the use of science and technology.

These examples highlight another advantage to making the transhumanist wager—the incremental benefits that accrue as we live longer and better lives as we approach the holy grail of a blissful immortality. Such benefits provide assurance that we are on the right path, which should increase our confidence that we are making the correct wager. In fact, the benefits already bestowed upon us by science and technology in the past confirm that it is the best path toward a better future. (Half the readers of this essay would have died from a childhood disease just a century ago.) As these benefits accumulate, and as we become aware of them, our existence will become increasingly indistinguishable from the most enchanting descriptions of any afterlife.

 

 

So we should throw off archaic superstitions and use our technology? Yes Will we do this? Yes. I can say with confidence that when an effective pill that stops or reverses aging becomes available at your local pharmacy—it will be popular. Or if, as you approach death, you are offered the opportunity to have your intact consciousness transferred to your younger cloned body, a genetically engineered body, a robotic body, or a virtual reality, most will use such technologies when they have been shown to be effective. By then almost everyone will prefer the real thing to a leap of faith. At that point there will be no need to make a transhumanist wager. The transhumanist will already have won the be

However at the moment the above is science fiction and subject to trillions of variables. Contingent factors beyond our imagination will lead to some unimaginable future, or no future at all. Thus evolutionary progress is not inevitable, and in no way do our views entail technological optimism—technology can be used for good or ill.  But even if our technology can lead to a glorious future, it could be halted by terrestrial or celestial disasters, or by dogmatists, zealots, religious fanatics, and others who oppose progress. The opponents may have legitimate fears about the repercussions of future technologies, but they may also be guided by ignorance and irrationality. They may long for a past paradise, fear what they don’t understand, believe they possess a monopoly on the truth, or think humans subservient to super beings. But for whatever reasons they oppose change, preferring stasis and stagnation to dynamic, progressive evolutionism. They prefer to prevent the groundswell of initiative, creativity, inventiveness, perseverance, and hope that drive evolution forward. They are fearful that the new world will render them and their beliefs, anachronistic. They are the enemies of the future.

But if the surge of cosmic longing presses forward, then higher forms of being and consciousness will emerge, and the universe will become increasingly self-consciousness. This is the story of cosmic evolution, of a universe becoming self-conscious through the creation of conscious beings. Humans are not an end, but a beginning. They need not fear imaginary gods, but need instead to have the courage to create minds more powerful than the gods. Let the dark ages not again descend upon us—let our most fantastic longings be realized. Let us have faith in the future.

Adam Smith on David Hume’s Death

David Hume died August 25, 1776. Here are some details from Wikipedia:

Diarist and biographer James Boswell saw Hume a few weeks before his death, which was from some form of abdominal cancer. Hume told him he sincerely believed it a “most unreasonable fancy” that there might be life after death.[42] … Hume asked that his body be interred in a “simple Roman tomb”. In his will he requests that it be inscribed only with his name and the year of his birth and death, “leaving it to Posterity to add the Rest”.[44] … Adam Smith later recounted Hume’s amusing speculation that he might ask Charon to allow him a few more years of life in order to see “the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of superstition.” The ferryman replied, “You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years … Get into the boat this instant”.[45]

On November 9, 1776, shortly after Hume’s death, the great economist Adam Smith wrote a letter to Hume’s good friend William Strahan, Esq. Here are some excerpts:

DEAR SIR,

It is with a real, though a very melancholy pleasure, that I sit down to give you some account of the behaviour of our late excellent friend, Mr. Hume, during his last illness.

…

Upon his return to Edinburgh, though he found himself much weaker, yet his cheerfulness never abated, and he continued to divert himself, as usual, with correcting his own works for a new edition, with reading books of amusement, with the conversation of his friends; and, sometimes in the evening, with a party at his favourite game of whist. His cheerfulness was so great, and his conversation and amusements run so much in their usual strain, that, notwithstanding all bad symptoms, many people could not believe he was dying.

…

Mr. Hume’s magnanimity and firmness were such, that his most affectionate friends knew, that they hazarded nothing in talking or writing to him as to a dying man, and that so far from being hurt by this frankness, he was rather pleased and flattered by it. I happened to come into his room while he was reading this letter, which he had just received, and which he immediately showed me. I told him, that though I was sensible how very much he was weakened, and that appearances were in many respects very bad, yet his cheerfulness was still so great, the spirit of life seemed still to be so very strong in him, that I could not help entertaining some faint hopes. He answered, “Your hopes are groundless. An habitual diarrhoea of more than a year’s standing, would be a very bad disease at any age: at my age it is a mortal one. When I lie down in the evening, I feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and when I rise in the morning, weaker than when I lay down in the evening. I am sensible, besides, that some of my vital parts are affected, so that I must soon die.”

…

But, though Mr. Hume always talked of his approaching dissolution with great

cheerfulness, he never affected to make any parade of his magnanimity. He never

mentioned the subject but when the conversation naturally led to it, and never dwelt

longer upon it than the course of the conversation happened to require: it was a subject

indeed which occurred pretty frequently, in consequence of the inquiries which his

friends, who came to see him, naturally made concerning the state of his health. The

conversation which I mentioned above, and which passed on Thursday the 8th of August,

was the last, except one, that I ever had with him. He had now become so very weak, that

the company of his most intimate friends fatigued him; for his cheerfulness was still so

great, his complaisance and social disposition were still so entire, that when any friend was with him, he could not help talking more, and with greater exertion, than suited the

weakness of his body. At his own desire, therefore, I agreed to leave Edinburgh …

On the 22d of August, the Doctor wrote me  the following letter:

“Since my last, Mr. Hume has passed his time pretty easily, but is much weaker. He

sits up, goes down stairs once a day, and amuses himself with reading, but seldom sees

any body. He finds that even the conversation of his most intimate friends fatigues and

oppresses him; and it is happy that he does not need it, for he is quite free from anxiety,

impatience, or low spirits, and passes his time very well with the assistance of amusing

books.”

I received the day after a letter from Mr. Hume himself, of which the following is an extract.

23d August, 1776.

“MY DEAREST FRIEND, I am obliged to make use of my nephew’s hand in writing to you, as I do not rise to-day. . . .

“I go very fast to decline, and last night had a small fever, which I hoped might put a quicker period to this tedious illness, but unluckily it has, in a great measure, gone off. I cannot submit to your coming over here on my account, as it is possible for me to see you so small a part of the day, but Doctor Black can better inform you concerning the degree of strength which may from time to time remain with me. Adieu, &c.”

Three days after I received the following letter from Doctor Black.

Edinburgh, Monday, 26th August, 1776.

“DEAR SIR, Yesterday about four o’clock afternoon, Mr. Hume expired. The near approach of his death became evident in the night between Thursday and Friday, when his disease became excessive, and soon weakened him so much, that he could no longer rise out of his bed. He continued to the last perfectly sensible, and free from much pain or feelings of distress. He never dropped the smallest expression of impatience; but when he had occasion to speak to the people about him, always did it with affection and tenderness. I thought it improper to write to bring you over, especially as I heard that he had dictated a letter to you desiring you not to come. When he became very weak, it cost him an effort to speak, and he died in such a happy composure of mind, that nothing could exceed it.”

Thus died our most excellent, and never to be forgotten friend; concerning whose philosophical opinions men will, no doubt, judge variously, every one approving, or condemning them, according as they happen to coincide or disagree with his own; but concerning whose character and conduct there can scarce be a difference of opinion. His temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balanced, if I may be allowed such an expression, than that perhaps of any other man I have ever known. Even in the lowest state of his fortune, his great and necessary frugality never hindered him from exercising, upon proper occasions, acts both of charity and generosity. It was a frugality founded, not upon avarice, but upon the love of independency. The extreme gentleness of his nature never weakened either the firmness of his mind, or the steadiness of his resolutions. His constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good-nature and good-humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of malignity, so frequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men. It never was the meaning of his raillery to mortify; and therefore, far from offending, it seldom failed to please and delight, even those who were the objects of it. To his friends, who were frequently the objects of it, there was not perhaps any one of all his great and amiable qualities, which contributed more to endear his conversation. And that gaiety of temper, so agreeable in society, but which is so often accompanied with frivolous and superficial qualities, was in him certainly attended with the most severe application, the most extensive learning, the greatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect the most comprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.

I Ever Am, Dear Sir,

Most Affectionately Your’s,

Adam Smith.

David Hume (1711 – 1776): How To Be A Philosopher

David Hume is one of my intellectual heroes. I first encountered him in the fall of 1973 in Lucas Hall on the campus of the University of Missouri at St. Louis. The campus was familiar, right up the street from my house, but the ideas I encountered there were from a different world. Anxious to expand my small intellectual world, I eagerly enrolled in a class called, “Major Questions in Philosophy.”

Professor Paul Gomberg, a newly minted Harvard PhD, taught the class with intelligence and enthusiasm. We read Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, Lenin’s The State and Revolution, and Hume’s famous  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Wow! Knowledge, the gods, and the state all undermined in sixteen weeks. But it was Hume who made the greatest impression. He demolished the design argument for god’s existence but, more importantly, he opened my mind.

It was not only Hume’s philosophy, but his character that I came to respect. He was not only a fearless intellectual, but he enjoyed life too. I wish that I could have been with Hume and Franklin in the salons of Paris, sipping brandy and flirting with the ladies. He was a good man who faced death bravely, more noble than most of his detractors, past or present. (I encourage anyone interested to read The Life of David Hume, the great biography written by Ernest Campbell Mossner.)

Here is Hume on how to be a good philosopher. It is from the opening pages of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: but neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to business and occupation: but the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biases to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.

Tomorrow’s post will talk about how the atheist Hume faced death bravely.

Can You Be an Atheist?

[For five days now I have given religious thinkers a chance to make their case that the meaning of life derives from their god. This is the last one I will do.]

William Lane Craig (1949 – ) is an American Evangelical Christian apologist  known primarily for his work in the philosophy of religion. He is a critic of: evolution, atheism, metaphysical naturalism, logical positivism, postmodernism, moral relativism, Catholicism, Mormonism, Islam, homosexuality, and non-fundamentalist Christian theology. (What does he like?) He is a fellow of the Discovery Institute, whose goal is to force public high schools in the United States to teach creationist ideas in their science classes alongside of accepted scientific theories. (Why not teach other creation myths besides your preferred one?) He is currently a Research Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, an evangelical Christian university.

(After reading this biography it is almost impossible for me to like this person. He is a true enemy of the future. I’ll read it anyway—as penance.)

Craig’s piece “The Absurdity of Life Without God” argues that life is absurd without a god. The fundamental reason for this is that without a god both the individual and the entire universe will end without a proper resolution. In that case there would be no hope of escaping our fate and life would lack significance, value, or purpose.

Craig argues that there is no ultimate meaning without immortality because if everything dies it does not matter that previously the universe, the human race, or any individual had existed. Still, immortality is not enough for meaning, since an unending life could be meaningless. For full meaning we need a god, without which humans must accept the view of Beckett, Sartre, and Camus—that life is meaningless. In addition, without gods there is no objective morality and moral relativism reigns.

Craig claims that if we really think about the universe as rushing toward oblivion we should realize that there is no hope or purpose without a god. Without a god we are accidents of nature, and there is no reason or purpose for our existence. With a god there is hope; without a god there is only death and despair. The implications of atheism are strong indeed. The basic problem with an atheistic response is that one cannot live happily with such a view. Either the atheist is consistent and recognizes life is meaningless, or is inconsistent and assumes there can be meaning without gods.

All of this leads Craig to the conclusion that it is a practical impossibility to live as an atheist. Without a god life is objectively meaningless, so atheists pretend that life has meaning by saying it has subjective meaning. Without a god, there is no morality and everything is permissible, so atheists assume there is some other ground for an objective ethics. Without a god there is no immortality where justice will reign, where the wicked will be punished and the virtuous rewarded. Without a god there is no purpose in life, so atheists make up some purpose for it.

The despair of the atheistic view contrasts sharply with the Christian world view. In that view a god exists, we are eternal, and we can be with this god. Christianity thus provides the conditions for a meaningful, valuable, and purposeful life. We can thus live happily.

Rejoinder – Craig seems unaware that science and technology will probably give us the immortality he seeks—assuming his followers don’t take us back into the dark ages. They are trying their best though by making sure that children don’t learn modern biology. Wait until he realizes what the computer scientists are up to. And when science defeats death that will be the end of religion. For religion is based primarily on a fear of death.

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William Lane Craig, “The Absurdity of Life without God,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E.D Klemke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Can Life Have Meaning Without Gods?

John Cottingham was born in London in 1943 and received his PhD from Oxford University. He is presently Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Reading and an Honorary Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford. He is a proponent today of the view that life is meaningless without a god.

In his recent book, On the Meaning of Life (Thinking in Action)Cottingham defends a supernatural conception of meaning. He maintains that being moral is necessary for meaning in life, but denies that it is sufficient—something else is needed for a life to be meaningful. Cottingham provides two reasons for thinking that a moral life is not sufficient for a meaningful life.

First, Cottingham argues that our endeavors must be successful in order to be meaningful. But only the god of traditional theism could order reality in such a way that our efforts will truly be successful, presumably because of the existence of an afterlife where justice reigns. Second, he argues that morality must be grounded in a god who issues moral rules that are eternal and absolute, in order for our lives to really have significance. Together these two claims serve as a reply to those who would advance a naturalistic account of meaning. Our moral ends are often thwarted in this world, thus we need another world to confer full significance on our actions. In brief, morality must have an objective basis in a god for morality to really matter.

But it is not only the existence of a god and a soul as necessary to confer meaning that interests Cottingham. He also argues that belief in their existence is necessary in order to encourage us to engage in moral projects; that is, the promise of eternal justice and eternal life inspires us to be moral. Thus Cottingham claims both that life cannot be meaningful without a god or a soul, and that such beliefs themselves motivate us to be moral. How do we maintain beliefs in gods and souls in the absence of sufficient evidence? This is where the religious life comes in; it encourages the moral actions and religious beliefs that give life meaning. As Cottingham puts it:

… because of the fragility of our human condition, we need more than a rational determination to orient ourselves towards the good. We need to be sustained by a faith in the ultimate resilience of the good; we need to live in the light of hope. Such faith and hope, like the love that inspires both, is not established within the domain of scientifically determinate knowledge, but there is good reason to believe it is available to us through cultivating the disciplines of spirituality. Nothing in life is guaranteed, but if the path we follow is integrally linked, as good spiritual paths are, to right action and self-discovery and respect for others, then we have little to lose; and if the claims of religion are true, then we have everything to gain. For in acting as if life has meaning, we will find, thank God, that it does.

To summarize, without a god there would be no objective moral principles and without those principles life is meaningless. Furthermore, without a god we could not achieve moral ends and without doing so life is meaningless. Finally, without a belief in a god we would not be sufficiently inspired to be moral, and thereby not able to find meaning.

Brief Rejoinder – The biological and social basis for morality are well-known—morality is not supernatural. The claim that people aren’t motivated to be moral without believing in gods is too silly to merit reply. In my experience virtually all the worst people I’ve ever known claimed to be religious while the atheists and agnostics were almost always morally superior. Around the world,  the best places to live are the least religious and vice versa. Perhaps I just don’t understand him, but if I do the weakness of his arguments amazes me.

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John Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003).

The Meaning of Life According to Christianity

Philip L. Quinn (1940 – 2004) was a philosopher and theologian who earned his PhD in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh. Quinn was on the faculty of Brown University, and in 1985, he assumed a position as the John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.

In his 1997 piece, “The Meaning of Life According to Christianity” Quinn dismisses the claim that the meaning of life question is meaningless. He argues that we can define two sorts of meanings that life might have: 1) axiological meaning (AM)—human life has AM if it has both positive intrinsic value and is on the whole valuable for the person living it ; or 2) teleological meaning (TM)—a human life has TM if all of the following are true: a) it contains some non-trivial, subjective, purposes; b) such purposes have positive value; and c) actions performed to achieve these purposes are done with zest.

A life might have AM and not TM; it might have TM and not AM, it might have no meaning, or it might have complete meaning (CM)—both positive AM and TM. In other words, such a life would be subjectively valuable, objectively purposeful and done with zeal.

Quinn notes that we can tell narratives of individual human lives or of the human race which contain complete meaning—for Christians the narrative of the life of Jesus reveals such meaning. Quinn considers some problems with living as an imitator of Jesus, for instance, that it might lead to TM meaning but not AM meaning. Such concerns lead him to add something else for complete meaning: “survival of bodily death seems required to secure…positive complete meaning …” Turning to narrative of the entire human race, Christians have the narrative of salvation history which reveals some of their god’s purposes, and we can find meaning by aligning ourselves to these purposes. But what of those who do not align themselves with their god’s purposes? Are they condemned or does their god save them? Quinn leaves the question open.

Quinn then addresses Thomas Nagel’s claim that from an objective point of view our lives have little significance—a view that the Christian narrative of world history repudiates. Still, humans need to remember that from their god’s point of view there are other things besides humans that are important. Moreover, Christians should be humble about the meaning they derive from their narratives, as there are many narratives and interpretations of narratives, not to mention that other religions have reasonable things to say about the meaning of life. So Christians should be modest about claiming that they know life’s complete meaning, even if they think Christian stories are best at providing insight. “When Christianity secures life’s meanings, it should not offer Christians so much security that they acquire the arrogant tendency to see their story apart from and above all other sources of insight into life’s meanings.”

To summarize, a human life has complete meaning if and only if it: 1) has both positive intrinsic value and is on the whole valuable for the person living it; 2) contains some non-trivial, subjective, valuable purposes that are engaging for that person; and 3) we have immortal souls. From a Christian perspective the world does have complete meaning, although we cannot be certain of exactly how it does.

[I  like the humility that Quinn brings to his analysis. Surprisingly I also agree with his basic idea of what makes a meaningful life. Of course I don’t think we need Christianity to make sense of life. And of course the basic Christian story is for the most part obviously unscientific and untrue and thus irrelevant. Still I did enjoy reading Quinn.]

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Philip Quinn, “The Meaning of Life According to Christianity,” in The Meaning of Life, ed. E.D Klemke and Steven Cahn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 38.

Quinn, “The Meaning of Life According to Christianity,” 40.

The Self and Its Search for Ultimate Meaning

Karl Paul Reinhold Niebuhr (1892 – 1971) was an American theologian and commentator on public and political affairs. He was the archetypal American intellectual during the Cold War, and one of the best-known theologians of the time. His views dismayed both religious conservatives and religious liberals alike.

In “The Self and Its Search for Ultimate Meaning,” (1955) Niebuhr argues that the religious inclination derives from “the freedom of the self over its rational faculties.” This freedom rejects certain solutions to the problem of the meaning of life—going beyond mere considerations of causation—to discern a creative mystery at the heart of existence. Our attempt to penetrate to the heart of the ultimate mystery invites three basic responses.

The first posits the self as wholly significant, as the ultimate mystery and source of meaning—either the individual or collective self. Niebuhr maintains that this is idolatry that disproportionately elevates the self or debases it by reducing it to a collective. The second response is what Aldous Huxley called “The Perennial Philosophy.” Here the meaning of life is found in the underlying unity between self and all being. But even this approach is limited by the finitude of living beings.

The third response finds meaning and mystery in the personality of a god. Niebuhr admits that the notion of a personal god is problematic, but so is the idea of personality generally. God judges humans harshly, as too pretentious and prideful, but the severity of his god’s judgment is assuaged by his god’s mercy. Only this third alternative recognizes the discontinuity of self and the ultimate reality that makes faith indispensable. In contrast, the first response is futile—we cannot create our own meaning—and the second is pretentious—introspection reveals that we are not identical with ultimate reality. Therefore the third alternative is best, above all because it does not explain the self away as does naturalism or mysticism.

In the end we must have faith in the mystery of “a power and a love beyond our comprehension…” He admits that “there is no way of making this faith or this hope ‘rational’ by analyzing the coherences of nature and of reason.” Yet we do have a pragmatic justification for believing that such power exists and will ultimately satisfy us because “it answers the ultimate problems of the human self.” We must commit ourselves to having this faith. The religious response which recognizes the distinction between self and a merciful god is the most satisfying response to the question of the meaning of life.

[This is a much better attempt of relating religion to the meaning of life than we found in Pojman’s article. And that is primarily because his conception of God is amorphous. But we can have faith in the future and hope that life is meaningful without any conception of the supernatural at all. In this sense Niebuhr’s view was limited.]

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Niebuhr, “The Self and Its Search for Ultimate Meaning,” 51.

Does Religion Give Meaning to Life?

Some defend the idea that the meaning of life depends on religion. In the next few days I will summarize what a few of these thinkers have to say. My brief responses are in [brackets.] For more thorough replies see my recent book.

Louis Pojman (1935-2005) was an American philosopher and ordained minister who received a D. Phil from Oxford University and a PhD from Union Seminary. He was a particularly prolific author of numerous philosophy texts and anthologies used at many universities in the United States. In his 2002 essay “Religion Gives Meaning to Life,” he argued that if classical theism is true then:

“We have a satisfying explanation of the origins and sustenance of the universe.” Furthermore, if theism is true, then the universe cares about us, the problem of evil is answered, and the universe is imbued by its creator with meaning. In contrast, the naturalist view starts and ends without value and meaning. From such despair comes further despair. [Creation myths are not intellectually satisfying, theism is almost certainly false, the problem of evil is devastating for classical theism, and how the gods might imbue reality with meaning is problematic. Naturalism doesn’t end in despair.]
“Theism holds that the universe is suffused with goodness, that good will win out over evil.” We have help in the battle of good over evil, and justice over injustice, which gives us the confidence to carry on the fight. We know that good will ultimately triumph. In contrast, in a meaningless universe, nothing matters. [The universe doesn’t seem filled with goodness and there is no reason to think good will triumph over evil without human beings. And meaninglessness doesn’t follow from anti-theism.]
“God loves and cares for us.” Our gratitude for this love motivates us to live moral lives. In contrast, secularism does not recognize this cosmic love and does not produce moral saints. “From a secular point of view, morality is not only stupid, it is anti-life, for it gives up the only thing we have, our little ego in an impersonal, indifferent world.” [There is no reason to believe the gods exist or that they love and care for us. Humanism is not anti-life and has produced its own saints.]
“Theists have an answer to the question, “Why be Moral?” Since god loves you and justice is guaranteed, you will get what you deserve. Thus you have a reason to be moral; doing good deeds is in your self-interest. In contrast, a non-theist has a hard time answering this question since it is so tempting to be an egoist. [The religious seem plenty tempted by immorality, as history shows. Morality doesn’t have its foundations in religion.]
“Cosmic Justice reigns in the universe.” There is moral merit and no moral luck. You will be judged as you deserve to be. [I just don’t believe this.]
“All persons are of equal worth.” This follows from being created in the image of god. In contrast, secularism has no justification for this belief, since it is obvious that individuals are not created equal without the god hypothesis. Why should the superior not then dominate the inferior? [This is just silly.]
“Grace and forgiveness—a happy ending for all.” We can be forgiven by divine power. [This is great, but it’s not true unless we make it so.]
“There is life after death.” We will all live forever in a blissful state. [This is great, but it’s not true unless we make it so.]

Given the above, and given that we are just as free in a theistic world, “it seems clear that the world of the theist is far better and more satisfying to us than one in which God does not exist.” Of course, as Pojman admits, the problem is that we don’t know if theism is true. He responds that unless one thinks that theism is almost certainly false, one might as well live as if it is true, since it is superior to the alternatives. “It is good to gamble on God. Religion gives us a purpose to life and a basis for morality that is too valuable to dismiss lightly. It is a heritage that we may use to build a better civilization and one which we neglect at our own peril.”

[I don’t accept that theism is more satisfying and it is almost certainly not true. Pascal’s wager is not convincing, and religion has not in the past nor will it in the future build a better civilization. Humans and their post-human descendents will need new narratives of meaning to replace outdated religous ones.]

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Pojman, “Religion Gives Meaning to Life,” 30.

Bertrand Russell Videos

Anyone who has read this blog knows that Bertrand Russell is one of my intellectual heroes. Here are two brief interviews with him when he was in his late eighties.

 

What’s Wrong With George Will?

George Will has written one of the most poorly reasoned pieces I’ve ever read: “Climate change’s instructive past.”  If my introductory students had written this essay I would have responded:  “This is poorly reasoned.” Or “I recommend an introductory logic class before you write another essay.”  Or “Please don’t turn in such nonsense again.”

Will was an intelligent man at one time. I don’t know what happened to him. Our brains do shrink as we age, still it’s just hard to believe that he believes what he writes. I suppose a non-scientist like Will’s contrarian view about a topic on which the experts are in virtual unanimous agreement might be the right one. Perhaps he’s a genius. But not likely.

Will cites two books by historians who note that past climate change wasn’t caused by human activity. From this he concludes that present climate change isn’t caused by human activity. Really? That’s like saying that in the past people died from natural causes so today no one can be murdered. The argument is ridiculous. Here it is in syllogistic form:

There have been warming periods not caused by human activity.

Therefore today’s warming period is (probably) not caused by human activity.

Logic teachers shake their heads. And I can just see the climate scientists discussing the column. “Hey Joe did you know that some climate change in the past wasn’t attributable to human activity?” “Oh my God Bob, I never thought of that! I don’t think anybody who has devoted their life to studying the climate knew this! All of our evidence and the scientific consensus go out the window! I’m so glad George Will taught us about climate history!”

Of course every climatologist knows that the climate has changed in the past from natural causes. That’s one of the things they study! But that doesn’t refute the overwhelming evidence for human caused climate change.

I wish Mr. Will wouldn’t insult our intelligence. I wish he’d retire. But he won’t. Perhaps he’s just a shill for the oil companies. Or perhaps he’s just an old curmudgeon. Or perhaps he’s just arrogant, so in love with his own intellect that he doesn’t know there are real scientists who really understand science. They go to their laboratories every day trying to tease a bit of truth out of nature. They don’t just pontificate about science from their study and then write op-eds.

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Addendum – Of the nearly 14,000 peer-reviewed scientific papers published between 1991 – 2012 exactly 0.17% either reject warming or attribute it primarily to causes other than CO2 and other greenhouse gases.