John G. Messerly's Blog, page 115

The Philosophy of Mind in Two Pages

Mind-body dualism – The body is material and governed by physical law; the mind immaterial and not governed by physical law. Reality is dual, composed of both physical and mental facts. According to Descartes, persons have privileged access to their mental states, and they are infallible with respect to those states.

Objections to dualism – 1) How do non-physical things interact with physical things, inasmuch as they are completely different kinds of things? 2) The idea of a non-material substance makes no sense; 3) it seems impossible for dualism to explain how immaterial mind emerged in the first place—given that we start completely material.

Materialistic theories of mind – there is nothing ghostly or non-physical within us. Mental facts must be explained by physical facts.

1) Behaviorism – Behaviors explain mental events. Jane didn’t shout because she was angry, rather Jane shouted because of some stimulus (obnoxious children for example.) Gilbert Ryle took this one step further and eliminated mental events altogether. We don’t have to explain immaterial substances—there are none—or how immaterial substances interact with material ones.

Problem with behaviorism – 1) mental states seem to exist without corresponding behaviors. 2) not all mental states correspond to behaviors. (What behavior corresponds to listening to Mozart?) 3) Different mental states can correspond to identical behaviors.

2) Mind-brain identity theory – Brain events cause mental events. Science confirms that mental events are caused by brain physiology. Mental events and states are neurological. This explains: a) mental facts without positing souls, b) how mind/body are connected (all is material), c) thought without necessary reference to behavior, and d) introspection.

Problems with identity theory – If mental states are brain states, then things without brains (aliens, robots) couldn’t feel, for example, pain  or joy. But couldn’t robots without brains feel pain if they were wired to feel pain? This thinking leads to another theory:

3) Functionalism – mental states (like pain) are equivalent to whatever physical system (cells, wires, chips, etc.) serves the function of creating experiences. For us, pain is neurons firing to link input with output, for aliens or robots, this might have to do with different biological or mechanical wiring. So functionalism is an advanced theoretical version of mind brain identity to account for robots, aliens, etc.

Problem with functionalism – Wires or chips can’t be the basis of consciousness, and robots without brains wouldn’t be conscious even if they acted conscious.

Basic objections to any materialist theory of mind

Having subjective experiences is the “what it is like” to have a mind. But how does a brain state equal a taste or feel or smell? [in philosophy these states are called “qualia.”] The idea is that neuron firings are objective while brain states are subjective. This is the biggest problem for materialistic theories of mind.

This problem is related to another problem for materialistic theories of mind—the problem of intentionality. Intentionality is the idea that mental states are about things. But how are neurons in brains about things? We might explain this by saying that brains resembles colors or smells, but this doesn’t seem right. Brains may be about smells or colors, but colors or smells aren’t about brains. Now we could say that brain states resemble mental states, but they don’t. If we look at your brain when you see green trees we won’t see green brains! And if we think about an abstract idea like the square root of -1 or justice, or equality, there is no physical thing that could look like that. So it doesn’t seem that resemblance between brains and minds explains how brains give rise to minds.

So perhaps we shouldn’t draw any conclusions about the philosophy of mind and the mind-body problem, since there is so much we don’t know about neurophysiology. Yet we are learning all the time and most neurobiologists think the brain will eventually be explained in full. For the moment though, we might take Wittgenstein’s advice:  What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence.

(This entry relied heavily on James and Stuart Rachels’ book: Problems from Philosophy.)

The Problem of Personal Identity in Two Pages

The problem – Is a person the kind of thing that can die on earth and be alive somewhere else? To understand this consider a thought experiment. If we make a perfect copy of you—complete with your thoughts and memories—is that copy really you or just a duplicate? (If you think the copy is you, then the waking up in heaven scenario is not problematic; if you think it’s just a copy, then the thing that wakes up in heaven isn’t you.)

Personhood at a moment – What is it to be a person at a particular moment? The bundle theory says you are a body and the mental events in your brain. There is nothing more to you than that. The soul theory says that there is more to you than this, there is a core to you that we might call your soul, ego, or self. So the bundle theory denies what the soul theory affirms—that there is some inner core that is the real you. David Hume, the Buddhists and others denies there is any such core.

Split brains – Modern science accords well with the bundle theory, but not the soul theory. For example, if one severs the brains hemispheres one seems to create different persons. This does not fit well with the idea of a unified soul; but on the bundle theory this is easy to explain—there are just two streams of consciousness. Moreover, if the bundle theory is correct—and science suggests it is—then the prospects of immortality seem bleak.

Personhood over Time – If soul theory were true we could say what personal identity over time means that you have the same soul in the past, present, and future. But on the bundle theory it is hard to see what accounts for personal identity.

Qualitative and Numerical Identity – By identity we might mean identity in the qualitative sense—qualities like patience, humor, honesty, etc.—or we might mean identity in the numerical sense—the same birth date, parents, etc.  So if you meet your old high school friend Jim Smith at a reunion, you might find his qualities have changed. He used to be carefree and now he’s serious. But he is still Jim Smith, the guy you went to high school with who was born in a certain year to Mr. and Mrs. Smith. He is not an imposter.

Now you want to be the same person in the future (or in heaven) that you are now;  you want there to be numerical identity. Otherwise you will no longer exist. But what theory might explain this numerical identity? Here are some theories.

Body Theory – x is the same person as y because they have the same body.

Problems – 1) this rules out post-mortem existence because your body will decay; 2) the prince who changes bodies with the cobbler suggests that identity is not tied up exclusively with bodies; and 3) the story of the “ship of Theseus” parallels the human body story—you do not have the same body that you used to have.

Same Brain Theory – x is the same person as y because they have the same brain.

Problems – One problem with this theory is one can be dead and have an intact brain. This suggests that the brain is not the locale of personal identity. Moreover, the brain’s physical structure changes over time even if the neurons are relatively stable.

Memory Theory– x is the same as y because they possess the same memories. (This explains the prince and cobbler, the prince is still the prince even in the cobbler’s body, and it appears to make post-mortem existence possible.)

Problem – Our memories are limited. So if memories make us who we are—we aren’t much. Furthermore, how can memory theory account for personal identity when being “the same person as” should be transitive across time? But memories aren’t transitive across time in this way. At 60 you may remember your 30 year old self, and at 30 you may remember your 10 year old self, but at 60 it is hard to remember your 10 year old self.

We might revise memory theory to deal with these objections by introducing the “memory-links theory.” In this theory x is y because there is a chain of memories linking a person; persons have identity based on psychological continuity. The problem here is how much psychological continuity there really is.

Moral responsibility – Another reason to accept the memory theory is that it fits well with our idea of moral responsibility. The argument is simple:

memories imply responsibility
responsibility implies identity
thus, memories imply identity

Problems – It seems you could remember a past action and no longer be responsible for it because you have changed. Why should I be responsible at 60 for something my 18 year old self did? So responsibility should depend on a person being the same person qualitatively, not just on being the same numerically.

Is the memory theory trivial? – If our memories are unreliable, then they can’t be the basis for personal identity; but even if our memories are reliable, that doesn’t say much about personal identity. Here’s why. If I say: “I am the same person as I was twenty years ago because I remember being the same person,” then I am just presupposing that I am identical with my past self. But that doesn’t show that I am identical.

Conclusion – Philosophers generally agree that soul theory explains nothing, but that bundle theory and some form of psychological continuity best explain personal identity. In addition, accepting the kernel theory gives us good reasons to be selfish; whereas the bundle theory may lead to more concern for others.

(This entry relies heavily on James and Stuart Rachels’ book: Problems from Philosophy.)

Do We Survive Death? Discussed in One Page

The idea of an immortal soul – For Socrates this meant something in you that is indestructible. For St. Paul the immortality of the soul meant your non-physical soul would be re-united with a new physical body at judgment day [The idea that you die and then go to a paradise or punishment is a Greek idea; it is not Christian orthodoxy.]

Problems – Doctrines of immortal souls are difficult to accept in the 21st century because: 1) the idea of soul is useless in science; and 2) consciousness depends on brains. You could just have faith in an immortal soul, or try to find reasons to believe in immortality, or you just give up on the idea altogether. For evidence of immorality you might turn to:

near-death experiences – PROBLEM – NDE, to the extent they occur, provide very little reason to believe in life after death, and are easily explained scientifically.
Reincarnation – PROBLEM – the evidence for R is weak or non-existent.
Psychics who communicate with dead. PROBLEM – anyone who claims to do this is a charlatan. The tricks by which supposed psychics fool people are well-known.

It would be miraculous if our consciousness could survive without our bodies. Perhaps we should just believe in miracles. But David Hume advanced a powerful argument that it is never rational to believe in miracles, it is one of the most famous in all of philosophy.)  Hume asks, What is more likely?

that someone in the past actually walked on water, rose from the dead, etc., or
that those who tell such stories are exaggerating, lying, or have themselves been deceived.

Of course #2 is more likely. Lying, exaggerating, or being credulous are common; walking on water or rising from the dead or not. Thus it is never rational to believe in miracles—defined as actions violating laws of nature—because #2 is always more likely than #1.

While immortality is possible, it is easy to see that it is highly unlikely.

The Problem of Evil in Two Pages

Bad things aren’t hard to explain for non-theists, but they are hard to explain for classical theists.

The Problem – The gods are all-good, powerful, and knowing and yet there is evil. Thus either the gods can’t do away with evil—in which case they’re not all-powerful; or they won’t do away with evil—in which case they’re not all good. We can distinguish between:

a) The logical problem of evil – gods and evil are incompatible or inconsistent; and

b)The evidentiary problem of evil – evil counts as evidence against the gods.

Response to the problem – Theists have articulated defenses, but generally dismiss theodicies (complete explanations for evil.) A defense is easy, you just need to show that it is rational to believe in gods and evil simultaneously. A theodicy is hard, it must show how evil fits into a god’s plan. Most theologians think that the best we can do is to show that evil and the gods are compatible;  but they don’t believe they can completely explain evil. In order to defend the rationality of religious belief—to offer a strong defense—philosophers/theologians try to provide reasons for the existence of evil. These include:

1. The ideas that pain/evil is necessary as part of the body’s warning system

PROBLEMS – Sometimes we need warnings but there is no pain (carbon monoxide, obesity, etc.); sometimes the pain doesn’t help us (cancer, etc.); sometimes pain may be debilitating. Furthermore, why would gods create pain? What explains such cruelty?

2.  The idea that evil is necessary so that we may better appreciate the good – (Logically this implies that we would have no notion of bad without good, or tall without short. Psychologically this implies that we wouldn’t appreciate good things with bad things, pleasure without pain, and happiness without unhappiness. )

PROBLEMS – Even if this is true, why do we need so much evil? We have cancer and heart disease, do we really need Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s too? And do you really need to know there are bad things to enjoy good things? (If you believe in heaven or paradise where supposedly you are eternally happy, would you need occasional pain there to appreciate its goodness?)

3. The idea that evil is punishment from wrongdoing; we bring it on ourselves

PROBLEMS – This makes sense only if moral character and suffering correlate. But misfortune/evil strikes indiscriminately, as does good fortune. Moreover, do babies deserve misfortune? Do we deserve horrible diseases? Do we deserve cancer? Can one ever do enough bad things to deserve say, everlasting punishment?

4. The idea that evil results from free will – Evil results from free will. A world with humans, and the evil that results from their free will, is better than one without humans even if that world had no evil. War, murder, torture, etc. are worth the price of the positives that derive from human free will.

PROBLEMS – We can answer that free will is not worth all the misery that ensues from free choice. In addition, we might wonder why an omnipotent god couldn’t create humans with the freedom to do bad things, but who never do them. Moreover, free will, if it even exists, only accounts for moral evil (evils attributed to free will like murder, rape, etc.) but not physical evil (earthquakes, floods, disease, etc) which have nothing to do with free will.

5. The idea that evil is necessary for the development of moral character. In a world without “trials and tribulations” we wouldn’t get to develop our moral characters or make our souls. Such a world wouldn’t elicit generosity, courage, kindness, mercy, perseverance, creativity, etc.

If the moral character development argument is combined with the free will defense then we have given the best account of evil possible. This is not a theodicy—a complete explanation—but a defense—a partial explanation. We could even add that since there is another world evil here is no big deal anyway. That is, all this pain will be insignificant when we all enjoy eternal bliss. Of course even if we can overcome the problem of evil that doesn’t mean the theistic story is true.

PROBLEMS –At least three basic problems remain in our attempt to reconcile evil and all good, all-knowing and all-powerful gods.

1) Why don’t the gods intervene to prevent extreme cruelty—such as the abuse of an innocent child? The free will defense is implausible here.

2) Why is there so much human suffering? Do we really need all these hurricanes and diseases? Do we really need to develop our characters by, for example, accidentally killing children or suffering from cancer? And even if we need to occasionally die in childbirth or from cancer, couldn’t we have fewer cases of this evil?

3) Why do non-human animals suffer so much? They don’t have freedom or need to develop their moral characters, yet they suffer. If you look about the entire world, and the entire history of the world, does the evidence suggest that it is the product of all good, all powerful, deities? Or does the evidence suggest the opposite? At the very least, doesn’t evil provide evidence against the existence of such gods? Of course it does.

(This entry relied heavily on James and Stuart Rachels’ book: Problems from Philosophy.)

Finally! The Arguments for the Existence of God in Two Pages

Is it reasonable to believe in a god(s)? To be reasonable, a belief must be backed by good reasons, but are there any? Western philosophers through the centuries have advanced 3 basic arguments for the existence of a god; we will consider each of them briefly. 

ARGUMENT #1 - The Argument from Design (a teleological argument)

Version A – “The best explanation argument”

1) There seems to be design in the universe;

2) This design didn’t come about by chance; thus

3) The universe was intelligently designed.

Version B – “The same-evidence argument”

1) Watches have designs and are designed by watchmakers;

2) Similarly, universes have designs and are designed by a universe designers; thus

3) The universe was designed by a universe designer.

Hume’s Objections –

We infer a designer from a watch because we have background information about watches (we have seen them, can visit watch factories, etc.) But we have no background information about universes or how or if they are created. Thus we can make no inference about their supposed design.
Suppose we accept the universe has a design; what would we conclude about its designer? Considered objectively, we wouldn’t conclude that it was designed by an omnipotent, omniscience, omni-benevolent deity. We would conclude it was made by less than perfect beings, intelligent aliens, drunk, child or malicious gods, etc.

Evolution – Hume’s were logical arguments, but in lieu of a definitive replacement for design the situation was at an impasse. This all changed with modern biology. After the fact of evolution was discovered, the design argument was essentially dead. (For more see: http://evolution.berkeley.edu/)**

There is a new kind of teleological argument, known as the “fine tuning” argument. The idea that life in the universe can only occur when certain universal physical constants lie within a very narrow range. This may imply a designer. However, the argument is not generally thought to be successful, and it is undermined if we live in a multiverse.) 

ARGUMENT #2 – The First Cause Argument (a cosmological argument)

Version A –

1) Everything has a cause;

2) Causes can’t go backwards indefinitely; thus

3) There is a first cause, the gods.

Problems – Either everything has a cause or it doesn’t. If everything has a cause, we should ask what caused the gods? If there is something without a cause or self-caused, we might just as well say that thing is the universe as say its some god. In fact, we would do better to say it’s the universe that is self-sufficient since we know the universe exists.

Version B –

1) The universe requires an explanation; thus

2) The best explanation is a god or gods.

Problems – We have no idea of what, if anything, explains universes, and no good reason why such an explanation would be anything like the gods we imagine.  Moreover, with the advent of “quantum cosmologies” in the 1980s, we have scientific ideas that explain how universes can appear spontaneous existence out of nothing. In conclusion, either:

the universe is explained by something else (but we don’t know what this might be);
the universe is explained by itself (it is its own explanation);
the universe has no explanation/cause (it is unintelligible, it just is); or
the universe is eternal (could be part of B or C above)

(You can substitute multiverse for universe in the above, but the choices don’t change. )

ARGUMENT #3 – God as a Necessary Being  (an ontological argument )

Version A –

1) The universe is contingent (depends on something else); thus

2)That something else is a necessary (not contingent) god.

Version B

1) God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”;

2) The greatest thing, to be the greatest thing must exist; thus

3) God exists.

Version C

1) God is perfect;

2) Existence is a perfection;

3) God exists.

Gaunilo’s objection – According to this reasoning a perfect island exists. But this is silly.

Kant’s objection – Whether a thing is perfect depends on its properties. Existence is not a property, but a determination of whether a thing exists. Thus the definition of a perfect being tells us what a perfect being would be like IF it existed;  not that a PB actually exists.

These are the very best arguments ever advanced by theologians and philosophers, and a majority of contemporary philosophers believe these arguments fail. Maybe arguments don’t matter and one should just believe anyway, or maybe personal religious experience gives one a reason to believe, or maybe the gods are just imaginary. But we can say that belief in gods is not simply a matter of reason or logic.

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** If you want to know the truth about evolution you can visit any of these websites:

Alabama Academy of Science
American Anthropological Association (1980)
American Anthropological Association (2000)
American Association for the Advancement of Science (1923)
American Association for the Advancement of Science (1972)
American Association for the Advancement of Science (1982)
American Association for the Advancement of Science (2002)
American Association for the Advancement of Science Commission on Science Education
American Association of Physical Anthropologists
American Astronomical Society
American Astronomical Society (2000)
American Astronomical Society (2005)
American Chemical Society (1981)
American Chemical Society (2005)
American Geological Institute
American Geophysical Union (1981)
American Geophysical Union (2003)
American Institute of Biological Sciences
American Physical Society
American Psychological Association (1982)
American Psychological Association (2007)
American Society for Microbiology (2006)
American Society of Biological Chemists
American Society of Parasitologists
American Sociological Association
Association for Women Geoscientists
Association of Southeastern Biologists
Australian Academy of Science
Biophysical Society
Botanical Society of America
California Academy of Sciences
Committee for the Anthropology of Science, Technology, and Computing
Ecological Society of America
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology
Genetics Society of America
Geological Society of America (1983)
Geological Society of America (2001)
Geological Society of Australia
Georgia Academy of Science (1980)
Georgia Academy of Science (1982)
Georgia Academy of Science (2003)
History of Science Society
Idaho Scientists for Quality Science Education
InterAcademy Panel
Iowa Academy of Science (1981)
Iowa Academy of Science (1986)
Iowa Academy of Science (2000)
Kansas Academy of Science
Kentucky Academy of Science
Kentucky Paleontological Society
Louisiana Academy of Sciences (1982)
Louisiana Academy of Sciences (2006)
National Academy of Sciences (1972)
National Academy of Sciences (1984)
National Academy of Sciences (2007)
New Mexico Academy of Science
New Orleans Geological Society
New York Academy of Sciences
North American Benthological Society
North Carolina Academy of Science (1982)
North Carolina Academy of Science (1997)
Ohio Academy of Science
Ohio Math and Science Coalition
Pennsylvania Academy of Science
Pennsylvania Council of Professional Geologists
Philosophy of Science Association
Research!America
Royal Astronomical Society of Canada — Ottawa Centre
Royal Society
Royal Society of Canada
Royal Society of Canada, Academy of Science
Sigma Xi, Louisiana State University Chapter
Society for Amateur Scientists
Society for Integrative and Comparative Biology
Society for Neuroscience
Society for Organic Petrology
Society for the Study of Evolution
Society of Physics Students
Society of Systematic Biologists
Society of Vertebrate Paleontology (1986)
Society of Vertebrate Paleontology (1994)
Southern Anthropological Society
Tallahassee Scientific Society
Tennessee Darwin Coalition
The Paleontological Society
Virginia Academy of Science
West Virginia Academy of Science

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Finally! Hinduism in One Page

The Essence of Hinduism

(The single best book on the this topic is Huston Smith’s The World’s Religions.)

Part One: The main practical elements of Hinduism

A. You Can Have What You Want

We begin by wanting pleasure. This is natural, but it doesn’t satisfy our total nature. We also want worldly success, especially wealth, fame, and power. This is a worthy goal, but people whose development is not arrested will outgrow these desires too. Hinduism doesn’t say that everyone will outgrow worldly desires, but at some point in their reincarnations people will renounce ego desires. This is the first great step in religion. In the end all worldly rewards prove insufficient, and in some reincarnation we turn to the Path of Renunciation. This is the moment Hinduism has been waiting for.

B. What People Really Want

People really want infinite being, infinite awareness, and infinite joy. This satisfies their total being. There are four paths to the realization of our total being, and people should focus on the one that best suits them while practicing all of them.

a. The Way to God (enlightenment) through Knowledge (Jnana Yoga) – This path is intended for those who have a strong reflected bent.

b. The Way to God (enlightenment) through Love (Bhakti Yoga) – This path is the most popular of the four, and best for those with a more emotional bent.

c. The Way to God (enlightenment) through Work (Karma Yoga) – The third path is intended for persons of active bent.

d. The Way to God (enlightenment) through Psychophysical Exercises (Raja Yoga) – This yoga is designed for people who are of scientific, meditative bent.

Part Two: The main theoretical ideas of Hinduism

A. The Concept of God (Brahman)



Hinduism encourages devotees to think of Brahman as either personal or transpersonal, depending on which carries the most exalted meaning for the mind in question.

B. Reincarnation



The process by which an individual soul passes through a sequence of bodies is known as reincarnation. In a human body, the soul has self-consciousness, freedom, and responsibility. Each thought and deed sculpts one’s destiny. Everybody gets exactly what is deserved (the law of karma.)

C. The Atman



The soul is called the Atman, the God within. Some say the individual soul  eventually passes into identification with God and loses every trace of its former separateness. Others say that some slight differentiation between the soul and God always remains.

D. The World



We live in: a) a physical and temporal world of galaxies and time;  b) a moral world operating according to the law of karma; c) a world that is maya, deceptively passing off its multiplicity and materiality as real; d) a world where people can develop their capacities; e) a world that is lila, the play of the divine in its cosmic dance—untiring, unending, resistless, yet ultimately beneficent with a grace born of infinite vitality.

E. Many Paths to the Same Summit



That Hinduism has shared her land for centuries with Jains, Buddhists, Parsees, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians may help explain an idea that comes out more clearly through her than in other religions—her conviction that the various major religions are alternate paths to the same goal. To claim salvation as the monopoly of any one religion is like claiming that God can be found in this room but not the next, in this attire but not another.

The Holocaust

I watched the PBS documentary “Memory of the Camps,” last night. (Watch Memory of the Camps for free on FRONTLINE’s website here, and learn more about the film’s remarkable history here. It turns out that some of the editing of the film was done by Alfred Hitchcock.)

The documentary is composed of film footage taken by Allied forces when they marched into the concentration camps in Germany in 1945. There are simply no words to describe what they found. “The footage was as horrifying as it gets: Gas chambers. Pits full of the bodies of thousands of systematically starved men, women, and children. Crematoria designed to burn large numbers of corpses. And haunted, emaciated survivors.”

The film was originally aired by FRONTLINE in May of 1985. At that time The New York Times said, “Memory of the Camps is a filmed monument that does more than tell the story of what it is recalling. It is the story itself,” and the Boston Globe called it “an uninterrupted silent scream that one can’t turn a deaf ear to or look away from.”

I will refrain from philosophizing about the horror that humans bestow upon each other. But none of it is surprising, as anyone familiar with the Millgram and Zimbardo experiments (or human history) will attest. And the evils of the past continue unabated to this day. In our own time the most powerful country in the world kills, tortures, imprisons, enslaves, humiliates, and starves both its own citizens and people around the world. It is almost as bad to be a citizen of the empire as it is to be its subject.

Do Politicians Have Grandchildren?

I am a grandfather. But when I think of the world into which small children enter, it fills my heart with pain. But I’m also perplexed. Don’t politicians and financiers and industrial tycoons have grandchildren? And if they do, how can they not care about perpetual war and massive incarceration and torture and environmental degradation and climate change? How can they not care about poisoning the water and the earth and the air? How can they have such disregard for the precarious state of the climate and the atmosphere, that miniscule bit of blue that separates us from the unimaginably cold and darkness of space?

Yes I know that politicians better their chances of being elected by supporting torture and war and prisons.  And I understand that oil and gas and factory farming profit from polluting the environment and expediting disastrous climate change. But don’t any of these people have grandchildren?

Titans of Technology Want to Defeat Death

Ariana Eunjung Cha’s recent article in the Washington Post, “Tech Titan’s Latest Project: Defy Death,” discusses the attempts by the wealthy tech elite to defeat death by using their vast resources to fund anti-aging research. These elite include, most notably, PayPal founder Peter Thiel, Google co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin,  Oracle’s Larry Ellison and others. As Ellison puts it: “Death makes me very angry.” 

I have written extensively defending my belief that death should be overcome and applaud the wealthy tech elite for the commitment to this most important goal. However many aren’t convinced.

In a 2013 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, 51 percent said they believed treatments to slow, stop or reverse aging would have a negative impact on society. Two-thirds said they worry that radical life extension would strain natural resources, that only wealthy people would get access to new treatments and that “medical scientists would offer the treatment before they fully understood how it affects people’s health. Fifty-eight percent said treatments that would allow people to live decades longer would be “fundamentally unnatural.”

And of course there is the opposition of Francis Fukuyama, a former member of the President Bush’s Council on Bioethics, who “argues that a large increase in human life spans would take away people’s motivation for the adaptation necessary for survival. In that kind of world, social change comes to a standstill, he said; aging dictators could stay in power for centuries.” What increased lifespans have to do with adaptation I have no idea, nor does the action of the mortal regarding climate change, nuclear annihilation or environmental destruction demonstrate much interest in survival. As for what increased lifespans have to do with stopping social change or more repressive political systems I am also in the dark.(I have responded to Fukuyama’s silly arguments previously.)

And then there is that deathist and opponent of every bit of social change ever proposed, Leon Kass, who asks: “Could life be serious or meaningful without the limit of mortality?” Kass’ arguments are even more absurd that Fukuyama’s. Kass simply hates progress and is a true enemy of the future. (I have replied to Kass previously here.)

But the most interesting objection to radical life-extension comes from a man I admire greatly, the world’s greatest philanthropist, Bill Gates. who says: “It seems pretty egocentric while we still have malaria and TB for rich people to fund things so they can live longer.” I do agree that giving everyone the opportunity to live say an 80 year healthy life probably takes precedence over giving a few the opportunity to live say double that. But the ultimate goal should be to eliminate death altogether. As I’ve said many times in this blog we are not truly free nor can life be ultimately meaningful unless death is optional. (The argument in detail is in my most recent book, The Meaning of Life: Religious, Philosophical, Transhumanist, and Scientific Perspectives.

John Rawls Moral Contractarianism

John Rawls’ “Hypothetical” Contract

We might also suggest the approach of the Harvard philosopher John Rawls, whose book A Theory of Justice is the single most influential philosophical ethics text of the past thirty years. Rawls’ contractarian approach differs radically from the approach of either Gauthier or Harman because it finds its inspiration, not in Hobbes, but in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.

Rawls begins by considering the original position where parties deliberate about the rules of right conduct that will be universally applicable in society. In the bargaining position, parties are impartial, that is, everyone’s interest count equally. This is guaranteed by the so-called veil of ignorance that hides from contractors any knowledge of themselves. You do not know your race, sex, social class, or nationality from behind the veil of ignorance. Although parties are self-interested and want to establish rules beneficial for themselves, in reality, self-interest is ruled out by the veil of ignorance because from behind it one cannot differentiate their interests from the interests of others.

The rules agreed to by rational bargainers behind a veil of ignorance are moral rules. This solution demonstrates a hypothetical way that contract theory could account for the rules favored by ordinary moral conscious-ness, since the veil of ignorance assures us that impartial rules will result. However, by mitigating the role played by self-interest, this type of con-tract radically departs from the account of morality given by Hobbes or any neo-Hobbesians.

It is important to keep in mind that the agreement that stems from the original position is both hypothetical and nonhistorical. It is hypothetical in the sense that the principles to be derived are what the parties would, under certain legitimating conditions, agree to, not what they have agreed to. In other words, Rawls seeks to persuade us through argument that the principles of justice that he derives are in fact what we would agree upon if we were in the hypothetical situation of the original position and that those principles have moral weight as a result of that. It is nonhistorical in the sense that it is not supposed that the agreement has ever, or indeed could actually be entered into as a matter of fact.

Rawls claims that the parties in the original position would adopt two such principles, which would then govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages across society. First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest. It is a matter of some debate whether freedom of contract can be inferred as being included among these basic liberties.

The first principle is more or less absolute, and may not be violated, even for the sake of the second principle, above an unspecified but low level of economic development (i.e. the first principle is, under most conditions, lexically prior to the second principle). However, because various basic liberties may conflict, it may be necessary to trade them off against each other for the sake of obtaining the largest possible system of rights. There is thus some uncertainty as to exactly what is mandated by the principle, and it is possible that a plurality of sets of liberties satisfy its requirements.

The second principle is that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that:

a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity

Rawls’ claim in a) is that departures from equality of a list of what he calls primary goods – ‘things which a rational man wants whatever else he wants’ [Rawls, 1971, pg. 92] – are justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of those who are worst-off under that distribution in comparison with the previous, equal, distribution. His position is at least in some sense egalitarian, with a proviso that equality is not to be achieved by worsening the position of the least advantaged. An important consequence here, however, is that inequalities can actually be just on Rawls’s view, as long as they are to the benefit of the least well off. His argument for this position rests heavily on the claim that morally arbitrary factors (for example, the family we’re born into) shouldn’t determine our life chances or opportunities. Rawls is also keying on an intuition that we do not deserve inborn talents, thus we are not entitled to all the benefits we could possibly receive from them, meaning that at least one of the criteria which could provide an alternative to equality in assessing the justice of distributions is eliminated.

The stipulation in b) is lexically prior to that in a). ‘Fair equality of opportunity’ requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed. It is often thought that this stipulation, and even the first principle of justice, may require greater equality than the difference principle, because large social and economic inequalities, even when they are to the advantage of the worst-off, will tend to seriously undermine the value of the political liberties and any measures towards fair equality of opportunity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it appears that contract theory is viable to the extent that individuals are relatively equal in power when the contract is both negotiated and renegotiated. But, in the real world, this does not appear to be the case. Thus, we always have an imperfect contract which represents the interests of the stronger, more interested, or more persuasive parties. Whether an “equilibrium” can be reached in the bargaining process is problematic, inasmuch as individuals rarely encounter each other “on a level playing field” even when interacting within the contract. So even though it may be the case that morality is, as Harman supposes, nothing more than the result of bargaining and power-struggling between various groups, we can still ask whether this should be the case. Many accept the “is” but reject the “ought.” And if they do, then morality “ought to be” more than just a contract between rational bargainers. (which is one reason why Rawls’ stipulates the veil of ignorance.)

Finally let us note how much of contemporary western civilization operates within a contract framework. We have contracts that govern our property, our mortgages, and our marriages. We have contracts that state who will speak for us if we cannot speak for ourselves and what kind of medical technology is deemed appropriate to sustain our lives. In short, we are a contract society. Whether this is for the better, only the reader can judge.