John G. Messerly's Blog, page 112

“Plain Sex”

Here is an outline of Alan Goldman’s influential article, “Plain Sex.”

Two Lessons about Ethical Thinking

(1) Many ethical disagreements hinge upon disagreements about facts, not about moral principles.

(2) Being a moral objectivist needn’t mean being morally conservative.

Both lessons help limit the appeal of moral relativism. Let us consider each in turn.

1) Many ethical disagreements hinge upon disagreements about facts, not about moral principles.

Goldman claims that views about immoral sexual behaviour are rooted in our definition of sexual behaviour & desire.

Goldman criticizes ‘Means-End’ Analyses

i. The end (i.e., purpose) of sex is reproduction.

ii. The end is the expression of love

iii. The end is communication

iv. The end is interpersonal awareness.

Why?  Should we reject these analyses?

Goldman’s reason for rejecting those analyses:

Theory (i) mistakes nature’s ‘purpose’ for reproduction for our own.  First of all, why should we think that nature really has any purposes at all?  Only conscious things can have purposes, but nature isn’t a conscious thing.  Secondly, even if nature does have purposes, why should consider them our purposes?  For example, if nature has purposes then probably the purpose of eating (from nature’s point of view) is nutrition, but we often think of eating differently.  To us, the purpose is not just nutrition but also enjoyment.

Theories (ii) – (iv) mistake things that may, in particular cases, be associated with sex for things that are essential to sex.  For example, Goldman thinks that sex may in particular cases be a way of expressing love, but it doesn’t have to be.

Are these convincing reasons for rejecting the these analyses?

Goldman’s Analysis:  “sexual desire is desire for contact with another person’s body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfill such desire of the agent.” (268)

Sex is ‘plain sex’ and nothing more.

Is this the right account?

How will the account you endorse affect your position on sexual morality?

Consider:  once you define the purpose of sex, then it seems make sense to consider sex that doesn’t serve that purpose as perverted, immoral sex.

Think about the implications of each of the above analyses of sex for what counts as immoral sex.

Notice how disagreements about something as seemingly uninteresting as the definition of sex can lead to substantial moral disagreements.

(2) Being a moral objectivist needn’t mean being morally conservative.

Goldman considers both Deontological (i.e., Kantian) & Consequentialist (i.e., Utilitarian) ways of considering sexual morality.

(a) Utilitarianism

The moral rightness and wrongness of an action is determined by how much happiness it produces in total.

Thus, the rightness or wrongness of  a sexual act is a function of how much happiness is produced by the act.

What implications does this view have for sexual morality?

(Note: Goldman seems to disapprove of utilitarianism.)

We might suggest it will lead to a fairly liberal view of sexual morality.  With some limitations, if those involved in a sex act fully consent to it, it’s likely to lead to an overall increase in happiness, so the sexual act is morally OK.

What might those limitations be?

(b) Kantian Morality

The Categorical Imperative:  “Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”

An Alternative Formulation of the C.I.:  Always treat others as ends in themselves, not simply as the means to an end, i.e., never just use people.

What implications does this view have for sexual morality?

Again, it might be thought to lead to a liberal view of sexual morality.  With some limitations, so long as people fully consent to a sexual act no one is being treated simply as a means to an end so the act is morally OK.

What might those limitations be?

Here, the thing to notice is that both of these objective moral theories seem able to support quite liberal views about what are morally acceptable ways of behaving.  The lesson here is that one can be a moral objectivist and have liberal moral views at the same time.

“Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person”

Here is an outline of Mappes’ “Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person.”

Mappes develops an essentially Kantian sexual ethic by appealing to the idea that in our dealings with others, we ought never to treat someone as a mere means to our own ends.

Mappes defines using someone as intentionally treating them in a way that violates the requirement that our involvement with others be based on their voluntary and informed consent.

According to a fundamental Kantian principle

1) it is morally wrong for A to use B merely as a means to achieve A’s ends

2) Using someone as a means is okay, but using them merely as a means is incompatible with respect to their personhood

We use people as mere means

1) when we undermine the voluntary or informed character of their consent to interact with us in some desired way

2) Hence, using another person can arise in at least two important ways

a) coercion – which undermines voluntary consent

b) deception – which undermines informed consent

Coercion can be occurrent or dispositional

1) Occurrent coercion involves the use of physical force

2) Dispositional coercion involves the threat of harm

3) The victim of dispositional coercion does intentionally choose a certain course of action; however, one’s choice, in the face of the threat of harm, is less than fully voluntary

Deception and Sexual Morality

1) Even if a child “consents” to sexual interaction, he or she is, strictly speaking, incapable of informed consent

2) We can also visualize the case of an otherwise fully competent adult temporarily disordered by drugs or alcohol. To the extent that such a person is rightly regarded as temporarily incompetent, winning his or her “consent” to sexual interaction could culminate in the sexual using of that person

Lying is not the only form of deception

1) Under certain circumstances, the simple withholding of information can be considered a form of deception

2) Mr. A, knowing that it is very unlikely that Ms. B will consent to sexual interaction if she becomes aware of Mr. A’s involvement with her sister, decides not to disclose this information. This is deception.

Coercion and Sexual Morality

1) Rape that employs dispositional coercion is surely just as wrong as rape that employs occurrent coercion

2) With dispositional coercion, the victim’s consent is not bypassed; it is coerced

3) There are numerous ways in which one person can effectively harm, and thus effectively, threaten, another

Consider four cases

1) Mr. Supervisor makes sexual overtures to Ms. Employee, which are rejected. Eventually, Mr. Supervisor makes it clear that sexual favors is a condition of employment

2) Ms. Debtor borrowed a substantial sum of money from Mr. Creditor. Ms. Debtor is sexually attracted to Mr. Creditor, but he doesn’t share her interest. When the debt comes due, she says she’ll pay if he consents to sex

3) Mr. Theatergoer has two tickets to the most talked about play. He finds a woman sexually attractive, and who would love to see the play. Mr. Theatergoer offers to take her to the play on condition she have sex with him

4) Ms. Jetsetter is planning a trip to Europe. She would like to have sex with a man whom she knows would love to go to Europe. Ms. Jetsetter proposes that he accompany her, all expenses paid, understanding that sex is expected

Cases 1 and 2 involve attempts to sexually use

1) another person, whereas cases 3 and 4 do not

2) We need to distinguish threats from offers

3) Threat: If you do not do what I am proposing you do, I will bring about an undesirable consequence for you

4) Offer: If you do what I am proposing you do, I will bring about a desirable consequence for you

The person who makes a threat attempts to coerce consent

1) The person who makes an offer attempts not to coerce but to induce consent

2) It is not uncommon for threats to be advanced in the language of offers

If it’s unclear whether a proposal is a threat or an offer

1) ask this question: Does the proposal have the effect of making a person worse off upon noncompliance?

2) The recipient of an offer, upon noncompliance, is not worse off than he or she was before the offer. In contrast, the recipient of a threat, upon noncompliance, is worse off than he or she was before the threat

A person can be effectively coerced by being threatened

1) with the withholding of something (a benefit) to which the person is entitled

2) Consider an example: B says I’ll help you, A, out of the quicksand if you pay me $1 Million”

This is a threat

1) because B is morally obligated to help A when such help involves no significant sacrifice of time, or risk, or resources. Before B’s proposal, A legitimately expected assistance from B “no strings attached.” In attaching a very unwelcome string, B’s proposal effectively renders A worse off

2) B threatens A with the withholding of something (assistance) that A is entitled to have from B

Cases 1 and 2 involve threats; 3 and 4, offers

1) Consider cases 5 and 6 in which Prof. Highstatus is sexually attracted to a student. Ms. Student, confused and unsettled, has begun to practice avoidance behavior

Case 5



1) Prof. Highstatus tells Ms. Student, though she deserves a B, she will be assigned a D unless she agrees to sex

Case 6

1) Prof. Highstatus tells Ms. Student, though she deserves a B, she will be assigned an A if she agrees to sex

It is clear that case 5 involves an attempt to use Ms. Student

1) Case 6, at least at face value, does not. In this case, Prof. Highstatus is undoubtedly acting in a morally reprehensible way. He is abusing his institutional authority.

2) There is however a suspicion that case 6 might involve a threat. Might not Ms. Student feel threatened? Is he not likely to retaliate should she turn him down?

Is Prof. Highstatus naïve to the threat

1) that Ms. Student may find implicit in the situation? Perhaps. In such a case, if she reluctantly agrees to sex, we may be inclined to say that he has unwittingly used her.

2) More likely, Prof. Highstatus is well aware of the way in which Ms. Student will perceive his proposal. Indeed, it may even be the case that he exploits his underground reputation for retaliation

3) To the extent, then, that he intends to convey a threat, he is attempting coercion

The Idea of a Coercive Offer – Case 7

1) Ms. Starlet, a glamorous and wealthy model, wants to be a movie superstar. Mr. Moviemogul invites her for a screen test in his office. After the test, he tells her he’ll make her a star on condition she agree to sex. She’s not at all attracted to him. With great reluctance, she agrees

Mr. Moviemogul has not used Ms. Starlet

1) She accepted his offer. The situation would be different if it were plausible to believe that, before accepting the proposal, she was entitled to his efforts to make her a star

The more general claim at issue is that offers are coercive

1) precisely inasmuch as they are extremely enticing or seductive

2) Though there is an important reality associated with this claim, we must not agree that an offer is coercive merely because it is extremely enticing or seductive

(It should not surprise readers to know that Mappes is a Christian thinker.)

“Voluntary Active Euthanasia”

Brock says his essay, “Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” will discuss voluntary active euthanasia in cases “where the motive of those who perform it is to respect the wishes of the patient and to provide the patient with a “good death…”

The Central Ethical Argument for Voluntary Active Euthanasia –

The values supporting voluntary active euthanasia “are individual self- determination or autonomy and individual well- being.” Self-determination refers to persons being free to make decisions about their own lives. [Rather than governments, religious organizations, political groups, strangers, etc.] And this autonomy ought to extend to the end of life when persons worry about suffering and the loss of dignity. Individual well-being refers to situations in which individuals decide that “life is no longer considered a benefit by the patient, but has now become a burden.” In other words, their well-being is best served by dying. This does not imply that physicians must perform this act against their will.

Potential Good Consequences of Permitting Euthanasia – 1) respect individual autonomy (of about 50,000 persons a year in the US in this situation; 2) give reassurance to those who may want euthanasia in the future; and 3) it will relieve vast amounts of suffering.

Potential Bad Consequences of Permitting Euthanasia – Brock list 3 arguments: 1) performing is incompatible with the “moral center” of being a physician and thus patients would fear their physicians. B replies that patients should not fear that their physicians will kill them, since E would be voluntary and the moral center of medicine should be self-determination and individual well-being not preserving life when persons have deemed they no longer want that. 2) E would weaken respect for life. (Do we respect life in our country?) Brock responds that he is skeptical because a) passive euthanasia had no such consequences; and b) euthanasia would only relevant in a small minority of deaths. 3) Legalizing voluntary euthanasia would lead down a slippery slope to involuntary euthanasia. Brock responds that this is the “last refuge of conservative defenders of the status quo.” When all your arguments against something have been defeated you simply say that this something will lead to something else.

While it is possible that doing x will lead to bad consequence y, that is not enough of a reason not to do x. [When in vitro fertilization was introduced in the 1970s, Leon Kass, later the head of President George W. Bush’s bioethics commission wrote feverishly for years that this would undermine all value for human life. Millions of persons have been born this way, some probably in this room, and nothing like that ever happened.] We don’t want to know if this is possible, but is it plausible. And no one had done this. Brocksuggests a number of safeguards to minimize the chance of abuse. However the idea that one must be terminally ill—like the law demands in Oregon and Washington in the US—does not, according to Brock, respect self-determination. As Brock suggests, OR and WA can serve as test cases for such laws. [Let’s see if society collapses.]

“Active and Passive Euthanasia” ~ James Rachels

James Rachels published one of the most salient pieces on the euthanasia (E) debate in 1975 the New England Journal of Medicine titled “Active and Passive Euthanasia.” Here is a brief outline of his argument.

The distinction between AE and PE is thought crucial. This is mistaken. Why?

AE is preferable to PE because it reduces suffering.

R understands saving all defective newborns, or destroying certain ones (DS with congenital defects for example), but he doesn’t understand allowing them to die slowly and painfully.

Given the distinction, life & death decisions are made on irrelevant grounds. For example, intestinal blockage allows us to let a DS baby die, but wo/ the blockage we would have to kill it. But the blockage is irrelevant. The issue is whether the DS baby should live. The distinction between AE and PE made this situation absurd—it led to us thinking IB was important.


Killing is not worse than letting die. Consider 1) Smith drowns his cousin for money; and 2) Jones lets his cousin drown for money. It doesn’t seem there is any moral difference between the 2 cases. Similarly, whether you kill or let die for a good motive—say to relieve suffering—the act is right or wrong independent of how you brought death about. In both cases the intent or motive is primarily to terminate life (and relieve suffering or costs).

We tend to think killing is worse than letting die because usually bad guys kill and physicians let die. But this doesn’t mean that there is something intrinsic to killing which is worse than letting die.

Counter argument – In PE the physician does nothing and the disease kills the patient. In AE the physician does something to kill the patient.

Response – 1) Physicians do do something—they let them die. That is a type of action. 2) It is bad to cause someone’s death because death is ordinarily thought bad for them. But if death has been deemed preferable, then bringing about death is no longer bad. 3) MDs may have to go along with the law, but the distinction cannot be defended philosophically. [This is one of the most air-tight and flawlessly reasoned pieces I ever read in the medical ethics literature. And my sense is that this argument is increasingly winning the day.]

“The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia”

In his article, The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia, J. Gay Williams rejects the view that “that if someone (and others) would be better off dead, then it must be all right to kill that person.” For Gay-Williams euthanasia (E) is intentional or deliberate killing, not accidental killing or letting one die. Given his subsequent rejection of the notion of passive E, it is clear he is using the narrow definition of E. E is intentional killing only, in other words, it is active E. Passive E is not E because one does not intend the person’s death—it is a foreseeable, but unintended consequence. (I foresee my driving will wear out my tires, but I don’t intend to wear them out by driving.)

The argument from nature – We have a natural desire to survive and E violates this desire. (Do we have this desire if we are suffering terribly? Isn’t it natural to want to relieve our suffering? And even if we do, have a natural desire to survive, does the fact that we have natural desires make them things we should follow? It may be natural for me to be violent, envious, lustful, scheming, etc. Does that mean these are good? It may be natural to die of bacterial infections, but that doesn’t mean its good, does it?) His argument in this section may be reconstructed as follows:

Acts of euthanasia are contrary to our human nature.

If (1), then acts of euthanasia are a denial of human dignity.

3. If acts of euthanasia are a denial of human dignity, then euthanasia is morally wrong.

4. Therefore, euthanasia is morally wrong.

The argument from self-interest – may be summarized as follows:

1. Acts of euthanasia contain the possibility that we will work against our own interests.

2. If (1), then acts of euthanasia are morally wrong.

3. Therefore, acts of euthanasia are morally wrong.

Support for (1): (a) Possibility of misdiagnosis/misprognosis; (b) possibility of new medical procedures; (c) thinking euthanasia permissible may encourage one to give up too easily; (d) choose E because of our concern for others.

The argument from practical effects – may be summarized as follows:



1. Cases of euthanasia could have a corrupting influence on doctors and nurses.

2. If (1), then acts of euthanasia are morally wrong.

3. Therefore, acts of euthanasia are morally wrong.

Support for 1: a) doctors and nurses might not try hard enough to save someone; and b) this may lead to involuntary E. (A “slippery slope” argument.)

Reflections – I find this argument ridiculously weak. Over the next two days I will outline arguments which agree with me.

Outline of The Euthanasia Debate

Technology prolongs and sustains life artificially. Parallel to the question of when becomes a person in the abortion debate, a central question in the euthanasia debate is when does one cease to be a person?  If one is deemed no longer to be a person, then the question of their rights is less important.

What is death? Until recently the cessation of breathing and heartbeat defined death. Now machines maintain respiration and heartbeat even when there is no brain functioning. So increasingly brain death is the preferred definition.

Also relevant to discussion of death are: 1) philosophical concerns about what is a person; 2) physiological concerns about what criteria define death; and 3) methods used to determine physiological states. Moreover the various definitions have a huge impact on moral decisions (if one is already dead, the moral situation is different than if one is not.)

Another important distinction is between ordinary treatment that offer a hope of benefit without undue cost vs. extraordinary treatment that offer no hope of benefit at great cost. The most obvious difficulty here is that the definitions keep changing, as what was once extraordinary—say heart surgery—becomes ordinary.

Also to be differentiated is killing vs allowing to die. The former refers to an act of commission (causing harm) that brings about death; the latter to an act of omission (permitting harm) that brings on death. Defenders of the importance of the distinction argue that if we kill, we are the cause of death; whereas if we allow someone to die, the disease is the cause of death. Opponents argue the distinction is not relevant.

A narrow definition of euthanasia (E) includes only killing as E; allowing to die is not E. Proponents typically view E as wrong; but allowing to die as not wrong.

A broad definition of E includes both killing (active E) and allowing to die (passive E). Proponents typically argue that both killing and letting die can be moral.

Another distinction is between voluntary E—where the patient consents to treatment or non-treatment—and non-voluntary E—where someone other than the patient gives consent.  In addition sometimes the category of involuntary E is introduced, cases where one doesn’t consent but had not made their wishes known beforehand.

Another important category is assisted suicide, typically by a physician (PAS). This is similar to voluntary active E except that in PAS the physician does not kill the patient but enables it.

In addition the right to refuse treatment has been recognized in America since 1990. In addition the use of living wills, durable power of attorney, advanced directives, and similar documents are now allowed.

Other problematic cases include the issue of defective newborns (DN). Here positions range from: 1) allowing to die in most circumstances; 2) allowing to die only when DN won’t have meaningful lives; 3) never allow to die. (At the other extreme would be killing in most circumstances.)

In the next few posts we will outline some views on the issue.

“The Case against Perfection”

I have vigorously defended transhumanism in this blog but I like to hear from some dissenters. Michael J. Sandel dissents in his article, “The Case against Perfection.” Here is a brief outline of the piece with some of my own parenthetical remarks.

Genetic engineering will improve the species, but some of it seems yucky. To understand why we need to consider “the moral status of nature, and …the proper stance of human beings toward the given world.” (Does nature have a moral status? Is there a proper stance toward it?)

Why is genetic engineering so bad? “The problem with eugenics and genetic engineering is that they represent the one- sided triumph of willfulness over giftedness, of dominion over reverence, of molding over beholding.” (What does this mean? This is all very cryptic.)

With genetic engineering:

we won’t be humble (about our gifts): “If bioengineering made the myth of the “ self- made man” come true, it would be difficult to view our talents as gifts for which we are indebted rather than achievements for which we are responsible.” (Is this true? And if it is, is it bad that it’s true?)


we will be too responsible (for human fate): “As humility gives way, responsibility expands to daunting proportions. We attribute less to chance and more to choice… The more we become masters of our genetic endowments, the greater the burden we bear for the talents we have and the way we perform… A domain once governed by fate has now become an arena of choice.” (Is this true? And if it is, is it bad that it’s true?)


We will feel less solidarity (with others): “…genetic enhancement, if routinely practiced, would make it harder to foster the moral sentiments that social solidarity requires.” (I don’t see why this is true.)

Objections

1)”Some may complain that it is overly religious; others may object that it is unpersuasive in consequentialist terms.” Response – “These various understandings of the sacred all insist that we value nature and the living beings within it as more than mere instruments; to act otherwise displays a lack of reverence, a failure of respect.”

2) “But those who care more about gaining a competitive edge for their children or themselves may decide that the benefits to be gained from genetic enhancement outweigh its allegedly adverse effects on social institutions and moral sentiments.” Response – “My concern with enhancement is not as individual vice but as habit of mind and way of being.” Sandel concludes:

The bigger stakes are of two kinds. One involves the fate of human goods embodied in important social practice–norms of unconditional love and an openness to the unbidden, in the case of parenting; the celebration of natural talents and gifts in athletic and artistic endeavors; humility in the face of privilege, and a willingness to share the fruits of good fortune through institutions of social solidarity. The other involves our orientation to the world that we inhabit, and the kind of freedom to which we aspire. ..But changing our nature to fit the world, rather than the other way around, is actually the deepest form of disempowerment. It distracts us from reflecting critically on the world, and deadens the impulse to social and political improvement. Rather than employ our new genetic powers to straighten ‘the crooked timber of humanity,’ we should do what we can to create social and political arrangements more hospitable to the gifts and limitations of imperfect human beings…

(Nothing about genetic engineering excludes changing social institutions for the better, and if we had followed Sandel’s advice throughout history we would still die young.)

“Moral Status of Cloning Humans”

Michael Tooley’s article “Moral Status of Cloning Humans” defends human cloning. I am in complete agreement with it. Cloning, despite the viceral reaction it raises, is a tool in the arsenal of the transhumanist once it is understood. Here is a brief outline of the article with a bit of commentary identified by parenthesis.

SECTION 1 – Is it Intrinsically Wrong to Produce a Person by Cloning?

Cloning might be wrong intrinsically because: 1) the right of a person to a genetically unique nature; and 2) the right of a person to a future that is, in a certain sense, open.

Regarding 1 – is it important to be unique? If there was another you on a distant planet does that diminish your worthiness?

Two persons could be identical because of deterministic law (genes and environment), or by chance (identical twins). Most people aren’t bothered by the latter, but by the former. If bothered by the former, is that because such persons would not be unique, or is one bothered because they don’t like determinism? Tooley thinks its determinism they don’t like, not the lack of uniqueness. But they should have no worries since cloning—even less than identical twins reared together—doesn’t imply genetic determinism (and doesn’t produce identical people.)

Do persons then have a right to a unique genome? The case of twins suggests they do not, as no one worries that there are twins or thinks it wrong to have twins. But is there some right violated by being a clone? It seems not.  One’s individuality is not threatened because someone else shares your genome. (Again that implies that genetic determinism is true, but we aren’t genetically determined.)

Or consider that if the gods had to choose between 1) evolution; 2) an original pair who would mate, or 3) an original pair who would reproduce perfect clones of themselves forever. Might not the gods have rejected the former as too random, and chose the latter instead? Would this last world be worse than the others, or much better?  Tooley thinks it would have been better. This suggests there is nothing crucial about genetic uniqueness.

Regarding 2 – we might think certain futures aren’t open to us because someone who preceded us did or did not do certain things. Tooley suggests such knowledge would be helpful, since we wouldn’t attempt to do impossible or extremely unlikely things based upon knowledge of our genome.  Or, if one thought themselves constrained by their genome, they would be wrong, as the case of identical twins shows. (Again, genetic potentials, dispositions, propensities, or proclivities do NOT imply genetic determinism.) Thus the arguments against cloning are unconvincing.

SECTION 2 – Considerations in Support of Cloning

In support of cloning Tooley offers the following:

1) We would gain scientific knowledge about nature vs. nurture debate. Such knowledge would be potentially beneficial to society and child rearing;

2) We could clone persons who have made significant contributions to society;

3) We can increase the chances that one will be happy and healthy;

4) It will improve and inform the relationship for both children and parents—since the parent will better recall what it was to be that child;

5) It would help infertile couples who could not otherwise have children;

6) It will allow homosexual couples to have their own children; and

7) It would save lives (primarily by the ability to clone perfectly compatible organs.)

SECTION 3 – Objections to the Cloning of Humans

Still, even if the arguments against cloning are weak—as the first section demonstrated—and there are multiple benefits to cloning—as the second section argued—cloning might still be wrong because of some bad consequences that might follow its adoption.

Arguments against cloning and responses to those arguments

1) Creating mindless organ banks is wrong because you are killing a person, or because you are not allowing a person to have a brain or soul, or because it is killing a potential person.

Response – Tooley rejects all of these objections. There are no convincing reasons to think that embryos, brainless organs, or potential people are people. Furthermore, while some may think organ banks are ghoulish, not using them allows innocent people to die who would otherwise not die. Thus to advocate against cloning is to recommend a course of action that will result in the death of many innocent people. (Remember also that in practice we’re talking about cells being directed to develop into a pancreas, liver, heart, etc. Not whole bodies hanging on hooks in chambers as in the movies.)

2) Cloning violates the rights of clones to a genetically unique or open future.

Response – This objection has already dealt with.

3) Brave New World scenarios such as human beings will cloned to serve as slaves, soldiers in the dictator’s army, etc.

Response – Such scenarios are not plausible.  Would society suddenly change their mind about the immorality of slavery because of genetic engineering? Would a dictator who couldn’t conscript his own army undertake a cloning project so that in twenty years he had the army he wanted? Not likely. (Remember you must show not that something is possible but that it’s plausible.)

4) Cloning will cause psychological distress because clones will think their uniqueness compromised or future constrained.

Response – The beliefs that give rise to such distress are, as we have seen, false; and they are also irrational since, as we have seen, genetic determinism is false. But we should not be constrained by the irrational beliefs of others. Moreover, these irrational beliefs will cease when cloning becomes familiar.

5) We use children—treat them as means to an end—when we clone them to save another child.

Response – Tooley thinks it unlikely that parents would be less likely to care or love their offspring in such situations.

6) Cloning interferes with autonomy.

Response – If my child is cloned with a genetic capability or potential to be intellectuals, that doesn’t mean they have to be. The same if they are disposed to be intellectuals; they still don’t have to be. In addition, is it really wrong to want children who won’t suffer from genetic diseases?  Finally, If cloning to produce children with certain traits is wrong, then so are almost all child rearing practices.

SECTION 4 – Conclusion

“My overall conclusion, in short, is that the cloning of human beings, both to produce mind-less organ banks, and to produce persons, is both morally acceptable, in principle, and potentially very beneficial for society.”

“The Morality of Killing Human Embryos”

Here are bullet points which summarize “The Morality of Killing Human Embryos”  by the philosopher Bonnie Steinbock:

Are embryonic stem cells persons? Do they have moral status?
Some things don’t have moral status—rocks—some things have more status than others—people than fish.
People have moral status because they’re homo-sapiens.
But when do they become human organisms?
Some say at conception, but this is at odds with the facts of modern biology.
Biologically, a genuine and unique organism presents itself at implantation—at about 14 days.
And biological humanity does not imply moral status—as the examples of extraterrestrials and persons in vegetative states show. Some humans aren’t people, and some people aren’t humans.
One could object to #7 by asking why should we limit moral status to persons.
Might there be a middle ground between the biological and personhood views of moral status?
We may think of moral status as corresponding with having interests or a stake in something.
A being must have interests to have moral rights and status.
Non-conscious beings do not have interests, nothing matters to them.
And we do have a good idea of what it’s like to be conscious—conscious beings have interests.
Embryos do not have consciousness or interests and hence no moral status.
What about the argument that it was in one’s interest not to have been killed as a fetus?
Steinbock counter that one never was an unconscious fetus, one comes to be when one is conscious.
Steinbock also argues that it does not matter to you if you are aborted before you are conscious.
At any rate, embryos outside of bodies have no future.
Most of these embryos have no future even if implanted.
Cloned embryos have no chance of have a future, hence they are even less morally problematic.
It is morally acceptable to use embryos in research because they have no moral status.

“Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement”

I believe that of all the authors I’ve encountered during my 30 year university teaching career, none was more painful to read than Leon Kass. Kass, among his many roles, served as the chair of the President’s Council on Bioethics after being appointed by George W. Bush.

When I read an enemy of the future like Kass, a quintessential lover of suffering and death, I wonder: a) what is wrong with this person? b) how can he believe what he believes? and c) why does he want to force his views on others?

In some ways these questions are easy to answer. Perhaps there is nothing wrong with loving death and dying; perhaps suffering and death are good things. And many people like to influence other people, I suppose all writers do, but I always found something particularly disturbing in Kass’ writings. It’s no so much that he believes stem cell research is immoral—although that position is nearly indefensible—is it his desire to control others that is so repugnant. Of course a lot of old conservatives are like this. They see the world they lived in receding into the past, and they want to stop the tide.

In 2003, Kass published: “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement.” He begins his article by granting that biomedical science and biotechnology have made contributions to society, but he worries that our children and grandchildren might succumb to technologies’s “seductive promises of a perfect, better-than-human future, in which we shall all be as gods, ageless and blissful.”

Hold it right there. Of all the things to worry about, he worries about the perfect, the better, the ageless, the blissful. I’m reminded of H. L. Mencken’s remark that a Puritan is someone who just can’t stand that somebody somewhere is having fun. But Kass isn’t through. He also worries that “the likely ends that these powers and techniques are destined to serve: ageless bodies, happy souls, better children, a more peaceful and cooperative society, etc.”

Wow! He opposes happiness, good children, peace, and cooperation, but he loves death. Surely something is wrong with this man; you wonder if he has ever smiled except when he knows that others are suffering. I mean, is all this perfection, agelessness, happiness, peace, cooperation and love really bad? Evidently according to Kass. I wonder how a traveller from another planet, who saw the pain and injustice of this world would respond to such a supporter of the status quo?

Kass does express some legitimate worries with pursuing these technologies: (1) issues of safety and bodily harm; (2) issues of unfairness and distributive justice; and (3) issues of freedom and coercion, overt and subtle. And “to put this disquiet into words,” and elucidate his “wisdom of repugnance,” Kass advances some further objections: 1) that the attitude of mastery displays an unwise hubris; 2) there is a morally relevant way in which biotech is an unnatural means; and 3) some of the goals of biotech are dubious. In the end, all this stuff makes Kass feel yucky.

But of course I don’t feel yucky when contemplating biotechnology or most other futuristic technologies, I feel hopeful. I want to be more happy and peaceful and cooperative. If Kass doesn’t want to, then he is welcomed to be as unhappy as he likes. And I don’t like suffering and death. If Kass likes them, he is welcome to die at anytime. In fact autonomy demands that we be allowed to die when we want. But I resent his trying to keep new technologies from those of us who want them. And that’s exactly what he was trying to do as chair of the Ethics committee; he wanted to make sure that stem cell research did not proceed. I resent such paternalism, as any autonomous being would.

But Kass and his ilk will ultimately fail. When safe biotechnology becomes available, it will be wildly popular, just like the in vitro fertilization that Kass once opposed. The march of the future is inexorable and will only be delayed, not stopped, by lovers of death and enemies of the future like Kass.