Daniel Orr's Blog, page 28

March 2, 1969 – Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Soviet and Chinese units skirmish on Damansky/Zhenbao Island

On March 2, 1969, Soviet border troops were sent toDamansky/Zhenbao Island to expel 30 Chinese soldiers who had landed on theisland.  Unbeknown to the Soviets, alarge Chinese force, (300 soldiers, according to the Soviets) which was hiddenand waiting in ambush in the nearby forest, opened fire on the Soviets.  Fighting then broke out, with other unitsfrom both sides joining the fray. Chinese units used artillery and small arms fire from their side of the Ussuri River,while the Soviets sent reinforcements to Damansky/Zhenbao Island from theirside of the river.

(Taken from Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 5)

What became the trigger for the escalation of border clashesthat nearly led to total war between China and the Soviet Union was thedisputed but nondescript Damansky Island (Zhenbao Island to the Chinese), asmall (0.74 square kilometers) 1½-mile long by ½-mile wide island located inthe Ussuri River between the Soviet bank in the east and the Chinese bank inthe west.  By the terms of a treatysigned in the 19th century, Damansky/Zhenbao Island belonged to the Soviet Union.  Theisland was uninhabited, and also experienced flooding from seasonal rains.  Both the Chinese and Soviets regularly sentpatrols to reconnoiter the island.

During border negotiations in 1964, the Soviet Union agreedto cede the island to China,but then retracted this offer when talks broke down.  Thereafter, the island became a flashpointfor armed clashes.  In March 1969, China accused the Soviet Union of intruding into Damansky/Zhenbao Island sixteen times duringa two-year period in January 1967-March 1969. In December 1968 and again in January 1969, Soviet border guards usednon-lethal force to expel Chinese patrols from the island.  More border incidents occurred in February1969.

Then on March 2, 1969, Soviet border troops were sent toDamansky/Zhenbao Island to expel 30 Chinese soldiers who had landed on theisland.  Unbeknown to the Soviets, alarge Chinese force, (300 soldiers, according to the Soviets) which was hiddenand waiting in ambush in the nearby forest, opened fire on the Soviets.  Fighting then broke out, with other unitsfrom both sides joining the fray. Chinese units used artillery and small arms fire from their side of the Ussuri River,while the Soviets sent reinforcements to Damansky/Zhenbao Island from theirside of the river.

A Chinese military report after the incident stated that theSoviets fired the first shots.  Morerecent information indicates that the Chinese military planned the incident,and used elite army units with battle experience to ambush the Sovietpatrol.  In this way, China hoped to retaliate for the many Sovietprovocations, and also to signal that Chinawould not be intimidated by the Soviet Union.

The two sides released different casualty figures for theDamansky/Zhenbao incident, although the Soviets may have suffered greaterlosses, at 59 dead and 94 wounded.  Boththe Chinese and Soviets claimed victory. The two sides also raised strong diplomatic protests against the other,accusing the other side of starting the incident.  The Soviet Union accused China of being“reckless and provocative”, while China warned that if the Soviet Unioncontinued to “provoke armed conflicts”, China would respond with “resolutecounter-blows”.

Sensationalist news reports by the media from the two sidesstirred up the general population in both countries.  On March 3, 1969 in Beijing, large protests were held outside theSoviet Embassy, and Soviet diplomatic personnel were harassed.  In the Soviet Union, demonstrations were heldin Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. In Moscow,angry crowds hurled stones, ink bottles, and paint at the Chinese Embassy.

On March 11, 1969 in Beijing,demonstrators besieged the Soviet Embassy in protest for the attack on theChinese Embassy.  Then when Soviet mediareported that captured Russian soldiers during the Damansky/Zhenbao incidenthad been tortured and executed, and their bodies mutilated, largedemonstrations consisting of 100,000 people broke out in Moscow. Other mass assemblies also occurred in other Russian cities.

On March 15, 1969, a second (and larger) clash broke out inDamansky/Zhenbao Island, where both sides sent a force of regimental strength,or some 2,000-3,000 troops.  The Chineseclaimed that the Soviets fielded one motorized infantry battalion, one tankbattalion, and four heavy-artillery battalions, or a total of over 50 tanks andarmored vehicles, and scores of artillery pieces.  The two sides again claimed victory in the10-hour battle, and also accused the other side of firing the first shots.  Both sides suffered heavy casualties.

The Soviets lost a number of armored vehicles, and failed toexpel the Chinese from the island.  OnMarch 17, 1969, some 70 Soviet soldiers who were sent to retrieve a disabledT-62 tank were forced to retreat.  TheChinese subsequently recovered the Soviet tank and transported it to Beijing where it was puton public display.  Casualty figures forthe March 15-17 battles are disputed. The Soviets place their own losses at 58 dead and 94 wounded.  The Chinese place their losses at 29 dead, 62wounded, and one missing.  Foreignindependent sources provide much higher combined total casualty figures, from800 to 3,000 soldiers killed for both sides.

As in the first incident (March 2), more recent Chinesesources indicate that the Chinese Army had prepared for the second encounter(March 15).  Chinese authorities hadanticipated that the Soviets would return in force.  The Chinese Army therefore sent a greaternumber of Chinese elite units, and fortified its side of the island with landmines.  With these preparations, theChinese succeeded in repelling the Soviets, who had attacked using armoredunits.  After the encounter, the Sovietsbegan an extended artillery barrage of Chinese positions across the river, andhit targets as far as seven kilometers inside China. 

The two incidents generated different reactions in theChinese and Soviet governments.  In China, Mao madeefforts to prevent the crisis from escalating further.  He ordered Chinese border troops not toretaliate to the Soviet artillery shelling of Chinese positions inDamansky/Zhenbao Island, and at the Chinese side of the Ussuri River.  In Moscow, theSoviet government was thoroughly provoked by the two incidents, viewing them asa direct challenge from China.

However, Soviet authorities were divided as to theappropriate response.  The ForeignMinistry called for caution, but the military wanted aggressive action.  On May 24, 1969, because of continued borderincidents by Russian troops, Chinafiled a diplomatic protest, accusing the Soviet Unionof provoking war.  On May 29, the Sovietgovernment threatened to go to war with China, but also called for talksbetween the two sides.

As tensions increased, so did troop deployment to thedisputed regions.  Soon, 800,000 Chineseand 700,000 Soviet troops were deployed at the border.  The Soviets continued to initiate borderincidents, apparently to provoke a wider conflict.  On August 13, 1969 in the Tieliketi Incident,300 Soviet troops, supported by air and armored units, entered China’sTieliketi area, located in Xinjiang region, in the western border.  There, they ambushed and killed 30 Chineseborder guards.

By now, the Soviet Union was preparing for war, andincreased its forces in Mongoliaand carried out a large military exercise in the Far East.  Soviet authorities notified Eastern Bloccountries that Russian planes could launch an air strike on China’s nuclear facility in Lop Nur, Xinjiang.  In Washington, D.C., aSoviet diplomatic official, while dining with a U.S. State Department officer,broached the planned Soviet attack on China’s nuclear site, to gaugeAmerican reaction.  The U.S. official reacted negatively, and subsequentU.S. warnings of interveningmilitarily if the Soviet Union attacked China, would have far-reachingrepercussions in the ongoing Cold War.

Meanwhile in Beijing, Chineseauthorities were concerned about the growing threat of war with the Soviet Union. Despite appearing defiant, and warning Russiathat it too had nuclear weapons, Chinawas unprepared to go to war, and its military was far weaker than that of the Soviet Union. Exacerbating China’sposition was its ongoing Cultural Revolution, which was causing seriousinternal unrest.

March 1, 1941 – World War II: Bulgaria joins the Axis

On March 1, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Axis by signing the Tripartite Pact. Germany had long pressured Bulgaria into allying with the Axis, but the Bulgarian government balked at getting involved in the war. However, with the Italian offensive into Greece being turned back, Adolf Hitler decided to intervene, and demanded the passage of German forces into Bulgaria for the invasion of Greece (and later including Yugoslavia). Recognizing futility to stop a German attack into its territory, the Bulgarian government acquiesced, and joined the Tripartite Pact with assurances of being given Greek territory and continued diplomatic relations with its neighbors Turkey and the Soviet Union. At that time, Germany and the Soviet Union had a ten-year non-aggression pact.

(Taken from The Balkan Campaign – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe)

In August 1940, Hitler gave secret instructions to hismilitary high command to prepare a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union, to be launched in the spring of 1941.  In October 1940-January 1941, the Germanslaunched fierce air attacks on Britain,which failed to force the latter to capitulate as Hitler had hoped.  Hitler then suspended his planned invasion ofBritainand instead focused on other ways to bring it to its knees.  He turned to the Mediterranean Sea, whosecontrol by Germany and Italy would have the effect of cutting off Britain from its colonies in Africa and Asia viathe Suez Canal.  In this plan, German forces would captureGibraltar through Spain,thus sealing off the western end of the Mediterranean Sea, while the ItalianArmy in Libya would captureBritish-controlled Egypt aswell as the Suez Canal, sealing off the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea.  German forces wouldjoin in the final stages of the Italian offensive.

As the German military formulated the invasion plan of theSoviet Union and the means to knock Britain out of the war, Hitler wasdetermined that no complications arose that would interfere with theseobjectives.  Foremost, Hitler had noappetite for turmoil to break out in southeastern Europe,especially the highly volatile Balkan region, the “powder keg” that had sparkedWorld War I.  Politically andstrategically, Hitler wanted stability in the Balkans to keep away the SovietUnion, with whom Germanyhad a tenuous non-aggression pact. Conflict in the Balkans would most likely prompt intervention by Russia, whichtraditionally held a strong influence there.

Hitler had long stated that he had no territorial ambitionson the Balkans.  Instead, Germany’s main interest there was purelyeconomic, as the Balkan countries were Germany’s biggest partners,supplying the latter with food and mineral resources.  But of the greatest importance to Hitler werethe Ploiesti oil fields in Romania, whichprovided the German military and industry with vital petroleum products.

Germanyand Italy mediated twoterritorial disputes involving Romaniaand its neighbors: on August 21, 1940, Romaniawas persuaded to cede Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria,and on August 30, 1940, it also relinquished one-third of Transylvania to Hungary.  A few weeks earlier, in late June-early July1940, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had used strong-arm tactics to force Romania to cede its northeastern regions ofBessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, Hitler strove to convince Mussolini to stall thelatter’s territorial ambitions in the Balkans. Mussolini had long viewed that in the German-Italian partition ofEurope, southeastern Europe and the Balkansfell inside the Italian sphere of control. Italian forces had invaded Albaniain April 1939 (separate article), and after the fall of France in June 1940, Mussolini exerted pressureon Greece and Yugoslavia, andthreatened them with invasion.  At thattime, Hitler was able to convince Mussolini to suspend temporarily his Balkanambitions and instead focus Italian efforts on defeating the British in North Africa.

But on October 7, 1940, at the request of Romanian dictatorIon Antonescu, German forces entered Romaniato guard against a Soviet invasion; for Hitler, it was to protect the vital Ploiesti oil fields.  Mussolini was outraged by this German action,as he believed that Romaniafell inside his zone of control.  Alsofor Mussolini, Hitler’s move into Romania was only the latest in along list of stunts that had been made without previously consulting him, andone that had to be reciprocated, or as Mussolini put it, “to repay him [Hitler]with his own coin”.  Hitler had invaded Poland, Denmark,Norway, France, and the Low Countries without informing Mussolini beforehand.

On October 28, 1940, Mussolini, without notifying Hitler,launched the invasion of Greece(previous article), despite insufficient military preparation and against thecounsel of his top generals.  Theoperation was a disaster, as the motivated Greek Army threw back the Italiansto Albania,and then launched its own offensive. Within three months, the Greeks occupied a quarter of Albanianterritory.  Greece had declared its neutralityat the start of World War II.  Butbecause of the Italian invasion, the Greek government turned to Britain forassistance.  In early November 1940,British forces had arrived, and occupied two strategically important Greekislands, Crete and Limnos.

The unexpected Italian attack on Greece and likelihood of Britishintervention in the Balkans shocked Hitler, seeing that his efforts to try andmaintain peace in the region had failed. His prized Ploesti oil fields and the whole southeastern Europe were now vulnerable.  On November 4, 1940, Hitler decided to becomeinvolved in Greecein order to bail out his beleaguered ally Mussolini and to forestall the British.  On November 12, 1940, the German High Commandissued Directive No. 18, which laid out the German plan to contain the Britishin the Mediterranean: German forces would invade northern Greece and Gibraltar in January 1941, and thenassist the Italians in attacking Egypt in the fall of 1941.  However, Spain’spro-Axis dictator General Francisco Franco refused to allow German troops into Spain, forcing Germanyto suspend its invasion of Gibraltar.  On December 13, 1940, the German militaryissued Directive No. 20, which finalized the invasion of Greece undercodename Operation Marita.  In the finalplan, German forces in Bulgaria would open a second front in northeasternGreece and capture the whole Greek northern coast, link up with the Italians inthe northwest, and if necessary, push south toward Athens and seize the rest ofGreece.  Operation Marita was scheduledfor March 1941; however, delays would cause the invasion to be launched onemonth later.

For the invasion of Greece,Hitler considered it necessary to bring into the Axis fold the governments of Hungary, Romania,Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia,notwithstanding their stated neutrality at the start of the World War II.  With their cooperation, German forces wouldcross their territories through Central and Eastern Europe,as well as control their military-important infrastructures, such as airfieldsand communications systems.  Hungary, which had benefited territorially inthe German seizure of Czechoslovakiaand Axis arbitration of Transylvania, was drawn naturally to Germany.  On November 20, 1940, the Hungariangovernment joined the Tripartite Pact . Three days later, Romaniaalso joined the Pact, as Romanian leader Antonescu was motivated to do so byfear of a Soviet invasion.  In succeedingmonths, large numbers of German forces and weapons, passing through Hungary, would assemble in Romania, mainly for the planned invasion of the Soviet Union (whose operational plan would be finalizedin December 1940 under the top-secret Operation Barbarossa).

Bulgariabalked at joining the Pact and thus be openly associated with the Axis, andalso was concerned that participating in the invasion of Greece would leave its eastern border vulnerableto an attack by Turkey,which was allied with Greece.  The Bulgarians also were aware of a Sovietplan to capture Varna, Bulgaria’s Black sea port, which the Sovietswould use to seize control of the Turkish Straits, which was a source of along-standing dispute between the Soviet Union and Turkey. 

However, Hitler exerted strong diplomatic pressure on Bulgaria andalso promised to protect Bulgarian territorial integrity.  Bulgaria acquiesced and agreed toallow German troops to enter Bulgarian territory.  On February 28, 1941, German engineeringcrews bridged the Danube River at the Romanian-Bulgarian border, and the firstGerman units crossed into Bulgariaand continued to that country’s eastern border. The next day, March 1st, Bulgariajoined the Tripartite Pact, officially joining the Axis.  On March 2, 1941, German forces involved inOperation Marita entered Bulgariaand proceeded south to the Bulgarian-Greek border.

To assure Turkey of German intentions, Hitler wrote to theTurkish government to explain that the German presence in Bulgaria was directed at Greece.  To further allay the Turks, German troopswere positioned far from the Turkish border. The Turkish government accepted the German clarification, and agreed tostand down its forces during the German attack on Greece.

Meanwhile, Greecewas aware of German plans, and in the previous months, held talks with Britain and Yugoslavia to formulate a commonstrategy against the anticipated German attack. The dilemma for Greece was that by March 1941, the greater part of itsmilitary forces were still tied down against the Italians in southern Albania,leaving insufficient units to defend the rest of the country’s northernborder.  At the request of the Greekgovernment, Britain and itsdominions, Australia and New Zealand, sent 58,000 troops to Greece; this force arrived in March 1941 anddeployed in Greece’snorth central border.

With regards to Yugoslavia, Hitler exerted greateffort to try and persuade the officially neutral but Allied-leaning governmentof Yugoslav Prime Minister Dragisha Cvetkovic to join the Axis.  In a series of high-level meetings between thetwo countries which even included Hitler’s participation, the Germans offeredsizable rewards to Yugoslaviafor joining the Axis, including Greek territory that would include Salonicawhich would give Yugoslaviaaccess to the Aegean Sea.  Talks went nowhere until Hitler met withPrince Paul on March 4, 1941, which led two weeks later to the Yugoslavgovernment agreeing to join the Axis.  OnMarch 25, 1941, Yugoslaviasigned the Tripartite Pact, motivated by a secret clause in the agreement thatcontained three stipulations: the Axis promised to respect Yugoslaviansovereignty and territorial integrity, the Yugoslavian military would not berequired to assist the Axis, and Yugoslavia would not be required toallow Axis forces to pass through its territory.  But two days later, March 27, the pro-AlliedSerbian military high command deposed the Yugoslav government and installeditself in a military regime, arrested Prince Paul, and named the 17-year oldminor crown prince as King Peter II.  Thenew military government assured Germanythat Yugoslaviawanted to maintain friendly ties between the two countries, albeit that itwould not ratify the Tripartite Pact. Anti-German mass demonstrations broke out in Belgrade and other Serbian cities.

As a result of the coup, a furious and humiliated Hitlerbelieved that Yugoslavia hadtaken a stand favoring the Allies, despite the new Yugoslav government’sconciliatory position toward Germany.  On March 27, 1941, just hours after the coup,Hitler convened the German military high command and stated his intention to“destroy Yugoslaviaas a military power and sovereign state”. He ordered the formulation of an invasion plan for Yugoslavia, which was to be carried out togetherwith the attack on Greece.  Despite the time constraint (the attack onGreece was set to be launched in ten days, April 6, 1941), the German militaryfinalized a lightning attack for Yugoslavia, code-named Operation 25, to beunder taken in coordination with the operation on Greece.

Hitler invited Bulgariato participate in the attack on Yugoslavia,but the Bulgarian government declined, citing the need to defend itsborders.  As well, Hungary demurred, as it had just recently signeda non-aggression pact with Yugoslavia,but it agreed to allow the German invasion forces to mass in its southwesternborder with Yugoslavia.  Romania was not asked to join theinvasion.

Mussolini, after conferring with Hitler, agreed toparticipate, and the Italian forces were to undertake the following:temporarily cease operations at the Albanian front; protect the flank of theGerman forces invading from Austriato Slovenia; seize Yugoslavterritories along the Adriatic coast; and link up with German forces for theinvasion of Greece.

On April 3, 1941, Yugoslaviasent emissaries to Moscow to try and arrange amutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union.  Instead, on April 5, the Soviet governmentagreed only to a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Yugoslavia,which did not promise Soviet protection in case of foreign aggression.  As a result, Hitler was free to invade Yugoslaviawithout fear of Soviet intervention.  OnApril 6, 1941, Germany and Italy launched the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece, discussed separately in thenext two chapters.

February 28, 1974 – Ethiopian Civil War: Prime Minister Aklilu Habte-Wold resigns

In January 1974, in what became the first of a series ofdecisive events, soldiers stationed at Negele, Sidamo Province, mutinied inprotest of low wages and other poor conditions; in the following days, militaryunits in other locations mutinied as well. In February 1974, as a result of rising inflation and unemployment anddeteriorating economic conditions resulting from the global oil crisis of theprevious year (1973), teachers, workers, and students launched protestdemonstrations and marches in Addis Ababa demanding price rollbacks, higher labor wages,and land reform in the countryside. These protests degenerated into bloody riots.  In the aftermath, on February 28, 1974,long-time Prime Minister Aklilu Habte-Wold resigned and was replaced byEndalkachew Makonnen, whose government raised the wages of military personneland set price controls to curb inflation. Even so, the government, which was controlled by nobles, aristocrats,and wealthy landowners, refused or were unaware of the need to implement majorreforms in the face of growing public opposition.

In March 1974, a group of military officers led by ColonelAlem Zewde Tessema formed the multi-unit “Armed Forces Coordinating Committee”(AFCC) consisting of representatives from different sectors of the Ethiopianmilitary, tasked with enforcing cohesion among the various forces and assistingthe government in maintaining authority in the face of growing unrest.  In June 1974, reformist junior officers ofthe AFCC, desiring greater reforms and dissatisfied with what they saw was theAFCC’s close association with the government, broke away and formed their owngroup.

Ethiopia and nearby countries.

(Taken from Ethiopian Civil War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 4)

Background Thislatter group, which took the name “Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces,Police, and Territorial Army, soon grew to about 110 to 120 enlisted men andofficers (none above the rank of major) from the 40 military and security unitsacross the country, and elected Majors Mengistu Haile Mariam  and Atnafu Abate as its chairman andvice-chairman, respectively.  This group,which became known simply as Derg (an Ethiopian word meaning “Committee” or“Council”), had as its (initial) aims to serve as a conduit for variousmilitary and police units in order to maintain peace and order, and also touphold the military’s integrity by resolving grievances, disciplining errantofficers, and curbing corruption in the armed forces.

Derg operated anonymously (e.g. its members were notpublicly known initially), but worked behind such populist slogans as “EthiopiaFirst”, “Land to the Peasants”, and “Democracy and Equality to all” to gainbroad support among the military and general population.  By July 1974, the Derg’s power was felt notonly within the military but in the government itself, and Haile Selassie wasforced to implement a number of political measures, including the release ofpolitical prisoners, the return of political exiles to the country, passage ofa new constitution, and more critically, to allow Derg to work closely with thegovernment.  Under Derg pressure, thegovernment of Prime Minister Makonnen collapsed; succeeding as Prime Ministerwas Mikael Imru, an aristocrat who held leftist ideas.

Haile Selassie’s concessions to the Derg included measuresto investigate government corruption and mismanagement.  In the period that followed, Derg arrestedand imprisoned many high-ranking imperial, administrative, and militaryofficials, including former Prime Ministers Habte-Wold and Makonnen, Cabinetmembers, military generals, and regional governors.  In August 1974, a proposed constitution thatcalled for establishing a constitutional monarchy was set aside.  Now operating virtually with impunity, theDerg took aim at the imperial court, dissolving the imperial governing councilsand royal treasury, and seizing royal landholdings and commercial assets.  By this time, Haile Selassie’s governmentvirtually had ceased to exist; de facto power was held by the military, or moreprecisely, by Derg.

The culmination of events occurred when Haile Selassie wasaccused of deliberately denying the existence of a widespread famine thatcurrently was ravaging Ethiopia’sWollo province, which already had killed some 40,000 to 80,000 to as many as200,000 people.  Conflicting reportsindicated that Haile Selassie was not aware of the famine, was fully aware ofit, or that government administrators withheld knowledge of its existence fromthe emperor.  By August 1974, largeprotest demonstrations in Addis Ababawere demanding the emperor’s arrest. Finally on September 12, 1974, the Derg overthrew Haile Selassie in abloodless coup, leading away the frail, 82-year old ex-monarch to imprisonment.

The Derg gained control of Ethiopia but did not abolish themonarchy outright, and announced that Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, HaileSelassie’s son who was currently abroad for medical treatment, was to succeedto the throne as the new “king” on his return to the country.  However, Prince Wossen rejected the offer andremained abroad.  The Derg then withdrewits offer and in March 1975, abolished the monarchy altogether, thus ending the800 year-old Ethiopian Empire.  (OnAugust 27, 1975, or nearly one year after his arrest, Haile Selassie passedaway under mysterious circumstances, with Derg stating that complications froma medical procedure had caused his death, while critics alleging that theex-monarch was murdered.)

The surreptitious means by which Derg, in a period of sixmonths, gained power by progressively dismantling the Ethiopian Empire andultimately deposing Haile Selassie, sometimes is referred to as the “creepingcoup” in contrast with most coups, which are sudden and swift.  On September 15, 1974, Derg formally tookcontrol of the government and renamed itself as the Provisional MilitaryAdministrative Council (although it would continue to be commonly known asDerg), a ruling military junta under General Aman Andom, a non-member Derg whomthe Derg appointed as its Chairman; General Aman thereby also assumed the roleof Ethiopia’s head of state.

At the outset, Derg had its political leanings embodied inits slogans “Ethiopia First” (i.e. nationalism) and “Democracy and Equality toall”.  Soon, however, it abolished theEthiopian parliament, suspended the constitution, and ruled by decree.  In early 1975, Derg launched a series ofbroad reforms that swept away the old conservative order and began thecountry’s transition to socialism.  InJanuary-February 1975, nearly all industries were nationalized.  In March, an agrarian reform programnationalized all farmlands (including those owned by the country’s largestlandowner, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church), reduced farm sizes, and abolishedtenancy farming.  Collectivizedagriculture was introduced and farmers were organized into peasantorganizations.  (Land reform was fiercelyresisted in such provinces as Gojjam, Wollo, and Tigray, where most farmersowned their lands and tenant farming was not widely practiced.)  In July 1975, all urban lands, houses, andbuildings were nationalized and city residents were organized into urbandwellers’ associations, known as “kebeles”, which would play a major role inthe coming civil war.  Despite theextensive nationalization, a few private sector industries that were consideredvital to the economy were left untouched, e.g. the retail and wholesale trade,and import and export industries.

In April 1976, Derg published the “Program for the NationalDemocratic Revolution”, which outlined the regime’s objectives of transformingEthiopia into a socialist state, with powers vested in the peasants, workers,petite bourgeoisie, and anti-feudal and anti-monarchic sectors.  An agency called the “Provisional Office forMass Organization Affairs” was established to work out the transformativeprocess toward socialism.

War The politicalinstability and power struggles that followed the Derg’s coming to power, theescalation of pre-existing separatist and Marxist insurgencies (as well as theformation of new rebel movements), and the intervention of foreign players,notably Somalia as well as Cold War rivals, the Soviet Union and United States,all contributed to the multi-party, multi-faceted conflict known as theEthiopian Civil War.

The Derg government underwent power struggles during itsfirst years in office.  General Aman, thenon-Derg who had been named to head the government, immediately came intoconflict with Derg on three major policy issues: First, he wanted to reduce thesize of the 120-member Derg; Second, as an ethnic Eritrean, he was opposed tothe Derg’s use of force against the Eritrean insurgency; and Third, he opposedDerg’s plan to execute the imprisoned civilian and military officialsassociated with the former regime.  InNovember 1974, Derg leveled charges against General Aman and issued a warrantfor his arrest.  On November 23, 1974,General Aman was killed in a gunfight with government security personnel whohad been sent to arrest him.

February 27. 1976 – Western Sahara War: The Polisario Front declares independence

On February 26, 1976, Spainfully withdrew from Spanish Sahara, which henceforth became universally called Western Sahara (although the UN already had referred toit as such by 1975).  As per theagreement, Moroccan forces occupied their designated region (which Morocco soon called its Southern Provinces; alsoin 1979, Morocco wouldinclude the southern zone after Mauritaniawithdrew); and Mauritanian troops occupied Titchla, La Guera, and later Dakhla(as the capital), of its newly designated Saharan province of Tirisal-Gharbiyya.  Then on April 14, 1976,the two countries signed an agreement that formally divided the territory intotheir respective zones of occupation and control.

In the three-month period (November 1975–February 1976)during Spain’s withdrawaland replacement with Moroccan and Mauritanian administrations, tens ofthousands of Sahrawis fled to the Saharan desert, and subsequently into Tindouf, Algeria.  On February 27, 1976, one day after Spain withdrew from the territory, the PolisarioFront declared the founding of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR),with a government-in-exile based in Algeria.

Map showing location of Western Sahara.

(Taken from Western Sahara War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 4)

Background OnDecember 3, 1974, the UNGA passed Resolution 3292 declaring the UN’s interestin evaluating the political aspirations of Sahrawis in the Spanishterritory.  For this purpose, the UNformed the UN Decolonization Committee, which in May – June 1975, carried out afact-finding mission in Spanish Sahara as well as in Morocco,Mauritania, and Algeria.  In its final report to the UN on October 15,1978, the Committee found broad support for annexation among the generalpopulation in Morocco and Mauritania.  In Spanish Sahara,however, the Sahrawi people overwhelmingly supported independence under theleadership of the Polisario Front, while Spain-backed PUNS did not enjoy suchsupport.  In Algeria, the UN Committee foundstrong support for the Sahrawis’ right of self-determination.

Algeriapreviously had shown little interest in the Polisario Front and, in an ArabLeague summit held in October 1974, even backed the territorial ambitions of Morocco and Mauritania.  But by summer of 1975, Algeria was openly defending thePolisario Front’s struggle for independence, a support that later would includemilitary and economic aid and would have a crucial effect in the coming war.

Meanwhile, King Hassan II, the Moroccan monarch (son of KingMohammed V, who had passed away in 1961) actively sought to pursue its claimand asked Spainto postpone holding the referendum; in January 1975, the Spanish governmentgranted the Moroccan request.  In June1975, the Moroccan government pressed the UN to raise the Saharan issue to theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN’s primary judicial agency.  On October 16, 1975, one day after the UNDecolonization Committee report was released, the ICJ issued its decision,which consisted of the following four important points (the court refers toSpanish Sahara as Western Sahara):

1.         At the timeof Spanish colonization, “there were legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco”;

2.         At the timeof Spanish colonization, “there were legal ties between this territory and theMauritanian entity”;

3.         Thereexisted “at the time of Spanish colonization … legal ties of allegiance betweenthe Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara.They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating tothe land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity… and theterritory of Western Sahara”;

4.         The ICJconcluded that the evidences presented “do not establish any tie of territorialsovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Moroccoor the Mauritanian entity. Thus, the Court has not found legal ties of such anature as might affect… the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular,… the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expressionof the will of the peoples of the Territory”.

Far from clarifying the issue, the ICJ’s involvementradicalized the parties involved, as each side focused on that part of thecourt’s decision that vindicated its claims. Morocco and Mauritania cited “legal ties” as supporting their respectiveclaims, while the Polisario Front and Algeria pointed to “do not establish anytie of territorial sovereignty” and “the principle of self-determinationthrough the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of theTerritory” to put forward the Sahrawi peoples’ right of self- government.  Spain’s chances of influencing thepost-colonial Saharan territory began to wane. On September 9, 1975, Spanish foreign minister Pedro Cortina y Mauri andPolisario Front leader El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed met in Algiers,Algeria to negotiate thetransfer of Saharan authority to the Polisario Front in exchange for economicconcessions to Spain,particularly in the phosphate and fishing resources in the region.  Further meetings were held in Mahbes, Spanish Sahara on October 22.  Ultimately, these negotiations did notprosper, as they became sidelined by the accelerating conflict and greaterpressures exerted by the other competing parties.

Shortly after the ICJ decision was released, King Hassan IIannounced that Morocco wouldhold the “Green March”, set for November 6, 1975, and called on Moroccans tomarch to and occupy Spanish Sahara.  On that date, the Green March (the colorgreen symbolizing Islam) was carried out, with some 350,000 Moroccan civilians,protected by 20,000 soldiers, crossed the border from Tarfaya in southernMorocco and occupied some border regions in northern Spanish Sahara.  Under instructions from the Spanish centralgovernment in Madrid,Spanish troops did not resist the incursion. On November 9, the marchers returned to Morocco, on orders of King HassanII who declared the action a success.

On October 31, 1975, six days before the Green March began,units of the Moroccan Army entered Farsia, Haousa and Jdiriya in northeastSaharan territory to deter Algerian intervention.  Spainhad protested the Moroccan action to the UN in a futile attempt to have theinternational body stop the march; instead, the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) passed Resolution 380 that deplored the march and called on Moroccoto withdraw from the territory.

The timing of the escalating crisis could not have come at aworse time for Spain.  In late October 1975, General FranciscoFranco, Spain’sdictator, was terminally ill and soon passed away on November 20, 1975.  In the period before and after his death, Spainunderwent great political uncertainty, as the sudden void left by GeneralFranco, who had ruled for 40 years, threatened to ignite a political powerstruggle.  The tenuous government, nowled by King Juan Carlos as head of state, was unwilling to face a potentiallyruinous war.  World-wide colonialism wasat its twilight– just one year earlier, Portugal, one of the last colonialpowers, had agreed to end its long colonial wars against African nationalistmovements, eventually leading to the independences in 1975 of its Africanpossessions of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea (since 1973), Cape Verde,and São Tomé and Príncipe.

By late October 1975, Spanish officials had begun to holdclandestine meetings in Madrid withrepresentatives from Moroccoand Mauritania.  As a precaution for war, in early November1975, Spaincarried out a forced evacuation of Spanish nationals from the territory.  On November 12, further negotiations wereheld in the Spanish capital, culminating two days later (November 14) in thesigning of the Madrid Accords, where Spain ceded the administration (but notsovereignty) of the territory, with Morocco acquiring the regions of El-Aaiún,Boujdour, and Smara, or the northern two-thirds of the region; while Mauritaniathe Dakhla (formerly Villa Cisneros) region, or the southern third; in exchangefor Spain acquiring 35% of profits from the territory’s phosphate miningindustry as well as off-shore fishing rights. Joint administration by the three parties through an interim government(led by the territory’s Spanish Governor-General) was undertaken in thetransitional period for full transfer to the new Moroccan and Mauritanianauthorities. (The Madrid Accords was not, and also since has not, beenrecognized by the UN, which officially continued to regard Spain as the “dejure”, if not “de facto”, administrative authority over the territory;furthermore, the UN deems the conflict region as occupied territory by Moroccoand, until 1979, also by Mauritania.)

On February 26, 1976, Spainfully withdrew from the territory, which henceforth became universally called Western Sahara (although the UN already had referred toit as such by 1975).  As per theagreement, Moroccan forces occupied their designated region (which Morocco soon called its Southern Provinces; alsoin 1979, Morocco wouldinclude the southern zone after Mauritaniawithdrew); and Mauritanian troops occupied Titchla, La Guera, and later Dakhla(as the capital), of its newly designated Saharan province of Tirisal-Gharbiyya.  Then on April 14, 1976,the two countries signed an agreement that formally divided the territory intotheir respective zones of occupation and control.

In the three-month period (November 1975–February 1976)during Spain’s withdrawaland replacement with Moroccan and Mauritanian administrations, tens ofthousands of Sahrawis fled to the Saharan desert, and subsequently into Tindouf, Algeria.  On February 27, 1976, one day after Spain withdrew from the territory, the PolisarioFront declared the founding of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR),with a government-in-exile based in Algeria.

February 26, 1976 – Spain withdraws from Western Sahara

On February 26, 1976, Spainfully withdrew from Spanish Sahara, which henceforth became universally called Western Sahara (although the UN already had referred toit as such by 1975).  As per theagreement, Moroccan forces occupied their designated region (which Morocco soon called its Southern Provinces; alsoin 1979, Morocco wouldinclude the southern zone after Mauritaniawithdrew); and Mauritanian troops occupied Titchla, La Guera, and later Dakhla(as the capital), of its newly designated Saharan province of Tirisal-Gharbiyya.  Then on April 14, 1976,the two countries signed an agreement that formally divided the territory intotheir respective zones of occupation and control.

In the three-month period (November 1975–February 1976)during Spain’s withdrawaland replacement with Moroccan and Mauritanian administrations, tens ofthousands of Sahrawis fled to the Saharan desert, and subsequently into Tindouf, Algeria.  On February 27, 1976, one day after Spain withdrew from the territory, the PolisarioFront declared the founding of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR),with a government-in-exile based in Algeria.

Map showing location of Western Sahara.

(Taken from Western Sahara War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 4)

Background OnDecember 3, 1974, the UNGA passed Resolution 3292 declaring the UN’s interestin evaluating the political aspirations of Sahrawis in the Spanish territory.  For this purpose, the UN formed the UNDecolonization Committee, which in May – June 1975, carried out a fact-findingmission in Spanish Sahara as well as in Morocco,Mauritania, and Algeria.  In its final report to the UN on October 15,1978, the Committee found broad support for annexation among the generalpopulation in Morocco and Mauritania.  In Spanish Sahara,however, the Sahrawi people overwhelmingly supported independence under theleadership of the Polisario Front, while Spain-backed PUNS did not enjoy suchsupport.  In Algeria, the UN Committee foundstrong support for the Sahrawis’ right of self-determination.

Algeriapreviously had shown little interest in the Polisario Front and, in an ArabLeague summit held in October 1974, even backed the territorial ambitions of Morocco and Mauritania.  But by summer of 1975, Algeria wasopenly defending the Polisario Front’s struggle for independence, a supportthat later would include military and economic aid and would have a crucialeffect in the coming war.

Meanwhile, King Hassan II, the Moroccan monarch (son of KingMohammed V, who had passed away in 1961) actively sought to pursue its claimand asked Spainto postpone holding the referendum; in January 1975, the Spanish governmentgranted the Moroccan request.  In June1975, the Moroccan government pressed the UN to raise the Saharan issue to theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN’s primary judicial agency.  On October 16, 1975, one day after the UNDecolonization Committee report was released, the ICJ issued its decision,which consisted of the following four important points (the court refers toSpanish Sahara as Western Sahara):

1.         At the timeof Spanish colonization, “there were legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco”;

2.         At the timeof Spanish colonization, “there were legal ties between this territory and theMauritanian entity”;

3.         Thereexisted “at the time of Spanish colonization … legal ties of allegiance betweenthe Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara.They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating tothe land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity… and theterritory of Western Sahara”;

4.         The ICJconcluded that the evidences presented “do not establish any tie of territorialsovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Moroccoor the Mauritanian entity. Thus, the Court has not found legal ties of such anature as might affect… the decolonization of Western Sahara and, inparticular, … the principle of self-determination through the free and genuineexpression of the will of the peoples of the Territory”.

Far from clarifying the issue, the ICJ’s involvementradicalized the parties involved, as each side focused on that part of thecourt’s decision that vindicated its claims. Morocco and Mauritania cited “legal ties” as supporting their respectiveclaims, while the Polisario Front and Algeria pointed to “do not establish anytie of territorial sovereignty” and “the principle of self-determinationthrough the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of theTerritory” to put forward the Sahrawi peoples’ right of self- government.  Spain’s chances of influencing thepost-colonial Saharan territory began to wane. On September 9, 1975, Spanish foreign minister Pedro Cortina y Mauri andPolisario Front leader El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed met in Algiers,Algeria to negotiate thetransfer of Saharan authority to the Polisario Front in exchange for economicconcessions to Spain,particularly in the phosphate and fishing resources in the region.  Further meetings were held in Mahbes, Spanish Sahara on October 22.  Ultimately, these negotiations did notprosper, as they became sidelined by the accelerating conflict and greaterpressures exerted by the other competing parties.

Shortly after the ICJ decision was released, King Hassan IIannounced that Morocco wouldhold the “Green March”, set for November 6, 1975, and called on Moroccans tomarch to and occupy Spanish Sahara.  On that date, the Green March (the colorgreen symbolizing Islam) was carried out, with some 350,000 Moroccan civilians,protected by 20,000 soldiers, crossed the border from Tarfaya in southernMorocco and occupied some border regions in northern Spanish Sahara.  Under instructions from the Spanish centralgovernment in Madrid,Spanish troops did not resist the incursion. On November 9, the marchers returned to Morocco, on orders of King HassanII who declared the action a success.

On October 31, 1975, six days before the Green March began,units of the Moroccan Army entered Farsia, Haousa and Jdiriya in northeastSaharan territory to deter Algerian intervention.  Spainhad protested the Moroccan action to the UN in a futile attempt to have theinternational body stop the march; instead, the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) passed Resolution 380 that deplored the march and called on Morocco towithdraw from the territory.

The timing of the escalating crisis could not have come at aworse time for Spain.  In late October 1975, General FranciscoFranco, Spain’sdictator, was terminally ill and soon passed away on November 20, 1975.  In the period before and after his death, Spain underwentgreat political uncertainty, as the sudden void left by General Franco, who hadruled for 40 years, threatened to ignite a political power struggle.  The tenuous government, now led by King JuanCarlos as head of state, was unwilling to face a potentially ruinous war.  World-wide colonialism was at its twilight–just one year earlier, Portugal, one of the last colonial powers, had agreed toend its long colonial wars against African nationalist movements, eventuallyleading to the independences in 1975 of its African possessions of Angola, Mozambique,Portuguese Guinea (since 1973), Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

By late October 1975, Spanish officials had begun to holdclandestine meetings in Madrid withrepresentatives from Moroccoand Mauritania.  As a precaution for war, in early November1975, Spaincarried out a forced evacuation of Spanish nationals from the territory.  On November 12, further negotiations wereheld in the Spanish capital, culminating two days later (November 14) in thesigning of the Madrid Accords, where Spain ceded the administration (but notsovereignty) of the territory, with Morocco acquiring the regions of El-Aaiún,Boujdour, and Smara, or the northern two-thirds of the region; while Mauritaniathe Dakhla (formerly Villa Cisneros) region, or the southern third; in exchangefor Spain acquiring 35% of profits from the territory’s phosphate miningindustry as well as off-shore fishing rights. Joint administration by the three parties through an interim government(led by the territory’s Spanish Governor-General) was undertaken in thetransitional period for full transfer to the new Moroccan and Mauritanianauthorities. (The Madrid Accords was not, and also since has not, beenrecognized by the UN, which officially continued to regard Spain as the “dejure”, if not “de facto”, administrative authority over the territory;furthermore, the UN deems the conflict region as occupied territory by Moroccoand, until 1979, also by Mauritania.)

On February 26, 1976, Spainfully withdrew from the territory, which henceforth became universally called Western Sahara (although the UN already had referred toit as such by 1975).  As per theagreement, Moroccan forces occupied their designated region (which Morocco soon called its Southern Provinces; alsoin 1979, Morocco would includethe southern zone after Mauritaniawithdrew); and Mauritanian troops occupied Titchla, La Guera, and later Dakhla(as the capital), of its newly designated Saharan province of Tirisal-Gharbiyya.  Then on April 14, 1976,the two countries signed an agreement that formally divided the territory intotheir respective zones of occupation and control.

In the three-month period (November 1975–February 1976)during Spain’s withdrawaland replacement with Moroccan and Mauritanian administrations, tens of thousandsof Sahrawis fled to the Saharan desert, and subsequently into Tindouf, Algeria.  On February 27, 1976, one day after Spain withdrew from the territory, the PolisarioFront declared the founding of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR),with a government-in-exile based in Algeria.

February 25, 1991 – Gulf War: An Iraqi missile attack kills 28 American soldiers

During the Gulf War, Iraqfired Scud missiles into Saudi Arabia, the deadliest occurring on February25, 1991 when a missile struck a U.S. Army barracks in Dhahran, killing 28American soldiers and wounding 100 others. During the war, Iraqfired a total of 88 Scud missiles, 46 against Saudi Arabia and 42 against Israel.  The missile attacks on Israel alsocaused a number of casualties, but were generally ineffective because of theprojectiles’ reduced accuracy resulting from the great distances involved.

The U.S. Air Force increased its efforts to find the Iraqimobile Scud launchers inside Iraq,at its peak allocating 40% of its resources to so-called “Scud hunts”.  American and British Special Forces teamsalso were inserted inside Iraqto locate missile sites for destruction by coalition aircraft.  Soon, however, the U.S. military high command admitteddifficulty finding the mobile Scud launchers, which evaded radar detection byseeking cover under man-made and natural protective formations; GeneralSchwarzkopf likened the task of locating a mobile Scud launcher to “finding aneedle in a haystack”.  The Scud attackscontinued, and post-war findings showed that much of Iraq’s Scud capabilities remainedformidable.  Because of the Scud attacksas well as Iraqi artillery fire on coalition troops on the Saudi border, theAllied high command decided to launch the ground offensive.

Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the Middle East.

(Taken from Gulf War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 4)

Background  On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait(previous article), overthrew the ruling monarchy and seizing control of theoil-rich country.  A “Provisional Governmentof Free Kuwait” was established, and two days later, August 4, the Iraqigovernment, led by Saddam Hussein, declared Kuwait a republic.  On August 8, Saddam changed his mind andannexed Kuwait as a“governorate”, declaring it Iraq’s19th province.

Jaber III, Kuwait’sdeposed emir who had fled to neighboring Saudi Arabia in the midst of theinvasion, appealed to the international community.  On August 3, 1990, the United NationsSecurity Council (UNSC) issued Resolution 660, the first of many resolutionsagainst Iraq, whichcondemned the invasion and demanded that Saddam withdraw his forces from Kuwait.  Three days later, August 6, the UNSC releasedResolution 661 that imposed economic sanctions against Iraq, which wascarried out through a naval blockade authorized under UNSC Resolution 665.  Continued Iraqi defiance subsequently wouldcompel the UNSC to issue Resolution 678 on November 29, 1990 that set thedeadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait on or before January 15, 1991 as wellas authorized UN member states to enforce the withdrawal if necessary, eventhrough the use of force.  The ArabLeague, the main regional organization, also condemned the invasion, although Jordan, Sudan,Yemen, and the PalestineLiberation Organization (PLO) continued to support Iraq.

Iraq’sannexation of Kuwait upsetthe political, military, and economic dynamics in the Persian Gulf region, andby possessing the world’s fourth largest armed forces, Iraq now posed a direct threat to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The United Statesannounced that intelligence information detected a build-up of Iraqi forces in Kuwait’s southern border with Saudi Arabia.  Saddam, however, declared that Iraq had no intention of invading Saudi Arabia, aposition he would maintain in response to allegations of his territorialambitions.

Meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney whoarrived in Saudi Arabiashortly after Iraq’sinvasion of Kuwait, SaudiKing Fahd requested U.S.military protection.  U.S. PresidentGeorge H.W. Bush accepted the invitation, as doing so would not only defend animportant regional ally, but prevent Saddam from gaining control of the oilfields of Saudi Arabia,the world’s largest petroleum producer. With its conquest of Kuwait,Iraq now held 20% of the world’soil supply, but annexing Saudi Arabia would allow Saddam to control 50% ofthe global oil reserves.  By September18, 1990, the U.S.government announced that the Iraqi Army was massed in southern Kuwait,containing a force of 360,000 troops and 2,800 tanks.

U.S.military deployment to Saudi Arabia,codenamed Operation Desert Shield, was swift; on August 8, just six days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,American air and naval forces, led by two aircraft carriers and twobattleships, had arrived in the Persian Gulf.  Over the next few months, Iraq offered theUnited States a number of proposals to resolve the crisis, including that Iraqiforces would be withdrawn from Kuwait on the condition that Israel alsowithdrew its troops from occupied regions in Palestine (West Bank, Gaza Strip),Syria (Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon. The United Statesrefused to negotiate, however, stating that Iraq must withdraw its troops asper the UNSC resolutions before any talk of resolving other Middle Easternissues would be discussed.  On January 9,1991, as the UN-imposed deadline of January 15, 1991 approached, U.S. Secretaryof State James Baker and Iraq’sForeign Minister Tariq Aziz held last-minute talks in GenevaSwitzerland(called the Geneva Peace Conference). But the two sides refused to tone down their hard-line positions,leading to the breakdown of talks and the imminent outbreak of war.

Because Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest sites, were located in Saudi Arabia, King Fahd received strong localand international criticism from other Muslim states for allowing U.S. troopsinto his country.  At the urging of KingFahd, the United States organized a multinational coalition consisting of armedand civilian contingents from 34 countries which, apart from Saudi Arabia andKuwait’s (exiled forces), also included other Arab and Muslim countries (Egypt,Syria, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Turkey, Morocco,Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). A force of about 960,000 troops was assembled, with U.S. soldiers accounting for 700,000 or about70% of the total; Britainand Francealso sent sizable contingents, some 53,000 and 18,000 respectively, as well aslarge amounts of military equipment and supplies.

In talks with Saudi officials, the United States stated that the Saudi governmentmust pay for the greater portion of the cost for the coalition force, as thelatter was tasked specifically to protect Saudi Arabia.  In the coming war, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, andother Gulf states contributed about $36 billion of the $61 billion coalitiontotal war cost; as well, Germany and Japan contributed a combined $16 billion,although these two countries, prohibited by their constitutions from sendingarmies abroad, were not a combat part of the coalition force.

President Bush overcame the last major obstacle toimplementing UNSC Resolution 678 – the U.S. Congress.  The U.S. Senate and House of Representativeswere held by a majority from the opposition Democratic Party, which was opposedto the Bush administration’s war option and instead believed that the UNSC’seconomic sanctions against Iraq, yet barely two months in force, must be giventime to work.  On January 12, 1991, acongressional joint resolution that authorized war, as per President Bush’srequest, was passed by the House of Representatives by a vote of 250-183 andSenate by a vote of 52-47.

One major factor for U.S. Congress’ approval for war werenews reports of widespread atrocities and human rights violations beingcommitted by Iraq’soccupation forces against Kuwaiti civilians, particularly against members ofthe clandestine Kuwaiti resistance movement that had arisen as a result of theoccupation.  Some of the moreoutrage-provoking accounts, including allegations that Iraqi soldiers pulledhundreds of new-born infants from incubators and then left to die on thehospital floors, have since been determined to be untrue.

Iraq’s programs for developing nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons were also cause for grave concern to Western countries, particularlysince during the Iran-Iraq War (that ended just three years earlier, in August1988), Saddam did not hesitate to use chemical weapons, dropping bombs andfiring artillery containing projectiles laced with nerve agents, cyanide, andsarin against Iranian military and civilian targets, and even against his ownpeople, i.e. Iraq Kurds who had risen up in rebellion and sided with Iran inthe war.

February 24, 1968 – Vietnam War: U.S. forces recapture Hue

At Hue, in central Vietnam, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces of the Tet Offensive, who had seized large sections of the city, were ordered to remain and defend their positions.  A 28-day battle ensued, with U.S. forces, supported by naval and ground artillery and air support, advancing slowly and engaging the enemy in intense house-to-house battles.  By late February 1968 when the last North Vietnamese/Viet Cong units had been driven out of Hue, some 80% of the city had been destroyed, 5,000 civilians killed, and over 100,000 people left homeless.  Combat fatalities at the Battle of Hue were 700 American/South Vietnamese and 8,000 North Vietnamese/Viet Cong soldiers.

Map showing North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and other countries in Southeast Asia.

(Taken from Vietnam War – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia)

Tet Offensive Inearly 1967, North Vietnambegan preparing for a massive offensive into South Vietnam.  This operation, which later came to be knownas the Tet Offensive, would have far-reaching consequences on the outcome ofthe war.  The North Vietnamese plan tolaunch the Tet Offensive came about when political hardliners in Hanoi succeeded insidelining the moderates in government. As a result of the hardliners dictatinggovernment policies, in July 1967, hundreds of moderates, including governmentofficials and military officers, were purged from the Hanoi government and the Vietnamese CommunistParty.

By fall of 1967, North Vietnamese military planners had setthe date to launch the Tet Offensive on January 31, 1968.  In the invasion plan, the Viet Cong was tocarry out the offensive, with North Vietnam only providing weapons and othermaterial support.  The Tet Offensive,which was known in North Vietnamas “General Offensive, General Uprising”, called for the Viet Cong to launchsimultaneous attacks on many targets across South Vietnam, which would beaccompanied with calls to the civilian population to launch a generaluprising.  North Vietnam believed that acivilian uprising in the south would succeed because of President Thieu’sunpopularity, as evidenced by the constant civil unrest and widespreadcriticism of government policies.  Inthis scenario, once President Thieu was overthrown, an NLF-led communistgovernment would succeed in power, and pressure the United States to end its involvement in South Vietnam.  Faced with the threat of internationalcondemnation, the United Stateswould be forced to acquiesce, and withdraw its forces from Vietnam.

As part of its general strategy for the Tet Offensive, North Vietnamincreased its military activity along the border region.  In the last months of 1967, the NorthVietnamese military launched attacks across the border, including in Song Be,Loc Ninh, and Dak To in order to lure U.S. forces away from the mainurban areas.  These diversionary attackssucceeded, as large numbers of U.S.troops were moved to the border areas.

In a series of clashes known as the “Border Battles”,American and South Vietnamese forces easily threw back these North Vietnameseattacks, inflicting heavy North Vietnamese casualties.  However, U.S.military planners were baffled at North Vietnam’s intentions, asthese attacks appeared to be a waste of soldiers and resources in the face ofoverwhelming American firepower.

But the North Vietnamese had succeeded in drawing away thebulk of U.S.forces from the populated centers.  Bythe start of the Tet Offensive, half of all U.S. combat troops were in I Corpsto confront what the Americans believed was an imminent major North Vietnameseinvasion into the northern provinces.  U.S. militaryintelligence had detected the build ups of Viet Cong forces in the south andthe North Vietnamese in the north.  Butthe U.S.high command, including General Westmoreland, did not believe that the VietCong had the capacity to mount a large offensive like that which actuallyoccurred in the Tet Offensive.

Following some attacks one day earlier (January 30), onJanuary 31, 1968 (which was the Vietnamese New Year or Tet, when a truce was traditionallyobserved), some 80,000 Viet Cong fighters, supported by some North VietnameseArmy units, launched coordinated attacks in Saigon, in 36 of the 44 provincialcapitals, and in over 100 other towns across South Vietnam.  In Saigon,many public and military infrastructures were hit, including the governmentradio station where the Viet Cong/NLF tried but failed to broadcast apre-recorded message from Ho Chi Minh calling on the civilian population torise up in rebellion (electric power to the radio station was cut immediatelyafter the attack).  A Viet Cong attemptto seize the U.S. Embassy in Saigon alsofailed.

Taken by surprise, South Vietnamese and American forcesquickly assembled a defense, and then soon counterattacked.  Crucially, U.S.forces that had been sent to the Cambodian border returned to Saigonjust before the start of the Tet Offensive.

Viet Cong units occupied large sections of Saigon, but afterbitter street-by-street, house-to-house fighting, South Vietnamese and U.S. forces soongained the upper hand.  South Vietnameseforces also mounted successful defenses in other parts of the country.  In early February 1968, the Viet Congleadership ordered a general retreat. The rebels, now suffering heavy human and material losses, withdrew fromthe cities and towns.

At Hue,the ancestral capital, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attackers, who hadseized large sections of the city, were ordered to stay and defend theirpositions.  A 28-day battle ensued, with U.S. forces,supported by naval and ground artillery and air support, advancing slowly andengaging the enemy in intense house-to-house battles.  By late February 1968 when the last NorthVietnamese/Viet Cong units had been driven out of Hue, some 80% of the city hadbeen destroyed, 5,000 civilians killed, and over 100,000 people lefthomeless.  Combat fatalities at theBattle of Hue were 700 American/South Vietnamese and 8,000 NorthVietnamese/Viet Cong soldiers.

While the Tet Offensive was ongoing, General Westmorelandcontinued to believe that the Tet Offensive was a diversion for a major NorthVietnamese attack in the north, particularly on the Khe Sanh American combatbase, in preparation for a full invasion of South Vietnam’s northern provinces. Thus, he sent back only few combat troops already committed to defendthe towns and cities.  After the war,North Vietnamese officials have since insisted that the Tet Offensive was theirmain objective, and that their attack on Khe Sanh was merely a diversion todraw away U.S.forces from the Tet Offensive.  Somehistorians also postulate that North Vietnam planned no diversion at all, butthat its purpose was to launch both the Khe Sanh and Tet offensives.

Based on the second scenario, North Vietnam planned the siege at Khe Sanh as a repetition ofits successful 1954 siege of the French base at Dien Bien Phu.  A North Vietnamesevictory at Khe Sanh would have the Americans meet the same fate as the Frenchat Dien Bien Phu.  Conversely, the U.S. military wanted Khe Sanh to bea major showdown with the North Vietnamese Army, where overwhelming Americanfirepower would be brought to bear in battle and inflict serious losses on theenemy.

The siege on Khe Sanh began on January 21, 1968 (ten daysbefore the Tet Offensive), when 20,000 North Vietnamese troops, after manymonths of logistical buildup and moving heavy artillery into the heightssurrounding Khe Sanh, began a barrage of artillery, mortar, and rocket fireinto the Khe Sanh combat base, which was defended by 6,000 U.S. Marines and someelite South Vietnamese troops.  Another20,000 North Vietnamese troops served as reinforcements and also cut off roadaccess to Khe Sanh, sealing off, and thus surrounding, the base.  The 77-day battle featured 1. artillery duelsby both sides; 2. Khe Sanh being supplied solely by air; 3. North Vietnameseprobing attacks on the Khe Sanh base; and 4. North Vietnamese assaults todislodge U.S. Marines outposts situated on a number of nearby strategic hills.

In early April 1968, the Siege of Khe Sanh ended, with U.S. airfirepower being the decisive factor.  Bythen, American B-52 bombers had dropped some 100,000 tons of bombs (equivalentto five Hiroshima-size atomic bombs), which wreaked havoc on North Vietnamesepositions.  U.S.bombing also destroyed the extensive network of trenches which the NorthVietnamese were building to inch ever closer to U.S. positions.  The North Vietnamese planned to use thetrenches as a springboard for their final assault on Khe Sanh.  (The Viet Minh had used this tactic to overrunthe Dien Bien Phu base in 1954.)  NorthVietnamese forces retreated to Laosand North Vietnam.  Combat fatalities during the siege of KheSanh included 270 Americans, 200 South Vietnamese, and 10,000 North Vietnamesesoldiers.

February 23, 1994 – Bosnian War: Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats form a unified government

In early 1994, with another Bosnian Serb general offensivelooming, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats found common ground.  With the urging of the United States, on February 23, 1994, Bosniaksand Bosnian Croats formed a unified government under the “Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina”.  The Bosnian War shifted to fighting betweenthe combined Bosniak-Bosnian Croat forces against the Bosnian Serb Army.

In early 1994, Bosnian Serb forces laid siege to Sarajevo, Bosnia’scapital, relentlessly pounding the city with heavy artillery and inflictingheavy civilian casualties.  The siege ofthe capital drew international condemnation, with the United Nations (UN) andthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) becoming increasingly involved inthe war.  NATO declaredBosnia-Herzegovina a no-fly zone.  OnFebruary 28, 1994, NATO warplanes downed four Serbian aircraft over Banja Luka.

Under a UN threat of a NATO airstrike, Bosnian Serbs wereforced to lift the siege on Maglaj; supply convoys thus were able to reach thecity by land, the first time in nearly ten months.  In April 1994, NATO warplanes attackedBosnian Serb forces that were threatening a UN-protected area in Gorazde.  Later that month, a Danish contingent of theUN forces engaged Bosnian Serb Army units in the village of Kalesija.  The NATO air strikes, which greatlycontributed to ending the war, were conducted in coordination with the UNhumanitarian and peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yugoslavia comprised six republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Macedonia, and two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

(Taken from Bosnian War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 1)

Bosnia-Herzegovina has three main ethnic groups: Bosniaks(Bosnian Muslims), comprising 44% of the population, Bosnian Serbs, with 32%,and Bosnian Croats, with 17%.  Slovenia and Croatia declared theirindependences in June 1991.  On October15, 1991, the Bosnian parliament declared the independence ofBosnia-Herzegovina, with Bosnian Serb delegates boycotting the session inprotest.  Then acting on a request fromboth the Bosnian parliament and the Bosnian Serb leadership, a EuropeanEconomic Community arbitration commission gave its opinion, on January 11,1992, that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence cannot be recognized, since noreferendum on independence had taken place.

Bosnian Serbs formed a majority in Bosnia’snorthern regions.  On January 5, 1992,Bosnian Serbs seceded from Bosnia-Herzegovina and established their owncountry.  Bosnian Croats, who also compriseda sizable minority, had earlier (on November 18, 1991) seceded fromBosnia-Herzegovina by declaring their own independence.  Bosnia-Herzegovina, therefore, fragmentedinto three republics, formed along ethnic lines.

Furthermore, in March 1991, Serbia and Croatia, two Yugoslavconstituent republics located on either side of Bosnia-Herzegovina, secretlyagreed to annex portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina that contained a majoritypopulation of ethnic Serbians and ethnic Croatians.  This agreement, later re-affirmed by Serbiansand Croatians in a second meeting in May 1992, was intended to avoid armedconflict between them.  By this time,heightened tensions among the three ethnic groups were leading to openhostilities.

Mediators from Britainand Portugalmade a final attempt to avert war, eventually succeeding in convincingBosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats to agree to share political powerin a decentralized government.  Just tendays later, however, the Bosnian government reversed its decision and rejectedthe agreement after taking issue with some of its provisions.

February 22, 1999 – Ethiopian-Eritrean War: Ethiopian forces launch a major offensive into Eritrea

On February 22, 1999, the Ethiopian Army, supported by air,armored, and artillery units, launched a major offensive in the easternfront.  Five days later, the Ethiopianshad broken through and captured the Badme area, and had advanced 10 kilometersinto Eritrea.  The Eritrean government then announced thatit was ready to accept the OAU peace plan, but Ethiopia, which earlier had alsoagreed to the proposal, now demanded that Eritrea withdraw all its forces fromEthiopian territory before the plan could be implemented.

Ethiopia, Eritrean, and nearby countries.

(Taken from Ethiopian-Eritrean War – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 4)

Background In themidst of Eritrea’sindependence war, in 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed in a militarycoup and a council of army officers called “Derg” came to power.  The Derg regime experienced great politicalupheavals initially arising from internal power struggles, as well as theEritrean insurgency and other ethnic-based armed rebellions; in 1977-78, theDerg also was involved in a war with neighboring Somalia (the Ogaden War, separatearticle).

By the early 1990s, the Ethiopian People’s RevolutionaryDemocratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of Ethiopian rebel groups, had formed amilitary alliance with the EPLF and separately accelerated their insurgenciesagainst the Derg regime.  In May 1991, theEPRDF toppled the Derg regime, while the EPLF seized control of Eritrea bydefeating and expelling Ethiopian government forces.  Both the EPRDF and EPLF then gained power in Ethiopia and Eritrea, respectively, with theserebel movements transitioning into political parties.  Under a UN-facilitated process and with theEthiopian government’s approval, Eritreaofficially seceded from Ethiopiaand, following a referendum where nearly 100% of Eritreans voted forindependence, achieved statehood as a fully sovereign state.

Because of their war-time military alliance, the governmentsof Ethiopia and Eritrea maintained a close relationship and signed an Agreementof Friendship of Cooperation that envisioned a comprehensive package ofmutually beneficial political, economic, and social joint endeavors; subsequenttreaties were made in the hope of integrating the two countries in a broadrange of other fields.

Both states nominally were democracies but with strongauthoritarian leaders, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia and President Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea. Stateand political structures differed, however, with Ethiopiaestablishing an ethnic-based multi-party federal parliamentary system and Eritrea settingup a staunchly nationalistic, one-party unitary system.  Eritreaalso maintained a strong militaristic culture, acquired from its longindependence struggle, for which in the years after gaining independence, itcame into conflict with its neighbors, i.e. Yemen,Djibouti, and Sudan.

Ethiopian-Eritrean relations soon also deteriorated as a resultof political differences, as well as the personal rivalry between the twocountries’ leaders.  Furthermore, duringtheir revolutionary struggles, the Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel groupssometimes came into direct conflict over projecting power and controllingterritory, which was overcome only by their mutual need to defeat a commonenemy.  In the post-war period, thisacrimonious historical past now took on greater significance.  Relations turned for the worse when inNovember 1997, Eritreaintroduced its own currency, the “nakfa” (which replaced the Ethiopian birr),in order to steer its own independent local and foreign economic and tradepolicies.  During the post-war period,trade between Ethiopia and Eritrea was significant, and Eritrea gave special privileges to the nowlandlocked Ethiopia to usethe port of Assab for Ethiopian maritime trade.  But with Eritreaintroducing its own currency, Ethiopiabanned the use of the nakfa in all but the smallest transactions, causing tradebetween the two states to plummet. Trucks carrying goods soon were backed up at the border crossings andthe two sides now saw the need to delineate the as yet unmarked border tocontrol cross-border trade.

Meanwhile, disputes in the frontier region in and around thetown of Badmehad experienced a steady increase.  Asearly as 1992, Eritrean regional officials complained that Ethiopian armedbands descended on Eritrean villages, and expelled Eritrean residents anddestroyed their homes.  In July 1994,regional Ethiopian and Eritrean representatives met to discuss the matter, butharassments, expulsions, and arrests of Eritreans continued to be reported in1994-1996.  Then in April 1994, theEritrean government became aware that Ethiopia had carried out a numberof demarcations along the Badme area, prompting an exchange of letters by PrimeMinister Zenawi and President Afwerki. In November 1994, a joint panel was set up by the two sides to try andresolve the matter; however, this effort made no substantial progress.  In the midst of the Badme affair, anothercrisis broke out in July-August 1997 where Ethiopian troops entered anotherundemarcated frontier area in pursuit of the insurgent group ARDUF (AfarRevolutionary Democratic Unity Front or Afar Revolutionary Democratic UnionFront); then when Ethiopia set up a local administration in the area, Eritreaprotested, leading to firefights between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

Another source of friction between the two countries wasgenerated when, starting in 1993, the regional administration in TigrayProvince (in northern Ethiopia) published “administrative and fiscal” maps ofTigray that included the Badme area and a number of Eritrean villages that laybeyond the 1902 colonial-era and de facto “border” line.  Since the 1950s, Tigray had administered thisarea and had established settlements there. In turn, Eritreadeclared that the area had been encroached as it formed part of the EritreanGash-Barka region.

Badme, a 160-square mile area that became the trigger forthe coming war, was located in the wider Badme plains, the latter forming asection of the vast semi-desert lowlands adjoining the Ethiopian mountains andstretching west to the Sudan.  During the early 20th century when theEthiopian-Italian border treaties were made, Badme was virtually uninhabited,save for the local endemic Kunama tribal people.  The 1902 treaty, which became the de factoborder between the Ethiopian Empire and Italian Eritrea in the western andcentral regions, stipulated that the border, heading from west to east, ranstarting from Khor Um Hagger in the Sudanese border, followed the Tekezze(Setit) River to its confluence with the Maieteb River, at which point it ran astraight line north to where the Mareb River converges with the Ambessa River(Figure 32).  Thereafter, the borderfollowed a general eastward direction along the Mareb, through the smaller Melessa River,and finally along the Muna River.  In turn, the 1908 treaty specified that theborder along the eastern regions would follow the outlines of the Red Sea coastline from a distance of 60 kilometersinland.  These treaties have since beenupheld by successive Ethiopian governments, whose maps have followed thetreaties’ delineations to form a border that is otherwise unmarked on theground.

February 15, 1979 – Sino-Vietnamese War: China announces its plan to attack Vietnam

By February 1979, 30 divisions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, China’s armed forces) were massed along the China-Vietnam border.  On February 15, 1979, China announced its plan to attack Vietnam.  Also on that day, China’s 1950 “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance” with the Soviet Union ended, thus freeing China from its obligation to pursue non-aggression against a Soviet ally.  Because of the threat of Soviet intervention from the north, on February 16, Chinese authorities declared that it was also prepared to go to war with the Soviet Union.  By this time, the bulk of Chinese forces (some 1.5 million troops) were concentrated along the northern border with the Soviet Union, while 300,000 Chinese civilians in these border regions were evacuated.

On February 17, 1979, some 200,000 PLA troops, supported byarmor and artillery, attacked along two fronts across the 1,300-kilometerChina-Vietnam border.  China officially announced that its offensivewas a “self-defense counterattack” to “teach Hanoi a lesson”. The Sino-Vietnamese War hadbegun.

(Taken from Sino-Vietnamese War – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia)

Background Inlate December 1978, Vietnaminvaded Cambodia,and within two weeks, its forces toppled the Khmer Rouge government, and set upa new Cambodian government that was allied with itself (previous article).  The Khmer Rouge had been an ally of China, and as aresult, Chinese-Vietnamese relations deteriorated.  In fact, relations between China and Vietnam had been declining in theyears prior to the invasion.

During the Vietnam War (separate article), North Vietnam received vital military andeconomic support from China,and also from the Soviet Union.  But as Chinese-Soviet relations had been decliningsince the early 1960s (with both countries nearly going to war in 1969), NorthVietnam was forced to maintain a delicate balance in its relations between itstwo patrons in order to continue receiving badly needed weapons and funds.  But after the communist victory in April1975, the reunified Vietnamhad a gradual falling out with Chinaover two issues: the persecution of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, and adisputed border.

Following the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese central governmentin Hanoi launched a campaign to break down thefree-market economic system in the former South Vietnam to bring it in linewith the country’s centrally planned socialist economy.  Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam (called Hoa), whocontrolled the South’s economy, were subject to severe economic measures.  Many Hoa were forced to close down theirbusinesses, and their assets and properties were seized by the government.  Vietnamese citizenship to the Hoa was alsovoided.  The government also forced tensof thousands of Hoa into so-called “New Economic Zones”, which were located inremote mountainous regions.  There, theyworked as peasant farmers under harsh conditions.  The Hoa also were suspected by the governmentof plotting or carrying out subversive activities in the North.

As a result of these repressions, hundreds of thousands ofHoa (as well as other persecuted ethnic minority groups) fled the country.  The Hoa who lived in the North crossedoverland into China, whilethose in the South went on perilous journeys by sea using only small boatsacross the South China Sea for Southeast Asiancountries.  Vietnamalso initially refused to allow Chinese ships that were sent by the Beijing government to repatriate the Hoa back to China.  The Hanoigovernment also denied that the persecution of Hoa was taking place.  Then when the Hanoi government allowed the Hoa to leave thecountry, it imposed exorbitant fees before granting exit visas.  Furthermore, North Vietnamese troops in thenorthern Vietnamese frontier regions forced ethnic Chinese who lived there torelocate to the Chinese side of the China-Vietnam border.

Vietnamand China also had a numberof long-standing territorial disputes, including over a piece of land with anarea of 60 km2, but primarily in the Gulfof Tonkin, and in the Spratly and Paracel Islandsin the South China Sea.  The dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands became even more pronouncedafter it was speculated that the surrounding waters potentially contained largequantities of petroleum resources.

The Vietnamese also generally distrusted the Chinese forhistorical reasons.  The ancient Chineseemperors had long viewed Vietnamas an integral part of China,and brought the Vietnamese under direct Chinese rule for over a millennium (111B.C.–938 A.D.).  Then during the VietnamWar, the Vietnamese accepted Chinese military support with some skepticism, andlater claimed that Chinaprovided aid in order to bring Vietnamunder the Chinese sphere of influence. Furthermore, China’simproving relations with the United Statesfollowing U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijingin 1972 also was viewed by North Vietnam as a betrayal to its reunificationstruggle during the Vietnam War.  In May1978, with Cambodian-Vietnamese relations almost at the breaking point, China cut back on economic aid to Vietnam; withintwo months, it was ended completely. Also in 1978, Chinaclosed off its side of the Chinese-Vietnamese land border.

Meanwhile, just as its ties with Chinawere breaking down, Vietnamwas strengthening its relations with the Soviet Union.  In 1975, the Soviets provided large financialassistance to Vietnam’spost-war reconstruction and five-year development program.  Two events in 1978 brought Vietnam firmlyunder the Soviet sphere of influence: in June, Vietnam became a member of theSoviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and in November,Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation”,a mutual defense pact that stipulated Soviet military and economic support toVietnam in exchange for the Vietnamese allowing the Soviets to use air andnaval facilities in Vietnam.  The treatyalso formalized the Soviet and Chinese domains in Indochina, with Vietnam aligned with the Soviet Union, and Cambodia aligned with China.

China nowsaw itself surrounded by the Soviet Union to the north and Vietnam to thesouth.  But Vietnamalso saw itself threatened by hostile forces in the north (China) and southwest (Cambodia).  Vietnamthen made its move in late December 1978, when it invaded Cambodia andconquered the country in a lightning offensive. Chinese authorities were infuriated, as their ally, the Khmer Rougeregime, had been toppled by the Vietnamese invasion.  Since one year earlier (1978), tensionsbetween China and Vietnam hadbeen rising, causing many incidents of armed clashes and cross-borderraids.  In January 1979, the Hanoi government accused China of causing over 200violations of Vietnamese territory.

By February 1979, 30 divisions of the People’s LiberationArmy, or PLA (China’sarmed forces) were massed along the border. On February 15, 1979, Chinaannounced its plan to attack Vietnam.  Also on that day, China’s1950 “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and MutualAssistance” with the Soviet Union ended, thus freeing China from itsobligation to pursue non-aggression against a Soviet ally.  Because of the threat of Soviet interventionfrom the north, on February 16, Chinese authorities declared that it was alsoprepared to go to war with the Soviet Union.  By this time, the bulk of Chinese forces(some 1.5 million troops) were concentrated along the northern border, while300,000 Chinese civilians in these border regions were evacuated.