Douglas A. Macgregor's Blog, page 6

US clears $3.2 billion in missiles for Germany

WASHINGTON — The US State Department today gave the greenlight for a massive $3.2 billion missile deal with Germany.

The deal could see RTX sell Berlin 173 Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block 1 missiles, 577 Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) Block III missiles as well as associated launchers, related equipment and US contractor logistical support.

“The proposed sale will improve Germany’s capability to meet current and future threats by providing integrated air and missile defense capabilities deployable from their future Aegis Weapon System equipped F127 class surface combatants, bolstering Germany’s capacity to present a credible deterrence to regional strategic competitors,” a notice posted on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s website says.

“The proposed sale will also improve Germany’s ability to operate alongside U.S. and Allied naval forces in facing a full spectrum of maritime threats. Germany will have no difficulty absorbing these missiles into its armed forces.”

Last year, the German government gave the official greenlight to the F127 frigate program, which German shipbuilder TKMS said was the “next generation of sea-based air defense.”

RTX describes the SM-6 as “three missiles in one,” capable of conduting anti-air and anti-surface warfare, as well as ballistic missile defense. SM-2, meanwhile, is a dedicated surface-to-air defense missile, which RTX says can defend “against anti-ship missiles and aircraft out to 90 nautical miles (103 miles) and an altitude of 65,000 feet.

As with all foreign military sales, dollar figures and unit amounts are subject to change as negotiations continue. Lawmakers will also have the opportunity to step in to prevent the sale, though that’s unlikely as Germany is seen as a key defense partner in Europe.

Potential defense partnerships in the desert: Previewing Dubai Airshow 2025

The 2025 Dubai Airshow kicks off on Monday, and Breaking Defense has you covered with what you need to know — both at the show itself and with news that could be happening around it.

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Real-time testing and iteration help the Army keep pace with threats

As threats evolve rapidly and operating environments grow more complex, the Army and its vendors must be able to keep pace while developing new capabilities. Tools such as in-flight reconfigurable avionics help Thales meet constantly changing demands much faster than traditional testing cycles.


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US Navy mobilizes units to salvage crashed aircraft in South China Sea

SINGAPORE — The US Navy has begun efforts to salvage a fighter jet and helicopter from the South China Sea, Breaking Defense has learned.

“The U.S. Navy has begun mobilizing units that will be used to verify the site and recover the F/A-18 and MH-60R aircraft lost off USS Nimitz (CVN 68) in the South China Sea, Oct. 26,” US 7th Fleet Public Affairs Officer Commander Matthew Comer said today in an emailed response to questions from Breaking Defense.

Comer did not provide specifics, but a source told Breaking Defense that the Military Sealift Command’s Safeguard-class rescue and salvage ship USNS Salvor (T-ARS-52) will be part of the efforts.

The ship was last seen on ship tracking website Marinetraffic in the South China Sea heading in a roughly southwesterly direction on the evening of Nov 9 off the Philippine island of Palawan, having left the port of Subic Bay near the Filipino capital of Manila the day before, with its final destination listed as Guam.

The source said that the Salvor will head to Singapore to pick up equipment prior to carrying out the salvage operation. Singapore is home to the Navy Region Center Singapore (NRCS), which coordinates shore support activities for Department of the Navy and other DoD services in Singapore.

The MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter belonging to the “Battle Cats” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 73 and F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter from the “Fighting Redcocks” of Strike Fighter Squadron 22 crashed within 30 minutes of each other on the afternoon of Oct 26 while conducting routine operations from the USS Nimitz.

All three crewmembers from the helicopter and both crew on board the fighter jet were successfully recovered, with both incidents currently under investigation by the Navy.

Blue Origin on track for NSSL certification after second successful New Glenn launch

WASHINGTON — Blue Origin’s successful second launch Thursday of its New Glenn heavy lifter — including its first landing of the reusable booster at sea — clears the penultimate hurdle for company to begin launching critical national security payloads.

While the Space Force in April gave Blue Origin an initial award allowing it to compete for National Security Space Launch Program (NSSL) Phase 3 Lane 2 launch contracts between fiscal years 2025 and 2029, New Glenn at the time had yet to complete its second launch required for NSSL flight certification.

NSSL Phase 3 Lane 2 launches carry high-value, must-go payloads and/or those headed to orbits that are more difficult to achieve. Space Systems Command (SSC) usually contracts for NSSL launches two years in advance, so the contract awards would cover missions actually lofted between FY27 and FY32.

The two-stage launcher made its first certification flight Jan. 16, and the company originally had planned to make its second one this spring.

With New Glenn’s successful flight yesterday, carrying two spacecraft built by Rocket Lab for NASA’s ESCAPADE Mars mission, the Space Force now is going into the final stages of its review.

“Space Systems Command (SSC) continues its process of certifying New Glenn for National Security Space Launches after the successful NG-2 launch,” the Space Force said in a press release Thursday.

“Certification Flights are a small subset of the certification process and provide valuable analytical data to ensure each LSP’s [launch systems providers] launch system is ready to deliver our most exquisite USSF satellites supporting critical U.S. warfighters and Intelligence Community needs,” the release added.

Landing New Glenn’s reusable first stage booster on Blue Origin’s recovery ship in the Atlantic, named Jacklyn after owner Jeff Bezos’s mother, was a major win for the company — making it only the second to so. SpaceX, owned by Bezos’ rival Elon Musk, pioneered reusable first stages and now recaptures them routinely following launches of its Falcon 9 rocket.

Blue Origin also was quick to point out during its broadcast of the launch, and in its press release, that it stuck the booster landing after only one earlier attempt during its January launch.

“[N]ever before in history has a booster this large nailed the landing on the second try. This is just the beginning as we rapidly scale our flight cadence and continue delivering for our customers,” Blue Origin CEO Dave Limp said in a press release.

Under the current NSSL Phase 3 Lane 2 award, the Space Force expects to commission Blue Origin for about seven missions starting in FY26. Meanwhile, SpaceX is expected to fly 28 missions and United Launch Alliance 19.

Pentagon announces nearly $9 billion in contracts over six-week shutdown

WASHINGTON — Now that the US government is open after the longest shutdown in history, the Pentagon is playing catchup, announcing nearly $9 billion in scores of contract awards on Thursday, including a potential big-ticket win for Boeing’s Chinook line with funds aligned to move out with a deal for German aircraft. 

After a 43-day shutdown, President Donald Trump inked a continuing resolution Wednesday night to reopen the government until Jan. 30, while some departments or agencies received funding through the end of fiscal year 2026 (military construction and Department Veterans Affairs, the Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration, and the legislative branch).

With the Pentagon’s furloughed civilian workforce back at their desks Thursday, the department released details of more than 80 deals it reached over the nearly six-week stint that rough math shows came in under the $9 billion mark in total. (That’s a rough estimate as the figure represents amounts like the ceiling of some indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts or new modifications to existing contracts.) The agreements ranged from smaller ticket follow-on deals to larger ones like one worth up to $876 million for 60 CH-47F Block II helicopters for Germany.

Under that Chinook deal, according to the announcement, the company has until late 2035 to deliver aircraft.

During the government shutdown, the Army also tapped AeroVironment to produce several aerial drones for international customers — the Puma All Environment 3, the Puma Long Endurance, the Puma All Environment and Long Endurance Hybrid, and the Raven. While that deal holds a “cumulative face value” of $874 million, the service has not yet shelled out any of those funds, according to the announcement. 

Over in the Air Force, the service awarded Anduril Industries with up to $50 million for a Small Business Innovation Research for its Agile-Launched, tactically-integrated unmanned system.

“This contract provides for procurement and support of the ALTIUS-600 system and related Group 2 UAS variants, payloads, data links, launch tubes … to support the government’s efforts to fully integrate the ALTIUS-600 onto various platforms, as well as integrating new accessories onto the ALTIUS-600,” the announcement said.

Blue Origin also received a $78 million “contract for expansion” for space vehicle processing at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Fla. with work to be completed by the end of January 2028.

Check out the full list of contracts and modifications here.

Who’s Who in Defense: Gen. Christopher Mahoney, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffGen. Christopher J. Mahoney

In September, the Senate Armed Services Committee confirmed Marine Corps Gen. Christopher Mahoney as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the second-highest ranking officer in the Pentagon. 

Responsibilities

In his position, Gen. Mahony is the senior adviser to Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs. In this capacity, Mahoney serves as vice chair of the Joint Requirement Oversight Council, which is given oversight of DoD acquisition priorities for major weapon systems. Mahony is one of six-members of the Nuclear Weapons Council, responsible for directing interagency activities focused on maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and performance of the US nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Quote

During his confirmation hearing on Sept. 11, 2025, Mahony said: “I would be remiss not to pause on the weight of this day. Twenty-four years ago, America was struck by cowards who mistook slaughter for strength. From the smoke and ruin of that morning rose a generation who answered the call of duty. They have carried forward the memory of the fallen, not in words alone, but in service.”

Military Service

Sworn in as the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps in 2023, Gen. Mahoney held that position until his latest appointment.Deputy Marine Corps commandant for programs and resources at the Pentagon from 2021 to 2023.Held command at squadron, group and wing levels. His general officer duties include: deputy commander of the Marine Forces Pacific; director of strategy and plans at Marine Corps headquarters (HQMC); deputy commander, US Forces, Japan; commanding general of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing; and deputy commandant for programs and resources, HQMC.

Education/Training

Holds a masters degree from both the University of Canberra, Australia, and the Air University, at Maxwell AFB, graduating with academic distinction. A graduate of: the Infantry Officers’ Course, Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course; the Marine Division Tactics Course; and the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN). College of the Holy Cross – BA in Economics in 1987. Commissioned through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps. 

Flight Training/Ratings/Missions

Trained as an infantryman by the Marine Corps, Mahony became a career aviator in the Navy, logging more than 5,000 hours of flight time in the A-6, F-5, F-18, and the F-35, qualifying as a forward air controller and parachutist,  After flight training in Florida and Texas, Mahony became an A6-E Intruder pilot, later transitioning to F-18 fighter jets, deploying multiple times to the Indo-Pacific, Italy and Iraq. 

Personal

Christopher J. Mahoney was born in 1965, a native of South Weymouth, MA, which lies on the coastal region south of Boston to Cape Cod.

When the law bends: What the narcotics boat debate misses

Debate over the legality of recent strikes on alleged narcotics-smuggling vessels has been loud but shallow. Critics cite the UN Charter and international legal bans on the use of force and call the strikes “murder.” Defenders say the devastation of synthetic opioids and the ways the illicit profits are used are reason for a decisive response. Both sides tend to ignore the fact that the international system has been here before.

International law doesn’t evolve by treaty alone. It evolves through state practice, which is how states interpret, stretch, and sometimes break the rules when the system can’t contain new threats. The law of armed conflict, built for mid-twentieth-century wars between states, was never designed for the world of fragmented governance, global crime, and hybrid networks that blur the line between criminality and warfare.

When law meets the vacuum of state failure, practice fills the gap. When weak states, transnational crime, and global commerce collide, the rules of international law bend, and they usually bend first under US pressure.

Critics label such actions illegal or immoral, but this misses the complexity of how law evolves. Every major change in the use-of-force regime from humanitarian intervention to counterterrorism began as something unlawful. Over time, repetition and multilateral participation transformed what began as violations into accepted practice.

The real question for narcotics interdiction is not whether it violates the law today, but whether states can meet the same standards that made past deviations sustainable: clear necessity, proportionality, transparency, and restraint. If strikes on narcotics vessels are ever to gain legitimacy, they will need not only justification but proof of humanity.

To understand how narcotics interdiction fits into this broader trajectory, four examples are instructive: the 1998 US strikes against al-Qaeda, the campaign against Somali piracy from 2005 to 2008, the targeting of ISIS oil convoys in Syria and Iraq beginning in 2014, and the recent strikes against the Houthis. Together, they show how states repeatedly bend the law when encountering the gray space between crime and war — and how current US policy appears to rely on the same evolving logic, regardless of the textbook legality.

The question is not whether striking a narcotics boat is lawful under today’s strict reading of positive law — because it almost certainly isn’t — but whether states will once again evolve the law through necessity.

Piracy And A Major First Bend

When Somali pirates terrorized the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean from 2005 to 2008, there was no legal authority to destroy pirate vessels or strike their coastal infrastructure. Pirates were criminals, not combatants. But after piracy threatened global commerce, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1851 authorizing “all necessary measures” to repress it. The United States, NATO, the EU, China, India, and Russia all joined in direct military operations, including sinking vessels and attacking shore bases.

This was a remarkable stretch of the law. Rather than only using force against individuals actively performing piracy in the moment, the campaign broadly targeted and dismantled the pirate networks on land and sea. What began without clear basis in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (prohibiting the lethal targeting of pirates) evolved into an accepted practice through collective action. The lesson: when criminal networks exploit governance vacuums and threaten global order, the law adapts.

Yet this adaptation did not emerge in a vacuum. The idea that states could use military force against criminal networks was born a decade earlier in the original campaign against al-Qaeda.

Infinite Reach And The Power To Declare Conflict

The problem of criminal networks wasn’t new, and the methods deployed to fight them were the result of hard-fought experience. Global terrorism demonstrated there were few ways to combat complex criminal threats. The lesson began in 1998 when President Bill Clinton launched Operation Infinite Reach, a series of cruise missile strikes against al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical facility in Sudan. The strikes followed the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania that killed over 200 people. But the United States was not in an armed conflict with either Afghanistan or Sudan, and the attacks lacked both Security Council authorization and a clear self-defense justification. Al-Qaeda were simply criminals, and by any legal measure of the time, the operation was unlawful.

Infinite Reach exposed the gap between the world’s legal categories and its emerging realities. Al-Qaeda was a transnational network thriving in lawless spaces, much like the smuggling networks of today. It was neither a state nor a traditional army, but its reach was global. If the US had followed international law to the letter, there were no lawful means to strike al-Qaeda before 9/11, and critics later faulted the Clinton administration for not doing enough. As with current debates on narcotics smuggling, judgments about unilateral action often turn less on doctrine than on political orientation.

After 9/11, the United States filled the gap in international law with domestic law. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) declared an armed conflict against those responsible for the attacks and those who harbored them. That single statute created a domestic legal foundation for unilateral global counterterrorism operations. The United States used its interpretation of international law to declare conflict with non-state actors and used force anywhere it perceived a threat. This recognition — that the entire network needed to be targeted if the threat was going to be defeated — led directly to the response to Somali piracy and a series of additional bends in international law. It is a pattern other states would follow.

The Red Line And The Houthi Precedent

Other states and US allies embraced the logic of the AUMF when confronting Somali piracy in 2008, but the pattern of bending the law did not stop there. In the years that followed, new and even more controversial justifications emerged outside the counterterrorism context. When the Assad regime used chemical weapons in Syria in 2017 and 2018, the United States launched strikes alongside allies without Security Council authorization. The strikes were not acts of self-defense; they were punitive and deterrent. Yet the international community tolerated them, and the law bent accepting deterrence and humanitarian necessity as sufficient justification.

The same pattern applied more recently in American and allied strikes on the Houthi movement in Yemen. These operations were justified as protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, but that is a global commercial interest, not a national one. There was no declared armed conflict with the Houthis, no direct attack on US forces or commercial interests prior to American military involvement, and no explicit international mandate. Still, many Western and regional powers accepted the strikes as legitimate, echoing the rationale once used to fight piracy.

Each of these episodes, from Infinite Reach to Somalia, to Syria and Yemen, represents a growing willingness to bypass the rigid categories of international law. They show that when existing law cannot manage transnational threats, state practice builds its own authority.

ISIS And The Targeting Of Civilian Infrastructure

Although the campaign against ISIS unfolded several years before the strikes in Syria and Yemen, it belongs in a different category of adaptation. If those previous examples stretched the law procedurally by redefining when and why states could use force, the war against ISIS stretched it substantively, redefining what could be lawfully targeted.

In 2014, ISIS was funding its operations through oil production in captured Syrian and Iraqi fields. Civilians drove the trucks that moved the oil, and civilians refined the oil and sold it. Destroying this profit-generating network meant striking the civilian infrastructure and civilian workers, an act that, on its face, seems to violate the law of armed conflict’s protection of civilians and civilian objects. It’s a thorny problem. Money is not a military object, and unrefined oil is several steps removed from fuel for military vehicles.

The US and its coalition partners nevertheless targeted ISIS’s oil fields, refineries, and convoys under the rationale that the oil itself was a “military objective.” This expanded doctrine of “war-sustaining activities” held that resources directly financing enemy operations could be lawfully targeted. It was a controversial idea and threatened to blur the lines between civilians and combatants. But it helped to defeat ISIS and became state practice.

What often gets lost in the controversy is how carefully those strikes were conducted. Coalition forces took deliberate steps to mitigate civilian harm. Leaflets were dropped to warn drivers. Pilots made low-altitude passes to scare them away. Precision munitions were used to destroy the trucks rather than the drivers. Certainly, drivers were tragically killed, but the intent and method reflected restraint, not indifference.

From Piracy To Narcotics: The Next Legal Frontier

The analogy to narcotics interdiction should be clear. The networks moving synthetic opioids by sea or air are not states, but they threaten public safety on a scale greater than each of the previous examples. These networks operate in spaces where law enforcement is weak and where legal categories break down.

If the narcotics trade is treated as a transnational network financing armed groups, its interdiction can fit within the logic of past precedents. As with Somali pirates and the Houthi militias, a threat to global order can invite a collective response that blurs the lines between law enforcement and war. As with al-Qaeda, a criminal enterprise can become an adversary in armed conflict when governments run up against the limits of combating terrorist groups. The Syria and Houthi strikes sidestepped both Security Council and self-defense rationales to protect global interests. And the ISIS campaign expanded the definition of military objectives to include treating civilian infrastructure as legitimate military objectives, provided efforts are made to spare civilians.

This is not to say such evolution is unproblematic. Every time the law bends, accountability bends with it. The more that states claim the power to define their own adversaries and conflicts, the greater the risk that convenience, not necessity, drives their decisions. The use of force becomes a matter of policy rather than principle.

The opposite risk of clinging to an inflexible legal order in the face of global criminal networks is equally real. The world has already accepted that terrorism and piracy warranted exceptional responses. Narcotics trafficking, which kills tens of thousands annually and destabilizes entire regions, may prove to be the next domain where law follows practice rather than the other way around.

The law of armed conflict has never been static. Somali piracy, al-Qaeda, Syria, the Houthis, and ISIS’s oil convoys all show that the rules bend when states confront threats that do not fit existing categories. Sometimes the bending comes with UN authorization, and sometimes it comes through unilateral declaration. What unites these cases is the same pattern: novel threats emerge, states act first, and law catches up later.

The narcotics-boat debate is only the latest manifestation of that pattern. Dismissing these strikes as “illegal” ignores decades of precedent. But embracing these strikes without question would ignore the moral and legal costs of every prior exception. The path between them, acknowledging that the law evolves through practice, but insisting that practice be humane and justified, is the only way the rules survive.

If the law bends again, it should bend the way it did against ISIS’s convoys with self-imposed precision, restraint, and a recognition that necessity and humanity are not opposites but the conditions for legitimacy itself.

Humanity, in this sense, is not a sentimental limit but an operational standard. It means distinguishing the guilty from the incidental, choosing methods that minimize suffering even when law does not compel it, and subjecting new forms of force to public explanation and review.

The legitimacy of future interdictions will depend less on the perfection of legal theory than on the care with which states wield their power. The world tolerates bends in the law only when it can see the discipline behind them.

Maj. Trent Kubasiak is a judge advocate with First Army at Rock Island Arsenal. Previously, he was chief of national security law for Eighth Army in the Republic of Korea. He deployed three times to Afghanistan and once to Kuwait. He has a JD from Marquette University School of Law, Wisconsin; an LLM from the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Virginia; and an MBA from Capella University.

The views expressed in this article are his own and do not represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

A Saudi-Israel deal and more from the Manama Dialogue 2025: Middle East Defense Digest

From the normalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel to America’s security posture in the Middle East, there’s plenty to talk about from the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Manama Dialogue in Bahrain. Breaking Defense’s Middle East Bureau Chief Agnes Helou brings you insights from the conference in the latest episode of the Middle East Defense Digest.

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ASELSAN redefines helicopter modernization for the next generation

As helicopter fleets around the world age, defense forces face a universal challenge: how to keep legacy platforms relevant amid rapidly advancing avionics, sensors, and weapon technologies. Türkiye’s ASELSAN, marking its 50th anniversary this year, has positioned itself as one of the most capable partners in this field, offering full-scope modernization programs for attack and utility helicopters across multiple continents.

With over 500 successful aircraft modernizations, ASELSAN provides complete, mission-ready solutions—from cockpit upgrades to communication, mission, and self-protection systems—tailored to both domestic and international requirements. Its experience spans U.S.-made, European, and former Soviet-era platforms, including S-70 variants, UH-1s, Cobras and Super Cobras, Cougars, and Mi-series helicopters, giving the company unmatched flexibility across global fleets.

Next-Generation Cockpits and Mission Systems

At the heart of ASELSAN’s modernization strategy lies its avionics suite design capability. The company provides tailor-made cockpit configurations and ready-to-integrate architectures for multiple helicopter types. Its digital cockpit suite, derived from Türkiye’s GÖKBEY utility helicopter, features large-format, touch-panel multifunction displays and open-architecture mission computers. These systems enhance situational awareness, reduce pilot workload, and enable seamless integration of sensors and weapons.

Central to this ecosystem is ACORE Avionic Central Control Computer, which connects avionics, navigation, communication, and identification functions under a unified command hub. Its modular hardware and scalable software allow smooth integration of both legacy and next-generation systems, minimizing obsolescence while maximizing flexibility.

For attack helicopter configurations, ASELSAN develops modern weapon management interfaces and hand controllers to replace outdated hardware. The company’s AVCI Helmet-Mounted Display further transforms pilot awareness by projecting flight, targeting, and navigation data directly onto the visor. The system merges night vision, infrared imagery, and symbology in one view, ensuring faster target acquisition and precise line-of-sight cueing.

Navigation, Sensors, and Communication Systems

Precision and connectivity remain central to ASELSAN’s modernization approach. KILAVUZ Tactical Inertial Measurement Unit and ANS-600 Inertial Navigation System provide reliable position and attitude data, even in GPS-denied conditions. For operational safety, ATRAS Traffic and Terrain Collision Avoidance System continuously monitors flight paths and offers both traffic and resolution advisories to prevent mid-air incidents.

Communication capability is delivered through ARTcom family of software-defined airborne radios, supporting secure, jam-resistant voice and data links. Compliant with NATO waveforms and Electronic Protection Measures, ARTcom enables interoperable communication across multiple mission networks and allied platforms.

In the electro-optical domain, ASELSAN’s ASELFLIR product family plays a crucial role in ensuring all-weather, day-night operational effectiveness. ASELFLIR-400/410 systems provide long-range detection and tracking of heat signatures from personnel, vehicles, or infrastructure—essential for reconnaissance, targeting, and search-and-rescue missions in complex environments.

Self-Protection and Electronic Warfare

Survivability is a key component of any modernization program. ASELSAN integrates layered electronic warfare and countermeasure solutions to protect aircraft from radar, laser, and infrared threats. YILDIRIM-100 DIRCM (Directed Infrared Countermeasure) system represents a pinnacle of this capability, using synchronized, multi-band laser countermeasures to defeat heat-seeking missiles. Combined with radar and laser warning receivers, these systems ensure 360-degree protection against both conventional and asymmetric threats.

Integration, Sustainment, and Global Reach

Modernization efforts are conducted at ASELSAN’s internationally certified hangars and helipads in Türkiye. However, the company also deploys dedicated teams to customer facilities worldwide. To minimize downtime, ASELSAN establishes System Integration Laboratories that allow software development and testing without grounding the aircraft. These labs later serve as training simulators, offering enduring operational and educational benefits.

A distinctive aspect of ASELSAN’s approach is its commitment to sovereign sustainment. Each program is designed to ensure that customers can perform their own maintenance, calibration, and repair of upgraded systems. This transfer of know-how builds long-term autonomy, reduces dependency, and lowers life-cycle costs.

A Strategic Partner for the Decade Ahead

As the global defense market shifts toward modernization over full platform replacement, ASELSAN’s modular and scalable approach resonates with air forces seeking cost-effective capability growth. By combining advanced avionics, sensor fusion, and self-protection systems with robust integration expertise, the company enables operators to extend the life and effectiveness of their fleets well into the next decade.

From cockpit to countermeasure, ASELSAN’s modernization philosophy reflects a single goal: to turn today’s legacy helicopters into tomorrow’s mission-ready assets: reliable, connected, and protected for the challenges ahead.