Douglas A. Macgregor's Blog, page 2

Army accelerates production of Black Widow drone for short-range reconnaissance

Drones have changed the battlespace seemingly overnight and across all warfighting domains. Red Cat plays an important role in the drone industrial base through its presence on the Defense Innovation Unit’s Blue List for quadcopters and fixed-wing VTOLS.

We talked about the Army’s new Black Widow drone for short-range reconnaissance, drone procurement needs across NATO countries, and other industry developments with Brendan Stewart, senior vice president, Regulatory and Government Affairs, Red Cat.

Close the gap: Turn the Franco-German missile early warning into measurable capability

As Washington reorients toward deterring China and speaks plainly about allies doing more for themselves, Europe can no longer assume US space power will be available at historic scale and speed. European governments already acknowledge an Earth observation shortfall for defense and are moving to address it. The real gap with the United States, however, lies in high-end, niche strategic space capabilities, above all, missile early warning.

JEWEL, a new Franco-German initiative building on the EU-funded ODIN’s EYE, is the first serious step toward closing that gap. And it also provides a test case on whether Europe can draw domestic technology and financing while avoiding the workshare gridlock that has stymied other multinational efforts.

First, let’s lay out what JEWEL is. A two-tiered missile early warning effort that includes space-based infrared sensing paired with long-range ground radars, the program’s center of gravity is the ability to ingest space and radar observations, maintain custody of difficult targets, and disseminate targeting-quality tracks to a regional integrated air and missile defense picture in seconds, not minutes. An indigenous European warning layer would reduce single-point dependency on the US, strengthen deterrence, and, crucially, give European capitals agency over release decisions when timelines are tight and politics are fraught.

Here’s why it matters: JEWEL is not an EU-flagged program. Rather, it is a Paris-Berlin project designed to be compatible with EU capabilities and open to partners, with the intent that it be usable by non-EU NATO member states such as the United Kingdom and Norway. Seen through this lens, JEWEL is not a prestige project but a strategic adjustment.

Which brings up a final key point: that JEWEL is only a few weeks old as a concept, with the ink barely dry on the announcement. If France and Germany want strategic autonomy that works under stress, they must turn JEWEL from a communiqué into a capability with measurable performance.

Hardware will not be the bottleneck. Interfaces, budgets, workshare, and the politics of governance will.

Early warning sits inside a wider nervous system. Any European system, including JEWEL, needs a viable space backbone that is defined, not implied. That means region-wide service-level agreements, both through NATO and the EU, for assured satellite communications (including pre-negotiated commercial SATCOM surge), pooled ISR coverage from small optical and synthetic aperture radar constellations with edge downlink to corps- and brigade-level headquarters, and resilient positioning, navigation, and timing with protected signals and terrestrial backups. More importantly, it means codifying a data layer with common formats that functions in a degraded mode, because real conflicts will be contested in space and cyberspace from the start.

Launch cadence is the other determinant for success. Reconstitution of an early warning constellation cannot be an afterthought. France and Germany should book launch slots ahead of need, block-buy small satellite buses, and stockpile the parts that constrain schedules, such as infrared focal planes, cryocoolers, secure radios, and radiation-hardened chips. Planners should create rapid replenishment playbooks now and test them rigorously in exercises. A missile early warning architecture without a replenishment plan is a single-use capability.

The politics are solvable if tackled early. Data custody and releasability must be explicit: Who owns the track file, who authorizes publication to NATO and the EU, and at what fidelity and latency? Tie those rules to funding milestones so they are not renegotiated in the middle of a crisis. Industrial workshare and IP, long the bugbear of European bilateral and multinational projects, should be segmented to prevent gridlock: One partner leads on space sensors and payloads, another on fusion software, a third on ground segment and security, and so on. Lock software ownership and exportability up front; ambiguity here is where programs go to die.

Finally, Paris and Berlin should emphasize stability in their strategic narrative by embedding missile early warning and cueing in defensive terms to blunt nefarious claims that they are fuelling an arms race. Early warning deters miscalculation; it does not invite it.

To judge whether European countries are truly closing the gap with the United States, look for action, not talk. That means a JEWEL letter of intent and ODIN’s EYE implementation documents that spell out concrete latency budgets, track-quality thresholds, and interface definitions rather than restating aspirations. It means both governments announcing radar sites with clear command relationships and survivability plans, not just slick viewgraphs. It means negotiating space SLAs with EU and NATO member states for ISR coverage, SATCOM availability, PNT error budgets, and then rehearsing them in rigorous exercises that assume contested space and cyber domains. It also means French and German ministries and agencies locking down data sharing rules, including provisions for the UK and Norway via NATO channels, so stovepipes never form in the first place.

Three tangible actions would prove JEWEL is more than talk: disseminate to appropriate entities latency and track-quality targets and European/NATO integrated air and missile defense interfaces with a validation test schedule. Stand up a pilot fusion node that demonstrates end-to-end track publication under time pressure and repeat it in major exercises with degraded inputs. Finally, formalize a launch and reconstitution plan with pre-booked launch cadence and funded spares, essentially treating launch as a program element, not as an afterthought.

If France, Germany, and other partners get the interfaces, governance, cadence, and training right, Europe will own the decisive minutes in a crisis. If they fail, then today’s perceived transatlantic rift will become a very real vulnerability at the worst possible time.

John B. Sheldon, Ph.D., is co-founder of AstroAnalytica Ltd., a London-based space consultancy. Previous roles include advisor to the UAE Ministry of Defence and faculty member at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air & Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Sierra Nevada reveals BRAWLR air defense system that’s already deployed — somewhere

WASHINGTON — Sierra Nevada Corp. has revealed new details about a closely held new air defense system that it claims has already helped down scores of aerial threats, though it won’t say where.

At last week’s annual Air and Space Forces Association conference outside Washington, the company for the first time publicly displayed the Battery Revolving Adaptive Weapons Launcher—Reconfigurable (BRAWLR), which SNC says can carry up to four types of rockets and missiles at once to take out enemy drones and cruise missiles from the back of a pickup truck, a trailer or the ground.

The company says the system gives troops an all-in-one defensive tool instead of forcing them to lug around multiple weapons launchers made by different companies.

It’s also allegedly already seen action. The company told Breaking Defense in an email this week that BRAWLR has intercepted more than 400 aerial threats since it was first deployed in 2023, though SNC declined to provide additional information about its use.

“SNC is providing a new breed of highly adaptable air defense systems,” the company said in an emailed statement. “These systems are designed to be able to form their own integrated air defense network or to be able to merge into an existing one with additional sensors and shooters, improving the effectiveness and relevance of all elements.”

Sierra Nevada designed BRAWLR in 2023 after the US government approached it with a request from a foreign military customer, a company spokesperson told Breaking Defense. The Nevada-based firm, which specializes in integrating disparate hardware and software into bespoke military equipment, can build the plug-and-play missile launchers within six months, according to a company fact sheet.

The 7-foot-tall BRAWLR features four weapons stations that can swap out to hold rail- or tube-launched munitions, including laser-guided Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System rockets, which can travel up to 6 km (3.7 miles); AIM-9M Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, with a range of 12 km (7.5 miles); and the British-made AIM-132 Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile, for targets up to 15 km (9.3 miles) away, Sierra Nevada said. 

When configured for “beast mode,” the fact sheet shows, the launcher can wield up to 46 APKWS rockets at once. The system can also support the medium-range AIM-120 and short-range IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, allowing troops to take out moving airborne targets. A single person can set up the launcher in 10 minutes, operate it, and break it down in just three minutes, Sierra Nevada says. 

BRAWLR is the centerpiece of a diesel flatbed truck-mounted air defense system called the Mobile Anti-Air Weapons Launcher—Reconfigurable, or MAAWLR, another company fact sheet shows. That variant requires two people and 20 minutes to set up, run, and break down, and features two X-band radars to sense smaller objects as well as electro-optical and forward-looking infrared imaging systems and a radio that can reconnect to new networks if its signal is blocked.

“Additional kinetic and non-kinetic defeat capabilities, interoperability with additional existing US command and control systems, and expanded system automation are expected to be demonstrated within the next year,” the company said in its emailed statement.

Is BRAWLR In Ukraine?

Sierra Nevada has delivered 20 of each system so far, with another 10 apiece on the way, according to the fact sheets. A company spokesperson said the system has been delivered to “several” customers.

But the firm declined to discuss acquisition details — including the customers, the price of the contracts and each unit, and the machines’ success rates — saying the information is classified. But information published by Sierra Nevada and the US government points to Ukraine as a possible recipient.

For instance, SNC advertised on its fact sheet that the MAAWLR truck can fire the AA-10, a Russian- and Ukrainian-made air-to-air missile also known as the Vympel R-27, and travel via the US Air Force’s C-17 Globemaster III cargo plane or the Antonov An-124 airlifter. The An-124, one of the world’s largest aircraft, is used for charter cargo flights, including by Ukraine’s Antonov Airlines.

Ukraine already uses each of the munitions that work with the two launchers. The systems are also compatible with US and European surveillance databases, according to the fact sheet.

In July, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced a proposed deal worth an estimated $180 million to sustain Ukraine’s US-made air defenses and provide related equipment. Though the release did not identify the specific air defense system in question, an initial version of the release noted Sierra Nevada and Virginia-based V2X as the main contractors, as well as two Ukrainian firms.

“The proposed sale will improve Ukraine’s ability to meet current and future threats by further equipping it to conduct self-defense and regional security missions with a more robust air defense capability,” DSCA said in the release. “Ukraine will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.”

The current version of the announcement on DSCA’s website no longer specifies which companies would handle the work. Sierra Nevada declined to comment on the change, and a State Department spokesperson declined to comment on the record. The Pentagon and Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense did not respond to emailed queries about the systems.

There is some recent precedent for companies to roll out equipment at defense trade shows several years after it began use in Ukraine — if that is indeed the case with BRAWLR. Last year, Aevex Aerospace brought its Phoenix Ghost family of kamikaze drones to the Association of the US Army’s massive annual trade show in Washington, putting it on display two years after news reports first surfaced that the US was sending the one-way attack drones to Ukraine.

Could BRAWLR Fight For The United States?

When Breaking Defense visited SNC’s display on Sept. 22, Pacific Air Forces Commander Gen. Kevin Schneider and Air Combat Command boss Gen. Adrian Spain stopped by and chatted with company officials in front of the system.

Sierra Nevada says it is “engaged at all levels of government,” including the Defense Department and Department of Homeland Security as well as “numerous US allies and foreign partners.” Notably, American troops used BRAWLR in August to counter drones during Northern Edge, a sweeping air and sea combat-training drill held across Alaska with US and international forces every two years. The system surpassed its testing goals, Sierra Nevada said, and will participate in several more US-led experiments and exercises if enough equipment is available.

Other Sierra Nevada air defense products, including a passive wide-area infrared sensing subsystem, a modular palletized sensing subsystem, and a palletized integrated air and missile defense system, may also take part in those events, the company said.

In addition to base protection and battlefield uses, Sierra Nevada argues BRAWLR could plug into a broader military network as part of Golden Dome, President Donald Trump’s vision of a multibillion-dollar missile defense shield over the US homeland.

What’s in a name: Goodbye Maxar, hello Vantor and Lanteris

WASHINGTON — More than two years after it was acquired and split into two units by private equity firm Advent International, Maxar Technologies is no more — with Maxar Intelligence renamed Vantor, and Maxar Space Systems now called Lanteris Space Systems.

The rebranding was announced today in two separate press releases from the newly named firms.

Maxar Intelligence has been a key provider of remote sensing imagery and AI-driven data fusion products and services to the US Intelligence Community, primarily the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Reconnaissance Office.

For example, Maxar Intelligence was chosen as the prime contractor NGA’s Global Enhanced GEOINT Delivery system, which delivers geospatial intelligence to more than 400,000 US government users, as well as a provider under the agency’s Luno program to gather commercial analysis of satellite imagery. In addition, the firm last year won a Phase 4 contract to push forward the Army’s One World Terrain program to create a 3D virtual map of the globe for mission planning and training.

Peter Wilczynski, chief product officer at Vantor, explained in an interview with Breaking Defense that the rebrand is aimed at shifting perception away from Maxar’s original identify as a satellite imagery provider to a “spatial intelligence company” working across all domains.

“There’s a much bigger opportunity in framing the company as a company that’s solving all domain problems with space technology, as opposed to a company that’s really, really focused on satellites and satellite imagery,” he said. “It’s not 180 degree turn of the wheel, but I think it is a substantial 30 degree shift in the focus, and certainly in terms of where we’re thinking about going into the future.”

In line with the company’s pivot to a spatial intelligence company, Vantor’s release unveiled its Tensorglobe software platform, “that gives customers the tools to automatically fuse data collected across space, air, and ground sensors into a unified, continuously updated intelligence picture.”

Wilczynski said that Tensorglobe combines into one product capabilities the company has been providing separately under different contracts and programs. The platform comprises three basic subcomponents: Coretex, which provides satellite tasking and collection management; Forge, which fuzes data from a variety of sensors to create a 3D “digital globe;” and Nexus, which provides a “gateway” for customers to access that digital information.

That said, Vantor will continue to own and operate Maxar Intelligence’s four legacy electro-optical remote sensing birds, as well as its six new model WorldView Legion satellites providing both high-resolution Earth imagery and imagery of on-orbit objects.

Maxar Space Systems, now Lanteris, is based in Palo Alto, Calif., and manufactures and operates satellite systems. L3Harris last year chose Maxar Space as a subcontractor to build 18 missile tracking satellites under its contract with the Space Development Agency. It also builds the widely sold Maxar-1300 series commercial communications satellites for operations in geosynchronous Earth orbit.

“The rebrand reflects the company’s evolution into a next-generation defense and space technology company operating at the intersection of national security, missile tracking, space infrastructure, deep space exploration and commercial connectivity,” Lanteris said in its press release.

According to the release, Lanteris “roadmap” is centered on:

National Security & Defense Tech – Proven platforms for missile tracking, secure communications and resilient constellations that safeguard U.S. and allied interests.Space Infrastructure – AI-enabled solutions, industry leading power and propulsion enabling advanced mobility, defense, energy and communications systems.Connectivity & Exploration – Advanced satellites and deep-space infrastructure extending global reach and enabling human exploration of the Moon, Mars and beyond.

“Our mission is to deliver mission-critical capabilities in space — faster, smarter, and more resilient than ever before, made possible by the dedication and expertise of our people,” said Lanteris CEO Chris Johnson in the release. “From tracking emerging threats to enabling humanity’s push into deep space, we’re building the systems that will define the future of security, communications and exploration.”

Maxar was acquired in December 2022 by Advent International for $6.4 billion, which immediately separated the two sides of the business. Both Vantor and Lanteris will remain (at least for the moment) part of Advent’s stable of companies.

Coast Guard ‘naming and shaming’ amid spike in Chinese activity near Alaska

WASHINGTON — The US Coast Guard in July made a rare announcement: Off the coast of Alaska, within a maritime zone known as the extended continental shelf, the service detected a Chinese research vessel. 

Then came a similar announcement in August. This time, five Chinese research ships were spotted operating in American Arctic waters. The Coast Guard, in conjunction with US Northern Command, the Pentagon’s combatant command tasked with defending the homeland, deployed units to observe the Chinese flotilla.

Come September, yet again, two Chinese-flagged research ships were spotted northwest of Alaska. And once more, the Coast Guard announced the deployment of ships and aircraft to monitor their activity.

Multiple officials, including the head of US Northern Command, told Breaking Defense China’s activities in and around American waters have increased this past year, the latest development in a broader pattern that started in 2021. But the subsequent public responses and objections by the Coast Guard is new, a trend that analysts said is designed to deter Chinese activity that close to the US.

“Not only is it testing the resolve of the US in this space, but it’s also trying to normalize presence,” Daniel White, a former DHS official, told Breaking Defense. “I think that is really what is important for [North American Aerospace Defense Command] and NORTHCOM and the Coast Guard, as far as naming and shaming.”

Making the issue more complicated is China’s selective use of the American extended continental shelf. Unlike American territorial waters just off the coast, an adversary’s presence on water above the extended shelf may be provocative, but not illegal, according to former Homeland Security and Coast Guard officials. And, crucially, China has suggested it doesn’t recognize American claims to the region.

In general, every country has exclusive rights to the resources found within 200 nautical miles of its coastlines. However, some countries undertake a multi-year process to extend the geographical boundaries under which they claim rights to certain resources. 

This claim is known as an extended continental shelf, and the United States made one in 2023 under rules outlined by the United Nations’ Convention on the Laws of the Sea. (The United States is not an official signatory to UNCLOS, but federal authorities generally adhere to its constructs for governing maritime conduct.)

Through the Global Times, a state-controlled media outlet, Chinese officials previously responded to the US Coast Guard’s announcements, saying they view the United States’ territorial claim as “unilateral.” Citing a “Chinese expert” the publication said that the “hyping up of ‘China threat’ rhetoric is only to justify the US’ evil deeds in the Arctic, revealing itself as a rule-breaker and global troublemaker.”

Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, testifies before the House Armed Services Committee in Washington, D.C. March 21, 2024. (DoD photo by EJ Hersom)Influence And Access

As the head of NORTHCOM and NORAD, Gen. Gregory Guillot’s job includes overseeing forces that are routinely tasked with detecting, tracking and intercepting any adversarial ship or plane approaching the homeland. In a statement to Breaking Defense, Guillot said Chinese military activity near Alaska has “increased significantly” over the past several years.

“The increase in activity stems from China’s construction of new polar research ships and Beijing’s aim to expand its influence and access in the Arctic,” he said.

In addition to the incidents with the research vessels the Coast Guard responded to this year, he noted that China’s navy sent a surface action group to patrol the Bering Sea each year from 2021 to 2024, with two of those patrols conducted alongside the Russian navy. 

He also said China “conducted its first ever air patrol inside” the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), when two H-6 medium bombers and two Russian Tu-95 heavy bombers overflew the Bering Sea together in July 2024.

The ADIZ is not formally American airspace but refers to certain airspace surrounding the United States and Canada, which is monitored by civilian and military authorities from both countries. When foreign aircraft enter that airspace unannounced, it can trigger fighter jets being scrambled to intercept them, much like what happened in late September when four Russian military aircraft were detected.

Meanwhile, the Coast Guard said it, too, is responding to a “significant increase” in Chinese activity in Arctic waters in the area around Alaska.

A spokeswoman said the service’s response is part of Operation Frontier Sentinel and it aims to “counter malign activities, defend sovereign interests, and promote maritime conduct consistent with international law and norms.

“The press releases are a proactive measure to inform the American public regarding the increase in activity in the Arctic and the Coast Guard efforts to safeguard our border security and territorial integrity,” she added when asked about the numerous announcements.

While Guillot chalked up China’s operations to a desire to expand its “influence and access” in the Arctic, the Coast Guard deferred a question about China’s impetus to the State Department. A State Department spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment by press time.

Ice floes surround the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy in the Arctic Ocean on July 29, 2017. The cutter is the largest icebreaker in the Coast Guard and serves as a platform for scientific reseach. (Photo by Bonnie Jo Mount/The Washington Post via Getty Images)Who And How?

Who responds to a perceived incursion matters.

The Chinese ships spotted near Alaska over the last few months were research vessels, meaning they are presumed to be unarmed and manned by civilians, so the Coast Guard responded. 

Former officials told Breaking Defense that since the Coast Guard is a law enforcement agency, it is seen as less threatening than a Navy warship or fighter jets. The difference matters because sending an armed warship to confront unarmed researchers could give China an opportunity to accuse the US of escalating or aggravating a situation.

White, the former DHS official, said it is also important that the Pentagon’s responses on social media to these interactions has been to amplify the Coast Guard’s message, rather than issuing its own statements. While NORAD routinely announces its efforts to intercept aircraft, it did not proactively issue public statements about the Chinese research vessels venturing near Alaska this year. While NORAD routinely announces its efforts to intercept aircraft, it did not proactively issue public statements about the Chinese research vessels venturing near Alaska this year.

“It’s different when it comes from [a four-star] combatant commander,” he added.

Peter Brown, a retired Coast Guard rear admiral and senior fellow at the America First Policy Institute, told Breaking Defense a country’s rights to resources in an extended continental shelf are not all inclusive, and that foreign ships are allowed to transit and fish in those waters.

“It appears that these Chinese research vessels are researching the water column of those areas because that is not an area of exclusive US jurisdiction,” he said. They are claiming “not to be interfering with the sea floor rights that the US has in that area,” a claim Brown said he personally doesn’t believe is true.

Their activity is “very likely non-compliant with the rights that they have in that space,” Brown added. “It’s like you invite the cable guy in to fix your cable, but if he’s taking pictures of your jewelry, that’s not what he’s supposed to be there for.”

Whatever the vessels’ true purpose, White said China’s actions near Alaska amount to the same type of gray zone tactics that Pentagon officials say the country frequently employs elsewhere in the world, providing an opportunity for the Chinese to test the waters — figuratively and literally.

The Chinese are sending “research ships to prove a point. … This isn’t to go all the way up the escalation ladder. I’m prodding, I’m probing, I’m testing, and let’s see what happens,” said White. “That’s why the Coast Guard is so loud” in announcing its responses.

Michael Marrow contributed to this report.

Senate confirms Hung Cao as Navy’s No. 2 civilian

WASHINGTON — The Senate today confirmed former Navy officer Hung Cao, by a vote of 52-45, as the next undersecretary of the Navy.

Cao, a retired captain and diver, was tapped by the White House to be undersecretary in February. His nomination was sent to lawmakers in March, and he has awaited a final vote on the Senate floor since his hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June.

His confirmation makes him the second-most senior civilian in the Department of the Navy behind Secretary John Phelan, who was confirmed in March. Brett Seidle, a career Navy civilian, has been performing the duties of the undersecretary up to now.

The Navy’s secretariat includes the secretary, the undersecretary, four assistant secretaries and a general counsel. Of those positions, only Phelan and Cao are confirmed by the Senate; the officials holding the other positions are all in acting capacities.

Cao’s confirmation comes as the rest of Capitol Hill is ensnared in what has become the first government shutdown since late 2018 with no clear end in sight.

Separately, the website tracking White House nominations sent to Congress today indicated Vice Adm. Karl Thomas, currently the deputy chief of naval operations for information warfare, was tapped to receive a fourth star. Defense Scoop first reported Thomas had been selected as the next commander of US Fleet Forces Command, which was vacated by Adm. Daryl Caudle when he became the chief of naval operations.

A spokesperson for the Navy declined to comment on the nomination.

Valerie Insinna contributed reporting to this story.

South Korea selects L3Harris proposal for next early warning aircraft

SINGAPORE — South Korea has chosen a team led by L3Harris for a follow-on contract for four Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, its procurement agency announced.

L3Harris proposed its Phoenix aircraft, which is a Bombardier Defense Global 6500 business jet modified with an advanced radar system, for the US ally, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said Tuesday.

South Korea had earmarked 3.1 trillion-won ($2.21 billion) for the project, which saw the Phoenix up against Saab’s Globaleye airborne early warning system with its own radar fitted on the same Global 6500 airframe, according to South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency.

L3Harris announced in a post on X Tuesday that it had been selected for the award.

Explaining its decision, DAPA said the L3Harris proposal, which will be fitted with Israel’s Elta EL/W-2085 radar, earned a higher evaluation score than Swedish defense firm Saab, its only other contender in the bidding.

Citing DAPA, Yonhap reported that there was no significant difference in the evaluation of the performance of both entrants, but “L3Harris received high scores in the areas of operational suitability, domestic defense industry contribution, and operation and maintenance costs, while Saab received high scores in the areas of contract terms and acquisition costs.”

The Republic of Korea Air Force is already an operator of the Boeing E-7A “Peace Eye” AEW&C aircraft, and the US State Department approved the potential sale of four more E-7As to South Korea in November 2024.

The current program is seeking additional aircraft as South Korea seeks to ramp up its own air defense and intelligence gathering capabilities against North Korea. The South is also seeking to bolster these capabilities as part of efforts to gain operational control of its military during a potential conflict.

Under current arrangements, operational control of the South Korean military will be placed under the South Korean-US Joint Forces Command during wartime, although peacetime operational command has come under the South Korean government since 1994.

Air Force Global Strike chief Bussiere to retire

WASHINGTON — The head of Air Force Global Strike Command said that he will seek retirement, according to a late Tuesday social media post. 

In a post on Facebook published by AFGSC, Gen. Thomas Bussiere said that he will “request retirement from the United States Air Force for personal and family reasons.” A change of command ceremony for AFGSC is scheduled for Oct. 17, according to a spokesperson for the command, at which point Bussiere would be expected to depart from his current role.

“Serving alongside the exceptional men and women of our Air Force has been the privilege of a lifetime. I’m especially proud of the Warrior Airmen of Air Force Global Strike Command and everything we’ve accomplished together,” Bussiere said. 

Bussiere earlier this year appeared to have a longer future in the Air Force after he was selected in July to serve as its No. 2 officer following the ouster of former Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James Slife. But after no movement on his nomination, Aviation Week reported in September it had been pulled by the Trump administration. 

As Breaking Defense previously reported, former Air Combat Command chief Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach quickly emerged as a frontrunner to replace Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin, who announced his surprise retirement in August. Bussiere at that time was seen as a leading contender for the chief of staff job too, and a highly unusual social media campaign cropped up to boost the general for the job over Wilsbach.

The campaigning was not successful: On Monday, the Senate formally received Wilsbach’s nomination to serve as Air Force Chief of Staff. The move likely foreclosed one of the only avenues forward for Bussiere as a four-star general, as his successor, Lt. Gen. Stephen Davis, has already been confirmed by the Senate. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has also been vocal about cutting the number of top brass. 

“I am deeply honored to have been nominated for Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force and profoundly grateful for the trust and confidence placed in me by the President,” Bussiere said in the Facebook post. 

After assuming his current post in December 2022, Bussiere oversaw the Air Force’s nuclear deterrent and strategic assets like bombers. He formerly achieved the rating of a command pilot after logging thousands of hours on aircraft like the F-15 Eagle, B-2 Spirit and F-22 Raptor, according to his service biography and held numerous roles including as commander of the Eighth Air Force. He joined the Air Force in 1985 via the ROTC program at Norwich University. 

The general was a strong advocate for modernization efforts underway across the Air Force, particularly for its aging bomber fleet. While Bussiere in his current post stewarded so-far successful programs like the B-21 Raider, his portfolio also included flagging efforts like the LGM-35A Sentinel, which he revealed will require new missile silos.

“While I’m stepping away from active duty, my commitment to service remains. I look forward to finding new ways to support our Air Force, our national defense, and the incredible people who make it all possible,” Bussiere said in the Facebook post, thanking “all who have supported me through this journey.”

Army says it’s mitigated ‘critical’ cybersecurity deficiencies in early NGC2 prototype

WASHINGTON — The US Army says it has mitigated several cybersecurity risks discovered in an early iteration of its nascent Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) platform, as detailed in a blunt memo obtained by Breaking Defense.

Penned on Sept. 5 and signed by Army Chief Information Office Chief Technology Officer Gabriele Chiulli, the document said the NGC2 platform “in its current state, exhibits critical deficiencies in fundamental security controls, processes, and governance.”

“These issues collectively create a significant risk to data, mission operations, and personnel by rendering the system vulnerable to insider threats, external attacks, and data spillage,” the document said. Chiulli wrote at the time that the Army “lack[s] the visibility and controls necessary to ensure the security and integrity of the platform. There seems to be a rush to get capabilities into the system without actual oversight or process to do it, putting greater risk as this system further increases this risk.”

But Army officials told Breaking Defense that in the three-plus weeks since the document was written and subsequently circulated within industry, the problems have been addressed.

“The issues were mitigated immediately,” Army Chief Information Officer Leonel Garciga said in a statement. He added that the “streamlined cyber security processes were able to quickly identify and assist the program office and vendor in triaging cyber security vulnerabilities and put mitigations in place.”

In a recent interview, Lt. Gen. Jeth Rey, deputy chief of staff at the Army’s G-6 which deals with Army cybersecurity and networks, argued that finding those early deficiencies early was all part of the service’s intended process, and that efforts were undertaken to correct them.

“We have to bake in cybersecurity early in the process and I think this is what we did,” Rey said in a Sept. 25 interview. “This is a new capability coming in and we found a risk and we mitigated it right out the gate. I think it’s a good news story for us going forward. If we continue to look at things in that manner and our processes work, I’m happy.”

He noted that the Army is still in the experimentation phase and moving to prototype, continuing to improving processes.

‘Very High Risk’ Of Adversary Access

NGC2 is the service’s number one modernization priority and is meant to provide commanders and units a new approach to manage information, data, and command and control with agile and software-based architectures. It is a so-called clean slate approach, meaning it was built from the ground up as opposed to previous modernization efforts to bolt on new capabilities to legacy architectures and systems.

In July, the Army awarded nearly $100 million to Anduril and a team of vendors to develop a prototype of the system, scaling to the entire division level at Project Convergence Capstone 6 this summer with the 4th Infantry Division. A prototype was tested at last year’s event at the battalion level. Chiulli’s document doesn’t say what NGC2 platform he was referring to, and Anduril referred Breaking Defense’s questions regarding the vulnerabilities to the Army. More recently, Lockheed Martin and its team also recently scored a contract to develop an integrated data layer with 25th Infantry Division.

As the Army is looking to scale Anduril’s prototype up to the entire division level, 4th ID has begun a series of so-called sprint events between now and Project Convergence to incrementally add capability. These events are called the Ivy Sting series.

Chiulli’s memo came 10 days before the first event. At the time, it listed a host of concerns, the “cumulative effect” of which was that NGC2 appeared more like a “black box” in which the service couldn’t control which users do or see what on the network.

“The lack of governance means there is no one person or entity accountable for accepting this risk on behalf of the Army,” it states. “Given the current security posture of the platform and hosted 3rd party applications the likelihood of an adversary gaining persistent undetectable access to the platform requires the system to be treated as very high risk.”

The issues listed include lack of access control and accountability, unverified and vulnerable codebase for third-party applications, critical gaps in governance and basic security hygiene and lack of data governance.

The first deficiency highlighted noted the system had no Role-Based Access Control, which means once a user is granted access, they would have unrestricted access to all applications and all data — anathema to the Pentagon’s broader zero trust principles. The memo described this as a critical security failure that could lead to potential access and misuse of classified information.

Regarding third-party applications, the memo notes the Palantir Federal Cloud Service that hosts the apps in a container hosting methodology has not been assessed by the Army or an Army CIO policy supporting the function of contractor owned/contractor operated pipeline. None of the apps had been subject to routine web-application security scanning.

The memo alleged that the system is operating with known, unmitigated vulnerabilities, akin to deploying a weapon system with known defects. With no clear mission owner to take responsibility for the system’s operational security, the memo warned security will fall through the cracks.

The Army officials didn’t say exactly how or when each purported deficiency was addressed, but at Ivy Sting on Sept. 15, NGC2 performed well, according to Garciga. He noted that the streamlined cyber security processes allowed Ivy Sting 1 to “move forward without delay.”

Maj. Sean Minton, an Army spokesperson, said broadly, “The Army is undergoing a once-in-a-generation transformation to provide our Soldiers the capabilities they need swiftly.

“As demonstrated in this case, our proactive cybersecurity posture is designed to identify risk and mitigate it while minimizing effects on the force,” he said.

SASC Dems skeptical of Golden Dome price, feasibility

WASHINGTON — Following a closed-door briefing today, some Democratic members of the Senate Armed Services Committee are raising concerns about the cost and technical feasibility of the Golden Dome missile shield — although one Republican lawmaker said the $175 billion cost estimate previously given by President Donald Trump has stayed steady.

Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein, director for the Golden Dome, held a classified briefing today with SASC members on the initial architecture for the sprawling, ambitious system  — his first interaction with the committee since being tapped to lead the effort in May. While members were broadly positive about Guetlein’s leadership of the program and the flow of information now coming from the Pentagon, several Democrats coming out of the meeting voiced continued anxieties about whether the project is a wise use of taxpayer funding.

Arizona Democrat Sen. Mark Kelly, a former Navy fighter pilot who is the ranking Democrat on SASC’s tactical air and land subcommittee, said he continues to have “reservations” about the program, as the system will need to prove a high rate of reliability just to meet the basic requirements.

“This is an incredibly expensive system. It’s complicated. The physics are really hard, and you’ve got to build something with very high reliability to be effective, and having some experience at this stuff, I’m very skeptical,” he said. “We need a lot more information before we make decisions to spend hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars.”

Sen Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., said his anxieties on the program’s cost, timeline and feasibility were not new, noting that independent experts have put out their own estimates that are significantly longer and more expensive than the Pentagon’s projections.

“My impression is that we are receiving more information [from the Pentagon], but still additional facts are absolutely necessary to assess the Golden Dome completely and accurately,” he said.

Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va, said the program is progressing but Guetlein faced “vigorous and challenging” questions, particularly about the program’s price tag.

“I think everybody on both sides of the aisle is still really trying to get their head around that, whether the numbers that have been publicly floated are sufficient,” he said.

Few details have emerged about Golden Dome apart from the vision bestowed by the president earlier this year — that of a comprehensive homeland defense system capable of intercepting cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, which would be operational by the end of the Trump administration. Besides a $25 billion down payment for the effort made in the reconciliation bill, a budget plan for the program has not been made public — although there are signs that industry will have to pony up internal research funding in order to take part.

In a statement, a Pentagon official said that the department met its deadline to develop an initial architecture, which is currently under review.

“No additional information is available at this time, keeping operational security top of mind,” the official stated. “We continue doing our part to meet the President’s vision as Golden Dome for America remains a strategic imperative to protect our Homeland.”

Lawmakers repeatedly declined to share specifics about the timeline, cost and technologies associated with the Golden Dome effort gleaned from today’s briefing, noting its classification. But asked whether the cost estimate for the effort still coincides with the $175 billion figure shared by Trump, Sen. Kevin Cramer, R-N.D., who leads SASC’s tactical air and land subcommittee, responded that “it does.”

Not all lawmakers raised concerns with the program’s cost. Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Ala., said he pressed Guetlein on the testing schedule for Golden Dome. Sullivan wanted to see a marked departure in approach from the Missile Defense Agency, which he said had a “risk averse culture” that relies predominantly on simulated tests rather than live demonstrations.

“I was very, very satisfied with his answer. I think their goal, and it’s a big one, is to be super aggressive on live testing, real testing, not just simulations,” he said, adding that SASC’s version of the fiscal 2026 defense policy bill includes a live fire requirement for Golden Dome.  “We say at least once a year; I think he’s going to be way more aggressive than that.”