Douglas A. Macgregor's Blog, page 5

From lasers to logistics: Pentagon CTO announces top six tech priorities

WASHINGTON — Pentagon research chief Emil Michael today formally announced a previously promised purge of tech priorities. By slashing a Biden-era list of “critical technology areas” (CTAs) in half, Michael aims to focus resources on key R&D projects and accelerate them into “sprints” that produce usable technology in three years or less.

“When I stepped into this role, our office had identified 14 critical technology areas,” Michael said in a video announcement on X. “While each of these areas holds value, such a broad list dilutes focus and fails to highlight the most urgent needs of the war fighter. Fourteen priorities in truth means no priorities at all.”

“We’re narrowing this list to six,” he continued. “These six critical technology areas represent the priorities that will deliver the greatest impact, the fastest results and the most decisive advantage on the battlefield.”

The potential for quick results was a crucial consideration in picking the priorities, explained Research & Engineering official Trevor Tiedeman.

“Under Secretary Michael reviewed the prior list of 14 CTAs against three criteria: alignment with Secretary Hegseth’s priorities, suitability for milestone based ‘sprints’ to deliver capabilities, and the requirement for Under Secretary-level coordination to support cross-Departmental efforts,” Tiedeman wrote in a Monday evening email to Breaking Defense. (Hegseth and his team have pushed to devolve authority from the Office of the Secretary, which handles those “cross-departmental efforts,” to the services).

“R&E is galvanizing the War Department around 12–36-month technology development and delivery ‘sprints,’” Tiedeman went on. “This approach directs funding toward the most urgent national security priorities.”

The New Big Six

The new list, meant to bring speed and focus to research spending, comprises:

Applied Artificial Intelligence (AAI): This category covers AI from back-office business functions to frontline warfighting, DoD said the priority on AI is “aligned with the White House AI Action Plan,” which envisions a zero-sum AI race between the US and China. (A recent reorganization brought the Pentagon’s Chief Digital & AI Office, the CDAO, under Michael’s direct control).

Biomanufacturing (BIO): This refers to “harnessing living systems” for mass production of key materials. In essence, biomanufacturing brews vital chemicals, like lubricants or anti-corrosion coatings, in giant vats of genetically engineered microorganisms, instead of using traditional petrochemical processes, which have been increasingly outsourced overseas. This could “eliminate any supply chain vulnerabilities,” Michael said.

Contested Logistics Technologies (LOG): Less a specific technology than a broad mission, LOG refers to using whatever tech can help “ensure seamless resupply and operational continuity in contested environments.” It’s worth noting that the term “contested,” in Pentagon jargon, applies particularly to the Pacific during a war with China.

Quantum and Battlefield Information Dominance (Q-BID): “Dominance” requires improving both longstanding radio-frequency tech and emerging quantum technologies to help US forces communicate and navigate. Officials have said for over a decade that they’re particularly concerned about the potential for traditional GPS and radio to be jammed by a high-tech adversary like Russia or China.

Scaled Hypersonics (SHY): “Scaling” means moving hypersonic missiles from the current array of small-scale prototypes to mass production. Hypersonic systems can move at Mach 5 or higher within the atmosphere, making them faster than current cruise missiles and more agile than ballistic missiles. For years, US officials have warned Russia and China are investing heavily and testing more frequently.

Scaled Directed Energy (SCADE): Much as in hypersonics, scaling “directed energy” means moving high-energy lasers and microwave-beam weapons from the promising small-scale demonstrations into mass production. The Pentagon, like other global militaries, hopes energy weapons could take effectively unlimited shots against incoming drone swarms and missile barrages that could overwhelm existing defenses such as Patriot and THAAD.

That list of six replaces an older list that included eight other CTAs [PDF] now cut, but many specific initiatives will be folded under one of the new big six.

“Previous CTAs, such as FutureG, Integrated Sensing & Cyber, and Quantum, are being consolidated and leveraged under the new Quantum & Battlefield Information Dominance (Q-BID) portfolio,” Tiedeman wrote.

The old “FutureG” was a catchall for next-generation wireless technologies. Other former CTA portfolios that might provide candidates for consolidation under Q-BID include “Integrated Network Systems” and “Space.”  

Likewise, aspects of “Advanced Computing and Software” and “Human Machine Interfaces” could continue under Applied AI. Programs now under “Microelectronics” and “Advanced Materials” could fit in multiple categories. Even “Renewable Energy” — not a favorite topic of the Trump Administration — could see some projects move under Contested Logistics or Biomanufacturing.

At the very least, Michael is keeping the current cadre of experts who’ve been serving as “principal directors” for each of the 14 old critical technologies. (Some of these officials handled two CTAs at once).

“We can confirm that none of our Principal Directors are being reassigned out of R&E,” Tiedeman said. “R&E will continue to strategically invest in a broad set of technologies outside the focused list of CTAs to sustain innovation.”

The new big six, however, will now receive the lion’s share of high-level attention, the under secretary made clear.

“These critical technology areas are actionable, tangible solutions to the challenges that our warfighters face today. They are driven by focused sprints, designed to deliver results in the now, not in 15 years,” Michael said in his video announcement. “These priorities will ensure that our war fighters never face a fair fight.”

Updated at 8:50 pm with additional details from Research & Engineering official Trevor Tiedeman.

New Army-led task force plans to stand up digital marketplace for counter-drone tech

WASHINGTON — The Army-led Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401), responsible for overseeing tech designed to counter small drone threats against the military and other intelligence agencies, is establishing an online marketplace where military leaders and other agency heads can purchase counter-drone equipment. 

Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, the task force’s director, said Friday that there are a plethora of vendors of all shapes and sizes who are able to provide counter-unmanned aerial systems (c-UAS) solutions to the military, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI and local law enforcement. Because of this there should be a central system in place where they can buy counter-drone tech more easily and quickly, he said. The c-UAS marketplace will coincide with a UAS marketplace that the Army is also in the midst of setting up, Ross said.

“We are going to establish a UAS and counter-UAS marketplace that will provide authoritative data on how each of these systems performs under varying conditions and allow users or customers to select a tool that’s right for them. We’ve got a wide variety of counter-UAS tools, and I actually think that we need all of them, because depending on where you are or what threat you’re focused on, your requirements will be slightly different,” Ross told a small group of reporters.

“We want to ensure that we provide a range of options, both to the Department of War and to our interagency partners,” he added before clarifying that the task force has not set a date for when the digital marketplace will launch nor how many systems will be available for purchase. 

The move comes nearly three months after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth created the task force to replace the old service-led Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO). Unlike with the JCO, Ross will report directly to the deputy secretary of defense, have acquisition and procurement authority, and be the support organization for the department’s “forensics, exploitation, and replication” for C-sUAS, an August 27 memo announcing the task force notes.

As Breaking Defense previously reported, all department-wide c-sUAS research and development efforts will be managed by JIATF 401, and it can approve up to $50 million per c-UAS development effort. However, the development of service-specific and US Special Operations Command capabilities are exempt from the move. 

With regards to how the task force will fund the marketplace, Ross confirmed that JIATF 401 does not have a budget yet, but said funds will likely derive from a series of places including operations and maintenance; research, development, testing and evaluation; and from procurement funds. 

“I think [where] we’ll be able to see some of the greatest gains is going to be with procurement dollars, because that will allow us to put counter-UAS capability into the hands of our formations,” he said. 

Ross stayed tight-lipped about the types of drones that the marketplace will offer, but said that it will include drone-detecting capabilities such as acoustic radar tools and non-kinetic effectors like radio frequency defeat capabilities.

“Today, if we were to field a counter-UAS solution around some critical infrastructure in the US, we would likely not include an explosive warhead. So, we would want a low-collateral interceptor if we’re going to use a kinetic interceptor, opposed to an explosive solution that might be more appropriate for a combat environment,” he said. 

So far, Ross said, the task force has helped provide Northern Command with “support” for such capabilities at the southern border.

“If you look across the 1,954 mile border, I think that we do face a challenge of unmanned systems, and NORTHCOM is focused on addressing those challenges now, in conjunction with other lead federal agencies, specifically DHS,” Ross said. “What we’re working towards is an integrated, distributed sensing network that includes both passive and active sensors, and then layering in  effectors, or counter-UAS effectors that allow us to defeat a threat as it crosses the border.” 

Further, Ross said, the task force is focused on countering Group 1 and 2 drones, which are smaller platforms weighing only 20 to 55 pounds. 

“We have robust capability for countering group 3 UAS,” Ross said. “But we have not spent as much time on countering Group 1 and Group 2 UAS that we see pretty consistently across the homeland.” 

While the marketplace is still in the works, JIATF 401 plans to hold a c-UAS summit later this month to better outline how it plans on working with interagency partners to test and evaluate platforms before they are potentially added to the marketplace. 

“We want to make sure that we’ve got enduring partnership with each of those agencies, because we know this problem is going to continue to evolve over time, and we want to be able to move at the speed of relevance,” Ross said. 

Army doubles balloons for upcoming SWARMS demo, adds NORAD to the mix

WASHINGTON — US Army plans for a high-altitude balloon swarm experiment in the Indo-Pacific region are expanding, with more platforms and help from the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to track them, according to a senior service official.

“We’re using this both to define what intel sensing could look like at scale [and] operationalizing the stratosphere for a phase one-type conflict,” Andrew Evans, the director for the new Strategy & Transformation Office inside the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence shop (G-2), told Breaking Defense.

The idea, he said in an interview in October, is to use the swarm as a dispersed, attritable intel-gathering tool at the outset of some hostilities or in the immediate aftermath of a worrying geopolitical incident.

“[For example], if something happened and you’re less concerned about station keeping and you just need to get sensors in the air to know what the heck’s going on, this is sort of the vision,” he said. “But you have to do it at volume and create mass disruption for an adversary.”

In August, Breaking Defense first reported on the 2026 experiment but since then, the number of potential balloons has doubled to 200, Evans explained.

Also new, Evans said NORAD reached out to the service with an offer to use its ground-based radars to track the floating objects to better get a picture of how such a swarm, if used by an adversary, would look to US observers, which would aid both offensive and defensive planning. The US Coast Guard is also expected to be on hand to help track the balloons. All of it is part of the “Lego building” that makes up the extremely high-altitude experiment.

While the service is still fleshing out details for next year’s $3.5 million experiment — now being called the Swarming Worldwide Autonomous Reconnaissance in the Multi-domain System (SWARMS) — the tentative plan is to acquire those couple hundred balloons. They will then be launched within 1,000 miles of Hawaii from both islands and ships, with some simply acting as decoys while others are outfitted with intel sensors, jammers or faux-kinetic effectors. 

“We’re going to launch in multiple waves, demonstrating what a phased use of these might look like over time,” Evans explained. “We’re going to create mass disruption [of the] stratosphere to demonstrate what it would look like if this was coming at you.”

Evans later added that the use of decoys is something the US is “seeing play out in Ukraine,” saying if it’s done “at scale, the adversary doesn’t know if it’s a decoy, if it’s a sensor, if it’s an effector. So, they have to operate as if any of it could kill them.” 

What the experiment isn’t going to do though, is a live collection of intel and disseminate that data onward. That part of the equation, Evans explained, has not been completely worked out, and service officials are hoping to glean insights on those lingering question marks during the 2026 SWARMS demo and then fold them into a possible follow-on event in 2027.

“We want to get the training wheels off this thing, and then we’ll start to partner,” Evans said.

“Not all of this has been completely solved yet. … We think that we’re going to have some challenges and therefore, need to resolve how we do the architecture of this, especially when you have multiple vendors that are all coming with their capabilities,” he said.

Theresa Hitchens contributed to this report.

Powering the future: Securing America with domestically made microelectronics

Defense technologies that span multifunction sensing, electronic warfare, communications, and radar demand the most advanced microchips to outpace evolving threats and stay ahead of current technology. A focus on smaller size, energy efficiency, tighter packaging, and most importantly – speed – set the tone for success.

For decades, much of the world’s semiconductor production migrated offshore, leaving the US exposed to potential supply chain vulnerabilities and global military threats. Reversing that trend through onshoring is now viewed as essential to rebuild a resilient industrial base capable of sustaining long-term innovation and mission success.

“The most significant trend we’re seeing right now is the push to bring manufacturing microelectronics – also known as semiconductors – back to the U.S. from the Far East,” said Vern Boyle, vice president of Northrop Grumman’s Microelectronics Center. “After decades of outsourcing, there’s a growing recognition of the vulnerabilities that came with relying heavily on overseas production. This realization has ignited a movement to expand semiconductor fabrication within the United States. At Northrop Grumman, we’re proud to lead the charge by continuing to do what we’ve always done — manufacturing semiconductors right here at home.”

Nowhere is that more evident than in the company’s dual-use innovations and its record-breaking Terahertz (THz) chip which showcases how cutting-edge design and manufacturing capabilities can deliver both immediate application benefits and long-term technological advantages. In 2016, the Northrop Grumman THz chip became the first of its kind to reach an unprecedented processing speed of one terahertz, marking a historic milestone in chip technology and computing power. 

“The program’s purpose was to create high-speed, high-processing-rate technology that is 1,000 times faster than the nearest competing technology,” said Boyle. “Communications is one application, high-rate sensing of environmental phenomenology for weather prediction is another. We’re in the early stages on the application side and have matured the technology to the point where we’re starting to build systems with it.” 

This revolutionary breakthrough earned its place in the Guinness World Records for containing the fastest chip transistors in existence, a record that remains unchallenged to this day. 

Blending dual-use commercial and defense

While commercial industry focuses mainly on delivering the “newest” integrated circuits at high volume, the chips needed for defense applications are typically purpose-built to meet defense requirements. Fewer may be needed, but they’re built for higher functionality and to last the lifetime of the system.

Through years of experience, commercial companies have been technically capable of producing certain components. However, their high-volume, profit-driven business models are often misaligned with the specialized, low-quantity needs of defense applications. Defense products are tailored for exceptional multifunction sensing, electronic warfare, communications, and radar for fighter planes. It’s microelectronics that allow those comms and radar systems to function across a variety of frequency bands that aren’t accessible otherwise, while remaining protected in high threat contested environments.

“Radar applications are a prime example of the multifunction systems we design these custom parts for,” explained Boyle. “For years, Northrop Grumman has been building radars for platforms like the F-16, F-22, and F-35. These systems require components capable of generating extremely high transmit power while covering wide frequency ranges, enabling them to detect and track threats at long distances. The advanced chips inside enable this high-level radar performance, ultimately enhancing the survivability of the platforms they’re integrated into.”

Recently, Northrop Grumman proactively took steps to strengthen the infrastructure for making secure, military-grade chips by opening the Microelectronics Center to external aerospace and defense companies. (Photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman)

Not just chips but ‘packages’ of them

As the demand for more powerful and versatile electronics grows – especially in defense and other cutting-edge industries – advanced packaging is becoming essential to overcoming the limits of traditional semiconductor manufacturing, paving the way for smarter, more capable systems.

Advanced packaging involves integrating multiple chips into compact, high-performance packages, essentially stacking or combining semiconductors designed for different tasks into a single, cohesive unit. This approach enables significantly more functionality within a smaller footprint, improving speed, efficiency, and overall system performance. It is becoming essential to overcoming the limits of traditional semiconductor manufacturing, paving the way for smarter, more capable systems.

“In some cases, it’s about improving performance, by choosing the best combination of chips for the package or improving the connection between a transceiver and a digital processor,” explained Boyle. “In others, it’s about maximizing space, like in the front-end of an F-35 or any tactical fighter, where space is at a premium and fitting more functionality into a smaller footprint is critical.  Ultimately, advanced packaging delivers a powerful combination of enhanced performance, smaller size, and greater energy efficiency, making it a transformative technology for modern applications.” 

Delivering and innovating for today and tomorrow

Recently, Northrop Grumman proactively took steps to strengthen the infrastructure for making secure, military-grade chips by opening the Microelectronics Center to external aerospace and defense companies. This now allows a multitude of platform providers to leverage Northrop Grumman expertise and access the company’s three US government-accredited semiconductor manufacturing facilities. Boyle noted how this decision expands the secure production of defense microelectronics on US soil. 

“By opening our defense-grade manufacturing facilities to partners, Northrop Grumman is expanding and strengthening the resilience of America’s semiconductor industry and supply chain. We are providing partners with unprecedented access to design and develop domestic chips, as well as the ability to directly purchase from us, enhancing collaboration across the broader defense industrial base.”

The same defense companies who compete on myriad programs are the ones leading the charge to make the nation safer, and they need mission-tailored, resilient and secure microelectronics to do it. Northrop Grumman can not only provide those services but has an intimate knowledge of defense applications across every domain. Now the work that has been done for commercial partners can be elevated and specified to benefit defense customers. 

Through the open access business model, these companies now have access to disruptive semiconductor solutions and onshore advanced packaging, proving that American made systems will be powered today and tomorrow by American-made chips.

Golden Dome: Loosen the gag order, and start talking

The Trump administration’s signature defense initiative, a next-generation missile defense capability for the US homeland, is both strategically necessary and long overdue. It is also already in jeopardy of failure.

The reason? A lack of dialogue and persuasion. If the Pentagon does not start explaining Golden Dome, it will never be built.

Almost ten months have passed since the Jan. 27 executive order calling for an “Iron Dome for America.” Following President Donald Trump’s approval of an initial reference architecture, a May 20 Oval Office event provided scarce detail beyond noting the new “Golden Dome” moniker. On May 27, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth signed a memo establishing a Golden Dome office with robust acquisition authorities. In mid-September, a more detailed architecture was delivered to Pentagon leadership. Its implementation plan is expected this week.

Significant missile threats make the need for air and missile defense of the homeland nearly self-evident. It is not hard to imagine Operation Spiderweb-type attacks on airfields, massive ballistic attacks on US homeland military bases similar to Iran’s attack on Al Udeid, or waves of cruise missile strikes on Washington, DC, as has been seen in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, work is needed to connect those threats to whatever solutions are in mind. Unfortunately, outside of a narrow scope of the executive branch, there has been precious little conversation about the strategic concept behind Golden Dome. Uncertainty abounds even within the Pentagon, including around how Golden Dome fits into broader defense strategy and policies.

The main problem is that a gag order precludes virtually any discussion of the initiative, even to Congress. A security and classification guide has still not been finalized. Despite its presidential mandate, “Golden Dome” are words that must not be spoken.

Executive orders are directives that can mobilize the executive branch and the military. But directives and orders alone are insufficient to build and field new capabilities, let alone to build consensus. Executive actions alone cannot legislate, appropriate, or persuade.

In the absence of information, public and congressional debate has swirled around uninformed and often misleading speculation. Better communication is needed for three critical audiences: Congress, industry, and everyone else.

Capitol Hill

The biggest impediment to Golden Dome’s long-term durability has been the gag order’s limitation on sharing information with Congress. The Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome, Gen. Michael Guetlein, was not allowed to give any briefings to congressional staff until Sept. 30 — some 76 days after his confirmation.

Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., is right to say that “We need a lot more information before we make decisions to spend hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars.” Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Ak. made a similar point when criticizing the Pentagon for not communicating with the Hill about the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. For Golden Dome to garner broad, ongoing legislative support, members and professional staff need to understand at least some basic threat metrics, strategic concepts, cost estimates, and tradeoffs — even if they are not yet set in stone.

Industry

The second critical audience is the defense industry. Private companies are investing hundreds of millions of dollars to prepare for building Golden Dome despite precious little insight about what the government wants them to do.

We’ve heard the Pentagon say companies should be spending more on internal investments, but boards, corporate officers, and business unit leaders must deliberate about financial risks and tradeoffs before making such commitments. Without knowing more about what their customer wants, it is difficult for many firms to spend meaningful sums on efforts of uncertain scope and purpose. It is challenging for publicly traded companies to justify such investment risk to shareholders.

Companies put on a good face publicly, but behind the scenes, the corrosive level of uncertainty is palpable. Especially given acquisition strategies that put a greater onus of risk on industry, the Pentagon needs its industrial base to have sufficient insight to believe the plan worthy of putting capital on the line. The reconciliation bill allocated $25 billion for Golden Dome; so far, none has yet been put on contract.

Golden Dome is shaping up to be a case study of what Hegseth recently warned against — that a lack of clarity from the Pentagon means that “contractors waste time guessing instead of building.”

To be sure, DoD has released some broad contracting vehicles, issued a few requests for information, and provided a broad overview at an unclassified industry summit in August. It is not nearly enough. The space-based interceptor request for prototype proposals is in some respects the only one moving forward, with prizes expected to be awarded soon. After spending nine months staffing up and preparing to implement the Pentagon’s wishes, defense industry executives are already calculating exit plans, should the broader initiative fizzle.

Everyone Else

Then there is everyone else: the American public, allies and partners, and adversaries. A lack of strategic messaging has resulted in misinformation and ill-informed speculation about what the initiative is.

Commentators are understandably trying to estimate the cost of what the architecture might involve. In the absence of information, many estimates are likely off by an order of magnitude. For an undertaking of this size, in a democratic republic, some level of public understanding is important to enable Congress and the executive branch to move forward.

Allies are also largely in the dark. The January executive order required an Allied and Theater Missile Defense Review to be completed by May 15. Many key allies and partners seem to have not yet been consulted. Canadian participation was mentioned in the Oval Office announcement, but this is likely a reference to sensor modernization efforts already underway. Should the US wish to leverage the defense industrial bases of its closest allies, it would be helpful to give them a heads up.

While it is useful to keep one’s enemies guessing, articulating some goals and parameters of Golden Dome can impose costs and communicate credible capabilities. Russia and China have been aggressively messaging that Golden Dome will be destabilizing and cause an arms race, or that the US is incapable of the effort. Public diplomacy to refute those allegations can begin with communicating that Golden Dome’s intent and capabilities will meaningfully raise the threshold for their adventurism.

What To Say

The good news is that the reasons America needs Golden Dome are easy to articulate. A glance at headlines from Ukraine, Israel, and the Red Sea confirms that while missiles have become weapons of choice, missile defenses have been remarkably effective.

The better news is that the effort is doable. The architecture is likely to be far more modest, more connected to current capabilities and ongoing work, and altogether more achievable than many commentators suggest. Hints for this are found in past industry day slides and a handful of requests for information. The industry day slides referenced “Limited Area Defense” for a select number of areas, as well as “Wide Area Surveillance.” Both have been terms of art within NORAD/NORTHCOM for their longtime pursuit of continental air defense of the US and Canadian homelands.

Slightly different missile launchers and some new radars for deployment in the Southeast United States — a few recent RFIs — are not exactly bleeding edge developmental efforts. This is good: While next generation capability is certainly in need of development, it would be imprudent to neglect the near-term low hanging fruit that is available to field real capability to contend with today’s threats.

The executive order emphasized attention to the full spectrum of threats: not just ICBMs and hypersonic gliders, but also air defense threats like cruise missiles and advanced drones. A significant amount of capability already exists to stitch together effective counters to cruise missiles, UAVs, and ballistic missiles.

That so much capability exists today should come as no surprise. Forty years of research and development have yielded eye watering capabilities. Every single missile defense system fielded today, save one (the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System, for intercepting ICBMs), has successfully intercepted missiles fired in anger over the last few years in real world operational engagements. Hit-to-kill has become so routine that the major complaint is that bullets are not hitting bullets more cheaply. With the exception of space-based interceptor development, much of the Golden Dome architecture will have an easier ramp to success.

The biggest near-term challenge will be the integration of these capabilities with a battle management system to make it real. As Gen. Guetlein himself has said, “Golden Dome isn’t a technology problem. It is an organizational behavior and social engineering challenge.” Successfully integrating systems across different domains, services, and agencies that were never designed to work together will, above all, require dialogue.

Another beneficial factor is the operating environment. Operating at home is different than in a contested environment overseas, with eased manning and power requirements. A Patriot battery operating at home can have a lighter footprint than one alone in the middle of a desert surrounded by enemies.

At least in terms of lower-tier threats, additional details from industry day suggest that Golden Dome will field a limited but meaningful measure of protection of certain number of sites. This capability would counter fait accompli, cheap shots, or decapitation attacks designed to degrade military means or political will.

No missile defense initiative will produce an impenetrable missile shield defending every acre of US territory from any possible drone or missile strikes. Golden Dome need not make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, but rather raise the threshold for limited, coercive attacks on the homeland. Should boost-phase ICBM engagement be demonstrated in 2028, a space-based interceptor layer could further complicate adversary planning.

The logic is hardly new that active defenses contribute to deterrence by raising the prospect of deterrence by denial. If that is Golden Dome’s aim, it needs to be said.

Just Start Talking

The Golden Dome initiative will be real and durable when its logic is understood on a broad, bipartisan, public basis. Such understanding can be achieved, but it will require a communication campaign. Without it, Golden Dome may remain a thick binder of great ideas locked in a Pentagon vault, filed alongside other admirable ambitions which never materialized.

To be sure, the Pentagon is prudent to keep some details quiet. Exact numbers of interceptors, notional salvo sizes, and sensitive operational details should be closely held. The need for operational security should not get in the way, however, of sharing a few big ideas about what Golden Dome is, how it will enhance US security, and why it is doable.

The sound of silence plays into the hands of those, at home and abroad, who caricature the effort as foolhardy, or reduce it to a meme. A failure to communicate invites Russian and Chinese propaganda to define the narrative.

Hegseth has called for aggressive, fast approaches to defense acquisition. His Nov. 7 memo states that “speed to capability delivery” is “the decisive factor in maintaining deterrence and warfighting advantage.” That acquisition approach must be applied to Golden Dome. Implementation speed, however, first requires understanding and persuasion.

Because the missile threats of today are profound, persuasion should not be that hard. There is a compelling story to be told. Those who can tell the story must be allowed to do so.

It’s time to loosen the gag order and start talking.

Tom Karako is the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In a first, F-22 pilot controls wingman drone from cockpit, General Atomics says

DUBAI AIR SHOW — In what General Atomics Aeronautical Systems says is the first known demonstration of its kind for the F-22 Raptor, a pilot flying the stealth fighter successfully controlled an MQ-20 Avenger drone from the jet’s cockpit — a capability the US Air Force expects will be key to its future forces. 

The demonstration occurred Oct. 21 at the Nevada Test and Training Range, with F-22 manufacturer Lockheed Martin and defense firm L3Harris teaming up as part of a company-funded demo, MQ-20-maker GA revealed today in a press release. The test flight is one of several planned for internal research and development.

“The MQ-20 Avenger, tricked out with mature mission autonomy software, is a perfect CCA surrogate and allows us to move fast and move first,” GA spokesman C. Mark Brinkley told Breaking Defense. “We already know the F-22 will play a critical role in crewed-uncrewed teaming operations, and General Atomics is in a unique position to get this started now.”

The effort leveraged Lockheed’s open radio architectures to integrate L3Harris-supplied datalinks and software-defined radios for the demo, with one radio put on the Avenger and another on the Raptor, according to GA. The drone was controlled using a tablet in the single-seat jet and a new software government reference architecture, exhibiting what GA says was non-proprietary, US-government-owned communications capabilities. 

Alongside Anduril, GA is currently on contract for the first round of the US Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program, which envisions manned fighters operating drone wingmen in the manner of the MQ-20 demo. GA has formally put up its YFQ-42A unmanned aircraft for the actual competition, while it flies the MQ-20 as an integration test article. RTX and Shield AI are separately on contract for the drone wingmen’s autonomy suites, Breaking Defense previously reported. 

A full-sized model of General Atomics’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (top) and Anduril’s (bottom) on display at AFA 2024 on Sept. 20, 2024. (Breaking Defense photos)

Service officials maintain they can carry multiple contractors, including new entrants, into production for the first CCA round, while awards for conceptual contracts for the second round are expected within months. As of Halloween, both Anduril and GA have notched a first flight for their respective prototype airframes in the CCA program. 

The F-22 demonstration follows the recent revelation from the US Air Force that the Raptor will serve as the “threshold platform” for drone integration.

An Air Force official previously told Breaking Defense that the fighter was prioritized due to its availability and role in the “pacing environment,” but also said that the F-22 is simply a starting point for unmanned teaming that will eventually expand to other aircraft like the F-35.

As China pushes out from the First Island Chain, US allies like Japan and the Philippines surveil from nearby

A new strategic reality is taking shape across the Indo-Pacific, driven by China’s rapid expansion of military and industrial power on land, at sea, in space, and in cyberspace. That forces the US, UK and democracies across the Indo-Pacific to rethink deterrence itself. 

At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth captured the mood bluntly: “We’re not going to sugar-coat it. The threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent.” He warned that Beijing’s militarization of every domain, coupled with industrial speed and political control, represents a test not only of US power but of the free world’s ability to adapt before it’s too late.

“We’ve all seen the videos and pictures of water cannons, ship-to-ship collisions, and illegal boardings at sea,” Hegseth said. “We’re also seeing the illegal seizing and militarizing of lands in the South China Sea. These actions reveal a lack of respect for neighbors and they challenge sovereignty, freedom of navigation, and overflight. We are closely watching China’s destabilizing actions. Any unilateral attempt to change the status quo in the South China Sea and the First Island Chain by force or coercion is unacceptable.”

That urgency now defines alliance strategy from the South China Sea to the Sea of Japan. Shipbuilding capacity, space operations, and gray-zone coercion are no longer separate stories, and are converging into a strategic, regional strategy designed to erode deterrence through constant pressure. 

At the same time, internal fissures inside China’s military-political structure, coupled with renewed alignment among countries such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, are altering the strategic equation in unpredictable ways.

As nations recalibrate, one central question drives the debate: can the US, UK, and its allies adapt fast enough to offset Beijing’s manufacturing capability and industrial momentum?

“The industrial power of China is the simple way of putting anxiety at the moment,” said Philip Shetler‑Jones, senior research fellow for Indo‑Pacific Security at London’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). “The scale and pace of shipbuilding gives China not just the ability to put a large fleet at sea and more modernized equipment, but also the ability to maintain and potentially replace losses in war, which is a big difference between China and almost everyone else. 

The capacity to regenerate force through industrial tempo is a foundational shift, not just for China’s naval forces but also for production, sustainment, and modernization of air and space systems, not to mention its capabilities in offensive and defensive cyber, electronic warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). That means deterrence no longer starts with defeating a single threat, but preventing a cascade of challenges across multiple warfighting domains.

“Obviously there’s a quantity problem,” said Gregory Poling, director and senior fellow in the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, referring to China’s production engine. “Biggest navy by number, biggest coast guard, largest rocket force in the world, which means that all of the smaller states, particularly Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan are thinking more about asymmetric capabilities, about intermediate range strike, about uncrewed platforms.

“There’s a ton of interest just over the last few years in places like the Philippines and Indonesia on getting external support for more uncrewed platforms. A lot of investments in things like the BrahMos missile system from India for both the Philippines and Vietnam. The strategic rationale is more or less identical to what you hear on the US side for the Marines and increasingly the Army – the need to engage in relatively low cost sea-denial capabilities because it would be a fool’s game to try to match China tonnage for tonnage these days.”

Three U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons assigned to the 35th Fighter Squadron, Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea, fly in formation before aerial refueling during Freedom Flag 25-2 over the Pacific Ocean, Nov. 6, 2025. Bilateral training exercises help ensure allies are able to come together to effectively respond to demanding scenarios in defense of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Melany Bermudez)

The two linchpin countries in the Indo-Pacific

Regional deterrence is assuming a new geography of frontline actors beyond America’s traditional Pacific power role. At the tip of the spear, physically and metaphorically, areJapan and the Philippines. 

Japan is not just a heavy industry power with high-tech companies and space-based capabilities that surpass the UK’s, but a country whose geographic positioning across the Indo-Pacific is vital to Taiwan’s sustainment during a Chinese blockade. It’s also America’s most stable ally and linchpin of its Pacific strategy. At the same time, its own sea lanes would be threatened by the presence of a massive Chinese naval force should Taiwan be cut off. Without Japan’s strategic role, the US’s entire posture in the region doesn’t work, according to Shetler-Jones. 

“It has, perhaps after China, still the most capable navy in the region. It’s gradually continuing to dispense with post-World War II constraints and taboos flowing from the constitutional interpretations of that. It’s a huge economy. So when they go from two percent to three or four (in defense spending of GDP), it makes an enormous difference. They’re able to translate that money into capability because they also have the industrial power, the high-tech companies, and the heavy industry. They’re in lots of areas.”

Japan would be strategically valuable just from where it sits geographically.

“If you’re worried about Taiwan, Japan is by far the most critical variable about how Taiwan gets support, either with Japan’s acquiescence or even from Japan under certain circumstances, Japan sort of coming in behind the US or with the US,” he said.

Geography also drives the significance of the Philippines in any Chinese foray into Taiwan, and for the same reason as Japan in that it comes right to the edge of Taiwan’s maritime zones. 

“Without the Japanese and the Filipinos, we’re not an Indo-Pacific power, at least not in the First Island Chain,” said Poling. “You can’t possibly contest Chinese A2/AD capabilities if you’re operating from Guam and from Hawaii. You have to do it from Japan and from the Philippines. 

“That’s our biggest political asset. It allows everything else [such as] leveraging that for things like Marine Littoral Regiments in the southwest islands or [around] Japan. Doing heel-to-toe rotations in the Philippines makes a big difference, at least if you want to be able to hold Chinese vessels at risk in order to enhance deterrence.”

Both the Philippines and Japan play key roles in surveilling the First Island Chain – supplying eyes, ears, and sensors so the US and its allies can monitor all points of ingress and egress. 

“Our undersea capabilities are the ones most talked about, and it still is our greatest edge,” said Poling. “It’s the one capability the US Navy has that China can’t compete with, at least not yet. The ability to ensure that the US sub fleet has uncontested access everywhere in the First Island Chain, and China cannot in the inverse break out of the First Island Chain uncontested, is key.”

Frontline allies

The strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific is shifting around two central realities: China’s accelerating military-industrial output and the emergence of new frontline actors essential to preserving regional stability. Beijing’s ability to rapidly field, modernize, and replace naval, air, and missile forces – combined with advances in space, cyber, ISR, and electronic warfare – has created a deterrence environment defined by tempo and scale.

Sustaining stability in that environment will depend on how quickly the US, UK, Japan, the Philippines, and other regional partners can synchronize their own industrial capacity, maritime posture, and intelligence networks. Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is no longer anchored solely in US presence; it relies on the ability of frontline allies to hold the line, complicate Chinese operations, and keep the First Island Chain accessible.

Zelenskyy says Ukraine could buy up to 100 French Rafale fighters

WASHINGTON — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared at a French airbase with President Emmanuel Macron today to sign a letter of intent for Kyiv to potentially purchase up to 100 Rafale fighter jets.

The proposal, finalized with signatures and as a Rafale loomed in the background, was a surprise move, coming just weeks after Zelenskyy signed a similar letter of intent to buy scores of Swedish-made Gripen fighters.

The French president’s office released a video of the signing, describing the agreement as “historic,” though saying it doesn’t yet amount to a sales contract, according to AFP. It’s a proposal that could be realized “over a timeframe of about 10 years,” the president’s office reportedly said. The deal could also include air defense systems.

“This document enables Ukraine to procure military equipment from France’s defense industrial and technological base, including 100 Rafale F4 aircraft by 2035 for Ukraine’s combat aviation, SAMP/T air-defense systems, air-defense radars, air-to-air missiles, and aerial bombs,” Zelenskyy posted on X. “New aircraft, new reinforcements, new steps to strengthen our army and our country. I am deeply grateful to France, President [Macron], and all the French people.”

Macron reportedly called the agreement “huge” and said it’s something that’s “needed for the regeneration of the Ukrainian military.”

Ukraine has been keen to upgrade its aerial platforms, both in the form of urgent donations and purchases to aid in the fight against Russia and for a much longer-term modernization effort. The goal of the new letter, a French official told Le Monde, is to “enable [Kyiv] to acquire the systems it needs to respond to Russian aggression.”

The Rafale, made by Dassault Aviation, is France’s most advanced fighter jet — at least until (or if) the Future Combat Air System fighter comes online in the 2040. Ukraine’s air force is currently a mishmash of Soviet- and Western-designed fighters, including the MiG-29 and US-made F-16.

Ukraine’s air force appeared to make a sly reference to today’s deal shortly before it was announced, releasing a video of a Ukrainian-flown, French-made Mirage 2000 fighter jet on a “combat mission” and saying it was “awaiting good news from France.”

New KC-46 vision system begins test flights, as Boeing eyes more Gulf sales

DUBAI AIRSHOW — Boeing has flown a new vision system on the company’s troubled KC-46 Pegasus air refueler for the first time, the firm’s defense chief revealed today, a key step toward resolving an issue that has plagued the platform for years.

Speaking during a roundtable with reporters ahead of the Dubai Airshow here, Steve Parker also disputed that cost increases influenced the US Air Force’s decision to ditch Boeing’s E-7 Wedgetail, emphasizing that questions over capability alone drove a rupture whose ripple effects have seemingly prompted NATO to similarly abandon aspirations for the radar plane. 

According to Parker, the flight testing for the KC-46 took place “yesterday” in the Seattle area, a manufacturing hub for the aerospace giant where the KC-46 is produced. Flight testing is critical for demonstrating a system’s maturity in operational environments, but like any development work carries risk of unwelcome discoveries. 

“It’s very rainy days, as sometimes it is in Seattle, but that’s the first flight with the new remote visual system. So that’s a huge milestone for the program,” Parker said. 

Although officials reportedly hoped to field it in 2023, the upgrade for the KC-46’s vision system, dubbed RVS 2.0, has been delayed several times and is now expected in 2027. In the meantime Boeing has been delivering Pegasus refuelers with what the Air Force dubs RVS 1.5 that carries some improvements over the 1.0 version. 

The current RVS needs to be replaced with its 2.0 successor, officials say, because of deficiencies that impede its performance. Unlike legacy tankers where boom operators peer out a window to guide telescopic refueling rods to receivers, operators in the Pegasus use cameras and remote controls. But the system struggles with dynamic lighting, where nighttime refuelings can be difficult to see or daytime runs can be washed out by sunlight.

RVS also has issues with depth perception, adding risk a boom operator could strike an aircraft during a refueling run. To address these problems, which are both rated by the Air Force as Category 1 deficiencies, RVS 2.0 will upgrade the aircraft’s two long-wave infrared and two visible spectrum cameras and add a set of visible spectrum cameras for a total of six separate lenses.

Visual issues aren’t the only woes facing the aircraft, which has several other open Category 1 deficiencies that both the US Air Force and Boeing are working to resolve. However, despite issues with the tanker, the Air Force announced earlier this year that it would forego a near-term competition to procure another tanker design and simply buy more KC-46s from Boeing.

Bernd Peters, Boeing defense’s vice president of business development and strategy, said during the roundtable that the KC-46 is a top product the company is pitching in the Middle East along with others like the T-7 Red Hawk training jet and autonomous systems. Referencing an announcement earlier this year that Qatar is seeking to buy the Pegasus, Peters said more customers could be forthcoming.

“[A]t the appropriate time, we’ll be able to discuss that. But for now, we still feel pretty bullish on KC-46 in the region,” he said.

E-7 Troubles

But things appear more sour for the firm’s Wedgetail, particularly following a surprise announcement last week that NATO countries will no longer pursue the aircraft as a replacement for the alliance’s aging E-3 Sentry. A statement from the Dutch defense ministry cited the loss of “strategic and financial foundations,” in part due to the Pentagon’s decision earlier this year to cancel its own plans for the aircraft. 

Announcing the decision to end the program — a highly anticipated acquisition for the Air Force that previously was set to replace the service’s own geriatric E-3 fleet to track airborne targets and manage forces in battle — a senior military official in June cited delays, survivability concerns and a cost increase of $588 million to $724 million per aircraft. Instead, officials said they would move to rapidly shift the aircraft’s tracking missions to satellites and buy more Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeyes as a stopgap. 

“I don’t think it had anything to do with price,” Parker said in response to questions about how the E-7 program has unraveled somewhat within the last year, saying instead that there’s “consternation within the US government about whether this capability is done from space” or from the air. Additionally, Parker said NATO has not formally made a decision to end the plane’s procurement despite that statement from the Dutch defense ministry.

“We’ll respect it, whatever decision they make,” Parker said of NATO’s E-7 plans. 

Boeing’s hope may reside with the US Congress, where lawmakers have balked at the Pentagon’s cancellation of the program, adding $200 million to the effort as part of a deal to reopen the federal government. The Air Force previously put Boeing on contract for two rapid prototype planes for delivery in FY28, though Parker demurred on whether funding from Congress could get those aircraft across the finish line to the Air Force.

“I think it’s a little bit early to tell at the moment, we’ll see what gets funded and what comes through, and we’ll go from there,” he said.

Colombia signs $3.6B deal for Gripen fighters

WASHINGTON — Colombia on Friday signed an agreement for 17 Gripen E/F fighter jets, with a value of €3.1 billion ($3.6 billion), according to a statement by Saab.

The deal covers 15 Gripen E one-seater aircraft, along with two Gripen F two-seaters and a host of equipment and weapons, the Swedish company announced. Delivery of the jets will take place between 2026 and 2032.

The decision to purchase the Gripen was made back in April, but the number of jets and total cost had not been decided. Saab beat out a US-backed offer of F-16 jets.

“I am honored that Colombia has chosen Gripen E/F to enhance its air defence capabilities and delighted to welcome Colombia into the Gripen family,” President and CEO of Saab Micael Johansson said in the statement. “This marks the beginning of a strong and long-term partnership that will strengthen Colombia’s defence and security, benefit its people, and boost the nation’s innovation power.”

Said Swedish defense minister Pal Jonson on X, “With the Colombian purchase of 17 Gripen E/F, our defence relations will deepen significantly & Colombia will receive one of the world’s greatest fighter jets.”

A translated statement from Colombian President Petro Gustavo, posted to X, included the notable line that “We are moving forward, and we must maintain this pace. At this pace, no one will dare to threaten us, neither from outside nor inside the country.” Petro has been engaged in a war of words with US President Donald Trump amidst a US military buildup in the region.

RELATED: If the US cuts Colombian military aid, Bogota’s Black Hawks likely first to feel it

The company statement also noted that the two sides have signed off on two industrial offset agreements, covering “a comprehensive industrial cooperation package that will benefit Colombia in areas including aeronautics, cyber security, health, sustainable energy and water purification technology.” Offsets are industrial trades that a company will offer up to a purchasing nation, and are sometimes required to close a deal.

Colombia now joins neighboring Brazil as an operator of the Swedish-made fighter. In addition to its 36 Gripens on order, Brazil is also home to an assembly plant for building the jets in country; it’s unclear if Colombia’s jets will also be built in Brazil.

Saab has been slowly building out the Gripen’s user base. In August, the company locked in a $550 million deal with Thailand to purchase four of the jets. And last month, Ukraine and Sweden reached a deal that will see the war-torn nation procure anywhere from 100 to 150 Gripen E fighters in the coming year. Meanwhile, there are ongoing talks with Peru as well.