Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 171

We need leaders who think like gardeners

By
Maj. Joseph Bruhl

Best
Defense department of leadership studies

Growing
up, if I wasn't playing sports, I was building model airplanes or gardening
with my father. Both were captivating
exercises, but for different reasons. Building models was a drill in precision and attention to detail. Gardening was a complex experiment in give
and take. Both developed important
skills, but as a leader I return most frequently to the lessons of my father's
garden. Leaders who think like gardeners
are better equipped to adapt, reason creatively, and approach challenges with
humility than those who think like model airplane builders. Unfortunately, many in the army prefer
fabricating P-51 Mustangs to nursing tomatoes.

Model
airplane building supports an "A+B=C" mentality that is familiar to many in the
military. Assemble the right tools,
carefully study directions (read doctrine), and work with exactitude. For the model airplane builder, nothing is
beyond his control. The only measure of success is: Does the model mirror the
standard?

Gardeners,
however, do not possess complete control. Their craft is affected by a host of things beyond their control. Gardeners' crop output is graded, not on
exactitude, but on an ability to adapt, think creatively, and remain humble
enough to try new methods.

Like the gardener,
today's combat leaders understand that progress can be affected by a host of
things beyond one's control: historic feuds, dysfunctional institutions, and
even past mistakes by U.S. forces. Here
again, adaptability, creativity and humility are keys to success.

Adaptive leadership,
however, is not limited to the counterinsurgency fight. It is a timeless military model. To support the development of
"gardener-leaders," the army should do three things: develop a profession of arms that values
thinking, writing, and education; adapt its personnel system to support diverse
experience; and renew mentorship as a foundation to the profession of arms.

1. Developing a Profession of Arms that values education,
thinking, and writing:

Access to civilian
education for both officers and NCOs must be dramatically increased. Education develops a leader's identity, mental agility,
cross-cultural savvy, and interpersonal maturity. This is why universities are often analogized
to gardens, where minds are cultivated and ideas are the harvest.

Increase the
importance of non-divisional assignments in an officer's professional
development. Assignments to the Army
Staff, the Combined Arms Center, and branch school houses are not "take a knee"
assignments; they are investments in the institutions that support our
profession and broaden
a leader's vision.

Encourage officers
and NCOs to write and publish. In a
recent article, Admiral Stavridis offers some "common sense guidelines" to
consider when writing. Army leadership, following these guidelines,
should be pushing folks to write and share; there is a wealth of untapped
wisdom that will add richness to the army's intellectual debates.

2. Adapting personnel systems to support diverse experience:

The army must
transition its personnel systems from an industrial-aged model that views
leaders as interchangeable parts to one that manages talent on an individual
basis. In the absence of complete personnel system
overhaul, the army should allow officers who self-select for civilian
education, teaching, or internships to "slip-back" a year group or two in order
to avoid missing key developmental jobs in their operational specialty.

By adapting its
personnel system to allow officers to pursue opportunities that develop
"gardener-leader" skills without hampering competitiveness for command, the army encourages its best officers to broaden their experience. When officers who pursue opportunities
outside traditional career paths command more frequently, the army demonstrates
a new set of values to junior officers.

3. Renewing mentorship as a foundation to the profession of arms:

In a culture that
promotes "gardener-leaders," mentorship is critical. Model airplane building provides step-by-step
instructions for the novice to follow. Gardening is something that can only be learned through experience and
tutelage.

Lack of mentorship
appears near the top of many surveys to explain the decision of junior officers
to leave. To reverse this trend, the
army should include mentorship in its holistic review of the profession of arms. What better way to build adaptive,
creative, and humble leaders who reflect Army values than through active and
genuine mentorship?

These three steps cultivate a culture where leaders
are not wedded to "the way we do things," but are able to adapt, think
creatively, and approach challenges with humility. All are "must haves" if the army expects to
apply the right lessons from the last decade and safeguard its profession of arms.

For more on this,
read the longer version of this article here.

Major
Joseph Bruhl is a strategic planner in irregular warfare and security force
assistance at the army's Security Cooperation Plans and Concepts Division. He
holds a B.A. from Truman State University and an M.P.A. from Harvard. He is a Next
Generation National Security Leader fellow at the Center for New American Security.

Lessons from Waziristan (II): The central role of the political agent

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on March 10, 2010

At the center of British
operations in Waziristan was not the military commander but the political
officer, writes Andrew Roe in his useful study Waging War in Waziristan. As best as I can make out, we
really don't have a parallel position -- the "political advisors" that senior
generals have in the Army are nothing like it.

The British political officer frequently was someone of military background,
holding a rank, but not in the military chain of command, and with his own small
forces to use on a daily basis. When things fell apart, he would call in the army, and the military commander would take over. But most of the time, says
Roe, he was "the central player around whom the entire local administration
revolved."

One agent, Capt. Jack "Lotus" Lewis, was not only fluent in Pushtu, he was
fluent in its local tribal dialects, Mahsud and Wazir. This appears to have been
more the rule than the exception. The Indian Political Service was a popular
destination for young Britons seeking excitement, and it could pick and choose
from applicants. Those going to the frontier had to pass the Higher Standard
Pushtu examination, and "mastery of tribal dialects was a matter of pride."
Military commanders came and went, but the political officers stayed for several
years -- and the tribes gave them their allegiance as individuals, Roe says.

Describing one successful political officer, Roe writes that he employed

steady and unfaltering conciliation, combined with personal interaction. It
was reinforced with a range of tribal subsidies for undertaking militia duty.

There always was friction between political officers and military commanders,
Roe notes, especially because the politicals would put limits on operations, or
order them to stop altogether. Also, the better a political was at his job, the
less he tended to be noticed. "[S]uccessful tribal management could consign the
officer concerned to political oblivion," Roe notes. By contrast, combat
operations led to medals and recognition.

His account of their role makes me wonder if we need to put political
officers on multi-year tours in Afghanistan. I bet Capt. Matt Pottinger
would volunteer.

And now, a few words about how to measure the enemy

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on February 12, 2010

We bring Kilcullenpalooza
to an end with his observations on a few ways of judging the performance of your
local Taliban unit. Significantly, only near the end of the essay does he focus
on the enemy. You listening, S-2s of the world?

So here are some ways to know your enemy:

"High-technology inserts." When you see the enemy using satellite phones,
sniper optics and high-end roadside bombs, those indicate that the group may
have access to external sponsors, and is a mainline Taliban outfit, rather than
just the local minor league team.
"Insurgent medical health." What shape are detainees arriving in? The local
wannabes tend to suffer from afflictions like malnutrition, parasitic diseases,
TB, and such. "Main force units, on the other hand, often have a better general
level of health," especially if based in Pakistan.
"Presence of specialist teams and foreign advisers." If you are facing a
Taliban group with mortar teams, intelligence teams, and more, then you are
facing the major leaguers. Doubly so if they have foreigners with them.
"Insurgent village of origin." Where is the guy from? If he is caught
fighting on his home turf, he may well be a part-timer and more amenable to
switching sides. These are the guys to think about reconciling, especially
because "attempts to destroy local guerrillas outright can backfire by
alienating communities, creating blood feuds that perpetuate the conflict." But
guys from outside the district "should be targeted with maximum lethality." They
can be killed without disrupting local relationships -- indeed, the locals may
feel safer  without the outsiders hanging around.
"First to fire ratio." Which side starts the firefights? That shows who
holds the tactical initiative. And the side holding that is better able to
control both its loss rate and that of its opposition. "If they are losing more
of their casualties in engagements we initiate, then we control their loss rate
and can force them below replenishment level and ultimately destroy the network
in question."
"Price of black market weapons and ammunition." Price fluctuations in common
items, such as AK-47s, or bullets for them, are possible indicators of changes
in the enemy's operating tempo. But price increases also may be signs of greater
demand by the local community, or of more effective interdiction.
"Insurgent kill/capture versus surrender ratio." You can track enemy morale
by following rates of surrender.
"Mid-level insurgent casualties." Pay attention especially to the middle
tiers, the planners, facilitators, specialists, trainers, recruiters, and
low-level operational commanders. This is the guts of an organization, and so a
good indicator of its health. Conversely, you may want to keep alive the rank
and file, who "may be good candidates for reintegration," and the top guys, who
might be convinced over time to give up.

That's it. Again, I think this is a terrific paper, one of the most
insightful things I've read lately, and one of Kilcullen's best essays. I think
it is most significant for the order of its recommendations. It tells you what
not to track, and then emphasizes measuring the people, the government, the
security forces -- and, lastly, the enemy. It is signed, "David Kilcullen/
Kabul, December 2009."

Rebecca's War Dog of the Week: Summer postcards series, a combat companion

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent 

In this photo, Maggie, a military working dog, plays with an
abandoned kitten before departing for a census and security patrol with U.S.
Marines at Patrol Base Detroit, Afghanistan, May 17, 2011. The Marines are
assigned to 3rd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 1. 

In the spirit of today's photo here's a link for animal
lovers on Facebook, called Helped
By Animals. If you have a good MWD photo -- or pics of
a soldier stray -- from the front you think deserve a viewing here, send 'em to
wardogoftheweek(at)gmail.com.

Rebecca Frankel, on leave from her FP desk, is currently writing a book about military working
dogs, to be published by Free Press.

Nate Fick: The Kerouac of our time?

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on February 4, 2010.

When I spoke at Harvard earlier this week I was struck that in conversations,
several undergraduates cited Nathaniel Fick's book One Bullet Away not just as a book they had read, but as a
work that had changed how they think about what to do with their lives. They
seem to have been influenced by it the way Ivy Leaguers in the 1960s were
influenced by Kerouac's On the Road -- sort of, "if I were really cool, that's
what I would be doing." I suspect the new direction is heavily affected by the
fact that today's freshmen have spent their entire conscious lives under the
shadow of 9/11.

I guess this shift makes Quantico the San Francisco of our time, and OCS and
TBS its Buddhist monasteries. And my other boss, John Nagl, the new Allen
Ginsberg. Just imagine him with a big old beard.

I see the best minds of my generation studying counterinsurgency . . .  

The American interrogation disaster (III): Cheneyism damaged our security

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on January 29, 2010.

Few people have more credibility with me on interrogation matters than
retired Army Col. Stuart Herrington. He has been a vocal and
articulate opponent of torture and other abuses.

So when in his speech at Fort Leavenworth, sponsored by the CGSC Foundation,
he expressed concern about the current rules governing interrogation, I am
inclined to pay attention.

As a result of a series of abuses, he said, new restrictions, new legal
rulings, and a new manual have placed a series of new constraints on the
handling of prisoners that deeply concern him. Much that was secret is now
public and available to our foes. Also, lawyers are far more involved than in
the past. "A detainee advised by an attorney is an interrogator's worse
nightmare."

He is most alarmed by the new limits on separating prisoners. This is
essential, he said, in order that prisoners not observe and police each other,
tracking how long their comrades are interrogated and punishing collaborators.
"Housing high-value detainees communally" (as was done at Guantanamo, he notes)
"is fatal to successful interrogation." Yet now, under the Army Field Manual,
separation may only be used against specific "unlawful enemy combatants,"
initially only for a period of 30 days, and requires the written approval of a
four-star commander. Even then, a prisoner can only be isolated after a
justification and interrogation plan has been provided and authorized by the
chain of command. What's more, he adds, "Other prisoners-an Iranian Quds colonel
or a North Korean officer, for example, cannot be separated, a true
show-stopper."

He places blame for this outcome squarely on the shoulders of senior Bush
administration officials:

For a professional interrogator, these new operating conditions are
onerous, and translate into a net loss for our national security. Responsibility
for this can be traced back to zealous officials in the Bush Administration who
decided that brutality was an effective shortcut to obtaining good
information-against the wisdom and experience of mainstream professional
interrogators. . . . Ironically, their ill-advised and unethical actions were
taken in the name of protecting the nation, but wound up doing harm.

My italics. Read it and weep.

Feeding the dragon: The case of Chinese attack helicopters and implications for export control reform

By Dean Cheng

Best Defense department
of corporate intelligence

This past week, a remarkably disturbing case of arms export control
violations came to light, and one which comes at a terrible time for the administration. 

From the various accounts, it would appear that a subsidiary of United
Technologies Corporation (UTC) was exporting software that was used in China's new
Z-10 attack helicopter program. Worse, according to the U.S. Attorney for Connecticut, where the
parent company is headquartered, this was not a case of technology diversion by
the Chinese, but a case where the company, Pratt and Whitney Canada (PWC), deliberately
engaged in violations of the Export Control Act.

The apparently deliberate nature of this violation makes it distinct
from something like the Loral-Hughes problems of the late 1990s which led to
the Cox Commission report on China-related security issues and the shift of
satellites and aerospace technology to the Munitions List for export controls.
In the Loral and Hughes cases, the really important technology wasn't even
technology, it was "know-how," in the form of failure analysis in the
wake of several failed Chinese space launches. The Chinese had very little
understanding of how to conduct a proper failure analysis, which involves
systems analysis, systems integration (almost in reverse), and a willingness to look
objectively at problems, without allowing "guanxi" to divert
criticism or blame. (Note that the latter aspect is not necessarily restricted
to the Chinese, but they have had far more problems in this regard than we
have.)

By contrast, the more recent case was not one of dual-use technologies,
but clearly military ones. The Z-10 attack helicopter is patterned on the U.S.
AH-64, Russian Mi-28, Eurocopter Tiger model, with a classic two-man
fore-and-aft crew disposition. There is no mistaking it for a passenger
helicopter. PWC  was apparently willing
to violate U.S.
export control laws, so as to gain access to the large Chinese civilian
helicopter market. 

For the administration, which has been striving to modify and modernize
the U.S.
export control regime, the case may raise questions about how carefully this
task much be approached. PWC's illegal exports occurred under the current
system, one which has been patched and modified but not truly overhauled.
Indeed, the administration's proposed changes would rationalize much of the
current system, allowing clearer oversight rather than the current patchwork of
sometimes contradictory lines of reporting and responsibility.

The UTC case demonstrates the continued need for export controls on
advanced, sensitive technology, but it would be unfortunate if it discouraged,
rather than encouraged, badly needed reforms to protect that technology better.

Dean Cheng is a research fellow
at the Heritage Foundation for Chinese political and security affairs.

 

A marine's Afghan AAR (VI): What being shot at means

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on December 28, 2009.

Here CWO2/Gunner Keith Marine analyzes different forms of incoming fire, and what to do about them:

Recognize small arms fire for what it is in accordance with the enemy's local TTPs. If it is just a few pop shots, more than likely the enemy is attempting to get a reaction from you and see what you do. They will shoot a couple shots at you, while using observers. You set up a base of fire and conduct an action left, then two days from now, they will conduct an identical SAF attack. If you go left this time, you will quickly locate an IED the wrong way. On the other hand, if the bad guys start shooting at you like they mean it, they are there to fight. You have to be immediate in your drill if you want to fix them and kill them. I hear all the time, how the bad guys get away. Well, don't fuck'n wait ten minutes for mortars or air. You kill enemy squads and fire teams with Marine infantry squads. Fucking assault them and utilize your weapon systems organic to the squad and superior marksmanship.

A marine's Afghan AAR (V): Learn how to patrol, dammit

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on December 24, 2009.

Here CWO2/Gunner Keith Marine gives a memorable lecture on patrolling, and
nearly runs out of letters in making his points. Read it now and believe it
later:

We have to get back our patrolling capabilities.  Ninety percent of
everything we do is patrolling but we aren't good at it. The Iraq experience
has done some good things for our Corps but it has diminished our patrolling
capabilities. Our NCOs' experience in Iraq has fostered a sure knowledge that
the double column is the preferred formation and moving along roads is
acceptable, which are exactly the wrong things to do. Right now we operate at
an acceptable level but with some focused training we can limit our casualties,
while killing more of the enemy. Everyone can spout 5-3-5 rules but few know
what it is and even fewer practice it.

A) Each patrol needs a viable mission that accomplishes a needed task.
Going here because we went over there yesterday is beyond stupid and you are
failing as a leader with that reasoning.

B) Go through the orders process in its entirety when able. At a minimum do
route planning and brief an order covering Situation (past 24 or 48 hours and
other patrols) Mission (what, where and purpose), Execution (intent, where you
expect to make contact or find IEDs and actions when that happens, IA drills for
contact, IED strike, Medevac, and cover formation types - where you will
satellite/guardian angel, wedge echelon etc).

C) Do a confirmation brief with the platoon commander.

D) Conduct Initial and Final Inspections. 

E) Use an Initial Rally Point inside the wire to conduct your final
inspection, do last minute rehearsals or rehearsal of concept drills, final com
checks, get in your initial combat formation and be counted out of the wire by
the APL -- use your APL, most of the Marines now days don't even know what that
is.

F) Point men need to be trained along with flanks. Use a dual point system --
one guy looking close for IED threat and one far scanning tree lines. Walk at a
pace that facilitates your mission, not which gets you back to the patrol base
quicker.

G) Take security halts and observe your surroundings frequently. Have one of
your patrol elements set up in observation covertly while the other element
moves into the village. Watch the actions the locals do. Want atmospherics,
see if there are runners or people move towards the patrol to greet them. If
something happens, this observation team is already set as a base of fire.

H) Investigate what is happening. Marines often see locals doing routine
tasks, like pumping water or kids playing, when if they investigated vice just
continuing to patrol on by, they would see the hole perfectly shaped for an IED
amongst the playing children dug by the guy with a pick axe being shielded by
the pretty kids playing in the road. The Taliban are masters at using the
obvious to deploy IEDs right under your nose.

I) Use deception. Send out two patrols at a time in different directions,
and then have one circle back. All too often we rotate patrols in and out. The
Taliban quickly figure out that if the patrol just went west, he has complete
freedom of movement to the East.

J) Use Satellites, traveling and bounding over watch and a variety of
formations to match the threat. 

K) Do not set patterns.

L) Stay the fuck off of roads and trails. I believe that every casualty our
battalion has taken from IEDs, with the exception of two incidents, has been on
a road or trail and it has been at times when the Marines were not required to
be on the road or trail as part of a sweep/clearance mission.

M) Use rally points.

N) Use the appropriate formation to be in the most advantageous position to
immediately gain the initiative and kill the enemy. We are very lacking in this
area and a lot of our squad leaders just don't get it. Use TDGs and a variety
of training scenarios to get them up to speed and understand a variety of
terrain and tactical based scenarios.

O) Crossing Linear Danger areas is a lost art, especially when a patrol will
walk three hundred meters along a canal to find a foot bridge to cross it -
-terrible at setting patterns, just walk through the water but set up near and
far side security first and use a variety of techniques so you don't set
patterns.

P) Communication Procedures need work. Rehearse them and have competent
Marines on the radio.

Q) Proper dispersion. Make sure it's enough to mitigate the IED threat but
not too much where you are not in a position to get combat power where it needs
to be. If you have to do ten "I'm up they see me, I'm downs" prior to getting
your weapon into action, your spent before you go into the assault. It's all
fun and games when someone is shooting at you via pop shots at 300 meters, a
completely different story when you have a few machine guns hammering down on
you from less than 100 meters.

R) Individual movement and actions such as using available cover and making
eye contact with the guy behind you every ten steps or so.

S) Stay in zone a while. We have become too bogged down with timelines. 
More often than not, the Iraq standard of four hour patrols is the constant. One platoon commander had his guys doing 12 hour patrols. Initially, when I
heard about it, I thought it was stupid.  After visiting the patrol base and
going on some of his patrols, I realized he was a genius.  He solved several
problems at once. His Marines automatically set up to observe areas because
they had to in order to rest. They spent a good deal of time speaking with
locals, because it's another way to rest. They moved slowly and deliberately,
because the Marines realized iPod time doesn't come until that 12 hours is up. They covered their entire AO almost daily and 24 hours a day. Marines had
enough time to focus on patrol prep.  There is a lot of ways to accomplish your
mission and you have to try a variety.  Change things up and never count
anything out.

Katyn: An overlooked but essential World War II movie

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on December 4, 2009.

Last weekend my wife and I watched Katyn, by the great Polish
filmmaker Andrezj Wajda. It is about the 1940 massacre of about 20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals by
the Soviets, and also about how the subsequent Communist cover-up corrupted
postwar Polish society. It isn't Saving
Private Ryan, but this should be on anyone's list of must-see World War
II movies.