Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 168

The most underappreciated general in U.S. history

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on September 27, 2010.

The most underappreciated general in U.S. history, according to readers who
responded by e-mail or in the comments section, is Nathanael Greene, a hero of
the Revolutionary War, who got more than twice as many votes as any other
candidate.

I like "RPM'"s reasoning in explaining in the comments why he went with Greene: "If you combine the
'unknown/under rated' label with 'most critical to victory in a really important
war' then the easy answer is Nathanael Greene. The British had conquered the
South and were aggressively moving north. Without Greene's victories in NC the
Revolution might have been a bust."

Here are the top 10 most underappreciated generals in American history,
according to you all:

1. Nathanael Greene

2. O.P. Smith

3. George Thomas

4. John
Buford

5. Winfield Scott

6. Lucian Truscott

7. George Crook

8.
George Kenney

9. George Marshall

10. John Reynolds

That's a good spread, with a lot of interesting choices. Clearly Greene had a
good strategy here -- as the only candidate from the Revolutionary War, he was
able to be the standard bearer for that party, while the more popular wars
dissipated their votes, with the Civil War and World War II each posting three
finishers. (I hereby dub this "the Ken Burns effect.") Given the competition, I
was impressed that Truscott finished so high. I thought Crook and Pete Quesada
would have done better, but the Indian Wars are obscure and have a taint to
them. And I suspect that in Quesada's case, the readers of this blog tend to be
ground-centric, as I am. Also, it apparently helped to be a general named
"George," who account for 40 percent of the list.  

Thanks to all who voted and discussed. I was impressed by the e-mailers who
wrote in to say that they had nominated one general, but on reflection had
decided to vote for another. I think we've demonstrated that there are a whole
lot of underappreciated generals out there. It makes me think I need to read a
good book on the American wars against the Indians/First Peoples. Any
recommendations? 

Among the most interesting write-ins were Raymond Odierno, Sir John Dill, and
Hin-mah-too-yah-lat-kekt (Rolling Thunder) AKA Chief Joseph, who got two votes
despite some questions about his citizenship. And, of course, good old Galusha
Pennypacker.

The worst general in American history?

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on June 2, 2010.

That was the discussion I was having yesterday with several friends. Here is
my ranking of their nominees:

1. Douglas MacArthur

2. Benedict Arnold

3. Ned Almond

4.
Tommy R. Franks

5. William Westmoreland

6. George McClellan

7.
Ambrose Burnside

8. Horatio Gates

It was my contest, so I declared MacArthur the No. 1 loser, because of his
unique record of being insubordinate to three presidents (Hoover, Roosevelt and
Truman) as well as screwing up the Korean War. Plus additional negative points
for his role in the gassing and suppression of the Bonus Marchers in 1932. You
can't defend a country by undermining it.

It really is extraordinary how the Army has extirpated his memory. The
influence of Marshall, Eisenhower and Bradley lives on, while MacArthur has been
treated as a historical dead end. Kind of amazing, considering he was a general
for 26 years, was the Army chief of staff, received the Medal of Honor, fought
in three wars and was a senior commander in two.

army.mil

The end of Sgt. Bagosy, USMC

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on September 17, 2010.

Oh man. Take a minute to read this widow's
account of watching her Marine sergeant husband fall apart after he came
home from Afghanistan. Two quotations that really struck me: 

"I knew that we had run out
of time."

And, as he contemplated suicide:

"There is no way I can stop you from doing this, is
there?" she said she asked her husband.

"No."

If you know someone who seems suicidal, here is a phone
number:

1-800-273-TALK

(HT to BD)

Military journalism roundup: Recently, Army magazine has surged ahead

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on September 15, 2010.

I am finding Army magazine over the last couple of years much better
than in the past, consistently running relevant, thoughtful articles like the
two I have highlighted in the last couple of days. I think Army has surpassed the Marine Corps
Gazette and is giving Proceedings a run for the money as the most
interesting and relevant of the services' glossy professional magazines.

Meanwhile, speaking of the U.S. Army and publications, whatever happened to
Parameters? And has Military Review just gone stupid? It
apparently is being edited by people who haven't read the last several years of
its own articles -- witness this straw man article written by someone who seems to think that
the COIN campaign in Iraq in 2007-08 didn't have an extremely lethal element.

I frequently am interested by stuff in Joint Force
Quarterly and Prism, but they are too new to have established records,
and JFQ especially seems to have its ups and downs -- witness a goofy,
uninformed article on military dissent in the new issue. (And a
misspelled name, too.) And it has been years since I've read anything really new
in the Naval War College Review or in anything published by the Air
Force, with the exception of a volume of war poems and stories collected by some
faculty members at the Air Force Academy. 

The great photo above came from Army magazine, taken by the
hard-working Dennis Steele. I used to run into him at United Air's international
departure gates at Dulles Airport.

"Hey, Dennis, coming or going?"

"Going."

"Iraq or Afghanistan?"

"Both."

And off he would trudge under his bags of cameras.

Dennis Steele, ARMY magazine

A different perspective on the Iraq war

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on September 2, 2010.

Blake Hall’s powerful memoir of a friend of his in Iraq. Read it.

Best Defense comment of the day: Jim Gourley on spelunking through PTSD

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on July 28, 2010.

This was posted yesterday by Jim Gourley in response to Blake
Hall's guest column. Like Blake's terrific essay, this comment really struck
me as thoughtful. I told my wife about the cave analogy over dinner. 

Of Lepers and Caves

By Jim Gourley

I'm going to say quite a few things that I can't immediately qualify, because
the views build on each other. I wish I could give you a clear line of
reasoning, but if I could then PTSD wouldn't be a problem. So I'm going to do
this the only way I know how -- create the ball of twine and then unravel it.
Bear with me.

I am an expert on PTSD. So is every other Soldier/Sailor/Marine/Airman
(avoiding diatribes against the all-inclusive "warrior" here) who has felt
and/or suffered (because feeling and suffering are distinct from each other)
from PTSD. I know we are all experts because no one else does, or can,
understand the condition without having gone through it. Army psychologists and
counselors who have not felt it or suffered from it only scratch the surface of
the problem.

PTSD is very difficult to deal with for two reasons. One reason is the
misconception that it is a psychological condition. It's not. It's a spiritual
condition. Yes, I know that you cannot anatomically identify the human spirit or
sedate it with valium and that, for all its complexities and mysteries, we find
the brain much easier to "treat", but I'm telling you right now that trying to
understand PTSD under a psychological paradigm is like trying to conduct an ACL
surgery at an auto-body shop. I've met David Grossman, and even he speaks about
it in metaphysical terms on a frequent basis. If you don't believe me, I'll go
dig up the quotes from all the shrinks-in-chief that declare the cause for
spikes in suicides in 2008 and 2009 and 2010 was "due to the weather." I give
all due respect to the shrinks and counselors. They're doing their best. But
with all due respect, their best is nothing but best guesses. Because this isn't
scientific. It's spiritual.

The second reason it's difficult is that, even when we acknowledge the
spiritual nature of this condition, we are woefully inept at dealing with it.
Blake Hall hits on all the things we do wrong -- ridicule, ostracize, and ignore
those with the disease. Treat the guy like a leper.

You want to know why we do that? Because deep down underneath all that
type-A, testosterone-driven, state-of-the-badass-art Spartan warrior bravado
that we exude, we are scared to f---ing death that we'll catch it. PTSD in the
Army is like cooties in a third-grade classroom.

If we want to treat PTSD, we've got to do exactly what Blake did. We've got
to learn how to hug lepers. We've got to get past the condition and see the man
or woman we've always known. We've got to embrace them and hold them tight, tell
them that we're here and we're not leaving them. And we've got to mean it. We
have to be there. At the office, on the steps of their house, on a swollen
riverbank out back of a Chili's on a Saturday night, on the floor of a living
room where there used to be furniture at 2 o'clock in the morning. These people
don't need us 24/7, but when they do, we've got to answer the call. And we've
got to be the kind of leaders and peers that instill enough confidence in them
that they'll pick up the phone and call us.

Hotlines and VA administrations can't help. They weren't there in the s--t
with you when it was all going down. They don't know. They didn't see. And they
don't really care. Yes, I know that many of these people really DO care, but I
only know that now. When you have PTSD, you DON'T know that. You certainly won't
believe it. Let me back up.

Here's what PTSD is like, and why people kill themselves over it. Think of
life like a cave. If I send you into a cave with a lantern and tell you there
are no bears in the cave, you feel safe. You will walk around the cave and enjoy
yourself. Now what if I give you a lantern and a gun and tell you that there is
a bear in there? You can still go down, but you'll be careful to look for the
bear and ready to run or shoot if you see it. Now, what if I send you down there
with a gun but no lantern and simply say "bear" to you? Pretty soon, you're in
there, you can't see the way out, and every rock you bump into feels like a
bear. After a long enough time being down in the cave, you realize you don't
have enough ammo to shoot everything that might be a bear. It has nothing to do
with running out of food or water or feeling like you're fighting some
unwinnable battle with the bear. You just get sick and tired of the uncertainty.
Are you going to live through the night? Are you going to wake up to a bear
gnawing your intestines? You get to the point where you just wish the bear would
come along and end it. And when he doesn't come, you decide to do it yourself.

Suicide isn't a surrender, it's a reassertion of power. These guys' lives
have spun out of control, and the decision over whether they live or die is the
last thing they have the power to determine. Think about it. You ever met a
Soldier that wasn't a "take charge kind of guy?" That's my warning bell. I've
seen lots of "cries for help" where a guy said "life is meaningless." I don't
put much stock in those. But when he says "life is scary"? That's the guy that's
going to do it.

So, back to the moment of choice. You've got that gun on your bed or your car
keys in your hand and a good cliff in mind. What's going to get you out of that?
Some slick-sleeve doc you've never seen before asking you how many times you've
been deployed, or a buddy putting his hand on your shoulder and saying "you
alright, bro? you look like you're hearing bears."

I'm out with a buddy a while back. We're talking about brands of beer. He
hears a car backfire, and suddenly he's scanning ridgelines. He's not here
anymore. He's all the way in Afghanistan, and he takes me halfway back to Iraq
with him. I think about saying something, telling him that he's here, not there.
That I'm with him. That everything is okay. But that would be the wrong thing to
say. A couple of minutes pass as we walk. He keeps scanning, I just stay by him.
After that, we go back to talking about beer. We don't mention anything about
the event.

A couple of days later we're walking along and he says "you know, I really
freaked out the other day." I tell him that I know, and I was right there with
him. That's all that needs to be said. He knows my story. We don't need any
elaborate cathartic rituals or long discussions about it. It's no different than
strapping on armor and walking outside the wire. I trusted him to be able to
take care of himself, and he trusted me to catch him the moment he couldn't.
We're Ranger buddies, not baby-sitters. Giving him dignity and letting him fight
the battle on his own is just as important as helping him get up when he gets
knocked down.

Our best therapists are our brothers and sisters. The medicine is the very
spritual bond of the profession of arms. But you've got to give that medicine in
a heavy, constant dose. I'm talking about full-on morphine drip here. When
you're in the cave with that bear, you're aware that something is wrong with
you. You can't help but feel that. Because of that, you become acutely
suspicious of EVERYONE around you. You begin to hate yourself. You have very
good, rational reasons for hating yourself. You don't understand why everyone
else can't see these reasons and why they don't hate you. Or maybe they do.
Maybe they're secretly drafting personnel action memos to move you somewhere
else. Maybe they're talking behind your back. It seems like the only people who
don't hate you are your wife or kids or parents. Well, it's obvious why. They
weren't out there with you. They didn't see. They're all idiots. You start to
hate them for not understanding you and not hating you. They keep telling you
it's going to be okay and to calm down, and if they say that one more time
you're going to scream and wring their necks because it's just not true because
so help-me-god-i'm-down-inthiscavewiththisbearandit'sgoingtogetmeAAAARGH!!!

"Jim, where's your furniture? Where's your wife? What's going on?"

"I've ruined my life, Sir."

A Lieutenant Colonel sits down on the tile floor of an empty house beside a
sobbing Captain. He's a Brigade XO who's had a long week and only has about a
month before he takes Battalion Command and goes to Iraq. His wife is waiting
outside in the car and his kids are waiting for him at home. But he takes time
for this guy, because he's been down in the cave. He knows this guy is terrified
of bears right now, and the Captain might not make it through the night if he
doesn't show him there's no bear. He doesn't just refrain from ridicule. He
starts telling stories. Stories he'd rather not remember. Stories told in
confidence that probably won't be told many more times in his life, but will
never be forgotten. That Lieutenant Colonel says lots of things, but it all adds
up to one important message.

"There is nothing wrong with you."

He doesn't mean that in a "you ain't hurt, drive on", Patton way. He means it
in a very genuine, spiritual way. There is nothing wrong with that Captain
because EVERYONE feels that way. We are either all lepers or we're all fine.
Either way, there is no reason for that Captain to feel like he's untouchable,
outcast, damaged goods. The Lieutenant Colonel chooses to believe we're all
okay. On this night, he's successful in convincing the Captain that this is
true.

"Is there a gun in the house?"

It's the right question to ask. There isn't one. But the Captain is holding
his car keys in his hand and has a bridge in mind. That the Lieutenant Colonel
cares enough to ask is all it takes to remove the notion.

"I'll see you at work tomorrow. We'll figure this out-- together."

And that's how my long, slow crawl out of the cave began.

That Lieutenant Colonel said all the right things in all the right ways. You
can't train a doc to do that, or write it down in a field manual. You can't
teach it to Cadets at West Point or illustrate it on a power point slide. How do
you get more leaders to be like that Lieutenant Colonel? The answer, sadly, is
that we've got to save as many people going through it as possible, and keep
them in the fight. They're the ones who are innoculated against it. They can
recognize it, acknowledge it, and help others to fight it. They possess a
compassion and empathy no one else can. How do we save the ones currently
dealing with it when we have so few who are innoculated? I don't know, but I
wish to God someone figures it out. In the meantime I keep watch over my buddy
while he watches ridgelines. So much for the extent of my PTSD expertise.

I know how people here feel about Sassaman's memoir, but there was one
passage in it that is worth reading the whole book to see.

"A part of me will always be a broken-hearted 40-year-old Battalion
Commander."

He says that in reference to the death of Captain Eric Paliwoda, an event
that shook him to the core. I suppose it resonates with me because part of me
will always be a broken-hearted 26-year-old Captain. I've learned how to keep
that part of me from causing the great suffering that nearly destroyed my life,
but I still feel it. I feel it every time I see a friend scan ridgelines, or
listen to someone talk about watching another human being bled out and die in
some godforsaken wheat field that no one will ever remember or care about. I
feel it, and by feeling it I'm able to relate. And while we relate to each other
and share the heartbreak, that person is able to breathe easy in the cave,
because there's one thing in there that they can be sure isn't a bear. It's
another leper holding onto them. Life isn't scary, and it's worth living another
day.

Dudes! Misinterpreting DoD's strategic guidance repeats mistakes, ignores emerging trends, and leads to failure

By Janine Davidson

Best Defense officer of strategic corrections

Much has been made about the Defense department's January
2012 Strategic Guidance documents, (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense and Defense Budget Priorities and Choices)
and what they do and do not say about stability operations and
counterinsurgency (COIN). Critics have
misinterpreted DoD's decision not to size the future force for large-scale Iraq
or Afghanistan-like stability operations as a rejection of COIN and stability
operations as a key mission-type the military must be ready to conduct. Given America's preponderance of power, it
is understandable that some may wish to plan for a world in which conventional
war is the only type on offer. But
military leaders who misinterpret the document's language as some sort of
permission to throw out the lessons of the last ten years in order to
organize, train, and equip for the types of conventional conflicts everyone
would prefer to fight would be
abrogating their responsibility to prepare the next generation of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines for the types of fights they will surely
face.

The fact is, whether we call it "COIN," "stability
operations," "peacekeeping," or "irregular warfare," such frustrating, complex,
population-centric, and increasingly urban operations
against and among savvy and networked non-state actors are simply a modern
version of an age-old phenomenon. And
they are here to stay. Contrary to what some might wish to believe, DoD's new
guidance document recognizes this reality and directs the military to sustain
competence and learning in this priority
mission area.

Understanding the Guidance

To be fair to the critics, the language on COIN and
stability operations in the guidance is a bit tortured, reflecting both the
very strong sentiment among military leaders that such messy missions are
something to be avoided or prevented if at all possible, as well as the cold
hard reality that the military does not get to choose the types of wars it will
fight or the enemies it will face.

The language that has people so worried is this:

Conduct
Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations: In the aftermath of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and
military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand
for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces
will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other
stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever
possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will
retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized
capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of
counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized
to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. [Italics original to document]

Critics zero in on the italicized line at the end of the
paragraph referring to sizing the forces and infer the military will be "scaling back" or "shunning"
stability operations. Such
misinterpretation reads the line out of context, equates size with competence,
and fails to appreciate how America raises its army and otherwise organizes,
trains, and equips the force.

First of all, this paragraph is in the key section of the
document, entitled "Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces." So obviously the president and the secretary
of Defense view these as key missions for which the force must be
prepared.

Second, not sizing the force for large-scale operations like
Iraq and Afghanistan is a responsible and prudent strategic approach. As these two huge wars wind down, of course
the force will be down-sized. This is what we do after every war, no matter the
type. It would irresponsible, and in
fact unconstitutional, to do otherwise. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States clearly
indicates the power of the Congress to "raise and support Armies..." but to
"provide and maintain a Navy." This
language is deliberate, as the founders did not want to maintain large
expensive standing ground forces in peacetime. The Congress is empowered to appropriate money to expand the force as
needed to fight wars. And that is
exactly what happened during the past decade. Our force planning can and should account for our ability to do this
again when needed.

For operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the army grew from
just over 480,000 soldiers in 2001 to a peak of 570,000 just a couple of years
ago. Likewise, the marine corp grew from
approximately 170,000 to 210,000.
Following redeployment from these wars, the new strategy calls for
downsizing back to about 490,000 soldiers and 182,000 marines by 2017,
(assuming we manage to disengage in Afghanistan) which is slightly larger than the what President George W.
Bush inherited eleven years ago. And
still, it is nearly four to five times the size of the ground forces of any of
our NATO allies.

Third, let's not confuse size with competency. Not sizing for Iraqs or Afghanistans does
not, and should not, mean forgetting how to conduct such missions -- no matter
the size. Learning from this experience and sustaining competency is exactly
what the guidance calls for the military to do: "U.S. forces will retain and
continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities
that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and
stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan."

But aside from clear strategic guidance to the military to
organize, train, and equip itself with these missions in mind, there is clear
historical precedent and emerging trends to suggest that failing to plan
accordingly for these missions would be folly.

Avoiding mistakes of the past

Throughout its entire 250-year history, coin, stability
operations, and nation building have been far from an "irregular"
occurrence. The U.S. has conducted such
missions -- on a large scale -- about every 25 years since the Mexican War in the
1840's. U.S. ground troops conducted
nation-building, peace-keeping, and a series of counter-guerilla wars against
American Indians on the western frontier throughout the 1800's. They conducted a bloody counterinsurgency in
the Philippines (1898-1902), a number of "small wars" in the Caribbean
(1930's), and occupation duty after the American Civil War and the two World
Wars. Since the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. has deployed every 18-24 months in response to complex crises of various
size, with the average duration of these endeavors becoming increasingly
protracted.

From the beginning, these missions have been frustrating and
ill-defined, and they have always been controversial. Repeatedly, after each
painful episode, the military has sought to avoid having to do them again by
forgetting its doctrine and failing to plan, leaving the next generation to
re-learn on the fly.

The U.S. army was so fed up with counterinsurgency after its
bloody and protracted experience in the Philippines that it eagerly -- with
the support of the secretary of War -- managed to turn the whole mission set over
to the marines in the early 20th century. While the army focused on "real" war, the marines were sent to the Caribbean for the "Banana Wars," where they had to
re-learn all the hard-learned lessons from old U.S. army manuals that were
being discarded. The marine corps did allow a small team of officers to capture
this Caribbean experience in the 1940 Small
Wars Manual; but the mainstream corps had little appetite for these
missions and was already trying to reinvent itself as specialists in amphibious
operations. Once WW II began, the marines discarded its doctrine, training, and education for small wars in order
to focus intensely on amphibious operations. This left the Vietnam generation to re-invent
relevant doctrine once again.

Although the U.S. military was just as ill-prepared for its
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan as it was for Vietnam, the current
generation was arguably better able to adapt due to the lessons-learned
processes and organizational culture that had evolved in the decades since
Vietnam. Still, adaptation is not the same as
organizational learning, and the aversion to these missions is a powerful
force. Military leaders might be tempted
to assume (or hope) that the past will not be prologue this time around; but
that would be a mistake, again.

The Future Fight and the Force We Need

Today we face a global environment characterized by
transnational criminals, terrorists, insurgents, and myriad illicit and violent
bandits and traffickers. Some of these "bad guys" are aligned with nation
states, but most operate in the gray space between what we consider crime and
war. Importantly, our future enemies
have been paying attention to our struggles against low-tech, high-impact
fighters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and have been sharing their own
"lessons learned" across global social networks. One lesson is clear: Go asymmetric and
"irregular" against the U.S. military, because taking it on head to head
conventionally would be just plain stupid. Tactics such as remotely detonated road-side bombs and suicide bombers
are only the beginning, given the potential proliferation of new and
increasingly less expensive unmanned vehicles, cyber technology, nuclear
materials, and the enhanced ability to mobilize populations via social
media. Demographic trends such as
urbanization, the youth bulge, resource scarcity, and radicalization ensure that
future conflicts requiring ground forces will occur in cities and slums and
among populations, where differentiating friend from foe, and victim from
"combatant," much less just trying to navigate through the crowded urban
"battle space" will continue to plague traditionally-minded and conventionally
trained ground forces.

Fortunately, preparing for these likely future missions is
more about thinking, learning and organizing than about major high-dollar
weapons systems. Yes, we should
continue to invest in unmanned vehicles, Strykers, MRAPs, and other types of
hardware that have proven valuable in these environments. But, just as important is the need to sustain
education and training to ensure future military leaders are well versed in the
latest doctrine on COIN, stability operations, peacekeeping, and mass atrocity
response. Military institutions must
continue to study and revise their doctrine in order to ensure that
capabilities and innovations that enable ground forces to operate in urban
environments among civilian populations and against "irregular" forces are
retained. The Marine Corps' Lioness
program, which places small, specially trained units of women marines among the
population reflects the need to work among diverse populations, while
respecting cultural customs regarding women. Likewise, the army's regional alignment of its force structure will
enhance its ability to engage with real people on the ground when the time comes.
The military should continue to develop special operations and civil affairs
capabilities as key components for security force assistance, conflict
prevention, and crisis response. Army
modularity, which allows ground units to be scaled and tailored for various
operations should continue to be developed, and competencies in foreign
languages, interagency coordination, and human intelligence collection and
analysis should be sustained and enhanced. Nothing in the recent guidance instructs or encourages the services to
stop developing these key capabilities or otherwise abandon them. In fact it instructs the military to
institutionalize these innovations.

Back to the Question
of Size

So how then, do we size this new more enlightened and
capable force to ensure success in future coin or stability operations
missions? With 490,000 soldiers and
182,000 marines on active duty, plus the forces in the selected ready reserve
(560,000 in the army and 39,000 in the marine corps), America's ground forces
will arguably be large enough for stability operations of significant size even
without needing to add to the force once a crisis hits. Still, there is no crystal ball to predict
the exact scenario our military might face. Moreover, despite much debate, there is still no consensus over the
question of how many ground troops are required to bring stability to a country
of a given population. Clearly neither
sizing the peacetime force for the largest imaginable stability operation, nor
down-sizing and hoping we won't face another large-scale mission of this sort,
is no way to plan. Because we have the
demonstrated ability to grow the force and adapt once a war begins, the trick
is to find the right size that allows us to conduct smaller and medium scale
operations and to initiate an operation while scaling up for something larger
if and when needed.

The Budget Priorities document makes this approach pretty
clear:

While the U.S. does
not anticipate engaging in prolonged, large-scale stability operations requiring
a large rotation force in the near-to mid-term, we cannot rule out the
possibility. If such a campaign were to occur, we would respond by mobilizing
the Reserve Component and, overtime, regenerating Active Component end
strength. Additionally, even as troop strength draws down, the Army, Marine
Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command will preserve expertise in security
force assistance and counterinsurgency training.

But to do this, we need to be confident that we can access
the capable and ready forces we need, when we need them. Being able to grow the force for large-scale
missions if required means having a reserve component that is ready for
mobilization and an active duty-training cadre that can deliver the expertise
on demand. The DoD's plan to, "...
leverage the operational experience and institute a progressive readiness model
in the National Guard and Reserves in order to sustain increased readiness
prior to mobilization," is aiming in the right direction. On the active duty side, the army and marine corps are both planning to retain a greater percentage of mid-grade NCO's and
officers even as they downsize, reflecting their understanding that a slightly
more senior force is not only required in the conduct of these complex missions,
but is also the seed corn needed to train and grow a force if required.

Far from rejecting stab ops and coin or throwing out the
lessons of the past ten years, the secretary's new strategic guidance and
budget priorities clearly reflect the understanding that these missions are not
likely to be avoided. Together, the documents present clear direction to the
uniformed military not to repeat the mistakes of the past by planning for only
the fights some might prefer to face. Such willful misinterpretation of the secretary's guidance would only be
planning to fail.

Janine Davidson  is assistant professor at George Mason University's Graduate
School of Pubic Policy. From 2009-2012, she served as the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Plans, where she oversaw the development of guidance
for military campaign and contingency plans and the review and assessment of
plans. Before all that she was a pilot in the air force.

Rebecca's War Dog of the Week: Summer Postcard Series: Butch, a father's best bud

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

I came across this wonderful photo of Butch and war-dog
tribute in his honor on United States War Dog Association's Facebook page this
week. I got in touch with the owner of the photograph, Tonja Dubois, and not
only did she graciously give permission to share the image here (a photograph
her father carried in his wallet until the day he died), but offered more of
the story.

"According to my dad, Butch, a French Bulldog, was the unit mascot
(sadly, I don't know the unit's identification information) and he was with the
Air Force from the time he was a puppy. The whole unit took part in raising
him.

Butch was a true companion to my dad and, according to Dad, 'one smart fellow.'
He would accompany the men to the garage and "work" with the crew,
fetching tools for the mechanics. He
was a beloved dog among all the men but was clearly attached to my dad. They
were tremendous friends and my dad doted on him with playtime, tricks, belly
rubs, and walks.

Butch had such an impact on my father, that Dad developed a love for dogs that
I have seen unmatched in other people. He didn't care what kind of dog it was;
he loved it unconditionally.

From the way my father spoke of Butch, he was probably the first real
confidante he had. He was also Dad's first dog. No other compared to him. Butch
reigned supreme in my dad's heart until his death in February 2010."

Tonja writes that he father was allowed to adopt Butch
when he left the military -- the Air Force relented after much begging. Butch
lived at home with his favorite Airman until his death that, in a remarkable if
not sad coincidence, came to pass on the very day Tonja was born in 1965.

Rebecca
Frankel, on leave from her FP desk, is currently
writing a book about military working dogs, to be published by Free Press.

Wanat: the families respond (III)

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on July 13, 2010.

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These people are serious. They are feeling let down by the army.
Here is a note from another bereaved parent:

I'm the Father of Pruitt Rainey. I gave my testimony and my son's last
e-mails to me to Gen Natonski in Norfolk VA at the Naval base. They tell it all.
What was going on and what was predicted at Wanat. I sat at Ft McPherson and
listened and recorded what both generals had to say. General Campbell and the
DOD and especially Gen. Petraeus really let my son down. The briefing was
supposed to hopefully bring us some closure. It was supposed to be about integrity. It was supposed to be about the honor of our sons. It was supposed to
be about the last respects we all pay to the ultimate  sacrifice our sons gave
to our country.  

It turned out to be a complete whitewash and a smokescreen for the army. I am
ashamed my son was even in the army. I feel so disrespected.



I watched
General Campbell smile and even laugh during his briefing especially when we
were asking him questions. One question I asked him was, did he speak with any
other person or soldier that was at Wanat? He answered, "I read some of their
statements." I asked him a second time: Did you speak with any of the other 48
witnesses that were at Wanat? He again smirked and said, "I read some of their
statements." 

I came out of my chair and lost it. I held up a picture, 8x10. I demanded he
look at my son's picture and tell him you made the correct decision today. He
walked up to me, looked, smirked, not one word, and walked away smiling again.
What else can I say...

Secretary Gates and our president need to step up and do the right thing.
Honor our sons, Honor all the sacrifices these soldiers gave to the freedom we
have."

Frankie Gay

You already banned Powerpoint? Great, next you might eliminate written orders

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns.
This originally ran on July 8, 2010.

I was reading a 1986 paper from the School of Advanced Military Studies about
generalship and was interested by this quotation from Hermann Balck, a senior German general of World War II:

Even my largest and most important operations orders were verbal [oral].
After all there wasn't any need for written orders. As division commander, I
forbade the use of written orders within my division."