Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 104

David Fromkin makes me think about the British mishandling the rise of Germany and what that means for our China policy

One
of the great things about writing this blog is the reading suggestions made to
me by readers. About a year ago, one of youse suggested David Fromkin's Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?. I finally got around
to it and am really enjoying it.

For
some time, the unspoken text of some in the West on China has been to avoid
making some of the mistakes the British and French made in the late 19th
century as Germany became Europe's leading economic power. In this view, the
argument is that the British (primarily) stymied Germany instead of bringing it
to the table where great power decisions were made.

But
in reading this book, I began to wonder if we have been looking through the
wrong end of the telescope. Fromkin, who also wrote the terrific A Peace to End All Peace, argues that Germany
brought about its own fate: "the hostile encirclement that Germany so much
feared was achieved by Germany itself." German leaders moved toward war in the
belief that it was inevitable, and that not only brought it on, they did so in
the belief that "Germany ought to launch a war as soon as possible precisely
because the chances of winning it would be less every year."

To
apply his observation to China: What, if by its own over-reaching, and through
its cultural contempt for all things not Chinese, it is likely to provoke a
reaction to its growing economic and military power? If that is a plausible
possibility, it has huge implications for Western policy. Among other things,
we'd need to consider whether the best policy is to give them enough rope.

A
second thought: At the time it started World War I, Germany was the leading
country in the world in technology, basic science, and perhaps in music. German
often was the language of scholarly discourse. None of that applies to today's
China. Yet another observation by Fromkin does evoke China a bit: "An advanced
country inside a backward governmental structure, broadly humanist yet narrowly
militarist, Germany was a land of paradoxes."

Why the Naval Academy will continue to have problems with its football team

By Robert Goldich

Best Defense department
of third rail issues

Gee, what a surprise -- Naval Academy football players doing something bad. This is not the Navy per se at all. It is the result of
a perfect storm of rotten policies, all directed at making the Academy football
team able to compete in Division I and win games generally. I wrote about this
in a lengthy CRS report I did in 1997 on the service academies, but there are
no indications that things have changed at all, except possibly to get worse.
These policies, and a geographical factor, include: 

Turning
the Naval Academy Preparatory School into an institution designed to enable
academically weak athletes to scrape by at the Academy, a terrible turn from
the original intent of the institution (all three academies have them), which
was to give a leg up for deserving enlisted personnel who obtain an Academy
appointment. This really stinks. 




Using
football as a method for recruiting African-American midshipmen, all too many
of whom have both academic and behavioral problems that would keep anybody but
football players (regardless of race) out of the Academy, but are accepted into
the Academy because of a culture that says the athlete can do no wrong. There
is a really repulsive racist aura, that of the bigoted stereotype of physically
strong but mentally weak black men, operating here. Furthermore, it discredits
affirmative action to recruit minority midshipmen based on their potential to
be good officers, not primarily good football players




Whole
battalions of retired admirals and captains floating around Annapolis and the
whole DC metro area who exert enormous pressure on the Academy to excel in
football in the all too typical rah rah culture of alumni from schools where
football is a metastatic part of the culture (think Penn State).




One
factor for which neither the Navy nor the players can be blamed, and which
extends far beyond the football business: the geographical placement of the
Naval Academy right in the middle of a fairly large town which is a party place
and beach/sailing resort, creating many more opportunities for off-base
partying and lots of alcohol consumption. The contrast with West Point and the
Air Force Academy, both of which are much more geographically isolated and
distant from anyplace with fleshpots, is obvious.




Letting
football players have all kinds of special privileges at the Academy, which
creates in the minds of many a sense that they are untouchable. This includes
time off from various onerous duties that other midshipmen must perform and
pressure on professors to let the slide by with low grades.

The absence of one or two of these would probably
tamp down these offenses, but there are so many negatives that it's hard to
avoid incidents of this nature.

Robert L. Goldich  retired from the Congressional Research Service in 2005
as its  senior military manpower analyst.   Currently he is consulting and drafting a book on the history
of conscription.

We still have troops in Kosovo? We do?

I read the Early Bird every day. I read the
defense coverage in a bunch of newspapers and blogs. But I confess I did not
know we still have troops based in Kosovo until I read this
short item this morning in the Fayetteville Observer.

Commanding a unit there must be a real
challenge. So today, I am sending out a Best Defense salute to those who serve
there -- and help keep the place quiet. Well done, apparently.

Hey, Tom, the punishments of the West Point rugby players are in fact appropriate

By
Jim Gourley

Best
Defense all-star guest columnist team

This week's
revelations of improprieties committed by the
West Point Rugby team catalyzed diverse and heated arguments.
Passions reached their apex when propelled by references to how harshly the
cadets were punished and the transparency of the institution's administration
of justice.

Tom himself was
challenged on the dual proposition that the cadets should have lost the
privilege of graduating on time with their classmates and that not conferring
this punishment indicated that West Point is somehow failing in the character-development
component of its mission. In his words, there is perhaps a mentality of
"boys will be boys" rather than "We turn boys into men, and
insist that they be gentlemen." The most fundamental and vital principles
of the discussion were subsequently lost in the
hail of slings and arrows -- specifically, the development of
character in a group of young men who are now serving as front-line leaders in
an Army that is still very much at war.

The official West Point statement
on the matter is as innocuous in its characterization of the offenses as it is
sterile in its description of the punishment. On the surface, it's fodder for
both conspiracy theorists and detractors of the service academies. But we too
easily forget that official statements are supposed to be no more than a
surface treatment. As people who have lived the service academy experience
know, still waters run deep. Those depths conceal a current of shame that runs
through the character development and disciplinary systems. By this I do not
mean that the service academies hide something that they feel ashamed of,
rather that shame itself is a force so potent and entrenched in the system that
it may well qualify as the greatest unspoken tradition of these institutions.
There is no greater exhibit of this than the iconic punishment of "walking
tours," forcing cadets to march in dress uniform with their rifles in
public.

What most people
outside of the academies don't realize is that, for every case in which a cadet
or midshipman is discovered to have broken with the institution's principles,
there are several more in which no wrongdoing is found. Some investigations
even find fault with the accusers for making specious allegations.
"Revenge accusations" and witch hunts are not common occurrences, but
they are not uncommon, either. The standards of conduct and the threshold of
suspicion are so sensitive that one need not hold a civil engineering degree to
make a mountain out of a molehill. Investigations are therefore necessarily
thorough and extremely uncomfortable processes. Compounding matters is that the
guarantees of confidentiality in these schools are constructed of wicker. To
paraphrase Churchill, rumors are able to get from the barracks to the chow hall
before the truth can put its dress greys on. In institutions where the
scripture of character is written in such absolutist verse, the court of public
opinion can be less forgiving than a firing squad. For a first classman
preparing to graduate, it ruins what ought to be a rare celebratory period in a
cadet's life. Much care is and absolutely should be taken in these
investigations as a measure of damage control, because damage is an unavoidable
consequence of the process.

Though not clearly
present, these intangibles nevertheless represent a genuine danger to the
mission of character development. The sense of dread that your graduation is
threatened, the public humiliation of being investigated, the awkward phone
call home to your parents warning them of the situation and their consequent
disappointment and worry contribute to an overwhelming sense of shame. It
becomes a dynamic unto itself in these cases, and consequently must be
considered as carefully as the existential circumstances by those in authority.
Much has been written about the principle of shame in military culture, but of
recent notoriety and also exceptionally relevant to this discussion are Steven
Pressfield and Nancy Sherman. They take dynamically opposing views of shame.
Pressfield is a zealous advocate of shame's utility in successful military
units as "the shadow version of honor."
He believes it is the stick of a loss of face to be used when the carrot of
esteem fails. Sherman also sees a relationship between the two, but
characterizes shame more as honor seen through a glass darkly.
The polarity of their views highlights the unifying idea of crucial relevance.
Whether you believe shame is a force for good or ill, its power cannot be taken
for granted. It is a punishment unto itself, and can lead to other forms of self-castigation.

This leads to a more
constructive view of the punishment as described in the context of character
development. The postponement of graduation was suggested without an
explanation of what end it would serve. A punishment should necessarily be
instructive and inform better future behavior. According to the press release,
the guilty parties received thorough attention. Like "hell," an
"intense respect rehabilitation program, involving self-assessments,
reflective journals, and role-model interviews, supervised by a mentor" is
just a phrase. The reality is much worse. To be sure, no weekends were spent
outside the cadet area in the making of these boys into men. Adding a delayed
graduation on top of that is excessive, and ensures the wound inflicted by
shame never heals properly. It makes for bitter graduates. In effect, you punish
their receiving units more than them.

The effect of shame
undoubtedly went even further. The impression made upon them by their officer
leaders and how they handled the punishment will be indelible. That may be the
most important lesson they learn out of all of this, because they will
assuredly face the burden of administering punishment to future subordinates
who commit grave offenses. How will they balance punishing the act and
improving the person, and how will they negotiate these dilemmas in environments
where reputation is as vital as body armor and shame mows down formations as
easily as a mortar round? That should be the greatest measure of the
institution's success or failure in "making men out of boys," for
what other purpose is there in making them into men if not to maintain good
order and discipline in a fighting force through a considerate application of
justice? For those who were admonished, this was a profound -- indeed, the
penultimate -- moment in their character development. It was the last influence
West Point had on how they were shaped into leaders. How they were shaped into
men will greatly inform the methods by which they go about shaping the boys
(and girls) given to them: America's sons and daughters.

Jim
Gourley is a 2002 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy . He now
works as a journalist and writer. His first book is due out in July.

Maybe the problem at West Point is commanders coming from all-male units?

Anonymous

Best
Defense guest columnist

Some food for thought as questions about the Rugby team continue to surface...

Interesting to note that BG Rich Clark, 74th commandant of
cadets, West Point, has served and led almost exclusively in Ranger and infantry
units -- all male units. While this is not unusual for comm's at this
particular time, it is concerning given USMA is a mixed gender officer training
program.

The 75th Ranger Regiment is a lethal,
agile and flexible force, capable of conducting many complex, joint special
operations missions. Today's Ranger Regiment is the Army's premier
direct-action raid force. Each of the four geographically dispersed Ranger
battalions is always combat ready, mentally and physically tough, and prepared
to fight our country's adversaries.

The Rangers are somewhat of a self-selecting group. While
physically and mentally tough, if there is a problem with a soldier in a unit,
they typically get rid of the soldier. They are not about leadership and
character development, but developing physical and mental strength and
endurance.

Celebrated and extolled are his credentials...

Rich is a warrior-leader with
rock-solid credentials for competence and with a heart for Soldiers,"
Huntoon said. "He will excel as the commandant for cadets."

Is there a correlation between Rugby and Rangers?

Heard the faculty strongly opposed the comm's decision and
punishment saying it undermines the entire respect mentorship program. And how
were the rugby players' mentors selected? They volunteered as a query was sent
out.

Going for a trail run as I need some fresh air.

Accountability watch: Gen. Gurganus is being investigated, with third star on hold

Interesting news for
all those Marines who were perplexed by the lack of fallout from last year's attack on Camp
Leatherneck: The inquisitive Rajiv Chandrasekaran reports that Maj. Gen. Gurganus is under
investigation
(begun in mid-May) and that his promotion to three stars is "on hold."

Rebecca's War Dog of the Week: Paulo in the streets of Paris, circa 1920

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense Chief
Canine Correspondent

Over the holiday weekend I saw this image posted on a
Facebook page
that features a wonderful selection of eclectic and charming images from a
worldwide archive of photos past. And though it's a little late, this photo
taken in 1920 seemed a fitting Memorial Day tribute. The provided caption (somewhat
bluntly mistranslated from the French) gets the basic information across. The
man identified as Andrivet had lost the use of his legs and the dog, who
appears to be pulling him along a Paris street, is called Paulo. But what caused Andrivet's injuries or
what bonded this pair is not explained, though given the date, one could make a
decent guess.

After a little digging, I found another photo of Andrivet
and Paulo (likely taken the same day even) in a collection
of old Popular Science magazines. While
the details are still scant, the small clip dated May 1920 reports that during
battle in Argonne both Andrivet and Paulo were wounded. The dog would make a
full recovery but his master would not. And because he could no longer get
around on his own, Paulo would pull Andrivet in this three-wheeled cart while
the WWI veteran steered.

"Paulo," the article notes, "is an
excellent motor, and he never stalls."

Also this week we remember, among others, Keaton
Coffey, Sean Brazas, Michael Brodsky, and Joshua
Ashley.

Rebecca Frankel is away from her
FP desk, working on a book about
dogs and war.

 

We need to understand what we mean when we talk about command climate

By Andrew Bell and Kurt Sanger

Best Defense office of command climate
change

The commandant
of the Marine Corps recently issued a letter to all Marines regarding command
climate. He wrote, "There is a disturbingly frequent correlation between
Marines who act poorly and units with poor climates." The correlation has been
identified in many of the high profile, negative incidents involving the
military over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as those
involving sexual assault. It is also often present in underperforming units. The
focus the commandant has placed on the issue will hopefully diminish all types
of incidents.

A major
obstacle presents itself in this area, however. As often as leadership raises
command climate, the concept is poorly defined and its meaning is not uniform
throughout the military. It is discussed in many publications, but there is no
doctrinal definition. There is a different answer to what command climate is
for virtually every servicemember.

Even were
there a common understanding, there are no DOD-wide metrics through which unit
performance and climate are correlated. In an informal survey of service
academies and professional military schools conducted last summer, we found
that there are no separate courses on developing command climate. If it is
addressed academically, it is done in the context of leadership studies.

Command
climate is not exclusively a product of leadership, and the two concepts must
be examined independently to be properly understood. Focusing on leadership
ignores group dynamics, the influence of non-leaders and non-traditional
leaders, and the development of "sub-climates" in small units. What
is acceptable in a platoon could differ from what is acceptable in a squad or
fire team; those differences are shaped by more than unit leaders.

This is not
to diminish the role of the leader in creating a command climate. He or she
will have more influence than anyone. However, an organization that expects its
climate to be controlled by its leader without accounting for other variables
does not fully understand climate, especially when the organization has leaders
who frequently change duty stations, or may get injured or killed. A leader has
failed when the unit cannot thrive in his or her absence.

Every
organization has a climate, whether it is an infantry platoon, a high school
baseball team, or a kindergarten class. The climate helps define what behavior
and actions will and will not be acceptable to the members of the organization.
In the armed forces, it is generally accepted that a healthy command climate is
necessary for an effective and efficient unit. A good one can be a cost-free
force multiplier; a poor one can cause servicemembers to make catastrophic
decisions. For this reason alone, command climate requires careful study and
attention by the military.

To emphasize
the importance of command climate and its hidden impacts, research of the
military's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that healthy command
climates mitigate the effects of post-traumatic stress and improve resiliency.
While the links between climate and effectiveness seem obvious, the connection
between climate, PTS, and resiliency demonstrates that climate has second order
effects. This should elevate the urgency with which command climate is examined
so that it can be designed deliberately instead of allowing it to grow of its
own accord.

Command
climate is a vital element for individual, unit, and organizational
effectiveness and well-being. It is a subject that deserves examination by
security theorists and practitioners. As we continue to advance the concept of
command climate development as a separate field of study, we hope to be joined
by the service academies and professional military schools in this worthy
effort.

Andrew Bell is a Ph.D. candidate in
political science at Duke University and a predoctoral research fellow at the
Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University. He
has served as an active duty Air Force officer and is a major in the Air Force
Reserve.

Kurt Sanger is a major and judge advocate
in the U.S. Marine Corps, and is an incoming National Security Law LL.M.
candidate at Georgetown University. The views expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or
any other organization .

Cage match in a cornfield: G. Gentile wrestles J. Nagl on counterinsurgency

By A. A. Cohen

Best Defense intellectual
pugilistics correspondent

Warrior-profs Gian Gentile and
John Nagl,
the two best-known heavyweight contenders in the national security debate
surrounding irregular warfare, squared off a few weeks ago at Grinnell College
in the wilds of Iowa on the merits of counterinsurgency and the future of
Afghanistan.

The moderated 60-minute debate was
kicked off with a three-word question: "Is COIN dead?"

In this corner, Gentile,
who has for years passionately opposed the very notion that counterinsurgency
worked in Iraq (the "Surge," along with Petraeusism, seem to be his two pet
peeves), let alone in Afghanistan, fired at his rival from the position: "The
idea that nation-building can be achieved at a reasonable cost of blood and
treasure is dead." Translation: COIN is not feasible for America -- ergo, COIN
is dead.

Gentile
propped up his argument by attacking what he describes as the "COIN narrative"
of the past decade, about which many "gripping tales" have been written, but
without any of these amounting to true, objective, "good history."
Gentile
charged that there was no significant change in generalship or
strategy between George Casey and David Petraeus in Iraq, and that the level of
violence there was bound to drop when it did, regardless of the change of
command and of the deployment of some 30,000 additional troops. Nagl parried by
citing RAND and other research that concludes the contrary. Recall as well that
General Casey was intent on drawing down U.S. forces, not surging them as
Petraeus sought to do in order to establish a semblance of order and security
prior to withdrawing from Iraq.

Nagl's
first response to the moderator's question was an expected zinger: Counter-insurgency cannot be dead for as
long as insurgency is alive and well. Obvious perhaps, but this full-body
slam was a good reminder that shedding the capability would not make future
needs for it disappear. Alas, what I wish he had mentioned, too, was that in
this debate again, military doctrine was being deliberately confounded with
matters of foreign policy. The United States has not conducted a nuclear
(atomic) strike since Nagasaki, and the intention to strike again in such a
fashion is absent, but the United States continues to maintain a nuclear
capability and doctrine.

Gentile scored his few real points, I believe, on the
issue that counterinsurgency operations on their own do not yield lasting
strategic results. True, but those operations constitute an important piece of
the puzzle. It is the role of statecraft to bring about stabilizing watersheds.
And what Gentile may wish to acknowledge is that counterinsurgency operations,
costly as they may be, will often be required to afford the time, the space,
and the conditions that are needed to enable statecraft to run its course.

While Gentile and Nagl
disagreed on many points of evidence, ultimately, their conclusions did not
appear to be altogether different. Both contenders agreed that the invasion of
Iraq was a strategic error, and that the price of a fully resourced
counterinsurgency campaign will rarely (Gentile: will never) justify the unsatisfying prize. Nagl takes the match on
style and substance... and of course, because he cited Galula.

Gentile's obsession with naysaying is certainly
understandable; we can all relate to his fear that should the counterinsurgency
campaign in Iraq go down in history as a victory, it will be tempting for our
elected leaders and their advisors to wish to repeat similar adventures again.
But the point is moot; history indicates that engaging in counterinsurgency
warfare is seldom a predetermined choice.

(Watch the
debate.)

A.A.
Cohen served in Afghanistan. He is a senior infantry officer in the Canadian
Army and the author of Galula: The Life and
Writings of the French Officer who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency.

What West Point says about why the rugby team was temporarily disbanded

Here, in its entirety, is the statement
sent to me this morning.

The following captures the actions
taken by United States Military Academy (USMA) Leadership from point of
notification of a derogatory email chain generated on the Men's Cadet Rugby
Team through the adjudication of punishment under the Cadet Disciplinary Code:

In April 2013, United States Military
Academy (USMA) Leadership was made aware of an inappropriate email chain
internally circulated within the Cadet Rugby Team. USMA Leadership immediately
appointed an Investigating Officer (IO) with orders to investigate pursuant to
Army Regulation 15-6 an email chain, the culture of the Men's Cadet Rugby Team,
any actions or behaviors that would suggest a hostile team environment or
culture of disrespect towards women, or any other potentially inappropriate
conduct/culture.

The IO completed the investigation in
May 2013. Cadets on the team were found to have violated the Cadet Disciplinary
Code for Unsatisfactory Behavior, Error in Judgment, Failure to Perform a Duty,
and a violation of the General Article for actions which tend to reflect
discredit on the Corps of Cadets and the United States Army. Maximum allowable
punishment under the Cadet Disciplinary Code was administered. Further actions
taken included temporary disbandment of the Men's Cadet Rugby Team. The
investigation did not find any evidence of sexual assault and there was no
evidence or indication of inappropriate pictures of female cadets. All Cadets
were required to complete an intense respect rehabilitation program, involving
self-assessments, reflective journals, and role-model interviews, supervised by
a mentor. Having completed the prescribed punishment Class of 2013, Cadets
graduated.

An extensive legal review was
conducted and found no legal objection to the investigation. The intent of this
program was not only to punish the offenders, but to address the cultural
issues with their actions and the incompatibility of these actions to the Army
Values. 

I called Lt. Webster Wright, the
chief spokesman for West Point, with some follow-up questions. He said that the
brunt of punishment landed on the 14 members of the team who were about to
graduate. They all graduated and are now commissioned officers of the U.S.
Army. I asked why their commissionings weren't delayed by three months, which
has been done in the past, and he said that was considered but rejected. This
makes me wonder if the message sent was "boys will be boys," rather than, "We
turn boys into men, and insist that they be gentlemen."

The disbandment of the team is
of uncertain duration. The investigation into "the atmosphere of the team"
continues, and it is possible that the team won't be allowed to play next
season, Lt. Col. Wright said: "We'll have to see how they do in the remedial
training,"

I also hear through the
grapevine that West Point received a query about this situation from the White
House on Friday, and responded yesterday (Tuesday) morning.